Ethics Case 1 20

Case 1 Topic: Canon 1
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359; to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
Bachelor of Laws 3A
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. SO ORDERED. 1 On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial
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Cases in Legal Ethics
on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms: xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5 ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3 (Italics supplied) Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Cases in Legal Ethics Bachelor of Laws 3A 2

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 104 January 28, 1954
That in the said contract my wife shall have full control, care and custody of the children, and as such all of our conjugal property rights and interests were apportioned to her with the exception of my private personal belongings and things pertaining to my law profession; That, besides the dissolution and the apportionment, said contract further states about my wife's and also my children's share to my current income by way of alimony and support; Now, therefore, by virtue of the said contract of separation, I now by these presents take my new found life-partner Regina S. Balinon, as my true and lawful wife; That in order to protect her rights and interests with regards to her personality and future property rights, I, hereby voluntarily and of my own free will solemnly swear under oath; That I will uphold and defend her honor and dignity and prestige as a woman of the weaker sex as well as any and all members of her family arising by reasons of said relationship; That I will remain loyal and faithful to her as a lawful and devoted loving husband for the rest of my life at all costs; That I will maintain and preserve the new existing companionship, the love, respect and goodwill prevailing among the members of her family of which I am now a member as well as equally mine; That I will not do any act that may tend to degrade or dishonor her or any member of her family unbecoming the dignity of said relationship but would rather take and respect her as my true and lawful wife; That in case of intentional desertion on my part thereby frustrating the true and honest intent of my affirmations, the same may be sufficient ground for my perpetual disbarment upon her instance or any third party in interest; That except for such minor dues and allowances by way of alimony and support mentioned above, any and all such future properties, rights and interests that we shall acquire during such relationship shall exclusively appertain and belong to her as her due share and shall bear her name in all such titles and documents thereto, subject to her legal share as such; That any offspring that we shall bear by reason of said companionship and relationship shall be acknowledged by me as my true and legal child with all the rights and privileges accorded by law pertaining to that of a legitimate child; That this contract of companionship is done of my own accord, freely and voluntarily without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, So help me God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my signature this 4th day of February 1949.
BENITA S. BALINON, petitioner, vs. CELESTINO M. DE LEON, ET AL., respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag, First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner. Celestino M. de Leon in his own behalf. Justo T. Velayo in his own behalf. PARAS, C.J.: The Solicitor General has filed a complaint against the respondent Celestino M. de Leon and Justo T. Velayo, duly qualified members of the bar in active practice, alleging that, since December, 1948, respondent de Leon, still legally married to Vertudes Marquez, lived as husband and wife with Regina S. Balinon; the said respondent prepared and subscribed on February 4, 1948, before respondent Velayo, a notary public, an affidavit which reads as follows: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: I, Celestino de Leon, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen, after having been duly sworn to according to law depose and say: That there exists a contract of separation executed and perfected between my wife, Vertudes Marquez and myself; That said contract states among other things that each of us is at liberty and free to take for himself and herself a lifetime partner with the full consent and authorization of each other; That by the same contract our conjugal partnership was dissolved and our existing property, rights and interests were divided and apportioned;
Cases in Legal Ethics Bachelor of Laws 3A
(Sgd.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON Signed in the Presence of : ................................................................................................... ...................................................................................................
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES s.s. City of Bacolod Personally appeared before me this 4th day of February 1949, Celestino de Leon with Residence Certificate No. ............ issued at ................ on ............... 1949 who executed the foregoing affidavit with contract of companionship consisting of two pages, and acknowledged by me that the same is his own free and voluntary act and deed. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the place and date first written above. (Sgd.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON Notary Public Until December 31, 1948 Doc. No. 484 Page No. 97 Book No. XVI Series of 1949.
This court had heretofore imposed the penalty of suspension upon an attorney who prepared a document stipulating, among others, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife, authorized each other to marry again and that each renounced whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying (In re Roque Santiago, 40 Off. Gaz. [7th Supp.] p. 208). In effect the affidavit prepared and signed by respondent De Leon has similar implication, in that although it did not bluntly authorize said respondent to marry another during his subsisting wedlock with Vertudes Marquez, he made it appear that he could take in another woman as a lifetime partner to whom he would remain loyal and faithful as a lawful and devoted loving husband and whom he could take and respect as his true and lawful wife; thereby virtually permitting himself to commit the crime of concubinage. It is true, as respondent De Leon argues, that the consent or pardon of either spouse constitutes a bar to a criminal prosecution for adultery and concubinage, but, as the Solicitor General observes, said crimes are not thereby legalized, the result being merely that prosecution in such cases would not lie. The contention that the affidavit is only a unilateral declaration of facts is of no moment, since it undoubtedly enabled respondent De Leon to attain his purpose of winning over Regina S. Balinon with some degree of permanence. It is likewise insisted that the acts imputed to respondent De Leon had no relation with his professional duties and therefore cannot serve as a basis for suspension or disbarment under section 25 of Rule 127. It should be remembered, however, that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer on grounds other than those enumerated by said provision (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil., 567). Moreover, we can even state that respondent De Leon was able to prepare the affidavit in question because he is a lawyer, and has rendered professional service to himself as a client. He surely employed his knowledge of the law and skill as an attorney to his advantage. (Manalo vs. Gan, Adm. Case No. 72, May 13, 1953.) With reference with respondent Velayo, there is no question that he did nothing except to affix his signature to the affidavit in question as a notary public. While, as contended by his counsel, the duty of a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him at least to guard against having anything to do with an illegal or immoral arrangement. In the present case respondent Velayo was somewhat negligent in just affixing his signature to the affidavit, although his fault is mitigated by the fact the he had relied on the good faith of his co-respondent. Wherefore, we hereby decree the suspension from the practice of law of respondent Celestino M. de Leon for three years from the date of promulgation of this decision. Respondent Justo T. Velayo is hereby merely reprimanded. So ordered.
The complaint also alleges that, notwithstanding the unlawful and immoral purposes of the foregoing affidavit, respondent Velayo knowingly signed the same in violation of his oath of office as attorney and notary public. Respondent De Leon admits his continuous cohabitation with Regina S. Balinon during his subsisting marriage with Vertudes Marquez and the fact the he prepared and subscribed the affidavit above quoted, but contends that he has not been finally convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; that while the affidavit may be illicit, it is not an agreement but a mere innocent unilateral declaration of facts; and that while the execution of said affidavit may be illegal and void ab initio, no specific law has been violated so as to give rise to an action. Respondent Velayo alleges, on the other hand, that his participation was limited to the task of notarizing the affidavit, as a matter of courtesy to a brother lawyer and without knowing its contents, and this allegation is corroborated by respondent De Leon who further stated that no consideration whatsoever passed to the former.

EN BANC March 23, 1929 In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows: LUIS B. TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER Province of Isabela (NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.) The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows: ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928 MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire. I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of
the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays. I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration. Yours respectfully, (Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public. The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by
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furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

FIRST DIVISION [A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003] ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent. [G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003] ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents. RESOLUTION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 5324333/521-2667.*1+ Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2] On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3] In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.[4] The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7] In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9] Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003. In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003. We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money; 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[16] There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
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What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22] Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented. The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession. The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.) WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Plana, J., took no part. Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents. Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf. Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, Present: A.C. No. 6672
Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821 Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719 Tel: 362-7820
- versus -
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent. Promulgated: September 4, 2009 CORONA, J.:
Back SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. (emphasis supplied) Hence, this complaint. Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.[7] The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8] Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty. We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty. The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:*6+ Front NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
10
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14] Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16] Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE. This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18] Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits. Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing. Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04: Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.*24+ As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession. Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings. A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
11
character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) lawyers name; name of the law firm with which he is connected; address; telephone number and special branch of law practiced.[28]
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED.
Bachelor of Laws 3A
12

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION
disbarment, dismissal from office and disqualification to hold public office with forfeiture of employment benefits for their involvement in Civil Case No. 7092 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City. The administrative complaint, however, was dismissed by this Court on the basis of 6 a Memorandum Report dated October 17, 1994 submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis, who likewise recommended that Atty. Sabio be required to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1103 on the ground that: Their charge that Atty. Salvador T. Sabio "clearly instigated" the filing of this complaint is also not totally baseless. In her comment, Judge Moscardon stated that ". . . the original counsel on record unquestionably accepted the Decision of the appellate RTC court (sic). On the other hand, the petitioners now, as well as their present counsel who are not fully conversant (with) the circumstances surrounding the matter, now attempt to mislead the High Court . . . ." Also worth mentioning were the allegations that (1) the respondent sheriffs were criminally charged for robbery, grave threats and malicious mischief; (2) that the plaintiffs re-occupied the premises after being ejected therefrom; (3) Atty. Sabio had been charged for crimes involving dishonesty. The foregoing points to the possible violations of the Code of Professional Ethics, particularly Canon I, Rule 1.02 (A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law . . .) and Rule 1.03 (A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause). The main bulk of Atty. Sabio's contentions were premised on the issue of whether the writs of execution were issued and implemented by herein respondents in gross violation of Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, with manifest partiality and breach of judicial trust, and with grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction. In his Compliance, Atty. Sabio asserts that the writ of execution was issued pending appeal despite the filing of a supersedeas bond and the payment of advance rentals. A review of the complaint, comment and answer filed in this case will readily show that the writs in question were issued strictly in accordance with Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which provide: Sec. 8. Immediate Execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the
13
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033 October 10, 1995 MARIBETH CORDOVA and CHRISTOPHER CORDOVA, complainants, vs. HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City; HON. BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON, former Presiding Judge of Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City; GIA L. ARINDAY, Branch Clerk of Court, and MARIO P. LAMERA, Court Sheriff, Branch 54, RTC, Bacolod City; ARMANDO N. ESO, Court Sheriff, and EDGAR DEPAMAYLO, Subpoena Server, Branch 50, RTC, Bacolod City, respondents.
REGALADO, J.: For consideration by the Court is the matter of the order we issued on November 23, 1994, requiring Atty. Salvador T. Sabio, counsel for herein complainants, to show cause and explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Acting on the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator and the Compliance filed by 3 Atty. Sabio, the Court issued a Resolution on May 30, 1995, further referring the matter to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. On July 7, 1995, the latter submitted a Report 4 and Recommendation finding Atty. Sabio guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of Canon I, which the Court hereby approves with modifications. The present incident is an offshoot of an administrative complaint filed by complainants Maribeth and Christopher Cordova, through their aforesaid counsel, Atty. Sabio, against herein respondents for
5 2 1
municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. Where defendant appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, execution of said judgment, with respect to the restoration of possession, shall not be stayed unless the appellant deposits the same amounts and within the periods referred to in Section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same manner as therein provided. The records of this administrative matter show that in an action for ejectment filed against the 7 predecessor in interest of herein complainants, judgment was rendered on April 14, 1992 by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 6, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 18761, ordering defendants to vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,200.00 appearance fee, P18,000.00 for rentals from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and costs of suit. On August 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court affirmed said judgment after finding that there was no cogent reason to reverse the lower court's decision. A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by plaintiffs on September 4, 1995, to which an Opposition and Motion for Reconsideration was filed by defendants on September 10, 1992. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion on September 28, 1992 and the writ of execution was issued on September 30, 1992. However, in the afternoon of September 29, 1992, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of September 28, 1992 granting the motion for execution, on the ground that they could not file the supersedeas bond because the court allegedly failed to apprise them of the amount thereof and, at the same time, attaching to said motion a bond in the amount of P18,000.00. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial Court on October 1, 1992, as a consequence of which the writ of execution previously issued was implemented on October 8, 1992 and plaintiffs were ordered restored to the possession of the subject premises. Therein defendant Luz Cordova went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with injunction but was rebuffed therein. In a decision promulgated on March 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29102, said appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court. As a result, the lower court granted on April 21, 1993 the Motion for Alias Writ of Execution filed by plaintiffs and ordered the release of the amounts of P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited by therein defendants. An alias writ of execution was subsequently issued on April 26, 1993.
The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants, as heirs and successors in interest of the late Luz Cordova, revolves around the validity of the writ of execution issued by Judge Moscardon and the aliaswrit of execution issued by Judge Labayen. 1. The writ of execution issued on September 30, 1992 by Judge Moscardon is being controverted on the ground that a supersedeas bond had been validly filed in this case and periodic rentals had been paid, hence said supposed compliance with the Rules of Court should have legally stayed execution pending appeal. Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70 clearly provide that to stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings, it is necessary that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from, the amount of which is to be determined from the judgment of said court. The postulation of complainants and their counsel that the execution sought was effectively stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond was sufficiently refuted and justifiably rejected when we consider the circumstances then obtaining. First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily discernible from the dispositive portion of the judgment of the municipal trial court. Hence, it was erroneous, if not altogether a deliberate falsity, for Atty. Sabio to claim that they could not file a supersedeas bond because that court failed to determine the same. Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal trial court had rendered judgment against complainants, which judgment was immediately executory, without prejudice to the right of appeal. As the records readily reveal, the purported bond was belatedly filed on September 29, 1992, more than five months later, and only after the aforementioned Regional Trial Court had already issued an order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. We cannot, therefore, elude the impression thus created that the filing thereof came only as a dilatory afterthought on the part of defendants and their counsel. In a vain attempt to remedy the situation, Atty. Sabio filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting execution, but the same necessarily had to fail for being frivolous. Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the rendition of the decision either in the court of origin or in the appellate court. The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is 8 mandatory. Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the latter court without filing a supersedeas bond. Such failure is a ground for outright execution of the judgment of the municipal trial court, the duty of the appellate court to order the execution of the appealed decision being 9 thereby ministerial and imperative.
14
Bachelor of Laws 3A
Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00 deposited by defendants therein represented rental payments for the period from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and that a writ of execution had by then already been issued by the Regional Trial Court. Evidently, therefore, the amount thus deposited could not qualify as or subserve the purpose of a supersedeas bond. Thus: Finally, anent the prayer for injunction, petitioner contends that she had deposited with the public respondent court the amount of P18,000.00 representing the money judgment, to stay execution pending appeal. The court noted that the said amount represented the rental payments only for the months from May 1991 to April 1992. It is for this reason that this Court, in its Resolution dated October 9, 1992 (p. 60, Rollo), ordered petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made pursuant to Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70. It appears, however, that a Writ of Execution was already issued and even implemented (par. 5. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 98-99, Rollo; Delivery of Possession, 10 p. 118, Rollo) that a preliminary injunction is thereby rendered nugatory. . . . While it is true, therefore, that defendants deposited an amount which approximates the monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was filed late, it could not qualify as a supersedeas bond. What is considered material for purposes of staying execution pending appeal under Rule 70 is not only the fact of payment but, more importantly, the timeliness of the filing of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the amount of P18,000.00 was correctly applied as mere rental payments from May, 1991 to April, 1992. On this ground alone, Judge Moscardon was perfectly justified in issuing the writ of execution and respondent sheriffs in implementing the same. Of these legal considerations, Atty. Sabio could not have been unaware. The records, furthermore, do not sustain Atty. Sabio's representations with respect to the application of the P12,000.00 which complainants supposedly deposited with the court a quo. Atty. Sabio insists that said amount was intended to answer for monthly rentals falling due after the rendition of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. This, however, runs contrary to the facts obtaining in this case. The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are silent on this point except for a statement found in the higher court's decision that "this Court, in its Resolution dated October 9, 1992, ordered petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made." Also, in the order of Judge Moscardon dated October 1, 1992, she stated that "the record does not show that the defendants had likewise paid the periodical rentals." Also, in the complaint filed in this administrative matter, it is alleged that the defendant consigned the rentals from May, 1991 until April, 1992 in the amount of P12,000.00. In view of these conflicting statements of complainants, plus the fact that there is not enough evidence on hand, we are prevented from making a specific determination thereon. Nevertheless, whether or not periodic rental payments were made during the pendency of the appeal no longer carries any weight in view of our earlier finding that execution could not be legally stayed by reason of the admittedly belated filing of the purported supersedeas bond.
Complainants further contend that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution allegedly because it should have forwarded the records of the case to the court of origin for proper implementation. The argument is specious. The Municipal Trial Court may issue execution immediately after judgment if no action was taken therefrom by defendants. But, after the perfection of the appeal, it is obvious that the jurisdiction over the controversy had passed to the Regional Trial 11 Court, hence the properly filed in and granted by the latter court. 2. Anent the issue on the legality of the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen, Atty. Sabio avers that the same is void for the reason that he was not furnished a copy of the order, dated April 21, 1993, which granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He further insists that the same was issued despite the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals had not yet become final and executory since it was still pending review before the Supreme Court. Under Section 10 of Rule 70, an appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall likewise not be stayed unless the appellants deposit the amount of rent due from time to time. In the case at bar, no proof has been presented to show that the monthly rentals which fell due after the rendition of the trial court's decision had been duly paid. Assuming arguendo, as claimed by Atty. Sabio, that the P12,000.00 deposited with the Regional Trial Court should answer for said rentals, the same was not sufficient to cover rentals due during the entire pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. At most, such amount could apply only to rental payments from May, 1992 to December, 1992. Of these facts, again, Atty. Sabio could not have been completely oblivious. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 31, 1993 and there is absolutely nothing in the records to show that herein complainants made further payments aside from the P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited with the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, respectively. In addition, Atty. Sabio does not refute, and in fact it is admitted in paragraph 6 of the complaint filed in this administrative matter, that complainants reentered and remained in possession of the premises, and it appears that they continued to do so despite the prior implementation of the original writ of execution. Verily, this time for failure of complainants to make periodic deposits during the pendency of the appeal and their continued occupancy of the premises, the issuance of thealias writ of execution was a ministerial and mandatory duty of respondent judges. Atty. Sabio likewise claims that execution could not issue because he was not served a copy of the 12 order dated April 21, 1993 which granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He rationalizes that: . . . The fact is that, a copy of the Order dated April 21, 1993 was not furnished the defendant's counsel. Truth to tell, this is exactly the ground why undersigned counsel filed his Urgent Motion to Lift AliasWrit of Execution, . . . .
15
It is therefore clear that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26, 1993 issued by the defendant Clerk of Court, Gia L. Aranday, was improperly issued, considering that the Order of the court granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated April 21, 1993 was not furnished the undersigned counsel, and, it is only through the resourcefulness of the undersigned of following-up this case that he came to know of the said Order dated April 21, 1993. Undersigned counsel found himself in an embarrassing situation, when he was confronted by his clients that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26, 1993 was issued without his knowledge of the prior Court Order dated April 21, 1993. It is in this respect, that undersigned honestly believed that he has a well grounded complaint against respondents Clerk of Court and process server for their negligent 13 act. (Emphasis in the original text.) That bad faith attended the filing of this administrative charge was unwittingly disclosed by the aforequoted allegations of Atty. Sabio in his compliance. No ratiocination was proffered by him nor did he invoke any authority of law or jurisprudence, since decidedly there is none, to support his theory that execution should not issue where the adverse party is not served a copy of the order even where the grant thereof had become a matter of right. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the filing of the present complaint was, at the very least, ill-conceived and malicious, and was resorted to as a last-ditch effort and a face-saving recourse of counsel. It is worth noting that the administrative complaint was filed against herein respondents only after the Court of Appeals had rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. This in itself is already a clear indication that the acts of respondents are valid and legal. Yet, Atty. Sabio persisted in instituting 14 these baseless charges against respondents to their proven prejudice. As correctly observed by the Bar Confidant, under the given circumstances, it is apparent that complainants decided to institute the present case only on the advice and/or upon the urging of Atty. Sabio. It also bears stressing that respondent Judge Labayen even waited for the Court of Appeals' decision before acting on the motion for an alias writ of execution of plaintiffs, if only to obviate any imputation of bias or partiality. We are fully convinced that, despite the misleading assertions of Atty. Sabio, the issuance of the writ of execution was done in the valid and judicious exercise of the functions and duties of respondent judges. We have carefully examined and analyzed the procedure adopted by respondents in the issuance and enforcement of the questioned writs. It would be the height of injustice were we to impose any sanction on them for complying faithfully with the procedural mandate of the rules governing the matter.
The Court would like to call attention again to the reprehensible propensity of disgruntled litigants, most especially their counsel, of filing totally baseless and unfounded charges against judges and court personnel in a vain attempt to escape the dire consequences of their own negligence or in an effort to transgress the lawful orders of the court. Judges and court personnel should be protected from unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants, abetted by counsel who seek thereby to camouflage their shortcomings. Besides, it goes without saying that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one 15 of the parties to the case is not enough. There should be evidence to prove the charge, which is obviously absent in the case at bar. As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an administrative complaint by his clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice. WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision. He is warned that a more severe sanction shall be imposed should he commit another administrative offense. Let copies hereof be attached to his record and served on the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on all courts of the land. SO ORDERED.
Bachelor of Laws 3A
16

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380] JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan 1 2 3 Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01, 6.02, and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows: Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted verbatim: xxxx This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned and his family, and those other families mentioned above are respective owners of the residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety. It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a regular and with standard height building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigneds residential house in particular, which readily poses danger to their residential house and life. To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and for the protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at your earliest opportune time. Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under construction with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your good office, your compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code. Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.) x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied) By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda 5 Soriano, respondents marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting. To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit he filed against respondent 7 before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as 8 amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c) of Republic Act No. 9 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the following findings:
17
10 6 4
Bachelor of Laws 3A
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the application of his wife for a building permit for the construction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife was not in favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other reason is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the construction of his building. From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the charges and accusations of complainant. We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283). x x x x. (Underscoring supplied) By Resolution of June 25, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala. Hence, the present Petition for Review filed by complainant. Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting. Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03. To his Comment, respondent attached the July 29, 2005 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution reads: x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of complainants building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements for the construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the
14 15 13 12 11
Building Code for constructing without a building permit committed by herein complainants wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is being processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law profession despite being employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is no sufficient 16 evidence to substantiate the complaints against the respondent. (Underscoring supplied) After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order. Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife. As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainants wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about "the danger and damages to their properties, health and safety" occasioned by the construction of the building. Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28, 17 2004, whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall 18 cause this office to instate proper legal action against you." Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005 from the Office of the Municipal Engineer showed, complainants wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to be constructed. Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not 20 prohibited. It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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19
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, 21 22 USA, when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect. He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 23 83 of the Civil Code. For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms 24 of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community." Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so 25 unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz, this Court declared that the therein respondents act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following circumstances were considered: a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman; b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person; c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child; d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife; e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia; 27 f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case. As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The community in which they have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the IBPBulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases. Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.
26
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while the first 28 marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith." Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:
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It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing 30 mistakes. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.
19

FIRST DIVISION
Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American citizen. On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of [4] Dumaguete City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34. The spouses Williams further alleged, thus: 21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law, Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she executed to buy property in Negros Oriental. 2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she would not lose her citizenship when she married an American unless she renounced it in a specific act. 2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that her act of marrying her husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution [5] supports his position, not Marisas (Annex A-4).
[3]
SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS,
A.C. No. 6353 Complainants, Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
- versus -
ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ,
Promulgated: Respondent. February 27, 2006
x----------------------------------- ---------------x RESOLUTION
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows that the false [6] charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) will not prevail in the end. In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss, respondent enumerated matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges against the complainants, and that the charges against him were bereft of any factual basis. On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for [8] investigation, report and recommendation. Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case for mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared. The parties were then directed to submit their verified position papers. In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.
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[7]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an attorney. The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for [1] Disbarment filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams. It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. [2] 13443 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants. According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that she is
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams. In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the modification that respondent be reprimanded, with a warning and advice to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients. The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations. As found by the Investigating Commissioner: There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically acquired her husbands citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines. The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a) elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyers life is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to obsoleteness [9] (Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
developments, and participate in continuing legal education programs. Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should likewise espouselegally sound arguments for clients, lest [16] the latters cause be dismissed on a technical ground. Ignorance encompasses both substantive [17] and procedural laws. We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the [18] Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. Pursuant to [19] the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and considering further that this is respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice. We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be determined on the merits in the courts a quo. WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
[15]
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional [10] Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence. Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross [11] ignorance of the law. As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a [12] [13] client. In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution, the [14] most basic law of the land. Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 6252 October 5, 2004
certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. "Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed 6 him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats." On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, Atty. Rafanan filed his 8 verified Answer. He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed. He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents. As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was dutybound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation. As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice." Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support 10 of his allegations, he submitted Certifications from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint 11 Affidavit of the two police officers who had assisted them.
9 7
JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof. The Case and the Facts Before us is a verified Complaint filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in 2 office under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 3 4 5 1.03 , Canon 5 , and Canons 12.07 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise: "x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the
1
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Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant. After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the 12 case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on 13 June 8, 2001. The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon. On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply to the verified Answer of respondent. 15 The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001. It also received complainants 16 Letter-Request to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its 17 Order dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution. The CBD received complainants Memorandum on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any. The IBPs Recommendation On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the 20 recommendation of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty." The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The Courts Ruling We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondents Administrative Liability Violation of the Notarial Law
19 18 14
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue 21 and date as part of such certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is 22 recorded." Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as 23 notaries public. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements. In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows: "The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument." For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They 25 are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest. It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry. Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija. We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the
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basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law. We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint CounterAffidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint. As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement. It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote 26 respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the 27 existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes. Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their 28 solemn oath to obey the laws. No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public. Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. 29 The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end 30 desired, disbarment should not be decreed. Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case. Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states: "Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except: a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like; b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except only in 32 certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients. "Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the 33 lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful." Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely 34 have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case. Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons: First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the 35 latters life and liberty are at stake. It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
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Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or 36 property, except by due process of law. The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents. Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation 37 which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and 38 expensive prosecutions. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases. No Proof of Harassment The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be 39 equated with liability. It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police. WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Prelude

EN BANC RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, A.C. No. 6683
Present: ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA, Respondent. CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated: June 21, 2011
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION PEREZ, J.:
The present administrative case is based on the following facts:
Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty. Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court impugning the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that called for the holding of a presidential snap election on 7 February 1986. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated with nine (9) [1] other petitions voicing a similar concern. On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing the consolidated [2] petitions, effectively upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883. On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 [4] was entrusted to the Courts Judicial Records Office (JRO) for safekeeping. The Present Case On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter to the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be [6] furnished several documents relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to be informed of how it was being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made contributions to the said fund by way [7] of the docket and legal fees they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954. On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed Atty. Teresita Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent and Mr. Biraogo. On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip [9] apprised Chief Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to [10] the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been [11] borrowed from the JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since returned. The tracer card named the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador Banzon (Atty. [12] Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo. The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action by [13] directing Atty. Dimaisip to supply information about how the respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure the return of the said rollo. Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice [14] Davide a Memorandum on 13 August 2003. In substance, the Memorandum relates that: 1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was employed with the Supreme Court as a member of the legal staff of retired Justice Emilio A.
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[8] [5] [3]
Gancayco (Justice Gancayco). Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential employment [15] that the respondent was able to gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. 2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the possible return of the [16] subject rollo. Atty. Dimaisip said that the respondent acknowledged having borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty. Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office of [17] Justice Gancayco.
On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. [18] 72954 was finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO. On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this Court, to make a study, report and recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, [20] the OCAT submitted a Memorandum to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The OCAT made the following significant observations: 1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from the Supreme Court on 20 August [21] 1991. However, as is customary, the coterminous employees of Justice Gancayco were given an extension of until 18 September 1991 to remain as employees of the court for the limited purpose of winding up their remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was already nearing the expiration of his extended tenure when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. [22] 72954 on 13 September 1991. The above circumstance indicates that the respondent borrowed the subject rollo not for any official business related to his duties as a legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but [23] merely to fulfill a personal agenda. By doing so, the respondent clearly abused his [24] confidential position for which he may be administratively sanctioned. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent is presently no longer in the employ [25] of the Supreme Court, he can no longer be sanctioned as such employee. Nevertheless, an administrative action against the respondent as a lawyer and officer of the court remains [26] feasible.
[27] [19]
2.
3.
Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En banc issued a Resolution on 9 December 2003 directing the respondent to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to return the same for a period of almost twelve (12) years. The respondent conformed to this Courts directive by submitting his Respectful Explanation [28] (Explanation) on 21 January 2004. In the said explanation, the respondent gave the following defenses:
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1.
The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow [29] the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. Instead, the respondent shifts the blame on the person whose signature actually appears on the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who, without [30] authority, took the subject rollo in his name. Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in particular as the author of such signature, the respondent, however, intimated that the same might have [31] belonged to Atty. Banzon. The respondent asserted that, for some unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended up in his box of personal papers and effects, which he brought home following the retirement of [32] Justice Gancayco. The respondent can only speculate that the one who actually borrowed the rollo might have been a colleague in the office of Justice Gancayco and that through [33] inadvertence, the same was misplaced in his personal box. The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to return the rollo, professing that he had never exerted effort to examine his box of personal papers and effects up until that [34] time when he was contacted by Atty. Dimaisip inquiring about the missing rollo. The respondent claimed that after finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed, in his personal box, he immediately extended his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no time in arranging [35] for its return.
After reviewing the records of this case, particularly the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced that it was the respondent, and no one else, who is responsible for taking out the subject rollo. The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information: 1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower of the rollo,
[46]
and
2.
2.
The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent, actually received [47] the rollo from the JRO.
3.
The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that he never [48] authorized Atty. Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf. We are, however, not convinced. First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that it was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the absence of any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been inadvertently placed in his personal box by another member of the staff [49] of Justice Gancayco. However, the respondents convenient surmise remained just thata speculation incapable of being verified definitively. Third. If anything, the respondents exceptional stature as a lawyer and former confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004: x x x However, the excuse that the rollo inadvertently or accidentally found its way to his personal box through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the fact that he was no less than the confidential legal assistance of a Member of this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is expected to exercise extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, including seeing to it that only his personal belongings were in that box for taking home after his term of office in this Court has [50] expired. Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately controverted. We, therefore, sustain its entry and hold the respondent responsible for borrowing the rolloof G.R. No. 72954. Respondents Administrative Liability
On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the respondents Explanation to the OCAT for initial [36] study. In its Report dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found the respondents Explanation to be unsatisfactory. On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to prepare a final report and recommendation. A series of [38] hearings were thus held by the OBC wherein the testimonies of the respondent, Atty. [39] [40] [41] Banzon, Atty. Dimaisip and one Atty. Pablo Gancayco were taken. On 6 August 2007, the [42] respondent submitted his Memorandum to the OBC reiterating the defenses in his Explanation. On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation to this Court. Like the OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent and found the latter to be [44] fully accountable for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it timely. The OBC, [45] thus, recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. Our Ruling We agree with the findings of the OBC. However, owing to the peculiar circumstances in this case, we find it fitting to reduce the recommended penalty. The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo
[43] [37]
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Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, We next determine his administrative culpability. We begin by laying the premises: 1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this Court and as such, can no longer [51] be held administratively sanctioned as an employee. However, the respondent, as a lawyer and a member of the bar, remains under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of this [52] Court. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his extended tenure when he [53] borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991. We must recall that Justice Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991. Hence, it may be concluded that for whatever reason the respondent borrowed the subject rollo, it was not for any official reason related [54] to the adjudication of pending cases. The respondents unjustified retention of the subject rollo for a considerable length of time all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing the same. It must be pointed out that the subject rollo had been in the clandestine possession of the respondent for almost twelve (12) years until it was finally discovered and recovered by the JRO.
As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied). Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year as too harsh for the present case. We consider the following circumstances in favor of the respondent: 1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo was borrowed on 13 September 1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which remained confidential despite the finality of the resolution in G.R. No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the respondent cooperated with the JRO for the return of the rollo. We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months.
2.
2.
3.
3.
Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises, without the courts [55] consent, is an administratively punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v. Gadon, this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus: Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's letter-complaint, should be meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking the records of the case home and forgetting about them. Court employees are, in the first place, not allowed to take any court records, papers or documents outside the court premises. It is clear that Forlales was not only negligent in his duty of transmitting promptly the records of an appealed case to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not to take the records of the case outside of the court and to [56] subsequently forget about them. (Emphasis supplied) Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the bar. It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent, even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The respondent is alsoSTERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
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ATTY. PRUDENCIO IBAEZ, respondent. S. [A.C. CBD No. 167. March 9, 1999] PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs. PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S.
This Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that *a+ lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated payment of the same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is [1] applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi, this court held that (t)he relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and [2] deserves punishment. Respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, a lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in [3] the publics eye. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a [4] responsible public office. ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the similar offense will be dealt with more severely in the future. LET copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be furnished the Department of Justice and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.
Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes (herein complainant) was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was docketed as I.S. 89-353 and assigned to Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibaez (herein respondent) for preliminary investigation. In the course of the investigation, Encarnacion Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social Security System (SSS) contribution in arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the system. The fact of non-payment was certified to by the SSS on October 2, 1989. On November 16, 1990 or over a year later, complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac a complaint for professional misconduct against Ibaez due to the latters failure to remit the SSS contributions of his sister-in-law. The complaint alleged that respondents misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascuals SSS contributions amounted to a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Seven days later, or on November 23, 1990, respondent paid P1,804.00 to the SSS on behalf of Encarnacion Pascual. In the meantime, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Tarlac Chapter, the court observing that it had no competence to receive evidence on the matter. Upon receipt of the case, the Tarlac Chapter forwarded the same to IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating Encarnacion Pascuals request to make payment to the SSS did not amount to professional misconduct but was rather an act of Christian charity. Furthermore, he claimed that the action was moot and academic, the amount of P1,804.00 having already been paid by him to the SSS. Lastly, he disclaimed liability on the ground that the acts complained were not done by him in his capacity as a practicing lawyer but on account of his office as a prosecutor. On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the respondent be reprimanded, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely in the future. On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved its Commissions recommendation. This Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP and finds respondent guilty of professional misconduct. While there is no doubt that payment of the contested amount had been effected to the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is clear however, that the same was made only after a complaint had been filed against respondent. Furthermore, the duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his office.
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SUPREME COURT Manila A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous"). Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.. The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner. After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA complainant, vs. ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
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Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant. Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent. REGALA, J.: On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child. After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites: That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and
proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child. That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar. The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent. A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed. This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondents. Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court. After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
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Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1wph1.t Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital. To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant. The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony. In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.) Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) . One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said: An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: ... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice. Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
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DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: [1] An Information for Estafa was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. VaflorFabroa (complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial [2] court granted. Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was [3] denied Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the [4] Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them.

EN BANC ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant, A.C. No. 6273 Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ.
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of Directors (the Board), [5] including her and the General Manager. The notice was signed by respondent. At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. [6] Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current Board, Gerango, complainants predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary. On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent letternotices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging [7] the duties of their positions. Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly. The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCOs By[8] Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. The RDs Resolution of February 21, 2002 was [9] later vacated for lack of jurisdiction of CDA. In her present complainant respondent:
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[10]
- versus -
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
Promulgated: March 15, 2010 x-------------------------------------------------- x

against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE [11] AID AND CONSENT TO THE SAME X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE [12] LEGAL PROFESSION 2. X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS [13] AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL [14] WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING [15] COMMUNITY AS WELL Despite the Courts grant, on respondents motion, of extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he [18] [19] should not be disciplinarily dealt with, but just the same he failed to comply. The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for [20] investigation, report, and recommendation. It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues: 1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following: 1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal [processes]. Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Bachelor of Laws 3A
[16] [17]
1.5
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers oath, particularly the following: 2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same will delay no man for money or malice
2.2 2.3
2.4 3.
Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in [21] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by [22] respondent. After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position [23] [24] papers. Complainant filed hers, but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper. In her Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the [26] complaint, however, for lack of merit. On Motion for Reconsideration, the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
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[27] [25]
1.2
1.3
1.4
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws. When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same. When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or [28] offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Sebastian v. Bajar teaches: x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their [29] processes. (Citations omitted).
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY. RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.: The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for [30] six months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he having been found to have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when [31] he had not. It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this time is thus called for. WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately. Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's
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Bachelor of Laws 3A
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows: Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason. Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case. xxx xxx xxx There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. xxx xxx xxx He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied) Atty. Almacen's statement that ... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal
of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment." The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. 1 Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words: Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time. Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus: Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal. Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No.
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L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case. There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue. Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records. It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument. His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus: At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: "Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes." "Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets." xxx xxx xxx Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
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Bachelor of Laws 3A
xxx xxx xxx Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ... xxx xxx xxx To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case. xxx xxx xxx Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith. Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines." xxx xxx xxx We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech. xxx xxx xxx The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... . xxx xxx xxx What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name." xxx xxx xxx We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses. xxx xxx xxx The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more. xxx xxx xxx As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
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our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances. He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the 2 criticisms expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at 3 all. The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566: A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... . Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable. Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon: In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed". We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites: Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision. Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this
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Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra: The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down. Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. 4 This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is 5 articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded 6 7 litigation, because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. "Our 8 decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, "are public property, and
the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion." The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have 9 been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties. Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their 10 actuations. For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of 11 courts and judges. Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their 13 performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) . Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641: No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
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and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained. ... . Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665). Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216) To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196) But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He 14 vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial 15 officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." As Mr. Justice Field puts it: ... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652) The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481) We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967) In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or 16 17 communications or in the course of a political, campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents. 1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that: It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
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2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do. The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public. 3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for reelection to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court: We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance: "It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author." Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220. 4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants. Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared: ... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public. 5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said: A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ... Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
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6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said: We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct. 7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement: I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here. The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that: ... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court. 8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that: The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ... The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court. 9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. 10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
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You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows: The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto. The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice
personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions." That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
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The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481. Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ... 11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years. 12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case. 13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred. 14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar. The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices. A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment. 1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation, found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed ... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... . 2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor
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and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared: But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... . To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that ... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.) 3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed: As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction." Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
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which, in the interest of
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion 19 thereof, Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, 20 however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
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the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule aboveadverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re 21 Brillantes, a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardianwas adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent inAlarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed. Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or nonpendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound 23 judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that ... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own 24 behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent 25 or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its
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22
Bachelor of Laws 3A
members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable. We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must 26 be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an 27 action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a 28 plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the 29 office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct 30 individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity. Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction 31 legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent. Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere 32 suspension to total removal or disbarment. The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last
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and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are 33 empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. FIRST DIVISION Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance. G.R. No. L-44388 January 30, 1985

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
VICTORIANO BULACAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAUSTINO TORCINO and FELIPA TORCINO, defendants-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The issue before us is whether or not a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should be dismissed by a municipal court on the ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to sign and file it for him. A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino Torcino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nues, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but was verified by the plaintiff-appellee himself. The verification reads: I, VICTORIANO BULACAN, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Baybay, Leyte after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law thereby depose and say: That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have caused the above complaint to be prepared by Nicolas P. Nues, Jr. and that I have voluntarily asked, sought and requested his aid to file, claim, prosecute, and defend in court my civil case against the defendants Faustino Torcino et al or others in connection with this case at the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte; that I have read and known the
contents thereon and the allegations therein are true and correct to my own knowledge. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte. s / V I C T O R I A N O B U L A C A N t / V I C T O R I A N O B U L A
C A N
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan with his Res. Cert. No. A-930280 dated Aug. 4, 1972 issued at Baybay, Leyte. s / N I C O L A S P . N U E S , J R t / N I C O
L A S P . N U E S , J R .
r 3 1 s t , 1 9 7 2 Doc. No. 344 Page No. 56 Book No. VII Series of 1972 When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the complaint was signed by Nicolas Nues, Jr. N o t On February 10, 1973, the municipal court issued the following order: a r The contending parties are given one week time to submit the proposed y compromise agreement in connection with his case. P Failure to do so will constrain this court to render judgment on the basis of the u ocular inspection conducted sometime on December, 1972. b l Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case amicably, the court rendered a decision ordering i the Torcinos to demolish and remove the portion of their house which was illegally constructed on c the land of the plaintiff The municipal court stated that there is no doubt that Victoriano Bulacan is the owner and has been in possession of Lot No. 5998 and that the lot of the defendants-appellants is on the eastern portion of said lot. The court found that the Torcinos constructed a residential house which unfortunately encroached on the lot of the plaintiff. The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte. On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore must be considered as sham and false. Four days later, another motion to dismiss the complaint was filed with the additional discussion that the fact that the complaint is verified, does not in itself cure the defect obtaining in the complaint.
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U n t i l D e c e m b e
On September 24, 1973, appellee Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to dismiss was not filed on time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in the answer in the municipal court and therefore, are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal in the Court of First Instance. The opposition also stated that the complaint substantially conforms to the Rule. On September 24, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. On December 7, 1973, when the case was called for continuance, the parties presented to the court a stipulation of facts which states and which we quote verbatim: COME NOW, the plaintiff and the defendants duly assisted by their respective counsel and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submits the following stipulation of facts, to wit: 1. That the plaintiff and the defendants hereby agree to relocate the defendants' land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-8133 which is hereto attached. 2. That should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the present construction particularly the wallings is beyond the lot of the said defendants as defined and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8133 then the defendants win remove any portion of the wallings that maybe inside the land of the plaintiff and vacate from the premises encroached. However, should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the walling constructed by the defendants does not encroach even an inch on the land of the plaintiff then the plaintiff hereby agrees to the dismissal of the present case. 3. That should the Geodetic Engineer finds out that the defendants has encroach the land of the plaintiff the defendants will be the one who will pay for the services of the Goedetic Engineer and should the findings be that no encroachment were made by the defendants, then the plaintiff should shoulder the expenses of the relocation survey. 4. That parties hereby agree that Geodetic Engineer Jaime Kudera be appointed by the Honorable Court to conduct and execute the relocation survey. 5. That plaintiff and defendants hereby agree to waive the claims and counterclaims for damages. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court renders judgment on the basis of the above stipulation of facts.
The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff Victoriano Bulacan, his new counsel Atty. Diego A. Cala defendants Faustino and Felipa Torcino, and their counsel Gerardo A. Pabello The court issued an order directing surveyor Jaime Kudera to conduct the relocation work on the basis of the stipulation. On December 17, 1983, Kudera submitted his report and on the basis of his findings, the Court of First Instance of Leyte affirmed the decision of the municipal court. The defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and assigned two errors: I THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. II THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT ON THE DECISION APPEALED FROM. The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 7, 1976 certified the appeal to us on the ground that no testimonial or oral evidence was presented by the parties and, therefore, no factual matters are in issue in the appeal. We affirm the decision of the lower court. The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the plaintiff but by one who was not a member of the bar and who designated himself merely as "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff." The appellants argue that the municipal court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule 7 which states: SEC. 5. Signature and address.Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not
52
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken out as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted. (Emphasis supplied) Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied) The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court. In the case of Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr. (126 SCRA 190) we decided a similar issue and allowed the appearance of two senior law students as friends of the complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan to prosecute the case before the sala of Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the Municipal Court of Paraaque. Similarly, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe (55 Phil. 621) a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the City Court of Manila. Court procedures are often technical and may prove like shares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent. In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr. Nues to conduct the litigation and to sign the complaint in Ms behalf, indicating his awareness that Nues in not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the pleading to be admitted rather than dismissed. As the lower court has cited:
So it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the attorney as required, but is verified by the party, substantial rights have not been affected and the defect may be disregarded as against a motion to strike. (71 C.J.S. 954- 955) Rules of pleading, practise, and procedure must be liberally construed so as to protect the rights and interests of the ties. As we stated in Paulino v. Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 257): xxx xxx xxx ... pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided. ... The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We agree with the appellee that the appellants are now estopped on this issue because they themselves prayed in the stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer would be bases for the decision of the court of first instance. We see no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion, in the lower courts' findings that the house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-23467 March 27, 1968
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AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for himself and as General President, ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents. Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner. Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent. SANCHEZ, J.: Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. The background facts are as follows: On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union, lodged a 1 complaint in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent; and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president. Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30, 1956 and 2 July 6, 1956), respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957, answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12, 1957. With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial commissioner. At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and testified. Two of these ten were permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas. On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered judgment, which provides,inter alia, that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which should have accrued to them had they not been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the meantime" and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted to their positions as seasonal workers
of respondent company (Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period of their lay-off." Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became final. Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the back wages due the ten complainants. On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages due the ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963. In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same case CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he "had actually rendered legal services to the laborers who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed by him." On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in part reads: 3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever money claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English language are hereto attached as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof; 4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above-entitled Case was already decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are also Complainants in this Case begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to TwentyFive Per Cent (25%) only for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur.
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3
Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's actual services rendered was so insignificant thereof; 5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to only Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon in 1956. On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof) of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February 28, 1963. On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his discharge specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees. On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants' motions for resonsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads in part: (b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's fees; xxx xxx xxx
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit. Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court. 1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction. These arguments are devoid of merit. The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents 5 related thereto." Expressive of the rule on this point is this 4. It is well settled that: A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court has power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even though the court may thus be called upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as original causes of action. While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the Court may thus be, called on to consider and
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(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the respondent company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing procedures; .... Biscom complied with the order of deposit.
4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc. On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.
Bachelor of Laws 3A
decide matters, which as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136-138.) Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if they would 6 otherwise, be outside its competence. To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would 7 only result in multiplicity of suits, a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually the 8 application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which renders the judgment. And, it has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition and have 9 the amount and extent of his lien judicially determined." Appropriately to be recalled at this point, is the recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral 10 thereto, such as claims for attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10) successful complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22). They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the aboveentitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien. 3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. 4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its 11 reasonableness." Lately, we said:
12
The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction.... xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10 successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3, 1956 before the 48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract only after the receipt of the decision. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by the union and its officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall be divided equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union president.
Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is between the debtor and the creditor, and not between attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is valid.Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138. In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other successful complainants 13 were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. Considering the long period of time
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Bachelor of Laws 3A
that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this judicial antidote. The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume that they have not reached an educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation between laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' 14 fees based solely on contracts. For, as in the present case, the real objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from the service. While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them, still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid to the laborers is not windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former. 5. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole of the legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the proceedings reveal the existence of an association between said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those pleadings up to judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent Fernandez. We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained to CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him about the incidents of this case." He there requested that he be furnished "separately copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent orders as well as motions in connection with the case." Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in their professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the same court. Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and
other pleadings that were filed later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous, too, were his services. And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR. 6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the event payment actually was made, he should be required to return whatever is in excess of the amount to which he 15 is entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.

SECOND DIVISION
EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Complainant,
Adm. Case No. 6589 Present: PUNO, J., Chairman,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and

57
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR., Respondent. Promulgated: December 19, 2005 DECISION TINGA, J.:
respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were not within the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving [10] aid, or consenting to the same, he added. Thus, according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and [11] the Court of Appeals. Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondents contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the [12] Commission of his change of address. Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the circumstances, [13] the Commission recommended instead the penalty of suspension for one month. As explained in the Report: A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those which were found to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be [14] suspended for one (1) month.
In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October [1] 1997, Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to attain his ends. According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving [2] a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique. The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered the [3] disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein. Plaintiffs were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio [4] Castillon who is an officer of the court. On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month [5] imprisonment and fine. Subsequently, on 26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were ordered to [6] pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.
On 30 July 2004, the IBP wit:
passed a resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation, to
In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied complainants allegations [7] and claimed that said complaint was a form of harassment. Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, [8] a hearing for the reception of complainants evidence was conducted. While notices were subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, [9] respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that
RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376 CBD Case No. 510 Epifania Q. Bantolo vs. Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
58
and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.
upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.
The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken. Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment [15] for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. Such is the situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually punished by the lower courts. A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the [16] integrity of the courts and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes [17] professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him. Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also [18] not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a months suspension from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is effective
called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.

EN BANC
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the [3] appellate courts resolution/order. In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others. In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning. On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a [4] verified petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant [5] verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued. At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country. After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that
60
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, FLORIDO, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
vs. ATTY.
JAMES
BENEDICT
C.
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer [1] by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order. In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al. Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the [2] Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. Complainant
another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years. The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case [7] No. 3898, which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients [8] cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states: CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal [9] profession. The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to [10] another. By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
[6]
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country. SO ORDERED.
Bachelor of Laws 3A
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Case 1 Topic: Canon 1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Cases in Legal Ethics

Case 2 Topic: Canon 1

(Sgd.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON Signed in the Presence of : ................................................................................................... ...................................................................................................

Case 3 Topic: Canon 2

Case 4 Topic: Canon 2

Case 5 Topic: Canon 3

Case 6 Topic: Canon 3

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent. Promulgated: September 4, 2009 CORONA, J.:

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Case 7 Topic: Canon 4

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Case 8 Topic: Canon 4

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Case 9 Topic: Canon 5

SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS,

ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ,

Promulgated: Respondent. February 27, 2006

x----------------------------------- ---------------x RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Case 10 Topic: Canon 5

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Case 11 Topic: Canon 6

Promulgated: June 21, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION PEREZ, J.:

The present administrative case is based on the following facts:

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Case 12 Topic: Canon 6

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Case 13 Topic: Canon 7

Case 14 Topic: Canon 7

Case 15 Topic: Canon 8

ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.

Promulgated: March 15, 2010 x-------------------------------------------------- x

against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that

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Case 16 Topic: Canon 8

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which, in the interest of

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Case 17 Topic: Canon 9

Case 18 Topic: Canon 9

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Case 19 Topic: Canon 10

EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Complainant,

Adm. Case No. 6589 Present: PUNO, J., Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and

On 30 July 2004, the IBP wit:

passed a resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation, to

Case 20 Topic: Canon 10

[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, FLORIDO, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Cases in Legal Ethics

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