NYCLU: Court Filing Seeks To End NYPD Surveillance of Muslim Community

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------
BARBARA HANDSCHU, RALPH DIGIA,
ALEX McKEIVER, SHABA OM, CURTIS 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH)
M. POWELL, ABBIE HOFFMAN, MARK
A. SEGAL, MICHAEL ZUMOFF, NOTICE OF MOTION FOR
KENNETH THOMAS, ROBERT RUSCH, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
ANETTE T. RUBENSTEIN, MICHEY AND FOR APPOINTMENT
SHERIDAN, JOE SUCHER, STEVEN OF AN AUDITOR OR
FISCHLER, HOWARD BLATT and MONITOR
ELLIE BENZONE, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Oral Argument Requested
Plaintiffs,
-against-

SPECIAL SERVICES DIVISION, a/k/a
BUREAU OF SPECIAL SERVICES,
WILLIAM H.T. SMITH, ARTHUR
GRUBERT, MICHAEL WILLIS,
WILLIAM KNAPP, PATRICK
MURPHY, POLICE DEPARTMENT
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
JOHN V. LINDSAY and various unknown
employees of the Police Department acting
as under-cover operators and informers,

Defendants.

-------------------------------------

MADAMS OR SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying
Declaration of Paul G. Chevigny dated January 22, 2013, the
Declaration of Shamiur Rahman dated October 28, 2012, the
Declaration of Faiza Ali dated January 18, 2013, the
Declaration of Linda Sarsour dated January 18, 2013, the
Declaration of Bernard Haykel dated December 7, 2012, the
deposition of Chief Thomas Galati dated June 28, 2012, the
exhibits annexed hereto and the accompanying Memorandum of

2
Law, counsel for the plaintiff Class will move this Court,
at a time and place to be designated by the Court, for the
following relief against the New York Police Department
(NYPD):
a) pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, an injunction against the policy and practice of
retaining records concerning visits to public places made by
the Zone Assessment Unit, the Demographics Unit or any other
unit of the NYPD where no information has been obtained that
relates to potential unlawful or terrorist activity, in
violation of Section VIII A (2) of the Modified Handschu
Guidelines;
b) pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, an injunction against the policy and practice of
surreptitiously joining, visiting and infiltrating
organizations or institutions including organizations
associated with Islam, and keeping records of such
investigative activities, in the absence of reasonable
indications or indication of terrorist or unlawful
activity, in violation of Sec. V(B), Sec. V(C) and V(D) of
the Modified Handschu Guidelines;
c) pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or alternatively pursuant to Rule 53, F.R.C.P., an
order appointing an auditor or monitor to supervise
compliance by the NYPD, its employees and agents with the
injunctive orders made herein mandating obedience to the
Modified Handschu Guidelines in investigations of political
activity by members of the plaintiff class; and
d) for such other and further relief as to this Court
seems just and proper.
Dated: New York, New York
January 22, 2013
Yours, etc
&AUXCAt<t>K&
PAUL G. CHEVIGNY\(PC-3569
40 Washington Square Sout
New York, NY 10012
(212) 998-6249
JETHRO M. EISENSTEIN (JE-6848)
Profeta & Eisenstein
45 Broadway, Suite 2200
New York, NY 10006
(212) 577-6500
MARTIN R. STOLAR (MS-1576)
351 Broadway, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10013
(212) 219-1919
FRANKLIN SIEGEL (FS-4952)
368 President St.
Brooklyn, NY 11231-5015
(212) 406-0700
ARTHUR EISENBERG (AE-2012)
New York Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 344-3005
Attorneys for Plaintiff Class

4
TO: MICHAEL A. CARDOZO
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
Attorney for Defendants
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
Peter G. Farrell, Esq.
Senior Counsel
------------------------------------------

BARBARA HANDSCHU, RALPH DiGIA, ALEX
McKEIVER, SHABA OM, CURTIS M. POWELL,
ABBIE HOFFMAN, MARK A. SEGAL, MICHAEL
ZUMOFF, KENNETH THOMAS, ROBERT RUSCH, 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH)
ANNETTE T. RUBENSTEIN, MICKEY SHERIDAN,
JOE SUCHER, STEVEN FISCHLER, HOWARD
BLATT, ELLIE BENZONI, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

Bureau of Special Services; WILLIAM
H.T. SMITH; ARTHUR GRUBERT; MICHAEL
WILLIS; WILLIAM KNAPP; PATRICK
MURPHY; POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK; JOHN V. LINDSAY;
and various unknown employees of the
Police Department acting as
undercover operators and informers,

Defendants.

------------------------------------------

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
CLASS MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Preliminary Statement

The attorneys for the plaintiff class in this action
(class counsel) submit this memorandum of law in support of
the motion of the plaintiff class for equitable relief in the
form of an injunction against ongoing violations by the

2
defendants, hereinafter referred to as the NYPD, of the
current Guidelines for investigations of political activities
by the NYPD, and for appointment of an auditor or monitor by
this court to insure compliance by the NYPD with the terms of
the injunction. This motion is necessitated by surveillance
and investigation of Muslim communities in the New York area
as detailed in the moving papers.
The court is familiar with the history of this case, and
has summarized it in recent opinions, including Handschu v.
Special Services Division, 475 F.Supp.2d 331, 332-334
(Handschu VII); 2007 WL 1711775 at *1 through *5 (Handschu
VIII); and 2008 WL 515695 at *1 through *2 (Handschu IX). This
is a class action, commenced in 1971 to limit police
surveillance over political activity, on behalf of a class
defined as:
All individuals resident in the
City of New York, and all other
persons who are physically present
in the City of New York, and all
organizations located or operating
in the City of New York, who engage
in or have engaged in lawful
political, religious, education or
social activities and who, as a
result of those activities, have
been, are now or hereafter may be
subjected to or threatened by
infiltration, physical and verbal
coercion, photographic, electronic
and physical surveillance,
provocation of violence, recruitment
to act as police informers and
dossier collection and dissemination
by defendants and their agents.

3

As a result of a consent decree, modified on the motion
of defendants in 2003, surveillance of political activities by
the NYPD is subject to a set of Guidelines which have been
made a part of this courts order modifying the consent
decree, Handschu IV, 273 F.Supp.2d 327, 349-351 (2003) and
Handschu V, 288 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420-431 (2003).
Under the Guidelines, investigations of political
activity can be conducted by the NYPD only based on a
criminal predicate. Handschu VII, 475 F.Supp.2d at 337 (. .
. each level of investigation of a political activity requires
some indication of unlawful activity . . . [emphasis in the
original]). Thus under Sec. V (C) of the Guidelines, a full
investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances
reasonably indicate that unlawful act [sic] has been, is being
or will be committed. A full investigation may be conducted to
prevent, solve or prosecute such unlawful activity. With
respect to terrorism investigations, the Guidelines provide,
under V (D), that a terrorism enterprise investigation may be
initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that
two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the
purpose of . . . furthering goals through unlawful acts or
committing crimes specified in the Guidelines. The section
further provides, the standard of reasonable indication is
identical to that governing full investigations generally.

4
Even for a preliminary inquiry under Sec. V(B) of the
Guidelines, an allegation or information indicating the
possibility of unlawful activity is required. Handschu V, 288
F.Supp.2d at 422-428.
Sec. VIII(A) (2) of the Guidelines, authorizes specified
limited NYPD activity to investigate political activity
without a criminal predicate: For the purpose of detecting or
preventing terrorist activities, the NYPD is authorized to
visit any place and attend any event that is open to the
public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the
public generally." The same section provides, however, that
"[n]o information obtained from such visits shall be retained
unless it relates to potential unlawful or terrorist
activity. Handschu V, 288 F.2d at 429-430.
As detailed in the accompanying declaration of Paul G.
Chevigny, which incorporates documents originating from the
NYPD and describes discovery conducted pursuant to a
stipulation with defendants, and in the supporting
declarations of Shamiur Rahman, Linda Sarsour and Faiza Ali,
there is substantial persuasive evidence that the defendants
are conducting investigations into organizations and
individuals associated with the Muslim faith and the Muslim
community in New York, and have been doing so for years, using
intrusive methods, without a reasonable indication of unlawful

5
activity, or a criminal predicate of any sort.
As part of the same program, agents of the NYPD have
persistently visited public places associated with the Muslim
faith and the Muslim community, without detecting evidence of
potential unlawful or terrorist activity, and have nonetheless
retained detailed records concerning such visits. Moreover,
while flouting the requirements of the Handschu Guidelines,
the NYPD has publicly claimed to be complying with the
requirements of those Guidelines.
For these reasons, class counsel seek an injunctive order
from this court requiring the NYPD to adhere to the
requirements of the Guidelines, to conduct investigations and
inquiries into political activity only in accordance with the
Guidelines, and to cease keeping records of visits to public
places when the records do not relate to potential unlawful or
terrorist activity. Because the NYPD violations of the
Guidelines have been so flagrant and persistent, and have been
so misrepresented, class counsel also request that the court
appoint an auditor or monitor to ensure compliance with the
injunctive order.
Under the decisions of this court, class counsel have the
power to make the present motion. As this court said in
Handschu X, 679 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496-7 (2010), class counsel
are empowered to challenge NYPD policies resulting in non-

6
constitutional violations of the Guidelines; the decree and
guidelines subject the NYPD to Class Counsels inquiries into
police surveillance policies and potential injunctive relief
for the class and against the NYPD. (See also Handschu IX,
2008 WL 515695 at *5 (. . . the Section X Reservation does
not preclude Class Counsel from challenging NYPD policies that
disregard the NYPD Guidelines. [emphasis in original]) The
court has the power and the duty to ensure compliance with the
Guidelines. Handschu VIII, 2007 WL 1711775 at *10-11 (Not
only does the district court have the authority to ensure
compliance [if the NYPD Guidelines are shown to have been
repudiated or disregarded]; it has the duty to do so.) See
also Handschu IX, 2008 WL 515695 at *2.

Point I

THE NYPD IS CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
IDENTIFIED WITH ISLAM IN VIOLATION OF THE
MODIFIED HANDSCHU GUIDELINES

During the past two years, news reports by the Associated
Press, journalist Leonard Levitt and other media have revealed
a program of the NYPD dedicated to the intense surveillance of
the Muslim communities in New York City and surrounding areas.
The news stories were based in part on NYPD documents. Some

7
of the same documents are offered in support of the present
motion.
As the declaration of Paul G. Chevigny and its
attachments show, the surveillance has been widespread and
intense. It falls into two categories that violate the
Guidelines, and will be discussed separately below in this
point. First, officers have monitored public places such as
ethnic restaurants and mosques, and have kept records of their
hundreds of contacts, including records of conversations upon
which they have eavesdropped. In the second place, agents of
the NYPD, including officers and confidential informants, have
infiltrated organizations connected to Islam, including
student associations, have attended worship at mosques, and
recruited informants, keeping detailed records of all their
work for the perusal of analysts. Both of these have been and
still are part of a massive program of intelligence.
The collection of intelligence about the Muslim
community has been the key concept for the NYPD. The police
have been gathering and recording information through the most
intrusive means, such as infiltrators, in defiance of the
standards for surveillance of political activity set out in
the Handschu Guidelines.
There is no question that the actions of the NYPD
outlined in the present motion are subject to the modified

8
Handschu Guidelines. The Guidelines apply to investigations of
political activity, permitting those investigations only if
they may turn out to encompass criminal activity. Handschu
VII, 475 F.Supp.2d at 337 (2007). In this motion, class
counsel have focused on the visiting of public places and
infiltration of organizations connected with Islam. The
motion documents that the NYPD is directing those visits and
investigations to political activity. We note that the NYPD
has taken the position in public statements that its
investigations of the Muslim community are covered by the
Guidelines. That is correct as far as it goes. What is
pertinent to this motion is that the NYPD has not complied
with the Guidelines in conducting these investigations.
The NYPD is investigating organizations associated with
Islam precisely because the NYPD is interested in their
political activities. The concentration on things Muslim
arises out of the prejudice that the NYPD has brought to its
program: the NYPD supposes that because an organization is
connected to Islam, therefore it is suspect. The present
motion addresses NYPD spying on the Muslim community because
the police have chosen to make Islam the mark of suspicion of
political crime.

9
A. Visiting Public Places and Keeping Records

As part of its program of intelligence about the Muslim
community, officers from the Intelligence Division, part of a
unit at first called the Demographics Unit and later the
Zone Assessment Unit (ZAU), visited and still visit places
of business and community centers, including restaurants and
stores. Limited discovery voluntarily offered by defendants
(which included review of representative visit reports of the
ZAU and a deposition of Intelligence Division Chief Thomas
Galati) revealed that there have been hundreds of such visits,
that many places are visited repeatedly and that the visits
apparently continue to the present.
As a matter of policy, the NYPD keeps meticulous records
of all those visits, including records of conversations, some
of which concern politics, which are collected to be examined
by analysts. Section VIII (A)(2) of the Guidelines authorizes
such visits for the purpose of detecting or preventing
terrorist activities but states that no information obtained
from such visits shall be retained unless it relates to
potential unlawful or terrorist activity. An examination by
class counsel of hundreds of the ZAU reports revealed no
relation to unlawful or terrorist activity, and the deposition
of Chief Thomas Galati confirmed the observation. Chief
Galati stated none of the visits during his tenure had

10
resulted in an investigation of crime. (Deposition of Thomas
Galati; Exhibit 4, 96/21).
This record-keeping is an obvious violation of Section
VIII (A)(2) the Guidelines, and it is undertaken as a matter
of NYPD policy. Accordingly, it warrants an order by this
Court that defendants must follow the Modified Guidelines in
conducting such investigations.

B. Infiltrating Organizations, Recruiting Informers
and Reporting to the NYPD

The NYPD documents accompanying the declaration of Paul
G. Chevigny show that the NYPD has sent informants into
mosques, to non-governmental organizations, to religious
movements and institutions (often designated extremist
groups even though their purposes are often only
theological), and to Muslim Student Associations, among other
institutions. Police agents have listened to preaching, to
conversations, have recorded names, have recruited and
attempted to recruit further informers, and have tried to
encourage radical rhetoric in the interests of justifying the
intrusions. The NYPD has maintained records of these
activities that are collected for intelligence analysts. These
intrusive investigations have gone on for at least seven
years, and apparently longer, and the evidence shows that they

11
still continue. When the news reporters exposed the program in
2011 and 2012, the Mayor and the Police Commissioner said that
the program had to continue. Chevigny Declaration, paragraph
41. At the end of 2012, a disaffected NYPD informer, Shamiur
Rahman, who had infiltrated the Muslim Student Association at
John Jay College among other organizations, went public and
described the instructions he had received from the NYPD and
his regret at what he had done. Chevigny Declaration,
paragraphs 20-22.
This intensive program of surveillance of the Muslim
community has been conducted pursuant to a theory about how
certain organizations and theological beliefs contribute to
the radicalization of Muslims. The program is dedicated to
collection of intelligence about the Muslim community, tracing
membership in those organizations and in search, apparently,
of radicalization. The evidence shows that investigations
conducted under this program are not based on indications of
criminal activity or any other version of a criminal
predicate.
A criminal predicate is necessary under the Guidelines
for inquiries or investigations of the sort that the NYPD has
been conducting in the Muslim community. The requirement is
fundamental because the guidelines fashioned in settlement of
this case as amended in 2003 do not allow general

12
intelligence investigations or investigations of pure
political activity; permissible investigations have always
been confined to [matters] supported by a legitimate law
enforcement purpose. Handschu VII, 475 F. Supp. 2d 331 at 337
(quoting the General Principles set forth in Section I of
the Modified Guidelines).
In Handschu VII, this court quoted Section II of the
Guidelines: In its effort to anticipate or prevent unlawful
activity, including terrorist acts, the NYPD must, at times,
initiate investigations in advance of unlawful activity. It is
important that such investigations not be based solely on
activities protected by the First Amendment. 475 F. Supp. 2d
331 at 337 (2007) (emphasis supplied by the Court). The
criminal predicate is the mechanism by which the Guidelines
protect against such investigations::
The Patrol Guidelines
implement that policy and that
principle in practice by
establishing three levels of
investigative activity in Section
V... each level of investigation of
a political activity requires some
indication of unlawful activity on
the part of the individual or
organization to be investigated...As
I noted in Handschu IV, a salient
feature of the [Patrol] Guidelines
is that they do not do away entirely
with the criminal activity
requirement which is a principal
cause of the NYPDs dissatisfaction
with [the Original Handschu
[Guidelines]. 273 F. Supp. 2d at
346.

13

475 F.Supp.2d at 337 (emphasis in original).

In connection with Section VI of the Guidelines,
concerned with the intrusive investigative techniques of which
the NYPD has made systematic use against the Muslim community,
this court went on to say, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 338, It is not
necessary for present purposes to recite those techniques in
detail, but one notices again the emphasis placed upon an
unlawful act as the justification for the use of a particular
investigative technique. 475 F.Supp.2d at 338 (emphasis in
original). The court noted that Section VI instructs the
police to take account of (ii) the intrusiveness of a
technique, considering such factors as the effect on the
privacy of individuals and potential damage to reputation;
(iii) the seriousness of the unlawful act; and (iv) the
strength of the information indicating its existence or future
commission of the unlawful act. Id.(emphasis in original).
This court thus recognized that it was a purpose of the
Guidelines, as it has always been an aim of this case, to
prevent just the sort of program which the NYPD has undertaken
against the Muslim community, dedicated to the systematic
oversight of persons and individuals for purposes of
intelligence and social control through surveillance in the
absence of indications of crime.
The evidence advanced in support of this motion shows

14
that the NYPD has simply flouted the Guidelines in its
investigation of the Muslim community. Spokespersons for the
NYPD have claimed to comply with the Guidelines, but the
evidence shows that the police have not respected the privacy
of persons in using intrusive techniques, and have not based
their actions upon indications of unlawful acts.

Point II

THIS COURT SHOULD ENJOIN THE VIOLATIONS OF THE
GUIDELINES BY THE NYPD

The program of surveillance summarized above and
described in the moving papers warrants action by this court.
The dangers of unfettered police surveillance against which
this case, and the various Guidelines which have been
instituted as part of the consent decree were directed, were
identified more than thirty years ago in the definition of the
class, which includes individuals who engage in lawful
religious activities and as a result of these activities are
subjected to: . . . infiltration . . . . photographic,
electronic and physical surveillance, provocation of violence,
recruitment to act as police informers and dossier
collection.. These are the very evils that are being visited
on the Muslim community by the NYPDs program of surveillance
in violation of the Guidelines.

15
The NYPD program of surveillance of the Muslim
communities as presently implemented inevitably communicates
to the people of New York that Muslim identity is inherently
probative of disloyalty. When the government acts in this
fashion, it brands Muslims as people whose exercise of first
amendment rights should be viewed with suspicion. As Justice
Brandeis warned in 1928: "Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The declaration of Paul G. Chevigny, in paragraph 45
through 49 together with the declarations of Shamiur Rahman,
Linda Sarsour, and Faiza Ali and the statement of John Jay
College President Jeremy Travis offer more details of the
injuries that the Muslim community endures. These include the
record-keeping on public places that brands them as suspect
and makes people afraid to be present in those places, the
recruiting of informers, which leads to suspicion and shame in
the community, suspicion of political rhetoric, the constant
suspicion among members of the community for fear that other
members may turn out to be informers, the sense of an invasion
of privacy that is created by the knowledge that the community
is infiltrated, and a fear of participating in political
actions, even in protest against the police tactics. An

16
atmosphere of fear and resentment is widespread in the
community.
A particularly dire effect of the use of police
surveillance for purposes of intelligence is that the program
is interminable. The present police program has endured for at
least seven years, and continues. When surveillance is
conducted to detect crime, it will stop when the crime is
stopped or the danger passes, but a surveillance program of
the sort that the NYPD conducts has no end. Its pervasive
injurious effects must increase as people become more aware of
the surveillance. This is the essence of a police state.
Organizations and persons in the Muslim community are
suffering irreparable harm due to the NYPD program described
above. The provisions of the Guidelines are designed for the
purpose of preventing such a program, and they should be
enforced by this court.

POINT III

THERE IS AUTHORITY UNDER RULE 706 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND RULE 53 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR APPOINTMENT OF
AN AUDITOR OR MONITOR

There is substantial authority for the appointment of an
auditor to review NYPD compliance with the Handschu

17
Guidelines, using the discretionary power of the Court under
Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to appoint an
independent expert or using the Court's power under FRCP 53.
While the appointment power under Rule 706 has most frequently
been utilized to appoint scientific, and specifically medical
witnesses, it has not been so limited.
At an earlier stage of this case, the Court appointed an
expert under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, with a
view to getting the document disclosure procedure [under the
decree] back into operation. Handschu v. Special Services
Division, 1989 WL 82397 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) at *1. The order
provided that
Joseph A. Settanni is
appointed by the Court as an expert
witness, consultant and monitor in
the discipline of professional
records and information management.
The complete and responsible
assistance, by subordinate officers,
their superiors and any other
requisite personnel of the involved
sections of the New York City Police
Department is to be provided to Mr.
Settanni with respect to all and any
aspects and activities concerned
with the records and information
management work to be accomplished
under this order. Defendants are
directed to grant access to Mr.
Settanni, whenever needed, to all
records relevant to the Stipulation
Settlement and Order and defendants'
obligations thereunder.

Mr. Settanis role as court-appointed expert under Rule

18
706 was to monitor compliance with an aspect of the Handschu
settlement and decree, and the appointment power has been used
in other settings to provide on-going supervision and
assistance to the court.
For example, in In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District
Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) the District
Court and the Bankruptcy Court were required to determine the
fairness of the proposed settlement of a class action on
behalf of people with asbestos-related illnesses. The
settlement fund (from the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville
Corporation) was limited, and asbestos-related illnesses have
a long latency. Allocation of settlement fund assets between
current and future claimants was therefore a central concern,
but the prospects for predicting the number of future
claimants was unknown. Judge Jack B. Weinstein and the
bankruptcy judge jointly appointed an expert pursuant to Rule
706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to advise the Courts on
these issues.
The Court of Appeals vacated the settlement for reasons
not here relevant, but strongly endorsed the appointment of
experts pursuant to Rule 706:
"Wholly apart from the
authority of the District Court to
appoint Rule 706 experts in
connection with determining the
fairness of the settlement of the
class action, we have no doubt of
the Court's authority to exercise

19
its bankruptcy court powers to
appoint experts to advise it on
matters that concern the on-going
administration of the Chapter 11
proceeding.

* * *

The Trust . . . is the
mechanism established under the
auspices of the Bankruptcy Court to
implement a plan of reorganization.
The Bankruptcy Court has continuing
responsibilities to satisfy itself
that the plan is being properly
implemented.

* * *

Toward that end, it is fully
entitled to avail itself of expert
advice on the difficult matter of
estimating future claims against the
trust . . . we have no doubt that
the role of the experts is within
the broad authority of Rule 706."

982 F.2d at 750 (emphasis supplied; internal citations
omitted).
An alternative source of authority for the appointment of
the auditor or monitor sought here is FRCP Rule 53. In the
Title VII employment discrimination action against the New
York Fire Department, U.S. v. City of New York, 2011 WL
6131136 (E.D.N.Y. 12/8/11), Hon. Nicholas G. Garaufis issued a
permanent injunction against
Use as part of any entry-level
firefighter selection process, [of]
any examination that in any way
results in a disparate impact upon
black or Hispanic applicants and is
not job related for the position of

20
entry-level firefighter and
consistent with business necessity,
or does not otherwise meet the
requirements of federal, state, and
City EEO laws.

2011 WL 6131136,*4. As part of the same injunctive order,
Judge Garaufis appointed a monitor pursuant to FRCP 53, whose
duties include [m]onitoring and reporting on the City's
compliance with its obligations under this Order. 2011 WL
6131136, *14.
Judge Garaufis appointed a monitor because efforts to
remedy New Yorks discriminatory firefighter hiring policies
had been met with years of intransigence and deliberate
indifference on the part of the City. U.S. v. City of New
York, 2011 WL 4639832 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 10/5/11), and the
history in this case has been comparable. As documented in
Handschu X, 679 F. Supp.2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), [t]he NYPD
[has] made it plain repeatedly that it did not want to pay any
attention to Class Counsel's questions or views about whether
its surveillance policies violated the Handschu Guidelines,
id. at 498, and the evidence marshaled in the accompanying
declaration of Paul G. Chevigny makes it plain that the NYPD
has been violating the Guidelines as a matter of policy for
years. There is ample reason for appointment of a monitor or
auditor here and the authority to take such action is clear.
Finally, the nature of the information to be reviewed by

21
the auditor in this case is no barrier to the appointment, as
evidenced by the decision in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439
F.Supp.2d 974 (N.D. Ca. 2006). In Hepting, individual claims
against AT&T and the United States government for warrantless
eavesdropping of telecommunications were met with invocation
of the state secret doctrine as well as claims of complete and
qualified immunity. The District Court denied motions to
dismiss the action outright, but recognized the sensitivity of
the information involved in the case:
". . . while the court has a duty to
the extent possible to disentangle
sensitive information from
nonsensitive information . . . the
court also must take special care to
honor the extraordinary security
concerns raised by the government
here. To help perform these duties,
the court proposes appointing an
expert pursuant to FRE 706 to assist
the court in determining whether
disclosing particular evidence would
create a reasonable danger of
harming national security.

* * *

Although other courts do not
appear to have used FRE 706 experts
in the manner proposed here, this
procedural innovation seems
appropriate given the complex and
weighty issues the court will
confront in navigating any future
privilege assertions.

* * *

The court contemplates that the
individual would be one who had a
security clearance for receipt of

22
the most highly sensitive
information and had extensive
experience in intelligence matters.
This individual could perform a
number of functions; among others,
these might include advising the
court on the risks associated with
disclosure of certain information,
the manner and extent of appropriate
disclosures and the parties'
respective contentions."

439 F.Supp.2d at 1010 (internal citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded Hepting to
the District Court "in light of the FISA Amendment Act of
2008", 539 F.3d 1157 (9
th
Cir. 2008), but did not challenge the
District Court's proposed appointment of an independent expert
in this setting of sensitive security information. There is,
thus, authority for use of this Court's power under Rule 706
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the setting of sensitive
information, as will be claimed by the New York Police
Department to be the case here.
Based upon proof by the plaintiff class here that the
Handschu guidelines are being ignored by the NYPD, this Court
will have the power and the duty to enforce the guidelines by
injunction, and will have continuing responsibility to satisfy
itself that the Handschu guidelines are being properly
implemented. Whether appointed pursuant to F.R.Ev. 706 or
FRCP 53, the auditor or monitor will provide a means to
monitor NYPD compliance with the order and provide other
assistance to the court's continuing jurisdiction.
Conclusion
For all the reasons stated above and on the basis of the
facts set forth in the declaration of Paul G. Chevigny and
supporting papers, the plaintiff class prays that the relief
sought herein be granted.
Dated: New York, New York
January 22, 2013
Respectfully submitted,
Jethro M. Eisenstein (JE 6848)
New York, NY 10006
(212) 577-6500
Paul G. Chevigny (PC 3569)
NYU School of Law
40 Washington Square Park
New York, NY 10012
(212) 998-6249
Martin R. Stolar (MS 2576)
351 Broadway, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10013
(212) 219-1919
Franklin Siegel (FS 4952)
368 President Street
Brooklyn, New York 11231
Arthur N. Eisenberg (AE 2012)
New York Civil Liberties Union
Foundation
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 344-3005
Attorneys for Plaintiff Class
23
ZUMOFF, KENNETH THOMAS, ROBERT RUSCH, 71 Civ. 2203 <CSH)
BLATT, ELLIE BENZONI, on behalf of DECLARATION OF
themselves and all others similarly SHAMIUR RAHMAN
situated,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
Defendants.
SHAMIUR RAHMAN, for his declaration pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1746, states as follows:
1. I am a native of Queens, New York. My family is
from Bangladesh. I speak "Banglish" (a mixture of Bengali
and English) with my family, but my first language is
English. In January 2012, I was recruited by a plainclothes
officer of the New York Police Department ("NYPD") to serve
as an informant. At first I thought I was helping to fight
terrorism, but as I saw what I was asked to do, I was more
interested in the money I was being paid. I started at
$1000 per month and by the time I quit I was getting around
$1500 per month. I received my instructions from a police
officer who called himself "Steve". We met and talked in
his car and also communicated by text message. I still have
the text messages I exchanged with him in my cell phone.
2. My assignment was to spy on members of the Muslim
communities in New York. I was told to use a strategy the
police called "create and capture". This meant I was to
pretend to be a devout Muslim and start an inflammatory
conversation about jihad or terrorism and then capture the
response to send to the NYPD. I did this on numerous
occasions with people I met at mosques and other locations.
3. As part of my work as an informant I visited many
mosques. I took pictures of the people worshiping there and
sent the pictures to the NYPD. I was instructed to listen
to what the imams said and to report any radical rhetoric.
I recorded cell phone numbers from the sign up sheet of
people who attended Islamic instruction classes. My NYPD
boss Steve never once told me I was collecting too much
information, no matter who I was spying on.
4. One of my earliest assignments was to spy on a
lecture at the Muslim Student Association at John Jay
2
College in Manhattan. I was told to report any "buzz words"
like jihad or revolution by the speaker. I was also told
to monitor the student group itself. My NYPD boss Steve
told me to take pictures at the group's events, to
determine who belonged to the group and to identify its
leadership. I took pictures of people in the group and
recorded the license plate numbers of their cars.
5. My NYPD boss Steve told me that the NYPD did not
think the John Jay Muslim Student Association was doing
anything wrong, they just wanted to make sure. The members
of the MSA were religious Muslims, and according to my NYPD
boss Steve, the NYPD considers being a religious Muslim a
terrorism indicator.
6. On the instructions of my NYPD boss Steve, I
attended additional events at John Jay and I travelled to
events organized by the Islamic Circle of North America and
the Muslim American Society. I was told to spy on the
speakers and to collect information about those who
attended.
7. On the instructions of my NYPD boss Steve I
attended the Muslim Day parade in Manhattan and took
pictures of people marching. I sent these pictures to the
NYPD.
8. I never saw anyone I spied on do anything
illegal, not even littering. At the end of September, 2012,
I decided I did not want to spy on people any longer, and I
told my NYPD boss Steve that I was quitting. He offered me
more money to continue but I declined the offer.
9. I believe that the spying on the Muslim
communities in New York by the NYPD Intelligence Division
puts everyone at risk. If they are able to continue to
target Muslims, they will end up spying on other groups as
well.
SHAMIUR RAHMAN
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct. Executed on October 2$ , 2012.
T h e D e m o g r a p h i c s U n i t
T w o S e r g e a n t s
T e n D e t e c t i v e s
F o u r P o l i c e O f f i c e r s
L a n g u a g e C a p a b i l i t i e s
B e % a E
T T T * " t l *
H i n d i
P u n j a b i
U r d u
I d e n t i f y a n d m a p e t h n i c r e j a d e j i t i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n s w i t h i n
t h e l r i - S t a t e a r e a . J l l l l l l i ; , g _ W f f i E S ; K : : a , : : ; _
I d e n t i f y a n d m a p e l ^ ^ P ^ c ^ ^ ^ K ' 1 1 1 1 1 1
' M o n i t o r ^ c u n q ^ ^ ^ K : ^ ^ m ^ S ^ ^ K m a n d p u l s e | h e
i d e n t i f i e d h o l B p i l s a s a j p i l | | | | j i f : : , : : : : ; ; :
IDENTIFICATION METHODS
Utilize statistical information from the United States 2000 Census regarding
countries of interest.
Establish a formula for determining a more accurate population for each ofNew
York City's ethnic communities.
Analyze non-citizen arrest database and I94s.
Analyze religious institutions locations and congregations.
Research privately funded surveys and studies of a variety of ethnic communities.
Identify businesses and or employment that is indicative of a specific ethnicity
(Pakistani cab drivers)
Deploy officers in civilian clothes throughout the ethnic communities
K E Y I N D I C A T O R S
T r a n s i e n t H o u s i n g ( M o s q u e s , S t o r e s , F l o p H o u s e s )
C r i m i n a l A c t i v i t y ( I n d i c a t o r s )
E x t r e m i s t l i t e r a t u r e
E x t r e m i s t r h e t o r i c ( I m a m s s p e e c h e s , c a f e c o n v e r s a t i o n s )
S a l e o f e x t r e m i s t p a r a p h e r n a l i a ( J i h a d T a p e s )
H o u s e s o f w o r s h i p
R e l i g i o u s s c h o o l s
L o c a l n e w s p a p e r s
C o m m u n i t y c e n t e r s
C o m m u n i t y b u l l e t i n b o a r d s ( l o c a t e d i n h o u s e s o f w o r s h i p )
L o c a l f l y e r s
S u s p e c t c h a r i t i e s
ANCESTRIES OF INTEREST
Egypt Turkey Lebanon Morocco
Yemen Bangladesh Palestine Iraq
Iran Jordan Afghanistan Syria
Pakistan Albania Algeria Tunisia
Somalia Libya Bahrain India
Chechnya Guyana Indonesia > Uzbekistan
Sudan
YugoslaviaSaudi Arabia ILA.E.
American Black Muslim
BUSINESS LOCATIONS
Determine the ethnicity of the owner
Gauge sentiment ( Interacting, observing and conversing with owners and patrons)
Identify locations where community members socialize (coffee house, gambling hall, house
of prostitution). 1
Purchase extremist literature of paraphernalia (bomber vid^o, radical compact disks)
Determine if location is facilitating criminal acts which may be enablers of terrorism
(Untaxed cigarettes, narcotics, sale of fraudulent I.D.)
Participate in social activities i.e. Cricket matches, Cafe's & Clubs
D A I L Y O P E R A T I O N S A N D
R E C O R D K E E P I N G
P r e a s s i g n m e n t b r i e f i n g a n d T a c t i c a l p l a n .
O n e D e t e c t i v e " h a n d l e r " s u p e r v i s e s a t e a m o f " R a k e r s "
R a k e r s a r e t a k e n t o c o m m u n i t i e s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r e t h n i c i t y a n d o r l a n g u a g e ( A r a b i c o f f i c e r s
a r e u s e d i n a v a r i e t y o f c o m m u n i t i e s )
G a t h e r i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d r e p o r t a c t i v i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l v i s i t s o n a d a i l y a c t i v i t y r e p o r t f o c u s i n g o n k e y
i n d i c a t o r s . - . *
866.876.8757 U.S. LEGAL SUPPORT, INC. www.uslegalsupport.com
[Page 1]
-------------------------------------------X
HANDSCHU,
PLAINTIFF,

-against- 71CIV.2203
(CSH)
SPECIAL SERVICES DIVISION,
DEFENDANT.
-------------------------------------------X
100 Church Street
New York, New York
June 28, 2012
10:30 a.m.
EXAMINATION BEFORE TRIAL of a
non-party witness, THOMAS GALATI, taken by
the respective parties herein, pursuant to
order, held at the Offices of The New York
City Law Department, 100 Church Street, New
York, New York, before a Notary Public of
the State of New York.
[Page 2]
1
2
A P P E A R A N C E S:
3
PROFETA & EISENSTEIN, ESQS.
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
4
5
New York, New York 10006
6
BY: Jethro M. Eisenstein, Esq.
7
NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
8
OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
Attorneys for the Defendants
9
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007-2601
10
BY: Peter G. Farrell, Senior Counsel
11
Special Federal Litigation Division
12
Also Present: Alexis Leist
13
Arthur Eisenberg
Paul G. Chevigny
14
Martin R. Stolar
Franklin Siegel
15
16
ALSO PRESENT:
17
New York Police Department
18
Steven Colon
Stuart Parker
19
Thomas Doepfner
20
THE NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT:
21
Celeste Koeleveld
Natalya Fadeyeva
22
23
24
25
[Page 3]
1
T. Galati
2
T H O M A S G A L A T I, called as a
3
witness, having been first duly sworn by a
4
Notary Public of the State of New York, was
5
examined and as follows:
6
7
MR. EISENSTEIN: I want to put on
8
the record part of the terms in which
9
this deposition is being conducted.
10
We have agreed that the entire
11
deposition is confidential for 30 days
12
after delivery of the transcript to the
13
defendants.
14
So that, you, Peter have the
15
opportunity to review the transcript to
16
determine what, if anything, you and
17
your client feel needs to be kept
18
confidential.
19
30 days after delivery of the
20
transcript, you will identify any
21
portions you want sealed. If there is
22
agreement about sealing, those portions
23
will be sealed. If plaintiff's counsel
24
disagrees, the matter is to be submitted
25
to the court and the portions you have
[Page 4]
1
2
designated are under a protective order
3
pending a decision. That pending a
4
decision on your request, that it be
5
sealed.
6
If a party wishes to append the
7
portion of the deposition transcript to
8
its court's submission, the filing will
9
be done under protective order setting
10
forth a procedure for determining
11
whether the attachment itself shall be
12
sealed and disclosed, outlined in
13
Lugosch, L-U-G-O-S-C-H versus Pyramid
14
Company 435F.3d 110 (2d Cir.2006.)
15
First of all, I'd like to ascend
16
that that's the agreement that we have
17
made.
18
MR. FARRELL: I concur that is
19
the agreement regarding confidentiality
20
subject to one question. I'd like to
21
add that "confidential" means disclosure
22
is limited to the five plaintiffs'
23
attorneys in the room today. That's what
24
we mean by "confidentiality". You
25
agree?
[Page 5]
1
2
MR. EISENSTEIN: Correct.
3
MR. FARRELL: We had agreed that
4
we would in 30 days look at the
5
transcript. You and I had a discussion.
6
If I needed additional time to do the
7
review so I would ask that come 30 days,
8
I would be in contact with you, rather
9
than having an automatic trigger where
10
you put the transcript on the internet,
11
that at least we confer on that point
12
first.
13
MR. EISENSTEIN: Peter, we
14
initially agreed 30. That's fine. If
15
you call prior to the 30 days, you're in
16
the middle of a trial. I'm not going to
17
disclose it.
18
If you're otherwise unable to
19
make the decision, we're not going to
20
disclose it. On the other hand, we
21
expect your good faith about not letting
22
that process go on indefinitely.
23
MR. FARRELL: That I concur with
24
upon receiving the transcript. The only
25
part I wasn't sure about is, if there's
[Page 6]
1
2
a disagreement over sealing that part
3
that we want to remain confidential.
4
Did you in your recitation put the
5
burden on one of us in particular?
6
MR. EISENSTEIN: Yes, I thought
7
we had agreed that the presumption is to
8
be disclosed. In other words, we
9
started out and plaintiffs did not agree
10
that the presumption was going to be
11
confidential. Because the presumption
12
is to be disclosed, you're the ones that
13
are pushing the rock up the hill about
14
sealing it.
15
In other words, unless you
16
prevail in persuading the court that the
17
section needs to be sealed, then it
18
would be disclosed. Presumption is
19
disclosure, presumption of
20
confidentiality. Look at our exchange
21
of letters, that was one of the things
22
which clearly in my view we agreed upon.
23
MR. FARRELL: I'll reserve my
24
right to look at that. I'm not going to
25
take issue on that further now. I want
[Page 7]
1
2
to add that this deposition is pursuant
3
to an agreement between the parties to
4
conduct some voluntary discovery in
5
response to counsel's motion of, I
6
believe it is, October of 2011, and that
7
voluntary discovery is set out. The
8
parameters are set out in letter and
9
e-mail correspondence between counsel
10
for the parties and specifically there
11
are at least five letters where that is
12
set out.
13
The dates are January 3rd, 2012,
14
January 24, 2012, February 2nd, 2012,
15
February 29, 2012 and March 30, 2012.
16
While we call this voluntary
17
discovery, we have also reserved our
18
rights regarding the duration of the
19
deposition and that's set forth those
20
correspondence.
21
Finally, I would like to request
22
review and signing as contemplated under
23
federal rules civil procedure 30 (e),
24
which is a separate request other than
25
or in addition to the 30-day review for
[Page 8]
1
2
the confidentiality.
3
MR. EISENSTEIN: I don't think we
4
would have an objection to signing, but
5
if review and signing is going to extend
6
the period during which we have agreed
7
to keep it confidential, that is
8
certainly not something that we had
9
discussed. I don't see any reason why
10
the review for the purpose of signing
11
can't go on concurrently with your
12
review.
13
I'm not sure whether you're
14
suggesting that that is an additional
15
period of time.
16
MR. FARRELL: I wasn't
17
addressing the time period right now.
18
What I was addressing was, in addition
19
to having the ability to deem things
20
confidential, I explicitly want the
21
right to review as contemplated under
22
the federal rules. That's usually done
23
as a review and signing of the
24
transcript under Federal Rule 30,
25
Subsection E.
[Page 9]
1
T. Galati
2
MR. EISENSTEIN: If all you're
3
saying is you want to invoke 30E, this
4
is a deposition in an action pending in
5
the United States District Court for the
6
Southern District of New York.
7
It's governed by the federal
8
rules. I don't know what else to say
9
about that.
10
You're invoking a rule which
11
exists and applies to any deposition as
12
far as I'm concerned. You can either
13
waive reviewing and signing or they can
14
insist in reviewing and signing.
15
On behalf of Chief Galati, you
16
are insisting on reviewing --
17
MR. FARRELL: Yes, we have that
18
right.
19
MR. EISENSTEIN: Anything else?
20
MR. FARRELL: No, that's all
21
that I have.
22
EXAMINATION BY
23
MR. EISENSTEIN:
24
Q With that introduction, good
25
morning. My name is Jethro Eisenstein. I'm
[Page 10]
1
T. Galati
2
one of the attorneys for the plaintiff in
3
the Handschu case. Chief, have you had your
4
deposition taken before?
5
A I have had depositions taken
6
before, yes.
7
Q I just want to review a couple of
8
rules: The court reporter sitting to your
9
left is going to take down every word that
10
you say and every word that I say. Do you
11
understand that?
12
A Yes.
13
Q Do you understand the oath that
14
you take to tell the truth is the same oath
15
that you take in court?
16
A Yes.
17
Q Do you agree to answer the
18
questions out loud with words because the
19
court reporter can't take down nods of the
20
head?
21
A Yes.
22
Q I'm going to ask you to wait
23
until I finish a question so that we get a
24
clean record. Sometimes it's hard to
25
discipline oneself, but if you wait until
[Page 11]
1
T. Galati
2
I'm done, she gets the question and then the
3
answer and we have a clean record. Okay?
4
A Yes.
5
Q If I ask you a question that is
6
not clear to you, please don't guess at my
7
question, just tell me you don't understand
8
and I'll ask the question in a different
9
way. Okay?
10
A Yes.
11
Q Are you employed by the New York
12
City Police Department?
13
A Yes, I am.
14
Q What is your current rank and
15
command?
16
A I am an Assistant Chief. I am
17
the Commanding Officer of the Intelligence
18
Division.
19
Q How long have you been employed
20
by the New York City Police Department?
21
A This July will complete 28 years.
22
Q How long have you held your
23
current rank?
24
A My current rank, I believe I'm in
25
four years, three or four years.
[Page 12]
1
T. Galati
2
Q How long have you been assigned
3
to the Intelligence Division?
4
A Since September of 2006.
5
Q What positions have you held in
6
the Intelligence Division?
7
A I've always been the commanding
8
officer of the Intelligence Division.
9
Q Have you held the position of
10
supervisor in other commands in the police
11
department?
12
A Yes, I have.
13
Q What other commands and what
14
supervisory divisions? You don't have
15
sergeant. Let's just say lieutenant and
16
above.
17
A It may be easier if I go
18
backwards.
19
Q Go backwards.
20
A I'm presently the commanding
21
officer of the Intelligence Division. Prior
22
to that, I was the commanding officer of the
23
gang division. Prior to that, I was the
24
commanding officer of the 46th Precinct.
25
Prior to that, I was the
[Page 13]
1
T. Galati
2
commanding officer of the 47th Precinct.
3
Prior to that, I was the
4
commanding officer of the Bronx Anticrime
5
Unit. Prior to that, I was the commanding
6
officer of the Bronx Tracer Unit and prior
7
to that, I was a lieutenant and I was
8
assigned to the Street Crime Unit.
9
Q What is your formal educational
10
background?
11
A I have a bachelors from Empire
12
State. I've also had other certificate
13
programs from the Harvard Kennedy School and
14
the police management of Columbia
15
University.
16
Q What were those certificate
17
programs in?
18
A Harvard Kennedy School was for
19
state and local -- I can't think of the name
20
of the actual program, but it was for state
21
and local. Not law enforcement, it was for
22
municipal, I guess.
23
Q But, it's related to law
24
enforcement?
25
A No, it's related to many
[Page 14]
1
T. Galati
2
different issues.
3
Q And the Columbia University
4
program is?
5
A A business school for police
6
executives.
7
MR. EISENSTEIN: Off the record.
8
(A discussion was held off the
9
record.)
10
Q Did you review any documents in
11
preparation for this deposition today?
12
A Yes.
13
Q What did you review?
14
A I reviewed the police
15
department's Handschu Guidelines and I did
16
look through some material that was provided
17
to me, I believe the same material that you
18
have, I did peruse.
19
Q The material, the Zone Assessment
20
Unit reports?
21
A Yes.
22
MR. EISENSTEIN: Would you mark
23
this as Exhibit 1 for today's date.
24
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a
25
document, was marked for identification,
[Page 15]
1
T. Galati
2
as of this date.)
3
Q Chief, I'm showing you what had
4
been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Do
5
you recognize this document?
6
A I do recognize this document.
7
Q Can you tell us who prepared this
8
document?
9
A I cannot tell you who prepared
10
this document. I saw this document for the
11
first time when it was published in the AP
12
Article.
13
Q Do you know whether it is a
14
document that was prepared within the New
15
York City Police Department?
16
A I can't tell you definitively
17
that it was prepared by someone in the
18
police department. It appears to have the
19
police department's logo on it, but I have
20
been unable to find who authored it and find
21
it in any of my records or the department's
22
records.
23
Q When it was published by the AP
24
Article, did you inquire about the origins
25
of this document?
[Page 16]
1
T. Galati
2
A Yes.
3
Q Am I to understand that you were
4
not able to find anybody in the Intelligence
5
Division who knew what the origins were?
6
A Yes.
7
MR. EISENSTEIN: Can you mark
8
this as Exhibit 2?
9
10
11
as of this date.)
12
Q Do you recognize this document?
13
A Yes.
14
Q Can you identify what this
15
document is?
16
A This is a section out of the
17
police department's organizational guide.
18
Q Is the first page of it an
19
organizational chart for the Intelligence
20
Division as of 2/15/08?
21
A Yes, 2/8/08.
22
Q Sorry, 2/8/08. The Demographics
23
Unit, would that name exist at the present
24
time in the New York City Police Department?
25
A Not at the present time.
[Page 17]
1
T. Galati
2
Q The Zone Assessment Unit was
3
formerly known as the Demographics Unit?
4
A Yes.
5
Q When did the change from
6
Demographics Unit to Zone Assessment Unit
7
occur?
8
A I couldn't give you an exact
9
date, but I believe it was sometime in 2010.
10
Q What was the reason for the
11
change of name?
12
A It was a different way that we
13
wanted to look at deployment. We were
14
breaking up deployments into zone, so that
15
could correspond with an analyst who also
16
had a zone deployment.
17
Q When it was called the
18
Demographics Unit, who did the Demographics
19
Unit report to?
20
A Clarify your question. Direct
21
report?
22
Q Yes. Who did the Demographics
23
Unit operatives directly report to?
24
A The people assigned to the
25
Demographics Unit reported to a sergeant,
[Page 18]
1
T. Galati
2
sergeants, actually in the Demographics
3
Unit.
4
Q In turn, who did they report to?
5
A The sergeants reported to a
6
lieutenant.
7
Q Was the lieutenant in the
8
Demographics Unit?
9
A The lieutenant would oversee more
10
than the Demographics Unit. He would
11
oversee other units as well.
12
Q What other units did the
13
lieutenant oversee?
14
A It has changed over the years.
15
I'm not exactly positive. Presently, I
16
believe he oversees the Citywide Debriefing
17
team and the Demographics team, the zone
18
assessment team, and I think that's all he
19
oversees right now. It may have been
20
different at different times.
21
Q You're talking about now when
22
it's called the Zone Assessment Unit, right?
23
A Yes.
24
Q Was that different when it was
25
called the Demographics Unit in terms of the
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lieutenant?
3
Who did the lieutenant supervise?
4
Were one of the things he or she was
5
supervising was the Demographics Unit, also
6
Citywide Debriefing?
7
A The lieutenants have been
8
assigned to different people at different
9
times. I am not exactly positive which
10
other ones. I believe -- I don't want to
11
guess what ones they were. We switched it.
12
Q Are there persons assigned to the
13
Demographics Unit? Withdrawn.
14
Were there persons assigned to
15
the Demographics Unit who were referred to
16
as Rakers?
17
MR. FARRELL: Objection.
18
A The first time I heard the term
19
Rakers is when the AP Articles came out.
20
However, I believe the term would be
21
referring to people assigned within the then
22
Demographics, now Zone Assessment Unit.
23
Q Were there persons within the
24
Demographics Unit who were referred to as
25
mosque crawlers?
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2
3
A Again, the term mosque
4
crawlers -- the first time I ever heard that
5
was from the AP Article. I've never heard
6
anyone in the division refer to mosque
7
crawlers.
8
As I mentioned for Rakers too,
9
that term, I've been assigned to the
10
Intelligence Division since 2006 and I've
11
never heard that term being used other than
12
when it came out in the AP Articles.
13
Q Are the persons, who have been
14
assigned to the Demographics Unit and then
15
to the Zone Assessment Unit, members of the
16
New York City Police Department?
17
By members, I mean graduates of
18
the police department, police academy
19
assigned to shield and tax ID number.
20
A Yes, they were sworn members of
21
the NYPD.
22
Q What formal training have the
23
persons had, the members of the NYPD
24
assigned to the Demographics Unit?
25
Let me break it down. What
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formal training did members of the NYPD,
3
assigned to the Demographics Unit, receive
4
before being deployed in the Demographics
5
Unit's activities?
6
7
A There's a lot of training that
8
officers get when they are in the academy
9
and outside of the academy during the course
10
of their career, you know. You're asking
11
for a specific time?
12
Q Let me be more specific. I'm
13
asking about the training received by
14
members of the force who were assigned to
15
the Demographics Unit.
16
I'm asking about the training
17
received by members of the force who were
18
assigned to the Demographics Unit before
19
they were deployed in their capacity as
20
members of the Demographics Unit.
21
In other words, training
22
specifically to the tasks that they would be
23
undertaking as members of the Demographics
24
Unit?
25
A Well, members of the Demographics
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Unit/Zone Assessment Unit receive training
3
that we give every year. We go to an annual
4
training, more specific to their
5
assignments.
6
They are given Handschu training
7
based on the Handschu Guidelines that is
8
provided by the legal team that we have
9
assigned to the Intelligence Division.
10
Q Is there written material
11
provided to them in connection with the
12
Handschu training?
13
A The Handschu Guidelines which are
14
in the Patrol Guide, are written material.
15
I believe the other training does not have
16
any other handouts other than the Handschu
17
Guideline.
18
Q Before being deployed as members
19
of the Demographics Unit or the Zone
20
Assessment Unit, do they receive any other
21
training detailing what they are expected to
22
do?
23
A Yes, we do inform them. If you
24
want to call it a specific training, we do
25
inform them about things that they should
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do. Yes, I don't want to call it official
3
training, if that's what you're asking for.
4
Official is not the word I'm
5
looking for. They are instructed on what
6
they should do.
7
Q Who issues the instructions to
8
them about what they are to do?
9
A Their instructions could come
10
from their direct supervisor. Their
11
instructions could come from me. I do know
12
that our legal counsel has sat down with the
13
entire unit at one point, so instructions
14
has come from our legal counsel.
15
Q Have you personally had
16
interaction with the members of the force
17
who were assigned to the Zone Assessment
18
Unit?
19
I can call it that and you'll
20
tell me if the answer would be different
21
than when it was the Demographics Unit;
22
okay?
23
A Yes.
24
Q Have you personally issued
25
instructions to members of the Zone
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Assessment Unit?
3
A I would say I have personally
4
issued instructions, but I may have done it
5
through a chain of command. I would direct
6
something and then it would be given down to
7
the ranks, to them.
8
Q What were the members of the Zone
9
Assessment Unit told that they are to do?
10
What are the instructions that are given to
11
them?
12
13
A It's a broad statement. If
14
you're asking me what their duties and
15
responsibilities are, I don't know what your
16
question is.
17
Q Okay. What are the duties and
18
responsibilities of the members of the Zone
19
Assessment Unit?
20
A The function of the Zone
21
Assessment Unit is to -- let me begin by
22
saying that in the beginning of the Zone
23
Assessment Unit, the function of the Zone
24
Assessment in the post 9-11 time was to go
25
out and go through the different communities
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2
in New York City and help us identify
3
different communities that would be
4
considered communities that have people that
5
live in it from countries of concern.
6
Q How were they told to go about
7
identifying such people?
8
A Well, as I said, this is directly
9
after 9-11, and countries that are of
10
concern were identified based on the 9-11
11
attack and other attacks that happened
12
throughout the world, the people who
13
committed those attacks;
14
Islamists that have been
15
radicalized to violence that committed those
16
acts came from countries of concern. Those
17
countries were identified. The Demographics
18
Unit were to go out to communities and tell
19
us if these communities represented the same
20
countries of concern where these Islamists
21
radicals came from.
22
Q Take a look at Exhibit 1. On the
23
fifth page, there's a page headed ancestries
24
of interest.
25
A Yes.
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2
Q Does that correspond to the
3
communities that you were sending people out
4
to look into?
5
6
A Are you asking me if this
7
corresponds to the countries of concern?
8
Q Correct.
9
A I would say that most of them
10
here do, but not all. Yugoslavia is no
11
longer a country. Chechnya is part of
12
Russia.
13
Most of the other countries
14
themselves are correct and American black
15
Muslim is not a country.
16
Q Take a look at page five of
17
Exhibit 2. I'm looking at the paragraph on
18
page five on Demographics Unit.
19
Was it a function of the
20
Demographics Unit to develop a comprehensive
21
analysis and understanding of the
22
demographics trend throughout New York City?
23
A I don't believe that is one of
24
their functions. They are not analysts, so
25
they are not trying to analyze, but, yes,
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they are supposed to understand the trend,
3
the demographics trend in the city.
4
Q What does that mean, demographics
5
trend? What's your understanding of that
6
phrase?
7
A When the Demographics Unit
8
started, it was started with, you know,
9
terrorism in mind, post 9-11. At that
10
point, nobody knew where the next attack was
11
coming.
12
All we knew was, there had been
13
people from countries of concern that
14
committed this attack. In order to fight
15
terrorism, we needed to know where people
16
lived from countries of concern that could
17
either recruit, hide or secrete themselves
18
in these communities that were radicalized
19
towards violence and we needed to know where
20
they were, to identify those countries of
21
concern, to find those people that were
22
radicalized towards violence.
23
Q That's your understanding of the
24
phrase demographic trends?
25
A Yes.
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Q That's what their function is?
3
A Yes.
4
Q Were members of the Demographics
5
Unit also to conduct investigations and
6
gather intelligence information as directed?
7
A Based on the Handschu Guidelines,
8
the term investigations means the gathering
9
of information. So, based on the Handschu
10
Guidelines, I would say that that is
11
correct. As far as the police department's
12
terminology that I use in investigation,
13
they do not conduct investigations, they
14
gather information.
15
Q When you say the terminology that
16
you use about investigations, what is in
17
your terminology? What is an investigation?
18
A In traditional department
19
terminology of what an investigation is,
20
there's a crime or a person that is being
21
investigated because a crime has been
22
committed, and we have to find out who did
23
this crime.
24
Or, we have information that the
25
crime will be committed and we're going to
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2
conduct an investigation on that person or
3
persons. That is what an investigation is.
4
An investigation could be from a car
5
accident. An investigator has to
6
investigate how the car accident occurred.
7
That's how I understand the term
8
of an investigation from traditional
9
department terminology.
10
Q Do I understand you to be saying
11
that using that terminology "Demographics
12
Unit" was not to engage in investigations,
13
as you just defined it?
14
A The Demographic Unit's
15
responsibilities were to collect information
16
on areas so that we can identify countries
17
of concern, where there were people that
18
were being radicalized towards violence,
19
Islamists radicalized towards violence.
20
Q Was the function of the members
21
of the force assigned to the Demographics
22
Unit to make assessment regarding the
23
potential for World events to impact upon
24
local communities?
25
A I don't believe it's their job to
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2
make an assessment. However, through the
3
rest of the Intelligence Division, we
4
monitor World events.
5
If World events dictated that a
6
particular area may become more of a
7
concern, then the Demographics or Zone
8
Assessment Unit would go to that general
9
area.
10
Q Was it in connection with that
11
activity that you just described? Was it
12
their job to collect information about how
13
World events were impacting local
14
communities for the analyst to analyze?
15
A I would say that if there was an
16
event in the world that resulted in some
17
type of violence or disruption, anywhere in
18
the World or within the States that was
19
related to terrorism activity, yes, they
20
would go.
21
They would basically see if it's
22
going to have any implications in New York
23
City.
24
Q Would it be fair to say that
25
their job was to see whether people were
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2
talking about it and how people were talking
3
about it?
4
5
A Their job was, if they hear
6
people talking about it, you know, they
7
should inform us. If what they're hearing
8
is hostility towards the United States or to
9
the general public at large, you know, as a
10
result of these events, would something
11
happen here as a result? Their job is to
12
listen for that.
13
Q You used the word hostility
14
towards the United States. I want to make
15
sure that I don't misunderstand you.
16
A lot of people talk. They don't
17
like what's going on, what this person is
18
doing, they don't like what the United
19
States is doing.
20
Are you talking as broadly as the
21
hostility in the United States, in the sense
22
of expressions of opinions that were
23
contrary to the policies of the United
24
States --
25
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2
Q -- or objected to the policies of
3
the United States?
4
A I would say that it doesn't even
5
have to involve the United States at all;
6
its general policing to prevent violence.
7
There is plenty of strife in
8
Pakistan where there's violence between Shia
9
muslims and Sunni muslims.
10
When there's violence between
11
these two sects of the religion. It could
12
escalate and happen here. It doesn't have
13
to necessarily relate to the United States
14
itself.
15
It could affect just the general
16
public or within that community itself.
17
It's a Pakistani community. It could be
18
among Pakistani to each other.
19
It's broader than hostility
20
towards the United States, hostility in the
21
community.
22
Q Were members of the force
23
assigned to the Demographics Unit instructed
24
to bring back information about expressions
25
of opinion whether or not they related to
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2
violence or potential violence?
3
A Say the question again.
4
Q What I'm trying to find out is,
5
were the instructions given to them to
6
report back about what they were hearing
7
broad enough?
8
For example, to call for them, to
9
report back? Let me just give you an
10
example about someone commenting to another
11
person from his community about the state of
12
the union message delivered by President
13
Bush.
14
15
A I guess I would have to see that
16
comment. I would have to see what that
17
comment is to make a determination.
18
It's not something that they
19
should bring to us. It depends on the
20
context, it depends on the time, it depends
21
on who is talking about it. I couldn't
22
answer that question.
23
Q Fair enough. Since the
24
instructions have to be given before going
25
out, what I'm trying to get from you is
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2
whether the instructions were as broad as
3
simply telling us what you hear, whatever it
4
is or were they limited in any fashion by
5
the instructions that came from you through
6
the chain of command?
7
Were they limited in any fashion
8
or were they, just to be clear, bringing
9
back everything you hear?
10
11
A No, their instructions were not
12
to go and bring back every conversation that
13
they heard. That's not what their
14
instructions were.
15
Q What was given to them in way of
16
instructions to guide their judgement about
17
what to bring back?
18
19
MR. EISENSTEIN: He says that
20
for a reason, but it doesn't mean you
21
should answer. He'll be very clear if
22
it's something he doesn't want you to
23
answer.
24
A A lot of conversation that has
25
been brought back has value. On the
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2
surface, it may seem valuable. Overall
3
conversation may relate to where people are
4
from at that particular location, you know.
5
To get a little bit deeper, I think that a
6
conversation overheard by people in the
7
Lebanese cafe may indicate to us that they
8
are from South Lebanon or North Lebanon.
9
Although it may not seem
10
important when you look at it, an analyst
11
can understand that a particular town that
12
was mentioned in a conversation may be in
13
South Lebanon.
14
That may be an indicator of
15
possibility that that is a sympathizer to
16
Hezbollah because Southern Lebanon is
17
dominated by Hezbollah.
18
Q I understand what you're saying.
19
A lot of stuff can be a risk, useful
20
information. What I'm trying to find out
21
is, somehow or another, the people assigned
22
to the Demographics Unit or the Zone
23
Assessment Unit are being asked to
24
distinguish between what they should report
25
about and what they shouldn't be reporting
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2
about. They have to make some judgements
3
about what to report about, correct?
4
A Yes. I would have to say they
5
would make some judgments.
6
Q What are given by way of
7
instructions to help guide their use of
8
their judgement about what to report about?
9
A If we deployed them because of an
10
event that took place in a particular part
11
of the World, a drone attack, we would want
12
to know and we would instruct them to find
13
out if people are upset about this drone
14
attack.
15
If they are, that's something
16
that would be important for us to know, that
17
would be something we would want to know.
18
If they were talking about something that
19
would help us identify what region or what
20
type of people they are from the country of
21
concern that we're trying to identify, that
22
would be something that we would want them
23
to report.
24
So, it's twofold. If there's a
25
reaction to something or if it's going to
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2
help us, their main purpose is just to help
3
us identify where in the city we would find
4
people from some countries of concern, where
5
Islamists radicalized towards violence would
6
hide or recruit.
7
Q I understand what you're saying
8
about telling us everything you hear about a
9
drone attack, for example.
10
If there isn't a specific event
11
that has occurred, are general instructions
12
given to help guide their judgement about
13
what information to bring back?
14
15
A Their main function is to
16
catalogue those locations so we can
17
understand what countries of concern they're
18
from, their observations and overheard
19
conversations.
20
When they are not deployed in
21
relation to an event, should they hear an
22
overheard conversation that I would
23
consider, and I'll use the word alarming or
24
aggressive, those kinds of conversations we
25
would want them to bring back.
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2
Q Was it part of the job of members
3
of the force assigned to the Demographics
4
Unit to analyze religious institutions,
5
locations or congregations?
6
7
A The Zone Assessment Unit/
8
Demographics Unit does not do any analytical
9
work when it comes to what their function
10
is. They have identified religious
11
institutions to the extent that we can
12
understand what country or countries of
13
concern would go to those particular
14
locations.
15
Q Have they identified those
16
locations by going to them?
17
18
A Yes. Are you asking me -- can
19
you rephrase the question?
20
Q Have members of the force, who
21
are assigned to what's now called the Zone
22
Assessment Unit, visited religious
23
institutions, congregations?
24
25
A Let me state that, since I'm here
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2
in 2006, members of the Demographics Unit,
3
it is our practice and policy that they do
4
not go into religious institutions unless
5
there's a need to because we have to
6
identify what type of institutions.
7
It's not always readily available
8
from the outside. However, we prefer that
9
they do it from the outside, if possible.
10
However, when 9-11 happened and then this
11
unit stood up and we had to understand a
12
little bit more and gain knowledge, it was
13
necessary to go inside those locations in
14
order to determine what type of congregation
15
it was and what people, from what countries
16
of concern would be there.
17
So, for identification reasons
18
early on, they did go into some of those
19
locations. It is not their normal practice
20
and it is not their practice today.
21
Q When you say early on, are you
22
talking about things that occurred prior to
23
your being in the Intelligence Division?
24
A Yes, I'm talking about early on
25
when the Demographics Unit was first
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2
deployed.
3
Q Were those activities, religious
4
institutions going on when you became
5
commander of the Intelligence Division?
6
7
A As I stated, I came in 2006 and
8
that is not our normal practice or policy.
9
I cannot definitively tell you that it has
10
never happened if it is a new location, a
11
new mosque that we have never seen before.
12
That is not readily available
13
based on signs. They may have. It is not
14
our policy nor is it our practice to have
15
them do that.
16
When I said early on, I am going
17
back to the original starting point of the
18
unit, when it was necessary to first really
19
determine what kind of location it was.
20
MR. EISENSTEIN: Can you mark
21
this as Exhibit 3.
22
23
24
as of this date.)
25
Q I've handed you what's been
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2
marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. My
3
question is, do you recognize this document?
4
MR. FARRELL: Off the record.
5
(A discussion was held off the
6
record.)
7

15

25
know.
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2

[Page 43]
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2

[Page 44]
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2

6
I guess my trouble with the
7
question is, the deposition is about
8
visiting public places and events under
9
the same terms as the public.
10
The question is open-ended and
11
you aren't putting it within that
12
framework. To the extent that your
13
answers call for something beyond that,
14
that's where I have an objection and I'm
15
instructing the witness not to answer.
16
MR. CHEVIGNY: Wouldn't mosques
17
be considered places open to the public?
18
MR. FARRELL: I can consult with
19
the witness to respond.
20
MR. EISENSTEIN: Let me make it
21
clear. I understand what this
22
deposition is about. I'm trying to find
23
out whether using that power under the
24
Handschu Guidelines as identified in
25
VIII (A)(2), I'm trying to assess how
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2
many mosques have been visited and my
3
way into that which is perfectly
4
appropriate.
5
I haven't gone into anything
6
that's outside the scope of what I was
7
going to be asking about in my view.
8
MR. FARRELL: Hypothetically,
9
there's a possibility that mosques were
10
visited, not under VIII (A)(2), but
11
pursuant to an authorized Handschu
12
investigation.
13
To answer that question, it's not
14
making a distinction.
15
MR. EISENSTEIN: You said it's
16
hypothetical. To find out how that is
17
so, ask the witness.
18
MR. FARRELL: I need to confer
19
with the witness.
20
A The Demographics Unit has
21
identified mosques throughout the city and
22
the ethnic community or communities that
23
would go to that mosque. What the exact
24
number is, I couldn't tell you the exact
25
number.
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2
Q Was the Demographics Unit tasked
3
with identifying mosques around the city
4
when the unit stood up, as you said?
5
A Yes.
6
Q Do you know when the Demographics
7
Unit was formed?
8
A I don't have an exact date, I'm
9
going to say early in 2003 sometime.
10
Q Did members of the Demographics
11
Unit identify mosques and the community that
12
they related to by visiting the mosques?
13
14
A The purpose of the Demographics
15
Unit and the Zone Assessment Unit was to
16
identify mosques, to identify the ethnic
17
community that would be associated with the
18
mosques.
19
If they could do it from the
20
outside, they would do it from the outside.
21
Often, they were unable to do that and they
22
would then go inside. I'm talking early in
23
the unit's existence.
24
If they needed to, they would go
25
inside the location in order to determine
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2
what ethnic community, what signs to
3
describe, what ethnic community would attend
4
that particular mosque.
5
As I did say, that is not the
6
practice and policy since I've been here in
7
2006, and I think I said earlier that unless
8
for some reason there was no other way to
9
determine that factor, I'm not saying
10
definitively that's not the practice, since
11
I'm assigned to the unit, that it has been
12
done.
13
Q I think you indicated when
14
there's a new mosque identified even today,
15
it would be part of the job of the
16
Demographics Unit to try to figure out who
17
goes to that mosque; am I correct?
18
19
A If we became aware of a new
20
mosque, we would want to know what ethnic
21
community would attend that mosque.
22
Q If necessary, if you couldn't do
23
it from the outside, the Demographics Unit
24
would visit; is that correct?
25
A Are you asking me today?
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T. Galati
2
Q Today.
3
A If the Demographics Unit was
4
unable to determine what kind of mosque it
5
was, would they go inside?
6
Q Yes.
7
A I would want to know what kind of
8
mosque, what kind of congregation it was, I
9
would want to know. I would want to know if
10
they exhausted all other means and that was
11
the only way. I would say that they would,
12
but they haven't.
13
It has not come up at least since
14
I'm here. I can't recall instances where
15
that has happened.
16
Q Have there been some number of
17
mosques in New York City that have been
18
identified by the NYPD as mosques of
19
concern?
20
MR. FARRELL: Objection. I need
21
to consult with the witness whether
22
privilege applies.
23
I have my objection noted. You
24
can answer the question.
25
THE WITNESS: Can you re-ask the
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2
question. Can I consult with you again?
3
MR. FARRELL: Sure.
4
(Recess taken).
5
A The Demographics Unit's job is
6
not to identify mosques of concern.
7
However, I can't tell you that when they
8
identify mosques, that it may indicate that
9
it's a mosque of concern.
10
That's not their function and
11
that's not who identifies mosques of
12
concern. Mosques of concern are identified
13
under authorized Handschu investigations.
14
Q Okay. What is mosque of concern?
15
Is it a phrase that's used by the NYPD? Is
16
that correct, mosque of concern?
17
18
A I don't use the term mosque of
19
concern nor do people in the Intelligence
20
Division since 2006 use the word mosque of
21
concern. I can't tell you that earlier on
22
that terminology may have been used.
23
Q Is the expression mosques of
24
interest used by the Intelligence Division?
25
MR. FARRELL: Objection. There
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1
T. Galati
2
has to be a way for us to continue. The
3
question that is asked generally about
4
Intelligence Division practices outside
5
of section VIII(A)(2) of the Handschu
6
Guidelines, the reality is that there
7
are Intelligence Division operations
8
that operate under other parts of the
9
Handschu Guidelines, that's the
10
difficulty that I have. I want you to
11
understand the difficulty I'm having
12
with the way the question is being
13
phrased.
14
We'll have to continue to consult
15
about privilege. I don't know if you
16
can structure the questions to get us
17
within the scope of VIII(A)(2).
18
If you recall the initial notice
19
of deposition, it has the categories.
20
It was limited to VIII(A)(2). It was
21
not going to be about general
22
intelligence practices or
23
investigations, authorized Handschu
24
investigations. You agreed then, you
25
revised the categories limited to VIII
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2
(A)(2).
3
MR. EISENSTEIN: I'm aware of
4
that and I'm asking questions that are
5
geared to address specifically VIII
6
(A)(2), but I need to get into that
7
subject in some way.
8
Obviously, you're free to consult
9
about law enforcement privilege. I need
10
to ask the questions to get there. So
11
far, the result of each of the
12
consultations that you've had had been
13
that you permitted the witness to
14
answer.
15
If you need to do it again, do it
16
again. I'm mindful, Peter, of the
17
constraints of the deposition, that you
18
have reserved the right to shut this
19
deposition down.
20
I don't think I'm going beyond
21
the bound. You don't have to warn me if
22
I go beyond the bound. Let's take the
23
question one at a time.
24
MR. FARRELL: I was trying to do
25
it in a collegial way.
[Page 52]
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2
MR. EISENSTEIN: I appreciate
3
that. I don't think that I'm straining.
4
I've asked a preliminary question about
5
a term and I want to know about that
6
term, and then I'm going to ask whether
7
that term has any significance about
8
what this deposition is about.
9
Q Having said all those things, do
10
you remember the question?
11
MR. FARRELL: Can you restate
12
it?
13
Q Has the Intelligence Division
14
used the expression mosques of interest?
15
A Can you say it one more time?
16
Q Does the Intelligence Division
17
use the expression mosques of interest?
18
MR. FARRELL: You have my
19
objection.
20
A I believe that the term mosques
21
of interest or mosques of concern had been
22
used in the past. However, that's not a
23
determination that's made by the
24
Demographics Unit, but I'm not saying that
25
the term has not been used.
[Page 53]
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2
Q In your understanding of the
3
Handschu Guidelines, does the designation of
4
a mosque as being of concern or of interest
5
give the NYPD in and of itself authority?
6
MR. FARRELL: I'm going to
7
object. I'm going to deem it outside
8
the scope of the deposition.
9
MR. CHEVIGNY: You're not
10
allowing him to answer?
11
MR. FARRELL: Yes.
12
Q When you've told me that the
13
Demographics Unit does not designate any
14
interest or concern, that that's not their
15
job to designate --
16
17
A I did not state that. The
18
Demographics Unit has used the term of
19
concern or interest. However, the way I am
20
interpreting concern, interest is related to
21
stuff that's learned outside of VIII (A)(2)
22
with authorized Handschu investigations.
23
Q Are you saying that that
24
designation has not occurred as a result of
25
a visit under VIII (A)(2)?
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T. Galati
2
3
A Under VIII (A)(2), where the
4
Demographics Unit has visited other
5
establishments, they will use a terminology
6
that may be location of concern or a
7
hotspot. So, in other documents or other
8
identifiable locations, they used that
9
terminology.
10
Q What I'm asking is, have they
11
used that terminology as a result of
12
information gained from a visit under VIII
13
(A)(2)?
14
15
A Are we talking about commercial
16
establishments?
17
Q Well, I will ask about that.
18
Right now I'm asking you about mosques.
19
A I don't believe that they make
20
that determination. Their function was to
21
identify the mosques in the community, and
22
what ethnicity that would go to the mosques.
23
They don't make that determination if it's a
24
mosque of concern or a mosque of interest.
25
If the way I interpreted it --
[Page 56]
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T. Galati
2

15
A
16
However, I will tell you that Demographics
17
visits mosques and identifies mosques.
18
Q Just so that we're clear, is it
19
your understanding that those visits are
20
authorized under VIII(A)(2) of the Handschu
21
Guidelines?
22
MR. FARRELL: Objection. You're
23
asking for a legal conclusion?
24
MR. EISENSTEIN: Anybody who has
25
to apply a legal rule can be asked about
[Page 57]
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T. Galati
2
their understanding of the rule. So
3
having said that, let me ask the
4
question again.
5
Q Is it your understanding that
6
those visits to the mosques by the
7
Demographics Unit are authorized under
8
section VIII(A)(2) of the Handschu
9
Guidelines?
10
11
A The Demographics Unit identifies
12
locations that would be frequented by
13
communities of countries of interest. By
14
identifying these locations, to help us
15
identify the communities, with the goal of
16
trying to detect or prevent terrorism
17
activity, by cataloguing those locations, to
18
include mosques is not investigating
19
political activity. So, I would say that
20
them visiting by itself does not fall into
21
investigating political activity.
22
Q Am I correct that what you're
23
saying in your understanding is the visits
24
to the mosques aren't even covered by the
25
Handschu Guidelines?
[Page 58]
1
T. Galati
2
3
A I'm saying the cataloguing of
4
mosques does not necessarily fall under the
5
investigation of political activity.
6
Q I'm a little concerned. I think
7
we're talking slightly past each other.
8
What I'm hearing you say is that the visits
9
to mosques for the purpose of cataloguing
10
them is not gathering information about
11
political activity so you don't even get to
12
the Handschu Guidelines? Is that what
13
you're saying?
14
In other words, you don't have to
15
identify a provision of the Handschu
16
Guidelines that would authorize it because
17
it's not even covered by the Handschu
18
Guidelines?
19
20
A No. What I'm saying is that
21
their function by itself by just cataloguing
22
may or may not fall into that depending on
23
what the result of that visit is. But, the
24
basic identification of locations and
25
cataloguing by itself is not the
[Page 59]
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T. Galati
2
3
Q So that, a demographics member of
4
the force assigned to the Demographics Unit
5
who goes to a mosque for the purpose of
6
finding out what kind of a mosque it is and
7
what community goes there is not using the
8
authority that is granted under this
9
section?
10
I'm going to quote, "For the
11
purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist
12
activity, the NYPD is authorized to visit
13
anyplace and attend any event that is open
14
to the public on the same terms and
15
conditions as members of the public
16
generally.
17
No information obtained from such
18
visits shall be retained unless it relates
19
to potential unlawful or terrorist
20
activity."
21
My question is, are you saying
22
that, in your understanding, when a member
23
of the Demographics Unit goes to a mosque
24
for the purpose of finding out who goes
25
there, what community goes there, what
[Page 60]
1
T. Galati
2
community it's related to, that member of
3
4
is not using the authority granted by the
5
section?
6
MR. FARRELL: Objection. I'm
7
objecting. It calls for a legal
8
conclusion.
9
You can answer the question.
10
A That section applies to a broader
11
goal within the Handschu Guidelines. VIII
12
(A)(2) is one part of a broader guideline,
13
the Handschu Guidelines, and the Handschu
14
Guidelines describe the main function of the
15
16
What I'm saying is, by itself
17
there are levels that can and cannot take it
18
into VIII (A)(2).
19
By itself, cataloguing locations,
20
to know the ethnicity of the community is
21
not investigating political activity.
22
Q Let's just take a member of the
23
force assigned to the demographics community
24
who goes into a mosque.
25
Are you saying that whether it's
[Page 61]
1
T. Galati
2
covered by the guidelines depends on what
3
that member of the force brings away? In
4
other words, if he only brings away
5
information about the ethnicity of the
6
people at that mosque, it's not covered by
7
the Handschu Guidelines at all?
8
Is that an example of what you're
9
saying or have I got it wrong?
10
11
A I think by identifying locations
12
and cataloguing them, finding out the
13
ethnicity by itself, is not investigating
14
political activity.
15
Q Do you know what instructions
16
have been given to members of the force
17
assigned to the Demographics Unit who are
18
deployed to visit mosques? Do you want to
19
hear that question back?
20
A That question may be different at
21
different times. I can't give you a direct
22
answer. I did answer a question earlier
23
that we tell the officers to try and make
24
observations that can help us identify a
25
location with the goal of trying to find out
[Page 62]
1
T. Galati
2
what country of concern may go there, should
3
we need to identify an Islamist that's
4
Radicalized towards violence, maybe hiding
5
there for police action, should it arise.
6
Q Are members of the force assigned
7
to the Zone Assessment or Demographics Unit,
8
who are deployed to go into mosques, given
9
instructions about section VIII (A)(2) of
10
the Handschu Guidelines?
11
In other words, are they told
12
that information obtained on the visits is
13
not to be retained unless it's related to
14
potential, unlawful or terrorist activity?
15
16
A You stated that members of the
17
unit are being sent into mosques. I didn't
18
state that. I stated to you that the goal
19
is for them to identify the mosque and the
20
community, countries of interest that may be
21
associated with that mosque.
22
However, the Demographics Unit
23
does receive instructions on VIII (A)(2), so
24
they do know what VIII(A)(2) is.
25
Q Is that instruction something
[Page 63]
1
T. Galati
2
that's given on a regular basis, had been
3
given once? What's the drill in relation to
4
instructions about VIII(A)(2) to members of
5
the Demographics Unit or Zone Assessment
6
Unit going into the community?
7
A I think that we instruct all
8
members of the Demographics Unit on VIII
9
(A)(2) as part of a broader training that we
10
do on all of Handschu, and I will state that
11
they receive training early on. Every
12
member that's assigned to the division
13
received training. I'm aware of counsel
14
giving personal training on the matter at
15
some point.
16
Every year, every member of the
17
division comes back to training, and then,
18
issues that arise during the course of daily
19
events we have meetings and we bring people
20
in, and if they need to be trained on a
21
particular area there, we'll address it like
22
that. We do many, many things to make sure
23
that everybody understands the entire
24
guideline, not just the VIII(A)(2).
25
MR. EISENSTEIN: Can I have this
[Page 64]
1
T. Galati
2
marked as Exhibit 4.
3
4
5
as of this date.)
6
Q I've put in front of you what's
7
been marked as Exhibit 4. My first question
8
is, have you seen this document before?
9
A I have seen this document as one
10
of the documents I reviewed that was
11
released by the AP Articles.
12
Q Do you know whether the statement
13
of particular speakers at particular mosques
14
that are reproduced in Exhibit 4 were
15
gathered by the Demographics Unit, whether
16
all or any of them were gathered by the
17
Demographics Unit?
18
A I would say that none of this
19
information was gathered by the Demographics
20
Unit.
21
Q What is the basis for that
22
statement?
23
A Can I consult?
24
Q Sure.
25
A This information is gathered
[Page 65]
1
T. Galati
2
based on authorized Handschu investigation.
3
Q The date of this document,
4
Exhibit 4, is before you took command of the
5
Intelligence Division, correct?
6
A Correct.
7
Q You or someone under your
8
direction reviewed those compiled statements
9
and determined that they were all as a
10
result of authorized investigations?
11
A Yes.
12
Q Did you make that determination
13
yourself or did you have someone review this
14
document and determine that?
15
THE WITNESS: Can I consult you?
16
MR. FARRELL: Sure.
17
A I know most of these personally
18
with my own knowledge, and the few that I
19
was unaware of, I did have checked.
20
Q I want to direct your attention
21
to an entry on the third page relating to
22
mosque Jade, J-A-D-E, M-A-S-J-I-D,
23
D-A-W-U-D-I on February 6, 2006.
24
Are you able to tell me whether
25
that was one you knew about yourself?
[Page 66]
1
T. Galati
2
A That is not one that I know about
3
myself.
4
Q Are you able to tell me what
5
level of investigation under the Handschu
6
Guidelines these reports come from?
7
In other words, were they from
8
preliminary investigations?
9
MR. FARRELL: Objection. I'm
10
going to instruct the witness not to
11
answer. That's not within the scope of
12
this deposition.
13
Q Does the NYPD use the term
14
rhetoric? Does the Intelligence Division
15
use the term rhetoric?
16
17
A That's a term that's been used.
18
Q Is the determination of whether a
19
person is or a place of interest based in
20
part on what the NYPD refers to as rhetoric?
21
22
A It could.
23
Q What is meant by the term
24
rhetoric?
25
MR. FARRELL: Objection. I need
[Page 67]
1
T. Galati
2
to consult with the witness.
3
(Recess at 2:00).
4
Q That's the pending question.
5
What is meant in that setting by the term
6
rhetoric?
7
A I would say that rhetoric is
8
overheard conversation which would be
9
inciting somebody or encouraging somebody to
10
commit an unlawful act.
11
Q Is that something that's the
12
subject of a written standard? What
13
constitutes rhetoric that would cause
14
someone or some place to be of interest?
15
A Can you rephrase it?
16
Q Sure. You just gave an answer of
17
inciting, of someone committing an unlawful
18
act. I'm asking if that's a definition of a
19
subject of written standard anywhere?
20
A I don't believe that's a written
21
standard.
22
Q In VIII (A)(2) of the Handschu
23
Guidelines, there's a reference to
24
information: "No information obtained from
25
such visits shall be retained unless it
[Page 68]
1
T. Galati
2
relates to potential unlawful or terrorist
3
activity."
4
Would you say that as applied in
5
VIII (A)(2), the same definition that you
6
had just given me of rhetoric applies? In
7
other words, that rhetoric wouldn't pertain
8
or relate to potential unlawful or terrorist
9
activity unless it involves someone saying
10
to someone else or advocating that someone
11
committed an unlawful act?
12
13
A Is your question that --
14
Q I'll ask it again. It's an after
15
lunch question. You have to forgive me.
16
Does any other unit besides the
17
Demographics Unit within the Intelligence
18
Division engage in the activity that are
19
described and authorized in VIII (A)(2)?
20
A No, the Demographics Unit is the
21
only unit.
22
Q Are members of the force assigned
23
to the Demographics Unit instructed to
24
report back about certain kinds of rhetoric?
25
[Page 69]
1
T. Galati
2
Q If they hear it.
3
4
A What I would say is, the function
5
of the Demographics Unit is to go out,
6
catalog locations. There are times when
7
there are World events, and during the times
8
of World events, then they would be going
9
out looking to gauge, I guess gauge the
10
feeling or the sentiment of the situation
11
related to it. It's a reaction area. That
12
would be the Demographics Unit that would go
13
into the location to gauge that sentiment.
14
It's based often on a World event or could
15
be based on an event.
16
Q Taking that as an example, in
17
that reaction situation, are the members of
18
19
instructed to report back about what they
20
hear on that subject, on the subject of the
21
event?
22
A I guess it would depend on what
23
they heard about that subject. I would say
24
that they are to report if they have
25
overheard a conversation which would be a
[Page 70]
1
T. Galati
2
reaction. We're looking for a reaction.
3
Q You're looking for what the
4
reaction is to that World event, correct?
5
A I would like to say the reaction
6
to determine if it has any implications for
7
New York City for that particular community
8
or anything. So, is this Global event going
9
to have an adverse reaction in a particular
10
area, community, particular people that may
11
cause the police department to have to react
12
to it?
13
Q I don't have any copies of this.
14
The record should reflect that there are
15
five looseleaf binders on the table that
16
contain pages one through 1260, bates
17
numbered documents that were produced for us
18
to inspect.
19
Since I don't have copies, I'm
20
going to show to Chief Galati the page
21
that's been marked as page 804.
22
Since I don't have it, would you
23
mind, chief, just reading out loud the
24
paragraph about a conversation between two
25
men in ?
[Page 71]
1
T. Galati
2

9

20
Q Am I correct that this is
21
contained in a Zone Assessment Unit report
22
about a visit to a commercial establishment?
23
A Yes.
24
Q My question is, was this an
25
activity that was undertaken by the member
[Page 72]
1
T. Galati
2
of the force assigned to the Zone Assessment
3
Unit covered by VIII (A)(2) of the Handschu
4
Guidelines?
5
A Just say the question one more
6
time.
7
Q That's okay. Is this document,
8
bates stamped 904, part of a report of a
9
member of the force assigned to the Zone
10
Assessment Unit conducting a visit pursuant
11
to section VIII (A)(2) of the Handschu
12
Guidelines?
13
A Yes.
14
Q Under section VIII (A)(2) of the
15
Handschu Guidelines, as you understand the
16
guidelines, is it permissible to record the
17
information about this conversation given
18
the restriction that says no information
19
retained from such visits shall be retained
20
unless it relates to potential unlawful or
21
terrorist activity?
22
23
A The main purpose of the
24
Demographics Unit/Zone Assessment Unit helps
25
us identify locations if we're faced with a
[Page 73]
1
T. Galati
2
threat that's coming from a country of
3
concern and we're looking to find a
4
terrorist that's likely to commit a
5
terrorist attack.
6
The police department needs to
7
know where we should go and look for that
8
particular terrorist. A lot of information
9
that the Zone Assessment Unit captures helps
10
us identify locations that we should look or
11
not look for.
12
In this document, it's clear that
13
speaking in Urdu officers indicate they are
14
Pakistani. It does have value to us for
15
potential terrorist or unlawful activity in
16
the sense that it's telling us, in this
17
particular location at , we
18
would be able to find -- that's a location
19
where we would possibly find -- I'm not
20
telling you that would be a Pakistani
21
location and we're going to find someone
22
that speaks Urdu, a terrorist from a
23
particular region in Pakistan where they
24
speak Urdu or if we're looking for an Urdu
25
Pakistani male that would commit a terrorist
[Page 74]
1
T. Galati
2
attack. This piece of information would be
3
very valuable to us.
4
We retain that information
5
because although it may seem like minutia,
6
the fact that they speak Pakistani and Urdu
7
is something that I find useful in my quest.
8
Q You comment speaking in Urdu and
9
Pakistani.
10
A Yes.
11
Q From the point of view of what
12
you just described and I'm not seeking to
13
argue with you, isn't the information that
14
this is a location where we could find
15
Pakistanis who speak Urdu -- let me ask the
16
question in a different way.
17
How is the police function
18
advanced or aided by the content of this
19
conversation in which one person is
20
complaining to the other about
21
worker who supposedly burned the
22
quran was rehired?
23
Does that information relate to
24
potential unlawful activity or terrorist
25
activity?
[Page 75]
1
T. Galati
2
A I would say we're not looking for
3
Pakistanis that speak Urdu. That's not what
4
we're looking for. The goal of the
5
information collected is so that when we're
6
looking for a terrorist, Islamist
7
radicalized towards violence, that we have
8
threat information that has come in and we
9
need to start looking for that person. We
10
have information that indicates that this
11
person is Pakistani, speaks Urdu or may even
12
to some extent based on Urdu give us a
13
particular region where they might be from.
14
That information is very valuable
15
when we're faced with an imminent threat and
16
we have to look for it.
17
My point is that the conversation
18
is indicating that these males who speak
19
Urdu is valuable to us in detecting or
20
preventing a terrorist activity.
21
Q That's really what I'm focusing
22
on, is the fact that these two men at that
23
location, speaking are angry
24
about what happened to someone who burned
25
the quran. Is that of value? Is that
[Page 76]
1
T. Galati
2
useful?
3
The phrase in VIII (A)(2)
4
information relates to potential unlawful
5
activity, not their ethnicity, not their
6
language, not the region they're from?
7
A The particular grievance they
8
were exchanging about, it's the information
9
that's contained in the conversation that's
10
of value. We're not identifying these
11
people. It may not be Pakistani. It's
12
frequented by a Pakistani individual that
13
speaks Urdu. That's an important part.
14
It's the information contained in the
15
conversation that would help us when we have
16
to start looking.
17
This is something that we can
18
turn to. We can start saying, where should
19
we be looking for a terrorist who's planning
20
or recruiting for a potential attack in New
21
York City and we know that that person is
22
Pakistani and Urdu.
23
Based on the language that would
24
be important to us, I would say, not
25
necessarily the content, but everything
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2
contained in it, the information that the
3
conversation has that I consider of value.
4
Q I'm focusing on the content and
5
on the specific provision of VIII (A)(2)
6
because, in fact, in this report the content
7
was retained. In other words, this is a
8
document from -- I don't remember if it's
9
2010 or 2011. It's relatively the last
10
couple of years. What I'm trying to find
11
out is whether from your vantage point as
12
Commander of the Intelligence Division, in
13
terms of instructing these people of the
14
force who are doing the work of the Zone
15
Assessment Unit, do you understand the
16
retention of the content?
17
What I mean by the content is the
18
expressed grievance about this
19
workers, the retention of that
20
content. Is that consistent with VIII
21
(A)(2) saying no information shall be
22
retained unless it relates to potential
23
unlawful or terrorist activity?
24
25
A What I'm saying is that as a
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2
whole, this statement has value to us in the
3
protection or prevention of a terrorist act.
4
Q Take a look at 833. Let me just
5
have the book back to make sure I'm giving
6
you the right page. It's 836. If you
7
would, read it. Since I don't have a copy
8
of it, read the conversation that's
9
reproduced on 836.
10

.

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2

10
Q In relation to the content of
11
that conversation, from your vantage point
12
as commander of the Intelligence Division,
13
is the information, the content, not the
14
fact that these are Pakistani males, not the
15
fact that they were conversing in Urdu, but
16
the content of their conversation, is it
17
authorized under VIII(A)(2) to retain that?
18
Does that information relate to
19
unlawful potential activity or terrorism?
20
A I have to state that in these
21
conversations, when they indicate signals to
22
us that we can use as far as identifying
23
people from countries of concern, it is of
24
value.
25
I can't take the content without
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2
taking the description and the Urdu in it.
3
I would say that it does have value to us.
4
And under VIII (A)(2), I would
5
state that we could retain that.
6
Q Can you articulate how it has
7
value? What is the thought process that
8
leads you to conclude that the phrase is no
9
information obtained from such visits shall
10
be retained unless it relates to potential
11
unlawful or terrorist activity?
12
If you could, tell us how you
13
would express what the value is?
14
A I think I did explain it in the
15
last example, but I will explain it again.
16
The purpose of the demographics Unit is to
17
catalog in these locations, collecting
18
information at these locations are for the
19
police department to respond to a threat
20
that they may be facing.
21
When we are faced with a threat
22
or we have information about a threat that
23
is present and we need to go out and we need
24
to try and mitigate that threat, we have to
25
be able to, at our fingertips, find what is
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2
the most likely location that that terrorist
3
is going to go to and hide out amongst other
4
people from the same country.
5
But, this is the person that is
6
going to commit a terrorist attack. To
7
value what's in here, that I know if I'm
8
looking for a terrorist who is Pakistani,
9
from a region in Pakistan who speaks Urdu,
10
I'm not going to waste my time in a
11
restaurant where they speak Arabic.
12
I want to know where the
13
restaurant is that are going to be
14
Pakistanis. Most likely, a Pashtun that's
15
speaking Urdu. So that's of value to me to
16
prevent or detect terrorism that I'm now
17
facing the threat.
18
I know where it's coming from. I
19
want to go to these locations so I can
20
either find somebody that's hiding in these
21
locations, recruiting in these locations.
22
That's the value of it.
23
Q Would you agree that there are a
24
number of locations that have been mapped by
25
the Zone Assessment Unit where Pakistani
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2
people speaking Urdu congregate?
3
A I believe that they have
4
identified numerous locations where people
5
speak Urdu.
6
Q The question that I'm asking is,
7
are you saying that the fact that two people
8
at a particular location complained about
9
in
10
the manner that is described in that
11
conversation makes that place more likely to
12
be a haven for someone engaging in a
13
terrorist act and therefore, that
14
information relates to potential terrorist
15
activity?
16
17
Q Do you understand my question?
18
A I understand the question. I
19
would say no, I am not telling you that this
20
place is more likely than another place
21
where they speak Urdu. What I'm saying is
22
that, depending on what threat we're facing,
23
we need to be able to look at what
24
information we have collected so we could
25
properly deploy and try to find the threat
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2
or the potential terrorist and the tension
3
that are going to help us in the information
4
contained.
5
The fact that it's Pakistani,
6
Urdu is a very important factor. It doesn't
7
mean that there's more of a chance that he's
8
going to be in this particular one. It's
9
important for me to know this is one of the
10
locations where we're going to have a
11
Pakistani community that speaks Urdu where a
12
person that is radicalized towards violence
13
could either try to either hide or recruit.
14
Q I understand what you're saying.
15
This is the question. What I'm asking you
16
is about VIII (A)(2). Correct me if I'm
17
wrong, a part of the Handschu rule that
18
places some restriction on what information
19
can be retained, right?
20
A Yes.
21
Q And the guidelines for what
22
information can be retained are captured in
23
the words related to potential unlawful or
24
terrorist activity, right? That's where the
25
limitation resides, so to spoke?
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2
A Yes.
3
Q Let's take this page 834 or 6,
4
whatever it is.
5
A 836.
6
Q There's certain information at
7
this place, Pakistanis who speak Urdu
8
congregate and talk to each other. That's
9
one set of information. Okay? You've told
10
me that that's extremely valuable for you to
11
know about if you're addressing a threat,
12
right?
13
A Yes.
14
Q I'm apologizing for taxing you
15
about this. I'm focused on whether the
16
retention of the specific conversation for
17
another word complaining about the threat of
18
these .
19
You told me that that piece of
20
information that there are two guys there
21
complaining about the
does not make it more likely
23
that a terrorist would go, am I correct so
24
far?
25
A You'd have to repeat that.
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2
Q I think you've told me that the
3
fact that at this particular location where
4
there are Pakistanis speaking Urdu, the Zone
5
Assessment Unit heard two men complaining
6
about
That fact alone, their complaint
8
expressed to each other doesn't make it more
9
likely that this is a place where a
10
terrorist would go?
11
A It doesn't make it more likely or
12
less likely. It's a tool for us to look for
13
a person that has that same characteristic
14
that's going to hide or recruit within a
15
place that he or she is comfortable in.
16
For a terrorist person that may
17
be trying to secrete themselves in this
18
particular community, I can't tell you it's
19
more likely or less likely. It's a tool for
20
us to look in the right place.
21
Q If it's neither more likely or
22
less likely, the specific conversation about
23
the ,
24
how does that piece of information relate to
25
potential unlawful or terrorist activity?
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2
A I'm taking the conversation as a
3
whole. I'm looking at that conversation.
4
I'm seeing Urdu. I'm seeing them identify
5
the individuals involved in that are
6
Pakistani.
7
I'm using that information for me
8
to determine that this would be a kind of
9
place that a terrorist would be comfortable
10
in and I'm retaining that for the fact that
11
I can retain it, if it's going to help me
12
detect or prevent a potential unlawful or
13
terrorist attack.
14
So, a potential terrorist could
15
hide in here and that piece of information
16
is important for me to know. That this is
17
where I'm going to find somebody that speaks
18
Urdu. And again, I'll go far beyond
19
Pakistan. Most Urdu speakers from that
20
region would be of concern, so that's why
21
it's important to me.
22
Q The fact that these two guys are
23
aggrieved about something that happened in
24
the U.S., is that of importance to you?
25
A That is less important to me than
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2
the fact that they are Pakistanis and that
3
they are speaking Urdu.
4
Within this, this is the
5
important pieces that I'm looking for.
6
Q Is the fact that these two guys
7
are aggrieved about something, is that
8
something that happened in the U.S., does
9
that fact relate to potential unlawful or
10
terrorist activity, the fact alone that they
11
are aggrieved about something that happened?
12
A Say your question one more time.
13
Q I understand what you said about
14
Pakistani, probably Pashtun, Urdu speaking,
15
all of the specification of ethnicity.
16
Putting that aside, I'm asking
17
about the fact that these two guys are
18
aggrieved about something that happened in
19
the U.S. is that fact related to potential
20
terrorist or unlawful activity?
21
A I can't separate the conversation
22
based out of the value that I see in the
23
conversation, what their grievance is. It's
24
not what I'm focused on. I'm focused on the
25
identification that I'm getting out of the
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2
conversation.
3
Q I'm showing you now what's been
4
Bates stamped as page two in the document
5
production. There's a conversation in
6
boldface, . Could you read
7
what the customer said?
8
A

15

19

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2

4

9
Q Am I correct that this page two
10
from the Bates stamped two is part of, I
11
guess, Demographics Unit report of a visit
12
to a location conducted by the Demographics
13
Unit under the authority of section VIII
14
(A)(2) of the Handschu Guidelines? Am I
15
correct that that's what this represents?
16
17
A This is a report I believe that
18
we call a weekly report of numerous
19
locations that were visited.
20
Q These visits were conducted under
21
section VIII (A)(2) of the Handschu
22
Guidelines?
23
24
A The visits and cataloguing alone
25
are not. However, there are a spectrum of
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2
things that may in fact fall under VIII
3
(A)(2).
4
Q What are the things that fall in
5
VIII (A)(2)?
6
A You're asking me about this whole
7
entire document, so, there are numerous
8
locations.
9
Q Just focusing on the section that
10
I asked you to read, does that part of the
11
report fall under VIII (A)(2)?
12
A I would say, yes.
13
Q I just want to understand and
14
bear with me with this question, and tell me
15
if you don't understand it. A member of the
16
force assigned to the Demographics Unit goes
17
into a location. At the moment he goes in,
18
I understand you to be saying that that's
19
not necessarily covered by VIII (A)(2). Not
20
necessarily doesn't necessarily have to be
21
authorized by VIII (A)(2).
22
Before he hears a word just going
23
into the location, he's been assigned to go
24
to the location. He steps in the door. I
25
want to try to break it down in some way.
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2
This won't be useful, but I'll try.
3
A When we go out and try to
4
catalogue locations so that we could
5
determine what country of concern would go
6
to that location, the simple fact that we're
7
cataloguing locations does not necessarily
8
fall under 8(a)(2). However, the authority
9
that we go out and go to these locations and
10
at times have these overheard conversations
11
does fall within VIII (A)(2), and the reason
12
why we retain them is because we have value
13
in the statements which would help us
14
prevent or detect terrorism activity.
15
Q Thank you. You got a little
16
ahead of me. That visit to and
, what is it that made it subject to
18
VIII (A)(2)?
19
A Say it again.
20
Q Maybe I need to back up.
21
MR. FARRELL: I want to put on
22
the record, you had asked a question
23
about what the witness has said. It may
24
be confusing as to what it may fall
25
under, but we'll look at it in the
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2
review process.
3
MR. EISENSTEIN: So noted that
4
you noted it.
5
Q Just focusing on the portion of
6
the report that relates to what the
7
reporting officer saw and heard at
, is that section of the
9
report subject to section VIII (A)(2) of the
10
Handschu Guidelines covered by VIII (A)(2)?
11
MR. FARRELL: The part that he
12
just read into the record?
13
MR. EISENSTEIN: Correct.
14
A I would say yes.
15
Q What is it about that section of
16
the report that in your understanding makes
17
it subject to that rule, the VIII (A)(2)?
18
A Information contained within
19
there, which has given us other information
20
that could be helpful in the purpose of
21
preventing terrorist activity.
22
Q What is the information contained
23
in what you read that I'm going to use the
24
phrase from VIII (A)(2) that relates to
25
potential unlawful or terrorist activity?
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1
T. Galati
2
A Well, the fact that they are
3
speaking in is a factor that I would
4
want to know. Being that it's a
, I would want to know that. There are
6
things in here that has helped me identify
7
who would go and visit this store. So those
8
factors tell me something that I consider of
9
value.
10
Q Am I correct that if they simply
11
reported a location where they speak
12
and and they are from a certain
13
region, that's all they wrote down from your
14
understanding, that would not involve VIII
15
(A)(2)? That's just a mapping function,
16
correct?
17
A No, it would help us. Mapping is
18
telling us where the places are. Some of
19
these observations and overheard
20
conversations just give us more information,
21
so it goes beyond the simple just
22
cataloguing of a location.
23
Q I understand that, chief. What
24
I'm asking you about is everything gives you
25
more information. In other words, every
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1
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2
word that they write gives you more
3
information about that location, correct?
4
A Correct.
5
Q But, there's a limitation in the
6
Handschu rules about what information you
7
can retain, right?
8
A Correct.
9
Q Isn't the retention of a
10
conversation in which one customer
11
says to the guy behind the counter, that
12
is correct and the government
13
is not corrupt the way third world countries
14
are corrupt? I'm sorry for the double
15
negative. Isn't that information that does
16
not relate to potential unlawful or
17
terrorist activity?
18
19
A I am taking the conversation as a
20
whole and I'm reading about two
21
people that are speaking in in a
22
meat store. I find value in that for
23
several reasons. This information is solely
24
used for the purpose of being able to
25
identify a location where I should face a
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2
threat, where I'm facing a threat of a
3
terrorist and that terrorist is .
4
This piece of information would
5
be valuable to me. I take it as a whole. I
6
take it as the conversation. I take it as
7
and that's what I feel is of value.
8
The sole purpose is for identifying a
9
location where I would find somebody that
10
was hiding who is a terrorist from .
11
MR. EISENSTEIN: I need to take
12
a bathroom break.
13
(Recess taken at 3:15 p.m.)
14
A I just want to clarify some of
15
the information: When the information is
16
collected, it is taken back and looked at by
17
an analyst. Analysts make determinations of
18
the information contained in conversations.
19
To the extent of that, what is
20
the community's reaction to let's say events
21
or things. Also, I think what's important
22
for us is, if the conversations indicate
23
support for let's say Osama Bin Laden or
24
Iran or depends on a particular
25
conversation, it's important for us to know
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2
because that might be a place that a
3
terrorist could recruit from.
4
So, the content of the
5
conversations may give us an idea of the
6
place that a terrorist would be comfortable
7
being in, so he could recruit from a
8
location like that. I think also the fact
9
that current events would tell us if the
10
community's upset, if that's going to have
11
any implication within the city.
12
So, there is a little more in
13
those conversations.
14
Q Who are the analysts that make
15
the kind of determination or assessment that
16
you've just been talking about? What their
17
names are, where do they fit in the
18
structure of the Intelligence Division?
19
A The analysts are non-police
20
officers. They are not police officers
21
that are hired there. They look at whatever
22
they look at, World events.
23
They look at local events. They
24
look at information that comes in from many
25
different parts of the Intelligence
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1
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2
Division, and it's their job to make an
3
assessment on whether or not there's an
4
issue of concern that we must address.
5
Q Are they under your command? Are
6
they within the chain of command of the
7
Investigations Unit, Intelligence Unit?
8
A Yes.
9
Q If they make an assessment of
10
what's being brought in, warrants, some
11
action, does that indicate that an
12
investigation has commenced?
13
14
A Related to Demographics, I can
15
tell you that information that has come in
16
has not commenced an investigation.
17
Q You're saying that based on what
18
has occurred during your tenure, correct?
19
A Yes.
20
Q Do you know whether that was also
21
the case before you took over the
22
Intelligence Division?
23
A I think that prior to me, there
24
had been indication that there was one place
25
that was visited, that later on became
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2
subject of an investigation.
3
However, I have not been able to
4
determine that. That case involved a
5
prosecution, but I have not been able to
6
definitively say that it was because of
7
Demographics.
8
I believe it was because of the
9
Handschu investigation.
10
Q After Demographics provided
11
whatever information, it provided an analyst
12
go over it. If the analyst doesn't find
13
anything that signals a threat or concern,
14
are the reports retained in any event?
15
In other words, are the
16
Demographics reports, whatever they contain
17
or the zone Assessment reports, whatever
18
they contain after they have gone to the
19
analyst, retained? Whether or not they are
20
contained, anything that was specifically
21
useful or specifically worth analyzing?
22
23
A The information in the
24
Demographics reports does have value. So,
25
yes, it is retained because the report
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1
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2
itself contains a lot of bits and pieces of
3
value, of intelligence value.
4
Q What is your understanding of the
5
meaning of the phrase investigation of
6
political activity?
7
A It's in relation to persons or
8
people or groups that want to exercise their
9
right to try and effect change or maintain
10
government or social status. That's what
11
political activity means.
12
Q

20
Q I understand that that document,
21
page one of the bates stamped documents was
22
prior to your watch, so to speak, right?
23
A Yes.
24
Q Are locations selected quotations
25
to be investigated where the zone assessment
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1
T. Galati
2
based on rhetoric --
3
4
A They are not selected based on
5
rhetoric. To go to a location, it's not
6
based on rhetoric.
7
Q Was that a change or are you
8
saying that that change doesn't mean that
9
that location or selected based on rhetoric?
10
Am I making myself clear?
11
A What I believe in this report
12
here is he's indicating that he listed these
13
locations due to rhetoric or event flyers.
14
Q You're saying, he went to a
15
larger group of places, but listed these
16
either because of rhetoric that was
17
overheard there or event flyers that he saw?
18
A That's how I understand it.
19
Q Under your command, are locations
20
visited or revisited by the Zone Assessment
21
Unit based on rhetoric heard at those
22
locations?
23
24
A I think when we're looking for a
25
reaction because of a World event, locations
[Page 101]
1
T. Galati
2
are picked because those locations have
3
characteristics that would make it easier
4
for them to gauge that reaction.
5
So, we would be looking for a
6
place that would be more populated than less
7
populated, so that's what I would say about
8
how we would deploy for a reaction.
9
Q There's a reference in there.
10
I'll find it if I need to do a place
11
investigated as part of a
12
operation.
13
Do you know what a
14
operation is? I'm representing to you that
15
there's a reference. I'll tell you what
16
page it is.
17
MR. FARRELL: In the document.
18
Q In the document that you --
19
MR. FARRELL: This particular
20
document in front of him?
21
Q Yes, it is in that volume
22
somewhere.
23
MR. FARRELL: You can pose your
24
question.
25
Q Have you heard that phrase?
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1
T. Galati
2
A We use the word , yes.
3
Q Can you tell me what that means?
4
A is a listening post
5
based on an event. So if something
6
happened, they would deploy so they can hear
7
the reaction to what happened.
8
Q I need to put a couple of books
9
in front of you.
10
MR. EISENSTEIN: Peter, would you
11
write down these numbers? 281, 512, 709,
12
898.
13
Q If you look at these three tabbed
14
pages, just focusing on them --
15
MR. FARRELL: You want him to
16
read the whole thing or a particular
17
part?
18
Q Let me say what I'm looking for.
19
I'm representing to you and you'll see
20
whether I'm right or not, that a place in
21
called was visited
22
by the Zone Assessment Unit on January 5,
23
2010, January, 14, 2010 and January 21,
24
2010.
25
After you've looked at it, in
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1
T. Galati
2
terms of the purposes that you've described
3
to me of the Demographics Unit or of the
4
Zone Assessment Unit, what is the purpose in
5
going back to this location three times of a
6
period in 11 days or 15 days? The question
7
is, why is the Zone Assessment Unit for
8
going back to a location three times in a
9
short period of time?
10
A I can't tell you exactly the
11
reason why we went to these three locations
12
in a short period of time. I can tell you
13
that there are times when we work in a
14
particular area and that may be the reason
15
why they went to it. To give you a
16
definite -- I can't tell you why they went
17
to that location.
18
Q I mean, are there multiple teams
19
operating? Is it possible that they are
20
just going back because they don't know if
21
another team was there?
22
A I don't want to guess on
23
something. I don't know the answer to that.
24
I don't want to guess on it.
25
Q Putting aside the specification
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1
T. Galati
2
and you don't know why that happened, is
3
there a reason? I can give you other
4
examples, but you probably will tell me you
5
don't know the specifics of that.
6
But, there are several places
7
where their reports of visits over a short
8
period of time. Without going to the
9
specifics of any particular one, and again
10
focusing on the function of the Zone
11
Assessment Unit, if they have established
12
that a place is owned by and patronized by
13
Pakistanis from a particular region who
14
speak Urdu and Pashtun, what are they doing?
15
In general, why would Zone
16
Assessment Unit teams be going back to such
17
a location repeatedly in a short period of
18
time? Let me add one factor to this. These
19
three situations, there's no reason to some
20
World event that it went on any specific
21
reaction activity, correct? Just using that
22
as an example. So, I'm focusing on that
23
situation where they are not reacting, not
24
seeking reaction to a particular World
25
event.
[Page 105]
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T. Galati
2
Can you think of a reason in
3
terms of the functions of the Zone
4
Assessment Unit for going back to a location
5
multiple times in a short period of time?
6
A Well, I can tell you that Zone
7
Assessment Unit does not monitor locations,
8
so they are not going there because they are
9
concerned or have conducted an investigation
10
on the location. That's not their duty and
11
responsibility. Zone Assessment people are
12
deployed by us and then help us identify
13
locations for places where people from
14
countries of concern may shop or gather.
15
They frequently go back to locations to make
16
sure the locations haven't changed often. I
17
see even on this, this is a new location
18
that just recently reopened.
19
Part of their duties and
20
responsibilities is to make sure that they
21
update their information, so that's a reason
22
why they do go back.
23
Another thing that they do is
24
identify places that may be better suited to
25
go to in the event of a World event, where
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2
they have to hear an overheard conversation.
3
Similar to what I said, it would
4
be better to go to a location, to go to a
5
location that has more people than less.
6
That's why they would go to a particular
7
location if it was based on a reaction,
8
community, sometimes they are small. So if
9
they are trying to gauge reaction in a
10
particular community, that doesn't have many
11
places and many different parts of the city.
12
They could be in that particular
13
area. Those are some of the reasons why
14
they could go to a location more than once.
15
However, I can't tell you why in
16
this case, in these other instances -- I
17
don't know what this span is, a week, a
18
month, two months. I can't comment on
19
those.
20
Q Take a look please at page 101 to
21
105. I'm going to also ask you about 96
22
through 100. If you would look at both of
23
those and let me know when you're done so I
24
can ask you questions.
25
A You said 101?
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T. Galati
2
Q Yes, and then 101 to 105. First
3
question, one of those are two
4
locations. One a another one
5
a , right?
6
A Yes.
7
Q The officer assigned the Zone
8
Assessment Unit, officer described the
9
or check location of concern for
10
the and did not check location of
11
concern for the .
12
A Yes.
13
Q First question: Are the
14
reporting officers making that judgement or
15
are they simply checking off what they have
16
been told already?
17
In other words, are they
18
assessing these places as locations of
19
concern or not locations of concern based on
20
what they are going out and seeing or are
21
they going because it's already a location
22
of concern or maybe there's a third
23
alternative?
24
A We do not tell the demographics
25
officers to go into a location that is part
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T. Galati
2
of some other Handschu investigation. They
3
have no idea whether anybody in the division
4
thinks it is or is not a place of concern.
5
When they reference a location of
6
concern, they reference it in a way that, if
7
there's an incident related to the
8
community, this is an
9
identifiable location that they would be
10
able to go into and that they would hear
11
conversations.
12
If you look at the
13
and you look at the , it's exactly
14
for that reason that you see a
15
isn't going to be filled with people that
16
are going to have conversations.
17
They wouldn't be able to gauge
18
community reaction to overseas or local
19
events. In a , you would have
20
more people. When they check it as a
21
location of concern, concern is not
22
necessarily indicating that that's a place
23
that there's an investigation or should be
24
an investigation.
25
A concern is their way of saying
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T. Galati
2
this is a place that we could go back to if
3
we need to find someone within the
4
community.
5
Q Of concern, that phrase or of
6
interest or whatever it is, let's say of
7
concern, is that phrase used differently in
8
relation to commercial establishment say in
9
relation to mosques?
10
11
A I believe that we make locations
12
of concern for commercial establishments.
13
It's not our policy to make locations of
14
concern religious establishments. That
15
being said, I can't tell you that that term
16
has never been used for a mosque.
17
But, it is not the practice or
18
the policy nor do I recall that being on any
19
document that I've seen related to a
20
religious institution. I have for
21
commercial establishments.
22
Q Take a look at 164 actually. Let
23
me give you a different one. Take a look at
24
149. Does that relate to location 919?
25
A Yes.
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T. Galati
2
Q ?
3
A Yes.
4
Q Here is a restaurant, a
5
restaurant. It's been checked
6
as not a location of concern, right?
7
A Yes.
8
Q My question is, is the Zone
9
Assessment Unit assigned officers making a
10
judgement here? Two , both
11
, in the same time frame,
12
January, 2010 and they are saying -- I'm
13
comparing it to 101. The one that I showed
14
you before, page 101?
15
A Yes.
16
Q Location 493.
17
A Yes.
18
Q Here, in January of 2010, two
19
. They are saying
20
one is a location of concern, the other one
21
is not a location of concern. Are the
22
officers making a judgement about whether a
23
place is a location of concern based on the
24
visit that they make, the Zone Assessment
25
officers?
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T. Galati
2
A Again, I will go back to the term
3
of concern. The term location of concern is
4
a place that we can go to that if there's an
5
event and we needed to overhear something or
6
get the feeling of community reaction to an
7
event, overseas that had happened or
8
occurred here, where would we go to hear or
9
get a reaction or a feel for what's going
10
on?
11
The only judgement that they are
12
making is that this is a location where we
13
may be able to hear something.
14
This is not -- one location is in
15
which may or may not be in the
16
middle of a area and one area is
17
in a more densely area.
18
Their judgement is, if we need to
19
-- this would be a better place for us to
20
hear. It has nothing to do with
21
investigation, just where would we deploy if
22
we needed to get a reaction, if we needed to
23
get a reaction to a issue.
24
MR. FARRELL: Where?
25
A The first one is 101. I would
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T. Galati
2
like to add to that last conversation. If
3
you look at the occupancy, the occupancy of
4
the location that is not of concern has
5
seating for 10 to 15 customers where the
6
location that they have has seating for a
7
capacity of 60 to 65 people.
8
Q Take a look at 639. You see
9
there's a notation that the owner is a known
10
member of the ?
11
A Yes.
12
Q Is that something that was
13
furnished to the assigned officer in way of
14
information when the assignment was made?
15
A No.
16
Q Would you say that that's
17
something that the assigned officer would
18
know based on his personal history?
19
20
MR. EISENSTEIN: It's a stupid
21
question. Let me ask it a different
22
way.
23
Q Is that personal knowledge that
24
that assigned officer is bringing to the
25
report?
[Page 113]
1
T. Galati
2
3
A The officers assigned to the
4
Demographics Unit, Zone Assessment Unit,
5
they have language skills. Maybe some of
6
them are also born in these countries. They
7
speak the language, they can determine
8
things that maybe I can't determine.
9
This officer who, I believe, is
10
, knew that this guy was a known
11
member of the
12
Q Is there an indication that this
13
was the third visit in a couple of weeks?
14
Do you see that? If you can't find it, I'll
15
find it: Sometimes it says first visit,
16
last visit.
17
MR. FARRELL: 639 is the one you
18
have?
19
MR. EISENSTEIN: Yes.
20
MR. FARRELL: It's my notes
21
comparing documents to each other.
22
Q If you look at 639 and 411, but
23
as you may recall, I don't have copies of
24
these.
25
MR. FARRELL: Can you pass us
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T. Galati
2
back 639?
3
MR. EISENSTEIN: Certainly.
4
Q According to my reading of these
5
documents, this place was
6
visited by the Zone Assessment Unit on
7
January 5, 2010, January 8, 2010 and again
8
on January 19, 2010.
9
A What was January 8th?
10
Q In the 411, there's a reference
11
to two reported ID's and it says visited
12
1/5, and 1/8, maybe in the narrative. So
13
here's the location: It's , it's
14
It's a . It's relatively
15
large, so it's clearly a place where people
16
would gather. All of that is known or
17
knowable in the visit of January 5th.
18
My question is, for what reason
19
is the Zone Assessment Unit going back to
20
this particular place three times within
21
two weeks?
22
A I can't give you a definite
23
answer why they went back three times. I
24
would say, it's not their job to monitor
25
locations. Their job is to go when we tell
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1
T. Galati
2
them to go for community reaction and I
3
can't definitively tell you.
4
It may have been an issue related
5
to a event. They wanted to go to
6
a location to overhear something.
7
They may have gone to numerous
8
locations. They may have been
9
working on that particular events.
10
I will tell you definitively they
11
are not monitoring locations. They are not
12
going back to locations because they are
13
monitoring those locations.
14
Q Do you see any reference in any
15
of the reports about that particular
16
location, any of these three reports to any
17
specific World event or local event?
18
A I do not see reference to it, but
19
it does not mean they weren't deployed based
20
on that. There are events that are big
21
events and we decide to make -- I decide to
22
make them go to a particular area because of
23
the event that involves a particular
24
community.
25
There are times when there are
[Page 117]
1
T. Galati
2
designated terrorist organization as far as
3
I know. I think that it has some value to
4
tell you where from he's from.
5
But, that is not the basis of why
6
they would be deployed.
7
Q Have members of the force
8
assigned to the Zone Assessment Unit ever
9
been deployed to visit functions of any
10
Muslim student association?
11
MR. FARRELL: I'm sorry, can you
12
have that read back?
13
A No, the Zone Assessment
14
Demographics Unit has never been deployed to
15
a Muslim student association events.
16
Q Have officers assigned to the
17
Zone Assessment Unit ever been deployed to
18
visit locations outside of the confines of
19
New York City?
20
A Yes.
21
Q Does that continue to occur up to
22
the present time?
23
A They have not been deployed
24
recently outside the confines of the city.
25
MR. EISENSTEIN: Mark
[Page 118]
1
T. Galati
2
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.
3
4
5
as of this date.)
6
Q Chief, I'm showing you what had
7
been marked as Exhibit 5. Have you seen
8
that document before?
9
MR. FARRELL: Do you have a copy
10
for me?
11
MR. EISENSTEIN: Sorry, I don't
12
have a copy of that one.
13
A I have seen this document as a
14
document that was looked at through the AP.
15
That was the first time that I seen that
16
document.
17
Q Is the activity described in that
18
document something that would be assigned to
19
the Zone Assessment Unit that is going to a
20
mosque and recorded license plates of cars
21
that came there?
22
A The Zone Assessment Unit has
23
never, to my knowledge, recorded license
24
plates.
25
MR. EISENSTEIN: Mark six
[Page 119]
1
T. Galati
2
please.
3
4
5
as of this date).
6
Q Outside of an authorized
7
investigation, has any unit of the
8
Intelligence Division recorded license
9
plates of people attending a mosque?
10
A Outside of an authorized
11
investigation, to the best of my knowledge,
12
no. I would like to also clarify an answer
13
that I gave earlier. It's not meant to be
14
funny.
15
Sometimes these officers, when
16
they go, they go to places that they may
17
like the food and go back for that reason,
18
and I know that that has happened. So
19
multiple visits might indicate such an
20
event.
21
Q There are charges particularly on
22
the DD five's for cover and concealment. Is
23
that reimbursement for buying food at the
24
establishment that's been visited?
25
A Yes.
[Page 120]
1
T. Galati
2
Q Do the officers assigned to the
3
Zone Assessment Unit go to the locations in
4
uniform or in plain clothes?
5
A They go in plain clothes.
6
Q Are the officers of the Zone
7
Assessment Unit who are deployed to those
8
locations in their communities, instructed
9
that they are not affiliated with the NYPD?
10
A Yes.
11
Q So, that we might find some of
12
the repeated places where the food is good?
13
A I'm not telling you that's the
14
reason. I am telling you that the reality
15
is that I have talked to people that they
16
have indicated that this is a place that
17
they like to eat. So a repeated visit may
18
be indicative of the like for food.
19
Q I'm showing you what had been
20
marked as Exhibit 6. Have you seen that
21
document before?
22
A I've seen it in relation to the
23
AP Articles.
24
Q If you would take a look at the
25
tab two, tab pages where I put the sticker
[Page 121]
1
T. Galati
2
on. Do you see a reference in one to
3
rhetoric, level one and then the other one
4
there's a rhetoric level two?
5
MR. FARRELL: Can we identify
6
the document for the record? The title
7
of it says Albanian locations of concern
8
report.
9
Q Do you see the rhetoric level one
10
and rhetoric level two?
11
A Yes.
12
Q Have you seen what those
13
categories are used before?
14
A This is prior to my assignment.
15
However, I have heard of level of rhetoric
16
that was used for a short period of time.
17
Q Were there some written
18
guidelines about rhetoric levels?
19
A I'm not sure if there's written
20
guidelines or not. We presently do not use
21
and have not used it since I'm here.
22
Q Are you able to tell me where
23
you've seen it used other than Exhibit 6?
24
A I believe during my prep, there
25
was discussion that I asked a question about
[Page 122]
1
T. Galati
2
this, where I was told that at one point
3
there were levels of rhetoric that they
4
used.
5
Q Do you know who told you that?
6
A Sergeant Mehta, M-E-H-T-A.
7
Q Is Sergeant Mehta still assigned
8
to the Intelligence Division?
9
A Yes.
10
MR. EISENSTEIN: Mark that as
11
seven.
12
13
14
as of this date.)
15
Q I want you to take a look at
16
Exhibit 7. My question is going to be
17
whether any of the activities reported on
18
Exhibit 7 are activities of officers
19
assigned to the Zone Assessment Unit?
20
A None of this is from the Zone
21
Assessment Unit. This is all from
22
authorized Handschu investigations. Can I
23
clarify one thing about this report?
24
Rhetoric, that was used very
25
early on when the unit first started and it
[Page 123]
1
T. Galati
2
was stopped at some point. I think it's
3
important on this document that you're
4
showing me and I don't know what the date
5
is. It says 2006 here.
6
This information was not
7
necessarily collected in 2006. This
8
information most likely was collected in
9
2003. So, I just want to make sure that
10
everybody understands that this is not
11
necessarily a 2006 or whenever this document
12
here was produced. This is older.
13
MR. FARRELL: So the record is
14
clear, the witness was referring to
15
Exhibit 6, not Exhibit 7.
16
MR. EISENSTEIN: Right. Good
17
point.
18
MR. EISENSTEIN: We're talking
19
about the information that was checked
20
in Exhibit 6. Exhibit 7 was checked in
21
2008 or is dated in 2008.
22
Q To your knowledge, did any kind
23
of written guidelines about rhetoric replace
24
the level one/level two system that you've
25
told us was used early on?
[Page 124]
1
T. Galati
2
A Early on, I couldn't tell you
3
definitely that there was guidelines on
4
rhetoric policy. I know we don't have it
5
now. I'm unaware that it exists prior, but
6
I can't definitively tell you that there
7
isn't a document.
8
Q There isn't one at the present
9
time that defines, for example, what kind of
10
rhetoric is considered actionable, so to
11
speak?
12
13
A I don't know what you mean by
14
rhetoric is considered actionable.
15
Q That rhetoric would be considered
16
a basis for moving something into the realm
17
of investigation?
18
19
A If there was something that was
20
recorded by the Demographics Unit that
21
raised to the level that it needed to be
22
brought to the attention of the front
23
office. It would be looked at by the
24
analytical shop and then it would be brought
25
to the attention of the front office, and I
[Page 125]
1
T. Galati
2
would make a decision on whether or not we
3
would make a lead on this.
4
I could tell you that I have
5
never made a lead from rhetoric that came
6
from a Demographics report and I'm here
7
since 2006. I don't recall other ones prior
8
to my arrival. Again, that's always a
9
possibility. I am not aware of any.
10
Q Where and in what form are the
11
reports that are generated by the Zone
12
Assessment Unit maintained? In other words,
13
are they at some physical location and are
14
they in paper form, electronic form, both?
15
Those are the questions that I'm asking.
16
A Presently?
17
Q Yes.
18
A Presently, when the zone
19
assessment officers do their reports, they
20
do an electronic report that is
21
electronically held in our database which is
22
a server database.
23
In addition, there's a standalone
24
computer where information is inputted for
25
the purpose of generating reports related to
[Page 126]
1
T. Galati
2
demographic areas and so on.
3
Q Does that mean that the reports
4
are in electronic form? One in the
5
standalone computer and the other one in the
6
database on the server?
7
MR. FARRELL: Objection. Go
8
ahead.
9
A Yes, they are produced and held
10
on the server and they also input the
11
information into a standalone for the
12
generation of reports.
13
This is the Zone Assessment Unit.
14
They put it into the zone assessment
15
database for generating special reports,
16
requested reports.
17
Q The Zone Assessment Unit has its
18
own database? That's a question. Does the
19
Zone Assessment Unit have its own database?
20
A Yes, it does.
21
Q There's also a larger
22
Intelligence Division database?
23
A Yes.
24
Q If you'll give us 5 minutes, I
25
want to make sure what's covered had been
[Page 127]
1
T. Galati
2
covered. Off the record.
3
(Recess taken).
4
Q At the present time, what is the
5
procedure for members of the force assigned
6
to the Zone Assessment Unit in terms of
7
writing up what they have observed?
8
Do they do it everyday? Do they
9
do it on a weekly basis?
10
A When they get back to their
11
office, they prepare an electronic what we
12
call a DD five form, what they did for the
13
day, for the visit.
14
Q They do that each day now?
15
A Yes.
16
Q Do they work steady day tours or
17
do they work around the clock?
18
MR. FARRELL: I'm going to
19
confer about privilege.
20
A I would say for the most part,
21
they do daytime deployments, but we moved
22
them periodically so we can understand
23
different locations at different times.
24
Q To your knowledge, has any
25
supervisor ever eliminated material from a
[Page 128]
1
T. Galati
2
report prepared by a zone and assessment
3
unit officer because it was not related to
4
potential, unlawful activity of terrorism?
5
A To my knowledge, I am not aware
6
of that, but I can't say that that hasn't
7
happened. I'm not aware of that.
8
Q Do the supervisors in the Zone
9
Assessment Unit have any instructions based
10
on relating to section VIII(A)(2) of the
11
Handschu Guidelines?
12
In other words, let me ask it in
13
a different way. Are the supervisors
14
instructed to look out for the retention of
15
material, retention of information that's
16
not related to potential unlawful or
17
terrorist activity?
18
A The supervisors are aware of the
19
procedure, the VIII(A)(2) and they're aware
20
of the Handschu Guidelines in VIII(A)(2).
21
We have a review process that we
22
use where the reports get looked at, and if
23
there's an issue related to that, it would
24
be addressed in a training session.
25
Q Who conducts the review in that
[Page 129]
1
2
review process?
3
A One of the people that review it
4
is our legal staff.
5
Q That's the legal staff of the
6
Intelligence Division?
7
A Yes.
8
Q Are they civilian employees or
9
members of the force?
10
A Both.
11
Q To your knowledge, has the legal
12
staff of the Intelligence Division ever
13
directed or caused the removal of material
14
from a Zone Assessment Unit report because
15
it was not related to potential unlawful or
16
terrorist activity?
17
A The review process that they have
18
is done after the report is prepared. So,
19
if they saw something that they felt should
20
be addressed, it would be addressed in a
21
training. I can't tell you that the report
22
would be changed. We have not changed
23
reports once they are finalized.
24
MR. EISENSTEIN: I have no
25
further questions. Thank you for your
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
866.876.8757
[Page 130]
patience and I'm done.
(At 5:30 p.m., the Examination
of this Witness was concluded.)
THOMAS GALATI
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
2i
day of X~*>'y ,2.01?
NOTARY PUBLIC
Notary Public
State of New York
Steven Joseph Colon, 'Esq.
Registration # 02CO6140735
Commission Expires on
February 6, 20lp
U.S. LEGAL SUPPORT, INC. www.uslegalsupport.com
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E X H I B I T S
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PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS:
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EXHIBIT EXHIBIT PAGE
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NUMBER DESCRIPTION
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1 Document 15
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2 Document 16
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3 Document 40
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4 Document 63
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5 Document 117
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6 Document 118
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7 Document 121
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I N D E X
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EXAMINATION BY PAGE
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Mr. Eisenstein 10-129
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2 CERTIFICATE
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4 STATE OP NEW YORK )
: SS. :
5 COUNTY OF KINGS )
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7 AYELET RUSSO, a Notary Public for
8 and within the State of New York, do hereby
9 certify:
10 That the witness whose examination is
11 hereinbefore set forth was duly sworn and
12 that such examination is a true record of
13 the testimony given by that witness.
I further certify that I am not related
14
15 to any of the parties to this action by
16 blood or by marriage and that I am in no way
17 interested in the outcome of this matter.
18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
19 my hand this 27th day of September, 2012.
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23 AYELET RUSSO
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[Page 134]
Errata Sheet for the Corrected Transcript of Chief Galati's deposition on 06/28/2012
Handschu v. Special Services, 71 CV 2203
Page
Number
Line
Number
Change This To
13 22 municipal, I guess.
municipal, a Senior Executive in
State and Local Government
23 4-5
Official is not the word I'm
looking for
Official is not the word I would
use
29 19 radicalized towards violence
radicalized towards violence
could try and secrete themselves
or recruit others to assist them.
35 15 possibility that that is
the possibility that that is a place
one might look to find
36 20 type of people they are from the -delete-
37 19 conversations
conversations about a specific
event
39 11 stood up started
40 11 before.
before and are trying to
determine which countries of
concern visit the mosque
41 9-11
I recognize it as an Intelligence
Division document
-delete-
47 9-12
I'm not saying definitively that's
not the practice, since I'm
assigned to the unit, that it has
been done.
I can't definitely tell you that they
do not go into mosques. What I
can say is that since I have been
assigned to the division, it is not
the practice to do so, nor has it
happened to my knowledge.
61:25 62:5
location with the goal of trying
to find out what country of
concern may go there, should we
need to identify an Islamist
that's Radicalized towards
violence, maybe hiding there for
police action, should it arise
location with the goal of trying to
find out where an Islamist
radicalized towards violence from
a country of concern would go to
hide, should the need arise for
police action
64 25 is was
65 2 investigation investigations
77 3 that I is what I
80 18 are for the so that the
83 2-4
and the tension that are going to
help us in the information
contained.
-delete-
83 7 he's a terrorist is
83 8 one place.
83 9 this is one this place is one
83 13 either try to either try to
85 16 person -delete-
86 8-10
would be a kind of place that a
terrorist would be comfortable
in
could be a kind of place that a
terrorist sharing those same
characteristics would be
comfortable in
86 20-21
region would be of concern, so
that's why it's important to me
region would be Pashtun so that's
why the detail is important to me
87:21 88:2
I can't separate the conversation
based out of the value that I see
in the conversation, what their
grievance is. It's not what I'm
focused on. I'm focused on the
identification that I'm getting
out of the conversation
I can't separate the content of the
conversation from the fact that
they are speaking Urdu. What
their grievance is, I am not
focused on. I'm focused on the
fact that they are speaking Urdu
91 12 have see
96 19:21
The analysts are non-police
officers. They are not police
officers that are hired there.
The analysts are mostly civilians.
103 4 in of
103 5 of in
103 6 in of
105:25 106:2
where they have to hear an
overheard conversation
where they are more likely to
hear a reaction
115 9 events event
120 10 Yes
They are instructed not to reveal
the fact that they are NYPD
officers
Signed and subscribed to me before this ^ day of ?*-*"> 2013.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Notary Public
State of New York
Steven Josepfi Colon, 'Esq.
Registration # 02CO6140735
Commission Expires on
February 0, 2010
-2-
Comments of Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly
Fordham Law School Alumni Luncheon
Cipriani Wall Street
Saturday, March 3, 2012
Thank you, Judge Heitler. It's a pleasure to be here with this distinguished group of alumni. I want to
start by thanking Fordham Law School for educating generations of public-service-minded attorneys.
The school is an incredible resource for this city, whether it's the 150,000 hours of volunteer service
completed by the graduating class of 2011 or the thousands of professionals who've gone on to do
outstanding legal work, including in the ranks of the Police Department.
In recent years, as the NYPD has taken on the mission of counterterrorisrn, the legal questions we face
have grown in complexity. We're constantly looking at how to safeguard civil liberties and defend
society from acts of terrorism. In some ways, these are issues we could have and should have addressed
years earlier.
Nineteen years ago, on February 26th 1993,1 was New York City Police Commissioner. It was aFriday
afternoon, and I was in my office on the 14th floor of Police Headquarters when a massive explosion
rocked the World Trade Center. The blast tore a hole in the building seven stories deep. I remember
seeing the smoke rise and the mass of emergency vehicles at the scene when I got there just ten minutes
later. The bomb, which was detonated in an underground garage, killed six people and wounded more
than 1,000. At the time it was said to be a miracle there weren't more fatalities.
That attack should have been a wake-up call for the nation and the city. It was not. The suspectsthe
first of whom was found when he tried to reclaim the deposit on the rental van used in the attackwere
dismissed as incompetent
In fact, their associates were already plotting another attack. The investigation of the World Trade Center
bombing focused the attention of authorities on Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, an extremist cleric
affiliated with a mosque in Brooklyn. He told worshippers it was their religious duty to fight enemies of
god. Rahman, also known as the Blind Sheikh, was at the heart of a plan to attack the U.N., the Lincoln
and Holland tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and the FBI's New York office. That plot was
thwarted by an informant who infiltrated the group.
Except forthose who managed toescape the U.S., the participants inthis plotand theWorld Trade
Center attack were ultimately arrested, tried, and brought to justice. With that, the case was essentially
closed.
We now know that byfailing tounderstand the international context inwhich these events occurred, by
failing toconnect the perpetrators toa web of violent actors with a murderous mission and ample means,
we lost a tremendous opportunity. As a country, we paid the price for that failure eight years later - inthe
death of3,000 people, the destruction ofthe Twin Towers, damage to thePentagon, and the devastating
trillion-dollar cost to our economy.
When I returned as police commissioner it was January 2002, less than four months after 9/11. Bythen it
was clear the city could not simply defer theresponsibility of counterterrorism tothe federal government.
We'd have towork with them. But it was obvious we would need tomake systemic changes inhow we
protect the city.
InJanuary 2002, theNYPD became thefirst police department in thecountry to develop our own
counterterrorismbureau. To lead it, we appointed Marine Corps Lieutenant General Frank Libutti, who
once commanded all marines in thepacific theater. To head ourrestructured Intelligence Division, we
recruited David Cohen, a 35-year veteran of theCIA, who ledboth theoperational and analytical
branches of the agency. We increased our representation on the Joint TerrorismTask Force withthe FBI
from 17detectives to 120. Wefound within ourranks fluent speakers of languages such as Arabic,
Pashto, and Urdu, and reassigned themto counterterrorism duties. We posted senior officers in 11 cities
around the worldto formrelationships with local police agencies and visit the scenesof terrorist attacks.
We hired acorps ofcivilian analysts who are experts inforeign affairs and military intelligence. They
studyregionsof the world we're concerned about and emerging methods of attack. We also cast a wide
net for collaboration, working with law enforcement agencies throughout thenortheast and mid-Atlantic,
and partnering with 11,000 members of the region's private security industry through a program called
NYPD Shield.
Inrecent months, some of ourmethods of intelligence gathering have been thesubject of debate and,
frankly, misrepresentation. So I want to take this time todiscuss thestrategies we use, therationale
behind them, and the legal foundation on whichwe rely.
Since 1985, the Police Department has been subject to a set of rules known as the Handschu Guidelines,
whichweredevelopedto protect peopleengaged in political protest. After 9/11, we were concerned that
elements of theguidelines could interfere with our ability to investigate terrorism. In 2002, we proposed
to a federal court that the lawbe modified, and the court agreed.
Before I go intodetails let me say that we imposed onourselves the strictest interpretation of political
activity. Onecould easily argue thatwhen we investigate terrorism, we are dealing withcriminal, not
political, activity. We go above and beyond by treating every terrorism investigation as subject to
Handschu. Let me alsosay that no otherpolicedepartment inthe countryis bound by these rules, which
restrict police powers granted under the constitution.
The guidelines begin with thestatement of ageneral principle, which I'll quote. "Initseffort to anticipate
or prevent unlawful activity, including terrorist acts, the NYPDmust, at times, initiate investigations in
advance of unlawful conduct."
For some, the very actof gathering intelligence seems illegitimate when applied to the crimeof
terrorism. In fact, the Police Department uses many of the samemethodsto find andstopterrorists that
we use to arrest drug dealers, human traffickers, and gang leaders. We develop detailed information
about the nature of thecrime and the people involved. We form partnerships with othergovernment
agencies, find sources, and make use of undercover officers.
This is what Handschu says about the broadest formof intelligence gathering: "The NYPD is authorized
tovisit any place and attend anyevent that is open to the public" and "to conduct online search activity
and toaccess online sites and forums onthe same terms... as members of the public." The department is
further authorized to, "prepare general reports and assessments... for purposes of strategic oroperational
planning."
Anyone whointimates that it is unlawful for thePolice Department to search online, visit public places,
ormap neighborhoods has either not read, misunderstood, orintentionally obfuscated themeaning of the
Handschu Guidelines.
A broad base of knowledge is critically important to our ability to investigate terrorism. It was precisely
our failure to understand the context in 1993 that left us vulnerable in 2001. The members of the 9/11
Commission note this fact intheir final report. Ofthe 1993 bombing theywrite, "The successful use of
thelegal system hadthe sideeffect of obscuring the needto examine the characterandextent of thenew
threat facing the United States." We won't make that mistake again - on Mayor Bloomberg's watch, or
mine.
As part ofour counterterrorism activities, we try todetermine how individuals seeking todo harm might
communicate or conceal themselves. Where might theygo to find resources or evade the law?
Establishing this kind ofgeographically-based knowledge saves precious time in stopping fast-moving
plots.
In a similar vein, weknowthat whilethe vast majority of Muslim student associations and their members
arelaw-abiding, wehave seen too many cases inwhich such groups wereexploited. Since 9/11, some of
the most violentterrorists we've encountered were radicalized or recruited at universities. In 2006, after a
series of al Qaeda plots involving university students and members of Muslim student associations in the
U.K., we began a six-month initiative tosearch open sources for signs of such activity inourarea. We
did not look at these groups on the basis of their religious affiliation. We looked at their public
communications onthe basis ofexamples like the 2005 London transit bombing and the2006 plot to
detonate explosives on transatlantic airliners, both of which involved active members of Muslim student
associations in Britain. We concluded our research in May of 2007, but not before we found a fewitems
of concern here in New York.
Now, inorder for the department tofollow upona lead, conduct a preliminary inquiry, or launch a full
investigation, the Handschu Guidelines require written authorization from theDeputy Commissioner of
Intelligence. An internal committee reviews each investigation toensure compliance, and every single
field intelligence report generated through aninvestigation isevaluated by a legal unit based in the
Intelligence Division.
Undercover investigations begin withleads, and wego where theleads take us. As a matter of Police
Department policy, undercover officers and confidential informants do not enter amosque unless they
are following up on a lead vetted under Handschu.
Likewise, when we have attended a privateevent organized by a student group, we havedone so on the
basis of a lead or investigation reviewedand authorized in writing at the highest levels of the department,
in keeping with Handschu protocol. Some leads havetaken us to verydangerous individuals.
Last month, Jesse CurtisMorton, a graduateof ColumbiaUniversity'sSchool of International and Public
Affairs, pleadedguilty in a federal court in Virginia to conspiracy to solicit murder. He admitted to
encouraging others to kill the writers of SouthPark after theydepicted the prophet Mohammed dressed
in a bear suit. Morton alsourged violence against an artist whoorganized Everybody DrawMohammed
Day in reaction to the threats.
The PoliceDepartment hadbeenwatchingMorton for sometimeafter he was foundto be an advocate
for violence. We took note when, in November 2006, he visited Stony Brook University's Muslim
student association to speakandrecruit. The following year he founded the websiteRevolution Muslim,
which became a platform for murderous ideology anda meeting placefor various violent actors. On his
website, readers couldfind the contents of Inspiremagazine, a publication put out by al Qaedain the
Arabian Peninsula, and which included articles such as "How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your
Mom".
That's the document Jose Pimentel used to learn to make pipe bombs last year. When we arrested
Pimentel in November, he was an hour away from completing the first of a series of bombs with which
heplanned to attack thecity. OnWednesday, Pimentel was indicted on charges of weapons possession
andconspiracy as terrorcrimes. Pimentel hadbeen in touch with Morton to tell himhowmuch heliked
his website.
Over the years, a total of ten peoplewho've beenarrested on terrorism charges havebeen incontact with
Revolution Muslim. This list also includes Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte. In June 2010 we
stoppedthese men at JFKAirport on their way tojoin the terrorist organization al Shabaabin Somalia.
This marked the conclusion of a three-and-a-half year investigation by the FBI and Joint Terrorism Task
Forces in New York and New Jersey, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, the
U.S. Attorney's office, and the New York City Police Department. The case against Alessa and Almonte
was developedthroughthe careful workof an NYPDundercover officer who madecontact withthe men
in 2009 and became a trusted confidante.
Our intelligence program was built to facilitate exactly the kind of regional collaboration that enabled us
to succeed in this case. Through Operation Sentry, an initiative to share terrorism-related information, we
partner with 140 other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, including 31 in the state of New
Jersey. Through Securing the Cities, a program to stop a radiological threat from entering the city, we
work with another 150 agencies.
The notion that the Police Department should close our eyes to what takes place outside the five
boroughs is folly, and it defies the lessons of history.
The plot against the London transit system in 2005 was hatched 180 miles away in the city of Leeds.
Faisal Shahzad, who tried to set off a bomb in Times Square in 2010, developed his plot in Connecticut.
Najibullah Zazi, who conspired with two high school classmates to bomb the subway system in 2009,
assembled his explosive ingredients in Colorado. And the bomb that blew up in the World Trade Center
19 years ago was constructed in New Jersey.
25% ofthe people killed on September 11th746 individualswere residents of New Jersey. If terrorists
aren't limited by borders and boundaries, we can't be either. It is entirely legal for the Police Department
to conduct investigations outside of city limits, and we maintain very close relationships with local
authorities.
Since 9/11, New York City has been targeted by terrorists in 14 different plots. Thanks to the work of the
Police Department, the FBI, and a good deal of luck, none of these plots have succeeded. In fact, while
the city saw terrorist attacks in the 1970s, 80s and 90s, no attack has taken place in the past ten years.
We are proud of this fact. We're also very clear about the nature of the threat we face. It is persistent and
it is dangerous. The.Police Department will not apologize for our lawful efforts to protect New York, and
we will not change our methods to satisfy those who would impugn them without understanding them.
We have a responsibility to protect New York, and we uphold the law in doing so. We appreciate all of
your support in this endeavor.
I want to thank Fordham Law School and the alumni association for having me here today. Thank you
for all that you do as legal professionals and alumni, and keep up the outstanding work.
BARBARA HANDSCHU, et al.,
Plaintiffs
-against-
SPECIAL SERVICES DIVISION, a/k/a Bureau
of Special Services, et al.
Defendants
x
71 Civ. 2203 (CSH)
Declaration of Bernard Haykel
BERNARD HAYKEL declares under the terms of 28 USC sec. 1746:
1. My name is Bernard Haykel and I am a full professor with tenure of Near Eastern
Studies at Princeton University where I teach courses and conduct research on Islamic law, Islamic
political movements and the modern politics of the Middle East. I have studied Islamic
fundamentalist movements since 1989, having conducted fieldwork in Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and India. I was a Fulbright Scholar in Yemen (1992-93) and have since returned
to the Middle East and South Asia on a yearly basis. My doctoral dissertation, for which I
received my Ph.D. from the University of Oxford in England, focuses on the life and work of the
one of the most important modern Islamic fundamentalist thinkers, the scholar Muhammad al-
Shawkani. Aside from writing numerous articles in refereed journals in my field as well as two
books, I have since 9/11 advised the office of Prime Minister Tony Blair as well as the CIA and
other USgovernment agencies on howto conduct the war on terrorismand on how to understand
and defeat the ideology of al-Qaeda.
2. I have been asked by plaintiffs' counsel to comment on various Islamic ideologies
and groups and will do so belowconcerning those with whichI am familiar. I list each ideology or
groupand providea summary of what I knowabout it.
3. Salafismand Salafis: Salafismrefers to a particular Islamic theology that is literalist
in its interpretation of the text of Islamic revelation, whichare the Koranand the traditions of
sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. Persons who adhere to Salafism's theology are
referred to as Salafis. These seek to live life as closely as possible as they think the Prophet
Muhammad and his companions did, and tend to vilify Muslims who disagree with their
interpretation of Islam. In particular theytarget for abuse Shii and Sufi Muslims becausethey
consider these groups to have erred from the original message of Islam. In political terms, Salafis
are divided along a broad spectrumof groups. On one end of this spectrumare the quietistor
non-political Salafis who shun formal and organized politicson principle. They refuse to vote or to
adhere to political partiesfor example. In the middle of the spectrum are politically active Salafis
who seek to influence politics by participatingin non-violent processes that would lead them into
positions of power. On the other end of the spectrumare violent activist Salafis who believe that
only through violence can their vision of society be instituted and accomplished. The violent
Salafis, aka Salafi-Jihadis are a numerical minority, and amongst these one can count such groups
as Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates. The violence that Al-Qaeda has inflicted, especially on other
Muslims, has made this group unpopular with other Muslims.
4. Wahhabism and Wahhabi: Wahhabism is an Islamic ideology that subscribes to the
views and teachings of an Arabian religious reformer called Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d.
1792). This reformer's ideas are rooted in Salafi theology and his writings form the basis of the
reigning political and religious ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today. A Wahhabi is a
follower of Wahhabism. A majority of Wahhabis are non-political or quietist. Strict Wahhabis are
intolerant of other non-Wahhabi Muslims, thinkingthemto be in error, and often are unfriendly to
non-Muslim personsand non-Muslim ideas and practices. Traditional Wahhabis, such as the
scholars in the employof Saudi Arabia, are against the Salafis who are engaged in politicsand
consider Al-Qaeda to constitutea deviant ideology that should be fought. One consequenceofthis
is that Al-Qaeda's followers have been either killed or imprisonedin Saudi Arabia.
5. The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR): an American civil rights
organization that was founded in 1994 andthat is concerned withMuslim affairs in the USand
Canada. CAIR is not known to have been involved with any terrorist group or to advocate
ideologies associated with such groups as Al-Qaeda or the MuslimBrotherhood.
6. Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA): an American Muslim organization that is
concerned with the welfare and betterment of Muslims in the US and with the propagation of Islam
in America. It is dominated by Muslims of SouthAsiandescent and organizes annual conferences
around the country.
7. Sayyid Qutb: An influential Egyptian ideologueof the Muslim Brotherhood. He
was sentenced and executed by the government of Egypt in 1966and his teachings, which have a
radical edge against non-Muslim governments and peoples, have been appropriated and invoked by
radical groups, including Al-Qaeda.
8. Muslim Brotherhood (MB): The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Islamist
political andsocial organization, centered on Egypt but maintains a loose affiliation withsister
organizations inothercountries throughout the world. It has formally renounced violence in Egypt
and Tunisia and is formally active in politics in both countries. The president of Egypt today
belongs to this movement. In the past, the MBwas persecutedby nationalist governments and it
has gone fromadvocating a more radical ideology to one that seeks political change through
gradual and non-violent means. The MBcompetes politically and ideologically with Salafis.
9. Hamas: This is the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories
and since 2006 has ruled the Gaza strip. Hamas refuses to recognize Israel and seeks to re-conquer
all of historic Palestine. It is committed to armed struggle as the method for accomplishing this. It
has offered Israel 10-year truce periods. Hamas has confined its military activities to Israel and the
Palestinianterritories and is not known to have engaged in any violent acts outside this area. It is
politically active in other countries and some of its leaders are based overseas.
10. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): a small Palestinian militant organization that has
beensupported by the Islamic Republic of Iranand Hezbollahin Lebanon. It is committed to
violent struggleagainst Israel and to its elimination. The USgovernment considers PIJ a terrorist
organization.
11. World Assembly of MuslimYouth (WAMY): a non-governmental organization
that is modeled on the YMCA and funded largely by the government of Saudi Arabia and is
headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This organization is focusedon organizing Muslimyouth
activitiesand the propagationof Sunni Islamic values and teachings amongst them. There have
beenreports that WAMYhad been involved in the funding of violent Jihadi activities and causes,
but these remain unsubstantiated. WAMY has been supportive of causes that involve attacks on
Muslims or some form of discrimination against them, such as in Bosnia, Chechnya, the
Philippines, but it is not evident that the support for these has involved more than humanitarian aid
and political advocacy. Since 9/11, the Saudi government has monitored WAMY closely to make
certain that it is not involved in any way in the support of groups such as Al-Qaeda.
12. Muslim World League (MWL): This is a non-governmental organization that was
established in 1962under the aegis of the government of Saudi Arabia, which still largely funds its
activities. The MWLwas createdto helpfight against Pan-Arab nationalism and socialismand has
since become an instrument of pan-Islamicsolidarity, benevolent action and legal standardizationas
well as helpingthe missionof propagating Islamaround the world. The MWLhas observer status
at the UNand has since9/11 beenclosely monitored by the Saudi government to ascertain that it is
not involved in the support of violent jihadi groups, ideologies or activities.
13. Muslim American Society (MAS): This is a nonprofit organization that was
founded in 1993 and appearsto be the formal face of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the
United States. MAS has been involved in educational activities among US Muslims and has tried
to organize the community but I am not aware that it has been involvedin any violent or terror
activity in the United States.
14. Salafi Society of NorthAmerica: an organization that adheres to Salafi teachings
and has a presence in one mosque in Brooklyn.
15. Tablighi Jamaat (TJ): A transnational Islamic movement that seeks to reform Islam
at a grassroots level through greater adherence to theobligations of the faith (e.g., prayer, fasting
etc.). It was founded in India in 1926and has a largefollowing in South Asia. The movement has
maintained an apolitical stance and has shunned intra-Muslimdisputes. It can be compared to the
Chabad movement in Judaism and is often the entry point for many Muslims seeking to become
more practicing adherents of the faith.
16. Hizb al-Tahrir (HT): A transnational Sunni Muslim organization founded in 1953
by Taqi ul-Din al-Nabhani andcommitted tothecreation of a unitary Islamic state, called the
Caliphate. Thisstate will erase all existing national borders, uniting Muslims under the leadership
of a single leader called thecaliph. It is not clear whether thismovement advocates violent struggle
(jihad) as a means for attaining its ultimate goal. It has followers in many countries and has been
active in the United Kingdom and in Central Asia.
17. Islamic Thinkers Society (ITS): A Muslimgroup based in the NY metropolitan
region that seeks to establish the Caliphate, a unitary, global Muslim state that is ruled in
accordance withIslamic law. The ITS appears to be a group that follows the teachings of the Hizb
al-Tahrirmovement and founder, and its methodfor spreadingits teachings and ideology is
through preaching and proselytism.
18. Dar ut Tawheed or TawheedNYC.com: a group that is committed to Salafi
teachings. Its online materials offera selection of texts andvideos that are Salafi in orientation.
Some of the materials are shared by Salafi Jihadis, but this is not necessarily indicative that this
group is jihadi in orientation.
19. Al-Muhajiroun: a British-based Islamist organization that has beenbanned bythe
British government for promoting andpraising terrorist activity, including the 9/11 attack. Al-
Muhajiroun is a splinter group that shares many of Hizb al-Tahrir's ideology suchas calling for the
establishment of the Caliphate (a unitary Islamic state). Al-Muhajiroun havealso beenaccused of
anti-semitismand for helping British Muslimsjoin militant groups in Chechnya and other
locations.
20. IslamChatra Shibir: A student political organizationin Bangladeshthat is
associatedwith the Jamaat-e-Islami movement, seekingto establishan Islamic state based on
Islamic law.
21. Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Pakistani terrorist organizationthat has the backing of the
Pakistani government andits intelligence service. Founded in 1990, it has been involved in
numerous terrorist attacks on India. Its statedobjective is to liberate in Indian-ruled Kashmirand
to establish an Islamic state in South Asia.
22. Sipah-e-Sahaba: APakistani Islamist and terrorist organization that has been
banned in Pakistan. Its principal aimis to attack the Shiisin Pakistan andto establish a Sunni
Islamic state in Pakistan and to restore the caliphate.
23. Hezbollah: A Shiite Islamic movement and political party in Lebanon and a proxy
of Iran's. Hezbollahis a militant organization that has fought Israel during its occupationof
Lebanon and is committed to Israel's destruction. It has on occasion been involved in violent terror
acts outside the local arena of Lebanon and Israel and there are widespread allegations that
Hezbollah has sleeper cells in the US. Some of its sympathizers have beenaccusedand sentenced
for raising funds illegally in the US. The US government considers Hezbollah a terrorist
organization.
24. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI): A Pakistani political organization that seeks to create an
Islamic state ruled in accordance with Islamic law. Its founder is Abu ATa Maududi, an ideologue
whose ideas underpin the JI's political program. This is a vanguard party, similar to the Muslim
Brotherhood and committed to similar goals.
25. The IslamicOrganization of North American: An Americanorganizationthat is
South Asian in leadership and origin. It is committedto preaching and spreading the Islamic faith
and to the teachings of Abu ATa Maududi, a Pakistani ideologue who had a vision of an Islamic
state based on the application of Islamic law.
26. United Muslims of America: an American Muslim non-profit corporation
established in 1982 and which appears to act as an umbrella group for other US Muslim
organizations. It states that it is a Muslim public affairs organization whose "mission is to educate
and encourage American Muslims to actively participate in the mainstreamsocial, economic, civic
and political activities in America." It appears to be a lobbying group that promotes Muslim
causes, both domestically and internationally.
27. Al-Azhar University: The oldest and most venerable institution of religious learning in the
Muslim world. It is Sunni by affiliation and has been a bulwark against radical (i.e. violent)
Islamism for much of the 20 and 21 centuries. It has been seen as being co-opted by the
Egyptian state, and its scholars have been loyal mouthpieces of the government in Cairo, which has
been at war with Islamists until the fall of President Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood, which
now rules through the president of Egypt, regards al-Azhar as an institution that stands firmly
against Islamism and Islamists.
I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on December 7, 2012
&x
1
Bernard Haykel
N.Y.P.D.
SECRET

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N.Y.P.D.
SECRET

The Associated Press has redacted information that could identify undercover officers, informants and criminal targets.
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
CENTRAL ANALYSIS RESEARCH UNIT
09 February 2006
INTELLIGENCE NOTE
SUbject: NYC Mosque Statements on Danish Cartoon Controversy
Chronological Order
02/08/06: Islamic Society Of Mid Manhattan, 154 East 55 Street, New York, NY.
Upon completion of the prayer led by Sheik Ahmed Dewidar, a speech was
given by Abdela Adhami (phonetic spelling). Adhami spoke about the cartoon,
stating Muslims should just ignore it and not become violent over it. The source
ascertained that Adhami is a teacher at a university in New Jersey.
02/08/2006: Bronx Muslim Center, 702 Rhinelander Avenue, Bronx, NY.
Upon completion of the Isha prayer service, Sheik Hamud spoke about the
cartoons, stating "we have to do something about it, but not what those people are
doing back home. They are burning and destroying stuff and they should know
that the prophet does not want something like that to happen. We should follow
the prophet in the best way we can, boycott anything that was made in Denmark,
don't buy or sell anything that has to do with them." He also stated, "We should
send letters to our legal organizations and explain how we feel and demand that
they do something about it.
02/07/06: Iqra Mosque, 35-54 73rd Street, Jackson Heights, Queens
Meeting with Islamic Thinkers Society
Akbar Khattak talked about holding a demonstration at which the members of
ITS will burn the Danish and German flags in order to make a political statement
against these countries as well as other European countries who have "violated the
sanctity of the Muslim faith." Khattak further added that A. Islam will e-mail the
source a map of the locations for Danish and German Embassies so the source can
locate the precinct of concern and get a sound device permit for the
demonstration.
02/07/06: 17th Precinct
to get a sound
device permit so that the Islamic Thinkers Society can conduct a demonstration
on February 15,2006, 1500 to 1730 hrs. Khattak stated ITS wants to give a short
speech outside the Danish Consulate, 885 2nd Ave, Manhattan. After this brief
speech the group will drag a Danish flag to the German consulate located at 871
1st Ave in Manhattan, where they will demonstrate for approximately 1 hour 30
minutes. Khattak stated that at some point in front of the German mission the
group will burn the Danish and German flags.
2
02/07/06 Jamaica Muslim Center, 85-37 168th Street, Queens, NY.
Imam Shamsi Ali spoke about the violence that has erupted overseas in regard to
the cartoons. He condemned the pictures but said that we should hope for the
violence to end. He said that most non-Muslims are ignorant to Islam and do not
understand the outrage that these pictures cause. He further said that if the
violence continues it will show non-Muslims that Muslims have no patience or
tolerance.
02/07/06: SOl's conversation with Mohammad Zubair Yaqub
During their conversation, Zubair received a phone call from "Suleman" in
Toronto. SOl was only able to hear Yaqub's end of the conversation, which
entailed Yaqub asking Suleman if Muslims were protesting in Toronto over the
Danish cartoons and stated that the war was started against Islam. At this point
SOl interrupted and asked what should Muslim's do? Yaqub's response to SOl
was "Inqlab" which SOl believes to mean fight. Yaqub continued his conversation
with Suleman informing him that America is like a lion and Muslims are like a
pigeon. They (Muslims) are closing their eyes thinking that the cat is not going to
eat them.
02/06/2006: Iqra Mosque, 35-54 73rd Street, Jackson Heights, Queens.
Akbar Khattak discussed the demonstrations that will take place in front of a
few consulates, including the Danish, German, and French consulates in
Manhattan possibly on Wednesday February 15th, 2006 during working hours.
Khattak asked Ariful Islam to print out the maps of the following consulates and
forward it to the source so he can take that information with him to the police
station when he goes to apply for the sound permit. Khattak stated these countries
have disrespected us by making fun of the prophet and Islam.
02/06/06: Masjid Dawudi, 143 State Street, Brooklyn NY.
Sheik Abdalla spoke about his anger towards the cartoons, stating all Muslims
should speak out for all to hear, but not become violent over this issue. There are
different views by Muslims in all Masjids about this.
02/04/06: Jamaica Muslim Center, 85-37 168th Street, Queens, NY.
Shaykh Ibrahim Negm, of the Islamic Learning Foundation, currently serving
as a full time Imam and director at the Islamic Center of South Shore in New
York. Negm spoke of the cartoons, which resulted in several Muslim
organizations around the world condemning the act by calling it "an attack on
the Muslim and Islamic" world.
After the sermon, Brother Abu Yusuf stated that Negm was calling for a
demonstration across the United Nations condemning the cartoons.
02/04/06: Islamic Learning Foundation, 15-02 College Point Blvd, Queens NY
Sheikh Ibrahim Negm spoke about the burning of the Embassy in Syria and
throughout the Middle East in regard to the cartoons. Negm condemned the
cartoon and stated that it has led to a lot of violence and that many unexpected
things might occur because of this.
3
02/04/06: Dar Al Dawa Mosque, 35-13 23rd Avenue, Queens, NY.
Dr. Faragalla Abouatattalled the prayer, then spoke about the cartoons, stating
that this has happened before. The source provided a flyer that contained a letter
voicing outrage over the cartoons, which provided addresses to send the letter
(Prime Minister of Denmark etc) and a link to the letter:
www.glexim.com/letter.htm.
02/03/06: Masjid Alfalah 42-12 National Street, Corona, N.Y.
The source reported that Zia Paracha lead the prayer service and spoke about the
cartoons; how disrespectful it is to Muslims for the artist to even depicting
Mohamed in a picture. Paracha advised those in attendance to speak out and
condemn the European media, but not to resort to violence.
02/03/06: Muslim Center Of New York 137-58 Geranium Avenue, Flushing, N.Y.
Mohammad Tariq Sherwani led the prayer service and urged those in
attendance to participate in a demonstration at the United Nations on Sunday
(02112/06). Sherwani explained that the demonstration is to express outrage at
the cartoons. Sherwani also announced that a guest speaker from Boston, Malik
Farooq, will be leading the Jumaa prayer service next Friday as well as
participating in the demonstration at the U.N.
02/03/06: Allman Mosque 24-30 Steinway Street, Corona, NY
Samy Massoud conducted the service and discussed the cartoons, stating, "They
call it freedom of speech and I call it freedom of disgust, low manners and filthy
behaviors." He continued that one could boycott them by not purchasing their
products and to contact politicians.
02/03/06: Makki Mosque, 1089 Coney Island Avenue, Brooklyn, NY
Iman Sabir talked about the cartoons, stating it was wrong to print that sort of
negativity about Mohammed and the Muslim faithful. The Imam asked all the
worshippers that on Friday, February 10, 2006 at 1400 hrs to attend a peaceful
protest in front of the Makki Mosque.
02/03/06: ICCNY 17113rd Avenue, New York NY.
Imam Omar Abu Namous told stories of the Muhammad, stating that the
Prophet was a man of good character, adding that the cartoons are an insult to all
Muslims and he asked all the attendees to support the current boycott against
European nations.
02/03/06: Jamaica Muslim Center, 85-37 168 Street, Jamaica NY
At approximately 13lOhrs a few members of the Jamaica Muslim Center Board
addressed the crowd about the cartoons, stating that it should be condemned and
the artist and the foreign press should be blamed for publishing it.
Imam Shamsi Ali brought up the topic of the cartoon, condemning them. He
announced a rally that was to take place on Sunday (02/05/06) near the United
Nations. He asked that everyone to attend if possible and reminded everyone to
keep their poise if they can make it.
4
02/03/2006: Makki Mosque, 1089 Coney Island Avenue, Brooklyn, NY.
Hafiz Sabir talked about the cartoons, stating that he is very angry and asked all
worshippers to join him in the protest rally that will take place in front of Makki
Masjid following the Juma prayer on Friday February 10th. He informed that
other mosques in NYC area have been sent an invitation for this protest.
Afterward, Sabir also announced that there will also be a protest on Sunday,
February 5th from 1100 to 1300hrs in front of the United Nations. He stated a
bus will leave from the mosque for any females that would like to attend. Males
will have to find their own transportation to the event.
02/02/06: ICCNY, 17113rd Avenue, New York, NY.
Imam Shamsi Ali stated that the cartoons portraying Muhammad with explosives
in his turban are insulting Islam and they are insulting all Muslims. He added that
we should support the current boycott against products from these countries.
01/30/2006: Iqra Mosque, 35-53 73
rd
St., Jackson Heights, NY
Meeting with Islamic Thinkers Society
Akbar Khattak talked about the cartoons, stating some groups in Denmark are
planning to desecrate the Quran in public. Khattak added that some naive
Muslims think these kinds of actions by non Muslims are against Islam but in
reality these actions are helping non Muslims to read and learn about Islam in
great depth.
5
Danish Cartoon Chronology
September 17,2005: Politiken, a Danish newspaper, reports that Kaare Bluitgen, a
writer, cannot find an illustrator for a book about the life of Muhammad, because artists
fear reprisals from Islamic extremists.
September 30, 2005: In response, lyllands-Posten, a right of centre newspaper, asks
artists to draw Muhammad as they imagine him and publishes 12 cartoons of the prophet.
October 14, 2005: Up to 5,000 people stage a protest outside the offices of lyllands-
Posten.
October 19,2005: Ambassadors from ten Muslim countries request a meeting with
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danish Prime Minister, over the cartoons. He refuses to
meet them.
November-December 2005: A delegation from Danish Islamic groups visit the Middle
East to spread publicity about the cartoons. Rumors circulate and additional images, not
originally published in lyllands-Posten, are attributed to the newspaper
January 10,2006: Cartoons reprinted by Magazinet, a Norwegian Christian newspaper
January 26, 2006: Saudi Arabia recalls its ambassador and initiates boycott of Danish
goods.
January 27, 2006: Thousands denounce the cartoons during Friday prayers in Iraq.
January 28, 2006: The Denmark-based Arla Dairy Group places adverts in Middle
Eastern newspapers to try to stop boycott of its produce.
January 29, 2006: lyllands-Posten prints a statement in Arabic saying the drawings were
published in line with freedom of expression and not a campaign against Islam.
Palestinians burn Danish flags and Libya announces it will close its embassy in Denmark.
Danes told to be vigilant in the Middle East.
January 30, 2006: EU says it will take World Trade Organization action if the boycott
persists. Masked gunmen in storm EU office in Gaza.
January 31, 2006: Danish Imams accept statements from lyllands-Posten and the Prime
Minister, and say are surprised at the extent of the protests. Saudi hospitals refuse to buy
Danish insulin.
February 1,2006: Newspapers in Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands published one or
more of the cartoons. France Soil' publishes all 12 and a new cartoon of its own. The
editor is fired by the newspaper's French-Egyptian owner. Syria withdraws ambassador to
Denmark.
6
February 2, 2006: Gunmen repeated protests in Gaza. Mr Rasmussen appears on AI-
Arabiya, a Saudi news network, to try and calm situation. The Jordanian newspaper AI-
Shihan prints the drawings - the editor is sacked, and ordered to apologize. Peter
Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, says the boycott must end.
February 3, 2006: The International Association of Muslim Scholars calls for a "day of
anger" across the world. 50,000 protest in Gaza. Muslims outside the Danish Embassy in
London call for execution of those who insult Islam. EI Pais, Spain's leading newspaper,
reprints a drawing, which shows the prophet made of words saying: "I must not draw
Muhummad".
February 4, 2006: Mobs in Damascus attack the Norwegian, Danish, Swedish and
French embassies but are beaten off by riot police. Protesters, including a man dressed as
a suicide bomber, gather for a second day in London.
February 5, 2006: Demonstrators set fire to the Danish Embassy in Beirut,
overwhelming Lebanese security forces. A protester dies, and America and Lebanon
blame Syrians for the riot. The Lebanese Interior Minister offered his resignation. Around
4,000 protest in Afghanistan. Iran withdraws its ambassador from Copenhagen.
February 6, 2006: Protester killed in Afghanistan as demonstrations take place in Kabul
and the city of Mihtarlam. Crowds gather in Srinigar, the capital of Kashmir, and three
cities in Indonesia. Pressure mounts in London to prosecute protesters for inciting
violence.
Feb. 7, 2006: Several hundred protesters, some armed, storm the NATO base in
Maymana, the headquarters of a provincial reconstruction team of about 100 Norwegian
and Finnish troops. Three Afghans are killed in the melee.
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen calls the unrest over the caricatures a
"growing global crisis." "I want to appeal and reach out to all people and countries in the
Muslim world. Let us work together in the spirit of mutual respect and tolerance," he
says.
Feb. 8, 2006: The Ulama Council, a leading group of Islamic clerics, calls for an end to
violent demonstrations. The Council stated, "We condemn the cartoons but this does not
justify violence".
Police fire into the air to disperse hundreds of protesters outside the U.S. military base in
Qalat, Afghanistan. Police then fire into the crowd killing four and wounding 20.
H(.'Pon by .. : __
S\lpervisor: _--
Carlool) CJllnllojngy
7
N.Y.P.D.
SECRET

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS N.Y.P.D SECRET. IT
IS INTENDED FOR OFFICIAL POLICE USE ONLY.

INTELLIGENCE
NOTE

NOTE: NO PORTION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE
COPIED OR DISTRIBUTED TO OTHER THAN THE
ABOVE WITHOUT THE EXCLUSIVE PERMISSION
OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER OR THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER - INTELLIGENCE.

N.Y.P.D.
SECRET
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS UNIT
October 16, 2006
Subject 1: DD5s referencing 10/11/06 plane crash into building at 524 E. 72
nd
Street
Following the 10/11/06 plane crash into 524 E. 72
nd
Street, New York, NY, we have been
monitoring DD5s for references to said event. From date of event until today, five DD5s
were submitted that contained references to the plane crash.
Four of the five DD5s reference remarks either of the "did-you-hear" variety, statements
of regret or expressions of relief that it was an accident and not an act of terrorism which,
it was feared, would draw negative attention upon the Muslim world and Muslim
community. A fifth DD5 (46822) features an individual who appears notably stirred up
by the news of the crash. Following are the itemized references:
Reports detailing general chatter, statements of regret and expressions of relief:
NYOI-0000046779, 10/12/2006, Brooklyn Islamic Center (M-21)
o CI noted chatter among the regulars expressing relief and thanks to God that
the crash was only an accident and not an act of terrorism, which they stated
would not be good either for the U.S. or for any of their home countries.
NYOI-0000046840, 10/13/2006, Al Khoei Islamic Center, Queens (M-I8; 53/05)
o CI stated that after prayers, Imam Alsahlani spoke to worshippers ahout
the plane crash and called on all Muslims to thank God that it was an
accident and not terrorist-related. The Imam added that the Muslim
religion does not need any more negative association with terrorism.
NYOI-0000046731, 10/12/2006, Al-Tawheed Islamic Center, Jersey City (08/03)
o UC reported that after a regular at the mosque told two worshippers of the
news, the worshippers' reaction was "that of sorrow." UC further
indicated that the worshippers made remarks to the effect that "it better be
an accident; we don't need any more heat."
NYOl-0000046842, 10/13/2006, Masjid Alfalah, Corona, NY (M-l1; 08/03)
o Mosque member _ asked UC if he heard about the plane crash. UC
replied in the affirmative. No further discussion ensued and the two then
proceeded to other activities.
o After service _ introduced UC to mosque member _
who presented himself to UC as a first officer/copilot for
They talked about his schedule and what
airport he is based out of
Report featuring individual who appears agitated after .,.Hl .... ., ....
NYOI-0000046822, Al Taqwa Mosque and
o Upon hearing of the crash, Sheik Uthman (active mosque member)
immediately got on his cell phone. In discussions with CI about the
possibility of another attack, DD5 states that "Uthman told CI he was not
aware that something might happen." Uthman also warned the source not
to go into Manhattan that . until it was clear what was going on.
He would asking the source if he had any further
news about the incident, and for the remainder of the day was observed
taking and receiving numerous calls. Phone dump will be conducted on
subject's phone for that day and time period.
In summary, there is no known chatter indicating either happiness over the crash, regret
that it was not a terrorist attack, or interest in carrying out an attack by similar method.
That said, the investigator has stated that a follow up will be conducted on the individual
referenced in DD-5 (46822).
Subject 2: Targets of intelligence investigations who possess pilot's licenses/flying
experience:
There are two known subjects of intelligence investigations who possess flying
experience and/or a pilot's license:

Last known address:
Other addresses:

US Status: Citizen
DMV State: NY
A TECS check did not reveal whether subject is still in.
Subject frequents shooting ranges and has made references to
killing Jews, whites, and the Danish publisher of cartoons of the
Prophet Mohammed
Organization Associations:

-- Association unknown
US Status: Out of US
Organization Associations:

-- Association unknown

Former fighter pilot
Currently out of U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION COORDINATOR
Deputy Commissioner's Briefing
Friday, 25 April 08
TIU/ Sean Bell Verdict Update (Lt | Thurs 24 Apr 08, 2038 Hours):
TIU has reached out to all our sources and advised them to be alert to any rhetoric
re: the Sean Bell verdict. TIU is especially concerned with and keying on our
convert mosques i.e. Ikhwa, Taqwa, Iqquamatideen and MIB (Mosque of Islamic
Brotherhood). TIU tasked CI TrueMaster to contact HI, a subject that the
CI encountered last week atHHHan(* who spoke tothe CI about getting
involved with the New Black Panther Party (DD5#78628). This info was passed
ontoHIHI ^d we are inthe process of identifying this subject. NSTR todate
re: Bell verdict.
SSU / OP# 206 Update (Sgt| |, Thurs, 24Apr 08,1507 Hours):
OP# 206 received an email from the Peoples Justice for Community Control and
Police Accountability calling for a rally and speak-out on April 25 at 1730 hours
in front of the Queens District Attorney's office located at 125-01 Queens Blvd.,
Kew Gardens, NY; coinciding with the verdict of the Sean Bell trial.
Endorsers of this email include the War Resisters League, Desis Rising Up and
Moving(DRUM), Free Mumia Abu-Jamal Coalition NYC, May lsl Coalitionand
the International Action Center (IAC) to name a few.
Unknown number of potential demonstrators.
Website listed for further information: www.peoplesjustice.org and
www.mvspace.com/peoplesiustice.
SSU / OP#197 Update (Sgt| |, Thurs, 24Apr 08,2010Hours):
OP# 197 attended the People's Summit New Orleans from April 20 thru April 22,
2008 located throughout various locations of the greater New Orleans, LA area.
Approximately 75 - 100 individuals attendedfromvarious US cities including
NYC, LA, San Francisco and New Orleans.
"The Friends of Brad Will" was mentionedin conjunction with many Mexican
activist groups who will be trying to remove the Governor of Oaxaca, Mexico
from office as well as denounce the Security and Prosperity Partnership Plan. The
group plans a series of demonstrations in Mexico and across the United States
with the support of the Brad Will Movement to force the governor to resign.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
The Associated Press has redacted information that couldidentifyundercover officers, informants and criminal targets
Some of these groups include: United States Marxist-Lenin Party, Mexican
Action Network and Critical Resistance New Orleans Chapter.
Activists from the Jena Coalition and Critical Resistance were in attendance and
presented several documentaries based on the alleged racial profiling and the
alleged injustices that people of color faced across the country by their respective
police departments. The New York Chapter of the Critical Resistance is located
at 976 Longwood Ave Bronx, NY.
Critical Resistance was formerly located on Atlantic Ave near Clinton Ave
(confines of the 77 Pet) and at the time was being lead by Ashanti Alston (former
Black Panther and Animal Rights Activist). The group hosted events prior to the
2004 Republican National Convention and was raided by the NYPD for selling
alcohol to minors.
Members from the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement NYC Chapter along with
Critical Resistance and members of the Sean Bell family will attend the outcome
of the Sean Bell case as well as a demonstration scheduled for Friday April 25,
2008. The demonstration will be held at the Queens DA's office located at 125-01
Queens Boulevard to await the judge's verdict.
May Day (May 1, 2008) rallies will be held in some of the following cities across
the United States: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Boston and New
York City. The rally in New York City will take place from 1200 to 1600 hours
at Union Square. The rally will focus on an end to the ICE deportations of
immigrant families, workplace raids taking place across the United States and the
Anti-war movement.
Marisa Franco, a former member of the Ruckus Society based out of Oakland, CA
was present at the conference. Ms. Franco has moved to New York City and she
will be organizing the May Day demonstrations along with the International
Action Center and her not-for-profit organization, Domestic Worker United based
in New York City.
One workshop was led by Jordan Flaherty, former member of the International
Solidarity Movement Chapter in New York City. Mr. Flaherty is an editor and
journalist of the Left Turn Magazine and was one of the main organizers of the
conference. Mr. Flaherty held a discussion calling for the increase of the
divestment campaign of Israel and mentioned two events related to Palestine.
There may be a counter demonstration by a Palestinian organization held near
Washington Square Park on May 8, 2008 against the 60 year independence of
Israel.
The Associated Press has redacted information that could identify undercover officers, informants and criminaltargets
The second counter demonstration pertains to the celebration of the Nakba
(destruction) being held at the Civic Center of San Francisco. The Palestine Right
to Return Coalition (AL-AWDA) is sponsoring the event to be held on May 10,
2008.
SSU / OP# 197 Update (Sgt | |, Thurs 24 Apr 08,1429 Hours):
OP# 197 will be participating in the "Times Up" Critical Mass Bike Ride on
Friday, April 25, 2008 at 1900 hours starting at Union Square (13 Pet.). OP# 197
was invited to attend the Bike Ride, as well as attend the after party at the "Times
Up" headquarters. The event has been known to produce approximately 150 - 250
riders depending on weather conditions.
SSU/OP# 218 Update (Lt J Thurs 24 Apr 08,2208 Hours):
OP# 218 will be attending a weekend seminar 04/25/2008 - 04/27/2008 entitled
"Al Wala Wa'l Bara, which side are you on" taught by Shadeed Muhammad
(Graduate of the Islamic University of Medina); to be held at Montclair State
University. OP# 218 will be attending with
and ^HHHHI|^|. The event schedule is asfollows:
Friday 04/25/2008 1930 hrs to 2200 hrs
Saturday 04/26/2008 0900 hrs to 1630 hrs
Sunday 04/27/2008 0900 hrs to 1530 hrs
SSU / OP# 237 Update (Det |, Thurs 24 Apr 08,1615 Hours):
OP# 237 did leave on a Whitewater Rafting trip Monday, April 21, 2008 and
returned Wednesday night April 23, 2008.
The trip was hosted by the EXTREMEGOERS -CCNY SPORTS GROUP; which
is essentially run by the MSO.
On Monday April 21, 2008, OP# 237 was met by |
|, and was driven in|
to meet the rest of the group in front of the Masjid Nur Al-Islam, 21 Church Ave,
Brooklyn, N.Y.
There were 19 participants in attendance and they utilized their own private
vehicles for transportation. Their original destination was Moose River located in
Old Forge, N.Y. and was later changed North Creek, located in North River N.Y.
Participants camped at this location.
The Associated Press has redacted informationthat could identifyundercover officers, informants and criminal targets
OP# 237 noted the following individuals (KTD) did attend:
Jawad Rasol Quereshi (ALM)
- Ahmed Gamea (CCNY-MSO Pres.)
- Majed Alkady (CCNY-MSO Treasurer)
- Taha Abdulla (CCNY-MSO Vice Pres.)
- Ali Ahmed(CCNY-MSO Pres. Extremegoers)
OP# 237 stated that tliere were additional participants that attended who were
present and former members of the CCNY-MSO.
OP# 237 stated that it appeared that Ali Ahmed was in charge and did orchestrate
the events.
In addition to the regularly scheduled events (Rafting), the group prayed at least
four times a day, and much of the conversation was spent discussing Islam and
was religious in nature.
The Associated Press has redacted informationthat could identifyundercover officers, informants and criminal targets
IriJP< m$?
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1/16/13 Mayar Bloomberg Defends NYPD Intelligence-Gathering On Muslim Communities Across Northeast
UlTTOS'TLIVE
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January 16, 20:1.3
KS? NEW YORK
Mayor Bloomberg Defends NYPD Intelligence-Gathering On
Muslim Communities Across Northeast
BvDAVID B.CARUSO 02/24/12 06:20PMETAssociated Press
NEWYORK- New York's mayor served notice Friday that his police department will do everything in its power to root out terrorists in the
U.S., even ifit means sending officers outside the citylimitsor placing law-abiding Muslims under scrutiny.
"We just cannot let our guard down again," Mayor Michael Bloomberg warned.
The mayor laid out his doctrine for keeping the city safe during his weekly radio show following a week of criticism of a secret police
department effort to monitor mosques in several cities and keep files on Muslim student groups at colleges in Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania and upstate NewYork.
Several college administrators and politicians have complained that the intelligence-gathering - exposed in a series of stories by The
Associated Press - pried too deeply into the lives of innocent people.
Withabout 1,000 officers dedicated to intelligence and counterterrorism, the NewYorkPolice Department has one of the most aggressive
domestic intelligence operations inthe U.S. Its methods have stirred debate in legal circles over whether it has crossed the line and violated
the civil liberties of Muslims.
In perhaps his most vigorous defense yet of some of the NYPD's anti-terrorism efforts, Bloomberg said it is "legal," "appropriate" and
"constitutional" for police to keep a close eye on Muslim communities that terrorists might use as a base to strike the city. And he said
investigators must pursue "leads and threats wherever they come from," even across state lines.
"Itwouldjust be naive to thinkwe should stop following threats when theyget to the border," Bloomberg said.
Inthe past few days, the department has come under fire fromuniversityofficialsand others, includingthe president of Yale University, after
the AP revealed that police agents had monitored Muslim student groups around the Northeast and had sent an undercover agent on a
Whitewater rafting trip with some college students.
More criticismcame from publicofficials in NewJersey after another AP report detailed a secret effort by the NYPD to photograph every
mosque in Newark and catalog Muslim businesses.
That operation was an extension of a similar tracking effort within New York's city limits. Plainclothes officers swept through Muslim
neighborhoods, photographing mosques and eavesdropping on businesses. Informants reported on what they heard inside mosques,
including the sermons. Police monitored and kept files on Muslims who Americanized their names. They also infiltrated Muslim student
groups.
Critics have said it isn't appropriate for the police to spy on citizens withoutreason to believe they committed a crime.
The American CivilLiberties Union issued a statement Friday accusing the NYPD of turningthe city into a "surveillance state."
Faiza Patel, co-director of a civil rights program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NewYork University's law school, said guidelines in
federal court rulings do not allow the department to hold on to files detailing the conversations of mosque worshippers "unless the
information relates to potential terrorist or criminal activity."
Rep. Rush Holt, a New Jersey Democrat, questioned why the NYPD was assembling volumes of information on people who weren't
suspected of breaking any laws.
"It's bad policing. It's profiling, fishing expeditions. They'relooking around saying, 'Surely in this communitythere must be bad people. If we
look long enough, we'll find them,'" Holt said.
Columbia University's president, Lee Bollinger, wrote an open letter Fridaysaying the NYPD shouldn't have been monitoringthe websites of
Muslim student groups at the school unless one of them had been suspected of a crime. Bollingersaid the government's tactics could have
a "chilling effect' on free speech and association.
"Such an intrusionintothe normal,dailyactivities of our students raises deeply troubling questions that should concern us all," said Bollinger,
a First Amendment scholar and former lawschool dean.
wwv.huffingtonpostcom/2012/G2/2&^ 1/2
1/16/13 Mayor Bloomberg Defends NYPD Intelligence-Gathering On Muslim Communities Across Northeast
AnumAhmed, an undergraduate student at New YorkUniversity, said at a roundtable discussion Friday that she feels nervous nowwhen
doing simple things, like online research for her Arabic class.
"Even looking up words on Google Translate,'*she said. 'Tmthinking, like, the NYPDis surveillingwhat I'msearching on the Internet."
Ahmed said she even feels frightened talking on the phone to her mother. "Sometimes I'm like, 'Should Ibe saying this out loud?" she said.
"Idon't feel like Cm protected. Tmbeing watched. And there's a big difference between the two."
Bloomberg said the NYPD would continue to do "everything that the law permits us to do" to detect terrorists operating in the U.S. before
they have a chance to act.
He warned of dire consequences if the city fails to detect plots, citing the 9/11 attacks and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,
which was carried out by followers of Omar Abdel-Rahman, a radical sheik who recruited jihadists from Brooklyn mosques.
"We are not going to repeat the mistakes that we made after the 1993 bombing," the mayor said. "We cannot slack in our vigilance. The
threat was real. The threat is real. The threat is not going away."
Newark Mayor Corey Booker was among several New Jersey officials who said they were surprised and concerned to learn that the NYPD
had broadly monitored Muslims and mosques in that state.
Bloomberg acknowledged that Booker himself hadn't been briefed by the NYPD, but said the Newark police department had been informed.
Inany case, he said, it is "100 percent legal" for city police officers to operate in other states.
"You have to also remember an awful lot of the 9/11 hijackers stayed in New Jersey for extended periods of time, training, planning their
attacks," Bloomberg said.
Online:
Copyright 2013 The Local Paper. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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Jethro Eisenstein
NewYork, NY 10006
Dear Mr. Eisenstein:
December 12, 2012
Rosemarie Maldotwdo
Assistant Vice President and Counsel
899 Tenth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
T. 212.237.8911
F. 212.237-8607
rinaldonado@jjay.cuny.edu
Setforth belowis the College's response toyour December 5, 2012 request underthe NewYork
FreedomofInformation Lawfor acopy ofstatements made by the College concerning media
reports that an NYPD informant conducted surveillance of the MuslimStudent Associationat
John Jay. The following documents are attached:
October 23, 2012 Statement issued byPresident JeremyTravis
October 25, 2012 StatementissuedbyPresident JeremyTravis
Pleasecontact me if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
^^^(7/^
Rosemarie Maldonado
The City
University
of
New York
Statement of Jeremy Travis, President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice
John Jay College recently became aware of allegations that John Jay's Muslim studentsand public events
sponsoredby the College's Muslim Student Association have been the subjects of surveillance activities.
We have not beeninformed bylaw enforcement of any such surveillance activities onourcampus. Asan
academic institution, we are committed to the free expression of ideas and to creating asafe learning
environment for all of our students. We are working closely with our Muslimstudents to affirmtheir
rights and to reassure them that we support their organization and freedom to assemble.
10/23/12
Jeremy Travis
President
899 TeathAvemts
xewmtrk, XY 20019
r. 313~33rS600
To the John Jay College Community:
Youmayhaveread the recent Associated Press story and subsequent media reports regarding
allegations of surveillance onourcampus. I write to share my thoughts onthis important matter.
John Jayis firmly committed to fostering anacademic environment that vigorously promotes freedom
of expression and protects the free exchange of ideas. As an educational institution dedicated to the
ideal of justice, John Jay is particularly committed tocreating acommunity of mutual respect where our
memberscanvoice adiversity of opinions without fear. Any surveillance practices that interfere with
constitutionally protected activities such as free speech, freedomof association and the freeexerciseof
religion must be considered inconsistent withthe mission and values of ourCollege.
Earlier thismonth, representatives oftheJohn Jay Muslim Student Association (MSA) came tomy
office to report aFacebook posting by astudent from another college claiming that he hadbeen, but
nolonger was, a police informant assigned to monitor JohnJay's MSA studentsandspeakers at MSA
events. The College had not been informedby lawenforcement of anysuchsurveillance activities
and I was very concerned tohear ofthese claims. Weimmediately assured MSA thattheCollege
supportedtheir rightto assembly andfree speech, andwiththe club's consent, provided additional
security for an MSAevent the next evening. Following this incident, Student Affairs and Public
Safety have continued towork closely with MSA torespond totheir concerns and support their
activities.
I wasdeeply troubledto read arecent press report in which anNYPD spokesperson confirmed that
thestudent involved intheFacebook assertions had infact been an informant. I trustthatyou would
agree that, incertain limited circumstances it isappropriate for law enforcement agencies to use
informantsto uncover criminal activity. There is no evidence, however, that this is the caseat John
Jay and wehave not beenadvised otherwise. We have faith inourstudents andit is particularly
important that John Jay's students, the brightleaders of our future, canengage in freedom of
expression. We will continueto promotethese valuesandto protectthe centralroleof academic
institutions in our society. In the near future, I will conveythese concernsto the NYPD on behalf of
our community.
Jeremy Travis
President
- X
ALEX McKEIVER, SHABA OM, CURTIS : 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH)
A. SEGAL, MICHAEL ZUMOFF, :
KENNETH THOMAS, ROBERT RUSCH,
ANETTE T. RUBENSTEIN, MICHEY
SHERIDAN, JOE SUCHER, STEVEN
FISCHLER, HOWARD BLATT and :
ELLIE BENZONE, on behalf ofthemselves
and all others similarly situated, :
Plaintiffs,
-against-
WILLIAM H.T. SMITH, ARTHUR
WILLIAM KNAPP, PATRICK
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
employees of the Police Department acting
Defendants. :
- X
LINDA SARSOUR, for her declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746, states as
follows:
1.1 am the executive director of the Arab American Association of New York,
located at 7111 Fifth Avenue in Brooklyn. The Arab American Association of New York
is a non-profit social service and advocacy organization serving the Arab immigrant and
Arab-American community in New York City. I make this statement to explain some of
the effects that the awareness of systematic police surveillance has had on me and on
members of the Muslim community with whom my organization works.
2.1 am constantly aware that my organization and Muslim institutions are subject
to infiltration by informers. In January of 2011, a man came to my office who claimed to
be a Palestinian; he was vague about his immigration status. He asked about the
political orientation of the organization. He asked about our youth program, and in
connection with that he asked if the program was a "deradicalization" program. I
decided that he was probably a police informant and declined to discuss these things
with him.
3. As a result of this and similar experiences, and reports of police infiltration in
the community, I am suspicious of persons who volunteer to work for my organization. I
feel that we cannot just accept persons who volunteer at face value, but we must
investigate to be sure that they are in good faith. My organization has an associate
director who speaks Arabic but is not Muslim. Two months ago he interviewed a man in
his twenties who said he was Egyptian; he was well-dressed and spoke Arabic. He said
that he was willing to work with us as a volunteer, and said he could work at any time
and had plenty of time available. I had to caution the associate director that we needed
to get a written application from this man and inquire into his background before we
could accept his help. I am informed that other organizations that work with Muslims are
similarly suspicious of volunteers.
4. People in the community experience a generalized suspicion of persons they
do not know, that they might turn out to be informants. At a recent celebration of the end
of Ramadan, held at the Dyker Beach Golf Course in Brooklyn, uniformed police were
present, representatives of the office of community affairs. A man from the community
asked me why they were there, and I explained that relations with the local police are
cooperative and friendly. The man said that when he is at the Mosque, he does not
know who is praying there. He said, "I don't know whether the guy praying next to me is
an informer or not." I told him I could not reassure him that people in the Mosque might
not be informers.
5. Recently my organization held a community conversation, hosted jointly with
the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), concerning problems of police
surveillance and law enforcement. One question that was raised was "What do you
think of when you think of the police?" One young woman drew a picture of a large eye
and explained it by saying, "When I think of the New York police, I think of a person
watching every move I make." A girl student said she was confused, because she no
longer knew whether the police were there to protect her or not. There was discussion
of Shamiur Rahman, who had just recently been revealed as a police informer.. One
young man said that he had spent time hanging out with Rahman, and he felt betrayed
by him.
6. There is suspicion in Muslim Student Associations (MSA's) as well. At Hunter
College, outside the door to the office of the MSA, there is a sign that says, "Please
refrain from political convos in the MSA. Read this to see why." The sign had arrows
that pointed to an article about NYPD surveillance by Len Levitt.
7. In short, the awareness of police surveillance has produced suspicion as
between people in the community, has produced caution and suspicion in organization,
and a sense of being watched constantly by the authorities.
I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on
](m^\ 1^ 2013
Linda Sarsour
- X
ALEX McKEIVER, SHABA OM, CURTIS : 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH)
A. SEGAL, MICHAEL ZUMOFF, :
KENNETH THOMAS, ROBERT RUSCH,
ANETTE T. RUBENSTEIN, MICHEY :
SHERIDAN, JOE SUCHER, STEVEN
FISCHLER, HOWARD BLATT and :
ELLIE BENZONE, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, :
Plaintiffs, :
-against-
SPECIAL SERVICES DIVISION, a/k/a :
WILLIAM H.T. SMITH, ARTHUR :
WILLIAM KNAPP, PATRICK :
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, :
employees ofthe Police Department acting :
Defendants.
x
FAIZA ALI, for her declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746, states as follows:
1.1 am the advocacy and civic engagement coordinator for the Arab American
Association of New York, located at 7111 Fifth Avenue in Brooklyn. I have been employed there
since October, 2012, and I was formerly employed at Brooklyn Congregations United. I was
employed at the New York chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) from
2005 to 2011.1 make this statement to explain some ofthe effects that awareness of systematic
1
police surveillance has had on me and on members of the Muslim community with whom I work.
2. Linda Sarsour explains in her statement in paragraph 3 that our organization is very
cautious in using volunteers. I think this is true of other organizations that work with Muslims.
When I worked at CAIR, the organization was very careful in using volunteers for fear of
informers.
3. It has been my experience that students and other young people, and their parents, are
intimidated by the awareness of police surveillance, and frightened of its effects. In February of
2012,1 went to a meeting of the Muslim Student Association (MSA) at NYU, with a speaker
from CAIR and another from the National Lawyers Guild. The students were asked to group
themselves, to go to one side of the room or the other, to show whether they were comfortable
with questions that were raised. One of the questions was, "Do you feel comfortable going to the
MSA after you know about the police surveillance?" A large number of students went to the side
of the room that expressed their apprehension. Several students at the meeting also said that their
parents were very concerned, that their parents did not want their children to participate in any
public political activities.
4. In November, 2012, the Jamaica Muslim Center held a town hall meeting with the New
York City Police. The idea was to express support of the police in connection with the Muslim
community. One speaker said that people had nothing to fear from the police if they were not
doing anything wrong, and he criticized those Muslims who object to the police tactics. I went
there to hand out leaflets and to carry a small sign that said "Walking While Black and Praying
While Muslim is Not a Crime." There was a young woman who was helping me prepare before
the town hall meeting, making leaflets and signs. She said to me that her mother had forbidden
her to go to the meeting because she was frightened of the police. The young woman said she
could help behind the scenes, in making the signs, but that it was impossible for her to go to the
meeting because of the prohibition.
5. In short, my experience is that young people and their parents are very apprehensive
about police surveillance, and they are afraid to take action against it or to protest publicly
because oftheir fear of the possible consequences.
I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, Executed on
MUA^/'V013
Faiza AH
1
------------------------------------------

ZUMOFF, KENNETH THOMAS, ROBERT RUSCH, 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH)
BLATT, ELLIE BENZONI, on behalf of DECLARATION OF
themselves and all others similarly PAUL G. CHEVIGNY
situated,

Plaintiffs,

-against-


Defendants.

------------------------------------------

PAUL G. CHEVIGNY, for his declaration pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1746, states as follows:
1. I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiff class in
this action, hereinafter referred to as Class Counsel. I
make this declaration in support of the motion of the
plaintiff class for the relief described below in paragraph 8.
2

Introduction

2. The prior decisions of the Court in this case,
summarized in Handschu X, 679 F.Supp.2d 488 (2010), resolved
a core question in the case,
determin[ing] a crucial relationship
between Class Counsel and the NYPD
under the Guidelines, namely, Class
Counsel's ability to inquire into
and challenge NYPD policies and the
NYPD's obligation to respond to such
inquiries and challenges, rather
than simply ignoring them.

3. The Guidelines empower[] Class Counsel to challenge
NYPD policies resulting in non-constitutional violations of
the Guidelines, and subject[] the NYPD to Class Counsel's
inquiries into police surveillance policies and potential
injunctive relief for the class and against the NYPD where
NYPD policies or practices violates the Guidelines. 679
F.Supp.2d at 496-7.
4. Class counsel have reason to believe that in its
surveillance and investigations of the Muslim communities that
form a part of the plaintiff class, the NYPD is violating the
Guidelines systematically and has been doing so at least since
2006. The violations fall broadly into two categories:
a. As a matter of policy, the NYPD visits and has
been visiting public places associated with Muslims, recording
information about political and religious activities, and
keeping records of such visits even though the records do not
3
relate to potential unlawful or terrorist activity. This
policy violates Sec.VIII(A)(2) of the Guidelines.
b. As a matter of policy, the NYPD infiltrates,
conducts undercover activities and secretly investigates
institutions and individuals associated with the Muslim
community, in the absence of reasonable indications of
unlawful or terrorist activity. This policy violates Sec. V(D)
of the Guidelines, which permits an investigation where there
is a reasonable indication of terrorism, and it violates
Sec. V(C), which permits a criminal investigation where there
is a reasonable indication of unlawful activity, as well as
Sec. V(B) concerning preliminary inquiries.
5. Beginning in the summer of 2011, a series of
articles by investigative journalists described pervasive
violations of the Handschu Guidelines, targeting the Muslim
communities in the New York Metropolitan Area. One of the
first of the stories
1
summarized the NYPD activities that
violated the Guidelines. According to this account, the
Intelligence Division of the NYPD assigned undercover officers
in a unit variously called the Demographics or Zone Assessment
Unit, to blend into ethnic neighborhoods and report on local
meeting places (Exhibit 1, pp.3-5). David Cohen, chief of the
Intelligence Division, is said to have wanted the squad to

1 With CIA help, NYPD built secret effort to monitor mosques, daily
life of Muslim neighborhoods, Associated Press, August 24, 2011(Ex.1).
4
rake the coals, looking for hot spots(Id. p.3); the officers
assigned to the unit became known as rakers. Records were
maintained based on the work of these officers. Furthermore,
the story reports that the NYPD organized a Terrorism
Interdiction Unit which recruited informers from mosques and
other institutions (Id. pp.5-6). Reports from informants and
officers were sent to a team of analysts in the Intelligence
Division.
6. Although the documents upon which the journalists
drew in Ex. 1 and other stories relate to conduct by the NYPD
in the past, the evidence described below in this declaration
will show that these practices continue. The breadth of the
operations described makes it apparent that these operations
have been undertaken as a matter of NYPD policy, and are not
isolated instances of abuse.
7. Invoking the authority established in Handschu X,
counsel for the plaintiff class sought discovery concerning
NYPD practices under the Guidelines. The NYPD agreed to
provide limited discovery on a voluntary basis, consisting of
a sampling of documents and a deposition of Assistant Chief
Inspector Thomas Galati, the head of the Intelligence
Division. This discovery was completed in the fall of 2012.

5
Relief Sought

8. The voluntary discovery provided by the NYPD, the
revelations made in articles published by the investigative
journalists, which continued during the discovery process, and
NYPD documents that have been made available to Class Counsel,
taken together, show that in relation to the Muslim
communities in New York, the NYPD is violating the Guidelines
as a matter of policy. Accordingly, on the basis of the facts
detailed below, the plaintiff class moves for the relief
summarized here:
a. An injunction against continuing the practice
of retaining records concerning visits to public places for
purposes of intelligence through the Zone Assessment Unit, the
Demographics Unit or any other unit of the NYPD where no
information has been obtained that relates to potential
unlawful or terrorist activity. Section VIII A (2) of the
Guidelines specifically provides that [n]o information
obtained from such visits shall be retained unless it relates
to potential unlawful or terrorist activity. The sampling of
documents produced by the NYPD in voluntary discovery
contained numerous accounts of conversations unrelated to
unlawful activity or terrorism, and Chief Galati acknowledged
that as a matter of policy, these entries are never excised.
b. An injunction against continuing the practice
of surreptitiously joining, visiting and infiltrating
6
organizations or institutions including organizations
associated with Islam, and keeping records of such
investigative activities, in the absence of reasonable
indications of terrorist or unlawful activity. The
declaration of Shamiur Rahman, Ex.2, recent statements by
Commissioner Kelly and others representatives of defendants,
together with the materials collected in paragraphs 19-26 and
43 of this declaration, show that the policy and practice
continues in violation of Sec. V(B), Sec. V(C) and V(D) of
the Guidelines.
c. An order appointing an independent auditor or
monitor to monitor NYPD obedience to the injunction and
compliance with Sec. V(B), Sec. V(C), V(D) and VIII (A)(2) of
the Guidelines. The auditor or monitor appointed under the
order must have access to all relevant data in the possession
of the NYPD, and make a periodic written report of its
findings to the court. The NYPD has deceived this Court and
counsel, as well as the public, concerning the character and
scope of its activities in violation of the Guidelines. In
light of this and other past conduct by the NYPD, such
oversight by the court becomes essential to the continuing
enforcement of the guidelines.

7

NYPD Retention of records concerning visits to public places

9. The NYPD has been and is systematically retaining
reports on visits to public places under circumstances where
the information does not relate to potential unlawful or
terrorist activity, in violation of section VIII (A)(2) of
the Guidelines. This conclusion emerges from the voluntarily-
produced NYPD documents examined by Class Counsel, from the
deposition of Assistant Chief Inspector Galati, and from an
undated NYPD document (Ex. 3) titled The Demographics Unit.
This document noted the personnel assigned to the unit and
language capabilities possessed by them and described their
task: to gather intelligence and report activity of
individual visits on a daily activity report focusing on key
indicators.
10. Class Counsel were permitted to examine but not to
copy daily activity reports from days chosen at random in
2006, 2010 and 2011, comprising some 1260 pages, all from the
Zone Assessment Unit (ZAU), the current name for the
Demographics Unit. The reports covered visits to 212 separate
places of business, mostly retail stores, restaurants and
cafes, many of which were visited repeatedly.
11. In the sample Class Counsel were permitted to
examine, officers assigned to the ZAU had recorded 31
conversations, mostly of a religious-political character,
8
concerning news items and matters of U.S. foreign relations
that were of interest to patrons of the establishments. These
reports were made by undercover officers on ZAU forms. In
addition to recording the conversations, the officers filled
out the form to record the ethnicity of visited
establishments owners and patrons, the presence of hookahs
and prayer areas, whether the establishment was frequented by
cab drivers, whether the owner and customers were Shia or
Sunni, the proximity of the establishment to other Muslim
institutions and level of rhetoric.
12. The conversations that the NYPD overheard and
recorded, some in Bengali or Urdu, included
a. a discussion between two men about a news
article reporting that a public service employee, who had been
fired for burning a copy of the Koran, was reinstated with
backpay. The men agreed that this result was unfair. One
asked the other rhetorically what would have happened to the
employee if he had burned a copy of the Bible;
b. a discussion between two men concerning a news
report that Imams in traditional garb had been barred by the
pilot from an airline flight, even though the Imams had been
carefully searched and cleared. The two men agreed that the
Imams would hardly have worn traditional Islamic garb if they
intended any improper action; one of the men was reported to
have said that Americans are clueless.
9
13. Since the sample of reports that we were permitted
to examine was small, yet yielded written reports about 31
such conversations having nothing to do with illegal activity
or terrorism, the thousands of daily ZAU reports we were not
permitted to see are likely to record similar information that
has nothing to do with illegal activity or terrorism.
14. On June 28, 2012, Class Counsel took the deposition
of Thomas Galati, an Assistant Chief Inspector in the NYPD and
Commanding Officer of the Intelligence Division; the questions
to him were limited to matters relating to compliance with
section VIII (A) (2) of the Guidelines. A copy of the
transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
2
Chief Galati
described the responsibilities of the unit:
The Demographic units
responsibilities were to collect
information on areas so that we can
identify countries of concern, where
there were people that were being
radicalized towards violence, Islamists
radicalized towards violence.

Galati p. 29.
15. He explained why the reports were and are being
retained:
The information in the Demographic
reports does have value. So, yes, it is
retained because the report itself
contains a lot of bits and pieces of
value, of intelligence value.

2 References in the form "Galati p.___" are to pages in the deposition
transcript. Pursuant to the agreement under which the depositions was
taken, and at the request of the NYPD, certain of Chief Galati's answers
have been redacted in the transcript attached hereto. An unredacted
transcript is being supplied to the Court under separate cover.
Galati, pp.98-99.
16. During the course of the deposition, Chief Galati
was questioned about conversations overheard by officers in
business establishments, and was asked what would justify
keeping the records in light of Section VIII (A)(2) of the
Guidelines. In particular, he was questioned about a report
from early 2006 from a particular grocery store, where
officers overheard a discussion in the Bengali language
concerning the U.S. President's State of the Union speech, in
which one of the speakers defended the U.S. government (Galati
pp.88-94). In response to a question whether the report
"related to potential unlawful or terrorist activity," Chief
Galati responded:
"I am taking the conversation
as a whole and I'm reading about two
^^^| people that are speaking in
VIHHI in a meat store. I find
value in that for several reasons.
This information is solely used for
the purpose of being able to
identify a location where I should
face a threat, where I'm facing a
threat of terrorist and that
terrorist isV^H^.
"This piece of information
would be valuable to me. I take it
as a whole. I take it as the
conversation. I take it as MH^
and that's what I feel is of value.
The sole purpose is for identifying
a location where I would find
somebody that was hiding who is a
terrorist from^HHB" [sic] .
(Galati pp.94-95; redacted per NYPD. See footnote 2).
10
11

17. There is nothing in this conversation or in the
conversations recounted in paragraph 12 that relates to
terrorist or unlawful activity so as to justify keeping a
record. This answer by Chief Galati says in effect that the
grocery is suspect as a haven for terrorists, and subject to
record retention, simply because the Bengali language is
spoken there.
18. Chief Galati testified that during his tenure as
Commanding Officer, since 2006, none of the information from
the Demographics Unit has been sufficient to trigger an
investigation (Galati p.97); that is to say, none of it was
viewed as having given rise to an indication of unlawful or
terrorist activity. Chief Galati also acknowledged that
information like the examples given above is retained as a
matter of policy. The reports of the ZAU officers are never
edited to excise information that does not relate to illegal
activity or terrorism. (Galati p. 129).
19. It was clear from Chief Galatis testimony, as well
as from Class Counsels examination of ZAU reports from 2010
and 2011, that the policy of keeping written reports
continues, in violation of Sec. VIII (A)(2) of the Guidelines.
Moreover, the NYPD has misrepresented to the public its
ongoing intelligence collection activities. On March 3, 2012,
Police Commissioner Ray Kelly gave a speech to Fordham Law
School alumni (Ex. 5), seeking to explain the NYPDs policies
12
of surveillance, which had come under criticism after the news
reports. The Commissioner discussed the Handschu Guidelines,
justifying the oversight of public places with these words:
This is what Handschu says about the broadest form of
intelligence gathering: The NYPD is authorized to visit any
place and attend any event that is open to the public.
Commissioner Kelly did not even mention the restriction on
keeping records of information obtained in such visits, the
purpose of which is to prevent the maintenance of records
regarding class members expression of political and social
views.

Infiltration and Investigation of Organizations
and Institutions_______________________________

20. In his speech of March 3, 2012 (Ex. 5), commenting
on criticisms of the NYPD for infiltrating mosques and student
groups, Commissioner Kelly assured his listeners that,
Undercover investigations
begin with leads, and we go where
the leads take us. As a matter of
Police Department policy, undercover
officers and confidential informants
do not enter a mosque unless they
are following up on a lead vetted
under Handschu . . . Likewise, when
we have attended a private event
organized by a student group, we
have done so on the basis of a lead
or investigation reviewed and
authorized in writing at the highest
levels of the department . . .

13
21. The evidence shows that this assurance is untrue.
Muslim student associations and mosques are infiltrated
without leads or indications of crime, as shown in the
attached declaration of Shamiur Rahman, executed on October
28, 2012 (Exhibit 2). Mr. Rahman was a confidential informant
for the NYPD between January and September, 2012.
3
In his
declaration he recounts being instructed to infiltrate mosques
and the John Jay College Muslim Student Association without
any indication of illegal activity. In fact his NYPD handler
specifically told him the NYPD had no reason to suspect
illegality at the John Jay College Muslim Student Association.
Mr. Rahman reports that the members of the association were
religious Muslims. According to his NYPD handler, the NYPD
considers being a religious Muslim a terrorism indicator.
22. Mr. Rahman was instructed to use what his NYPD
handler called a create and capture strategy, starting an
inflammatory conversation about jihad or terrorism and
captur[ing] the response to send to the NYPD. There was no
mention of following leads or guidance concerning indications
of crime.
23. The work of the informant Shamiur Rahman is no
isolated incident. It grows out of and continues a long-term
approach to policing adopted by the NYPD in connection with

3 Mr. Rahmans activities were first reported by the investigative
team from the AP, and NYPD Deputy Commissioner Paul Browne acknowledged
in an interview on WINS News Radio that Rahman was an NYPD confidential
informant.
14
investigations involving Muslims. That approach is based on a
model of pure intelligence-gathering concerning organizations,
places and persons connected to Islam, and not on a model of
investigations triggered by an indication or reasonable
indication of unlawful activity. This philosophy was
articulated in 2007 in the testimony of NYPD Assistant
Commissioner Larry Sanchez, formerly of the CIA and one of the
architects of the new approach at the NYPD, before the U.S.
Senate Homeland Security Committee
4
:
"The key to it was . . . to
start appreciating what most people
would say would be non-criminal
would be innocuous looking behaviors
that could easily be argued in a
Western Democracy especially in the
United States to be protected by
First and Fourth Amendment rights
but not to look at them in the
vacuum but to look across to them as
potential precursors to terrorism

24. The NYPD elaborated on the same approach in a 2007
document, Radicalization in the West: the Homegrown Threat
5
.
In this document, the NYPD asserts that it need not look for
any criminal predicate before initiating investigations:
There is no useful profile to
assist law enforcement or intelligence to
predict who will follow this trajectory
of radicalization. Rather, the
individuals who take this course begin as
unremarkable from various walks of
life, (Radicalization, pp.8 and 82)

4 Available online at http://hsgac.Senate.gov/public/audio
video/103007video.ram
5 Available online at www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/
documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. Hereinafter
"Radicalization"
15

* * *

the subtle and non-criminal nature
of behaviors involved in the process of
radicalization makes it difficult to
identify or even monitor from a law
enforcement standpoint. Taken in
isolation, individual behaviors can be
seen as innocuous; however, when seen as
part of the continuum of the
radicalization process, their
significance becomes more important.
Considering the sequencing of these
behaviors and the need to identify those
entering this process at the earliest
possible stage makes intelligence the
critical tool in helping to thwart an
attack or even prevent the planning of
future plots.(Radicalization, p.10)

25. In Radicalization, the NYPD treats mere association
with many Muslim groups as itself an indication of terrorism
and therefore a basis for investigation under the guidelines.
The document purports to describe a process of
radicalization, particularly through association with Salafi
Muslims, that it claims leads to terrorism. The NYPD is thus
asserting that adherence to a school of theology and
religious observance itself gives cause for investigation; in
the last analysis, as the passages quoted above in the
preceding paragraph show, the NYPD seeks intelligence about
16
those who associate with Salafi groups or institutions
regardless of indications of crime.
6

26. As Radicalization acknowledges, however, Salafi is
a generic term, depicting a Sunni revivalist school of thought
that takes the pious ancestors of the early period of early
Islam as exemplary models . . . [and] seek[s] to purge Islam
of outside influences . . . The Salafi interpretation of Islam
seeks a 'pure' society that applies the Quran literally . . .
(Radicalization, p.86). While some Salafis strive to achieve
this goal by violent means, the report recognizes that other
Salafi currents encourage non-violent missionary or political
activities to achieve these religious/political goals . . .
(Radicalization, p.17). Bernard Haykel, an expert on Islamic
law, Islamic political movements and the modern politics of
the Middle East, makes the same point in paragraph 3 of his
declaration, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
27. The approach taken by the NYPD is confirmed in
police documents that were made public with the news reports
during 2011 and 2012. Also revealed was a document entitled
NYPD Intelligence Division Strategic Posture 2006." (Ex. 7,
hereinafter SP). Class counsel understand the authenticity

6
The Radicalization document came under criticism from Muslims and
others who did not fail to see that the text tried to imply a strong
connection between Islam and terrorism. The criticism is reviewed in
Patel, Rethinking Radicalization(Brennan Center for Justice, 2011)
(available at www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/rethinking
radicalization) which shows that many students of terrorism did not share
the views in the NYPD report.
17
of this document is not disputed. This 112-page document
7

summarizes infiltration and oversight of several categories of
Muslim-oriented organizations, including extremist groups,
Muslim Student Associations, NGOs, mosques and hot spots.
28. The approach for each of these categories is all-
encompassing; the surveillance does take in some Muslim groups
associated with violence, but it includes others known to be
peaceable. The character of some of the organizations is clear
from the police documents themselves; as far as possible, we
make use of the police descriptions. More complete
descriptions for some organizations are set forth in the
accompanying declaration of Bernard Haykel (Ex.6).

Extremist Groups

29. The SP brands twenty-one organizations as Extremist
Groups (SP pp. 63-74). The list includes groups identified
with violence, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hezbollah and Hamas,
but peaceable organizations have been chosen for investigation
and infiltration as well:
a. The first organization in the list of
extremist groups is Tabligh-i-Jamaat (the name means
society for the faith), which is a large, transnational
conservative Muslim group based in South Asia (Haykel dec.,

7 The copy of the SP annexed hereto as Exhibit 7 has been redacted
to remove the names of individuals. An unredacted copy is being
supplied to the Court under separate cover.
18
Ex. 6, para. 15). Even the description in the SP (SP p.66)
does not substantially differ; the SP does not make the
organization sound extremist except for saying darkly that
terrorist organizations have viewed it as fertile ground for
recruitment.
b. The list also includes the Muslim Brotherhood
(SP p.68), described by the NYPD as a source for radical
jihadist ideology. (SP p.69). It is in fact a large
international political and social organization committed to
Islam, and it has renounced violence (Haykel dec., Ex. 6
para.8).
c. Jamaat-e-Islami, listed below the Muslim
Brotherhood (SP p.68), is a large, conservative Islamic
political party in South Asia (Haykel dec., Ex. 6 para.24);
d. Muttahid Majlis-e-amal (the name means united
council of action) is described in the SP itself, (SP pp. 73-
74), as a Pakistani umbrella organization of four religious
extremist parties, whose goal is an Islamic State in
Pakistan. A conversation in a restaurant between adherents is
reported in which the speakers criticize the actions of one of
the parties.
30. Huge Islamic organizations with conservative
political and theological aims are listed under the rubric
extremist. Their American affiliates were infiltrated by
undercovers or informants for the NYPD (SP pp. 97-99). In
19
some cases, unspecified association with the alleged extremist
organization is given as excuse for infiltrating other
institutions such as mosques or NGOs, as described below in
paragraphs 32 and 34. Plaintiffs submit that this is
surveillance based on status and association with no
indication of unlawful activity, much less terrorism, to
justify it.

Student Associations

31. Seven Muslim Student Associations are listed as of
concern (SP, pp. 16-18), at Brooklyn College, Baruch College,
Hunter, City College, Queens, La Guardia and St. Johns. In
every case there was a police informant or undercover at work
in the organizations (SP p. 89). Here again the surveillance
is based on status and association. In the case of Brooklyn
and Baruch Colleges, the alleged presence of Salafi speakers
was given as an excuse; in the case of Baruch and Hunter,
radicalization was given as an excuse; at City College it
was a Salafi website and at St. Johns fund raising and
speeches. At Queens College there is claimed to be a trace of
an association with a radical Muslim organization, Al
Muhajiroun (Haykel dec., Ex. 6, para.19 ). In almost all of
the cases then, the student associations were surveilled and
infiltrated just because of their interest in islamic
20
theological concerns or because of something vague like
radicalization or even fundraising.

NGOs

32. The seven organizations listed as influence
proliferators in the SP (SP p.60) are for the most part
conservative Islamic organizations. To choose some examples:
a. One for which SP gives a purported description,
the Islamic Circle of North America (SP p.61), is identified
as ideologically aligned with Jamaat-i-Islami, which is to
say that it is aligned with a conservative party in Pakistan
(described above under extremist groups in paragraph 29).
Thus a conservative Muslim organization is made to appear
radical to the casual reader because the organization is
connected to another, classed as extremist, when it seems
that neither one is extremist. (See also Haykel dec., Ex. 6
para. 6). The Salafi literature listed on p.61 are writings
by well-known conservative Muslim leaders.
b. The World Association of Muslim Youth (SP p.60)
is a Saudi-funded group similar to the YMCA, according to the
declaration of Bernard Haykel, Ex 6, para.11.
c. The Muslim World League (SP p.60) is also
funded by the Saudis to advance Islamic values (Haykel dec.,
Ex. 6, para 12).
21
33. The organizations described in paragraph 32 do not
sponsor unlawful or terrorist acts nor are they claimed to
have contributed to them. They were all under investigation
by undercovers or other infiltrators (SP p.96) based on their
theological views, status and association.

Mosques

34. The Strategic Posture document identifies fifty-
three mosques as of concern, (SP pp.6-13) adding that
twenty-four have a Salafi influence, which says no more than
that they are influenced by a conservative theology. Several
are identified with phrases that purport to link them to
terrorism, such as the words Blind Sheik. Yet others are
identified with peaceable Muslim organizations, for example:
a. Masjid Al-Falah is described, SP p.8, as
National HQ for Tablighi-Jamaat which means that it is
associated with a large international South Asian-based
religious group, as described in paragraph 29 above. As in the
previous paragraph, combining the name of one group with
another under some rubric such as extremist does not serve
to establish that the mosque is anything other than a
religious organization.
b. At least five mosques are described as TJ
[tabligh-i-jamaat] feeders. (SP pp.10, 12). Again, this
merely associates them with the same religious group.
22
c. Two mosques are simply linked to Al Azhar
University in Egypt (SP p.12). This does no more than identify
them with an ancient and distinguished Muslim educational
institution. (Haykel dec., Ex. 6, para. 27)
35. Here again, on the basis of adherence to a
conservative theology, there was intense surveillance of all
the mosques listed, through undercovers, informers and the
Demographics Unit (SP pp.85-87).

Hot Spots

36. Places of business, primarily restaurants, are
designated in SP as hot spots, and the character of six of
them is outlined in the SP (SP pp. 35-41). Class Counsel are
acquainted with the surveillance of some of these through the
examination of Demographics Unit/ZAU documents in discovery:
a. One of the Pakistani hot spots named in SP at
p.37 was the Bukhari Restaurant. The ZAU reports chosen at
random and read by Class Counsel yielded three visits to this
place in 2006, and a fourth in 2010. Nothing of note was
reported, except that a conversation was overheard on one
occasion.
b. A second Pakistani hot spot was Chandni
Restaurant, also described in SP at p.37. The reports read by
Class Counsel yielded three police visits to this place
23
between 2006 and 2011, and again nothing of note was reported
except that a conversation was overheard.
c. Among the Egyptian hot spots was the
Arabesque Caf, SP at p. 41. About this place, Class Counsel
read two reports and saw a third visit noted between 2007 and
2010, all reporting nothing of significance.
37. Since the reports Class Counsel read were chosen at
random, there may be many other reports about the places
named; but the reports over several years, yielding so little
result, point strongly to a conclusion that the police canvass
of these hot spots has not led to an indication of crime. In
his deposition, in fact, Chief Galati said that the repeated
visits to such places had not led to an investigation under
the Guidelines. Galati p. 97.
38. The documents show that officers of the Intelligence
Division hoped that they would find the places visited to be
Radicalization Incubators, a phrase used in the paper
Radicalization in the West (see paragraph 24 above) in 2007:
Generally these locations,
which together comprise the radical
subculture of a community, are rife
with extremist rhetoric. Though the
locations can be mosques, more
likely incubators include cafs, cab
driver hangouts, flophouses,
prisons, student associations, non-
governmental organizations, hookah
(water pipe) bars, butcher shops and
bookstores. While it is difficult to
predict who will radicalize, these
nodes are likely places where like-
minded individuals will congregate
24
as they move through the
radicalization process.

Radicalization, p.20.

39. Judging by the Galati deposition and the reports
examined by Class Counsel, investigators never found such
Radicalization Incubators through the Demographics Unit.
Nevertheless, sometimes pressure was applied to officers to
fulfill the hopes of superiors. Ex. 8 is an NYPD document from
2006 in which commanding officers in the Demographics Unit
report criticizing the unsatisfactory work level of a
detective who had submitted negative reports of rhetoric
heard in cafes and hotspot locations as well as negative
reports of community events.
40. NYPD documents show that the same sort of
infiltration and reporting without any indication of illegal
activity has been endemic at Muslim institutions for years.
One example is the document entitled Intelligence Division,
Central Research Analysis Unit, Intelligence Note, 06 February
2006" (Ex. 9). The subject is NYC Mosque Statements on Danish
Cartoon Controversy. This document collects information from
sources reporting on meetings at mosques and other Muslim
organizations on twenty occasions between January 31 and
February 8, 2006. All the underlying reports came from
undercover officers or informants. The summary report shows
intense and widespread intrusion into religious and political
life, and yet there is not so much as a piece of rhetoric that
25
would point toward an unlawful act; on the contrary, the
rhetoric is cautious and pacific. This exhibit is evidence of
the character of the surveillance of mosques and other
religious organizations, showing that the informers
persistently reported conversations and advocacy they
overheard, even though they found nothing indicating unlawful
activity. These persons, institution and organizations are
subject to surveillance not because of what they do or even
say, but because of who they are: religious Muslims.
41. A second example of this kind of wholesale
infiltration of Muslim institutions is the document entitled
Intelligence Division, Intelligence Analysis Unit, October
16, 2006" (Ex. 10). The subject is DD5's referencing 10/11/06
plane crash into building at 524 E. 72 Street. Like Ex. 9,
this is an intelligence analysis that collects information
from field reports (DD5's) of confidential informants (CIs)
and undercover agents. This exhibit illustrates the constant
infiltration of religious organizations and meetings. Here
the NYPD is monitoring reaction to a plane crash already known
not to involve terrorism or crime. The exhibit well-
characterizes the information collected as nothing but
general chatter, statements of regret and expressions of
relief. For one member of a mosque, who appears agitated
the informant went so far as to promise a follow-up and a
26
phone dump, apparently an intrusion into the list of numbers
called by the member.
42. The pattern is followed in the document attached as
Ex. 11, Intelligence Division, Intelligence Collection
Coordinator, Deputy Commissioners Briefing, 25 April 2008.
This document collects then-current intelligence information
concerning a variety of topics, some of which show intrusions
into the business of people other than Muslims. At the top is
information apparently from the Terrorism Interdiction Unit
(TIU), relating that the TIU has instructed all their sources
to watch for Muslim reactions to the verdict acquitting police
officers in the homicide of Sean Bell. The last item, about
participation in a whitewater rafting trip by the Muslim
Student Organization of City College, is an example of
infiltration of a student organization, in which the names of
the participants are recorded.
43. Exhibits 9 through 11 record the surveillance of
mosques and other religious organizations, showing that the
informers persistently reported conversations and advocacy at
the organizations, but found nothing indicating unlawful
activity; although the exhibits are reports that were
generated some years ago, it is apparent that NYPD policy has
not changed. The news stories from 2012, saying, for example,
that NYPD informants reported on what they heard inside
mosques, including the sermons, and also infiltrated student
27
groups, provoked public controversy and protest, with demands
to stop the surveillance. Associated Press, NY mayor defends
intelligence-gathering on Muslims February 24, 2012 (Ex. 12).
If the police had ceased these practices, it would have been
simple enough for the defendants to say that the information
in the stories was out of date. On the contrary, the mayor
said that the police practices would continue, with the words,
We just cannot let our guard down again. The speech of
Commissioner Kelly in March, 2012 (Exhibit 3), referred to
above in paragraphs 19-20, is to the same effect. The
defendants mean to continue their practice of infiltrating
Muslim organizations. Shamiur Rahman, who was sent by the
NYPD into the John Jay College Muslim Student Association, was
just one of an army of spies.
44. Class Counsel submit that it is apparent from the
facts set forth in the paragraphs above, that the NYPD has not
made any serious effort to comply with the Handschu
Guidelines, either to restrict the retention of records to
instances of potential unlawful or terrorist activity or to
restrict investigations and infiltrations to cases where there
are reasonable indications of unlawful or terrorist
activity.
45. Moreover, as explained in paragraphs 19-26 and 43
above, the aims of intelligence collection by the NYPD have
remained the same over time. It is notable that two of the
28
organizations that the informant Shamiur Rahman was assigned
to infiltrate in 2012 (see his declaration, Exhibit 2), the
Islamic Center of North America and the Muslim American
Society, were listed in the Strategic Posture of 2006 (Ex. 7,
p.60) as NGO's that the NYPD had infiltrated. Both are
peaceable Muslim organizations (Haykel dec., Ex.6, para. 6,
13).
46. The NYPD is continuing a massive, all encompassing
dragnet for intelligence concerning anything connected with
Muslim activity through intrusive infiltration and record-
keeping about all aspects of life, politics and worship. The
NYPD operates on a theory that conservative Muslim beliefs and
participation in Muslim organizations are themselves bases for
investigation. But the character and history of those beliefs
and organizations do not support the theory that such beliefs
are precursors to terrorist activity, and the guidelines do
not permit investigation based on beliefs. The result has
been and remains a huge, unjustified intrusion on the privacy
of persons associated with Islam.
47. The practices of the Intelligence Division of the
NYPD in surreptitiously joining, visiting and infiltrating
mosques and other organizations associated with Islam, and
keeping records of such activities, simply ignore the
requirement contained in the current Guidelines of a criminal
predicate for such investigations. The NYPD has shown itself
29
to be unwilling or unable to adhere to the rules that require,
for example a reasonable indication of unlawful activity
based on specific facts or circumstances, Guidelines Section
IV(C)(1), before such an investigation is initiated.

Injuries from NYPD Intelligence Practices and Policies

48. The Handschu Guidelines at issue in this motion are
not mere technical regulations; there are good reasons of
policy for their existence. Keeping records about visits to
public places is restricted to cases of potential unlawful or
terrorist activity because the constant record-keeping brands
places as potential havens for radicals and even terrorists
when they are demonstrably not.
49. In addition, as the news stories indicate, NYPD
files are inevitably subject to leaks and disclosure and the
attendant public embarrassment and stigma associated with
being identified in a police department dossier.
Investigations and infiltrations are restricted by the
Guidelines to cases where there is reason to suspect crime
because investigations and infiltrations are dangerous to the
institutions that are infiltrated and their participants.
Recruiting informers, for example, is injurious to the
community. In Ex. 1 the Associated Press reporters recounted
how the NYPD sought to recruit informers for intelligence
work, and put pressure on people to inform. Those who are
30
pressured are frightened and intimidated, and those who know
them share their fears; moreover, those who are recruited are
degraded by the sense of having informed on the community.
50. Informers try to find or generate sensational
information that they can take back to their handlers; the
presence of informers distorts the discourse and the life of
those who are infiltrated. The experience of Shamiur Rahman
(Ex.2) is a superb example. He was recruited and paid as an
informer, and he was encouraged to find something
incriminating in the organizations he visited or joined. As a
result, he sought to engender inflammatory rhetoric. At
present he has withdrawn as an informer, but the awareness of
his work is intimidating to the people upon whom he informed.
The president of John Jay College, Jeremy Travis, has
expressed his dismay at the presence of an informer in the
student association (Ex. 13).
51. The poisonous effects of police surveillance thus
continue to spread. Informers regret their role and reveal
their work, people disaffected from the NYPD (apparently)
reveal documents to reporters, and the pervasive presence of
the oversight becomes known to the community. College
presidents as well as Muslim leaders try to reassure their
communities in vain, because the surveillance is known to
continue even though the identity of other informers is
unknown.
31
52. The declarations of Linda Sarsour (Ex. 14) and Faiza
Ali (Ex. 15) relate concrete examples of the injuries that
flow from the NYPD's practices. Leaders of organizations
become suspicious of people who offer to help; worshipers
suspect that others at the mosque are infiltrators; people
feel they are being watched, and fear and resent the presence
of informers. Students are afraid to participate in Muslim or
political activities, and parents are fearful that their
children will get into trouble with the police. A sense of
fear and resentment is widespread in the community.
53. Intrusions by keeping records and investigation and
infiltration may be thought acceptable where there is a
genuine reason to suspect crime. As part of a general policy
of intelligence, however, we submit that they are worse than
onerous, and they are appropriately forbidden by the Handschu
Guidelines. Pres. Travis of John Jay College put the arguments
in a nutshell in his statement to his community: I trust you
would agree that, in certain limited circumstances it is
appropriate for law enforcement agencies to use informants to
uncover criminal activity. There is no evidence, however, that
this is the case at John Jay and we have not been advised
otherwise. (Ex. 13).
54. A principal injury flowing from the policy of police
surveillance for intelligence, rather than based upon
indications of crime, is that the program becomes
32
interminable. When surveillance is conducted in search of
crime, there is hope that it will end when the crime is
detected or is found not to exist. In the case of the NYPD
policy, the surveillance goes on indefinitely, because there
is no logical end to the need for intelligence. The intrusion
on the Muslim community has gone on for at least seven years,
and probably longer. As time goes on, participants in the
program have become critical, and some have revealed some of
the facts, and yet the program goes on while the sense of
being watched, the fear of police infiltration grows in the
community. There must be an end to this illegal program of
oversight.
55. There is another injury, we submit. That is the
injury to this Court and to the confidence of the community in
the powers of the legal system to protect them. The NYPD has
misrepresented its intelligence program as complying with the
Handschu Guidelines when in fact it has been conducting a
program of intelligence surveillance over the Muslim
community. The misrepresentation by the police increases the
injuries due to the NYPD program itself. We submit that it is
time to put an end to the NYPDs limitless program of
intrusion.
33

The Need for Continuing Oversight by the Court

56. The history of the conduct of the NYPD under the
current Guidelines, which were adopted at their own
suggestion, shows the many ways that the NYPD has not been
truthful either to the public or to the court about their
surveillance of political activities.
57. As this court noted in its latest opinion in this
case, 2012 WL 5939058 (Nov. 26, 2012), the defendants allowed
counsel and this Court to litigate a motion concerning the
validity of an internal police order (IO 47) for months after
the NYPD had rescinded the order. That was only one sign of
the persistent attitude of the NYPD, which follows or refuses
to follow the Guidelines and the directions of this Court as
it pleases. The defendants have repeatedly taken the position
that Class Counsel should have no power to question the NYPDs
administration of surveillance under the Guidelines; it is
their position that oversight of all such secret police work
is their exclusive prerogative. They have shown that, in
practice, they recognize no duty to obey any authority outside
the NYPD.
58. The surveillance of institutions and organizations
connected with Islam, as described above in this declaration,
presents a further example of the disdain of the NYPD for the
truth and for the strictures of the law. As noted above, the
INDEX OF EXHIBITS TO
DECLARATION OF PAUL G. CHEVIGNY
DATED JANUARY 22, 2013

EXHIBIT NO. DESCRIPTION
1 Article Entitled "With CIA Help, NYPD built
secret effort to monitor mosques, daily life
of Muslim neighborhoods" (Associated Press,
August 24, 2011.
2 Declaration of Shamiur Rahman executed on
October 28, 2012.
3 NYPD Intelligence Division powerpoint
regarding Demographics Unit marked as Exhibit
1 at deposition of Thomas Galati, June 28,
2012.
4 Transcript of deposition of Thomas Galati
taken on June 28, 2012.
5 Comments of Police Commissioner Raymond W.
Kelly, Fordham Law School Alumni Luncheon,
Cipriani Wall Street, Saturday, March 3, 2012.
6 Declaration of Bernard Haykel executed on
December 7, 2012.
7 NYPD Intelligence Division Strategic Posture
2006 -- powerpoint presentation marked as
Exhibit 3 at deposition of Thomas Galati on
June 28, 2012.
8 NYPD memo dated January 26, 2006 from
Supervisor, Demographics Unit to Commanding
Officer, C.A.R.U. re supervisors conferral
with detective.
9 NYPD Intelligence Division Central Analysis
Research Unit Intelligence note dated 9 Feb.
2006 re NYC mosque statements on Danish
cartoon controversy.

10 NYPD Intelligence Division, Intelligence
Analysis Unit, Intelligence Note dated October
16, 2006 re DD5's referencing 10/16/06 plane
crash into building at 524 East 72
nd
Street.
11 NYPD Intelligence Division, Intelligence
Collection Coordinator, Deputy Commissioner's
briefing dated Friday, 25 April, 2008 marked
as Exhibit 7 at the deposition of Thomas
Galati conducted on June 28, 2012.
12 Article entitled "Mayor Bloomberg defends NYPD
intelligence gathering on Muslim communities
across northeast" by David B. Caruso,
Associated Press, 2/24/12.
13 Statements of Jeremy Travis, President of John
Jay College dated October 23, 2012 and October
25, 2012.
14 Declaration of Linda Sarsour executed on
January 18, 2013.
15 Declaration of Faiza Ali executed on January
18, 2013.

NYCLU: Court Filing Seeks To End NYPD Surveillance of Muslim Community

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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