Challenges of Public Participation in the GRP-MILF Peace Talks: By Atty.

Charina Sanz1 Mobilizing public support for the peace talks is perhaps one of the most formidable tasks ever faced by the negotiating panels of the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Mercado 2009:47). For almost a decade now, hundreds of consultations were conducted by government among stakeholders. There were also countless of dialogues, forums, conferences, trainings, summits held among civil society all with the goal of drumming public interest and understanding of the peace process. So much resources have been poured into peace-related initiatives, engagement with stakeholders activities, and communication programs not only by government and civil society but also by donor programs. If an accounting could perhaps be done, the amount would definitely reach staggering proportions. But it would have no doubt been a good investment had all this been translated into public support to negotiated agreements such as the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The public rejection of the MOA-AD, following the Supreme Courts injunction against its signing on August 5 last year, stunned both the peace panels and many in the peace civil society networks. The MOA drew sharp criticisms not only from those expected to oppose it such as (Christian) LGUs adjoining the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao but also from senators, congressmen, the media and even by some members of civil society. Among the issues raised against it were procedural: The province of North Cotabato and the cities of Zamboanga and Iligan complained that they were not consulted and informed about the MOA-AD; the Lumads felt they were also excluded from the whole process. From August to October last year, the MOA-AD was vilified and pilloried by a public that sees the agreement as nothing but conceding a territory to the MILF that would cause the countrys dismemberment. Clearly, there was confusion and deep misunderstanding on the issues but drowned out in the public outcry were the underlying reasons why the peace negotiations were in the first place being held, that it seeks resolution of a sovereignty-based conflict (Mercado 2009:47), redress of historical grievances and recognition of the Bangsamoros rights to self-determination and control over their ancestral domain. If at all, the MOA-AD debacle only goes to show that public support is crucial to the peace process. But what does it really take to win public support to the peace talks and more specifically to contentious negotiated agreements?

The writer is a lawyer, researcher and former journalist and is currently finishing her thesis on the same subject for a Masters degree in Applied Social Research (MASOR) at the Ateneo de Davao University. She is also now working with the Mindanao Commission on Women. as a member of its communications team.

Meaningful participation by the public seems to be the key that can galvanize support for negotiated agreements; and agreements gain legitimacy only when the public gets to be involved in all stages of peacemaking - from preparatory, negotiations, agreement signing to implementation. These are lessons learned from peace processes studies done in other areas with protracted conflict. Without a strong constituency supporting the peace agreement, it is bound to fail and run the risk of being rejected and opposed by the public as what was clearly shown in the MOA-AD. The public has a sense of ownership over it when it participates in the process of shaping the contents and providing substantive inputs on the issues being negotiated. Genuine substantive issues are also surfaced and become subject of political dialogue, problem-solving and constructive action. (Barnes 2002:12) Barnes writes that when these processes were conducted in the 'public sphere,' the public was better able to understand and potentially accept the reasons for the compromises reached. The agreements reached were subsequently imbued with greater legitimacy. Also, the processes helped to establish the value of public debate and democratic processes as the legitimate response to conflict and marked a historic moment of real change in each country we studied. Without public participation, agreements that are reached exclusively on negotiations between leaders of combatant groups, while satisfying their core interests, may also fail to address the underlying substantive issues that are of concern to the public. While strategy may be effective for ending the violence, it may exacerbate public mistrust and undermine the legitimacy of the agreement nor does the process facilitate reconciliation between communities and sectors divided by war. (Barnes 2002b) Barnes (2002a) also argues that based on case studies done by Conciliation Resources, negotiation processes which are more inclusive involving a spectrum of political and societal groupings, including women and others typically marginalized from decisionmaking, can catalyse profound change in the conflict dynamics and state-society relations. To varying degrees, they were able to influence the negotiation agenda, the substantive agreements and their implementation. This paper seeks to explore the nature of public participation in the GRP-MILF peace talks by first examining the different governmental policies and meanings of consultation and public participation. A presentation of the range of participation modalities from existing literature comes next as well as their application in public participation in the peace process. Lastly, critical factors that may affect the viability of public participation in the GRP-MILF peace process will be explored. Lack of Consultation and Transparency Paradoxically, despite governments claims that it conducted more than a hundred consultations, some Mindanao analysts point out that the major flaws of the GRP-MILF peace negotiations were the absence of consultations among stakeholders and a lack of

transparency and accountability (Mercado 2008:48). A lack of consultation contravenes the very essence of any peace process which is participative of the stakeholders. The participative aspect of any process can not be overemphasized since this should lead to a regional and national consensus on the peace formula, argues Mercado. This is a view also shared by Archbishop Orlando B. Quevedo, OMI. (Quevedo 2008: 55). It is the lack of clarity (in key concepts of) the MOA-AD aggravated by a lack of consultation and reinforced by anger, misinformation, misconceptions, biases, prejudices and resistance to change, led to the present grave uncertainties regarding the peace process, he writes. An analysis from the Center for People Empowerment in Governance also urges the MILF to take a second look at the strong backlash ignited by the MOA-AD. A lesson that can be drawn is the fact that the war for self-determination involves not only taking arms and talking but also a political war to win the broadest support for the just and historic struggle of the Bangsamoro people. A lot of hard work needs to be done in this area, states CENPEG (2008). The Supreme Court decision declaring the MOA-AD unconstitutional cited some procedural flaws as among the reasons why it was struck down. In its ruling on the case of The Province of North Cotabato, et.al. vs. The GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, the Court said that that GRP panel and the Presidential Adviser of the Peace Process (PAPP) failed to implement a consultation and feedback mechanism provided under Executive Order No.3 issued by President Gloria Arroyo. Executive Order No. 3 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of a National Peace Forum intended as the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government-civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives." PAPP is also the one mandated to [c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process. The Court also states that E.O. No. 3 is intended to enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the peoples participation. It cited that an underlying principle of the comprehensive peace process is that it should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community

Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process. But contrary to perceptions that there were no consultations done, Candelaria (2009: 12) points out that the government panel and the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) in fact conducted about 112 or so consultations. It is unfortunate that the Court failed to give sufficient weight to these consultations, says Candelaria who is former chief legal consultant of the GRP Panel. A serious and incisive examination of the documented consultative fora, resolutions of local government units and position papers reveals consistency with the E.O. 3. The government panel and OPAPP also assert that the conduct of a plebiscite at least six months following the signing of the MOA-AD would have been more than enough compliance to the consultation requirement. Candelaria further writes: The Court admitted that it may not require the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct consultation in a particular way or manner but may require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions with the authority granted by the President. The threshold of a constitutionally compliant consultative process, however, is not clearly defined in the judgment. This is where peace negotiators and advocates may contribute in crystallizing the limits of compliance with the corresponding respect for the integrity of the confidential character of crucial stages of peace negotiations (underscoring supplied) (Candelaria 2009: 112) The GRP panel, according to him, is also in receipt of local government resolutions, statements and memoranda expressing their sentiments on the key issues (for example, opposition to inclusion in Bangsamoro Homeland and the need for consultations, adding representatives to the Panel, etc. (Candelaria 2008: 43) Local Government Code of 1991 The Supreme Court also declared that local government units should be consulted and informed on the MOA-AD following the provision on prior consultations required from national agencies and offices upon implementation of any projects or programs:
Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. (Italics and underscoring supplied)

Although the Court notes that in the case of Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao, the prior consultation requirement only applies to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment, the Court said. From provisions under E.O 3 and Local Government Code, it can be gleaned that while consultations are made requirements for viable peace processes or programs and projects at the community level, the laws and even the Court decision on the MOA-AD failed to define exactly what consultation means. More importantly, what also needs to be clarified is the prescribed format or procedure that would be constitutionally compliant, borrowing from Candelaria (2009), by which consultations should be conducted. Should consultations then be sufficient in terms of number of participants, areas covered or sectors consulted? Or would the sufficiency of consultations be measured in terms of public acceptability of the negotiated agreement? At what stage of the peacemaking should consultations be conducted and the public able to participate? Is it starting from the preparatory stage and following through from the formal negotiation up to signing of agreements and their implementation? What happens then if despite compliance with the prescribed format there would be no public acceptance? Will these invalidate the consultations conducted and the agreements reached by parties? If the consultative mechanisms that were used have failed, what then would be forms or mechanisms that would guarantee participation? To answer these questions, it is important to first take a look at key concepts on consultation and public participation from existing literature. Defining Consultations Consultations (or consultative mechanisms) are one of basic modalities for enabling participation in peace negotiations. The other two are representative participation through political parties and direct participation where all interested individuals engage in a process of developing and implementing agreements to address the conflict. (Carl 2009). Existing literature on consultations locates the concept to the concept of participation, particularly effective participation in governance (Barnes 2002a:10). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) defines participation as a bottom-up process within which people enter (and often help to create) spaces for interaction with and influencing of decision-making mechanisms. Participation is an action undertaken by citizens." (Peacebuilding Initiative: n.d) (See other definitions from the World Bank; FAO; OECD, and others.)

Public participation is becoming to be viewed as a right under international law. Burgess and Malek, citing Hart (2003), seeks public participation as a right that packs a moral punch but lacks legal teeth and effective enforcement." Now being promoted as both a right and a necessity, public participation right is established in international declarations and conventions adopted by most nations, as well as in many recent national constitutions. Hart (2003:1) says that while there is no mandate for governments to be legally required to solicit public participation, it is often in their best interest to do so. Modalities of Participation The existing literature offers several modalities or indicators that measure the extent and effectivity of public participation as follows: Arnsteins Citizens Ladder of Participation; the Core Values of Participation from the International Association of Public Participation (IAP2); Walkers 3 Cs of Public Participation; and Burgess and Spanglers (2003) concept of consensus building. Arnsteins citizens ladder of participation illustrate the different levels by which citizens get to have meaningful participation (at the highest rung) where they have real power affecting the outcome of the process or just going through the empty ritual of participation at the lowest rung. Arnstein argues that participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. It maintains the status quo. Levels 1 (Manipulation) and 2 (Therapy) are non-participative and the aim is simply to cure or educate the participants. Level 3 (Informing) is a most important first step to legitimate participation. But too frequently the emphasis is on a one-way flow of information. No channel for feedback. Level 4 (Consultation) is a legitimate step and includes attitude surveys, neighbourhood meetings and public hearing but Arnstein still feels this is just a window dressing ritual. Level 5 (Placation) is an example of cooption allowing citizens to advise or plan ad infinitum but retains for power holders the right to judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice. Level 6 (Partnership) is where power gets redistributed through negotiation between citizens and power holders. Level 7 (Delegated power) is where citizens hold a clear majority of seats on committees with delegated powers to make decisions. Public now has the power to assure accountability of the program to them. Level 8 (Citizen Control) is where the have-nots handle the entire job of planning, policy making and managing a programe. Walkers 3 Cs of Public Participation is also instructive. Consultation is one of three general types of public participation process along with consensus, and collaboration. Consultation involves parties in decision-making but not collaborative nor does it involve any form of consensus. Its basic activities are information gathering and feedback. (Walker n.d. ) Feedback is invited when a decision authority seeks input from other parties. The decision authority might present a range of possible alternative decisions or propose a

specific action and then seek the reactions of other parties, such as those likely affected by the decision. The decision authority may ask for ideas as it begins a planning process. In either case, the decision authority provides opportunities for participation in the decision situation without participating in the process of decision making itself. (cf Walker) On the other hand, consensus is a better alternative to consultation, according to Walker, as decision authorities and citizens have become disenchanted with the consultative strategy. Citing Dukes (1996), he defined consensus as either approval [of the agreement] or the absence of active opposition by each interest. Consensus refers to an outcome in which an agreement, settlement, or solution is generated that all participating parties can support, or at least will not oppose. The third process is collaboration which for Walker involves a process of joint decision making among key stakeholders of a problem. Five features are critical to the process: (1) the stakeholders are interdependent, (2) solutions emerge by dealing constructively with differences, (3) joint ownership of decisions is involved, (4) stakeholders assume collective responsibility for the future direction of the domain, and (5) collaboration is an emergent property. Collaboration implies a joint decision making approach to problem resolution where power is shared, and stakeholders take collective responsibility for their actions and subsequent outcomes from those actions, writes Walker, citing Gray (1996), Selin and Chavez (1995). In collaborative conflict management and decision making activities, people have meaningful opportunities for voice, that is, to communicate as participants in significant ways. Their ideas and interactions matter in both the process and outcome of the situation. Burgess and Spangler (2003) presents another variation of consensus called consensus building but it is more than just consensus as defined by Walker because it encompasses collaborative problem solving or collaboration. Consensus building is a process that allows various stakeholders (parties with an interest in the problem or issue) to work together to develop a mutually acceptable solution. The process allows a variety of people to have input into decision-making processes, rather than leaving controversial decisions up to government representatives or experts. Models of consensus building vary from three to ten stages, but all address the same set of fundamental issues, but more or less have the following steps: problem identification; participant identification and recruitment; convening; securing funds; finding a location; selecting a convener, facilitator, and/or mediator; process design; problem definition and analysis; decision making; approval of the agreement; and implementation. It is noteworthy to point out that based on these above views, consultation is viewed as mere window dressing ritual (Arnstein) or not collaborative nor involving any form of consensus and merely information gathering and feedback. (Walker). Consensus or consensus-building or collaboration are the preferred modes of the authors which they see

as a higher form of participation where people get to have meaningful influence in the outcome. Participation mechanisms in peace processes Some examples of participation mechanisms in peace processes cited in case studies done by the Conciliation Resources are social mobilization and political engagement in peace processes; communications strategy for peace; peace advocates; national peace conferences; referenda and plebiscite; government commissions and civic forums. The study also cited the Philippines National Unification Commission created by then newlyelected President Fidel V. Ramos to come up with an agenda for peace talks. The NUC is a nationwide consultation process that aimed to develop a strategy for talks with various armed groups. A paper written by Miriam Coronel Ferrer (2002) states that despite shortcomings, the NUCs report was groundbreaking in recognizing poverty and inequality as the primary causes of conflict and in setting out the Six Paths to Peace that became the operational framework for government peace policy. The process reinvigorated the peace process, raised public awareness, helped crystallize a network of peace organizations and made public consultation a part of governance. Ferrer writes that the NUC exercise helped institutionalize public consultations as a regular part of governance. Inspired by the NUC's success, government and civil society groups have used subsequent consultations - or 'summits' - to address specific issues like economic development, poverty and crime. Consultations that enable direct interface with government have generated more pressure to deliver results. But consultations alone are not enough. If held repeatedly but without substantial outcomes, participants become cynical about the purpose and the sincerity of those engaged. This soon overrides the usefulness of the process as a mechanism for building consensus. Instead, consultations should be cumulative and be seen as such - building from the outcome of the previous ones - rather than merely repetitive. Government and society must consistently follow through with the changes identified through these processes if a just and sustainable peace is to emerge, even if only block by block. (Ferrer 2002) The NUC serves as a good participation model but The National Peace Forum stablished under E.O. No.3 seems to be an ideal successor to the NUC. But whether or not the National Peace Forum took off or why it apparently failed to operate according to the mandate it was given can best be answered by OPAPP and subject to a separate research. But many factors seem to be at work in determining the success of certain mechanisms. The NUC came at a time when the Ramos administration was bent on forging an agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front. The conditions are not the same with regards the National Peace Forum under the Arroyo administration which perhaps explains its fate. Delving into this some more, the paper hazards to raise a list of critical areas that can be looked into and hopefully help inform any future operational framework on the conduct of consultations or any participative mechanisms.

Some Critical Areas 1. Confidentiality Nature of Peace Negotiations In reflecting on public participation in Mindanao peace processes, Fr. Roberto Layson, OMI writes in 2003 that both the government and the MILF must observe transparency if there is going to be a real participation of the people in the peace process. Says Layson: We cannot condone back-channeling approach that leaves many of us in confusion. The public must assert their right to know and to be informed regarding what the GRP and MILF talked in private. It is understandable how there may be reluctance on the part of armed groups like the MILF to democratize the process for public participation because of apprehensions that it might also open the floodgates of letting the spoilers in and sabotage the process (Barnes 2002b). In Mindanaos case, the apprehensions may also be that by letting the majority Christian settlers into the process, it could unexpectedly lead to a popularity poll where, going by numbers, the minority Moros are definitely at a disadvantage. A history of marginalization explains these apprehensions. A number of CSOs in fact share this view and caution against opening up the process to a broader public which has overwhelming bias and prejudices against the Moros and undermine their assertions towards right to self-determination. If ever the process is democratized, the public has to have a prior understanding and appreciation that the peace negotiations are towards solving a sovereignty-based conflict. But the MILF should heed findings from studies on peace processes in other countries where peace agreements become successful when the parties open the door to allow other voices to shape the agenda of the negotiations. Elite pactmaking, described by Barnes (2002a:7) as strategy for negotiations to end conflict where combatants are met with the assistance of an international mediator and often behind closed doors in a foreign location, sometimes fail to provide opportunities to address the substantive issues that are often the roots of conflict. With transparency, people understand the issues more, contribute in the discussions and are more likely to accept the agreement reached. Wanis-St. John (2008) writes that more and more peace scholars and practitioners are now studying and advocating for the merits of public participation. He acknowledges that a tension can emerge between the secrecy and exclusion needed to make peace (and negotiated agreements) and inclusion needed to embed the peace in society after a violent conflict, especially if what negotiators and policymakers do in one sphere (peacemaking) undermines what happens in the other sphere (peacebuilding). He proposes creative ways to manage and overcome that tension which he describes as resulting from two opposing needs: the need to produce negotiations that include the minimum number of factions/participants required to get agreement, and the need to create the broadest possible support among the population and political parties for a peace process.

So how can the public realistically participate in the negotiations? Wanis-St. John (2008) said that since mediators cannot simply invite the public to rounds of peace negotiations as if they were a festival, it is through groups organized in the civic sphere that public participation can be realized. 2. Inclusion and Exclusion Issues The process must be inclusive of the major stakeholders of the negotiated peace they must be on board, writes Mercado (2009b: 122). It does not mean numbers or quantity of participants but significant persons or quality of stakeholders that would create the groundswell of support to both the process as well as the substance of any agreement. These stakeholders should include LGUs, Congress, civil society and the private sector (business) who act, acoording to Mercado, as guarnators that the process is not only inclusive but also transparent and accountable. The clamor of the Indigenous Peoples (Lumads) that their assertions towards selfdetermination and their prior claims to their own ancestral domain should also be heeded. (Mercado 2009b:123). Mindanao Lumads who opposed their inclusion in the Bangsamoro category felt that this is a violation of their right of self-ascription under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. According to the Lumads, the MOA-AD should have explicit provisions recognizing and respecting their own collective rights for self-determination and over their ancestral domain claims. It would be morally and legally infirm if the process and agreement are undertaken on the basis of might and not on the rightness and morality of the claim and aspiration. In fact, any agreement not based on morality and justice would NOT be sustainable (underscore supplied by author). (Mercado 2009b: 123) The Local Government Units, specifically the province of North Cotabato and the cities of Zamboanga and Iligan, claimed in their petition before the Supreme Court that the GRP panel and the PAPP drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting them or the communities affected nor informing them of the proceedings. LGUs claim that their rights to consultation and information on matters of public concern were violated. The GRP panel and PAPP however contend that these issues of consultation and information would have been addressed through the conduct of a plebiscite within 6 months after the signing of the MOA on 700 barangays outside of ARMM that would be restored to the ancestral domain. More towns would be included, again subject to plebiscite after 25 years. (Quevedo 2008) The government stipulates to conduct and deliver, within six (6) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A. [MOA-AD Territory Par. 2 (c)] For its part, the MILF acknowledged that they had shortcomings, having relied too much on government to reach out to the non-Moros, according to MILF vice chair for

political affairs Ghazali Jaafar, quoted by Mindanews (Arguillas 2009), during Konsult Mindanaws presentation of its findings to the MILF. We want the agreement reached to be acceptable not only to the majority but also to the migrants, Jaafar was quoted. He also related that both peace panels had agreed to conduct consultations with their constituents and that the MILF did its part. Wanting to rectify their shortcomings, he disclosed that they have commissioned several groups to reach out to brothers and sisters among the Tedurays, Manobo, Arumanen, Blaaan as far as Agusan and Davao del Sur. The MILF also established a Department of Mindanao Migrants to focus on the non-Moro issues. (Arguillas 2009) 3. Role of Civil Society Civil society in Mindanao, a network of NGOs, religious groups and grassroots organizations, have lobbied for, advocated and created its own spaces for participation in the peace process. (See Arguillas 2002 for examples). Countless consultations, forums, dialogues, conferences and peace summits were also conducted in Mindanao and in Metro Manila that were intended to mobilize support within civil society itself, media, grassroots communities, schools, LGUs, indigenous peoples, and many others. But participation in the peace negotiations by civil society is limited: some were invited as process observers during the negotiations (Abubakar 2005) or as members of technical working groups of the GRP panel. Other studies on the role of civil society in the peace process can best explain the extent of participation, for example Rood (2005); Ferrer (2005); Guiam (1999). Aside from lobbying for civil society representation in the negotiations, civil society groups also exert its own initiatives in mobilizing public support and increasing public participation to the negotiations. These come in the form of information campaigns, peace caravans, printing of educational materials, holding of media summits, among others. Various communication strategies were also developed by different groups targeting the broad public but an assessment in terms of impact is yet to be done. After the MOA-AD, a number of Mindanao peace CSOs conducted their own consultations among various communities and stakeholders. These include the Mindanao Peaceweavers; BUC-led Konsult Mindanaw; Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM); Bangsamoro Center for JustPeace (BCJP); Mindanao Business Council and the National Democratic Institute. Results and findings from these consultations will be used to formulate a peace agenda, according to the CSOs, that they intend to submit to both the GRP and MILF peace panels and political candidates of national and local posts running for the May 2010 polls. Some questions raised by civil society are the following:

Will civil society-led consultations be considered as a supplementary parallel mechanism for public participation that can merit recognition and acceptance by both the GRP-MILF panels?

Is there a process or mechanism within the peace negotiations by which results and findings from these consultations be considered by the panels as substantive inputs in framing the agenda of the negotiations? How should these results and findings be reported? Is there a sufficiency in form and content criteria that may be followed?

4. Social Mobilization and Peace Communication Strategies Social mobilization and communication strategies that were carried out by CSOs and government yielded minimal results in terms of generating mass support to agreements reached in peace negotiations. So far, there is yet no published evaluation on the impact of peace communication programs but it would help if the following questions be considered: What is the nature and types of communication initiatives and programs in support of peace process? Who is doing communication work among government agencies, donor programs and CSOs? How are these programs designed? Is the design geared towards mobilizing public support and increasing public participation? How is impact gauged? In what way could these initiatives generate more impact? Would a convergence of efforts help instead of spontaneous scattered bits and pieces of programs and strategies? 5. Powerful vested interests and a weak state Mobilizing public involvement and support to the peace negotiations is made more challenging on account of the presence of powerful players in control of local politics and economy in Mindanao with various vested interests. These include political warlords with private armies and a host of armed groups that operate in the island. A lot of areas are also plagued with a weak governance system due to persistent armed conflict. The peace process is inextricably linked to the political situation and its fate and outcome may depend on the political status of the negotiating government. The social capital and the credibility of the Government are busted. For a peace process to bring to a successful conclusion will require a very high social capital and credibility that this Government sorely lacks. Government has to do a lot of selling, cajoling and convincing, especially so when the waters the Parties have navigated in coming up with the MOA-AD are deep and little known. For this very reason, Government should have walked the extra mile in making sure that the stakeholders are on board. (Mercado 2009:48). Kreuzer (2008) offers another explanation on what he describes as the governments impotence in the face of the instrumental use of democratic ideals and institutions by opportunistically motivated spoilers. He asserts that a structurally weak government whose policies are highly-fragmented proves incapable to pursue consistent policies over a longer period. Writes Kreuzer (2008: 26) Even if we assume that the government was interested and willing to conclude an agreement, it was neither the only accepted representative of

the Philippine side to the conflict (as many other parties demanded their inclusion), nor was it able to ensure compliance. Even though the government proved capable of negotiating an agreement, it did not enjoy sufficient support from its own national constituency for agreements to be implemented successfully (citing Lieberfeld 1999, 77). Unless the government makes a firm commitment to address the roots of conflict and keeps in check the vested interests of powerful players for the sake of advancing peace, there can be no real change. But with pressure from a public in full support of the peace process that is seriously regarded as the most feasible means to finally resolve the roots of conflict, it can be done. The tasks indeed are formidable yet the parties should realize that it is only through meaningful public participation that there can there be successful implementation of negotiated peace agreements. Civil society should also take a long and hard look at its practices, particularly at the design, implementation and impact of projects. A scrutiny should also be made on what the endless round of peace activities do really achieve in the long-term. So too with how consultations are being conducted where participants only attend window dressing rituals, borrowing from Arnstein, for reporting and documentation purposes without letting participants explore the substantive issues of the conflict or getting their consensus. All these would be meaningless exercises if in the end there would be no public support for the peace process. What is also perhaps most needed at this time is a more coherent and strategic programming geared towards enabling real participation of the people where their voices are heard and their issues and position papers substantively addressed rather than regarding them as mere passive target audiences of peace advocacy and communication projects. The lessons from the MOA-AD debacle should not be forgotten. The cause of peace is better served where there are genuine spaces for people to participate in shaping their future and the establishment of long-lasting peace in Mindanao. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abubakar, Ayesah. (2005). Challenges of peacebuilding in the GRP-MILF peace process. www.mindanews.com. Arguillas, Carolyn. (24 November 2009). Konsult Mindanaw presents findings to MILF; MILF says we want agreement acceptable to all. www.mindanews.com. Arguillas, Carolyn (2003) Enlarging spaces and strengthening voices for peace: Civil society initiatives in Midnanao. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/philippines-mindanao/enlarging-spaces.php

Arnstein, Sherrry R. (1969) A Ladder of Citizen Participation. JAIP, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1969, pp. 216-224. Barnes, Catherine (2002a). Democratizing peacemaking processes: Strategies and dilemmas for public participation, In C. Barnes (Ed.). Owning the process: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Conciliation Resources Accord Issue 13. Barnes, Catherine. (2002b). Owning the Process: Mechanisms for Political Participation of the Public in Peacemaking. An Accord Programme Joint Analysis Workshop Report. Old Joordans, Buckinghamsshire, United Kingdom, 1-3 February 2002. Burgess, Heidi and Cate Malek. (2005) "Public Participation." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/public_participation Burgess, Heidi and Brad Spangler. (2003) "Consensus Building." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/consensus_building/>. Candelaria, Sedfrey. (2008). Silencing Peace: The Story of MOA-AD in Pieces for Peace: The MOA and the Mindanao Conflict. Manila: Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID), Magbassa Kita Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Candelaria, Sedfrey. (2009). Postscript to the SC MOA-AD Judgment: No Other Way But to Move Forward in Voices of Dissent: A Postscript to the MOA-AD Decision. Manila: PCID, Magbassa Kita Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Carl, Andy. (2009). Public participation in peace processes and the challenges of inclusion and exclusion. Paper presented to Women Negotiating Peace Experience, Obstacles, Opportunities - Conference programme. 19 June 2009. http://vefsetur.hi.is/1325/sites/vefsetur.hi.is.1325/files/Andy%20Carl.PDF Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CENPEG). (24 August 2008). MOAAD: Its not over yet. CENPEG. Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa (April 1999) A critical partnership: civil society and the peace process. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/philippinesmindanao/critical-partnership.php Ferrer, Miriam Coronel (2002). Philippines National Unification Commission: national consultations and the Six Paths to Peace in C. Barnes (Ed.). Owning the process: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Conciliation Resources Accord Issue 13.

Ferrer, Miriam Coronel (2005). Institutional Response: Civil Society. A Background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005. GRP-MILF Negotiating Panels (2008). Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain. Hart, Vivien..(2003). Democratic Constitution Making. In United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Special Report No. 107. www.usip.org International Association for Public Participation. Core Values for the Practice of Public Participation. http://www.iap2.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=4. Layson, Roberto. 2003. Reflections on Public Participation in Peace Processes in Mindanao. Paper presented during the seminar workshop on Learning from Public Particiaption in Peacemaking. 18 September 2003. Sydney Hotel, General Santos City. Mercado, Eliseo. 2008. MOA- Quo Vadis? in Pieces for Peace: The MOA and the Mindanao Conflict. Manila: PCID, Magbassa Kita Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Mercado, Eliseo. 2009. Forging Ahead Post MOA-AD in Voices of Dissent: A Postscript to the MOA-AD Decision. Manila: PCID, Magbassa Kita Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Peacebuilding Initiative (n.d.). Public Administration, Local Governance & Participation: Definitions & Conceptual Issues. http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1947 Quevedo, Orlando B. 2008. Two Fundamental Postulates for Lasting Peace in Mindnao. In Pieces for Peace: The MOA and the Mindanao Conflict. Manila: PCID, Magbassa Kita Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Oliver, Quintin (2002) Developing public capacities for participation in peacemaking. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/publicparticipation/developing-public-capacities.php Rood, Steven. (2005). Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society. Policy Studies 17. Washington: East-West Center. Saravanamuttu, Paikiasothy. (2006) Democratization of the Peace Process: Sri Lanka in Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further Reading (Volume 2) Supreme Court of the Philippines (2008). G.R. No. 183591. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/183591.

Walker, Gregg B.Ph.D. (n.d.) Civic Discovery and the Three Cs of Public Participation: Consultation, Consensus, and Collaboration. Oregon State University Wanis-St. John, Anthony. (2008). Peace Processes, Secret Negotiations and Civil Society: Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion. International Negotiation 13 (2008) 19 www.brill.nl/iner