Religious Belief Author(s): Martin Southwold Reviewed work(s): Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec.

, 1979), pp. 628-644 Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2802151 . Accessed: 27/04/2012 09:45
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RELIGIOUS

BELIEF

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
University Manchester of Such Those who loyallysubscribeto a religionnormallydo believe at leastitsbasic tenets. and describe believing is an important partof religiousbehaviour,and we should understand it more exactly. To dismissbelief as a matterfor psychologyis an error,which restson a fallacy.Though Leach has falleninto thiserrorhe has also pointedto a fruitful approach.The is fromfactualtruth:it may be called symbolic truthof at leastbasic religioustenets different truth. It is argued that basic religious tenets are empirically indeterminate, axiomatic, symbolic,and collective. From thisthe most appropriatecognitiveattitudeto them can be inferred:it is suggestedthatreligiousbeliefmay commonly approximateto this.Religious in which have thefourcharacteristics noted: believersdo not lack rationality believingtenets it would be less rationalto prefer articlesof faithwhich did not have them.

I
Justwhat does 'belief' mean in a religiouscontext?Of all theproblemssurrounding attempts to conduct anthropologicalanalysisof religion this is the one that has perhaps been most the troublesomeand therefore most oftenavoided, usually by relegatingit to psychology, that raffishoutcast discipline to which social anthropologistsare forever consigning phenomena they are unable to deal with within the framework of a denatured Durkheimianism. But theproblemwill notgo away, it is not'merely' psychological(nothing social is), and no anthropologicaltheoryof religionwhich failsto attackit is worthyof the name (Geertz I966: 24-5).

Leach producedan apt illustration thisevasionwhen of Shortlyafterwards he wrote,in his paper'Virgin birth':
When an ethnographer reportsthat'members of the X tribebelieve that. . .' he is giving a of description an orthodoxy,a dogma, something which is trueof thecultureas a whole. But Professor Spiro (and all the neo-Tylorianswho thinklike him) desperately wants to believe that the evidence can tell us much more than that-that dogma and ritualmust somehow correspond to the inner psychological attitudesof the actors concerned. We need only considerthe customsof our own societyto see thatthisis not so (Leach I967: 40).

II By theseremarksLeach appearsto be sayingthatan ethnographic report thata people believe a certain theiradherence a dogma to proposition reports and onlythat:it does not tellus thatthepeople believe-in the ordinary sense of 'hold as true'"-the proposition.Put like this, the contentionappears implausible,not to say perverse.2 Leach's reference 'inner psychological to in attitudes', place of the second 'believe', servesto obscure thisfact.It also in providesan argument, albeit fallacious, supportof the contention. And it
Man (N.S.) I4,
628-44.

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the of two contentions: one we have noticed, also has the effect confounding which is wrong,and anotherwhich is rightand fruitful. of Let us first justifyour interpretation 'inner psychological attitudes' a as paraphrase 'believe'. for
i)

after passagecited,Leach writesofwomen going through the Immediately outlines. comments: He theEnglishmarriageservice, which he briefly
But all this tells me absolutely nothing about the inner psychologicalstateof the lady in question: I cannot inferfromthe ritualeitherwhat she feelsor what she knows. She may be she an outrightatheist.Alternatively may believe thata churchmarriageis essentialforthe children(I967: 40). well-beingof her future

2)

to Leach explainswhat he is trying say.

... partly I am interested in the problem of method ... how should we interpret about palpable untruth?.. . Why do all these people believe in ethnographicalstatements somethingwhich is untrue? (I967: 44).

Intermittently least,Leach supposesthatwe have to understand at reports them: thatpeople believe what is palpablyuntruefor what,thatis,theydo not believe,i.e. hold as true. Leach's words as I have: thus he summarisesLeach's 3) Spiro interpreted as argument containing:
... two main theses:the culturalbeliefconcerningconception does not meanwhat it says, what it says(I968: 243). and, even ifit does, the nativesdo not believe

Leach'sapproachhe 4) So too did Needham (I972: 5-7); thusin repudiating states bluntly:
Somethingthatis believed by nobody is not a belief... (I972: 6).

in which we have understood Now thereis a grainof truth thiscontention fromLeach's words. It does happenthatindividualswho publiclyadhereto a more or lessprivately, disbelieveit: certainly foundthis I dogma nevertheless, There can be situations which a dogma is in among my Sinhaleseinformants. maintainedin a societyeven though most,conceivablyall, membersof the societydisbelieve it. But it is most unlikelythat a competentethnographer on would barelyreportthatthe people believe the reporting such a situation dogma: he would surely realise,and report,that the people maintainthe dogma but do notbelieve it. If a competentethnographer reportsthat his he people believe something, surelymeansthattheydobelieve it,i.e. hold it as truein some sense. which appear to say that Leach was misled by the few obscure-reports certainpeoples maintaina dogma thatcopulationdoes not cause conception: which,as he argues,mustbe palpablyuntrueforthem.I do not wish to take but thatLeach, spaceto re-openthishoarycontroversy; it shouldbe remarked misreadthe evidence. The principallocus like many other anthropologists, was disputandi a passage by W. E. Roth describinga group of Australian be in Aborigines;it may conveniently consulted Spiro I968: 242, citingRoth I903: 22. Leach seems to have supposed that Roth reported that these thatcopulationis not a cause of conception.But Roth Aboriginesmaintained

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

later account early report (I9I6) andin hismoreconsidered (I932:

did not.What he wrotewas thattheydo not 'recognise'thisconnexion.There is a subtle distinction between not recognising factin certaincontextsof a discourse, and denyingthatit is a fact.This is similarto the distinction which Spiro (I968: 256) draws betweenignoringa known factand being ignorant thatit is a fact. both in his Malinowski was indeed more positiveabout the Trobrianders, deniedthatconceptionis caused thattheTrobrianders He reports categorically But he also makes it obvious why they did. Christian by copulation. had preached 'the doctrineand ideal of Paternity'againstthe missionaries Trobriandethos:
Only during my thirdexpedition to New Guinea did I discover that the nativeshad been somewhat exasperatedby having an 'absurdity' preached at them, and by findingme, so as unmissionary' a rule,engaged in the same futileargument(I932: I 59).

I53-78).

What people say in understandable exasperation ought not be interpreted, or reported, theirestablished as dogma, stilllessas what theybelieve. thattheirpeople believesomething, When ethnographers report theymean what their words would naturallybe understoodto mean. They may be as mistaken confusedabout the facts, Malinowski was,just as theymay be or wrong about factsof otherkinds.But it does not appear thatour fallibility of concerningbelieving is of such an exceptional order that all ascriptions seem to imply that, believing must be discounted.Leach does, however, as whateverethnographers mean,we cannottake theirreports evidence that to are believed, in the ordinarysense of the term. By referring dogmas attitudes' thatit is,normally Leach suggests believingas 'inner psychological He at least,unknowable because inaccessible. confirmed thatthiswas indeed his implicationwhen he wrote,in a letter to replying his critics:
I claim thatthe anthropologist absolutelyno information has about what is inwardlyfeltby believer (I 968: 65 5). any professed

this On a simpleinterpretation is plainlyuntrue;on a subtler interpretation, it on Whatevermay be thecase which Leach surely intended, rests a confusion. avowals ofbelievingin thefirst regarding person('I believe . . .'),it is fallacious to suppose that ascriptions believingto a thirdparty ('he believes. . .' or of indeed 'they believe.. .') necessarily describehis innerstateof mind,and are to unwarranted theextentthathis innerstateof mind is unknown. therefore I explain below (p. 633) why this is a fallacy,showing that ascriptions of about theirobservable behaviour,which believing to othersare statements can ethnographers make,shouldmake,and do make,forthemostpartreliably As and informatively. Geertz said, to categorisequestionsabout believingas and thus beyond our competence,is to shirkissuesof major psychological, concernon which we can,and should,bringour competence anthropological to bear. III Leach's unsatisfactory formulation distracts readerfrom another,and the thatcan be understood fromlaterpartsof his paper.He valuable,contention

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reportthata people believesomething comes to concede thatan ethnographic question does imply thattheyhold it to be truein some sense: the important thenis,in what sense?
said. There are If we are not Tylorians we can say what Powell's Trobriand informants different kindsof truth.Which is also what good Catholics say ... (I967: 44). untrueis to say thatit is a species way of explaininga beliefwhich is factually An alternative does not relateto theordinarymatter-of-fact which it expresses of religiousdogma; thetruth (I967: 45). world of everydaythingsbut to metaphysics

This takes us right away from the obscurantismof 'inner psychological to It attitudes'. directsour attention the cognitiveattitudes-which,though are inferential, inferablefrom overt behaviour-appropriate to truthsof kinds.It invitesus to examinewhether believing-holding as truedifferent supposed. thanwe have sometimes is a more complex and subtlematter In Englishtheword 'true' hasa wide spanofmeaning.Much thesameseems to apply to parallel termsin other languages (e.g. Dinka: Lienhardt I96I: to what an informant causean ethnographer misinterpret I 39): and thismight to is sayingwhen he employssuch a term.But it is more important consider how we use 'true' becausethisaffects themeaningofour Englishword: chiefly also becausea similar pattern and hence'hold as true',i.e. 'believe'; and perhaps may be presentin otherlanguages.The ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary for listssixteensensesand sub-senses the adjective'true'. Only one of theseis or specified 'of a statement belief',and thisis: as
the 'Consistentwith fact;agreeingwith reality;representing thingas it is'.

senseof'true' in modernEnglish; This is of coursetheordinary, unmarked, or I shall referto it henceforth 'factualtruth'.Some of the other senses,or as and something like them,mightbe applied to propositions, notablyreligious most,ifnot all, senses thata themewhich underlies suggests tenets. Inspection whetherin the directsenseof takingits place in a is the notion of 'fitting', structure, physical,social, or conceptual,or in the derived sense of being truestatement 'seemly'. (Indeed we saythata factually 'proper','appropriate', 'fitsthefacts'.) a It is conceivable,then,thata personwho describes dogma as 'true' might mean that it is seemly: presumablymost adherents would consentto that. personswho regard in and presumably others, There are in our own society, for religioustenetsas eyewash,but appropriate keepingthe lower ordersin held exclusively,are their proper place. But I assume that such attitudes, exceptional;mostof thosewho believe a tenethold it to be truein a stronger sense than this. This was my experiencein fieldworkamong two notably and sophisticated rationalpeoples,theGanda and theSinhalese;and it is what that I understand frommonographson otherpeoples. I have the impression i.e. many Sinhaleseheld theirtenetsas true withoutqualification, in a sense when one considersthat including factualtruth.This is hardly surprising fundamentalists common enough in our own highlycriticalculture.But are I also had theimpression but thatsome people were not fundamentalists, held sense. theirtenets truein a subtler, as more discriminating I regret because I thatI can reportonly impressions; did not get harderfacts

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I did not at the time grasp theseissues.I explore them now with a view to betterresearchin the future, othersand by me. It should be possible to by for sampleof people,what the cognitiveattitudes determine, a representative are to religioustenets reallyare; and it shouldbe done. Cognitiveattitudes not about them,and wholly inner and psychological:we do have information could and should have more. There is not a dichotomy between mere the attitudes betweenthese lie and fundamentalism: mostimportant adherence two. Not to get thisclearis both to demeanthosepeople whose believingwe a write about, and also to fail to understand fundamental aspectof religious what does "belief" mean in a religiouscontext?' behaviour.'Just IV As I have indicated,within one communitydifferent personsmay have towards religioustenets.The same person may different cognitiveattitudes and contexts(see, e.g., Powell have different attitudes different in situations I956: 277-8 quoted in Leach I967: 48 (note 5), and ofcourseEvans-Pritchard to tenets:thus attitudes different I937 passim).And theremay be different among the SinhaleseI foundit not uncommon forpeople to expressdissent which no one told me, or fromsome tenets, whereastherewere othertenets even showed me, thathe doubted.These unquestioned of articles faithwere, Buddhism:thoseto unsurprisingly, thosewhich are logicallybasicto practical deny which would carry away a large part of what is characteristically Buddhist. Thus religiousbeliefis not one thing:it is a complex of cognitiveattitudes moreexactlythanwe usuallydo. My we which,I am arguing, shoulddescribe which is mostappropriate immediatepurposeis to definea cognitiveattitude towards at least basic religioustenets, and which I sensed was actuallythe of informants. Because we attitude at leastmy more sensitive and thoughtful anthropologistsourselves are either unbelievers or at best rather crude we to it this and to distinguish from believers, findit difficult identify attitude others. But ifwe can see what to look for, may in factfindit is as common we as what we should recognise intelligent as To attitudes othermatters. do so to of should lead to considerablerevisionof our judgementsof the rationality of religiousbelievers:it mighteven enhanceour understanding the place of page of his on religionin our culture-which, as Durkheimremarked thefirst Elementary formsof the religious life,is an objective of the anthropologyof religion( 9 I 5: I-2). The tenets Buddhismcan be broadlyorderedalong a continuum of ranging fromthe most basic and indispensable the most accessory to and optional; as I have remarked, such distinctions reflected thecognitiveattitudes at in of are leastsome Buddhists. determined For example,it is basic to hold thatrebirth, by by Karma, is real; thatNirvana is a realstateattainable humanbeings;that the Buddha and othershave attainedit; thatthe Buddha's teachingprovides efficacious directionsfor attainingit. But it is optional to hold, e.g., that of thatthe services Buddhist participation ritesis conduciveto attainment; in at and mortuary ceremonies;thatgodlike beings clergyare essential funerals

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exist.Similardistinctions of may be made among the tenets any religionthat have been subjectedto rationalanalysis. What I have to say appliesprimarily to more basic tenets, and may be less trueof more accessory I tenets. seek to show thatat leastbasic religioustenets are
i) empirically indeterminate, 3) symbolic, and

axiomatic, 4) collective.
2)

From these characteristics can inferthe appropriatecognitive attitude we attitude towardsthem; and I suggest thatthisappropriate actuallyoccursand could be identified we looked forit. if Leach suggested thatthetruth which a religiousdogma expresses 'does not world of everyday things but to relate to the ordinary matter-of-fact metaphysics'(I967: 45). Let us start from this appropriatelyindefinite Even in thatmode ofdiscourse whichis concerned describe characterisation. to and analyse the objective physical world-i.e., in physics-metaphysical propositionshave a place. Here, a metaphysical propositiondoes not serve a for to directly describethe world-rather it servesto establish framework a mode of discoursewithinwhich theworld can be described. Since it does not and directly describetheworld it is not directly falsifiable; ifit is not falsifiable it is not verifiable either (i.e. it cannot be sufficiently confirmed or made within the mode of corroborated). But if the physical statements discourseit foundsare directly thenit may be indirectly falsified. falsified, Religious tenetsmay be used to found a mode of physicaldiscourse,as Horton has argued (i967; I973, etc.). But sometimesat least they are so thattheycannotbe falsified formulated even indirectly: thusforexample the thatGod existsseemsto be undecidable, or proposition directly indirectly, by to reference empiricalevidence.Propositions(doctrines, tenets, notions,etc.) which are so formulatedthat they are inherently immune to empirical falsificationor verificationI have termed 'empirically indeterminate' has (Southwold I978: 374). As theterm'indeterminate' been used of mystical in propositions a slightly senseby Cooper (I97 5) and Salmon (I978), different I mustclarify. do not use the term'indeterminate' precisely senseof I in the Reichenbach (I944), which Cooper claims to have taken over. I am not as suggesting, Cooper does, thatreligiousbelieversactuallyemploy a threevalued logic. I do not know of any language which admitsto the true/false paradigma thirdtermof equal weight.Referring Putnam (I957), Salmon to writes:'To say a sentence indeterminate is entailsthatthe sentence will never be verifiedor falsified'(I978: 448). I say that basic religious tenetsare in indeterminate thissense.I neitherassert nor deny thatbelievers objectively themselvesrecognisepreciselythis; I find it '. . . difficult impossibleto or of of an i.e. distinguish attitude doubt or suspended belief, no assignment truthof value, froman assignment the value indeterminate' (Salmon I978). This do can tenets uncertainty be bridgedby sayingthatbelievers not treat religious as factually truenor as factually of false.Such non-assignment true/false value seemsto be describedforthe Azande by Evans-Pritchard (I937: 8i). I argue that it is appropriate for doctrines which objectively are empirically and indeterminate, may be common,even normal.

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Now althoughbasic religioustenets may serveto founda mode of physical discourse,this is not theirsole nor even theirprincipalfunction. Religious discourseservesrather interpret, shape,our experienceof reality, to and than directlyto describereality(cf. LienhardtI96I: I48). It includesmythsand similar imaginative and evocative forms. It normally includes ethical propositions, which are of courseprescriptive rather thandescriptive. Indeed be foundmore thancan reasonably includedundera 'mode of religioustenets discourse': theyfound,forexample,ethicalconduct,and ritual.They found not just a mode of discoursebut a way of life,and one which is socially nor a established. Since neither prescriptions conduct,neither way of lifenor a society, have factualtruth-value, is obvious why religiously it metaphysical be propositions cannoteven indirectly falsified. Contraryto the conventional a our own religioushistory, religioncomes to be rejected wisdom concerning not as simplyfalsebut rather inappropriate unfitting. as or

V The relation between a basic tenet and the religion it serves to found resembles that between an axiom and a theory based on it. Boudon's is observation illuminating:
raised by the concept of axiom did not vanish until it was The epistemologicaldifficulties understood that an axiom was not a propositionplaced at the beginning of a deductive a argumentbecause it was untestable-but rather propositionmade untestable itslocation by at the beginningof the argument(I97I: IO).

We have oftenasked ourselveswhy religionspropound 'mystical' (or, as I and to prefer say,empirically indeterminate) doctrines, have tendedto answer of the by disparaging rationality believers.It should be evidentthatreligious tenetsare, like axioms, necessarily untestablebecause of their place at the not the beginning, foundation, just of a deductiveargumentbut of a way of formtheywould be falsified, could then and life.Iftheywere castin falsifiable if servetheirpurposewith greatdifficulty at all: what is to serveeffectively as an axiom fora collectiveway of lifemustbe immuneto falsification. are We when we criticise grossly mistaken otherpeoplesas not rationalforholdingas their rationality true tenetswhich are mystical, non-demonstrable: would fail which were not so. rather iftheybased theirlives on tenets If we have oftenassumed the religioustenetsof othersto be false-an built into his definitionof assumptionwhich Evans-Pritchard mistakenly notions(I937: I 2; see Southwold I978: 375)-this has usuallybeen mystical or the becausewe did notshare, greatly respect, ways oflifewhichtheyfound; religioustenetsin fact are normallynot falsebut unfalsifiable, empirically indeterminate.By similar measure, the tenets not only are objectively axiomatic,in the senseof servingas axioms: theyalso seem to believersto be axiomaticin thesenseof unquestionable (see,e.g.,Evans-Pritchard I956: 9 for the way in which the existenceof God is taken for grantedby Nuer). This mustbe so: if the truthof a basic tenetis seen as a necessary precondition for

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the religionforwhich it is axiomatic,thento considerit mightnot be trueis to impugn the religion,the cultureit orders, and hence theselfthatis shaped by the culture.To doubt is not only to thinkthat one's thoughtis wrong is thatone'sself invalid. (Evans-Pritchard I937: I95), it is to suppose Those who can sincerelyconsideror discussthe truthof basic tenetshave already in in ceasedto be believers, thesenseof fullyparticipating the religiouslife.

VI I have suggested thatbelievers, at leastthe more sensitive or among them, show signsof recognising thatreligious tenets neither are truenor false;I have are true. now arguedthatnevertheless thesetenets regardedas unquestionably if These two positionsare consistent we recognisethatthe truthof religious is tenets not factualtruth but anotherkind: I shallcall it symbolictruth. Something like this was recognised by Leach when he wrote, in the

Introduction hisPolitical to systems highland Burma: of

In sumthen, viewhere that my is ritual action belief aliketo be understood forms and are as ofsymbolic statement aboutthesocialorder I4). (I954:

That formulation requires correction. or are Religiousbeliefs, tenets, certainly symbolicof much more thanthe social order.And symbolscommunicatein a way thatis much less like thatof language thanLeach assumed(cf Langer corrections I95 I: 74-7). But withthese made,Leach'sview is sound.Religious in tenetsare indeed symbols,functioning very much the same ways as the concreteobjectsor actionsthatare more readilyrecognised ritualsymbols; as and theactsofaffirming, assenting or even adhering suchtenets ritual to, to, are and acts,like immolation, genuflexion, so forth. I offerno exact definitionof ritual symbols or symbolism: indeed the categoryappearsto be farfromhomogeneous.But I do outline some basic based largelyon Langer I95 I . In the mostgeneralsense distinctions,
are for but for of Symbols notproxy their objects, arevehicles theconception objects (I95:
60: I). I

This formulation was adoptedby Geertz(I966: 5); and it doubtless underlies Barth's characterisation ritual acts and objects as 'vehicles for concepts, of

in linguistic forms, theeverydayusage of language,thenit is essential thatwe make a distinction thekind thatLangertermsthatbetween'discursive'and of or 'non-discursive' 'presentational' The symbolism(I95 I: 94-7, and passim). formercovers the mannerin which languagein itseverydayusage signifies; the kindsof meaningto be foundin art,music,ritual, thelatter different myth, and of course religious'belief. At least part of the distinction thatwhich is too to be a strikingparallel with the different modes of thinkingwhich and to in and the psychologists neurophysiologists report be specialised theleft of righthemispheres the cerebralcortex (see Sagan I977: ch. 7). Presentational symbolismdoes convey conceptionswhich are, at one or

and understandings, emotions' (I975:

i i).

If we allow symbols include to

Barth between and draws codes(I975: 'digital' 'analogic'

ch.25). There seems

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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

about reality. how it does so is noteasyto grasp, at least more removes, Just but it is clear thatit normallydiffers fromdiscursive symbolism. Some things we call symbolsseem to signify much as metaphors;for otherswe need a less familiarmodel. Sperber rightlydraws our attentionto the term that the Ndembu use to designate symbols:
... theword chijikijilu, whichmeans landmark'. landmark nota signbutan index 'a A is whichserves our of ThisNdembumetaphor cognitively organise experience space. to seems muchmoreapposite subtle me than Western and whichcompares to the metaphor symbols

to words (I 975: 3 3)3.

It is certainly major taskforthe anthropology religionto describeand a of analyse more fully and preciselyjust how presentational symbolismdoes about reality;and it is one which is well in hand. For my convey conceptions present purposeitis necessary to neither reviewtheresults alreadyhave nor we to anticipate thosewe may hope to get.It is enough,first, acknowledgethat to ritual symbols-including tenets,beliefs,dogmas-do convey conceptions about reality, hencemay be regarded trueor false. and as And second,thatsince the relationof such a symbol to realityis different from that of discursive symbolism(everydayor scientific language), this kind of truthis different fromfactualtruth we normallyunderstand as it. If people regard a presentational symbol-more especially a tenet-as I having a 'fitting'or 'appropriate'relationto reality, say theyregardit as 'symbolicallytrue'. Hence thereis a senseof 'believe' which means 'hold as It from symbolicallytrue',and thismay be markedas 'believehts'. is distinct 'hold as factually true', which may be writtenas 'believehtF'4-though the I two are easilyand oftenconfused. seekto exploresome of thedifferences and similarities betweenthesetwo kindsof believing. Cooper (I975: 252-3) suggests to thatit may be unjustified say thatpeople 'believe' magico-religious which theyregardas untestable, propositions and which have some similarity In with metaphysical propositions. view of the wide variety senses theword 'believe', and thedifficulty distinguishing of of of and controllingthem,I thinkit is prudentto tryto avoid using the word in altogether scientific contexts NeedhamI972: I92-3). But it is quite (cf. impractical tryto restrict senseofbelief-terms theverb'believe' and to the (i.e. thenoun 'belief) to 'hold as factually true',and to ruleout theirapplicationto religious'belief. The latterapplicationis a salientand ineradicablefeature of Englishusage; what we have to do is to make surethatwe understand facts the thathave been,and may be, reported throughtheusage.

VII The way in which 'believehts' differs from'believehtF' bestbe brought can out by considering carefully what the lattermeans.To say thata person just holds a propositionas factually true is to say that he regardsit as correctly some partor aspectofreality; thathe holdsthatthestate affairs describing or of it describes existsin reality. Or, better still,it is to say thatthisproposition is

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to and model ofreality reference whichhe assesses an elementin hisinternal by with reality. guideshis transactions if Hence thereare fourconditionswhich mustbe satisfied we are to say of thathe believeshtF certain a proposition: a person,with sufficient warrant, with of in i) There mustbe some situations which somesets actsare consistent (or better,if possible, rationallyentailed by) the proposition'sbeing set with (or entailedby) factually true,and a different of actsare consistent suchsituations sufficiently frequently itsbeingfalse;and he mustencounter observations.-Under 'acts' I includeverbal to allow us to make sufficient acts, and notably those of assertingor unequivocally implying the proposition, and of avowing it as true/false. do In such situations mustpredominantly thoseactsthatare consistent he 2) with itstruth rather thanthosethatare consistent with itsfalsity. of would deprivethe a) To requireperfect consistency conductwithbelief consistent. thereis But conceptof use: normalpeople are not perfectly betweenconductwhich is as consistent oftenenough a cleardistinction with a belief as it is reasonable expect, and that which is grossly *to with it. inconsistent actsincludeverbalacts,theyshouldifpossiblealso b) Though therelevant remarks, we includenon-verbal acts.As Gombrich(I 97I: 4-5) rightly if say a persondoes not reallybelieve what he professes his non-verbal with it. There are two good reasonsfor acts are seriously inconsistent this: i) If to believehtF propositionis to have it as an elementin one's a conduct is internalmodel of reality, thenall one's reality-oriented potentially relevantin decidingwhetherit actuallyis an elementin thatmodel. by ii) Ifa personisdeceivingothers, perhaps and also himself, simulating a beliefhe does not reallyhold,it is normallyeasier,and cheaper, to do so by verbalfalsehoods thanby non-verbal pretences. this 3) There must be evidence thathe entertains propositionin association with theseacts. Philosophersare agreed that a person cannot be held to believe a propositionthathe has never'entertained' considered;and as or situational we have knownsinceEvans-Pritchard 937) that (I peoplepractise selection of their beliefs,we have to establishthat the propositionis in entertained the contextof the acts relevantto believingit. One cannot infer that a certain propositionis believed merely from the fact that with it, since any course of conduct is observed conduct is consistent with more than one proposition(Gombrich (I97I) overlooks consistent this-see my commentsin Southwold I978: 366). of if Entertainment a propositionis mostplainlyestablished the person it or expresses in or withhisact: thisis why verbalassertions endorsements, evidenceofholdingas true, important evidenceof are as thoughunreliable is if believing.It may be lessobvious thatentertainment also established the actordenies proposition he acts-provided he does so spontaneously, the as and not merelyin replyto a leading question.If thiswere all, we should resultthatit is hardest establish to thatpeople believe have thefrustrating

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believe:-for a tenetis axiomaticit tendsto if just what theydo mostfirmly be taken for grantedratherthan statedexplicitly.Hence we must allow thatifan act is customary theculturein question, in and ifwe can establish a in thatit is also customary entertain particular to proposition association with such acts,then any member of the culturedoing that act may be assumedto entertain thatproposition. 4) His conduct cannot with comparable plausibilitybe explained by an alternative hypothesis. a) It may happenthattheevidencegivesequal supportto theascription of beliefs.This is no problem: people do operate with several different schemes interpretation, so to saythata personbelieves of alternative and one thingneed not be understood precluding believingsomething as his else-not even when, abstractedfrom contexts,the two beliefsare logicallyinconsistent. to conductmay be fully accountedforwithoutreference the b) A person's show thathe does beliefby which he explainsit. This does not in itself not believe what he professes: mostit may show thathis beliefis not at the cause,or the only cause,of his conduct. which really calls in question an c) The kind of alternative hypothesis of and ascription beliefis one thattheactoris deceivingothers, perhaps We can neverbe certain thatthisis not so; but we can oftenbe himself. is confident. sufficiently in and Certainty unattainable empiricalscience, that especiallyin that concerninghuman behaviour; the uncertainty of attends ascriptions beliefis not so specialas to place themoutsidethe normal area of scientific likelihood. This analysisservesto make plain why it is thatascriptions believingof statements someoneotherthanoneself that believessomething-do notrequire specialknowledgeof theinnermentalstate(or psychological attitudes) the of believer.It shouldbe evidentthattheverb'believe' designates relation a rather than a state: a relation,firstly between the believer and a proposition, and secondly from the believer through the proposition to reality.What is to purported occur is doubtless mentalin largepart,and specialpsychological knowledgewould doubtless helpus to assess and understand better. it But such specialknowledgeis notnecessary, sincein factwe use 'believe' in a way which enablesus to regardthe mind of the believeras a 'black box' (see,e.g.,Ashby to i964: 86sqq.). The factswe refer are the inputsand outputsof the 'black box', and the relationsbetween them: we are not committedto giving an accountofjustwhat goes on withinthe'black box'.5 VIII Now since we use 'believe' for 'hold as symbolically true' as well as for 'hold as factually true',it is impliedthatthissame schemashouldbe applicable to ascriptions believinghtS. largepartit is. But thecrucialdifference that of In is thefirst and consequently second,cannotbe satisfied, condition, the eticallyat least. Cooper (I975: 253) points out that if a propositionis untestable my (in

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it terms,empiricallyindeterminate) is hard to see how behaviour could be distinguished consistent as with itstruthrather thanits falsity. proposition A is empirically indeterminate and only ifeverystateof affairs if which can be with itstruthas with determined holdingin the real world is as consistent as If demonstrable consistent as itsfalsity. some courseof actionwere objectively courseof actiondemonstrable consistent and with with itstruth, a different as its falsity, then the different consequencesof these coursesof action would to of provide evidenceof thetruth-value theproposition, contrary definition. This would not be so only if the two coursesof action had no discernibly different consequences;whichis perhaps common,as theancient plea,'why do sinnersprosper...?', bears witness.Empiricallywe do in fact find that a wide rangeof kindsof conductis held to be consistent remarkably with,and indeed legitimated a given religioustenet. by, that the range is usually not infinite: Yet it is also clear, and important, and withina particular some kindsof conductare difficult religioustradition In to some virtually impossible, legitimate acceptedtenets. Buddhism,for by of to example, it is difficult legitimatethe participation Buddhistclergyin allow the factthat Buddhist war: though traditiondoes, albeit reluctantly, clergy,temporarilydisrobed, served in the army of King Dutthagamani (Gombrich I97I: 29). It would be virtuallyimpossible to legitimatethe I service of a Buddhist cleric as general or war-leader,and history, think, difference between recordsno instanceof this.This is plainly an important somewhere between Buddhistand Islamicsocieties-with Christendom falling thesepoles. various which distinguish There are certainly emic,thoughnotetic,criteria kindsof conduct as consistent, othersas inconsistent, and with believinghts a particularreligioustruth.In Sri Lanka, for example, it is maintainedthat a Buddhist layman who believes the Dhamma (the Buddhistdoctrines)will endeavour to observe the Five Precepts.Hence a man who regularlyand wantonlykills living beings (in breach of the FirstPrecept),or is regularly drunk (in breach of the Fifth),is shown therebynot really to believe the Dhamma. But the criteriaare characteristically imprecise.Most Buddhist takelife:e.g. theyuse insecticides, will kill at leastthe and laymendeliberately most dangerous kind of snake (the Russell's Viper); and in their own judgements,and those of most of their fellows,this does not make them And many men,at least,considerit allowable to drinkliquor in unbelievers. moderation.The standardsare not precisianbut customary:those of the thantheupright man (Gluckman I955: I25-6). Not only is reasonablerather or it emically determinedwhat kinds of conduct shall be held consistent belief:itis also emicallydetermined whatbehaviour inconsistent withreligious as withinthosekindsof conduct. is or is not to be classified falling This makes it difficult argue (as Spiro I 97 I does) that customary to behaviour itselfis inconsistent with accepted religioustenets, thus showing thatthetenets not reallybelieved.When we perceivesuchinconsistency are it is betweenthe behaviourand what we take to be the meaningof the tenets; but it may be thatwe have misinterpreted meaning, that and thebehaviouris consistent with theirpropermeaning.Now ifwe takeseriously view that the

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theirmeaningcannotbe symbols, are religioustenets ritualor 'presentational' as the discoveredby translating wordsin which theyareexpressed, ifwe were dealing with the ordinarydiscursiveuse of language. The meaning of a in as religioustenet, of any otherkind of ritualsymbol,is theway it functions as its experience; function a 'landmark'perhaps: interpreting ordering, shaping, to how it is in factrelated theway This can be discoveredonly by determining of The significance a symbol,like the of lifeforwhich it servessymbolically. of onlyby analysis what meaningofa word,liesin itsuse: it can be determined people actuallydo, and cannot then be turnedto judge what they do. The how a tenetis actuallyemployedin theway of mustdetermine anthropologist and he mustreportthisas the symbolicmeaningit lifein which it functions: as actuallybears.If,forexample,he finds, he will, thatmost Buddhistsspeak bonum, so far fromactivelyendeavouringto yet of nirvana as the summum attainthatstateas soon as possibletheyactuallypursuegoals theyacknowledge of theireventualattainment nirvana with it,while postponing as inconsistent about into the remotefuture:thenthe conclusionmustbe thatthe doctrines for nirvana do not signifyto them a prescription attainingan immediate meaningwhich we have to personalgoal, but ratherhave some transformed discover. that Spiro'serrorderivesfromassuming As Tambiah (I970: 4I-2) suggests, the meaning of Buddhisttenetscan be known by readingthem as theyare that largeassumptions Even ifwe allow therather in presented the Scriptures. and writings, we can know what a tenetmeantin thecontextof thescriptural senseas havingonce been itsstandard thatthiscan be takenin some defensible meaning,it still does not follow that this is its meaning in contemporary with thatmeaning,we have to practicalBuddhism: if practiceis inconsistent meaning,no doubt as a result the register factthatpracticerevealsa different of symbolictransformation. who It must,however,be said thatit is not only Spiro and otheroutsiders in withpractice practical a give Buddhisttenets meaningwhich is inconsistent even in thesmallworld do Buddhism:so,in Sri Lanka at least, manyBuddhists of to of the villages,and theyuse thisinconsistency pointto the unworthiness like other ritual that religioustenets, practice.We should not be surprised And we may remarkthatit would be of sustaina variety meanings. symbols, a poor sort of religion that could only validate the actual, without also which theactualcan be seento fallshort. proclaimingan ideal matchedagainst and of The tensionbetweenthe normativeinterpretations Buddhistdoctrines thesymbolicmeaningstheybear in thecontextof actuallifeis an aspectof an of But neither thisnor otherfeatures dynamicin Buddhistsocieties. important thatthe graspedwithoutrecognising Buddhistreligiouslifecan be correctly do doctrines have symbolicmeaningsin actuallife. of It follows that assessment a symbolic proposition must be radically if proposition, it is With a factual fromthatof a factualproposition. different it properly formulated, is relativelysimple to know what it means: the importantquestion is whetherit is true.6But a symbolicproposition-and especiallya basic religioustenet-is, forthosewho maintainit,axiomatically true: the importantquestionis, what does it mean? For the anthropologist,

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then,the questionis not whether theybelieve it but how.This throwslighton a notable oddity in Christiantheology.In the Bible-as among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard I956: 9)-the existenceof God is taken for granted:it is axiomaticallytrue,and the focusof concernis with the religioussignificance ofthisdatum.But formanymodernChristians, foravowed unbelievers, as the is to is but significance takenforgranted, thetruth considered be at issue.This as is, in effect, mistakea symbolicproposition a factualproposition:which to may be why the religiousresult tendsto be somewhatprosthetic.

Ix
Sometimesthingsbecome symbolicfora particular individualbut not for his fellows generally: we may speak of these as private and idiosyncratic for symbols.Similarlypropositions may acquire idiosyncratic symbolictruth should not have a largeplace individuals.Such privatesymbolisms particular the in ethnographic reports, primaryconcernof which is to reportwhat is common to membersof a society,what constitutes theirculture.It seems thata normal likely,moreover,thatthe greaterpart of the symbolictruths in personholds are collective, a numberof sensesand forvariousreasons. fromothers, Most people do in factlearnmostof theirideas and attitudes to be originaland creative.A person's and are not much inclined symbolic for truths therefore, themostpart,likelyto be collectivein theobvious are senseof having been acquiredfromhis culture. thatof being be 2) They will therefore collectivein a second obvious sense, common to and sharedby the membersof a community.Much of their power as symbolsderivesfromthisfact. 3) Through being sharedtheyacquire a kind of verisimilitude which,while not beingthetruth matters fact, that'aura offactuality' Geertz of of has that to Our warrant for (I966) seesas fundamental religionas a cultural system. existsis simplythatthehypothesis thatit does is the sayingthatsomething most satisfactory way of accountingfor a set of given experiences.The claim that,e.g.,God existsis warranted the extentthatobservedevents to are bestfitted thatsupposition:and thisseemsto be so of social eventsif to membersof societyare indeed actingon thatsupposition. (We may prefer to account for theseeventsby the hypothesis thatthe actorsbelieve that God exists;but believerscannotbe expectedto recognisethisas a distinct withoutallowing thatthe beliefmightbe false, hypothesis and this,as we arguedabove (p. 635), is hardlypossibleforthem.) 4) It is not only that,throughbeing shared, religioustenets acquire thataura of factuality which makesthemappearto be simplytrue:inasmuchas they are empirically this indeterminate is the only way theycan come to seem true. As I remarkedin an earlierpaper,'The apparenttruthor factually falsityof such doctrines seems to depend wholly on social factors' (Southwold I978: 374). Further, we have seen,the criteria reallybelievingsymbolictruths as for 5) are emic, customary, and hence collective: e.g. a man reallybelievesthe Dhamma only ifhe sufficiently refrains fromtakinglife.
i)

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of of 6) Thus symbolictruths become representative membership a group,a community, Church. Not to overload the term'symbolic' stillfurther, a I would follow a hintof Nadel's and saythattheyare 'emblematic'of such I membership (Nadel I 95 I: 262, citedin Firth 973: I 74). Theyrepresent both internally, expressing attachment the group to such membership as and externally identifying as a as one and solidarity with fellowmembers, with outsiders and with othergroups. member of thisgroup in contrast in on is This emblematicfunction prominent credalaffirmations liturgical and other formaloccasions,and is perhapsalways presentin avowals of believing a religioustenet.We should ask ourselveshow farinformants' be as can avowals of beliefto an ethnographer safely interpreted conveying rather thanas simplyasserting cognitiveattitudes group identity. a thatthey for 7) Ifthesymbolsare landmarks ordering world,it is important constitutesperson's a socialworld. be sharedamong thosewhoseinteraction 8) When symbolic truthsare held in common they can be acted upon collectivelythroughritual; they serve thus to alter as well as to order 9) The awareness that symbolic truthsare held in common, and their in the activation collectiveritual, evokes,and charges symbolictruths with, thatmen feelin thesupportof theirfellows: thesenseof strength
of both affairs are secular Individuals weak,butsocialgroups strong, in theordinary are I96I: 247). life in dealing and withthePowers (Lienhardt
I96I: experience Lienhardt (cf.

250, 291).

i o) It would seemthatsymbolictruths usually, notinvariably, if are collective and is in yet anothersense: theirprincipalreference to collectiveaffairs concerns,whether it be moralityin the most general sense,or more specific social orjural valuessuch as matrilineal descent. and Thus it would seem thatsymbolicpropositions, theholdingof themas collective.It is of courseindividualswho believehts true,are eminently them: in but as members of but theydo so primarily theircapacitynot as individuals a collectivity.Because this is so, the fact of such believing is most exactly of reported saying, thebelievers, by 'theybelieve . . .' in thecollectiverather sense.This is the germ of truthin Leach's contention than the distributive7 which we began by considering. As we have argued, however, 'they believe . . .' is normallyalso truein thedistributive sensewhich sumsa set,of 'he believes . . .' ascriptions; thisis not, as Leach supposed,excluded,but it would seem to be secondaryand derivative.When, as is all too easy, we interpret 'they believe . . .' reportssimply in the distributive sense, this conducesto understanding 'believe' in thesenseof'hold as factually true'.This in turn leads to those misconceiveddebates about rationality which Leach (I 954: I 3) dismissed mostly as 'scholasticnonsense'. x I have attributedfour characteristics basic religious tenets: they are to empirically indeterminate, axiomatic,symbolic, and collective.These characteristics closely connected.It is because theyare axiomatic thattheyare are

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collective, and becausetheyarecollectivethattheyareaxiomatic.Their power as symbolslargelyderivesfromtheirbeingcollective:theirabilityas symbols to sustaina varietyof meaningshelps to make them commonly and hence Their place as axioms makesit natural collectively acceptable. thattheyshould be empiricallyindeterminate; that they and, as we argued,it is functional shouldbe,sinceiffalsifiable Theirfunction symbolic as theywould be falsified. truths also makes it desirablethattheyshould be empirically indeterminate, lest question and doubts about their factualtruthconfuseor confutetheir symbolicrole. if The logically proper attitudetowardssuch propositions, one maintains truebut not factually true.This is a difficult them,is thattheyare symbolically do positionto maintain explicitly, when one'slanguageand conceptualsystem and not clearlydistinguish betweenthesetwo kindsof truth, do assumea twotrue' is equivalent to 'factuallyfalse'. valued logic by which 'not factually I Despite this difficulty, do see signs that the cognitive attitudeof more sensitive believersis at leastimplicitly close to what is logicallyproper: and I evidenceof this. urge thatwe should look forfirmer believers takethesimpler I have little doubt thatmany,ifnot most, religious are and more robustview thattheirtenets factually trueas well as symbolically fromthe appropriate true.This is but subtlydifferent view, and we should because theyfailto mark such a difficult hardlydescribepeople as irrational the an thatan empirically distinction: more so since,by definition, assumption indeterminate propositionis factually truecan never conflict with empirical or evidence.They are no more mistaken irrational takingtheirtenets be in to factually truethanwe are,as we often have been,in assuming themto be false; and theyhave farbetter excuse.
NOTES

ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary,under'believe':
'3. With clause or infinitive phrase:To hold it as truethat . . ., to think'.

that keeptheindividual hiscourse' on (I945:

4

-Leach actually illustrates this sense in the same sentencewhen he writes,'But Professor Spiro . . . desperately wants to believe that 2 As Needhamn argues (I972: 5-7). 3 Sperber cites Turner I969: I 5 as his source; Turner reports therefurther subtleties the of Ndembu idiom.-As Firth(I973: i68) has remindedus,the notion of a symbol as a landmark had earlierbeen employedby Fortes:'Totemic and othersymbolsare theideological landmarks
I44).

I have made myselfa rule that when using subscripts distinguish to different sensesof a word, a change to different level of distinction should be marked by a change of fount(lower case, capitals,numerals, etc.). Thus the two lower-caseletters 'ht' can be understoodas making one distinction:the change to capitals,'S' and 'F', indicatesthattheseserve further segment to the sensemarked by 'ht'. 5 It is not only Leach who failsto see this: the erroris verycommon. Most of the problems with which Needham (I972) wrestlesarisefromthe fallaciousassumptionthatbeliefmust be regardedas an innermentalstate;and,as he shows,thefallacyis widespreadamong philosophers. It seemsto arisefromtwo basic errorsof method:
i) Ifone analyses usage ofthe noun 'belief rather thantheverb 'believe' it is farlessevidentthat a relationratherthana stateis designated. 2) Again concentration on usage of the noun obscuresthe crucial factthatthe semantics of'he believes' are significantly different fromthoseof 'I believe'. If the latteris erroneously takento be paradigmaticfor both, then the way is opened for indulging the favouritephilosophical

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techniqueof introspection. The results irrelevant are for and confusing analysingascriptions of believing to thirdparties-i.e. statements the form'he believes' or 'they believe'. of These pointsare farfromobvious, and to thatextentdeserveto be proved. I am assumingthat anthropologistsare too little committed to the philosophical errors to care to see them extensivelyrefuted. 6 And the harderit is to get it properlyformulated as to make the question of its factual so truthat leastin principledecidable,the more likelyit is to be functioning as a factualbut as not a symbolicproposition. 'Distributive: referring each individual of a class separately;opposed to "collective"' to (ShorterOxford EnglishDictionary).
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