Warrantless Arrests

Umil vs. Ramos FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples Army. Issue: RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA. The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error. DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions. 2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti --Marti and his wife went Whether or not the arrest is Valid

to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993] First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 3 concur Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in Gerentes house which is about 6 meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace. Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first

blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victims head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only Gerente was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large. On 2 May 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of RA 6425, and for Murder. When arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On 24 September 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, found Gerente guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of 12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for

which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. . Gerente appealed. Issue: Whether the police officers have the personal knowledge of the killing of Blace to allow them to arrest, and the subsequent searchly Gerentes person, without the necessary warrant. Held: The search of Gerentes person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eyewitness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on Gerentes person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The frisk and search of Gerentes person upon his arrest was a

permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003] Second Division, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 1 filed a separate dissenting opinion Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1

Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Issue: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds statement of its all right when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a waiver. Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the

first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following

requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtuds implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtuds lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtuds box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained. People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie

Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed. Issue: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible. Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that A peace officer or private

person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence. PADILLA VS CA Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help

pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition 2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo 3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro). Issues: 1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.

Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: ? Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) ? Search of moving vehicle ? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable

evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of NonUniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. 3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the

appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum. People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied. Go vs. CA Case Digest Go Vs. Court of Appeals 206 SCRA 138 G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station,

accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal

case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond. People vs. Tangliben [GR L-63630, 6 April 1990] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance mission was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigators Report. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, found Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs. Tangliben appealed.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, even in light of the Courts ruling in People vs. Aminnudin. Held: One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision in People v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured. However, herein, the case presented urgency. Although the trial courts decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such onthe-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin herein. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of

contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated. Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano Case Digest Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985) FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants witness. ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid? HELD: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an allembracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general. PEOPLE OF appellee, vs. THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. RULING: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit: (1)search of moving vehicles, (2)seizure in plain view, (3)customs searches, (4)waiver or consent searches, (5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6)search incidental to a lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is

charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accusedappellant. FACTS OF THE CASE: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOLINA FACTS: Sometime in J une 1996, SPO1 Paguid opon r eceived an information regard ing the presence of an a llegedmarijuana pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As toaccused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addressesof the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. In the morning of August 8,1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called forassistance at the

PNP proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a trisikad carrying the accusedappellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if possible w e will se ttle this . SPO1 Pamp lona insis te d on op ening the bag, whic h re ve a led d ried marij uana leaves insid e. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.Accusedappellants contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having beenobtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ISSUE: W/N THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTSCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES HELD: The funda menta l law of the land mand ates tha t searc hes a nd seiz ures be carr ied out in a reas onab le fas hion. TheConstitution provides: SEC. 2. The r ig ht of the p eop le to b e secure in their persons, hous es, pap ers , and e ffects againstunr easonab le sea rches and s eizures of wha te ver na tur e a nd for a ny p urpos e shall be inviolable, a nd no search warr ant orwarrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oathor affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched andthe persons or things to be seized. i Searc h and s eiz ure may be made without a warrant and the e vid ence ob ta ined the refrom may be ad miss ible in thefollowing instanc es: (1) search incid ent to a lawful arres t; (2) searc h of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of c ustoms

laws; (4) seizure of evid enc e in p lain view; (5) when the acc used hims elf waives his r ig ht a gainst unreasonablesearches and seizures; ii[24] and (6) stop and frisk situations.As a rule, an ar rest is c onsidered legitima te if effected with a valid war rant of a rrest. T he Rules of Cour t, however,recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense(arrest in flagrante delicto ); (b) when an offense has just been committed a nd he has pr obable caus e to believe based onpersonal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is servingf i n a l j u d g m e n t o r i s t e m p o r a r i l y confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferre d f r o m o n e confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). In the case at bar, accusedappellants manifested no outward indicationthat would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad , accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,a ttemp ting to c ommit or have committed a c rime. T he res ponse of M olina tha t Boss, if p ossib le we will settle this is anequivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note thatwere it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to thearresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1 Paguidopon onlylearned Mulas name and address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula.It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer whilethey were on the side of the road. These

circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen himbefore the arrest. The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, thesearch conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not beadmitted as evidence. WHEREFORE accused are ACQUITTED. People vs. Estrella [GR 138539-40, 21 January 2003] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur Facts: Prior to 20 November 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of Antonio C. Estella at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales. In the morning of 20 November 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Buloron, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnachea accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in the search warrant. On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella sitting on a rocking chair located about 2 meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, the latters brother, and being rented by Estrellas live-in partner, named Eva. They approached Estrella and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed Estrella the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked Estrella if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to

surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty. While inside the hut, Estrella surrendered to the team 2 cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained 20 bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of Estrella and his live-in partner. They found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained 4 big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested Estrella and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales. The defense, however, alleged otherwise and claimed that on 20 November 1996 between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m., while Estrella was talking with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and about 70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached them. The group introduced themselves as policemen and told them that they were looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued against him. Estrella identified himself to them. The policemen inquired from Estrella as to where his house is located and Estrella told them that his house is located across the road. The police did not believe him and insisted that Estrellas house is that house located about 58 meters away from them. Estrella told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about half an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to Estrella. They photographed Estrella and brought him to their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Estella was investigated at San Marcelino, Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan. Still, Estrella was charged for possession of prohibited drugs and

unlicensed firearms. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69), in Criminal Case RTC 2143-I and on 25 August 1998, found Estrella guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana was ordered confiscated in favor of the government, and the Sheriff was directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition. On the other hand, Estrella was acquitted from the charge of violation of PD 1866 The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and 4 live ammunitions, subject of the offense, were however ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Estrella appealed said decision. Issue: Whether the search undertaken inside the hut during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered was legal. Held: There is no convincing proof that Estrella indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecutions story. Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5 (Arrest without warrant; when lawful), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or

has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112. Never was it proven that Estrella, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest. Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12 (Search incident to lawful arrest), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latters person that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case. The purpose of the exception in Chimel v. California is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person being arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. Herein, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within Estrelas

immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. The People of the Philippines vs Ruben Montilla y Gatdula Facts: On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant. ISSUE: Whether or conducted is legal. not the warrantless arrest

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name. On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938) F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of the law "to search the person, house or store of the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents & other papers relating to her activities as userer." On the same date, Almeda,

accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to the office of the petitioner, and after showing the SW to the petitioner''s bookeeper, Salas, & w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the petitioner''s motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be nullified in these proceedings. HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or another; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Veroy Vs. Layague Case Digest Veroy Vs. Layague 210 SCRA 97 G.R. No. 95630 June 18, 1992 Facts: Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric

HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception, they are: (1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; (6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house. Police Officers had an information that the petitioners residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo

shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house. The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). No bail was recommended. Issue: Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Held: The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy. Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or

"possess" are capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them. Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]). None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek

permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED. People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]

the passenger seat on the right side of thevehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng consented to.When they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of different sizescontaining pulverized substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter boarded the vehiclesand proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at CampDangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance containedin the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the MTCBontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavitsdespite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had waived hisright to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against Omaweng, ordered theelevation of the case to the proper court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the ProvincialFiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did not present any evidence other than portions of the JointClarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses JosephLayong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgmentconvicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right againstunreasonable searches and seizures. Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of hisConstitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consentto the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thetestimony of the PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted byOmaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right againstunreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents to haveit made in his person or premises. He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to besecure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be madeeither expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41 packages of drugs werefound, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure

Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc.They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., theyflagged down a creamcolored Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion andheaded towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and had no passengers.The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which Omawengacceded to. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under

PEOPLE VS. BARROSGR 90640, MARCH 29, 1994, THIRD DIVISIONJUSTICE FELICIANOFACTS: Bonifacio Barros was charged and convicted of violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Barros wascoming from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, MountainProvince to Baguio City where he carried four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accusedintended for distribution and sale.- M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain ProvinceCommand, rode the Dangwa Bus.- Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself and put the carton under his seat.- After alighting at their station, Sgt. Ayan ordered C2C Bongyao to inspect the carton and foundout it contained marijuana.- As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when heboarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bonifacio was arrested and subsequently convicted.- Barros now appeals from the

judgment of conviction and claims that his right to due processwas violated when he was searched without the mandatory warrant. ISSUE: WON non-objection to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to hiswarrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver. WON Bonifacio was denied due process when he was searched and arrested without warrant. HELD: Judgment reversed RATIO: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes within themeaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The fruits of the search and seizurewill be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.Exception: 1) Peace officers may conduct searches of moving vehicles, it not being practicable tosecure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quicklymoved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought,however only visual inspection. The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted onthe occasion of his warrantless arrest because he failed to To constitute awaiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved hadknowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said personhad an actual intention to relinquish the right. PEOPLE v USANA and LOPEZ 323 SCRA 754DAVIDE; January 28, 2000 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Courtconvicting the tw o a ccused tog ether

with J ulian D.Escano for the violation of R.A. 6425, as amended FACTS - On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gunban, some law enforcer s of the Makati Polic e weremanning a checkpoint a t the corner of Sena tor GilPuya t Ave. a nd the South Luzon Expressway. Theywere checking the cars going to Pasay City, stoppingthose they found suspicious, and imposing merely arunning stop on the others. At about past midnight,they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493.One of the policemen saw a long firear m on the lapof the person seated at the passenger seat, who waslater identified as Virgilio Usa na. They asked thedr iver, id entified as Esca o , to open the d oor. P O3Sub a seized the long fir earm, an M-1 US Carb ine,from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police,p a r k e d a l o n g S e n . G i l P u y a t A v e . , t h e o t h e r passengers were sea rch for more weap ons . Theirs e a r c h y i e l d e d a . 4 5 c a l i b e r f i r e a r m w h i c h t h e y seized from Escao.- T he thr ee passeng ers were therea fter broug ht tothe police sta tion Block 5 in the Kia Pride dr iven byPO3 Nona to. Upon reaching the pr ecinct, Nonatotur ned over the key to the des k officer. Since SPO4d e l o s Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, h e requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readilyagreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag insid e it, whic h they askedEscao to open. The bag contained a parcel wrappedin tape, which, upon examination by National Bureauof Investigation, was found positive for hashish.- An information for violation of RA 6425 therea fterw a s f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e m . T h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h e three accused guilty of the said crime.- Accused-appellants assail the manner by which thecheckpoint in question was conducted. They contendt h a t t h e c h e c k p o i n t m a n n e d b y e l e m e n t s o f t h e Makati Polic e should ha ve been announced . Theya lso complain of its having b een conduc ted in

ana r b i t r a r y a n d d i s c r i m i n a t o r y m a n n e r . A l s o , t h e y question the validity of the search. ISSUES 1. WON the check point was illegal2. WON the search was valid3. WON the accused are guilty of violation of RA 6425 HELD 1. NO- Not all chec kpoints a re illegal. Those which arewarranted by the exigencies of public order and areconduc ted in a wa y leas t intrus ive to motoris ts ar eallowed. Ratio This Cour t has r uled that not all checkp oints a r e i l l e g a l . T h o s e w h i c h a r e w a r r a n t e d b y t h e exig encies of public order a nd a re c ond ucted in awa y leas t intrus ive to motoris ts are a llowed. For,a d m i t t e d l y , r o u t i n e c h e c k p o i n t s d o i n t r u d e , t o a certain ex tent, on motoris ts right to "fr ee p assagewithout interruption," but it cannot be denied that, asa rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelersduring which the vehicles occupants are required toansw er a brief ques tion or tw o. F or as long as thev e h i c l e i s n e i t h e r s e a r c h e d n o r i t s o c c u p a n t s subjected to a body search, and the inspection of thevehic le is limited to a visual sea rch, said routinec h e c k s c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d a s v i o l a t i v e o f a n individua ls r igh t against unr easonab le search. Infact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixedarea, are even less intrusive.- The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuanceo f t h e g u n b a n e n f o r c e d b y t h e C O M E L E C . T h e COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual searchof pedes tr ians . It would als o defea t the purpose forwhic h s uch ban was ins tituted . Thos e who intend tobring a gun during said period would know that theyonly need a car to be able to easily perpetrate theirmalicious designs.- The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for aviola tion of the constitutiona l rig hts of the accuseda g a i n s t i l l e g a l s e a r c h a n d s e i z u r e . P O 3 S u b a admitted that they

were me rely s topp ing c ars theyd eemed suspic ious , suc h as those w hose w ind owsa r e heavily tinted just to see if the passengersthereof were carrying guns . A t b e s t t h e y w o u l d merely d irec t their flas hlights insid e the cars the yw o u l d s t o p , w i t h o u t o p e n i n g t h e c a r s d o o r s o r subjecting its passengers to a body search. There isnothing discriminator y in this as this is wha t the situation demands. We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only w o u l d i t b e impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to viola te the b an. Even so, bad ges of le gitimacy of checkp oints may still b e inferr ed fr om the ir fixed loca tion a nd the reg ula rized ma nne r in which they are operated. 2. YES- Escano consented to the se arch a nd conse nted warrantless search is one of the exceptions from the warrant requirement. Ratio Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1)search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of movingv e h i c l e s ; ( 3 ) e v i d e n c e i n p l a i n v i e w ; ( 4 ) c u s t o m s searches; (5) consented warrantless search; and (6)stop-and-frisk situations.Even though there was ample opportunity to obtaina search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the searchdone on the car of Escao was consented to by him.3. NO- No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to thehashish found in the tr unk of the car and the re wasn o s h o w i n g t h a t U s a n a and Lopez knew of t h e presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or tha tthey saw the same before it was seized. Ratio Despite the validity of the searc h, we cannotaffirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violationof R.A . No. 6425, as ame nded . The follow ing facts militate aga inst a finding of conviction: (1) the carbelonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was noto p e n e d soon after it was stopped and after

t h e accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car wasdriven b y a polic ema n from the plac e where it wasstopp ed until the polic e sta tion; (4) the cars trunkwas opened, with the permission of Escao, withoutt h e p r e s e n c e o f U s a n a a n d L o p e z ; a n d ( 5 ) a f t e r arrival at the police station and until the opening of the cars tr unk, the car was in the possess ion andcontrol of the police authorities. No fact was adducedto link Usa na a nd Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in thel a t t e r s c a r b e f o r e t h e " f i n d i n g " o f t h e h a s h i s h sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time andwithout their pres ence left much to be d esir ed toimplicate them to the offense of selling, distributing,or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there wasn o s h o w i n g t h a t U s a n a and Lopez k n e w o f t h e presence of hashis h in the trunk of the car or tha tthey saw the same before it was seized. Dispositive Ac c u s e d a p p e l l a n t s a r e h e r e b y acquitted. People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991] Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of theManila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filledup the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,Switzerland. Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that thepackages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Martis representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foamplaced at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Martisbox to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes

(proprietor) and husband of Anita(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiarodor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of thegloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting theshipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from thecellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Martis packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a Receipt acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latters stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as theDangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed. Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights, beinvoked against the State. Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot beinvoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government withoutthe latter transgressing the accuseds rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees nocogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offensecharged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyesinto a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at thatwhich is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has beencommitted in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass onthe part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. Theconstitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directedonly against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could onlybe invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power isimposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be firstsecured if it is to pass the test of

constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest orinitiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case atbar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizurecannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, theprotection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Facts: At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked accusedappellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.) She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Inside the womens room, accusedappellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room. Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized.

In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo.[12] After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white packages on the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest.[13] She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines. appellant. Trial Court convicted the accused

confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been excluded from the evidence. The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accusedappellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it

Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She argues that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been excluded from the evidence. Issue: Is the arrest Valid? Held: Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She argues that the shabu

(b)

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against appellant.

People VS Susan Canton SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam.[2] When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying Excuse me maam, can I search you?[3] Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules.[4]When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: Money, money only. Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.[5] SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room, Mylene touched something in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them.[6] The first was taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh.[7] Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes.[8] The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline substances[9]which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office,

testified that no investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN.[11] However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles.[12] He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt.[13] Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. the trial court rendered a decision[16] finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million. SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied, together with her prayer that a new trial be made and with the judge who decided the case as inhibited. Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the Terry search doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence.

Held: SC did not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.[26]

Issue: Whether or not he arrest was violative of Susans Constitutional Rights

II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons under the Terry search doctrine. The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.[27] In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows: SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are

newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence. Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,
which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.

PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993] Friday, February 06, 2009

Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one