RULE 6--- KINDS OF PLEADINGS SECTION 3COMPLAINT 1. FLUOUR DANIEL V.

EB VILLAROSA-- The complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. In this case, we note that records show that recurring in each of the three contracts is the provision that payment by petitioner shall be subject to its timely receipt of similar payments from Fil-Estate. On their face, the said attached contracts clearly require a specific condition before petitioner may be held liable for payment. SECTION 5DEFENSES 1. MIRANDA V. BESAwhen you make a specific denial, you deny whatever the plaintiff is alleging. (wrong: I specifically deny allegation in paragraph 3 because my possession is lawful; I am the owner of the property) SECTION 6--- COUNTERCLAIM 1. MEL VELARDE V. LOPEZPlaintiff should be sued in the same capacity that he is suing the defendant (de borja v. de borja) SECTION 7COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM 1. SPOUSES MELITON V. CA--- Lessor suing for unlawful detainer and lessee suing the lessor for reimbursement for improvements made on the propertyCOMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. Considering Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. TEST: "one compelling test of compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues. Both the claims therein of petitioners and private respondent arose from the same contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as well as their potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual relation. The relationship between petitioners' counterclaims and private respondent's complaint is substantially the same as that which exists between a complaint for recovery of land by the owner and the claim for improvements introduced therein by the possessor. As we have ruled, in actions for ejectment or for recovery of possession of real property, it is well settled that the defendant's claims for the value of the improvements on the property or necessary expenses for its preservation are required to be interposed in the same action as compulsory counterclaims. 2. YULIENCO V. CA-- the promissory notes in both cases differ from and are not related to each other. There is, therefore, a dissimilarity in the subject matter of both cases arising from separate and distinct transactions and necessarily requiring different evidence to support the divergent claims. (2 promissory notes invoke 2 different transactions and therefore require different evidence). FINANCIAL BUILDING V. FORBES PARK -- The action for damages is barred due to Forbes Parks failure to set it up as a compulsory counterclaim. Undoubtedly, the prior

Civil Case and the instant case arose from the same occurrence the construction work done by Financial Building on the USSRs lot in Forbes Park Village. the logical relation between the two cases is patent and it is obvious that substantially the same evidence is involved in the said cases. Moreover, the two cases involve the same parties. The aggregate amount of the claims in the instant case is within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court, had it been set up as a counterclaim. second. Since Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 16540, its existing compulsory counterclaim at that time is now barred. A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim. Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. In the event that a defending party has a ground for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one remedy. If he decides to file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his answer.[21] The latter option is obviously more favorable to the defendant although such fact was lost on Forbes Park. Inasmuch as the action for damages filed by Forbes Park should be as it is hereby dismissed for being barred by the prior judgment in G.R. No. 79319 (supra) and/or deemed waived by Forbes Park to interpose the same under the rule on compulsory counterclaims, there is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the herein petitioner. 4. ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE--- petitioners counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.[24] There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.[25] On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. However, the trial court dismissed petitioners counterclaim. Pursuant to this Courts ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim. Court can continue hearing the counterclaim for damages for ti is compulsory. If the permissive counterclaim was dismissed, the party is not barred from filing a separate complaint because such is merely permissive. 5. KOREA EXCHANGE BANK V. JUDGE GONZALESIf the counterclaim is permissive, there is a need to pay the docket fees if it arises from a different transaction and you must also file a certificate of non-forum shopping because a permissive counterclaim is considered an initiatory pleading.

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SECTION 8CROSS CLAIM 1. LIGON V. CA-- While LIGON may be correct in her argument that a cross-claim must be answered, and the party who fails to file an answer thereto may be declared in default,[27] one should not lose sight of the true nature of a cross-claim. Section 7[28] of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines a cross-claim as any claim by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim. It may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. The answer then to the cross-claim is meant to join the subsidiary issues between the co-parties in relation to the opposing partys claim against the crossclaimant.[29] Needless to state, until the principal issue between the plaintiff and the defendant cross-claimant shall have been heard and determined, it would be premature to decide the cross-claim

rule -- a defendant in a compulsory counterclaim need not file any responsive pleading, as it is deemed to have adopted the allegations in the complaint as its answer -does not apply. The filing of a responsive pleading is deemed a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court; a new party impleaded by the plaintiff in a compulsory counterclaim cannot be considered to have automatically and unknowingly submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The correct procedure in instances such as this is for the trial court, per Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, to order [such impleaded parties] to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained, by directing that summons be served on them. In this manner, they can be properly appraised of and answer the charges against them. Only upon service of summons can the trial court obtain jurisdiction over them. In summary, we make the following pronouncements: 1. The counterclaims against Respondents CCC, Gregory T. Lim and Anthony A. Mariano are compulsory. 2. The counterclaims may properly implead Respondents Gregory T. Lim and Anthony A. Mariano, even if both were not parties in the original Complaint. 3. Respondent CCC or any of the three solidary debtors (CCC, Lim or Mariano) may include, in a Motion to Dismiss, defenses available to their co-defendants; nevertheless, the same Motion cannot be deemed to have been filed on behalf of the said co-defendants. 4. Summons must be served on Respondents Lim and Mariano before the trial court can obtain jurisdiction over them. RULE 7PARTS OF A PLEADING SECTION 3 SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS 1. BUKLURAN V. CA-- Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.[36]Considering that the union is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may sign the pleading. For this reason alone, the CA cannot dismiss the petition. DADIZON V. BERNADAS-- the mandatory requirement of impleading all indispensable parties applies only to the filing of an original action, but not to an appeal, since it is the partys choice whether to appeal or not, and he or she cannot be compelled to do so. SOPA V. SANTOS -- Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the party to the case or the counsel representing that party. In this case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion for reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBTs Board of Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this case. Therefore, the said pleadings cannot be considered unsigned and without any legal effect.

SECTION 11THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 1. TAYAO V. MENDOZA-- A third-party complaint is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. Were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party complaint would have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party defendant. The purpose is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising from one particular set of facts.[12] The trial court is vested with discretion whether or not to allow the defendant to file a third-party complaint. As such, the defendant has no vested right to file a third-party complaint. SAMALA V. VICTOR-- it is immaterial that the third-party plaintiff asserts a cause of action against the third party defendant on a theory different from that asserted by the plaintiff against the defendant. 9 It has likewise been held that "a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants those liable to him in tort for the plaintiff s claim against him or directly to the plaintiff. ALLIED BANK V. CA-- As a general rule, a trial court that has established jurisdiction over the main action also acquires jurisdiction over a third-party complaint, even if it could not have done so had the latter been filed as an independent action. This rule, however, does not apply to banks that have agreed to submit their disputes over check clearings to arbitration under the rules of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation. In that event, primary recourse should be to the PCHC Arbitration Committee, without prejudice to an appeal to the trial courts. In other words, without first resorting to the PCHC, the third-party complaint would be premature.

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SECTION 12, 13 1. LA FARGE V. CCC-- A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. However, the general rule that a defendant cannot by a counterclaim bring into the action any claim against persons other than the plaintiff admits of an exception under Section 14, Rule 6 which provides that when the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained. However, while a compulsory counterclaim may implead persons not parties to the original complaint, the general

SECTION 4VERIFICATION 1. VALLACAR TRANSIT V. CATUBIG-- No such law or rule specifically requires that respondent's complaint for damages should have been verified. A party's failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the party's failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective. On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and

that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.[22] SECTION 5CERTIFICAITON AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING (NONE) 1. EASTLAND V. MORTEL-- It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused. Hence, the certification must be accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals.24 In the case before us, there is no substantial compliance to speak of because no certificate of non-forum shopping was appended when the petition for review was filed with the Court of Appeals. The subsequent submission of said certificate on motion for reconsideration will not cure said defect. The rule against forum shopping and the necessity of a certification of non-forum shopping are basic requirements in remedial law. Failure to comply with them constitutes gross negligence. 2. ARQUIZA V. CAregardless as to whether the CNFS is defective, it will not matter coz CNFS is not required in noninitiatory pleadings.

RULE 8MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS SECTION 8 1. PERMANENT SAVINGS V. VELARDE-- A reading of respondents Answer, however, shows that respondent did not specifically deny that he signed the loan documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note seems to be his. Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties.[25] Respondent reiterated these allegations in his denial under oath, stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses [26] Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law In fact, respondents allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.[28] Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.[29] Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent specifically denied petitioners allegations regarding the loan documents, as respondents Answer shows that he failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and its concomitant documents. Therefore, respondent is deemed to have admitted the loan documents and acknowledged his obligation with petitioner; and with respondents implied admission, it was not necessary for petitioner to present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of the loan documents sued upon. RULE 9EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD SECTION 1DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS NOT PLEADED 1. VILLANUEVA V. CAprescription can be raised as ground for dismissal in th answer. But since they failed to include it in the pre-trial order, it is barred. 2. AQUINO V. AUREissue of non-recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings should be impleaded in the answer. Failure to do so is deemed a waiver thereof. 3. ANUNCIACION V. BOCANEGRA Quite apart from their voluntary appearance, respondents Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were clearly in violation of Rule 15, Section 8 in relation to Rule 9, Section 1. Applying the foregoing rules, respondents failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their cause. They are already deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial court plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the motion

DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING 1. BPI LEASING V. CA-- certificate of non-forum shopping may be signed, for and on behalf of a corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. This ruling, however, does not mean that any lawyer, acting on behalf of the corporation he is representing, may routinely sign a certification of non-forum shopping. The Court emphasizes that the lawyer must be specifically authorized in order validly to sign the certification. 2. BAUTISTA V. JUDGE CAUSAPINfor original actions, court cannot dismiss the case outright for lack of CNFS. It must be upon motion and proper hearing.

EFFECT OF FALSE CERTIFICATION 1. ESPINOSA V. CAeffects: indirect contemt, administrative and criminal acitons 2. RMC V. SINGSONno violation of section 5 if the 2 cases that were supposed to be mentioned, although involve the same parties and subject matter, would nevertheless pertain to different issues. SECTION 5FORUM SHOPPING 1. LAND CAR V. BACHELOR EXPRESS-- Forum shopping refers to the act of availing oneself of several judicial remedies in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, substantially founded on the same transaction and identical material facts and circumstances, raising basically like issues either pending in, or already resolved by, some other court.[1] The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed before courts but also in connection with a litigation commenced in court while an administrative proceeding is pending in order to defeat administrative processes in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and possibly a favorable court ruling.[2] Forum shopping is said to exist where the elements of litis pendentiaare present or where a final judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other;[3] or where, in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought

to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. We likewise cannot approve the trial courts act of entertaining supplemental motions to dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action. SECTION 2COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM OR CROSS CLAIM NOT SET UP IS ARRED 1. FINANCIAL BUILDING V. CA AND LOADMASTERS V. GLODELCross claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal. 6. 5.

such truth.[14] By conducting a full-blown trial, both parties will be able to present their evidence, thus, affording them the opportunity to enforce and protect their respective rights. SABLAS V. SABLAS a. Where there is no motion, there can be no declaration of report. An order of default can only be made upon motion of the claiming party. Court cannot motu proprio declare defendant in default. b. Where there is no declaration of default, answer may be admitted even if filed out of time. the rules of court provides for discretion on the part of the court not only to extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow it to be filed even after the reglementary period. c. Where answer has been filed, there can be no declaration of default anymore. DAVID V. JUDGE FRUELDA- In your motion to set aside order of default, it should be: a. Under oath b. Allegation that your failure to file an answer was due to FAME c. Affidavit of merit BDO V. TANSIPEK a. ORDER of defaultinterlocutory; cannot be appealed; remedy: file a motion to set aside order of default b. JUDGMENT of defaultfinal order; remedy: APPEAL the judgment

SECTION 3DEFAULT; DECLARATION OF 1. VIRON V. PANTRANCOdefault is a result of failure to file an answer and not failure to attend the pre-trial 2. OAMINAL V. CASTILLOyou cannot declare a person in default if you still have nto acquired jurisdiction over his person. i.e. improper service of summons. \ 3. Lina v. Court of Appeals[22] enumerates the remedies available to a party declared in default: a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]); b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41) 4. ACANCE V. CA-- Even granting arguendo that the respondents had fully complied with the requirements for extraterritorial service of summons and the court a quo correctly declared them in default; still, it should not have been too rash in dismissing the petitioners motion to lift the default order. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.[13] In this case, there is no showing that the petitioners failure to file an answer was due to an apparent scheme to delay the proceedings or to flagrantly transgress the rules. Under the circumstances, the setting aside of the order of default is in order. The petitioners should be afforded the opportunity to present evidence on their behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. After all, court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out

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RULE 10AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS SECTIONS 2 AND 3AMENDED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND BY LEAVE OF COURT 1. BAUTISTA V. MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES-- The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule.[3] Records show that petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil Case No. 371. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final,[4] as in this case. BIGLANG AWA V. PPCorder of dismissal had already become final,motion for leave of court to amend complaint is already rendered moot. TIRONA V. ALEJOan amendment is not permitted where the court has no jurisdiction ovr the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint in the first place, amendments may not be had.

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SECTION 5AMENDEMENT TO CONFORM TO OR AUTHORIZE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 1. CAGUNGUN V. DBP There are 2 possible scenarios: NO OBJECTION 1. Pleader can file motion to amend complaint to conform to evidence presented 2. Court can grant or deny 3. Effect of failure to amend: it will not affect the result of the trial of the case WITH OBJECTION

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Pleader can file motion to amend Court can grant or deny. If grant, complaint amended if the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and admission of such evidence would not prejudice the objecting party in maintaining his action or defense upon the merit Effect of failure to amend: evidence objected cannot be considered.

SECTIONS 6 AND 7SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS AND FILING OF AMENDED PLEADINGS 1. SORIANO V. CAa pleding subsequently filed after an original one which states a totally different cause of action is not a supplemental pleading and is not permitted. The rule allowing amendements toa pleading is subject to the general limitation that the cause of action shall not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case shall not be altered. RULE 11TIME TO FILE PLEADINGS Section 7ANSWER TO SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT 1. CHAN V. CHANif the defendant has already answered the original complaint and he does nto file an answer to the amended complaint, he cannot be declared in default precisely because he has already filed an answer. But with respect to those new issues raised in the amended pleadings, then he can be defaulted with respect only to those new issues. SECTION 11EXTENSION OF TIME TO PLEAD 1. CRISOLOGO JOSE V. LANDBANKto admit or reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. RULE 13FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS SECTION 4PAPER REQUIRED TO BE SERVED AND FILED 1. NERY V. JUDGE DELA PENAex-parte manifestations and motions not prejudicial to the other party need NOT be served. SECTION 7SERVICE BY MAIL 1. SPOUSES BELEN V. CHAVEZSection 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present address of the party and not at any other address of the party. SECTION 8SUBSTITUTED SERVICE 1. JOHNSON AND JOHNSON V. CAconstructive notice rule only applies if there is a conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The following may be sufficient proof: a. Certification from the postmaster and not only that, but he must include in his certification the manner, date and recipient of the delivery b. Mailman may also testify that notice was actually delivered SECTION 10COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE 1. TOMAWIS V. TABAO-CAUDANGhow to prove service by registered mail: a. ACTUAL RECEIPT 1. Registry return card 2. Registry receipt 3. Affidavit of person mailing b. CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY 1. Registry receipt 2. Affidavit of person mailing OR 3. In lieu thereof, unclaimed letter + certified copy of the notice given by the post master to addressee

SECTION 11PRIORITIES IN MODES OF SERVICE AND FILING 1. MACEDA V. DE GUZMANPersonal service and ifling is the general rule and resort to other modes of service and fling , the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances fo time, place and person, personal service or filing is mantary. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may the party resort to other modes, which then must be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. 2. TIBLE & TIBLE V. ROYAL SAVINGS2 pre-requisites for the relaxation of the rule: a. Justifiable cause or plausible reason for noncompliance b. Compelling reason to convince the court that outright dismissal of the petition would seriously imipair the orderly administration of justice.

SECTION 13PROOF OF SERVICE 1. GOVERNMENT V. ABALLEservice by RM is proven by: a. Registry receipt issued by mailing office AND b. Affidavit fo the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 or rule 13. RULE 14SUMMONS SECTION 6 AND 7SERVICE IN PERSON AND SUBSTITUTED SERVICE 1. PASCUAL V. PASCUALpoints to remember a. Impossibility of prompt personal servicesheriff must show that defendant cannot be promptly served and there is impossibility of prompt service. several attempts means at least 3 tries, preferable on at least 2 different dates. b. Specific details in the returnsheriff must describe the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. Effors made to find defendant and reason behind the failiure must be clearly narrated. c. Person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein d. A competent person in charge SECTION 11SERVICE UPON DOMESTIC PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY 1. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE V. ORDONEZsecretary in the receiivin gstation of the corporation is not allowed to receive summons. Only those enumerated in section 11, rule 14. Enumeration is exclusive. SECTION 12SERVICE UPON FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY 1. ATIKO TRANS V. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE- if you have 2 defendants, 1 foreign and the other is a domestic corporation, there are 2 different ways of serving summons. 2. PIONEER V. GUADIZif service was supposed to be made on the agent, but the sheriff resorted to substituted service and instead served on the agents employeeit is not allowed. However, court impliedly ruled that it can be allowed should substantial and compelling reasons exist. SECTION 14SERVICE UPON DEFENDANTS WHOSE IDENTITY OR WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN 1. SANTOS V. PNOCunder section 14, the law does not distinguish as to whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. If the defendant is unknown, service by publication is proper. SECTION 15EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE 1. NM ROTHSCHILD V. LEPANTOwhen defendant is a non-resident and not fond in the phi.ippines and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any

case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person iunless he voluntariliy appears in court. SECTION 16RESIDENTS TEMPORARILIY OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES 1. MONTEFALCON V. VASQUEZto acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas filipiono seafarers are contractual employees. It is of common knowledge that they have a temporary residence I the urban areas in manila where most of the manning agencies hold office. That because section 16 of rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the rules may be availed of by the serving officer. RULE 15MOTIONS Summary: under rule 15, except for motions that the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse paryt, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the defendants therein and shall specify the time, date of the hearing which must not be later than 10 days form the fling of the motion. The motion and notice shall be served at least three days before the date of the hearing.

RULE 17DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS SECTION 1DISMISSAL UPON NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF 1. OB JOVENIR V. MACAMIR REALTY-- the provision ordained the dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right at any time before service of the answer.18 The plaintiff was accorded the right to dismiss the complaint without the necessity of alleging in the notice of dismissal any ground nor of making any reservation.1 the notice of dismissal was filed by the plaintiff on 12 November 1981. Respondent filed his answer three days earlier, or on 9 November, but plaintiff was served a copy of the answer by registered mail only on 16 November. Notwithstanding the fact that the answer was filed with the trial court three days prior to the filing of the notice of dismissal, the Court still affirmed the dismissal sought by the plaintiff. The Court declared that the right of the plaintiff to cause the dismissal of the complaint by mere notice is lost not by the filing of the answer with the trial court, but upon the actual service to the plaintiff of the answer Evidently, respondents had the right to dismiss their complaint by mere notice on 13 February 1997, since as of even date, petitioners had not yet served their answer on respondents. The Motion to Withdraw Complaint makes clear respondents "desire to withdraw the complaint without prejudice." That respondents resorted to a motion to effect what they could have instead by mere notice may be indicative of a certain degree of ignorance of procedural rules on the part of respondents counsel. Yet such "error," if it could be called as such, should hardly be of fatal consequence. Petitioners posit that the "remedy" of filing a notice of dismissal is not exclusive, respondents having the "option" of securing the courts approval to the dismissal.24 On the contrary, the trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground. SECTION 2DISMISSAL UPON MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF 1. LANDCENTER V. PONCE-- A dismissal or discontinuance of an action operates to annul orders, rulings or judgments previously made in the case. It also annuls all proceedings had in connection therewith and renders all pleadings ineffective. A dismissal or nonsuit leaves the situation as though no suit had ever been brought. Further proceedings in the action are arrested and what has been done therein is also annulled, so that the action is as if it had never been. It carries down with it previous proceedings and orders in the action, and all pleadings of both parties, and all issues with respect to the plaintiffs claim. (in this case, after he has secured a favorable judgment and which case is subject na to a petition before the sc, then you withdraw your complaint, it annuls everything that was had. Even the orders issued in your favor. ) SECTION 3DISMISSAL DUE TO FAULT OF PLAINTIFF 1. ESPIRITU V. LAZARO-- It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even absent any allegation and proof of the plaintiffs lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules.20 The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining the relief prayed for.21

SECTION 2MOTIONS MUST BE IN WRITING 1. GONZALES V. BALIKATANmotion to declare petitioners in default was not made in writing but was made in open court and in their presence. By their presence, notice to them is fairly constituted. Wha thte law eschews is not the lack of previous notice of hearing but the lack of opportutnity to be heard. SECTION 4HEARING OF MOTION 1. PATRICIO V. JUDGE LEVISTEeven if there was no proof of service of the motion, no notice of hearingparty was given opportunity to e heard and to argue his case when the court required the party to file a reply to the motion for reconsideration and subsequently set the motion for oral arguent. Rules relaxed. 2. BAJET V. JUDGE BACLIGex parte motion for issuance of alias writ of exectution is a motion which is non-litgious and my be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights fo the adverse party. 3. BAGANO V. JUDGE HONTANOSASit is a basic rule that all written motions should be heard. Excepted from this rule are non-litiguous motions which may be acted upon by the court w/o prejudicing the rights of the parties. However, motion to cancel statutory lien is not a non-litiguous motion, hearing must be had. 4. PRIMETOWN V. JUNTILLAMOTION for issuance of writ of possession is ex pate and summary in nature. Nto need for hearing on the motion. RULE 16MOTION TO DISMISS SECTION 1GROUNDS 1. ALLIED BANK V. CAgrounds to be considered as to what will be dismissed: a. Date of filing, with prefence generally to the first action filed ot be retained b. Whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal c. Whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties.

In this case, there was no justifiable reason for petitioners failure to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial. Petitioners stubborn insistence that the case was not yet ripe for pre-trial is erroneous. Although petitioners state that there are strong and compelling reasons justifying a liberal application of the rule, the Court finds none in this case. The burden to show that there are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified is on petitioners, and they have not adduced any such compelling reason. 2. PINGA V. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO-- the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint. RULE 18PRE-TRIAL SECTION 3 1. DE GUIA V. DE GUIA-- Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served separately on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.1wphi1.nt SECTIONS 4,5 AND 6 1. VICTORY LINER V. CAdiscusses mandatory character of pretrial and effect of failure to appear 2. VDA. DE AGATEP V. RODRIGUEZ-- The pre-trial brief serves as a guide during the pre-trial conference so as to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial if not to dispense with it. It is a devise essential to the speedy disposition of disputes, and parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. in the present case, the RTC correctly found that petitioner had a separate cause of action against PNB. A separate cause of action necessarily means additional cause of action. Moreover, the defenses adopted by PNB are completely different from the defenses of Lim and Rodriguez, necessitating a separate determination of the matters enumerated under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court insofar as PNB and petitioner are concerned. On these bases, we find no error in the ruling of the CA which sustained the trial court's dismissal of the amended complaint against PNB for failure of petitioner to file her pretrial brief. BARANGAY CONCILIATION SECTIONS 408-409 1. VERCIDE V. JUDGE HERNANDEZ-- Contrary to respondents interpretation, it is clear even from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. 2. BERBA V. HEIRS OF PALANCA-- the settlement of the parties may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong barangay, withinsix months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an action in the proper city or municipal court.

3.

PASCUAL V. PASCUAL-- since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.

SECTION 412 1. ATTY. MAGNO V. ATTY. JACOBA-- Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties. 2. AQUINO V. AURE-- It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.[22]Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lendings failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in herAnswer. WEE V. DE CASTRO-- While it is true that the Certification to file action dated 18 January 2002 of theBarangay Lupon refers only to rental increase and not to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property, the submission of the same for conciliation before theBarangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of theKatarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and reasonably include also the matter of the possession of the property subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the terms thereof.

3.