People v.

Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992] Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng consented to. When they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41 packages of drugs

were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure. * Case showing valid waiver The accused driving a vehicle, was stopped at a checkpoint, and when the vehicle was inspected, the soldiers asked permission to see the contents of the bag which was partially covered by a spare tire. The accused consented, and upon inspection, the bag was found to contain marijuana. (NACHURA)

People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998] En Banc, Martinez (J): 12 concur Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by the Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulays illegal drug trade. On 17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain quantity of drugs that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3 vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery and waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulays vehicle at 3:00 am. The operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3 suspects were brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the NBI for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulays house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on shabu, and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained. On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio Correa y Cayton @ Boyet, Rito Gunida y Sesante @ Dodong, and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ Boy Kuba for having violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3 accused pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty as charged and were sentenced to death and a fine of P10 million. Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure, due to waiver on their part. Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ Boyet, Rito Gunida y Sesante @ Dodong, and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ Boy Kuba are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search and

seizure. They never protested when the police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Further, they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial. * Case showing valid waiver Police officers informed that the accused would deliver marijuana, followed the accused, then informed that later accosted him and one of the policemen opened a tin can in the jeepney of the accused but the accused didnt protest . The SC held that there was consent. (NACHURA)

People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994] Third Division, Feliciano (J): 3 concur Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed. Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver. Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby i.e., the fruits of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the

carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command (Narcom) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or tipped off by an undercover deep penetration agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the record that any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. As the constitutional guarranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and invalid. The fruits of the invalid search and seizure i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against Barros.

ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27, 2004 Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure. While admittedly, Paula Matillano failed to object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties, such failure to oblect or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search & seizure. The petitioners were armed with handgun, Lui had threatened and intimidated her and her husband was out of the house when the petitioner & the cohorts conducted the search. In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and seizure? Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following: a. that the right exists;

People vs. Damaso [GR 93516, 12 August 1992] First Division, Medialdea (J): 3 concur Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso(@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled Ang Bayan, xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecutions evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Damaso appealed.

b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of said right; c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to be valid. The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. CA.

Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house. Held: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her . The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed Damasos helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities intrusion into Damasos dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damasos house at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his house. ***waiver must be given by the person whose right is violated.. PC officers sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan City, reached a house suspected to be rented by a rebel. Outside the house, they saw one Luz, Tanciangco (who turned out to be a helper of the accused). The PC officers told Luz that they already knew that she was a member of NPA, and requested that they be allowed to look around. Luz consented. Inside the house, the team found subversive materials and firearms, which Luz identified as belonging to the accused.

Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 December 1975] Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by the combined team of agents of the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco. During the period from the latter part of August to September 18, 1966, the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it loaded copra and coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of Indonesia. In its trip to Indonesia it brought various merchandise from the Philippines which were exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee beans and subsequently taken to Davao City. Said vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on 18 September 1966 on its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia before proceeding to Davao City where it was apprehended on 19 September 1966. At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was searched and after Captain Pantinople informed the team that Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional AntiSmuggling Center operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of Davao, proceeded to the Velascos room at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said document. Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they entered the room. There are conficting claims whether the manicurist Teofila Ibaez or whether Velascos wife, who was allegedly inside the room at that time, voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter; and whether the police officers forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away the same, or whether Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open the suitcases and baggages of Velasco and delivered the documents and things contained therein to Reynolds. The Collector of Customs of Davao seized 1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema. The seizure was declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court on 29 November 1974 in Nasiad vs. Court of Tax Appeals (GR L-29318, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In the present special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; the only question left then is whether the search conducted by a party headed by Reynolds without the search warrant for the hotel room of Velasco, who entered into a contract with Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and use ostensibly for fishing, is violative of such constitutional provision. Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of the person who was the occupant of the hotel room then rented by Velasco.

SC held that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches & seizures , being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded, or one who is authorized to do so in his behalf. Here, there was no evidence that Luz was authorized to open the house of the accused in his absence. Accordingly, the search , as well as the seizure, was declared illegal. (NACHURA)

Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the written statement of Teofila Ibaez (allegedly wife of Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating that the person who was present at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibaez, a manicurist by occupation. If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibaez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would

have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant *** There was deemed a valid waiver where, upon a warrantless search of a hotel room, consent and voluntary surrender of papers belonging to the registered but absent occupant was given by a woman identified as the wife of the occupant although it turned out later that she was, in fact, a mere manicurist. (NACHURA) People vs. Asis [GR 142531, 15 October 2002] En Banc, Panganiban (J): 7 concur, 6 on official leave Facts: Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an Information dated 18 February 1998; the information stating That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; one (1) wristwatch one (1) gold necklace; and undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. When arraigned on 9 July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused to the crime. After due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8 March 2000, held that the crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, ruled that although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two (2) x x x committed the crime, and appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do not question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was Formentos wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant.

Issue: Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the bloodstained pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search. Held: Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not present when the search was made. Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that moment. There was no interpreter to assist him a deaf-mute during the arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law, becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal. ***Ruling in Lopez not applied here.. because at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, appellant Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the subject of the search, he himself should have given consent. Added to this is the fact that the appellant is a deaf-mute who could not understand what was happening at the moment, there being no interpreter to assist him. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance.