Professional Documents
Culture Documents
230
SPECIAL FORCES
BASE CAMP
OPERATIONS
JULY 2003
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other
means. This determination was made on 30 May 2003. Other requests for this document must be
referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE:
Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
Contents
Page
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of
the document.
i
FM 3-05.230
Page
ii
Preface
Field Manual (FM) 3-05.230 is a “how to” guide for Special Forces (SF)
conducting joint and combined operations. It provides references and describes
tactics, techniques, and procedures for establishing base camp operations. It
supports the doctrinal concepts and principles of FM 3-05.20, Special Forces
Operations; FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces; and Joint
Publication (JP) 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base
Defense, and should be used in conjunction with these manuals. This FM is a
focused collection of applications and practical information. It is not intended to
provide “the schoolhouse solution” to a particular problem or situation, but to
help detachments recognize, analyze, and resolve the problems they will
encounter throughout the full spectrum of operations.
This manual was designed and written for SF operating in an ambiguous
environment. The specific objective of FM 3-05.230 is to devise fabrication
techniques, recommend air-transportable equipment, and organize the camp
construction sequence, with a view toward increasing the efficiency of SF during
the initial phases of base camp establishment. The techniques and equipment
described in this manual include concepts tailored from the warning order to the
time of demobilization and disposition of the camp.
This manual is unclassified to ensure Armywide dissemination and facilitate the
integration of SF in the preparation and execution of campaigns and major
operations. It also provides guidance for SF commanders who determine the force
structure, budget, training, material, and operational requirements necessary to
prepare SF to conduct their missions and collateral activities.
The most common measurements that the soldier uses are expressed throughout
the text and in many cases are United States (U.S.) standard terms rather than
metric. Appendix A consists of conversion tables that may be used when mission
requirements or environments change.
This manual contains numerous acronyms, abbreviations, and terms. Users
should refer to the Glossary at the back of this manual for their meanings and
definitions.
The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and
recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD,
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.
iii
Chapter 1
1-1
FM 3-05.230
1-2
FM 3-05.230
COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS
1-12. Respect and camaraderie between SF and HN personnel is a
leadership issue. Showing reverence for legitimate HN culture, taboos, and
unwritten laws is a proven time-tested method of earning immediate respect
from the HN. This is not to imply that human rights, ethics, or other issues
deemed unacceptable by our government are tolerable.
1-13. SO imperatives are a fine guide for SF to follow in building productive
counterpart relationships (FM 3-05.20 discusses the SO imperatives in more
detail). Although not all imperatives apply all the time, mission planning and
execution concerning the following points increase the likelihood of success:
• Balance security and synchronization. Insufficient security may
compromise a mission. Excessive security and compartmentalization
almost always causes the mission to fail due to inadequate
coordination.
• Understand the operational environment. SF units must understand
the theater and civilian influences, as well as enemy and friendly
capabilities.
1-3
FM 3-05.230
1-4
Chapter 2
Predeployment Planning
Like the commanders of other Army units, SF commanders task-organize
their elements into teams and task forces based on the mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available, and
civil considerations (METT-TC) in the battlespace. This chapter describes
the mission planning process that SF commanders and staff go through in
the predeployment phase.
DETACHMENT ASSIGNMENTS
2-1. In anticipation of various missions and to ensure functional coverage of
all premission activities, the SFOD commander organizes a detachment staff
using METT-TC. Detachment staff members perform those duties outlined in
FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, for their particular functional
area. Also, detachment members perform additional duties in the absence of
the primary individual or at the discretion of the detachment commander.
FM 3-05.20 contains more detailed information on staff organization and
functions.
2-1
FM 3-05.230
2-2
FM 3-05.230
• Desired size is such that the camp can be defended by one-fourth of the
assigned strength.
• Defense in depth:
Primary, alternate, and supplementary defense lines.
Alternate and secondary positions.
Ability to limit and seal off penetrations.
Internal camp changes.
Reserve forces.
Coordinated fire support plan.
• Variations in configurations.
• The interior should be compartmentalized in case a certain area of the
camp is penetrated.
• Resupply depends primarily on air unless the camp is situated near
water.
• Airstrip requirements—if an airstrip is built, it must be near enough
that small arms fire can cover it.
• A plentiful water supply is necessary, preferably by wells.
• Prestocking of war materials, which can be banded and palletized
ready for delivery.
• Prestocking of a stock of two complete camps.
• Use of the containers in which war materials are transported to the
base campsite (containers express [CONEXs], military vans
[containers] [MILVANs], or sea-land containers).
• Generator use—it is best to use three-phase hook-up systems to avoid
power surges or blowing generators.
• Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) storage sites separate from the
main camp area.
• On-hand excavation and earthmoving equipment for hasty repairs.
2-7. If the terrain dictates that the base camp be built in multiple sections,
personnel should build each section as though each is a separate camp. Also,
personnel must ensure defensive and protective measures support the other
camps. In an area where there are several camps and the opposition activity
is gaining strength, the camps are required to have—
• Immediate fire support (Appendix E).
• Immediate close air support.
• Reaction forces available within 30 minutes, upon request.
2-3
FM 3-05.230
2-4
FM 3-05.230
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
2-11. Planning considerations fall into two types: general and logistical.
Both of these types are discussed in the following paragraphs.
2-5
FM 3-05.230
2-13. The use of foreign or commercial materiel, tactics, and techniques may
permit the deployed SF team to pass a cursory visual inspection by a hostile
observer to avoid electronic identification, and to prevent identification by
weapons signature. SF missions may require procurement and use of foreign
or commercial—
• Weapons.
• Communications equipment.
• Clothing.
• Rations.
• Maps.
Other specialized materiel requirements may include—
• Satellite communications (SATCOM) and other specialized communi-
cations equipment.
• Suppressed weapons.
• Specialized equipment for collecting information, such as telescopes,
night vision devices, electronic surveillance and direction-finding
equipment, surreptitious entry devices, and remote sensor systems.
• Terminal guidance equipment, such as radar transponders and laser
target designators.
• NBC defensive clothing or equipment.
2-14. A sample communications plan has been developed to fulfill the
communications requirements for the base camp and the detachment
(Figure 2-1, page 2-7). Equipment listed provides for a synergistic operational
environment. Additional equipment will be required to outfit HN forces.
2-15. The group commander must identify his contingency requirements for
such equipment. He must coordinate with the special operations theater
support element (SOTSE) to procure sufficient quantities to properly train
each SFOD in the equipment’s use and repair before the SFOD is committed.
All equipment that could indicate the nature or operational area of the
mission receives the same security classification as the mission itself.
2-6
FM 3-05.230
2-7
FM 3-05.230
2-8
FM 3-05.230
• Locking devices.
• Intrusion detection systems.
• Security lighting.
• Assessment or surveillance systems (such as closed-circuit television).
• Access control devices.
• Facility hardening.
2-21. The security of the base camp depends on each individual there. By
integrating the above measures and the proper equipment, the lives and
equipment of the camp will be safer.
REGIONAL ANALYSIS
2-22. The military analyst must understand the nature of the complexity of
the situation and understand the opposition to determine effective courses of
action (COAs). His analysis must consider the following factors:
• The nature of the society.
• The nature of the opposition.
• The nature of the government.
2-23. The analyst must identify the principal factors for each of these broad
factors and study each in turn. Finally, he must weigh and compare the
factors in each area and reach conclusions. These conclusions lead to
development of COAs. The analyst can then predict the potential effects of
each possible COA and select the best one. The process is time-consuming
and may require additional expertise. FM 3-07, Stability Operations and
Support Operations, contains additional information.
2-24. The analyst considers the separate analyses of the society, the
opposition, and the government together. His conclusions must reflect the
interaction of all factors. He must determine the dynamic with which each
side attempts to mobilize human and materiel resources in its favor. This
dynamic affects specific groups of people. The analyst identifies issues that
concern key political, social, and economic groups. The government and
opposition may offer solutions to the people’s problems and attempt to deliver
on their promises within resource constraints. Measured combinations of
benefits, persuasion, and coercion motivate groups to conform their behavior
to the will of the government or the opposition.
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
2-25. Throughout history, the knowledge and physical effects of terrain
have played a dominant role in the development of society during both peace
and war. Terrain is a portion of the earth’s surface that includes man-made
and natural features. Terrain analysis is the process of analyzing and
interpreting these features and the influence of weather and climate on
them. Terrain data (or information) is raw data in any form about a segment
of terrain. Knowledge of the battlefield terrain is extremely important during
all phases and levels of military planning. JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint
2-9
FM 3-05.230
2-10
FM 3-05.230
2-11
Chapter 3
Employment
This chapter provides an overview of the different areas that are covered
throughout the employment phase: SFODA staff responsibilities, base
camp construction, and base camp operations. This chapter also provides
considerations and procedures that should be followed during the
planning, construction, and operation of a base camp. Concurrently with
base camp construction, military training is conducted and numerous
occasions arise that require the SF team and HN personnel to defend the
campsite from attack by the opposition. Due to a tremendous amount of
activity at or near the site, it sometimes takes several months to build an
SF base camp. The camp’s exact configuration and facilities will depend
upon the functional requirements and the METT-TC factors. After
infiltration, an effective area organization already in place may be found,
or it may be lacking or incomplete. Regardless of its development or
degree of success, constant improvements will be necessary.
3-1. During construction, the actual building of the camp begins and
responsibilities during this phase shift from the SFOB/FOB to the
detachment (FM 3-05.20 includes more information). The responsibilities of
the SFODA staff are explained below.
3-2. SFODA commander. He ensures that the buildup of logistics takes place
as scheduled. He has a weekly formal meeting with the HN forces to discuss
the plans for the coming week. The commander does not dominate the scene
with his counterparts if he can refrain from doing so. He considers his actions
as on-the-job training for his counterparts and places himself in the
instructor role. He also maintains frequent contact with the local officials on
the status of the camp and solicits their assistance. As the camp nears
completion, the SFODA commander shifts emphasis from camp construction
to expanding the operational capabilities of the detachment. He identifies
problem areas and seeks assistance, if necessary. He also establishes an SOP
for the operation of the base camp. The SFODA commander helps develop a
routine for nonoperational activities and divides responsibilities among
detachment members. He lays the groundwork for the next detachment.
3-3. Assistant detachment commander. He serves as second in command. He
ensures implementation of the detachment commander’s decisions and
concepts, and serves as the detachment commander in the commander’s
3-1
FM 3-05.230
3-2
FM 3-05.230
3-10. Section II is devoted to one particular design that was developed after
careful study and research. The design is a square-shaped outer barrier and
perimeter with a square-shaped inner barrier and perimeter. This design
affords the maximum use of all weapons systems, C2 elements, and protective
systems in and around the camp. Camps used during the Vietnam era did not
always employ inner barriers or perimeters. There was a common
denominator found within a majority of the camps: trench systems (zigzag),
command bunkers, and key weapons bunkers. The enemy always targeted
the command bunkers, medical bunkers, and team houses as priority targets
during attacks.
3-11. This new design was developed with the following in mind: security,
construction process, manning, maintenance, and operation. The design was
kept basic to allow a detachment to construct the camp with minimum
outside assistance and to allow for ease of modification or improvisation.
3-12. This is only one design and should not be considered the “best” design
for a camp. It can be modified to almost any shape to fit the situation.
Terrain, environmental factors, and situation will dictate the actual design
and requirements for all camps.
DESCRIPTION
3-13. The base camp is established to facilitate the assigned SF mission. The
base camp not only serves as an operational base to carry the battle to the
enemy, but also serves as an administrative center that must maintain
constant contact and services with the population base of the local area.
Support from the local population is critical to the success of the mission.
3-14. The base camp is based on the concept of independent, hardened,
mutually supporting platoon and company positions surrounding a hardened
central control facility. Facilities must be provided within the camp for the SF
team, their HN counterparts, and for 200 to 800 soldiers with or without their
dependents as the situation dictates. Appendix F outlines construction
methods and requirements. Appendix G provides information on building
materials. Appendix H discusses electrical requirements and Appendix I
provides individual building plans.
3-15. There is no “set” geometric pattern. Squares, rectangles, circles, stars,
and triangles are among the most common shapes. Appendix J depicts base
camp examples.
3-16. The exact location of the camp in relation to the surrounding terrain
will dictate the initial shape and size of the camp. The shape can change as
improvements are made and changes to the situation occur.
3-17. The lack of a set geometric shape has necessitated the need for seven
common denominators, regardless of the shape or size. Each of these common
denominators is discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.
3-3
FM 3-05.230
INNER PERIMETER
3-18. The inner perimeter is the heart of the SF base camp (Figure 3-1,
page 3-5). All operational, administrative, and logistics activities are
controlled from this area. It also serves as the hardened core of the camp’s
defensive system. A protective wall or berm that is usually constructed of
earth and logs surrounds this perimeter. Bunkers for automatic weapons and
numerous individual fighting positions are integral parts of this berm.
3-19. The following paragraphs describe the positions that are usually
located within the inner perimeter. Helpful tips and techniques for
construction, operation, and security are also included.
3-4
FM 3-05.230
3-5
FM 3-05.230
3-6
FM 3-05.230
Fighting Bunkers
3-23. Two layers of logs (at least 6 inches in diameter) form the foundation
of the bunker’s roof. The second layer crisscrosses the first layer. These logs
extend over the sides of the bunkers at least 18 inches.
3-24. Sandbags are used to contain the blast layer of the bunker’s roof. A
burster layer of logs (at least 6 inches in diameter) is often added over the
blast layer. Construction of a second-layer tin roof above the existing
sandbagged one is an excellent addition to these bunkers (Figure 3-5).
3-25. Each bunker contains at least one automatic weapon. These weapons
are issued in addition to the defensive firepower of the reaction force when
the bunker’s occupants are out on operations.
3-26. Each bunker has ample stocks of small arms ammunition (ammo),
grenades, food, first-aid supplies, and water. Space in the sleeping section of
these bunkers is at a premium. Triple-decked bunks are constructed to allow
maximum utilization of space. Wooden floors are excellent additions to these
bunkers. Although used primarily as living quarters, this section also has
firing ports on the left and right sides. Chicken wire is used to screen firing
ports from grenades. (Figure 3-6, page 3-8, and Appendix I, Figures I-2
through I-6, pages I-4 through I-6, show the layout of a fighting bunker.)
3-7
FM 3-05.230
3-8
FM 3-05.230
3-9
FM 3-05.230
personnel) and the TOC. Entry to the TOC bunker is limited to U.S.
personnel and carefully selected HN counterparts only. There should not be
separate TOCs for SF and the HN—one TOC operates effectively and
efficiently without the problem of two TOCs issuing different and sometimes
conflicting instructions to its members. SFOD members should—
• Ensure an emergency power and lighting system is provided for this
bunker. Battery-powered lights are useful in this role. A small
generator located near the bunker will provide power to critical
equipment inside the bunker.
• Stock bunker with emergency food, water, medical supplies, batteries,
and small arms ammo and grenades.
• Ensure bunkers always have two entrances and exits.
• Bury all field lines to protect them from damage. (S-folding these lines
every 20 feet or so as they are buried will create enough slack to afford
protection from near-burst indirect fire rounds [Figure 3-8].) STP 31-
18E34-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 18E,
Special Forces Communications Sergeant, Skill Levels 3/4, includes
more information on the laying of communications wire.
• Construct an additional tin roof 2 to 3 feet above the bunker’s existing
sandbagged roof. This will waterproof the bunker, thus preventing the
sandbags from becoming too heavy from rainwater, and may cause
incoming mortar rounds to detonate before impacting the sandbagged
protective layer (Figure 3-9, page 3-11). This second roof is an excellent
addition to all of the larger bunkers within the inner perimeter.
3-10
FM 3-05.230
Medical Bunker
3-34. This position is always underground (water table permitting). It is
large enough for a treatment and operating room, a ward area, and storage
for most of the camp’s medical supplies. Both U.S. and HN team medics sleep
here. This bunker serves as a field hospital only during camp defense
operations. Detachment members receive day-to-day treatment in the
dispensary located in the outer perimeter. They should—
• Ensure both entrances to this bunker are wide enough to accommodate
aid and litter teams.
• Stock bunker with emergency food, batteries, medical supplies, ammo,
and plenty of water for drinking and for use in treatment of casualties.
• Ensure an emergency lighting system is included for the bunker.
Battery-powered lights and a small generator near the bunker are
vital.
• Construct a second tin roof above the sandbagged protective layer—the
roof is an excellent addition to this bunker.
• Build racks in ward area that allow for the stacking of patients on
litters after treatment so that space will not become a problem during
camp defense (Figure 3-10, page 3-12).
3-11
FM 3-05.230
Generator Bunker
3-35. Detachment members normally construct this bunker above ground
and heavily sandbag it for maximum protection. It furnishes all electrical
power for the camp. The size and number of generators depend on the size of
the camp. These generators will be double-banked, which will allow one bank
to run while the other is shut down for servicing or repairs. Adequate fuel
supplies should be stored in the adjacent bunker below ground. SFOD
members must—
• Always allow 2 or 3 feet of space between the top of the sandbagged
walls and the start of the protective roof so that heat does not become a
problem (Figure 3-11, page 3-13).
• Ensure chemical fire extinguishers are placed in this bunker.
• Bury all power lines to protect them from damage. (S-folding these
lines every 20 feet or so as they are buried will create enough slack to
afford protection from near-burst indirect fire rounds.)
3-12
FM 3-05.230
Mortar Positions
3-36. Detachment members locate the camp’s heavy mortars within the
inner perimeter. Personnel select sites to give 360-degree fields of fire.
Positions built below ground house the weapons, ammo, and crew. The
following operational and security concerns require SFOD members to—
• Ensure the ready-ammo box contains just that—ready ammo. Rounds
stored here are out of the packing cases and stacked by type (high-
explosive [HE], white phosphorus [WP], illumination [ILLUM]) and in
the cardboard shipping tubes (Figure 3-12, page 3-14). SFOD members
remove the tape from these tubes. The objective is to have the rounds
in the air in seconds—not minutes.
3-13
FM 3-05.230
3-14
FM 3-05.230
• Cover the muzzle of the weapon when not in use (Figure 3-13).
• Cover the entire weapon with a poncho or tarp when not in use
(Figure 3-13).
WARNING
Failure to properly dispose of unused charges
could result in bodily injury.
3-15
FM 3-05.230
• Keep a generous basic load of all types of mortar rounds in the bunker
to avoid running out of ammo during the middle of a camp defense.
• Remove most of the ammo from the packing cases and store by type
(HE, WP, ILLUM) in wooden racks in this bunker. These rounds
remain sealed in their cardboard tubes until needed.
• Store additional ammo by type in wooden shipping boxes (Figure 3-15).
Have the necessary tools ready in the bunker to open boxes when
required.
• Rotate all ammo, when restocked, to use the oldest ammo first.
• Maintain communication with the TOC by both radio and field
telephones. A directed mortar is invaluable during camp defense.
Undirected fire is a waste of time and ammo.
• Stock the bunker with food, water, first-aid supplies, flashlights,
batteries, small arms ammo, grenades, and tools.
• Construct a second tin roof above the existing sandbagged one—the
roof is an excellent addition (Figure 3-16, page 3-17).
• Preplan mortar barrages to channelize an attacking enemy, deny him
access to the camp’s tactical wire, and to cover dead space within the wire.
3-16
FM 3-05.230
Fire Arrow
3-37. Although the fire arrow is not current U.S. doctrine, it may be
necessary based on HN support and as a possible contingency. This device is
used to signal overhead aircraft the direction of attack, desired direction of
bombing runs, resupplies, and so on. Detachment members construct this
device in a location that allows for maximum aerial observation and
accessibility by ground troops. It should have a primary and alternate
marking system for both day and night operations.
3-38. Virtually any type of lighted or visual marking system is acceptable if
all participating units are briefed and concur. Day marking or visual
acquisition devices include, but are not limited to, colored smoke, mirrors,
road flares, and any reflective or contrasting marker panel (space blanket).
Night marking or acquisition aids may include a light gun, road flares, fire
pots, flashlights, chemlights, and infrared (IR) lighting systems. Electronic
navigational aid (NAVAID) markings (ZM, SST-181, GAR-1, tactical air
navigation [TACAN]) may be used for either day or night operations and
placed as directed by mission requirements. To construct a fire arrow, the
following instructions apply:
• The shaft of the arrow should be at least 10 feet long. Two sections
forming the arrowhead are 3 feet in length. The entire framework is
constructed from 2 x 4s (Figure 3-17, page 3-18).
• A wooden spool from an electrical cable reel makes an excellent
rotating base from the fire arrow.
• A device must be constructed to lock the arrow in place once it is
pointed in the right direction.
3-17
FM 3-05.230
S-4/Arms Room
3-39. Detachment members construct this building above ground with chest-
high sandbagged walls. It must be large enough to contain all supplies and
equipment that are required to sustain the camp during normal operations
and during camp defense operations. The arms room will be collocated within
this building and will have the capability to secure both small arms and crew-
served weapons not required to be on line in the camp. Sleeping quarters for
both the U.S. and HN team S-4 personnel will also be located in this building.
SFOD members should—
• Construct storage racks in the supply room to accommodate items to be
stored on them.
• Organize items by type, size, and frequency of use.
Latrines
3-40. SFOD personnel construct adequate latrine facilities in the general
areas of all living and work areas. The number and size of these latrines will
vary depending upon the amount of personnel in the base camp. Generally,
the box (pit) or the burn-type latrines are constructed. The burn type is
preferred. Detachment members situate numerous urine tubes throughout
the camp and place the tubes in a pit or drum (with holes punched all
around) and fill with gravel. SFOD members should—
• Position latrines near living and work areas.
3-18
FM 3-05.230
Ammunition Bunkers
3-41. These are always constructed underground (water table permitting).
Detachment members locate these bunkers in several areas within the inner
perimeter and construct them close to or in the berm. SFOD members should—
• Ensure each of the camp’s fighting bunkers contains a reserve stock of
ammo. All fighting bunkers should be stocked in advance.
• Construct ammo bunkers close to or in the berm (one bunker per side).
• Ensure doors are large enough to allow for ease of loading and
unloading operations.
• Construct a second tin roof above the existing sandbagged one. This
roof should slope away from the bunker entrance and the
communications trench.
• Always stack and store ammo by type.
• Always have necessary tools in the bunker to allow for rapid opening of
containers.
3-19
FM 3-05.230
Vehicle Revetments
3-42. SFOD members build these above ground and use them as protective bays
in which the camp’s organic vehicles park at night (Figure 3-18). Construction can
be of earth and logs or dirt-filled 55-gallon drums. These bays are located in
several areas within the inner perimeter. SFOD members should—
• Incorporate armored vehicles into the camp’s defensive system by
constructing their revetments as integral parts of the berm.
• Always back vehicles into their revetments.
• Always construct alternate revetments for armored vehicles.
3-20
FM 3-05.230
Fire-Fighting Posts
3-43. Fires are a constant danger in any camp. In fact, fire has destroyed
more camp facilities than enemy actions. Fire-fighting posts should be located
throughout the entire camp. These locations usually consist of 55-gallon
drums filled with water and a supply of buckets. Chemical fire extinguishers
are located in all vehicles, motor pool, generator and fuel bunkers, medical
bunker, ammo bunker, and communications and TOC bunkers. If the
situation permits, SFOD members should place a water truck with a pump
and hoses within the inner perimeter. Detachment personnel should—
• Fill drums with rainwater on most fire-fighting posts. The addition of
gutters on nearby buildings channels the rainwater directly into the
drums (Figure 3-19). During the dry season, the camp’s water truck
may be used to fill the drums on a regular basis.
• Paint fire buckets red to allow for easy recognition of “strays.”
• Hold regular fire-fighting drills.
3-21
FM 3-05.230
INNER BARRIER
3-45. The inner barrier is the obstacle zone surrounding the inner perimeter
(Figure 3-20, page 3-23). As the word “zone” implies, this barrier has two or
more barbed wire entanglements in depth (two rows) with intervals between
them. These intervals contain additional obstacle belts. The entire zone is
covered by fire from positions on the inner perimeter. The inner barrier must
also be wide enough to prevent the enemy from getting within grenade-
throwing range. Detachment personnel leave two passages open in this
barrier. The first is for the access road, which allows vehicles to enter the
inner perimeter (a later section of this chapter discusses the access road in
greater detail). The second is a small personnel path that leads from the
inner to the outer perimeters. Both passages have guarded gates.
3-46. Detachment personnel must remember that obstacles covered by fire
are barriers. These cost an enemy time and casualties to overcome. Obstacles
not covered by fire are merely obstructions and can be breached or bypassed
at random. The barrier itself will not halt a determined attack or even
infiltrators, but it will slow them down, cause casualties, and channelize
them so that effective fires can be brought upon their attack.
3-47. Starting from the berm and working outward, the inner barrier
usually contains the following protective features. Helpful tips and
techniques for construction, operation, and security are also included.
3-22
FM 3-05.230
3-23
FM 3-05.230
Mine Belt
3-49. Mines have been employed in the defensive systems of camps in the
past. Because of the potential source of danger to friendly forces and civilians,
the practice of employing buried mines in the camp’s defensive systems must
be carefully planned if they are to be used. Detachment members use
controlled mines and defensive devices extensively throughout the entire
defensive system. The M-18 claymore mines are excellent defensive weapons
when properly employed. SFOD personnel place these mines in depth (two
rows) so that they can be used against more than one assault from a given
direction. The “Outer Barrier” section, later in this chapter, discusses other
controlled mines in more detail. The following are helpful tips for SFOD
members:
• Select locations carefully for claymore mines before employing them in
the defensive system.
• Employ claymore mines in depth (at least two rows). Mines should be
at least 3 meters apart in each row to prevent sympathetic detonation.
• Ensure that placement of each claymore mine provides full coverage.
• Always fire the outer row first.
• Stagger each row to safeguard the claymore mines from the backblast
of the outer rows.
• Be aware that claymore mines are electrically command-detonated
from friendly positions (in this case, the berm). Identify which firing
wire leads to what row by simply tying a knot in the end of the wire.
One knot would indicate the first row (outer), two knots the second
row, and so on.
• Ensure alert training includes the locations of the mines controlled
from that position and the timing for their firing. Do not fire claymores
at a target that can be destroyed by other means.
• Avoid the centralized firing of banks of claymores (five or more) from a
master control position.
• Ensure claymores in the inner barrier face the rear of the outer
perimeter personnel. This arrangement is not a problem during an
attack as outer perimeter personnel should be in protected positions
and the inner barrier claymores will only be fired in the event of an
attempted breach of the inner barrier. A simple but time-consuming
solution is to disconnect the firing devices each day. An alternate
solution is to mount the mines to the inside lid of a used ammo crate or
box. The box is then buried in the ground and filled with enough dirt to
keep it in place and still allow the lid to close. The lid is then raised
each night (or when required) by a wire or rope. A stake is placed in the
ground behind the box to act as a stop and to prevent the lid from
coming back too far and allowing the mine to fire into the air
(Figure 3-22, page 3-25). Remove the metal latch to prevent infiltrators
from locking it down.
• Save the firing wires from expended claymore mines. SFOD members
can reuse them with the addition of a new blasting cap.
3-24
FM 3-05.230
• Check all claymore mines daily to ensure that they are ready to be fired
and that good circuits are present. Use the supplied test sets or a
galvanometer.
Tanglefoot
3-50. Detachment members use this obstacle belt to disrupt the enemy
during an assault and as a counter sapper measure. The tanglefoot usually
has a minimum depth of 9 meters. SFOD personnel place stakes at irregular
intervals from 1 to 3 meters apart. They also string barbed wire from these
stakes in irregular crisscross patterns at varying heights of 6 to 8 inches. This
process causes a crawling enemy to have to rise over the wire, thus exposing
him to observation and fires. SFOD members should—
• Always use metal stakes.
• Incorporate trip flares in the tanglefoot.
• Always rig flares on the friendly (inner) side of the obstacle belt with
the trip wires running forward at an angle toward the enemy (outer)
side. Doing so places the obstacle belt between an enemy and the trip
flares and will prevent him from disarming them before an attack or
breach.
3-25
FM 3-05.230
• Stake the bottoms of the concertina wire coils to the ground every 8 feet
or less in both the enemy and the friendly rows.
3-52. An attacking enemy will attempt to breach a triple concertina fence by—
• Using explosives (bangalore torpedoes).
• Using wire cutters. This is extremely time-consuming but not
impossible.
• Placing improvised scaling ladders under the fence and lifting up the
wire in a particular section to create a tunnel under the wire
(Figure 3-23).
• Using scaling ladders or mats placed on the fence as platforms to
depress the concertina coils to create a passage over the fence.
Channelizing Fences
3-53. These are usually triple concertina fences that crisscross the various
barbed wire and obstacle belts of the inner barrier. Their purpose is to
channel an attacking enemy into the fields of fire of friendly automatic
weapons. Their construction is identical to the triple concertina fence
described above.
Communications Trenches
3-54. These trenches zigzag through the inner barrier from the inner to the
outer perimeters (Figure 3-24, page 3-27). These trenches allow the protected
movement (from both friendly and enemy fires) of personnel and equipment
between these two perimeters. There should be at least one trench per wall or
side. SFOD members should—
• Always excavate communications trenches in an irregular zigzag
pattern.
• Ensure trenches are at least 6 feet deep and are wide enough to permit
foot traffic in both directions at once.
• Always construct and emplace retaining walls to prevent cave-ins and
normal erosion during the rainy season.
3-26
FM 3-05.230
• Use the strongest, most durable material available to act as the facing
walls. Support in place by using pickets not smaller than 3 1/2 inches in
diameter. Maximum spacing between pickets should not exceed 5 feet.
Drive these pickets into the floor of the trench at least 17 inches.
Anchor the pickets at the top by running wire out to stakes or to
another form of tie-down located outside the trench. Use the formula
and diagrams outlined in FM 5-34, Chapter 6, to determine the length
of these anchor wires.
• Ensure that turns at the zigzags will allow transport of a litter through
them. A simple solution is to cut off the inside corners.
• Lock all entrances to the inner perimeter during the hours of darkness.
Each trench entrance in this perimeter should have a trapdoor
arrangement constructed and kept locked except during actual alerts.
Trip Flares
3-55. Detachment personnel rig all barbed-wire fences in the inner barrier
with trip flares. These should be inspected daily. Properly employed, trip
flares will not only give early warning but also illuminate an attacking
enemy. SFOD members should heed the following instructions:
• Never attach trip flares to the metal pickets of any fence. This is the
first place that an enemy will look. Attach flares to a separate metal or
wooden stake located behind the fence and always on the friendly
(inner) side. Run trip wires forward at an angle toward the enemy
(outer) side. This method will prevent the enemy from disarming them
before he attacks.
• Place trip flares in channelizing fences (these fences are unique in that
they do not have a friendly or enemy side) by locating them on separate
stakes between the coils of concertina wire rows. Run the trip wires out
to the right and left in an irregular pattern to the outer coils
(Figure 3-25, page 3-28). This method will prevent the enemy from
disarming the flares before an attack.
• Inspect all fences and flares daily.
3-27
FM 3-05.230
OUTER PERIMETER
3-56. The outer perimeter is the central defensive position of the camp
(Figure 3-26, page 3-29). The majority of the camp’s reaction force and
weapons defend this position. Numerous bunkers containing automatic and
crew-served weapons surround it. Water table permitting, these bunkers are
constructed underground. This allows the bunkers on the inner perimeter to
engage targets outside the camp without having their fires masked by the
outer perimeter positions. A perimeter trench links together all fighting
bunkers, platoon and company command posts, mortar pits, and ammo
bunkers located in the outer perimeter. Numerous individual fighting
positions are integral parts of each trench section. Normally, one reaction
force company is responsible for each side, to include one corner of the inner
perimeter. They are connected by communications trenches, at least one per
wall. These trenches allow the protected movement of personnel and
equipment between the two perimeters.
3-57. The outer perimeter consists of various protective features and
facilities. These are described in the following paragraphs.
Fighting Bunkers
3-58. Water table permitting, detachment members construct these bunkers
underground. They should have a depth of at least 5 feet. Logs used in the
construction sides and the roof should be at least 6 inches in diameter. SFOD
members then add a blast layer of soil to the roof. This layer should be at
least 2 feet deep. Personnel often add a burster layer over this blast layer.
These bunkers have three firing ports: one to the front and one each on the
left and right sides. Each bunker contains at least one automatic weapon.
Personnel stock each bunker with ample supplies and small arms ammo,
grenades, food, water, and first-aid supplies.
3-28
FM 3-05.230
Guard Towers
3-59. When possible, guard towers should be positioned around the outer
perimeter so that the towers have interlocking visibility.
3-29
FM 3-05.230
Sleeping Bunkers
3-60. Each of the fighting bunkers has an adjoining sleeping bunker. This
bunker serves as the living quarters for the reaction force personnel manning
that particular section of the perimeter (Figures 3-5, page 3-7, and 3-6, page
3-8). Though addressed as separate entities for the sake of clarity,
detachment members actually construct the fighting and sleeping bunkers as
one installation with the perimeter trench passing through the center
dividing the two sections. All other construction details are identical. An
L-shaped entrance with steps is located in the rear of each sleeping section.
These steps permit entry to both the bunker and the perimeter trench.
RPG Screens
3-61. SFOD members erect a section of chain-link fence 10 feet in front of
each fighting bunker to defeat RPG rounds. Angling this fence prevents
oblique shots from hitting the bunker (Figure 3-4, page 3-6).
Perimeter Trench
3-62. This trench connects all the defensive positions of the outer perimeter
(Figure 3-27). This trench is usually 6 feet deep and wide enough to permit two-
way traffic. Each section of this trench contains numerous individual fighting
positions (bays). These positions have firing ports that cover the outer barrier, a
firing step-up, and a grenade sump. The rear wall of this trench (side closest to
the inner barrier) is slightly higher than the front wall containing the
individual fighting positions. This arrangement protects the occupants of these
positions from fires of the inner perimeter. Detachment members must provide
adequate drainage for this trench system and bunkers. All other construction
details are identical to those of the communications trenches described in the
inner barrier section of this chapter.
Vehicle Revetments
3-63. These are identical in construction and use to those found in the inner
perimeter. On the outer perimeter, vehicle revetments are constructed
parallel to the perimeter trench. This location affords vehicles protection from
both friendly and enemy fire.
3-30
FM 3-05.230
Mortar Positions
3-64. Usually, SFOD members locate the camp’s light mortars (60
millimeter [mm]) in the outer perimeter. These pits are identical to those
constructed in the inner perimeter. Built below ground, the pit contains the
weapon, ready-ammo box, and an increment disposal can. The only difference
in construction is that the mortar pits on the outer perimeter not only have
steps connecting them with ground level, but also have a small passageway
that connects them to the perimeter trench. An adjacent bunker (with
overhead cover) serves as a crew shelter and ammo area. This bunker may
also serve as living quarters for the mortar crew. Detachment members
construct a triple-decked bunk in the space normally occupied by the cased
mortar ammo. This arrangement not only positions the crew close to their
assigned weapon, but also allows more room in the sleeping bunkers.
Ammunition Bunkers
3-65. SFOD members construct these bunkers underground (water table
permitting) on the outer perimeter and facing the communications trench.
They are located close to where this trench joins the outer perimeter trench.
This arrangement places an ammo bunker close to the center of each reaction
force company’s defensive position. There is one ammo bunker per section
(side) of outer perimeter. These bunkers have a double-wide door for ease in
loading and unloading operations. Detachment personnel organize and stack
(by type) the ammo stored in these bunkers. The construction of a second tin
roof above the existing one is an excellent addition to this bunker. This roof
should slope away from the bunker entrance and the communications trench.
Latrines
3-67. On the outer perimeter, SFOD members construct burnout-type
latrines above ground. These latrines are identical to those found in the inner
perimeter. Usually, detachment members construct at least three latrines per
section (side) of the outer perimeter. SFOD members must ensure they
account for the dead space created by these structures.
3-31
FM 3-05.230
camp, detachment members must consider water storage for a camp under
siege conditions. SFOD members should plan for this contingency in advance.
Two 10-foot water towers should supply all the camp’s needs. Detachment
personnel use pump and purification systems. Aboveground buildings serve
as the shower points for reaction force personnel. SFOD members must
ensure they account for the dead space created by these structures.
Dining Facility
3-69. SFOD personnel construct this building above ground. In addition to
the dining area, there is also a serving line, kitchen, food storage area, and a
butcher shop. Food must be sufficient in both quality and quantity. The
butcher shop is a necessity. Detachment members slaughter live animals on a
regular basis. This practice greatly reduces the camp’s refrigeration
requirements. U.S. and HN team medical personnel must constantly monitor
all sanitation procedures at the dining facility. From the standpoint of
morale, food problems are major problems. U.S. personnel should attempt to
eat what the HN personnel are eating.
Perimeter Road
3-70. This road allows camp personnel in vehicles to service the various
installations of the outer perimeter. Detachment members construct small,
single-lane trench bridges to allow vehicle passage over the communications
trenches. These bridges must be sturdy enough to support the largest vehicle
in camp when it is fully loaded.
Fire-Fighting Posts
3-71. Fire-fighting posts are located throughout the entire camp. These
posts are identical in design to those located in the inner perimeter.
OUTER BARRIER
3-72. The outer barrier is the main obstacle zone that surrounds the camp
(Figure 3-28, page 3-33). This barrier is two or more barbed-wire entangle-
ments in depth with intervals containing additional obstacle belts between
them. Fires from positions on both the outer and inner perimeters cover this
entire zone. This barrier must be wide enough to prevent the enemy from
getting within grenade-throwing range. Detachment members leave one
passage open through this barrier. This passage is for the access road that
allows vehicles to enter the inner perimeter.
3-32
FM 3-05.230
3-73. Starting from the bunkers and trenches and working out, the outer
barrier usually contains the protective features discussed in the following
paragraphs. Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and
security are also included. Some of these protective measures may be
improvised; however, all mines should be command-detonated
whenever possible.
3-33
FM 3-05.230
Claymore Belt
3-74. This belt contains two rows of claymore mines, allowing the mines to
be used against assaults from two directions. Detachment members must
check claymores daily.
Punji Moat
3-75. The moat is one of the oldest forms of field fortifications. Properly
constructed, it still remains a very formidable barrier against enemy attacks
(Figure 3-29). SFOD members excavate a ditch (at least 8 feet deep and 8 feet
wide) around the entire outer perimeter. They embed punji stakes (15 to 18
inches long) at 1-foot intervals in both the sides and floor of this moat. These
sharpened stakes of bamboo or wood are excellent expedient antipersonnel
devices. Several thousand stakes are required for each section (side).
Punji Field
3-76. An attacking enemy will attempt to cross the moat by using
improvised scaling ladders. With this fact in mind, detachment members
extend a punji field from the forward edge of the moat outward for 5 meters.
Detachment members embed these punjis in the ground to a depth of 3 to 4
inches at an angle of 45 degrees. The punjis will impale an attacking enemy
between the knee and the ankle. For increased effectiveness, detachment
members often emplace punjis in clusters of three stakes. One stake runs
forward and the other two are angled out 30 degrees to the right and left.
Double-Apron Fence
3-77. A reinforced double-apron, barbed-wire fence is erected forward of the
punji field. This fence is identical to the one constructed in the inner barrier.
Tanglefoot
3-78. Detachment members use this obstacle belt to disrupt the enemy
during an assault and as a counter sapper measure. Tanglefoot usually has a
minimum depth of 9 meters. All other construction details are identical to the
inner barrier.
3-34
FM 3-05.230
3-35
FM 3-05.230
the detonating cord. Install a plastic priming adapter onto the branch
line near the blasting cap.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the fuse well of the grenade and
screw the priming adapter to hold this assembly in place. Refill the
hole surrounding the grenade with soil to protect the blasting cap from
fragments or tampering.
3-83. Detachment members employ grenades in clusters of three to five
devices when used as controlled mines. The pattern of installation can be in
meters. The installation process for each device is identical to the one
described above. When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of
detonating cord is laid behind the devices. The branch line from each device is
then joined to the ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free
ends of the branch lines are sealed with waterproofing compound. The free
end of the ring main is run to a location just outside the leading edge of the
punji field. At this point, it joins the claymore firing wire leading out from the
bunker or individual fighting positions on the outer perimeter. The electric
blasting cap on the claymore line is taped 6 inches from the end of the ring
main and is sealed with waterproofing compound to protect it from moisture.
The entire firing system (from firing point to the explosive devices) is then
buried to protect it from damage. Only the portion of the firing system that
crosses the moat is left exposed. (Figure 3-30, page 3-37, shows a layout of
firing systems.)
3-84. Detonating cord. SFOD members should follow these instructions:
• Select the location for the device. (This should be an area
approximately 10 meters square.)
• Enclose this entire area with a ring main of detonating cord.
• Prepare four branch lines of detonating cord. In this application, the
detonating cord is doubled and has overhand knots tied every 6 feet.
Branch lines are approximately 9 meters long. Branch lines run
lengthwise with the ring main and are spaced 2 meters apart.
• Secure the branch line to the ring main using a girth hitch with one
extra turn. Branch lines join the ring main at an angle of 90 degrees,
and at least 6 inches of this line should be left free beyond the tie. Use
waterproofing compound to seal the free end of the branch line.
• Cover the loop of the ring main and the branch lines with a thin layer
of soil.
• Bury the remainder of the ring main and the claymore firing wire to a
depth of at least 6 inches for maximum protection from damage. (When
detonated during an attack, the detonating cord will cause any enemy
soldier in contact with it to become a casualty. Those in close proximity
to this detonation will probably become victims of shock.)
3-36
FM 3-05.230
3-37
FM 3-05.230
3-38
FM 3-05.230
• Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap to the device end of the branch line.
• Use waterproofing compound to seal the area where the cap joins the
detonating cord.
• Install a plastic priming adapter onto the branch line near the blasting cap.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the threaded cap well of the
shaped charge. Using the plastic priming adapter to hold this assembly
in place, they sandbag the sides, rear, and top of the charge to protect it
from damage and to prevent it from moving.
• Connect the free end of the branch line to the claymore firing wire. The
electric blasting cap on the claymore wire is taped 6 inches from the
end of the branch line. The end of the branch line is sealed and
waterproofed. The entire system is buried to protect it from damage.
Only the portion that crosses the moat is left exposed. Shaped charges
are powerful weapons. Only single charges, not clusters, are used as
controlled mines.
3-39
FM 3-05.230
• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the destructor or C-4. (If C-4 is
used then the adapter is not required.)
• Waterproof the area where the cap joins the projectile.
3-89. When used as controlled mines, projectiles are employed in clusters of
three to five devices. The pattern of installation can be in straight or
staggered lines. The distance between devices depends on the type of
projectile used. The installation process for each device is identical to those
listed above. When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of detonating
cord is laid behind the devices. The branch line from each device is then
joined to the ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free ends
of the branch lines are sealed with waterproofing compound. From this point,
the installation of the remainder of the firing system is identical to the
process described above for controlled mines. One advantage of using
projectiles as controlled mines is, in effect, it gives SFOD members what
equates to a mortar or artillery barrage exactly where they want it and when
they need it.
3-90. 55-gallon drums of gasoline. To prepare gasoline drums for use as
controlled mines, SFOD members—
• Select the location for the device and place two sandbags on the ground
end to end, parallel to the outer perimeter.
• Lay a 55-gallon drum of gasoline on its side with the top of the drum
(filler cap end) resting on the sandbags.
• Rotate the drum so that the filler cap is in the twelve o’clock position.
• Attach a 1-pound block of TNT centered in rear of the drum with
adhesive paste.
• Dig a small hole approximately 5 inches deep in front of the drum.
• Run a branch line of detonating cord from the device to a location on
the leading edge of the punji field where it will eventually join the
claymore firing wire. (These are not connected at this time.)
• Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap to the device end of the branch line.
• Waterproof the area where the cap joins the branch line.
• Install a plastic priming adapter near the blasting cap.
• Prepare a second branch line approximately 8 feet long in the manner
described above.
• Remove the fuse assembly from a WP grenade.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap on the end of the 8-foot branch line
into the threaded cap well of the grenade, using the plastic priming
adapter to hold this assembly in place.
• Place the grenade into the hole with the free end of the branch line
running toward the rear of the drum; refill the hole with soil.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap on the long branch line into the
threaded cap well of the TNT charge on the rear of the drum, using the
plastic priming adapter to hold this assembly in place.
3-40
FM 3-05.230
• Sandbag the sides, rear, and top of the drum to protect it from damage
and movement.
• Waterproof the free end and then join the branch line to the main
branch using a girth hitch with one extra turn.
3-91. From this point, the installation of the firing system is identical to the
process described above for controlled mines. When used as controlled mines,
gasoline drums are employed as single devices, not clusters. They are
effective out to approximately 85 meters. A WP grenade should always be
included to ensure positive ignition of the gasoline. Either plastic explosive or
TNT alone will not always positively ignite fuel. In the device described
above, only gasoline was used. Gasoline is adequate for an antipersonnel
device. However, M4 thickener can be added to the gasoline as an enhancer.
Thickened fuel burns longer and clings to anything in its path. The one major
drawback is that over prolonged periods of time, thickened fuel deteriorates
and must be disposed of in a time-consuming process. On the other hand,
gasoline stores extremely well. Some may be lost to evaporation over a
prolonged period of time, but this is easily replaced. Drums should always be
emplaced with filler cap facing up.
Double-Apron Fence
3-92. This is identical in construction to the reinforced fence erected around
the punji field.
Access Road
3-95. This road allows vehicle passage to the inner perimeter. Detachment
members construct a trench bridge at the point where it crosses the punji
moat.
Channelizing Fences
3-96. These are triple concertina fences that crisscross the various barbed
wire and obstacle belts of the outer barrier. Their purpose is to channel an
attacking enemy into the fields of fire of friendly automatic weapons.
Trip Flares
3-97. All barbed-wire fences in the outer barrier are rigged with trip flares.
Barrier fences are inspected daily.
3-41
FM 3-05.230
Sensors
3-98. Detachment members use detection systems, if available, on the outer
perimeter to provide real-time information on enemy movement and
intention. Special emphasis is placed on monitoring dead space. Two
examples of detection systems are the Eagle Intrusion Detection System
(EIDS) and the Observation Post Kit (OP-KIT).
3-99. The EIDS is used as a force multiplier in supplementing manpower
with technology to increase security and provide real-time notification of
surreptitious entries into prohibited areas. The EIDS incorporates three basic
detectors: seismic, magnetic, and passive infrared to detect, classify, and
report unauthorized intrusions. Camera-monitoring devices are used as a
primary or alternate detection system, if feasible. Perimeter detection
systems provide minimal benefit unless continuously monitored.
3-100. The OP-KIT was developed to provide a remote long-range day- or
night-capable camera with remote control and transmission capability to
meet a variety of operational scenarios. As stated earlier, these systems
provide minimal benefit unless continuously monitored.
Miscellaneous
'HWDFKPHQW PHPEHUV EXU\ DOO ILULQJ GHYLFHV WR D GHSWK RI DW OHDVW
LQFKHV WR SURWHFW WKHP IURP IUDJPHQWV DQG WDPSHULQJ 'RLQJ VR LV H[WUHPHO\
LPSRUWDQW LQ WKH DUHDV ZKHUH GHWRQDWLQJ FRUG SDVVHV XQGHU EDUULHU IHQFHV
6)2' PHPEHUV PXVW SUHYHQW FXWWLQJ WKH EDUEHG ZLUH ZKHQ GHYLFHV DUH
GHWRQDWHGDQGDOZD\VFRQGXFWWHVWVKRWVLQWKHVRLOWKDWZLOOEHXQGHUWKHZLUH
3-102. Positions on the outer perimeter serve as firing points for both the
claymore mine belt and the controlled mine belt, which can lead to confusion
as to which firing wire detonates what mine. The knot system can be used to
determine the individual rows in a belt. All the wires leading to the controlled
mine belt are placed on the left side of the firing point. All wires leading to
the claymore belt are placed on the right side.
3-103. Alert training should include the location of the mines controlled from
that position and the timing for their firing. Controlled mines should not be
fired at a target that can be destroyed by some other means. SFOD members
must check all mines daily.
ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
3-104. The camp not only serves as an operational base to carry the battle to
the enemy, but also as an administrative center that must maintain constant
contact with the surrounding population. To accomplish this successfully,
each camp should have an administrative area (Figure 3-33, page 3-43). This
area is usually located between the outer barrier and the airfield. A triple
concertina fence and bunkers protect the area. This area permits the camp to
offer medical and administrative services to the local population while at the
same time not allowing them access to the camp.
3-105. The administrative area usually contains the following facilities.
Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also
included.
3-42
FM 3-05.230
3-43
FM 3-05.230
Main Gate
3-106. This gate is the only entrance to the camp and the first of several
gates on the access road. It is constructed of wood and laced with barbed wire.
The gate is wide enough to cover the single-lane access road and is guarded
24 hours a day. A sign is usually hung over this gate that gives the name of
the camp (the camp is no longer a secret by now). A smaller gate is usually
constructed on one side to allow personnel (patrols) passage at night when
the main vehicle gate is blocked. This gate is guarded 24 hours a day. At
night, there are at least two guards on duty at all times. During daylight
hours, three or more guards are required to screen all civilians seeking entry
to the dispensary or the government administrative buildings. Detachment
members lock the gate during the hours of darkness. They use knife-rest
devices (defined in paragraph 3-119, page 3-46) during this period to reinforce
this gate. SFOD members emplace these devices in front of and behind the
gate. They then chain these devices in position and lock them from the inside.
The guards at this gate have the key and pass it on to their relief. These
procedures also apply to the smaller personnel gate. Claymore mines and trip
flares are also used to reinforce this gate. They are installed at dusk and
removed at dawn.
Dispensary
3-107. SFOD members construct this building above ground, but chest-high
sandbags on the inside of the building protect it. For convenience, the
dispensary is located just inside the main gate. Both the camp’s reaction force
personnel and the local population receive normal day-to-day medical
treatment here. This building usually contains a waiting room, an office, at
least one treatment room, and a ward area. Some patients may be required to
remain in the ward overnight. For this reason, the dispensary is staffed for
24-hours-a-day operation. Usually, medical aides and nurses handle the night
shift with U.S. and HN medical personnel on call. Patients who require
prolonged treatment are evacuated to the rear area.
Guard Towers
3-108. When possible, guard towers should be positioned around the outer
perimeter. Guard towers should have interlocking visibility.
3-44
FM 3-05.230
targets and must be protected. They are usually quartered inside the camp at
night. A PSYOP and CA officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) can
provide valuable training and monitoring of these personnel and services.
Motor Pool
3-110. The motor pool is usually a large covered shed with several rooms at
one end that are used for office space and storage. Detachment members use
this area to service and repair the camp’s vehicles. Vehicles are parked inside
the camp at night in protected revetments. Only those vehicles under repair
remain in the motor pool overnight. Spare parts and tools are controlled
items and must be kept locked. SFOD members keep fire extinguishers
handy—the right type for each kind of fire.
Fuel Dump
3-111. This is a large revetment that serves as the central storage area for
most of the camp’s fuel supplies. Detachment members construct the
revetment out of earth and logs (similar to the berm) or out of dirt-filled
55-gallon drums. Revetment construction is necessary to protect fuel supplies
from both enemy and friendly fires. This dump serves as the central storage
area for some (never all) of the camp’s fuel supplies. Small reserve fuel
supplies are located in other areas of the camp (generator bunker). Fuel
supplies are normally shipped to the camp in 55-gallon sealed drums. If
available, self-sealing bladders should be installed in these revetment or
underground storage tanks for safer long-term storage. The fuel dump must
have chemical-type fire extinguishers readily available.
Helicopter Pad
3-112. The helicopter pad allows helicopters to land inside the camp. Usually
this pad is only large enough to accommodate a single utility-type helicopter
at a time. Heavy-lift and multiship formations must land at the airfield. The
pad can be circular or rectangular in shape. The surface of the pad must be
solid enough to support the aircraft in all types of weather. The surface is
marked with a large white and orange “H.” A windsock is placed near the pad
to assist aviators in determining pad location, as well as wind speed and
direction.
Bunkers
3-113. Automatic weapons bunkers at each of the corners, the main gate,
and the outer barrier gate protect the administrative area. These bunkers are
identical in construction to those on the outer perimeter. Detachment
members erect a section of chain-link fence 10 feet in front of each of these
bunkers to defeat RPG rounds. Angling this fence prevents oblique shots from
hitting the bunker. Detachment members rig the fence with trip flares and
claymore mines. They install the claymore mines each night and remove
them each morning.
3-114. These bunkers are manned 24 hours a day. Two of these bunkers are
used as traffic control points. The main gate bunker controls the flow of local
civilians seeking medical aid and administration buildings. The outer barrier
gate bunker prevents these same civilians from entering the motor pool and
fuel dump area or the remainder of the camp.
3-45
FM 3-05.230
Additional Facilities
3-116. The following facilities are also included in the administrative area:
• Outer barrier gate. This entrance is identical in construction and size to
the main gate.
• Latrines. At least two burn-type latrines are required to service the
administrative area.
• Fire-fighting post. The fire-fighting post has the same requirements as
for the inner and outer perimeters.
• Water supply. The dispensary will require a good water supply.
ACCESS ROAD
3-117. This single-lane road is the only quick passage into the camp. It runs
from a point outside the main gate to the inner perimeter. Special
consideration must be given to both the construction and fortification of this
road because it breaches all barriers and perimeters of the camp.
3-118. SFOD members construct gates at each barrier and perimeter entry
point. At night, the personnel lock all gates and reinforce them with knife-
rest devices, flares, and claymore mines. Spike boards are also emplaced
across the road in front of each gate. These boards prevent the enemy from
using a vehicle as a battering ram to attack the gate. The access road has
three curves in its construction:
• Where it joins the main road outside the camp.
• At a point inside the barrier.
• At a point inside the outer perimeter.
Should the enemy attempt to use a vehicle to attack a gate, these curves not
only force a reduction of speed but also will position the vehicle broadside to
the camp’s defensive fires.
3-119. During daylight hours when the road is in use, detachment members
remove all defensive obstacles. Traffic on this road is then controlled from
two bunkers: one located just inside the main gate and the other at the
entrance to the outer barrier. There are several types of defensive obstacles:
• Knife-rest devices. These are portable wooden or metal frames strung
with barbed wire. They are used to reinforce all access road gates
during the hours of darkness. These devices are emplaced in front of
and behind each access road gate. They are then chained in position
and locked from the inside. The guard at each gate has the key and
passes it on to his relief.
• Claymore mines and trip flares. These are emplaced forward of the
knife-rest devices each night. They are removed during daylight hours.
3-46
FM 3-05.230
SURROUNDING AREA
3-120. The surrounding area usually contains the following facilities and
locations that are critical to the camp’s survivability (Figure 3-34, page 3-48).
Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also
included.
Airfield
3-122. Air is the primary means of resupplying the camp. The larger the camp,
the greater the demand for logistics to support its operation. The volume of
supplies needed for a single camp alone exceeds the lift capacity of all the
helicopters usually assigned to a given operational area. Usually, helicopters
are in great demand for operational—not administrative—missions. Hence, an
airfield becomes a necessity to allow the use of fixed-wing aircraft to maintain
the camp’s logistical demands. The airfield must be large enough to accept the
largest aircraft operating in the camp’s area. SFOD members should always
place the airfield as close to the camp as possible. The enemy will quickly
recognize the airfield’s importance to the survival of the camp. The SFOD must
be prepared to provide protection of the airfield from the time construction
begins.
3-47
FM 3-05.230
3-48
FM 3-05.230
• Security of both the site and the equipment during construction of the
airfield.
• Convoy security to move the equipment out of the area after
construction is completed.
• Perforated steel planking (PSP) (an excellent addition to the surface of
the airfield). PSP will ensure a fairly reliable all-weather airstrip.
Installation of a windsock near the airfield will aid the aircrews. If the
airfield will be used at night, then it must have improvised lighting
installed to assist the pilots in landing and takeoffs. Firepots work
great for this purpose.
• A fire arrow installed on the edge of the runway to assist the pilot in
determining wind direction at night. The arrow should always be
pointed into the wind. (Figure 3-35 shows an example of an airfield
layout.)
Perimeter Road
3-124. This is a utility road that encircles the entire camp. It is primarily
used to transport personnel and equipment to camp construction and
maintenance projects in the outer barrier of the camp’s defensive system. It is
often easier to approach maintenance problems in this barrier from outside
the camp. The opposition uses two methods to interdict roads: mines and
ambushes. Of these, the use of mines is the most common form of attack.
Mining operations by the opposition usually occur during the hours of
darkness. These operations require a minimum number of personnel, require
a very brief period of time to accomplish, and are virtually impossible to
totally prevent. Roads must be swept daily by road-clearing patrols equipped
with mine detectors. Since this is a very exacting task, no individual should
be permitted to operate a detector for more than 20 minutes at a time. Once
3-49
FM 3-05.230
Main Road
3-125. This road serves as the primary link between the actual camp and
other locations that are within the camp’s area of influence. This road
services any outpost or friendly villages.
VEHICLES
3-127. All vehicles should have their windshields removed and their
floorboards sandbagged as protection against mines. During convoy
operations, SFOD members should always follow strict convoy distance and
security procedures. All vehicles must carry extra fuel, spare tires, tools, and
towing chains. Vehicles must be kept in a high state of repair (they may be
the only way out as a last resort). A highly qualified mechanic is required for
the vehicles and generators. He will need to cross-train local soldiers and
civilians to assist him.
KEY PERSONNEL
3-128. A camp is in many respects like a small town: both need a wide
variety of skilled workers to keep it running. Drivers, mechanics, carpenters,
cooks, plumbers, barbers, tailors, nurses, and clerks are but a few of the many
specialties that will be required to keep the camp running. Reaction force
personnel and their dependents should be canvassed for assistance in locating
the personnel required. A thorough background investigation should be
conducted on all “trusted” personnel.
DEPENDENTS
3-129. In most cases, married reaction force personnel will have their
families with them. This poses several problems—first and foremost, where to
put them. The easy solution would be to put them in separate quarters
outside the camp. However, doing so would allow the enemy to capitalize on
this and use them to overthrow the camp. It would also cause the reaction
force personnel to worry about their families each night. The best solution is
to put them inside the camp in underground bunkers between the outer
perimeter and the start of the inner barrier. Wherever they end up living,
they will have to be protected and cared for; therefore, it is important to have
a plan.
3-50
FM 3-05.230
CIVIC ACTION
3-130. The SF team’s approach to civic action will prove highly successful
when—
• It improves the capabilities of counterparts by requiring them to
participate in planning and carrying out the programs. Participation
improves efficiency and makes the people realize that the HN officials
are concerned with their welfare.
• It improves the HN system by working with the counterparts to ensure
that they are aware of the support available through the HN, and
encouraging or persuading them to use the government organization.
• SF personnel and their counterparts encourage the local civilians to
carry out self-help projects with reaction force troops providing some
assistance. Experience has shown that civilians have more personal
interest in projects in which they participate.
• The use of reaction force troops on civic action projects helps develop
good relations between troops and civilians. Civic action projects will do
more for the cause of defeating the enemy in the long term than most
military operations that are undertaken.
3-131. Commanders must establish a viable plan from the very beginning of
establishing the camp to ensure mission success in the end. FM 41-10, Civil
Affairs Operations, contains further information on civic actions. The
functional areas of civic action are—
• Health and sanitation.
• Education and training.
• Agriculture.
• Welfare and refugees.
• Transportation.
• Commercial development.
• Resources control.
COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS
3-132. The following information discusses relationship concerns between
the United States and its counterparts. U.S. advisors—
• Do not command their counterparts’ units.
• Must establish long-standing relationships and rapport with
counterparts.
• Should recommend corrections to their counterparts as required.
• Should support their counterparts in disputes with U.S. agencies if this
support is warranted.
• Should not present too many subjects at once to their counterparts.
• Should ensure through testing that the counterparts understand what
they have been taught.
3-51
FM 3-05.230
DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS
3-133. The best defense is a good offense. The following paragraphs discuss
important information for the SFOD to take into consideration.
3-134. SFOD members should establish a series of outpost and ambush sites
around the camp’s surrounding area each night. They should also employ
outpost and saturation patrolling during daylight hours.
3-135. SFOD members must develop a base defense plan from the beginning.
It should include final protective fires and sectors of fire for machine guns,
the principal direction of fire for automatic rifles, and barrages and
concentration for mortars and artillery. Indirect fires should be preplanned
and, if possible, preregistered. Consideration should be given to possible
request for tactical air support. Range cards must be prepared for all crew-
served weapons. Fires must be controlled so that preliminary enemy probes
do not give away automatic weapons positions and fire plans. Normally,
mortars and shoulder-fired weapons should be used against small-scale
actions that do not severely threaten the camp. Night firing devices are used
for indirect fire weapons. Aiming stakes and other similar devices should be
used for direct fire weapons to assist in control of fire. A countermortar plan
must be developed, and firing units capable of supporting this plan should be
assigned specific areas of fire.
3-136. Other defensive considerations include the following:
• A good barrier plan is essential; however, local security should never
depend on physical barriers alone. A well-coordinated illumination plan
must be developed and rehearsed.
• Multiple means of communication should be established between both
perimeters and the TOC.
• The chain of command within all units must be well defined to preclude
confusion.
• Emergency plans to restore communications and provide medical aid to
ensure uninterrupted defense of the area must be developed and
rehearsed.
MORALE
3-137. A paramilitary organization does not have the hold on the individual
soldier in regards to absences without leave (AWOLs) and deserters that a
regular army unit has. Excessive AWOLs and desertions decrease combat
effectiveness, and lead to less successful operations. Good food, living
3-52
FM 3-05.230
conditions, care of dependents, and athletic programs will add to the overall
morale of the camp and its personnel.
WATER SUPPLY
3-138. Standard military water supply procedures should be used whenever
possible. Water blivets, reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs),
and standard-issue water cans are a few examples of what may be available.
Springs
3-139. Springs often make an excellent source of water. They should be dug
deep, and sealed, fenced, and piped to the camp. Proper development of a
spring will increase the flow of ground water and lower the chance of
contamination from surface water. Springs are usually of two types: gravity-
seepage, where the water-bearing soil comes to the surface over hard,
underlying soil; and artesian, where the water under pressure and trapped by
the hard layer of soil finds an opening and wells to the surface. Detachment
members should dig a small hole near the spring to determine the depth of
the hard soil and whether the spring is gravity-seepage or artesian.
Personnel then check uphill and nearby for sources of contamination. They
have the water tested to determine purification requirements before
drinking. A final point to check is to determine if the spring runs water
during long, dry spells. Usually the soil is dug to the hard, underlying part,
and a tank of reinforced, watertight concrete is made on all but the uphill
side. The opening on the uphill side should be lined with porous concrete or
stone without mortar to admit the gravity-seepage water. The uphill side can
be backfilled with gravel and sand, which helps keep fine materials in the
water-bearing soil from entering the spring. If the hard soil cannot be
reached easily, a concrete cistern is built. A pipe containing holes that is
placed in the water-bearing layer of soil can feed this cistern. With an
artesian type of spring, all sides of the tank are made of watertight,
reinforced concrete, but the bottom is left open. The water then enters
through the bottom.
Cisterns
3-140. These are used to store rainwater and other caught or gathered
water. The cistern must be watertight to prevent surface contamination from
polluting the supply. Reinforced concrete is the best material since it is
strong, has a long life, and can be made quite watertight. A manhole and
drain must be provided so that it can be cleaned. A vent and a place to add
chlorine for disinfectant are also necessary. The cistern should be able to hold
at least 3,000 gallons (7 1/2 x 7 1/2 x 7 1/2 feet). To ensure that the cistern is
watertight, approximately 5 1/2 U.S. gallons of water to 100 pounds of cement
is used. When the concrete is mixed, it should be tamped thoroughly and the
surface kept damp for at least 10 days. If possible, the walls and floor should
be poured at the same time. The manhole entrance must be at least 4 inches
above the cistern surface and the cover must overlap by 2 inches. The bottom
of the cistern should be sloped so that one part can be more easily siphoned or
bailed out when cleaning. If an overflow is installed, it should be covered with
a copper screen.
3-53
FM 3-05.230
3-141. The cistern should be properly cleaned and disinfected before use and
at regular intervals, as required. Downspouts from aboveground structures
can be used to fill the cistern. A catchment screen and sand filter should
always be installed between the cistern and incoming water source. A sand
filter will prepare water for either boiling or chlorinating. The sand filter
should be at least one-tenth the size of the catchment area. A typical filter
will be 4 x 4 feet for a 3,000-gallon cistern. The filter will be layered from the
bottom up with coarse gravel (1 inch), fine gravel (1 inch), coarse sand (1
inch), and fine, clean sand (18 inches). About every 6 months, the manhole
cover to the filter must be removed and the filter cleaned. All matter from the
splash plate should be removed, and the top 1/2 inch of sand should be
scraped off and removed. When the depth of the sand becomes only 12 inches,
it should be rebuilt with clean sand to the original 18 inches.
3-54
FM 3-05.230
• Close valve number 2 and open valve number 1 so that untreated water
enters the mixing barrel.
• Close valve number 1 and mix solution in the mixing barrel with a
stick.
• Remove the prop from the float valve of the solution tank so that it will
operate properly.
• Open wide the metering valve and valve number 4 to clean the system;
allow a gallon to drain through the system.
• Close down the metering valve until only a stream of drops enters the
funnel.
• Open valve number 3.
3-144. Detachment members must use trial-and-error methods to learn how
much concentrate should be put in the concentrate barrel and the amount of
solution to allow past the funnel. The result should be water with a noticeable
chlorine taste in the distribution system. The flow into the funnel and the
taste of the water in the distribution system should be checked regularly to
ensure proper treatment and operation.
3-55
FM 3-05.230
3-56
FM 3-05.230
3-145. Units select base campsites that most effectively use available
terrain, water supplies, and HN personnel to accomplish their mission. The
base camp is established to facilitate the SF missions. A base camp is
established in the JSOA when the HN requests assistance and HN personnel
are trained in FID. The base camps are sometimes built in an austere and
hostile environment. In many places, the United States must consider the
implications of their presence. The populace tends to be suspicious of the
unfamiliar; the use of CA and PSYOP should be underscored to minimize any
negative effects caused by the construction of the camp.
3-146. Opening up the base camp and conducting operations and training
should last no more than 60 days. Then the camp is considered capable of
accomplishing its assigned mission with no supplementary forces or
assistance. By this date, all nonorganic troops will be withdrawn and all
logistical support will be provided through normal channels on a request
basis. The average life of an operational base camp is approximately 18
months. This time is based on the fact that the opposition would either
comply or move operations following the realization that the base camp could
not be eliminated by various means, and that joint operations were winning
the full trust of the HN people.
3-147. Consideration must be given to media reporting during the period
that the base camp is operational. Appendix K provides information on media
support.
3-57
FM 3-05.230
3-58
FM 3-05.230
and operation. Trained personnel also exploit cordon and search operations
for individuals and information of intelligence interest.
3-152. In stability operations and support operations, cordon and search
operations are used to search out the opposition infrastructure as well as
individual unit elements; these cordon and search operations may use a
community or area as cover for their activities or as a support base. CI agents
conduct these operations, whenever possible, with HN forces and
organizations.
3-153. Ideally, U.S. forces, including CI personnel, provide support while HN
officials direct the entire operation. HN personnel, as a minimum, should be
part of the screening and sweep elements on any cordon and search
operation. In situations where there is no viable HN government, these
operations may be conducted unilaterally or as part of a combined force.
SCREENING OPERATIONS
3-154. The purpose of CI screening operations is to identify persons of CI
interest or verify persons referred by HICs who are of CI interest, and gather
information of immediate CI interest. Based on priority intelligence
requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IRs), screening can be
focused in any direction to meet the commander’s requirements.
3-59
FM 3-05.230
Indicators
3-157. CI personnel use the following indicators in an attempt to identify
hostile infiltrators. CI personnel look for persons—
• Of military age.
• Traveling alone or in pairs.
• Without ID.
• With unusual documents.
• With suspicious wounds or apparent combat wounds.
• Possessing large amounts of money, precious metals, or gems.
• Displaying any peculiar activity.
• Trying to avoid detection or questioning.
• Using enemy methods of operating.
• Having a pro-enemy background.
• With a suspicious story.
• With a family in enemy areas.
• With a technical skill or knowledge.
• Who have collaborated.
• Who violate regulations in enemy areas.
3-60
FM 3-05.230
Checkpoints
3-159. This type of screening requires personnel to prepare apprehension
lists and indicators to be used by screening teams. Specialized equipment,
such as metal detection kits, would significantly enhance the screening
process. These teams will provide the initial screening and will detain and
refer suspects to the military intelligence (MI) control element for detailed CI
interrogation and possible exploitation.
3-160. Checkpoints are placed in strategic locations where there is sufficient
space for assembling people under guard and for parking vehicles for search
and investigation (Figure 3-37, page 3-62). These checkpoints are set up as
either mobile or static missions. Local security is posted to protect the
checkpoint, and a sufficient amount of personnel are posted to the front and
rear to catch anyone attempting to avoid the checkpoint. The preparation
needed for static and mobile checkpoints is identical to other screening
operations and the indicators will remain the same.
3-161. Mobile checkpoint. A mobile checkpoint is used as a moving system
by which the team, either mounted or on foot, briefly selects individuals at
random. These checkpoints are located at various points for periods not to
exceed one day.
3-162. Static checkpoint. Static checkpoints are those manned perma-
nently by MP units or troops at the entrance to a bridge, town gates, river
crossing, or similar strategic point.
3-61
FM 3-05.230
3-62
FM 3-05.230
3-168. In the collection or screening station, the CI team personnel bring the
residents to the collection area (or holding area) and then systematically lead
them to specific screening stations (Figure 3-38). En route to the screening
station, CI team personnel search each individual for weapons. Then they
lead the residents past the mayor or community leaders (opposition defectors
or cooperating prisoners who will be hidden from view so that they can
uncompromisingly identify any recognizable opposition). These informants
will be provided with the means to notify a nearby guard or a screener if they
spot an enemy member. Once spotted, CI personnel will immediately
segregate this individual and appropriate personnel will interrogate him.
3-63
FM 3-05.230
SECURITY MEASURES
3-169. Army Regulation (AR) 190-16, Physical Security, paragraph 1-5,
outlines the physical security programs that will provide the means to
counter threat entities during peacetime, mobilization, and wartime. These
include—
• Hostile intelligence services.
• Paramilitary forces.
• Terrorists or saboteurs.
• Criminal elements.
• Protest groups.
• Disaffected persons.
Physical security procedures include, but are not limited to—
• Using physical security equipment or measures to reduce vulnerability
to a threat.
• Integrating physical security into contingency, mobilization, and
wartime plans, and testing physical security procedures and measures
during the exercise of these plans.
• Coordinating base camp OPSEC, crime prevention, and physical
security programs to protect against the total criminal element.
• Training guards at sensitive or other storage sites in tactical defense
against, and in response to, attempted penetrations.
• Creating physical security awareness.
3-170. AR 190-16, paragraph 1-7, states that threat assessments are
comprised of the following resources:
• Monitoring. Due to diverse missions, the dispersal of forces, and
various states of readiness, base camps must constantly monitor
current and potential threats. Threat information is normally passed
through intelligence summaries, serious incident reports, law
enforcement, and security incident reports.
• Analysis. Base camps will develop a local threat statement based on
local area analysis and information provided by service intelligence and
investigative organizations.
• Security resources. The threat statement is an essential tool for the
commander to use to determine the commitment of physical security
resources. It is an integral part of the installation physical security or
resource protection plan.
3-171. The security of the base camp depends on each individual there. By
integrating the above measures and the proper equipment, the lives and
equipment of the camp will be safer.
3-64
Chapter 4
Redeployment
Closing out a base camp is a critical part of mission planning throughout
all phases of operation. Initial plans for the disposition of the base camp
must begin as soon as the mission is received. Based on U.S. Government
(USG) goals and the situation on the ground, the disposition of the camp
can take any of the forms discussed below. STP 31-18-SM-TG, Soldier’s
Manual and Trainer’s Guide, CMF 18, Special Forces Basic Tasks, Skill
Levels 3/4, and FM 3-05.20 contain additional information.
4-1
FM 3-05.230
FINAL CLOSEOUT
4-6. Final closeout of a base camp can be expected to include logistical and
financial considerations. Some of these are—
• Assembly of HN forces, to include employees of the facility, into
assembly areas.
• Completion of administrative records of all personnel at the facility, to
include inventorying and accounting for arms, equipment, and
sensitive items.
• Settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits to any HN personnel
employed at the facility.
4-2
FM 3-05.230
4-3
Appendix A
Weights, Measures,
and Conversion Tables
Tables A-1 through A-5, pages A-1 and A-2, show metric units and their
U.S. equivalents. Tables A-6 through A-15, pages A-2 through A-5, are
conversion tables.
Table A-1. Linear Measure
Unit Other Metric Equivalent U.S. Equivalent
1 centimeter 10 millimeters 0.39 inch
1 decimeter 10 centimeters 3.94 inches
1 meter 10 decimeters 39.37 inches
1 decameter 10 meters 32.8 feet
1 hectometer 10 decameters 328.08 feet
1 kilometer 10 hectometers 3,280.8 feet
A-1
FM 3-05.230
A-2
FM 3-05.230
A-3
FM 3-05.230
A-4
FM 3-05.230
A-5
Appendix B
Logistical Sustainment
The U.S. Army strategy for conducting operations has changed from air-
land to force projection using tailored packages. Commands have aligned
their unit sustainment organizations and activities with the U.S. Army’s
concept of force projection. This change allows units to integrate organic
CS and CSS elements within the theater Army support structure for
continuous and responsive sustainment to deployed units. FM 100-25
contains additional information.
DIRECT SUPPORT
B-1. When the theater support system is in place, it can meet most unit
requirements except dedicated direct support (DS), which unit CS and CSS
must provide. Logistic planners then must concentrate on the following
areas:
• Initial entry. Planners must determine the type of sustainment
required: the number of days of accompanying supplies based on the
time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) and the unit basing
needs.
• Buildup and integration. Planners must coordinate and integrate
logistics with the theater support system before TPFDL closure and as
it continues to mature (FM 100-25, Chapter 7).
PREPARATION MODES
B-3. Deliberate planning and crisis-action planning are the two
methodologies of planning. In deliberate planning and preparation, ARSOF
and the ASCC can fully identify support requirements in OPLANs and
concept plans (CONPLANs) from a bare-based SOR down to the user level
based on an established set of planning assumptions. In this way, the ASCC
coordinates how to fulfill requirements from the support structure in the
theater Army. In crisis-action planning and preparation, the requirements
anticipated at the combatant commander’s level dictate the amount of
B-1
FM 3-05.230
B-2
FM 3-05.230
unit requirements at all stages of the mission. Ideally, the J-4 uses the ASCC
OPLAN in preparing his CONPLAN for inclusion in the mission order. This
approach allows theater support elements time to review required support
before the SOF mission unit submits its mission-tailored SOR. This review is
especially critical in crisis-action planning and short-notice mission changes.
The SOR is a living document that requires periodic reevaluation and
updating as requirements change. Determination of requirements begins
with the receipt of the mission. Time and accuracy are critical factors.
B-10. Although deliberate planning is the preferred method, crisis-action
planning is within the framework. The key is to anticipate requirements
based on emerging operations and then to use approved OPLANs.
RESPONSIBILITIES
B-12. Responsibilities for planning and executing theater support do not
align with the levels of war or with the HQ normally associated with them.
The ASCC provides the necessary capability for the Army forces assigned to
a unified command.
B-13. The geographic combatant commander supports SOF in his AOR. The
ARSOF logistics planners identify the support requirements in the planning
phase. The ASCC must also identify the logistics shortfalls for inclusion in
the combatant commander’s risk assessment in his AOR. If the ASCC cannot
support ARSOF, the ASCC must raise the shortfall to the supported
combatant commander for resolution.
B-14. The theater SOC tasks missions to ARSOF. The theater SOC works
closely with the unified command staff and the theater ASCC to articulate
the ARSOF requirements. The geographic combatant commander establishes
priorities and allocates the available resources to ARSOF to accomplish each
mission. The ASCC develops the theater support plan, which includes
sustainment of ARSOF by the theater logistics organizations. The theater
SOC then monitors ARSOF sustainment in the theater.
B-15. The SOC and ARSOF logisticians coordinate with the ASCC to develop
plans and subsequent orders to implement directives the ASCC will issue to
B-3
FM 3-05.230
support the ARSOF assigned to the unified command. The SOC advises the
ASCC commander on the appropriate command and support relationships for
each ARSOF mission. The SOTSE keeps USASOC informed of the status of
ASCC’s supporting plans.
B-4
FM 3-05.230
(CLASSIFICATION)
1. REFERENCES.
2. GENERAL.
a. Unit to Be Supported.
b. When Support Is Required.
c. Location of Supported Unit When Support Is Required.
d. Unit Points of Contact.
e. Number of Personnel to Be Supported.
f. Unit Identification Code.
g. Force Activity Designator.
h. Funding. Special funding for the operation and how to access, if applicable. Fund flow
for obtaining supplies, including project code.
3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
a. Mission. State the general mission of the unit, command, or operation.
b. Desired Results. Provide a concise statement of the desired results of the support
being requested.
4. ASSUMPTIONS. Give the conditions that are likely or must exist for this support to be
required. Relate the assumptions to specific requirements, as required or appropriate.
5. CONSTRAINTS. Define situation that, if experienced, will degrade operations. Give
conditions to specific requirements identified, as required or appropriate.
6. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION. Describe functional command and
control of the unit.
7. SUPPLIES.
a. Class I.
(1) Dining facility requirements.
(2) Augmentation.
(3) Food storage facilities. Determine which of the following food storage facilities are
required to contain a 30-day supply of rations.
(a) Dry space in cubic feet.
(b) Chill space in cubic feet.
(c) Freezer space in cubic feet.
(4) Mermites. Determine requirements for mermites. List how many and how often
they are required.
(5) Meal payment. Determine how individuals will pay for their meals.
(CLASSIFICATION)
B-5
FM 3-05.230
(CLASSIFICATION)
(CLASSIFICATION)
B-6
FM 3-05.230
(CLASSIFICATION)
(d) Oil (bulk).
(e) Grease.
(f) Coolants.
(g) Packaged POL or other lubricants.
(2) Tankers and dispensers. Identify requirements for tankers or dispensers in
addition to organic capabilities. List by type, capacity, and quantity.
(3) Planning factors. Determine if the planning factors used to identify POL
requirements were factors other than those in the Combined Arms Support
Command (CASCOM) database or operational log (OPLOG) planner. If so,
specify.
d. Class IV. Determine requirements for building and barrier materials.
e. Class V.
(1) Additional Class V requirements. Determine Class V requirements over and
above those in the unit basic load. List by Department of Defense (DOD)
identification code, nomenclature, and quantity.
(2) Planning factors. Determine which planning factor was used to forecast Class V
consumption rates.
f. Class VI.
g. Class VII.
(1) Additional equipment. Determine requirements for additional items of equipment,
such as trucks and generators. List by nomenclature, NSN, and quantity.
(2) Maintenance augmentation. Determine the requirement for maintenance
augmentation to support the equipment listed above.
h. Class VIII.
(1) Determine requirements for Class VIII supplies by nomenclature, NSN, quantities,
and special requirements associated with a particular item, such as refrigeration.
(2) Determine schedule of resupplies required.
(3) Determine whether resupply will be prepackaged standard line items.
(4) Identify Class VIII supplies peculiar to the AO—whether they are readily available
or must be specifically acquired (for example, antivenins).
(5) Determine availability and reliability of HN Class VIII for emergency purposes.
i. Class IX (Repair Parts).
(1) Mandatory parts list. Determine if there is a mandatory parts list to support the
equipment.
(CLASSIFICATION)
B-7
FM 3-05.230
(CLASSIFICATION)
(2) Prescribed load list (PLL). Determine if the PLL includes repair parts to support all
assigned equipment.
(3) Equipment density list. Develop an equipment density list to provide to HN or
other supporting agency, as required.
(4) Leased vehicles and equipment. Determine Class IX requirements for leased
vehicles and equipment, if necessary.
j. Class X. Determine Class X requirements. List by type and quantity.
k. Other.
(1) Emergency resupply. Identify requirements for emergency resupply push
packages. (Specify by NSN, nomenclature, and quantity. Attach as separate
enclosure for each type of push package.)
(2) Maps and photographs. Identify requirements for maps and imagery.
8. SERVICES.
a. Field Services.
b. Engineering Services.
(1) Equipment power compatibility. Determine the following if supplied with
commercial power at the wartime site.
(a) Equipment is compatible.
(b) Plug adapters are required. List what voltage and how many are needed.
(c) Transformers are required. List what voltage and how many are needed.
(2) Water requirements. Identify daily requirements for potable water.
(3) Pest control requirements. Determine requirements for rodent and insect control
assistance.
(4) Heavy-equipment requirements.
c. Other Services.
(1) Linen requirements. List by type and quantity.
(2) Laundry services requirements.
(3) Other services identification. Determine if other services are needed.
9. MAINTENANCE.
a. DS and General Support (GS) Maintenance. Identify requirements for DS and GS
maintenance.
b. Other Maintenance Equipment. List commercial and nonstandard equipment that
must be maintained.
(CLASSIFICATION)
B-8
FM 3-05.230
(CLASSIFICATION)
10. TRANSPORTATION.
a. Air Transportation.
(1) Unit load plans. Enclose unit load plans.
(2) Administrative aircraft. Determine requirements. Specify type and number of
hours per week.
(3) Equipment and personnel requirements. Determine requirements for additional
materiel handling equipment and personnel.
(4) Cargo storage facilities. Determine requirements for cargo storage facilities.
Specify by the number of square feet required for the following:
(a) Covered secure storage.
(b) Outdoor secure storage.
(5) Airfield requirements.
(a) C-130s.
(b) C-141s.
(c) C-5As.
(d) Other (specify).
b. Water Transportation. Determine water transportation needs (specify).
c. Ground Transportation. Determine requirements for supplemental military vehicles.
(1) Tactical vehicles. With or without communications equipment.
(2) Other special purpose vehicles.
11. FACILITIES.
a. Maintenance Facilities. Identify vehicle communication, weapons, and aviation
maintenance area (covered) requirements (list in square feet).
b. Billeting Facilities.
(1) Billet number and size requirements.
(a) Officers.
(b) Senior enlisted.
(c) Enlisted.
(d) Females.
(2) Tentage.
c. Medical Facilities. Determine requirements for physical facilities.
(1) Hospital beds.
(CLASSIFICATION)
B-9
FM 3-05.230
(CLASSIFICATION)
(CLASSIFICATION)
B-10
FM 3-05.230
(CLASSIFICATION)
c. Finance. Determine finance support requirements. Identify what is required (pay and
allotments).
d. Religious Support. Identify religious support requirements.
e. Legal. Determine requirements for staff judge advocate support.
13. MEDICAL.
a. Patient Care. Determine legal and policy constraints on providing medical care to
indigenous personnel.
b. Medical Evacuation. Determine aeromedical and overland evacuation requirements.
c. Medical Logistics.
d. Medical Intelligence.
e. Preventive Medicine Services. Vaccination and prophylactic medication requirements.
f. Veterinary Services.
g. Dental Services.
h. Laboratory Services.
14. SIGNAL.
a. Terminal Equipment and Access. Determine requirements for the following:
(1) Supplemental terminal equipment. Specify by type and quantity.
(2) Access to HN communication telephone system. Specify need, such as number
of lines.
(3) Access to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) telegraph network.
(4) Access to HN military teletype system.
(5) Access to automatic secure voice communications.
(6) Access to NATO secure voice network.
(7) Access to Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN).
b. Transmit and Receive Sites. Determine the number of transmit and receive sites to be
set up and how much area will be needed.
c. Signal Maintenance Support.
d. Frequency Requirements.
15. SECURITY.
a. Military Police. Determine MP requirements.
b. Counterintelligence. Determine if CI is required.
c. Base Defense. Determine if base defense capabilities are required.
(CLASSIFICATION)
B-11
Appendix C
Funding
The purpose of this appendix is to provide information as to the proper
legal use and expenditure of government monies. This section is only a
guide. If there is any doubt as to the proper use of funds, a judge advocate
should be consulted. The National Defense Authorization Act dated 1994
contains additional information.
All leaders should be aware that Title 10, USC, is the document that
provides the guidance and restrictions on all monies spent by the USG.
The phrase Title 10 money refers to all funds associated with the U.S.
military and is further subdivided into various funding lines to be spent
in specific ways. The principal source of money for any particular unit is
operation and maintenance (O&M) funding, which is budgeted on an
annual basis to provide for all unit-initiated activities. Units may also
have access to other types of monies, such as Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS)-directed exercises funding, DA funding for operational exercises, SA
funding, and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) funding.
C-1
FM 3-05.230
C-2
FM 3-05.230
C-3
FM 3-05.230
C-4
FM 3-05.230
C-5
Appendix D
Legal Considerations
This appendix describes basic policies, guidance, procedures, and
responsibilities regarding legal services provided during times of
deployment. The matters outlined here may be augmented by specific
guidance contained in the OPLAN to the various missions and
contingencies.
GENERAL
D-1. Mission. The Group Judge Advocate (GJA) is the primary legal advisor
to the group commander and members of the group staff. The GJA also
advises subordinate commanders and staff officers on all legal matters and
coordinates all legal activities within the AO.
D-2. Task organization. The manner in which the group legal section
deploys will depend greatly upon the composition of the SFOB. In all major
deployment situations, the GJA should deploy with the group battle staff,
and the battalion legal NCOs must deploy with their FOBs. The remaining
members of the group legal section should deploy with the group’s main body.
GJA deployment information follows:
• An SFOB may deploy only the GJA and the group senior legal NCO.
An SFOB may add the group administrative specialist, and in some
cases, the GJA will request a flyaway package from HQ, USASFC(A).
The flyaway package will consist of an additional judge advocate and
an additional legal NCO. The group legal office can also request a
flyaway package to support split missions or to support garrison
operations while the GJA deploys.
• Individual mobilization augmentees are attorneys who fill a specific group
legal billet. These individuals will fill positions vacated by the GJA when
he deploys.
PREDEPLOYMENT
D-3. Upon receiving a warning order, the GJA will immediately join the
battle staff and begin conducting a mission analysis. The GJA will coordinate
with the particular theater combatant commander’s judge advocate to
determine ROE in effect. Afterwards, the GJA will assist the S-3 in drafting the
ROE annex. The GJA will also—
• Draft the legal annex.
• Conduct briefings and train all deploying personnel on the law of
armed conflict (LOAC), ROE, and human rights.
D-1
FM 3-05.230
• Coordinate with group budget officer and the S-4 to ensure that
ordering officers and Class A agents with appropriate level of
purchasing authority are appointed as needed.
D-4. The GJA and the S-4 will also coordinate with higher HQ to obtain
support of a contracting officer in the theater of operations.
DEPLOYMENT
D-5. The GJA will be located in the group operations center (OPCEN) and
will provide legal advice as discussed in the following paragraphs.
D-6. International law/operational law. The GJA will function as the
operational law advisor to the group commander, staff, and subordinate
commanders. The duties of GJA include, but are not limited to—
• Advising the command on the LOAC during wartime and LOAC
concepts during stability operations and support operations, reviewing
mission concepts for compliance with the LOAC, and providing a staff
estimate to the commander for his decision.
• Participating in planning cells and reviewing OPLANs, CONPLANs, and
operation orders (OPORDs) for LOAC implications of attacking or
destroying specific targets.
• Reviewing target folders and advising on the LOAC implications of
attacking or destroying specific targets.
• Briefing the group commander at scheduled command and staff briefings
concerning legal aspects of the operation.
• Briefing the deploying team while they are in isolation concerning legal
considerations specific to their operation, the ROE, and the laws of the
country to which they are being deployed.
• Attending briefbacks given by the teams and ensuring that each team
member has an understanding of the legal aspects of his mission.
• Attending debriefing of the teams after completion of mission, as
required.
• Coordinating with the S-1 and S-3 to ensure that all EPWs and detainees
are properly processed and cared for. Where the status of any person in
U.S. custody is uncertain, the GJA will arrange for, or assist in, the
conduct of Article 5 tribunals pursuant to the Geneva Conventions.
• Advising the command and briefing the group on the effects and
requirements of any status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) in effect in
the AO. If no treaty or other international agreement has been concluded
by the time of deployment, the GJA will contact the higher HQ Staff
Judge Advocate (SJA) or the Defense Attaché Office of the U.S. Mission to
the country concerned to ensure some type of SOFA is negotiated. In the
absence of an international agreement, U.S. forces may be subject to the
jurisdiction of the friendly HN.
D-2
FM 3-05.230
D-9. Legal assistance. The GJA will provide basic legal assistance to the
group (such as power of attorney, wills, and advice) as long as it will not
conflict with other GJA responsibilities.
D-11. Administrative law. The GJA will advise and represent the
command on administrative law issues (such as initiating investigations IAW
AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, and
administrative separations).
D-12. Fiscal law. The GJA will advise the S-3 on all foreign training and SA
matters to ensure that legal limitations on the use of funds, with particular
regard to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, have
been complied with.
D-3
Appendix E
Fire Support
Fire support planning is the continuous process of acquiring and
analyzing targets, allocating fire support to targets, scheduling the attack
of targets, and synchronizing all available fire support to achieve the
commander’s intent and to support the scheme of maneuver.
Fire support coordination is the process of executing the fire support
plan. It, too, is continuous and runs concurrently with the planning
process during combat operations. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), and FM 3-09.32, J-Fire
Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, include
additional information.
E-1
FM 3-05.230
E-2
FM 3-05.230
E-3
FM 3-05.230
E-4
FM 3-05.230
E-5
FM 3-05.230
E-6
FM 3-05.230
NOTE: This diagram does not show the SOF TACP elements. They will be
located with SF from detachment to SFOB.
E-13. Special operations CAS connectivity is shown in Figure E-3, page E-8.
Execution of CAS requests includes the following:
• Fighter check-in (provides the controllers with all pertinent
information regarding the aircraft and weapons).
• CAS 9-line briefing, which includes the following:
Established standards for use with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
Threat condition information that does not dictate the CAS
aircraft’s tactics.
The mission brief that follows the numbered sequence (1–9) of the
CAS Briefing Form.
Use of a standardized briefing sequence that improves mission
direction and control by allowing terminal controllers to pass
information rapidly.
Mission information and sequence that may be modified to fit the
tactical situation.
E-7
FM 3-05.230
E-8
FM 3-05.230
NAVAL GUNFIRE
E-14. NGF ships are very mobile, which allows them to be positioned to take
advantage of their limited deflection pattern. Very close supporting fire can
be delivered when the gun-target line is parallel to friendly front lines. The
relatively flat trajectory of NGF results in the probable error being long or
short as opposed to left or right.
E-15. The general mission of NGF support is to assist the ground force by
destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing targets that oppose that force.
Requests for NGF are processed through the S-3/G-3/J-3 channels.
Communications operate on the division NGF support net (HF).
E-9
FM 3-05.230
LGBs, AGM-65 WP
Maverick, GP Bombs, Rockets,
United
CBUs, Aerial Mines, 30-mm High
States
A/OA-10A 2.75 5RFNHWV/89 Yes No Explosive None NVG
Army
and 2 Flares, LUV 5 Incendiary
(USA)
and 6 Flares, 30-mm (HEI), LUV
Cannon 1, 5, 6
PPN-19,
Gated Laser SST-181,
FLIR, Low-
United Intensifier Single
Light Level
States 106-mm Howitzer, (GLINT), Sideband
Television
AC-130H Air Force 40-mm Cannon, No Yes 106-mm (SSB),
(LLLTV),
(USAF) 20-mm Cannon WP, Personnel
Radar,
(SOF) 106-mm HE, Locator
GPS
40-mm LTD System
(PLS)
GLINT,
FLIR,
106-mm Howitzer, 106-mm PPN-19,
USAF LLLTV,
AC-130U 40-mm Cannon, No Yes WP, SST-181,
(SOF) Radar,
20-mm Cannon 106-mm HE, SSB, PLS
GPS
40-mm LTD
E-10
FM 3-05.230
FLIR,
F-16C/D LGBs, AGM-65 Radar,
Fighting USAF Maverick, GP Bombs, No Yes Laser None
GPS,
Falcon 20-mm Cannon, CBUs NVG
LGBs, AGM-65
Maverick, GP Bombs,
20-mm Cannon, CBUs,
Aerial Mines, 2.75
Rockets, LUV 1 and 2 FLIR,
USN Laser, WP
F/A-18 Flares, Napalm/Fuel Air Radar,
and Yes Yes Rockets, None
Hornet Explosive (FAE), AGM- GPS,
USMC HE Rockets
82 Walleye, 84 Stand- NVG
Off Land Attack Missile
(SLAM), 88 High-Speed
Antiradiation Missile
(HARM)
GP Bombs, Aerial
WP Radar,
S-3B USN Mines, 2.75 5RFNHWV No No None
Rockets FLIR
LUV 2 Flares
E-11
FM 3-05.230
E-12
FM 3-05.230
E-13
FM 3-05.230
WARNING
Risk-estimate distances are for combat use and are not
minimum safe distances for peacetime training use.
E-19. Figures E-4 through E-7, pages E-15 through E-18, provide examples
of different methods for calling for fire.
E-14
FM 3-05.230
Fire Mission
Message to Observer
(Mandatory Call)
Units to Fire
Changes to Call for Fire (If Any)
Number of Rounds (Per Tube)
Target Number
Time of Flight (Seconds)
Adjustments
“Direction __________________________________________, Over”
(Prior to 1st Adjustment) (Mils or Degrees, Magnetic)
“Left/Right _________________” (Meters From Impact to Observer Target Line)
“Add/Drop _________________” (Meters, Distance From Impact to Target)
“Fire for Effect, Over”
“Repeat, Over”
Mission Completion
E-15
FM 3-05.230
Mark
Message to Observer
(Mandatory Call)
Units to Fire
Changes to Call for Fire (If Any)
Number of Rounds (Per Tube)
Target Number
Time of Flight (Seconds)
Mission Completion
“End of Mission, Over”
E-16
FM 3-05.230
As Required
Clearance: Transmission of the fire mission is clearance to fire. Danger close is 200 m
with the 105 mm, and 125 m with the 40 mm, 25 mm, and 20 mm. For closer fire, the
observer must accept responsibility for increased risk. State “Cleared Danger Close”
on line fire. This clearance may be preplanned.
At my command: State “At My Command” on line fire. The gun ship will call
“Ready to Fire” when ready.
Adjust Fire: Only adjust for marking rounds or incorrect target. Adjust from impact by
giving range (meters) and cardinal (North, South, East, West) direction.
Do Not
Do not ask the gun ship to identify colors.
Do not reference clock positions.
Do not pass run-in headings/no-fire headings.
Do not correct left/right or short/long.
E-17
FM 3-05.230
Grid Method
(Given in Two Transmissions)
Message To Observer
E-18
Appendix F
F-1
FM 3-05.230
deficiency. All construction materials required for a camp are precut and
stored on a building-by-building basis. The building materials are then
banded and palletized so they can be delivered. If only certain buildings are
required (for example, rehabilitation of the existing camp), buildings are
ordered by name and shipped to the site. A stock level of two complete camps
is maintained.
F-3. The prefabricated container is the basic element for all underground
facilities and for those surface facilities required to be hardened. The machine
gun bunker, communications bunker, emergency medical bunker, power
generator facility, tactical operations bunker, POL storage, and ammunition
bunker are typical of the facilities provided by the prefabricated container.
The container is “hardened” by burying, sandbagging, or a combination of
the two.
CAUTION
Using large caliber or crew-served weapon systems in
an enclosed emplacement will require proper hearing
protection and adequate ventilation of gases. Also, if
using a prefabricated bunker with open-air area in the
rear, a blast wall/revetment approximately 4 feet from
rear and at least as high as the bunker should be built.
This will help protect occupants from possible enemy
indirect fires and fratricide.
F-4. The “floating” camp permits continued operation of the base camp in
areas subject to periodic flooding. Surrounding the camp is an earthen wall or
dyke, which permits operation of the camp during the initial stages of the
rainy season. In addition, the earthen wall creates protection and an obscure
view of the inside of the camp from the opposition. When the water level
exceeds the capacity of the dyke to prevent flooding of the camp, two
additional concepts are used for the floating camp. One concept provides a
floating platform or raft constructed of empty 55-gallon drums banded to a
wooden frame and floor members upon which facilities are constructed. The
second concept uses an adjustable platform permitting a convenient elevation
above the water level to be maintained. Rafts are used to support crew-served
weapons, buildings, and airboat docking facilities. A helicopter landing pad is
provided, consisting of a wooden platform supported by four containers. This
configuration does not float but does manage to keep the pad above water in
most cases.
DEFENSE MEASURES
F-5. An intrusion barrier consisting of tanglefoot wire, concertina wire, and
various anti-intrusion devices integrated with claymore mines surrounds the
camp. This barrier is currently “packaged” by placing the above items in
containers in sufficient quantity to provide approximately 300 meters of
hasty perimeter.
F-2
FM 3-05.230
F-6. Resupply of the base camp should not depend almost exclusively on
aircraft. However, each base camp should have an airstrip. An airstrip
capable of landing a C-130 is desirable in addition to the helicopter pad,
although the construction effort is somewhat extensive and in certain adverse
terrain conditions, practically unattainable. Construction of an airstrip
generally requires the greatest single camp construction effort and usually
dictates the use of heavy moving equipment. Soil stabilization or landing-mat
material is usually required for a pad or airstrip to reduce the severe dust
conditions prevalent during the dry season and extreme mud during the
rainy season.
WATER SUPPLY
F-7. A plentiful water supply, preferably multiple wells located within the
perimeter of the base camp, is essential for survival of camp inhabitants.
Streams and cisterns are inferior alternatives to the well as a source of water.
POWER SUPPLY
F-8. Electric power is provided by diesel or gasoline-driven generator sets,
usually 30 to 50 kilowatt (kW) capacity each, obtained through the military
supply system. The number of generator sets required depends upon the size
of that particular camp.
F-3
FM 3-05.230
F-4
FM 3-05.230
F-13. Tables F-2 and F-3 can help in determining the amount of time
required for excavating a site.
Table F-3. In Hardpan (Not Broken Up): Dipper Shovel and Clamshell Comparison
Size of Machine Dipper Shovel Clamshell
(Cubic Yards) Cubic Yards/Hour Cubic Yards/Hour
0.38 3 5
0.5 6 9
0.75 10 16
1 17 22
F-5
FM 3-05.230
F-6
FM 3-05.230
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
F-17. Based upon the SF base camp requirements as set forth by SF
personnel and upon the tentative camp construction sequence outlined, the
following listing of equipment is applicable to certain construction tasks.
• Set up warning outposts:
Organic field telephone systems (wire).
High-powered optics, binoculars, listening devices, and communi-
cations (wireless).
Explosives and earthmovers.
Chain saws and brush cutters.
• Dig temporary sanitation sites:
Spades and shovels.
Power spades.
• Set up defensive perimeter and armed points:
Earthen dykes and barriers.
Strengthened prefabricated bunkers.
Sandbags filled.
Corrugated galvanized steel sheets.
Explosives.
Power spades.
Drain pipes.
Power saws.
• Set up communications with FOB/AOB:
Communications equipment in strengthened prefabricated
bunkers.
Batteries charged.
Antennas erected.
• Set up dispensary facilities:
Prefabricated bunker used.
Bunker strengthened.
• Lay out base camp:
Transit or level.
Stakes and string.
Tape or other measuring device.
• Set up water supply:
Storage tanks.
Purification equipment.
Drill.
F-7
FM 3-05.230
F-8
FM 3-05.230
Telephones.
Batteries.
Backup power supply.
• Improve field landing strip:
Grader, scraper, or bulldozer.
Aggregate.
VS-17 panels.
Concrete and asphalt (surfacing materials).
Matting material.
• Build dispensary.
• Build repair shops.
• Build living quarters.
F-9
Appendix G
Building Materials
This section provides the necessary materials to construct a generic base
camp. Any other design or size would require a modified list of building
materials for construction. AR 71-32, Force Development and
Documentation – Consolidated Policies; AR 415-16; AR 710-1, Centralized
Inventory Management of the Army Supply System; and AR 725-50,
Requisition, Receipt, and Issue System, include additional information.
MATERIALS
G-1. The amounts of materials listed are based on normal construction waste
residue and unforeseen construction needs. Each area of the camp has been
listed separately to aid in the ordering and procuring of materials needed
during any project phase.
G-2. All wood should be protected against wet conditions and termites. To
prevent insect, rot, and pilferage problems, materials should not be stockpiled
too far in advance of utilization.
G-3. Security of materials will be of primary importance during the
construction process. Detachment members must ensure that all materials
are stored inside a guarded perimeter at all times.
G-4. All materials are ordered for a specific position or location; detachment
members should not use materials that are not intended for that project.
G-5. All listed materials are the minimum required amounts to construct a
generic building, which can be adapted for use as any building and any
specialty buildings if significantly different from the generic team house. The
charts include the following (corresponding figures and tables in Appendixes
H and I are shown in parentheses):
• Generic team house, Table G-1, page G-2. (Figures H-1a through H-2b
and Table H-1 [pages H-2 through H-4], and Figures I-1 [page I-3] and
I-15 [page I-12].)
• Generic bunker, Table G-2, page G-3. (Figures I-17 through I-20
[medical or communications bunker], pages I-13 and I-14; Figures I-42
through I-44 [generator bunker], pages I-25 and I-26; and Figures I-45
and I-46 [fuel bunker], page I-27.)
• Guard tower, Table G-3, page G-3. (Figures I-47 through I-49, pages
I-28 through I-30.)
• Barriers, Table G-4, page G-4.
• Vehicle revetment, Table G-5, page G-4.
G-1
FM 3-05.230
• Communications trench – open, Table G-6, page G-4. (Figure I-12, page
I-10.)
• Fighting bunker – inner and outer, Table G-7, page G-5. (Figures I-2
through I-6, pages I-4 through I-6.)
• 81-mm mortar position, Table G-8, page G-5.
G-2
FM 3-05.230
GENERIC BUNKER
G-7. Table G-2 is a list of materials required to construct two generic
bunkers.
GUARD TOWER
G-8. Table G-3 is a list of materials required to construct three guard towers.
G-3
FM 3-05.230
BARRIERS
G-9. Table G-4 is a list of materials that depicts the total amount required to
construct both the inner and outer barriers.
VEHICLE REVETMENT
G-10. Table G-5 is a list of materials required to construct three vehicle
revetments.
G-4
FM 3-05.230
G-5
FM 3-05.230
G-6
FM 3-05.230
G-7
Appendix H
Electrical Requirements
This section provides all electrical and air conditioning requirements for a
base camp. All fixtures, circuit loads, and specifications are included in
the wiring diagram, and a panel board diagram is provided for each
structure within the camp.
POWER SUPPLY
H-1. The electrical requirements for this camp have been calculated based on
the projected electrical needs of the camp at the average daily load. Power
source will be from fuel-driven generators as both the primary and alternate
methods. The primary will be from two 100-kW diesel generators that will
run for 12 hours each. This method allows one generator to cool and have
operator’s maintenance performed, which will greatly extend the generator’s
life between overhauls. The additional emergency power for the critical areas
of the camp will come from separate 5-kW gasoline generators placed near
the location to be serviced (medical bunker, dispensary, communications and
TOC bunkers). A grid system will be incorporated to direct power to all areas
of the camp, as required.
GENERATOR LOCATION
H-2. The 100-kW generators will be located in separate bunkers to prevent
destruction of both generators at once during an attack. In addition, the noise
and emissions levels should be considered when installing the equipment so
as not to interfere with sleep and operations.
H-3. The communications and TOC bunkers will have battery backup power
available in case of total power failure.
H-1
FM 3-05.230
H-2
FM 3-05.230
H-3
FM 3-05.230
GENERATOR BUNKER
H-6. Figure H-3a, page H-5, shows the wiring diagram for the generator
bunker. Figure H-3b, page H-5, shows the wiring specifications. Figure H-4a,
page H-6, is the panel board diagram and Figure H-4b, page H-6, outlines the
panel board electrical bill of materials. Table H-2, pages H-6 and H-7,
outlines the electrical materials required for the generator bunker.
H-4
FM 3-05.230
H-5
FM 3-05.230
H-6
FM 3-05.230
PERIMETER LIGHTS
H-7. Figure H-5 shows the wiring diagram for the perimeter lights.
Table H-3, page H-8, outlines the electrical bill of materials.
H-7
FM 3-05.230
AIR CONDITIONING
H-8. Figure H-6a, page H-9, shows the air conditioning diagram;
Figure H-6b, page H-10, outlines the bill of materials and output
requirements; and Table H-4, page H-10, depicts the total power load.
H-8
FM 3-05.230
H-9
FM 3-05.230
Outdoor unit carrier, 38BQ008, 7 1/2-ton, 38 amp, 208 V, 30, 60 Hz, 3′ 5 3/8″ x 3′ 8 1/2″
x 2′ 9″
Heat pump system, indoor unit carrier, 40BA009, 7 1/2-ton, 4300 CFM, 8.3 kW, 208 V, 30, 60 Hz,
3′ 4″ x 2′ 8″ x 2′ 5″
Building type: Underground, 50′ x 20′ x 9′
Cooling capacity required: 50′ x 20′ x 54 BTU/hr; square feet = 54,000 BTU/hr
Heating capacity required: 50′ x 20′ x 86 BTU/hr; square feet = 86,000 BTU/hr
ELECTRICAL NOTES
H-9. Figures H-7 through H-9, pages H-11 and H-12, depict switch
connections in a circuit. Figure H-10, page H-12, is a diagram of an air
conditioning wall unit. The following contains various electrical notes to be
used for the electrical wiring of the base camp:
• To determine number of lights required in a building: room square
footage divided by 28 = number of lights.
• To determine wattage required from amps: amps x 0.85 = watts.
• Junction boxes:
2 inches x 4 inches used for lights, receptacles, and wall switches.
4 inches x 4 inches used for ceiling fans and perimeter lights.
15 inches x 15 inches used for wire connection between building
safety switch and main bus line.
18 inches x 18 inches used for wire connection between perimeter
light safety switch and main bus line.
H-10
FM 3-05.230
• Electrical circuits:
Lighting circuit should contain no more than nine lights per
circuit.
Receptacle circuit should contain no more than six receptacles per
circuit.
No more than three circuits may be placed in the same conduit. If
this is done, the circuit cannot share a common neutral.
• Wiring:
Unless otherwise indicated on diagrams, #12 wire will be used.
Only the size wire indicated between each connection should be
used.
• Power loads: Between fixtures that are only used during daylight and
ones only used during darkness, the total power draw should not
exceed 100 kW at any one time.
H-11
FM 3-05.230
H-12
Appendix I
PLANS
I-1. These designs are based on U.S. doctrine and techniques used in
building construction. The list of materials in Appendix G corresponds with
these plans. Any deviation from these plans will cause the list of materials to
change.
I-2. The amount of materials has been calculated to near-exact proportions
for these plans. Individual building techniques may require an additional
“overage” of materials to allow for waste or other things associated with
construction operations.
I-3. The Generic Building Framework diagram (Figure I-1) may be used for
the Administration, Team House, and Security Force buildings.
I-4. All dimensions given in the provided graphics are approximate and are
not to scale.
I-5. The following is a listing of enclosed graphics (corresponding figures
and tables in Appendixes G and H are shown in parentheses):
• Generic Building Framework, Figure I-1, page I-3. (Table G-1, page
G-2, Figures H-1a through H-2b and Table H-1, pages H-2 through
H-4.)
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Front Elevation), Figure I-2, page I-4.
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Rear Elevation), Figure I-3,
page I-4.
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Side Elevation), Figure I-4,
page I-5.
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Plan View), Figure I-5, page I-5.
(Table G-7, page G-5.)
• Fighting Bunker (Firing Platform and Firing Port Details), Figure I-6,
page I-6.
• Splinter Wall (Side Elevation), Figure I-7, page I-6.
• Splinter Wall (Details), Figure I-8, page I-7.
• Timber Trestle Bridge (Side View), Figure I-9, page I-8.
• Timber Trestle Bridge (Support), Figure I-10, page I-8.
• Timber Trestle Bridge (Sill and Footing), Figure I-11, page I-9.
I-1
FM 3-05.230
• Open Communications Trench, Figure I-12, page I-10. (Table G-6, page
G-4.)
• Covered Communications Trench, Figure I-13, page I-11.
• Administration Building (Plan View), Figure I-14, page I-11.
• Generic Team House (Plan View), Figure I-15, page I-12. (Table G-1,
page G-2, Figures H-1a through H-2b and Table H-1, pages H-2
through H-4.)
• Security Force Quarters (Plan View), Figure I-16, page I-12.
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Foundation Plan View), Figure
I-17, page I-13.
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Section View), Figure I-18, page
I-13.
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Stairwell Floor Plan), Figure I-
19, page I-14.
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Stairwell End Plan), Figure I-20,
page I-14.
• Dispensary (Plan View), Figure I-21, page I-15.
• Dispensary (Front and Rear View), Figure I-22, page I-15.
• S-4/Arms Room (Plan View), Figure I-23, page I-16.
• S-4/Arms Room (Section View), Figure I-24, page I-16.
• Water Operations Building (Plan View), Figure I-25, page I-17.
• Water Operations Building (Front View), Figure I-26, page I-17.
• Water Operations Building (Rear View), Figure I-27, page I-18.
• Washroom (Plan View), Figure I-28, page I-18.
• Washroom (Front View), Figure I-29, page I-19.
• Washroom (Rear View), Figure I-30, page I-19.
• Latrine (Plan View), Figure I-31, page I-20.
• Latrine (Side View), Figure I-32, page I-20.
• Latrine (Toilet Section View), Figure I-33, page I-21.
• Latrine (Urinal Section View), Figure I-34, page I-21.
• Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Plan View), Figure I-35, page I-22.
• Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Front View), Figure I-36, page I-22.
• Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Rear View), Figure I-37, page I-23.
• Motor Pool (Plan View), Figure I-38, page I-23.
• Motor Pool (Front View), Figure I-39, page I-24.
• Motor Pool (Side View), Figure I-40, page I-24.
• Motor Pool (Diagonal Bracing), Figure I-41, page I-25.
• Generator Bunker (Plan View), Figure I-42, page I-25. (Figures H-3a
through H-4b and Table H-2, pages H-5 through H-7.)
• Generator Bunker (Front View), Figure I-43, page I-26.
I-2
FM 3-05.230
I-3
FM 3-05.230
I-4
FM 3-05.230
I-5
FM 3-05.230
Figure I-6. Fighting Bunker (Firing Platform and Firing Port Details)
I-6
FM 3-05.230
I-7
FM 3-05.230
I-8
FM 3-05.230
I-9
FM 3-05.230
I-10
FM 3-05.230
I-11
FM 3-05.230
I-12
FM 3-05.230
I-13
FM 3-05.230
I-14
FM 3-05.230
I-15
FM 3-05.230
I-16
FM 3-05.230
I-17
FM 3-05.230
I-18
FM 3-05.230
I-19
FM 3-05.230
I-20
FM 3-05.230
I-21
FM 3-05.230
I-22
FM 3-05.230
I-23
FM 3-05.230
I-24
FM 3-05.230
I-25
FM 3-05.230
I-26
FM 3-05.230
I-27
FM 3-05.230
I-28
FM 3-05.230
I-29
FM 3-05.230
I-30
FM 3-05.230
I-31
Appendix J
J-1. Base camps can be modified to almost any shape or size to fit the
situation. Functional requirements and the METT-TC factors will dictate the
actual design and requirements for all camps.
J-2. Below are Vietnam-era base camp examples (Figure J-1, pages J-1 and
J-2). The photos show the various geometric shapes that were used to form
base camps.
J-1
FM 3-05.230
J-2
Appendix K
Media Support
Media reporting influences public opinion, which may affect the perceived
legitimacy of an operation, and ultimately influences the success or
failure of the operation. The speed with which the media can collect and
convey information to the public makes it possible for the world’s
populace to become aware of an incident as quickly as, or even before,
JFCs and USG decision makers.
Public affairs (PA) plans should provide open and independent reporting,
respond to media queries that provide the maximum disclosure with
minimum delay, and create an environment between commander and
reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. Additional
information may be found in JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military
Operations Other Than War; FM 100-6, Information Operations, Chapter
5; FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, Chapter 7; and The Judge Advocate
General’s School, United States Army (TJAGSA) publication, Operational
Law Handbook, Chapter 30.
K-1
FM 3-05.230
K-2
FM 3-05.230
K-3
FM 3-05.230
K-4
Glossary
AC alternating current
ACSA acquisition cross-Service agreement
AFARN Air Force air request net
AFFOR Air Force forces
ALCE airlift control element
ALO air liaison officer
ammo ammunition
amp ampere
AO area of operations; air officer (USMC)
AOB advanced operational base
AOC air operations center (USAF)
AOR area of responsibility
APAM antipersonnel/antimateriel
APICM all-purpose improved conventional munitions
AR Army regulation
ARFOR Army forces
ARSOA Army special operations aviation
ARSOC Army special operations component
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATO air tasking order
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance
AVUM aviation unit maintenance
AWG American wire gauge
AWOL absent without leave
BBDPICM base-burning dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
BDA battle damage assessment
bn battalion
Glossary-1
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-2
FM 3-05.230
cu cubic
DA direct action; Department of the Army
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DFT deployment for training
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DPICM dual purpose improved conventional munitions
DS direct support—A mission requiring a force to support another
specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the
supported force’s request for assistance. (JP 1-02)
DSN Defense Switched Network
DTV digital television
E&R evasion and recovery—The full spectrum of coordinated
actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational
recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel
isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. (JP 1-02)
ea each
EAP emergency action plan
ECC evacuation control center
EIDS Eagle Intrusion Detection System
EMT electrical metallic tubing
EO electro-optical
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ER electronic reconnaissance
FAC forward air controller
FAE fuel air explosive
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FAX facsimile
FC foundation construction
FDC fire direction center
FFAR folding-fin aerial rocket
FID foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian and
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs
taken by another government to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)
Glossary-3
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-4
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-5
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-6
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-7
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-8
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-9
FM 3-05.230
PI point of impact
PIR priority intelligence requirements—Those intelligence
requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and
stated priority in the task of planning and decisionmaking.
(JP 1-02)
PLL prescribed load list
PLS personnel locator system
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POM preparation for overseas movement
PR personnel recovery
PRF pulse repetition frequency
psi pounds per square inch
PSP perforated steel planking
PSYOP Psychological Operations—Planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations
is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable
to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02)
PTADB planning terrain analysis database
PW prisoner of war
R&R rest and recuperation
RAP rocket-assisted projectile
ROE rules of engagement
ROWPU reverse osmosis water purification unit
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RPM rounds per minute
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
S-1 battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5 civil-military operations officer
S-6 battalion or brigade signal staff officer
SA security assistance
SACC supporting arms coordination center
Glossary-10
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-11
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-12
FM 3-05.230
Glossary-13
Bibliography
AR 15-6. Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. 30 September 1996.
AR 71-32. Force Development and Documentation – Consolidated Policies. 3 March 1997.
AR 190-16. Physical Security. 31 May 1991.
AR 415-16. Army Facilities Components System. 17 March 1989.
AR 710-1. Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System. 15 April 2003.
AR 725-50. Requisition, Receipt, and Issue System. 15 November 1995.
DD Form 1972. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request. July 2001.
FM 3-05.20. Special Forces Operations. 26 June 2001.
FM 3-05.102. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. 31 August 2001.
FM 3-05.201. Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations. 30 April 2003.
FM 3-07. Stability Operations and Support Operations. 20 February 2003.
FM 3-09.32. J-Fire Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.
15 November 2002.
FM 5-33. Terrain Analysis. 11 July 1990 (Change 1, 8 September 1992).
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999 (Change 3, 10 April 2003).
FM 5-103. Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 5-424. Theater of Operations Electrical Systems. 25 June 1997.
FM 8-42. Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations.
27 October 1997.
FM 21-10. Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 21 June 2000.
FM 23-90. Mortars. 1 March 2000 (Change 1, 9 December 2002).
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956 (Change 1, 15 July 1976).
FM 34-52. Intelligence Interrogation. 28 September 1992.
FM 34-60. Counterintelligence. 3 October 1995.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.
FM 46-1. Public Affairs Operations. 30 May 1997.
FM 63-3. Corps Support Command. 30 September 1993.
FM 100-6. Information Operations. 27 August 1996.
Bibliography-1
FM 3-05.230
Bibliography-2
Index
A motor pool, I-23 through
I-25 G
access road, 3-46, 3-47
open communications group support company (GSC),
administrative area, 3-42
trench, I-10 1-2
through 3-46
S-4/arms room, I-16
attack aviation assets, E-9
security force quarters, H
I-12
B headquarters and
splinter wall, I-6, I-7 headquarters company
base camp considerations, 2-3
timber trestle bridge, I-8, (HHC), 1-1
through 2-5
I-9 host nation assistance, 1-3
base camp conversion, 1-4
vehicle revetment, I-31
base camp defense, 3-58
washroom, I-18, I-19 I
base camp demobilization, 1-4
water operations building, inner barrier, 3-22 through 3-27
base camp principles, 2-2, 2-3 I-17, I-18
inner berm, 3-4 through 3-6
base camp shapes and sizes,
3-3, J-1, J-2 inner perimeter, 3-4 through
C 3-21
battalion headquarters and
call for fire, E-15
headquarters detachment
(HHD), 1-2 civic action, 3-51 L
battalion headquarters and close air support, E-6 through legal considerations, D-1
support company (HSC), 1-2 E-8 through D-3
building materials, G-1 through construction, 3-3 through 3-50, logistical sustainment, B-1
G-5 F-1 through F-9 through B-11
building plans, I-1 through I-31 cordon and search operations,
3-58, 3-59, 3-61 through
administration building, M
3-63
I-11 media support, K-1 through K-4
counterpart relationships, 1-3,
covered communications modified table of organization
1-4, 3-51, 3-52
trench I-11 and equipment (MTOE),
dispensary, I-15 G-6, G-7
D
fighting bunker, I-4 through mortar pit, 3-17
I-6 defensive considerations, 3-52
fuel bunker, I-27 dependents, 3-50
N
generator bunker, I-25, direct support (DS), B-1
naval gunfire, E-9
I-26 E
generic building, I-3 electrical requirements, H-1 O
generic team house, I-12 through H-12
outer barrier, 3-32 through 3-42
guard tower, I-28 through equipment requirements, F-7
I-30 through F-9 outer perimeter, 3-28 through
3-32
kitchen, I-22, I-23 F
latrine, I-20, I-21 fire arrow, 3-17, 3-18
medical or communi- fire support, E-1 through E-18
cations bunker, I-13,
funding, C-1 through C-5
I-14
Index-1
FM 3-05.230
Index-2
FM 3-05.230
30 JULY 2003
JOHN M. KEANE
General, United States Army
Acting Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0321205
DISTRIBUTION: