Analysis
Going in All Directions
Summary: While simultaneously
reacting to the conflict between Israel
and Hamas and conducting another
wave of arrests in the Ergenekon
case, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s
prime minister, suddenly appointed
Egemen Bağış as Turkey’s chief
EU negotiator. Time will tell if this
indicates a rekindling of the EU acces-
sion process after nearly three years
of lethargy and growing political and
public disinterest.
In the meantime, the Prime Minister’s
tolerance for dissent and freedom of
the press is wearing thin and authoritar-
ian tendencies are rising. The Turkish
government has also, however, recently
launched a Kurdish channel on state
television. In short, with or without
the EU process, pressures from
society for widened rights and free-
doms ultimately do get a response.
The discipline of the EU process, how-
ever, is needed for Turkey to avoid the
pitfalls of illiberal populism and move
toward a consolidated democracy.
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by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — In Turkey, the Israeli
military assault against Hamas in Gaza
has engendered quite an uproar. Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime min-
ister, has taken the lead in expressing
moral and political outrage against
Israeli military action and the human
cost of the operation. Media coverage
went a long way to keep the tempera-
ture high, and societal response was
extremely negative and full of angst.
As Erdoğan’s envoy was joining French
President Nicolas Sarkozy in Syria,
news broke out of a new round of
arrests (the tenth) in the long-running
Ergenekon case. To recap: The case is a
judicial proceeding looking into illicit
organizations and how they allegedly
conspired to overthrow the govern-
ment of Turkey. So far, only the de-
tainees from the first waves of arrests
are being tried in court. Two high-
ranking generals have also been taken
into custody, though indictments
against them, have yet to be formally
prepared and made public.
This new arrest wave has seen the ar-
rest of four serving colonels, three re-
tired generals, the former head of the
Higher Education Council, an eccen-
tric academic, and the former deputy
chief of Special Operations. Docu-
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Sabah. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
ments found inside the home of the
chief of Special Operations led police
to an arms cache buried in the woods.
One other prominent figure, former
Istanbul Mayor Bedrettin Dalan, who
was also on the arrest list, remains in
Miami though he promises to return
to Turkey soon. Following this latest
wave of arrests (some of those arrested
were released within a couple of days),
the military’s high brass met for over
six hours. The next day, the chief of
staff had an unscheduled meeting with
the Prime Minister and then his sched-
uled meeting with the President. Later,
Erdoğan declared that a few individu-
als could not harm the reputation or
the integrity of an institution, clearly
alluding to the military. It is widely as-
sumed that the recent release of some
retired generals is a consequence of
these meetings. On Monday, the police
arrested a lieutenant colonel, where
documents that were found in his
home led to the discovery of addition-
al massive arms caches and ammuni-
tion buried under the ground.
In the middle of this hectic time, even
by Turkish standards, Erdoğan abrupt-
ly changed Turkey’s chief negotiator
of EU accession talks. Egemen Bağış,
the vice-chairman in charge of for-
eign affairs of the ruling Justice and
Analysis
Development Party (AKP) and a close advisor of Erdoğan,
was appointed minister of state in charge of EU relations,
replacing foreign minister Ali Babacan who had doubled
as chief negotiator. Babacan is known to be very close to
President Abdullah Gül who, in turn, sees himself as the
true custodian of the EU accession project.
The move was not totally unexpected even if its timing was.
Those who still continued to care about the EU accession
process (their numbers are steadily declining), long thought
that Babacan ought to have either found a strong deputy or
dropped the post, given his overwhelming schedule as for-
eign minister. But coming at a time when nobody expected
the government to seriously engage on EU accession until
after the municipal elections, if even then, the news of the
personnel change made waves.
As a recent ICG report on Turkey-EU relations noted:
“[Turkey’s] prospects for EU membership are at make or
break stage.” The report detailed how both sides showed
by their actions and inactions that they were happy to let
relations remain in a coma. Neither side dared break off
relations outright, but the report argued that given the
urgency of the Cyprus issue, such lack of firm commitment
on both sides risked just that. (In 2006, the European Union
gave Turkey three years to open sea ports and airports to
Greek Cypriot vessels. In the fall of 2009, the EU Commis-
sion is scheduled to review the situation, at which time it
will make a recommendation on what to do with Turkey, if
Ankara does not comply with the EU’s requirements.)
Indeed, the AKP government long ago dropped the ball on
EU-related reform, evidenced by the fact that only one-sixth
of the reform measures identified in its National Program
were enacted over the past two years. Erdoğan, who is con-
vinced that Turkey will never get a fair shake with Sarkozy
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in positions of
power, has barely uttered a positive word about the Europe-
an Union in recent times. He is reported to have “initiated a
revolt against the heavy legislative load [of the new National
Program] when it was first presented by Foreign Minister
Babacan.”
Over the course of the last year, the Prime Minister’s
authoritarian instincts and intolerance for even the mild-
est of criticism by outsiders or dissent in his ranks also
2
became painfully obvious. Erdoğan called for a boycott of
the Doğan Media group newspapers, refused office accredi-
tation to journalists he deemed too critical, and even asked
for the closure of a local newspaper because he was unhap-
py with the validity of a news piece. In this latter incident,
the editor stood by the reporting and his boss did not close
the newspaper. In the wake of the favorable Constitutional
Court verdict on the closure case against the AKP, Erdoğan
has taken a hardline position and sided with the military on
occasion concerning the fight against the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK) and the democratic reforms related to the
Kurdish population. He has also attacked newspapers whose
reporting he has found disconcerting. Under these circum-
stances of rising illiberalism, it was no wonder that the EU
process and the democratizing measures it entailed went by
the way side. In the run-up to municipal elections, nobody
truly expected the AKP to rekindle the flame of the 2002-
2004 period, particularly in the absence of any pressure
toward EU accession from the opposition.
Yet on the last day of 2008, President Gül signed into law
the new National Program that committed the government
to the continuation of the EU reform process. Then came the
replacement of Babacan by Bağış, that in this context might
hold the promise of revitalizing the EU accession process,
pending the outcome of the upcoming elections.
It is in this context that recent developments in Turkey
ought to be interpreted. Somewhat revolutionary develop-
ments are taking place in Turkey, while their true signifi-
cance is hardly noticed. The scene is somewhat bizarre be-
cause accompanying these developments are the defensive
reactions of a nation to a bewildering array of challenges
to its self-image and who have yet to fully appreciate what
modern, secular citizenship means. In a way, fulfillment of
rights and an increasingly intolerant, authoritarian streak in
government and society march in tandem.
This transformative period is unfolding under the watch of
a political class that cannot rise above crass populism, and
that still finds it expedient to cater to primal prejudices. The
innate religiously-based conservatism of the AKP and the
ossified nationalism of the opposition has increasingly bog
down the political system.
Despite the record of the past three years, the AKP has also
Analysis
taken several trailblazing steps. On January 1, Turkish state
television started a 24-hour broadcast in Kurdish on its
new channel, TRT-Ses (“6” in Kurdish). For years, Kurds
and Turkish democrats demanded such an opening but the
security establishment objected to it on the grounds that it
would undermine the unity of the nation. The opposition
gave a wordy but nonetheless knee-jerk reaction criticizing
the move. The overall reaction of the public, however, was
mostly favorable, or neutral at worse.
Additionally, the state television’s main news hour was
recently aired from a cemevi (gathering place), the place of
worship for Turkey’s Alevis, on the occasion of their holy
day Ashura. The staunchly secularist Alevis are a minority
Muslim sect much discriminated against and are considered
less than full Muslims by conservative Sunnis, upon whose
support the AKP relies.
The AKP government also finally resolved the thorny is-
sue of restoring citizenship to the communist poet Nazım
Hikmet, who was stripped of his Turkish citizenship in 1951
after having been forced to flee the country.
These steps were taken against a backdrop of rising intoler-
ance across a country that is undergoing spasms of deepen-
ing conservatism and nationalism. Perhaps no single move
exposed Turkey’s split personality better than the online
petition initiated by 200 public intellectuals and so far
supported by some 27,000 signatories, opening the file of
the tragedy of Ottoman Armenians during WWI. It reads:
“My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to
and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman
Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice
and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of
my Armenian brothers. I apologize to them.”
The petition was controversial even among public figures
that sympathized with its intention because of the personal
apology at the end. Despite reactions ranging from the self-
victimizing (“it is they who killed us”), to the cynical (such
as Erdoğan’s comment that “these Turkish intellectuals must
have committed genocide”), to a horrifyingly racist com-
ment by a social democratic deputy, this civic initiative broke
open the final taboo of Turkish history. Probably many, if not
most, signatories do not qualify the 1915 tragedy as genocide.
Yet they ask that there be a reckoning for the elimination of
the Armenian population of Anatolia from their ancestral
lands, followed by reconciliation. After all, only those nations
that confront their history are able to transcend it and build a
better present.
In short, with or without the EU process, pressures from
society for widened rights and freedoms ultimately do get a
response. The trouble is that without the disciplining
effect of the EU accession process, a lot of time and energy
are being wasted before taking the right course. Given the fact
that Turkey’s entire system of government is being overhauled
and the balance of power between the bureaucracy and the
elected representatives is rapidly shifting, the EU framework
is absolutely necessary to consolidate a liberal democracy in
Turkey. Otherwise, the outdated and now-maligned, tutelary
democracy of Turkey might be replaced, not by a full-fledged
liberal democracy but by an illiberal populism or at worst by
an “electoral authoritarianism.”
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
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