ICJ AND INDIA PROJECT

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA
PROJECT WORK
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
PALLAVI BAJPAI LLM 1ST YEAR ROLL NO. 26 SUBMITTED TO: V. BALAKISTA REDDY
CONTENTS S. TOPIC No 1 2 PAGE NO.
INTRODUCTION 3-16 RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY,PORTUGAL V 17-24 INDIA,1955 Facts of the case Submissions by the Party bringing in the case Preliminary Objections raised by the govt. of India Contentions by both the parties and courts considerations over them Judgment Contribution Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of I.C.A.O council, Pakistan v india,1971 25-34 Points discussed Facts of the case Main contentions by the parties Appellate jurisdiction of the court Observations by the court Jurisdiction of I.C.A.O council Judgment Contribution Trail of Pakistani prisoners of war, Pakistan v India ,1973 Facts of the case Courts observations Judgment Contribution Aerial incidence, Pakistan v india,1999 Main principles discussed Facts of the case Jurisdiction based upon three issues Preliminary objections by India regarding jurisdiction Contentions by both the parties Observations by the court Judgment Contribution Points on which court did not adjudicate Conclusion Bibliography
35-38
39-49
6 7
50-51 52
INTRODUCTION: United Nations was formally established on 24 October 1945.fifty one countries came together for promoting peace throughout the world through mutual cooperation1.The UN was founded after World War II to replace the league of nation, to stop wars between countries, and to provide a platform for dialogue. It contains multiple subsidiary organizations to carry out its missions. The UN consists of the representatives of almost all member states of which there are currently 193 members. UN charter lays down certain guidelines which are to be followed by all the member states.it delineates 4 main purposes: 1. The maintenance of international peace and security. 2. To develop friendly cooperation between countries. 3. To settle international disputes and respect human rights. 4. To serve as a center for all peaceful national activities. UN does not make or declare any laws but provides guidelines in order to prevent conflict between nations .it believes that all the nations of the whole world have a say for its rights whatever be the states status.2 Chapter 3 article 7 talks about the organs of the UN. There are 6 main organs of the UN, which are: a) General assembly b) Security council
1 Shaw on international law, sixth edition 2 http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
c) The economic and social council d) Trustee council e) International court of justice WORLD COURT: The world court, which is the most important international court, the common name of the permanent court of justice and presently the international court of justice. The permanent court of justice was established in 1920 under the auspices of the League of Nations. In 1946, it was replaced by the international court of justice, which was made the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, by the article 92 of UN charter3. The international court of justice is organized in accordance with the statute of international court of justice which is a part of the United Nations charter. International court of justice commenced its working from April, 1946. UN has 6 principal organs, international court is the only one not located in New York.it presides at The Hague (Netherlands). The courts role is to settle international disputes submitted to it the states in accordance with the international law and to give advisory opinion on the legal question referred to it by the organs of the UN and specialized agencies. International court is the most important court both politically and scholar. The court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for a term of 9 years by the general assembly and the Security Council. It is assisted by a registry which is its administrative organ. Official language of the court is English and French. The basic document which defines the functions and rules, composition of international court of justice is the statute of ICJ which is annexed to the charter of the
3 The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It
shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

United Nations. The statute can be amended by two third majority vote in the general and ratified by two third of the states.4 STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COURF JUSTICE: S No. 1 2 3 4 5 TOPIC ORGANISATION OF THE COURT COMPETENCE OF THE COURT PROCEDURE ADVISORY OPINION AMENDMENT ARTICLE 2-33 34-38 39-64 65-68 69-70
MEMBERS OF THE COURT: The International Court of Justice is composed of 15 judges elected to nine-year terms of office by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. These organs vote simultaneously but separately. In order to be elected, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes in both bodies. This sometimes makes it necessary for a number of rounds of voting to be carried out. In order to ensure a measure of continuity, one third of the Court is elected every three years. Judges are eligible for re-election. Should a judge die or resign during his or her term of office, a special election is held as soon as possible to choose a judge to fill the unexpired part of the term. Elections are held in New York (United States of America) on the occasion of the annual autumn session of the General Assembly. The judges elected at a triennial election enter upon their term of office on 6 February of the following year, after
4 Article 69: Amendments to the present Statute shall be effected by the same procedure as is provided
by the Charter of the United Nations for amendments to that Charter, subject however to any provisions which the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council may adopt concerning the participation of states which are parties to the present Statute but are not Members of the United Nations.
which the Court proceeds to elect by secret ballot a President and a Vice-President to hold office for three years. All States parties to the Statute of the Court have the right to propose candidates. These proposals are made not by the government of the State concerned, but by a group consisting of the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration) designated by that State, i.e. by the four jurists who can be called upon to serve as members of an arbitral tribunal under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. In the case of countries not represented on the Permanent Court of Arbitration, nominations are made by a group constituted in the same way. Each group can propose up to four candidates, not more than two of whom may be of its own nationality, whilst the others may be from any country whatsoever, whether a party to the Statute or not and whether or not it has declared that it accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The names of candidates must be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations within a time-limit laid down by him/her. Judges must be elected from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law. The Court may not include more than one national of the same State. Moreover, the Court as a whole must represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. In practice this principle has found expression in the distribution of membership of the Court among the principal regions of the globe. Today this distribution is as follows: Africa 3, Latin America and the Caribbean 2, Asia 3, Western Europe and other States 5, Eastern Europe 2, which corresponds to that of membership of the Security Council. Although there is no entitlement to membership on the part of any country, the Court has always included judges of the nationality of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Once elected, a Member of the Court is a delegate neither of the government of his own country nor of that of any other State. Unlike most other organs of international organizations, the Court is not composed of representatives of governments. Members of the Court are independent judges whose first task, before taking up their duties, is to make a solemn declaration in open court that they will exercise their powers impartially and conscientiously. In order to guarantee his or her independence, no Member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other Members, he/she no longer fulfils the required conditions. This has in fact never happened. No Member of the Court may engage in any other occupation during his/her term. He/she is not allowed to exercise any political or administrative function, nor to act as agent, counsel or advocate in any case. Any doubts with regard to this question are settled by decision of the Court. A Member of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, enjoys privileges and immunities comparable with those of the head of a diplomatic mission. In The Hague, the President takes precedence over the doyen of the diplomatic corps, after which precedence alternates between judges and ambassadors. Each Member of the Court receives an annual salary consisting of a base salary (which for 2010 amounts to US$166,596) and post adjustment, with a special supplementary allowance of US$15,000 for the President. The post adjustment multiplier changes every month and is dependent on the UN exchange rate between the US Dollar and the Euro. On leaving the Court, they receive annual pensions which, after a nine-year term of office, amount to 50 per cent of the annual base salary. Although the Court is deemed to be permanently in session, only its President is obliged to reside in The Hague. However, the other Members of the Court are required to be permanently at its disposal except during judicial vacations or leave of absence, or when they are prevented from attending by illness or other serious
7
reasons. In practice, the majority of Court Members reside in The Hague and all will normally spend the greater part of the year there.5
PRESIDENCY AT THE COURTS: The President and the Vice-President are elected by the Members of the Court every three years by secret ballot. The election is held on the date on which Members of the Court elected at a triennial election are to begin their terms of office or shortly thereafter. An absolute majority is required and there are no conditions with regard to nationality. The President and the VicePresident may be re-elected. The President presides at all meetings of the Court; he/she directs its work and supervises its administration, with the assistance of a Budgetary and Administrative Committee and of various other committees, all composed of Members of the Court. During judicial deliberations, the President has a casting vote in the event of votes being equally divided. In The Hague, where he/she is obliged to reside, the President of the Court takes precedence over the doyen of the diplomatic corps. The President receives a special supplementary allowance of 15,000 dollars per annum, in addition to his/her annual salary. The Vice-President replaces the President in his/her absence, in the event of his/her inability to exercise his/her duties, or in the event of a vacancy in the presidency. For this purpose he/she receives a daily allowance. In the absence of the Vice-President, this role devolves upon the senior judge. On 6 February 2012 the Court elected Judge Peter Tomka (Slovakia) to be President and Judge Bernardo Seplveda-Amor (Mexico) to be Vice-president
5 http://www.ICJ-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2
CHAMBERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE COURT: The court self-sufficiently discharges all the duties as a full court 6.but at times it may also seek assistance from permanent or temporary chambers. The court consists of three types chambers: 1 The chamber of summary procedure, which comprises of 5 judges, president, vice president, and 2 substitutes which the court requires by virtue of article 29 of the statute.7 2. A chamber of 3 judges to deal with certain categories of cases like labour or communications8 3. A chamber to deal with a case.9 After formally consulting the parties regarding the number of its members and informally regarding their name - who will then sit in all phases of the case until its final conclusion, even if in the meantime they cease to be Members of the Court. There are three committees of international court:
6 Bench of 9 judges excluding adhoc judges 7 Article 29: With a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Court shall form annually a chamber composed of five judges which, at the request of the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure. In addition, two judges shall be selected for the purpose of replacing judges who find it impossible to sit. 8 Article 26,para1: 1. The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges as the Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases; for example, labour cases and cases relating to transit and communications. 9 Article 26,para 2: The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties.
1) Budgetary and administration committee: it deals with decisions to be taken by the court on administrative matters. 2) Rules committee: this committee advises the court on the procedural issues and working method. Library committee: this committee looks over the program of acquisition for the library of the court and supervising the on-going modernization of its services. JURISDICTION: The International Court of Justice acts as a world court. The Court has a dual jurisdiction : it decides, in accordance with international law, disputes of a legal nature that are submitted to it by States authorized to make such a request 11 India is a charter member of the United Nations and participates in all its specialized agencies.it has contributed its troops to UN for carrying out its peace keeping obligations. India was a founding member of the United Nations, joining in October 1945, two years before acquiring independence from the United Kingdom. In 1953, the chief delegate of India at the time, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was elected the first woman President of the UN General Assembly. As a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement that started in 1955, India had traditionally represented the interests of the developing nations (or third world nations, as they were known at that time) and supported the struggle against colonialism and apartheid, its struggle towards global disarmament and the ending of the arms race, and towards the creation of a more equitable international economic
10 Contentious cases 11 Advisory cases
10
and it gives advisory opinions on legal
questions at the request of the organs of the United Nations or specialized agencies

order.12 India has been elected 7 times to the UN Security Council. India has been seeking a permanent seat on the un security council as a member of the G4, an organization composed of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India, all who are currently seeking permanent representation. India makes a number of claims to justify its demand. India has the world's second largest population and is the world's largest liberal democracy. It is also the world's ninth largest economy and third largest in terms of purchasing power parity. Currently, India maintains the world's third largest armed force. India is the third largest contributor of troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions after Bangladesh and Pakistan. Although in absolute numbers the troops supplied by India are only 3000 more than that from Nepal, a small country in comparison with India. India is regular contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions. The number of troops contributing to UN peacekeeping operations as of March 2007 was 9,471. It also suffered the death of 127 soldiers, who died while serving on peacekeeping missions. India is one of the main contributors to the UN regular budget. Indian contribution to United Nations Democracy Fund was USD 16 million for 2009. India has a permanent mission to the UN, which is led by the Permanent Representative, Hardeep Singh Puri. India, running unopposed in the Asian Group, was elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council after it garnered 187 votes in the then-192 member General Assembly. India has a keen interest in the un as it is continuously making more responsive to the needs of the member states. The charter of the United Nations provides that all members of the UN shall ipso facto become party to the international court of justice.
12 http://www.un.int/india/india un.html
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DECLARATIONS
RECOGNISING
THE
JURISDICTION
OF
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE The states party to the international court of justice may recognize as compulsory and without special agreement the jurisdiction of the court in relation to any other state accepting the same13 .The states which have recognized the courts jurisdiction has a right to bring any other state which also accepted the jurisdiction. India on 14 September, 1954 made a declaration regarding its acceptance of jurisdiction which was replaced by the declaration of 18 September, 1974 which is followed presently. India accepted ICJs jurisdiction in relation to art 36, Para 2 over all disputes other
13 Article 36 ICJ statute: 1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms. 6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

than the following: 1) disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of the Republic of or methods of settlement; Nations; India; (2) disputes with the government of any State which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of (3) disputes in regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction (4) disputes relating to or connected with facts or situations of hostilities, armed conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in self-defence, resistance to aggression, fulfilment of obligations imposed by international bodies, and other similar or related acts, measures or situations in which India is, has been or may in future be involved; (5) disputes with regard to which any other party to a dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice exclusively for or in relation to the purposes of such dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of a party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less than 12 months prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court; (6) disputes where the jurisdiction of the Court is or may be founded on the basis of a treaty concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, unless the Government of India specially agree to jurisdiction in each case; (7) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a multilateral treaty unless all the parties to the treaty are also parties to the case before the Court or Government of India specially agree to jurisdiction; (8) disputes with the Government of any State with which, on the date of an application to bring a dispute before the Court, the Government of India has no diplomatic relations or which has not been recognized by the Government of India; (9) disputes with non-sovereign
13
States
or
territories;
(10) disputes with India concerning or relating to:
(a) the status of its territory or the modification or delimitation of its frontiers or any other matter concerning boundaries; (b) the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the margins, the exclusive fishery zone, the exclusive economic zone, and other zones of national maritime jurisdiction including for the regulation and control of marine pollution and the conduct of scientific that (d) (e) the the for airspace research historical superadjcent and to by reasons its land and of its delimitation foreign belong maritime maritime to territory; vessels; it; and (c) the condition and status of its islands, bays and gulfs and that of the bays and gulfs
determination
boundaries.
(11) Disputes prior to the date of this declaration, including any dispute the foundations, reasons, facts, causes, origins, definitions, allegations or bases of which existed prior to this date, even if they are submitted14 India has shown extra ordinary participation at the international court of justice and to the other organs of the UN .from time immemorial eminent judges, scholars; leaders have held leading positions at various organs of UN and have contributed their share. There have been few distinguished personalities who have held the bench at the world court. They are Sir Benegal Rao, Nagendra Singh, Raghunandan swarup pathak and Justice Dalveer Bhandari. Name Sir benegal rao Nagendra singh Posts Judge Judge,president,vice Years of serving 1952-53 1973-88
14 http://www.ICJ-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1

president Raghunandan swarup Judge pathak Dalveer bhandari Judge 1989-91 2012
B N Rau served India as a representing delegate in the United Nations. From 1949 to 1952 he was India's Permanent Representative to the U.N., till he was appointed as a Judge of the International Court in The Hague. He also served as the president of the United Nations Security Council in 195015. Justice Raghunandan Pathak was the 18th chief justice of India .he served as a judge at international court of justice for three years. Judge Nagendra Singh was associated with the world court from 1972 till his death in 1988, first as a judge and then from 1985 as a president .he took an exalted view of the court, he was anxious that the court did not arrogate to itself the power to make laws. The most outstanding and significant contribution of justice Nagendra Singh is enriching the jurisprudence of the court in his opinion in the case Nicaragua v USA.His contribution as the president of the court to the judgment is reflected in his stand ,on the legal customary rules on general principles of international law. He is equally challenging and through provoking dissenting opinion, as an ad hoc judge of international court of justice, in the appeal relating to the jurisdiction of I.C.A.O council India v Pakistan; over ruling the weighty objections of India based on the councils serious breaches of procedural norms. His separate individual opinion in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta also was influencing on the world court.16
15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judges_of_the_International_Court_of_Justice 16 Book:nagendra singh of the world court: contribution and development by v c govindaraj
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Justice Bhandaris significant contributions to constitutional law, environmental law, human rights jurisprudence, gender justice, rule of law, protection of fundamental rights, protection of Intellectual Property Rights and to comparative law are widely recognised. He is also a member of leading international academic and legal bodies and is closely associated with a large number of Committees dealing with various aspects of International Law such as: Human Rights, Biotechnology, Sustainable Development, Securities Regulation, Trade, Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law and Space. Acknowledging his outstanding contribution, the North-western University School of Law, Chicago, US while celebrating its 150 Years (1859-2009) selected Dr. Justice Bhandari as one of its 16 most illustrious and distinguished alumni.17
HYPOTHESIS: International court of justice being a chariot of UN is expected to carry on its shoulders the task of fulfilling the principles of UN .As part of my legal study I would like to focus on the functioning of ICJ and its effectiveness with respect to the Indian context.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY USED: The researcher in this project has adopted doctrinal type of research. Throughout the
17 http://www.un.int/india/press%20release%202012/press03.pdf

project the case study type of research had been adopted to ascertain the grounds, causal factors, and contributions of international court of justice in the international regime with reference to Indian context. The study is basically focused on the library work and internet survey.
To further elucidate the relationship between India and international court of justice, the Indian cases brought at ICJ are discussed in the preceding chapters.
CASE 1-RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY

PORTUGAL V INDIA, 1955 FACTS OF THE CASE: This case was referred to by an application filed on 22 December, 1955.
17
The district of Daman comprises, in addition to its littoral territory, 2 parcels of territory completely surrounded by the territory of India which constitutes enclaves: Dadra and Nagar aveli. It is in respect of the communications between those enclaves that the question arises of the right of passage in favor of Portugal through Indian Territory and a correlative obligation binding upon India. The issue in Dadra on 21-22 July 1954 resulted in the overthrow of Portugal authority in that enclave .this created tension in the surrounding Indian Territory .thereafter all passage was suspended by India. Thus Portugal was placed in a position in which it became impossible for it to exercise its sovereignty rights over the enclaves. SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTY BRINGING IN THE CASE TO ICJ18 1 it requested the Court to adjudge and declare that a right of passage was possessed by Portugal and must be respected by India. 2 Portugal asked the court adjudge and declare that India had not complied with the Obligations incumbent upon it by virtue of the right of passage. 3 Portugal also requested the court to decide that India must end the measures by which it opposed the exercise of the right of passage or that there should be a temporary suspension of the right. PRILIMINARY OBJECTIONS RAISED BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:19 The First Preliminary Objection was to the effect that a condition in the Portuguese
18 Cases and materials on international law, seventh edition by David Harris 19 : http://www.ICJ-cij.org/

Declaration of December 19th,1955, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court renewed for that Government "the right to exclude from the scope of the present Declaration at any time during its validity any given categories of disputes by notifying the Secretary- General of the United Nations and with effect from the moment of such notification" and was incompatible with the object and purpose of the Optional Clause, with the result that the Declaration of Acceptance was invalid. The Second Preliminary Objection was bad on the allegation that the Portuguese Application of Iceberg 22nd 1955, was filed before a copy of the Declaration of Portugal accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court could be transmitted to other Fatties to the Statute by. The Secretary-General in compliance with Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute. The filing of the Application had thus violated the equality, mutuality and reciprocity to which India was entitled under the Optional Clause and under the express condition Of reciprocity contained in its Declaration of February 28th, 1940, accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. The Third Preliminary Objection was based on the absence, prior to the filing of the Application, of diplomatic negotiations which would have made it possible to define the subject matter of the claim.
The Fourth Preliminary Objection requested the Court to declare that since India had ignored the Portuguese Declaration before the Application was filed, India had been unable to avail itself on the basis of reciprocity of the condition in the Portuguese Declaration enabling it to exclude: from the jurisdiction of the Court the dispute which was the subject matter of the Application.
19
The fifth Preliminary Objection was based on the reservation in the Indian Declaration of Acceptance 'which excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court disputes in regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Government of India. That Government asserted that the facts and the legal considerations adduced before the Court did not permit the conclusion that there was a reasonably arguable case for the contention that the subject matter of the dispute was outside its domestic jurisdiction.
Finally, in The Sixth Preliminary Objection, the Government of India contended that the Court was without jurisdiction on the ground that India's Declaration of Acceptance was limited to "disputes arising after February 5th 1930 with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date." The Government of India argued: first, that the dispute submitted to the Court by Portugal did not arise after February 5th, 1930 and, secondly, that in any case, it was a dispute with regard to situations and facts prior to that date.
CONTENTIONS BY BOTH THE PARTIES AND COURTS CONSIDERATIONS OVER THEM: The right invoked by Portugal for the first submission was only to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves. The court referred that it was not contended that passage was accompanied by any immunity and made clear such passage remained subject to the regulation and control of India, which must be exercised in good faith, India being under an obligation not to prevent the transit necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty.

The Court then considered the date with reference to which it must ascertain whether the right invoked existed or did not exist. Portugal had previously invited the court to hold that arguments of India concerning its right to adopt an attitude of neutrality, the application of the United Nations Charter and the existence in the enclaves of a local government were without foundation. The Court, however, considered that it was no part of its judicial function to declare in the operative part of its Judgment that any of those arguments was or was not well founded. India had contended that the right of passage claimed by Portugal was too vague and contradictory to enable the Court to pass judgment upon it by the application of the legal rules enumerated in Article 38 (1) of the Statute. Portugal had relied on the Treaty of Poona of 1779 for claiming the right of passage over the Indian Territory. India had objected that what was alleged to be the Treaty of 1779 was not validly entered into and never became in law a treaty binding upon the Marathas. The Court, however, found that the Marathas did not at any time cast any doubt upon the validity or binding character of the Treaty. India had further contended that the Treaty did not operate to transfer sovereignty over the assigned villages to Portugal but only conferred, with respect to the villages, a revenue grant. The Court was unable to conclude from an examination of the various texts of the Treaty of 1779 that the language employed therein was intended to transfer sovereignty; the expressions used in the treaty, on the other hand, established that what was granted to the Portuguese was only a revenue tenure, and not a single instance had been brought to the notice of the Court in which such a grant had been construed as amounting to a cession of sovereignty. There could, therefore, be no question of any enclave or of any right of passage for the purpose of exercising
21
sovereignty over enclaves. The Court found that the situation underwent a change with the advent of the British as Sovereign of that part of the country in place of the Marathas: Portuguese sovereignty over the villages had been recognized by the British in fact and by implication and had subsequently been tacitly recognized by India. As a consequence the villages had acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves within Indian Territory and there had developed between the Portuguese and the territorial sovereign with regard to passage to the enclaves a practice upon which Portugal relied for the purpose of establishing the right of passage claimed by it. It had been objected on behalf of India that no local custom could be established between only two States, but the Court found it difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom might be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The court observed that with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there existed during the British and post-British periods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between daman and the enclaves. This practice having continued over a period extending, beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change in regime in respect of the intervening territory which occurred when India became independent, the court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that the practice was accepted as law by the parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation. As regards armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition, the position was different. The court is, therefore, of the view that no right of passage in favour of Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India has been established in respect of armed forces, armed police, and the arms and ammunitions. The course of dealing established between the Portuguese and the British authorities with respect to the

passage of these categories excludes the existence of any such right. The practice was established shows that, with regard to these categories .it was well understood that passage could take place only by permission of the British authorities .this situation continued during the post British period. As regards arms and ammunition, the Treaty of 1878 and rules framed under the Indian Arms Act of 1878 prohibited the importation of arms, ammunition or military stores from Portuguese India and its export to Portuguese India without a special licence. Subsequent Practice showed that this provision applied to transit between Daman and the enclaves. The finding of the Court that the practice established between the Parties had required for the passage of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition the permission of the British or Indian authorities rendered it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether or not, in the absence of the practice that actually prevailed, general international custom or general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, which had also been invoked by Portugal, could have been relied upon by Portugal in support of its claim to a right of passage in respect of these categories. The Court was dealing with a concrete case having special features: historically the case went back to a period when, and related to a region in which, the relations between neighbouring States were not regulated by precisely formulated rules States, which was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations between them, the Court must attribute decisive effect to that practice. The Court was, therefore, of the view that no right of passage in favour of Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India had been established in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and
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ammunition. Having found that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over intervening Indian Territory between Daman and the enclaves in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general, the court will proceed to consider whether India has acted contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugals right of passage in respect of any of these categories. The events that took place in Dadra on 21-22 July 1954 resulted in the overthrow of Portuguese authority in that enclave. This created tension in the surrounding Indian Territory. Thereafter all passage was suspended by India. India contends that this became necessary in view of the abnormal situation which had arisen in Dadra. In view the tension then prevailing in intervening Indian Territory, the court is unable to hold that Indias refusal of passage to the proposed delegation and its refusal of visas to Portuguese nationals of European origin and to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the Portuguese government was action contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugals right of passage. Portugals claim of right of passage is subject to full recognition and exercise of Indian sovereignty over the intervening territory and without any immunity in favour of Portugal. The court is of the view that Indias refusal of passage in those cases was, in the circumstances, covered by its regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal. JUDGEMENT: Following upon the Application, the Court was seized of six preliminary objections raised by the Government of India. By a Judgment given on 26 November 1957, the Court rejected the first four objections and joined the fifth and sixth objections to the Merits.

The President and Judges Basdevant, Badawi, Kojevnikov and Spiropoulos appended Declarations, to the Judgment of the Court. Judge Wellington Koo appended a Separate Opinion. Judges Winiarski and Badawi appended a Joint Dissenting Opinion. Judges Armand-Ugon, Moreno Quintana and Sir Percy Spender, and Judges ad ~SocC hagla andFernandes, appended Dissenting Opinions. In its Judgment, the Court:
a)
rejected the Fifth Preliminary Objection by 13 votes to 2;
(b) Rejected the Sixth Preliminary Objection by 11 votes to 4; (c) found, by 1 l votes to 4, that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli and the coastal district of Daman and between these enclaves, to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves and subject to the regulation and control of India, in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general; (6) found, by 8 votes to 7, that Portugal did not have in 1954 such a right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition; (e) Found, by 9 votes to 6, that India had not acted contrary to its obligations resulting from Portugal's right of passage in respect of private persons, civil -officials and goods in general. CONTRIBUTION: The court considered that general customs do play role as the source of international law, through which the court settles disputes. The court by not sticking to the traditional rules which govern the decisions of ICJ, moved a step forward and took a lenient move by considering the informal treaties also ,here the court relied on the fact that there was a treaty signed between the Portuguese and the Marathas, which was followed by the British also.so on this basis declared that there was a right of passage .The court even recognised that for a custom
25
to be established it is not necessary that there should be an exact number of states, a custom can even be established between two states, as the court did in this case.

CASE 2-APPEAL RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION OF I.C.A.O COUNCIL INDIA V PAKISTAN, 1971 POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED: 1) Appellate jurisdiction of the international court of justice. 2) Jurisdiction of the council of the international civil aviation organisation. 3) ICJ may review council assertion of jurisdiction through interlocutory appeal. 4) I.C.A.O has jurisdiction to decide merits of dispute between India and Pakistan under Chicago convention. 5) Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the I.C.A.O council. FACTS OF THE CASE: Shortly after achieving their independence, both India and Pakistan became parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944' (the Chicago Convention) and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, Under the Chicago Convention, "each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of other contracting States not engaged in scheduled international air service shall have the right to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission."' The Transit Agreement guarantees similar privileges of over flight and non-traffic stops for scheduled service .The Convention also established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to supervise the rights and Obligations created by the treaties and provided that disputes arising under the treaties be settled by the ICAO Council. Appeals from the Council's decisions were to be taken either to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal.'
27
When fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965 in Kashmir, India suspended the over flight and stopping privileges guaranteed to Pakistan under the treaties' After the Tashkent Declaration ended fighting early in 1966, Prime Minister Gandhi and President Ayub Khan exchanged notes partially restoring the status quo. India insisted, however, that these notes did not revive the suspended treaties, but rather produced a "Special Agreement" revocable at will by either party or requiring prior permission for all overflights or stops. Aircraft operations between the two countries continued on this uncertain basis until February, 1971, when an Indian airliner was hijacked to Pakistan and destroyed, allegedly with the silent cooperation of the Pakistani government. India purported to revoke the "Special Agreement" and accordingly refused to allow over flights or stops by Pakistani aircraft, even with prior permission. In March, Pakistan filed both an Application and a Complaint with the ICAO Council 20, demanding relief from the Indian action. India answered with preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Council, which were rejected by that body in July. In August, India's application for appeal from the Council's decision to accept jurisdiction was filed with the ICJ. MAIN CONTENSIONS OF THE PARTIES: Pakistan civil aircraft had the right to overfly the Indian Territory on the basis of 1) International Civil Aviation Convention 2) International Air Services Transit Agreement Both of which were signed in Chicago 1944.
20 (a) an Application under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of the Transit Agreement, (b) a Complaint under Article II, Section I, of the Transit Agreement. India having raised preliminary objections to its jurisdiction, the Council declared itself competent by decisions given on 29 July 1971. On 30 August 1971 India appealed from those decisions, founding its right to do so and the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal on Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of the Transit Agreement (hereinafter called "the jurisdictional clauses of the Treaties".
Hostilities interrupting overflights broke out between the two countries in August 1965, but in February 1966 they came to an agreement that there should be an immediate resumption of overflights on the same basis as before 1 August 1965. Pakistan interpreted that undertaking as meaning that overflights would be resumed on the basis of the Convention and Transit Agreement, but India maintained that those two Treaties had been suspended during the hostilities and were never as such revived, and that overflights were resumed on the basis of a special regime according to which they could take place only after permission had been granted by India. Pakistan denied that any such regime ever came into existence and maintained that the Treaties had never ceased to be applicable since 1966.21 APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT: India founded ICJ jurisdiction on article 84 of the Convention22, article II of the Transit Agreement23,'" and articles 36 and 37 of the ICJ Statute. Pakistan objected to
21 Para 1-12 of the judgment 22 "If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council. . . . Any contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision of the Council to an ad hoe arbitral tribunal . . . or to the Permanent Court of International Justice." Art. 85 deals with the procedure for establishing an arbitral tribunal. 23 ARTICLE II SEC 1 :A Contracting State which deems that action by another Contracting State under this Agreement is causing injustice or hardship to it, may request the Council to examine the situation. The Council shall thereupon inquire into the matter, and shall call the States concerned into consultation. Should such consultation fail to resolve the difficulty, the Council may make appropriate findings and recommendations to the Contracting States concerned. If thereafter a Contracting State concerned shall in the opinion of the Council unreasonably fail to take suitable corrective action, the Council may recommend to the Assembly of the above-mentioned Organization that such Contracting State be suspended from its rights and privileges under this Agreement until such action has been taken. The Assembly by a two-thirds vote may so suspend such Contracting State for such period of time as it may deem proper or until the Council shall find that corrective action has been
29
the Court's jurisdiction on a number of grounds, several of which were summarily rejected by the majority24. The Court did deal at some length, however, with three major objections to its own jurisdiction First, in its Counter-Memorial, Pakistan noted the difference between an Application and a Complaint under the ICAO Rules for the Settlement of Differences and claimed that while the Court had the Power to review ICAO Council action on the former, it had no jurisdiction to review action taken on the latter. An Application has traditionally been viewed as the proper form for challenging acts by Parties in violation of the Convention. The Rules and the Convention outline the procedure to be followed by the Council in reaching a decision on an Application, the remedies available for failure to comply with the decision, and the procedure for appeal .A Complaint, on the other hand, is the proper form for protesting behaviour which, though not technically illegal under the terms of the treaties, might nevertheless cause hardship or injury to another party The crucial difference is that the Council does not reach binding decisions on Complaints, but only makes "findings and recommendations." Pakistan argued that since there are no provisions in the Rules or the treaties for appeal from Council action on a Complaint and since it is impossible to review a non-binding recommendation, the Court had no power to review the Council's jurisdiction in this case. The Court agreed that its appellate jurisdiction may in some cases depend on the nature of the action in the tribunal below, but it went on to reason that, since an Application as well as a Complaint had been filed and since the facts alleged in both were identical, it would be absurd for the Court to hold that the Council had properly asserted jurisdiction over one and not the other3 While the Court seems thus to have adhered to a
taken by Such State. 24 Many of these objections, such as Pakistan's attempt to take advantage of a reservation in the Indian declaration under the ICJ Statute, were properly rejected by the Court as irrelevant unless the jurisdictional clauses of the treaties in question were found to be inadequate.

transactional theory of pleading, it should be cautioned than it did not vote on this issue separately and at least one judge who joined with the majority in the result indicated in a separate opinion that he would not have voted to accept jurisdiction over a Complaint that had been submitted alone. The possibility that the Court might deny appellate jurisdiction in such a situation should not be ignored. The second major objection to the Court's jurisdiction was raised in the Rejoinder by Pakistan, the final written pleading submitted to the Court. Pakistan claimed that India's reliance on the jurisdictional clauses of the Convention and the Transit Agreement in appealing to the ICJ contradicted the basic Indian contention that the treaties were no longer in effect between the two parties. The Court recognized that, if accepted, such circular logic would make it impossible for any nation claiming termination of a treaty to contest jurisdiction under its terms. None of the three judges who dissented from the Court's decision to accept jurisdiction relied on this argument in their opinions. The final and most compelling argument against ICJ jurisdiction was not raised by Pakistan until the oral arguments, where the chief counsel for Pakistan suggested that the ICJ's appellate jurisdiction applied only to final decisions of the ICAO Council and not to preliminary orders and rulings .The language of article 84 of the Convention offers support for this objection, since it refers simply to "appeal from the decision of the Council" .A narrow reading of this clause would indicate that preliminary decisions of the Council are not subject to immediate appeal. In fact, the Court agreed that this view "would certainly have to be regarded as correct in respect of any procedural or otherwise genuinely interlocutory decisions of the Council." In distinguishing a decision on jurisdiction from other decisions on preliminary matters, the Court relied on a series of policy arguments. OBSERVATIONS BY THE COURT: The first rationale offered by the Court is that a decision on jurisdiction, in contrast to other preliminary decisions, "is a substantial question crucially affecting the position
31
of the parties to the case," so that for purposes of appellate review, a "final decision of the Council as to its competence should not be distinguished from a final decision on the merits."3" In his concurring opinion, Judge Lachs amplified this explanation with the suggestion that the ICJ should usually exercise restraint in accepting jurisdiction, but not in cases where it acts as a court of appeal. In such cases, "to apply a restrictive interpretation of rights of appeal-and thus of powers of the court of appeal would obviously entail an extensive interpretation of the powers of the 'court of first instance., In a variation of the same theme, Judge Dillard pointed out that the Court should be concerned with protecting a litigant from the expense and vexation of defending on the merits before a tribunal which has no jurisdiction. JURISDCITION OF I.C.A.O: As the Court pointed out, jurisdiction of the Council to hear this case depends on the existence of a "disagreement relating to the interpretation or application" of the Convention or the Transit Agreement. India advanced two arguments against the existence of such a dispute. First, it argued that since the treaties as between India and Pakistan had been either suspended or terminated, there could be no dispute concerning their interpretation or application. Secondly, India argued that, while the Council certainly had jurisdiction to settle disputes about the application and interpretation of the treaties, it could not decide disputes concerning termination and suspension.25The Court was swayed by neither argument. It chose to view the first as simply an Indian reply to Pakistani charges that India had violated the Convention. The Court made a series of "observations" generally critical of the Indian denial of the continued validity of the treaties, an action somewhat inconsistent with its theory of interlocutory appeal. Rather, the Court emphasized that India could not be permitted to void the effect of the treaties' jurisdictional clauses by a unilateral declaration that the treaties were no longer
25 India relied on the theory that the primarily technical and non-legal functions of ICAO indicate that parties to the Convention did not intend that the Council should decide complex legal issues.

operative, To the argument that the Council had no jurisdiction over disputes involving termination, the Court replied by noting that India had again made the "assumption that the Treaties have in fact been validly terminated or suspended.". The Court refrained from adjudicating the issue of the extent of Council jurisdiction of disputes over termination, since it depended largely on the result of questions yet to be litigated before the Council. Having thus upheld the jurisdiction of the ICAO Council over the dispute, the Court returned the case to the Council for decision on the merits." JUDGEMENT: In its judgment in the case concerning the Appeal relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), the Court, by 13 votes to 3, rejected the Government of Pakistan's objections on the question of its competence and found that it had jurisdiction to entertain India's appeal. By 14 votes to 2, it held the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization to be competent to entertain the Application and Complaint laid before it by the Government of Pakistan on 3 March 1971, and in consequence rejected the appeal made to the Court by the Government of India against the decision of the Council assuming jurisdiction in those respects.
For these proceedings the Court was composed as follows: Vice-President Ammoun (Acting President), President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Padilla Nervo, Forster, Gros, Bengzon, Petrn, Lachs, Onyeama, Dillard, Ignacio-Pinto, de Castro, Morozov and Jimnez de Archaga, and Judge ad hoc Nagendra Singh. President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan and Judge Lachs appended Declarations to
33
the Judgment. Judges Petrn, Onyeama, Dillard, de Castro and Jimnez de Archaga appended Separate Opinions. Judge Morozov and Judge ad hoc Nagendra Singh appended Dissenting Opinions. The objections to the Court's jurisdiction based on the alleged inapplicability of the Treaties as such or of their jurisdictional clauses could not be sustained. The Court was therefore invested with jurisdiction under those clauses and it became irrelevant to consider objections to other possible bases of the Court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, since it was the first time any matter had come to the Court on appeal, the Court observed that in thus providing for an appeal to the Court from the decisions of the ICAO Council, the Treaties had enabled a certain measure of supervision by the Court of the validity of the Council's acts and that, from that standpoint, there was no ground for distinguishing between supervision as to jurisdiction and supervision as to merits.
DECLARATIONS AND SEPARATE OR DISSENTING OPINIONS: Judge Morozov and Judge ad hoc Nagendra Singh (Dissenting Opinions) were unable to concur in the Court's decision on the jurisdiction of the ICAO Council. President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Declaration) and Judges Petrn and Onyeama (Separate Opinions) were unable to concur in the Court's decision on its own jurisdiction. Judge Jimnez de Archaga (Separate Opinion) concurred in the operative clause of the Judgment but did not approve the Court's conclusion as to its jurisdiction to hear an Application. Judges Lachs (Declaration), Dillard and de Castro (Separate Opinions) added further

observations. CONTRIBUTION: Court pointed out several times; it would be absurd to allow nations to decide unilaterally that they were no longer subject to jurisdictional clauses in treaties which they have ceased to regard as operative. If a defendant nation could legitimately refuse to submit to international adjudication merely by declaring that the treaty conferring jurisdiction had been terminated or suspended, then the principle of submission to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal would become a virtual nullity. There can be little question that the Court reached the correct decision on this issue. The Court's wisdom on the issue of its own jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal is far more difficult to establish. In this country, it has long been the rule that the right of appeal in the federal system is generally delayed until after a final decision by the court of first instance, Efficiency of judicial administration and avoidance of the dangers of prejudgment of the merits which may arise with piecemeal adjudication have been the traditional justifications for this final decision rule. The former justification has little relevance to the practice of a court which has recently been handling only one or two cases annually, but the danger of piecemeal adjudication would seem to be just as great in the international context as in the federal system. The Court did recognize the problem with its statement that it "must avoid not only any expression of opinion on the merits of the case, but any pronouncements which might prejudge, or appear to prejudge, the eventual decision of the Council." Unfortunately, by discussing India's argument on the merits to an unnecessary extent, the Court failed to follow its own advice 26 .More significantly, the extent to which the Court delved into the substantive aspects of the dispute in dismissing India's challenge
26 Judge Nagrenda Singh is obviously referring to these digressions when he criticizes the Court for giving the impression of discussing more than merely the jurisdictional issue. .
35
to Council jurisdiction may indicate that the Court underestimated the incompatibility of a policy of liberal interlocutory appeal, even on jurisdictional questions, and evenhanded judgment on the merits. The result of the case suggests that the ICJ weighed heavily the need to protect the sovereignty of nations involved in international adjudication. This concern for sovereignty is understandable and justifiable since nations must be guaranteed respect for their sovereignty if they are ever to surrender enough of it to allow for a system of international judicial dispute settlement. On a purely theoretical level, the argument in favour of liberal interlocutory review of jurisdictional matters by the ICJ thus seems very compelling. The danger of piecemeal adjudication must be assigned a relatively insignificant value if it can be avoided only by implementing a procedure that would entail Forcing international parties to sacrifice more of their sovereignty than might be worth their while. The Court is indeed justified in its apparent sentiment that resort to international tribunals is still a sufficiently new practice among nations that it should be protected and buffered from careless destruction by adherence to a less valuable and far narrower principle, such as avoidance of piecemeal adjudication. Modifying the traditional notions of competence de la competence, the Court could reasonably have held that the Council's decision with regard to its own jurisdiction would have presumptive validity until final decision, after which the ICJ could exercise its power to hear appeals on all issues, including that of Jurisdiction.27
27 The fault in the Court's actual approach is further dramatically emphasized by the cost incurred by Pakistan during the pendency of the interlocutory appeal. With its civilian aircraft forced to circumnavigate the Indian subcontinent to maintain the air-link between the two part of the formerly divided nation, the government of Pakistan estimated a loss per week of $63o,oo0. Annexes at 30. Of course it would be unfair to assume that India's apparent lack of concern for a speedy resolution of the ICAO dispute and its role in the revolution in Bengla Desh were merely coincidental. Its success in delaying through the interlocutory appeal device might have been a clear warning in itself to the Court on the ways in which a determined litigant might take advantage of such a privilege for purposes having little to do with the suit itself. It is also interesting to note that had Pakistan complied with the procedural rules of the ICJ by filing preliminary objections to the ICJ's jurisdiction, the

Even if the Court reached the correct result on the issue of its own jurisdiction the majority opinion would still be difficult to defend against criticism of its failure to clearly set forth the rationale for allowing liberal interlocutory appeal. The opinion conveys a sense that the Court was struggling to at least some extent with the admittedly difficult problem of striking the proper balance between important countervailing considerations, but the Court failed to make its analysis explicit. This is especially disappointing in an opinion which was the Court's first in an appellate capacity. The Court failed to take full advantage of an important opportunity to discuss the function and purpose of its new role in the international legal process28.
proceeding would have been even further prolonged. The Court took disapproving note of this irregularity, but carefully stated that it in no way prejudiced the Pakistani case. Opinion at 52. The Court's extreme tolerance of procedural sloppiness throughout the case can perhaps best be explained in terms of the dramatic political devlcopments occurring during the time of the litigation. By the time oral arguments had been heard in July, 1972, East Pakistan had become Bengla Desh. As a result, the legal dispute between India and Pakistan over the Chicago Convention had lost much of its urgency. With Pakistan's need for speedy adjudication of the controversy now out of consideration to some extent,the Court quite possibly became more interested in condemning the Indian theory of unilateral termination than in dealing with minor infringements of formal requirements. 28 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 14
37
CASE 3-TRIAL OF PAKISTANI PRISNORS OF WAR PAKISTAN V INDIA, 1973 FACTS OF THE CASE: In 1971, a rebellion was suppressed by Pakistani armed forces in east Bengal, which was then part of Pakistan. Shortly afterwards, hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan, and Indian forces took control of East Bengal (which later declared itself independent as the State of Bangladesh). During the fighting, Indian forces took a number of Pakistani prisoners of war. In May 1973, Pakistan, believing that India was proposing to transfer some of these prisoners of war to Bangladesh for trial for acts of genocide and crimes against humanity, Pakistan sought to prevent this transfer by instituting proceedings against India on the basis of certain provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9December 1948 .At the same time, Pakistan sought interim measures of protection to prevent the transfer of the prisoners of war. India rejected the Court's jurisdiction. Pakistan on the basis of article 41 of the statute and article 66 of the rules of the court, plead the court indicate the following interim measure of protection: 1) That the process of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees in accordance with international law, which has already begun, should not be interrupted by virtue of charges of genocide against a certain number of individuals detained in India. 2) That such individuals, as are in the custody of India and are charged with alleged acts of genocide, should not be transferred to 'Bangladesh' for trial till such time as Pakistan's claim to exclusive jurisdiction and the lack of jurisdiction of any other Government or authority in this respect has been adjudged by the Court;"
India being the absent party to the case wrote a letter on 23 may, 1973 to the ambassador of the neither land declining to consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in the case, and claimed that without such consent the Court could proceed with it, and that there was no legal basis whatever for the jurisdiction of the Court in the case. On 11 July, 1973 Pakistan informed the court that there are expectations of negotiations between the two states in near future and Pakistan asked the court to postpone further consideration of its request for interim measures in order to facilitate those negotiations. Government of Pakistan further asks the Court to fix time-limits for the filing of written pleadings. COURTS OBSERVATIONS: The court considered that it was Pakistan which requested the Court to indicate interim measures of protection on the basis that the circumstances Of the case and it is of the essence of a request for interim measures of protection that it asks for a decision by the Court as a matter of urgency, as it is expressly recognized by the Court in Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. Now the Government of Pakistan asks the Court to postpone further consideration of its request for the indication of interim measures signifies that the Court no longer has before it a request for interim measures which is to be treated as a matter of urgency; And so the Court is not therefore called upon to pronounce upon the request. Having regard to Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court which provides that a request for the indication of interim measures of protection may be made at any time during the proceedings in the case in
39
Connection with which it is made, therefore the present case the Court must first of al1 satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute;
Accordingly, By 8 votes to 4, Decides that the written proceedings shall first be addressed to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute, then on request for extension of time by Pakistan to submit memorial the court granted time. Later on 14 December, 1974 Pakistan informed about the negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India which had resulted in an agreement signed at New Delhi on 28 August 1973, And, requested the Court to make an Order officially recording discontinuance of the proceedings in this case. On the other side Government of India, while it has addressed certain communications to the Court through its Ambassador in The Hague has not yet taken any step in the proceedings; Therefore the court on 15 December, 1974 Places on record the discontinuance by the Government of Pakistan Of the proceedings instituted by the Application filed on 11 May 1973. On 13 July 1973, the Court held (14 to 1) that, since urgency was of the essence of a request for interim measures, Pakistan, by asking for postponement, had indicated that its request no longer concerned a matter of urgency and the Court was therefore not called upon to pronounce on that request. Subsequently, the proceedings were discontinued at the request of Pakistan on 15 December, 1974. Justice Nagendra Singh gave separate opinion and justice Petren gave dissenting

opinion. CONTRIBUTION: The court gave importance to the interim measure which requires immediate steps to be taken, and so considered the first thing in this case. It emphasised on the elementary and basic principle of judicial propriety which governs the exercise of the judicial function, particularly in inter- state disputes, that no court of law can adjudicate on the rights and responsibilities of a third State, (a) Without giving that State a hearing, and (b) Without obtaining its clear consent. The court even extended its precious time so that the parties could reach an amicable settlement of the dispute. The separate and dissenting opinions also hold weightage. The separate opinion of Nagendra Singh postulates that request for postponement in relation to interim measures can only have the legal effect of withdrawal, which must take priority over al1 other considerations, particularly when India had declined to be present and has, therefore, no say in regard to the request of Pakistan. He asserted that when agreeing to postponement of further consideration of the request for interim measures and finding that it is not therefore called Upon to pronounce thereon, should have declined to deal any further with the case, as judicial propriety does not permit the Court to advance any further therein. Whereas the dissenting opinion says that the foremost question which the court must have taken into consideration should have been regarding jurisdiction, and the court adjudicated without appointing an ad hoc judge of Pakistan which is one of the essentials for settling of disputes at the world court. Judge Petren also raised a point regarding the attitudes of the two Governments in question gives the impression that
41
it is much rather the intervention of the mediator than that of the international judge which would be more likely to help them resolve the series of disagreements between them.
CASE 4-AERIAL INCIDENCE OF 1999 PAKISTAN V INDIA,1999 MAIN PRINCIPLES DISCUSSED: 1 The Jurisdiction of ICJ was discussed. 2 general act for pacific settlement of international disputes. 3. Treaty succession. 4. Common wealth and multilateral-treaty reservation in optional clause declaration. 5. UN charter as basis of jurisdiction. 6. Effect of obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means.
FACTS OF THE CASE

Pakistan's Application of September 21, 1999, requested the Court to declare that India is responsible under international law for the shooting down, on August 10, 1999, an unarmed aircraft of the Pakistani navy allegedly by Indian air force planes. The aerial incident resulted in the death of all 16 personnel on board who allegedly were on a routine training mission over Pakistani territory. Pakistan also maintained that Indian air force helicopters violated its territorial integrity by visiting the aircraft's crash site inside Pakistan territory, in an attempt to pick up items from the debris immediately after the incident. In Pakistan's view, the actions of the Indian air force violated its sovereignty and breached India's obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, other treaties and customary international law. Pakistan also claimed that India's actions constituted breaches of the 1991 Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations29 between both countries for which India must bear international responsibility. Article 1 of the 1991 Agreement obligates both countries to ensure that violations of each other's air space do not take place and provides that if any violation occurs inadvertently, the incident is to be investigated promptly and the other side informed of the results without delay. Pakistan asked the Court to hold that India is obligated to make reparations to it for the loss of the navy aircraft and to the heirs of the Pakistani servicemen.
Pakistan brought this issue to ICJ on the bases of jurisdiction based upon three
29
See Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations, Apr. 6, 1991, Pak.-India. Article 1 obligates both countries to ensure that violations of each other's air space do not take place, and provides that if any violation occurs, the incident is to be investigated promptly, with the other side to be informed of the results without delay
43
points: 1. Pakistan relied on Article 17 of the 1928 General Act for Pacific Settlement of Disputes as providing jurisdiction to the ICJ as successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which functioned between 1922 and 1945. Article 17 provides that all disputes with regard to which the parties to the General Act are in conflict as to their respective rights are to be submitted for decision to the PCIJ (currently the ICJ, as Article 37 of the ICJ Statute provides).
2. As an additional basis of the Court's jurisdiction, Pakistan relied on the declarations made by the two States accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. That provision, known as the "Optional Clause," provides that States Parties to the ICJ Statute may at any time file with the UN SecretaryGeneral declarations stating that they recognize as compulsory, without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the Court's jurisdiction over all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation, or the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
3. Finally, Pakistan invoked Article 36, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute as a basis of jurisdiction. According to this provision, the Court's jurisdiction comprises all matters specially provided for in the UN Charter or in treaties and conventions in force. Preliminary objections of India regarding jurisdiction: 1. India contested the jurisdiction and referred to a communication of September 18, 1974, addressed to the UN Secretary-General stating that India "never regarded

[itself] as bound by the General Act of 1928 since [its] Independence in 1947, whether by succession or otherwise." 2. India challenged the Court's jurisdiction, invoking a reservation contained in its declaration of September 18, 1974, which excludes from jurisdiction "disputes with the government of any State which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations. 3. India emphasised that the Charter and a bilateral treaty relied on by Pakistan do not contain any specific provision of itself conferring compulsory jurisdiction on the Court.
CONTENSIONS BY BOTH THE PARTIES: India argued that, with the demise of the League organs and the PCIJ 30, to which the general Act refers, the act had lost its original efficacy. In support of this argument, India invoked the UN General Assembly's adoption of the Revised General Act in 194931. India also characterized the General Act as an agreement of a political character and, as such, not automatically binding on successor states like India and Pakistan. Noting that it had made no notification of succession as required by Articles 17 and 22 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties32, India referred to a communication of September 18, 1974, addressed to the
30 Although the PCIJ was created by the League of Nations and operated under its auspices, the PCIJ's Statute was not part of the League Covenant, and the Court was not a statutory organ of the League. 31 Sega Res. 268A (III) (Apr.28, 1949), at 10. For the text of the Revised General Act, see 71 UNTS 101. Article 17 is among the provisions that were amended by the new, 1949 act. See Aerial Incident Judgment. 32 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, opened forsignatureAug. 23, 1978, UN Doc. A/CONF 80/31, 17 ILM 1488 (1978).
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UN Secretary-General, stating that India "never regarded itself as bound by the General Act of 1928 since its Independence in 1947, whether by succession or otherwise33. Pakistan argued that India's communication of September 1974 was a subjective statement devoid of objective validity and that the emergence of an independent India was not a case of state succession, but of continuity of the same state-namely, British India before 1947 and independent India thereafter. As for its own status, Pakistan believed that it had succeeded automatically to the General Act in 1947 based on customary international law and, in any event, through its notification of succession addressed to the Secretary-General on May 30, 1974.34 India and Pakistan also advanced differing interpretations of the practice of the two countries since 1947. Pakistan claimed that the General Act qualified as a peaceful
33 Aerial incident Judgment,. India's communication was issued while different ICJ proceedings instituted against it by Pakistan were pending. 34 See Aerial Incident Judgment,. In this connection, the parties also disagreed on the interpretation of a schedule to the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order issued by India's governor-general on August 14, 1947, which was stated to have the effect of an agreement between the two countries concerning treaty succession. According to Pakistan's interpretation, it had succeeded to the rights and obligations under all international agreements to which British India was a party. In India's view, however, Pakistan could not have succeeded, under the 1947 order and agreement, to British India's rights and obligations by virtue of British India's membership of the League of Nations; Pakistan needed to submit a new, independent application for membership in the United Nations. In support of its view, India referred to judgment issued by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on June 6, 1961, which found, in considering Pakistan's status in relation to the 1927 Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, that Pakistan did not automatically become a member of the United Nations or succeed to the rights and obligations of British India deriving from its membership in the League of Nations or the United Nations. Pakistan claimed that this judgment could not be relied upon, because Pakistan had not had an opportunity in the case to express its views to the Supreme Court. See id., paras. 18-20; Yangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Bros. (Karachi), Sup. Ct., Civ. Appeal No. 139, Judgment of June 6, 1961 (Pak.); see also Materials on Succession of States, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/14, at 133-41 (1967).

means to settle their differences mutually agreed upon between them referred to in the Shimla Accord of July 2, 1972, which reaffirmed the General Act's procedure. India maintained that the Shimla Accord represented no more than an arrangement between the two countries to resort to negotiations before referring any difference to some other method of settlement through a further and specific agreement between the parties.35 India noted With respect to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the ICJ Statute (the Optional Clause),that its declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction excludes disputes with the government of any State which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations, including Pakistan. 36 Pakistan argued, however, that India's Commonwealth reservation was made in bad faith and was extra statutory and illicit because it lay outside the range of reservations permitted by the Court's Statute37. In Pakistan's view, the permissible conditions to which an Optional Clause declaration may be made subject are listed exhaustively in Article 36(3) of the Statute. Thus, India's declaration was valid except for its Common- wealth reservation, which was opposable to Pakistan absent its acceptance by that state. India, by contrast, argued that a reservation cannot be severed from the declaration and forms an integral part of it. Pakistan further claimed that India's reservation was, in any event, obsolete and lacked any contemporary justification: the members of the Commonwealth are no
35 See. Aerial Incident Judgment 36 Aerial Incident Judgment 37 Pakistan relied on a similar argument in an attempt to dismiss India's reliance on British India's reservations attached to its May 21, 1931, instrument of accession to the General Act.
47
longer united by a common allegiance to the British Crown, and the modes of dispute settlement originally contemplated never materialized. In reply, India pointed out that there is no support for the applicability of the doctrine of obsolescence to unilateral acts and that the doctrine certainly could not apply, in any case, to a reservation that had been a part of practice since 1974. Pakistan also argued that India's Commonwealth reservation amounted, as a practical matter, to discrimination and an abuse of right of Pakistan. India quoted another reservation in its declaration, which excludes disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a multilateral treaty, (UN Charter) unless India specially agrees to jurisdiction or all the parties to the treaty are also parties to the case before the Court. Relying on the Nicaragua precedent, Pakistan pointed that, because its case against India ultimately rested on considerations of customary international law, the case was not affected by India's multilateral-treaty reservation. India, by contrast, argued that the reservation would still apply wherever an application relies upon a cause of action that, in the final analysis, is based on the UN Charter. Finally, Pakistan argued, that Article 1 (ii) of the 1972 Shimla Accord, through which both parties agreed "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them," had the effect of an estoppel preventing India from invoking its reservation in an attempt to block the Court's jurisdiction. In reply, India simply pointed out that the Shimla Accord does not contain a compromisers clause. India stressed the importance of a state's intention in making its declaration accepting the Court's Optional Clause jurisdiction, and pointed out that

it has long been recognized that a state is allowed to select its partners in regard to which it is prepared to accept such jurisdiction. India characterized its Commonwealth reservation as an unambiguous statement of classical reservation ratione personae. To accept Pakistan's theory of extra statutory reservations as valid would allow any party to escape the effect of a reservation by merely stating that it was extra statutory in character.38 OBSERVATIONS BY THE COURT: The Court declined to address the question of whether the General Act can be regarded as a convention in force for the purposes of Article 37 of the Statute of ICJ. The Court found, that India's communication of September 18, 1974, served the same legal ends as a notification of denunciation under Article 45 of the General Act. Exclusively on that basis,'4 the Court concluded that India cannot be regarded as having been a party to the General Act on the date on which Pakistan filed its application.39 The Court rejected all of Pakistan's arguments relating to Optional Clause jurisdiction. With regard to Pakistan's contention that India's Commonwealth reservation is extra statutory, the Court affirmed a prior decision in which it observed that declarations accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction are facultative, unilateral engagements that states are absolutely free to make or not to make-either unconditionally and without temporal restrictions, or by qualifying the acceptance through conditions or reservations.40 The Court noted that Article 36(3) of the Statute has never been regarded as laying
38 American Journal of international law 39 40
Consequently, Article 17 of the General Act, read in conjunction with Article 37 of the ICJ Statute, did not form a basis of jurisdiction in this case. citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1984 ICJ
49
down exhaustively the conditions under which declarations might validly be made, and also noted that the practice has recognized the right of states to attach reservations to their Optional Clause acceptance, thus enabling them to define the parameters of that acceptance. In reply to Pakistan's argument that India's Commonwealth reservation is a discriminatory act constituting an abuse of right, the Court noted that the reservation refers generally to states that are or have been members of the Commonwealth, and that states are, in any event, free to limit the scope ratione personae of their acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. As to Pakistan's obsolescence argument, the Court confirmed that an Optional Clause declaration must be interpreted and given effect as it stands, based on the words actually used and having due regard for the state's intention when it made the declaration. Whatever reasons India may have had for limiting as it did the scope of its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, the Court must abide by this limitation expressing the intention of India as the state making the declaration The Court disagreed with Pakistan that Article 1 (ii) of the Shimla Accord estopped India from invoking its commonwealth reservation; this provision imposed only a general obligation on the parties to settle their differences by peaceful means, to be further determined by mutual agreement. Thus, the Shimla Accord does not as such require India and Pakistan to submit their disputes to the Court.25 Given that Pakistan and India are both members of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Court concluded that their Optional Clause declarations provided no basis of jurisdiction in this case. 41 According to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the ICJ Statute, the Courts jurisdiction comprises all matters specially provided for in the UN Charter or in treaties and
41 For a discussion of this type of reservation, see STANIMIRA. ALEXANDROV, RESERVATIONS IN UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS ACCEPTING THE COMPULSORYJURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE

conventions in force. In Pakistan's view, 30 Article 36(1) should be read in conjunction with Articles 1 (1), 2 (3)-(4), 33, 36(3) and 92 of the Charter as establishing a basis for jurisdiction. Moreover, Pakistan argued that the parties had reaffirmed such jurisdiction under Article 36(1) in the 1972 Shimla Accord, which provides that, the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter shall govern the relations between the two countries.42 The Court observed, that neither the UN Charter nor the Shimla Accord contains any specific provision conferring compulsory jurisdiction on the Court in relation to disputes between India and Pakistan. The Court thus concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain Pakistan's application on the basis of Article 36(1) of the Statute.43 JUDGEMENT: THE COURT, By fourteen votes to two, finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on2 1 September 1999. IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-Presidents; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Reddy. AGAINST: Judge Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hoc pizada. Judges Oda and Koroma and Judge ad hoc Reddy appended separate opinions to the
42 American general of international law
43 The Security Council may, at any stage of the nature referred to in article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or method of adjustment.
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Judgment of the Court. Judge Al-Khasawneh and Judge ad hoc Pirzada appended dissenting opinions to it. The court observed that there are no provisions conferring compulsory jurisdiction on the court to entertain this dispute between India and Pakistan. Neither the un charter nor Shimla accord contained any such provisions .consequently the court held it had no jurisdiction to entertain Pakistans application on the basis of article 36(1)of the statue. The court by way of obiter dicta considered that there is a distinction between a states acceptance of its jurisdiction and question of whether any act of state violates international law. The independent states whether they accept international courts jurisdiction or not in all cases they remain liable for wrongful acts which violate international law. The judicial settlement of international law is an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of disputes amongst the states. It made clear to the parties that lack of jurisdiction does not relieve them of the international obligation undertaken by them; they are supposed to act in good faith and reach to a peaceful settlement of dispute. 44 CONTRIBUTION: Acceleration of judicial process: The court for the second time45 found at the preliminary stage that it is without jurisdiction to entertain an application.46
44 : http://www.ICJ-cij.org/ 45 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 46 The Court's refusal to entertain Portugal's application in East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) in 1995, although technically a dismissal, was based on a finding at the merits stage that the Court could not, in the absence of Indonesia as a necessary

The speed with which the court disposal of this case shows its attempts to accelerate judicial process.47The court was done with this case by its decision on jurisdiction in 9 months after the application was filed and less than 3 months after the oral proceedings. Declaring article 36 as not exhaustive: court confirmed article 36 of the statute does not contain an exhaustive list of conditions under which such declarations may be made. Declaration regarding optional clause: Court's statements concerning reservations contained in Optional Clause declarations are important in that they affirm prior pronouncements, they add little to the relevant body of law.48 POINTS ON WHICH THE COURT DID NOT ADJUDICATE UPON: The Court did not address the question whether the General Act must be regarded as a convention in force for the purposes of Article 37 of the Statute. On two prior occasions, the Court similarly shied away from tackling this question.49
third party, exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it to adjudicate the dispute referred by Portugal 47The fact that only four days were devoted to hearing the parties' arguments on jurisdiction is further evidence of this trend. 48 Inasmuch as two 44 The Court also failed to comment on India's contention that because a reservation forms an integral part of the 1998 decisions dealt extensively with article 36(2), the absence of significant new developments regarding that provision was perhaps to be expected. See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cam. v. Nig.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 ICJ REP. 275 (June 11); Peter H. F. Bekker, Case Report: Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 92 AJIL 751 (1998); FisheriesJurisdictiThe Optional Clause declarations of Barbados, Canada, Gambia, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, and the United Kingdom all include versions of the Commonwealth reservation. No state in the Court's history had previously challenged the validity of the Commonwealth reservation. 49 Nuclear Test, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case
53
The Court also left unanswered the question of India's reliance on the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, which was invoked in support of India's argument that the parties did not succeed to the General Act.42 In the end, the Court concluded only that India was not a party to the General Act when Pakistan filed its application. The Court did not address Pakistan's status in relation to that act. The Court also failed to comment on India's contention that because a reservation forms an integral part of the declaration in which it appears, the reservation cannot be severed from the declaration. In connection with Canada's similar contention advanced in recent proceedings the Court stated only that "declarations and reservations are to be read as a whole."50
CONCLUSION: It has been observed that international court of justice has been criticised for its limited effectiveness and has experienced many failures, it has not lived up to the expectation the world court running along with un would evolve into an international government. The trend in which the court functions leads itself to be called a potent symbol of possibilities of an international legal system.
50 Fisheries Jurisdiction The Court's subsequent statement in paragraph 59 of that judgment, however, appears to make a finding that a reservation is an integral part of a declaration dependent upon the specific circumstances of a case ("It follows that this reservation is not only an integral part of the current declaration but also an essential component of it, and hence of the acceptance by Canada of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
To begin with, only a total of 63 states have recognised its compulsory jurisdiction with or without reservations through the optional clause system. Less than 100 cases in more than 50 years show the pace with which the court has dispensed justice. The main reason for ICJ to lag behind is ICJs jurisdiction, its relatively rigid procedure and the enforceability of its decree. The key reason of concern for ICJ has been its jurisdiction, as discussed in the cases earlier we see how ICJ did not accept its jurisdiction to try contentious matters which if dealt would has added precedents to the international legal field. International society is still expanding its horizons, as is the jurisdiction of international tribunals. Since the beginning, almost all the international tribunals have adopted non-compulsory or binding jurisdiction, including the ICJ. However, more recently established international dispute settlement fora, such as the International Criminal Court, to some degree have started to adopt compulsory jurisdiction. The most typical of these is the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Mechanism. An examination of compulsory jurisdiction in WTO dispute settlement reveals some important implications for the ICJ. The need of the hour requires reform, but reforming a World Court is not an easy matter. The goal should be achieved step by step. In my opinion the ICJ can construe its jurisdiction broadly when there are differences as to what the scope of its jurisdiction is. Of course the relevant provisions or Optional Clause declaration must be interpreted in a natural and reasonable way. It is also argued that the jurisdiction of ICJ should be extended but not at the cost of there being a license to misuse it.in my opinion this international court has the ability do a much better job of exercising its competence under the current ICJ statue and in
55
an environment of proliferating international courts and tribunals, if it chooses to interpret its jurisdiction broadly. So we can hope that the Peace Palace will heat up and the World Court will be in business again.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFFERED: 1. Cases and material in international law by David Harris, seventh edition. 2. International law by Shaw. 3. Nagendra Singh of the world court-contributions and developments. 4. Role and record of international court of justice by Nagendra Singh. 5. The United Nations structure and functions of an international organisation. INTERNET SOURCES: 1. http://www.ICJ-cij.org/
2. http://www.un.int/india/press%20release%202012/press03.pdf 3. American journal of international law. 4 .Howard international law journal.
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

CONTENTS S. TOPIC No 1 2 PAGE NO.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

and it gives advisory opinions on legal

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

(10) disputes with India concerning or relating to:

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

CASE 1-RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

rejected the Fifth Preliminary Objection by 13 votes to 2;

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

FACTS OF THE CASE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE & INDIA

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