Professional Documents
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JUDGMENT
PRESENT
BY THE COURT:-
7. The definition of New Industrial Unit in clause 2(k) of the Incentive Scheme
of 1998 is as under:-
8. The definition of “New Industrial Unit” in clause 2(b) of the Incentive Scheme
of 1987 is as under:-
“2(b) “New Industrial Unit covered by 1985 dispensation” means an industrial unit, which
commenced commercial production on or after 1.4.1985 and was entitled for interest free
sales tax loan scheme under the 1985 dispensation.”
9. The definition of “New Industrial Unit” in clause 2(a) of the Incentive Scheme
of 1989 is as under:-
“(a) “New Industrial Unit” means an industrial unit which commences commercial
production during the operative period of the New Incentive Scheme but will not include,-
(i) an industrial unit established by transferring or shifting or dismantling an existing
industry; and
(ii) an industrial unit established on the site of an existing unit manufacturing similar goods.”
“The choice between a strict and a liberal construction arises only in case of doubt in regard
to the intention of the Legislature manifest on the statutory language. Indeed, the need to
resort to any interpretative process arises only where the meaning is not manifest on the plain
words of the statute. If the words are plain and clear and directly convey the meaning, there
is no need for any interpretation. It appears to us the true rule of construction of a provisions
as to exemption is the one stated by this Court in Union of India v. M/s. Wood Papers Ltd.,
(1991) 1 JT 151 at p.155 : (AIR 1991 SC 2049 at pp.2501-525):
“.......Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision is to be invoked
at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the
notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed
strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and
the subject falls in the notification then fully play should be given to it and it calls for a wider
and liberal construction....”
12. In Bajaj Tempo Ltd., Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay
City-III, Bombay (1992) 3 SCC 78, while dealing with a case under Section 80-J of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 available to the new industrial undertakings, however not to such new
industrial unit which were formed by transfer of building, machinery or plant previously used
in any other business, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 5 observed as under:-
“The section, read as a whole, was a provision, directed towards encouraging industrialisation
by permitting an assessee setting up a new undertaking to claim benefit of not paying tax to
the extent of six per cent in a year on the capital employed. But the legislature took care to
restrict such benefit only to those undertakings which were new in form and substance, by
providing that the undertaking should not be, 'formed' in any manner provided in clause (i) of
sub-section (2) of Section 15-C. Each of these requirements, namely, formation of the
undertaking by splitting up or reconstruction of an existing business or transfer to the
undertaking of building, raw material or plant used in any previous business results in denial
of the benefit contemplated under sub-section (1). Since a provision intended for promoting
economic growth has to be interpreted liberally, the restriction on it, too, has to be construed
so as to advance the objective of the section and not to frustrate it.”
13. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Dhut – (2007) 3 SCC 700
while dealing with a case arising under Section 147 and 149 of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988,
the Apex Court reiterated the principles relating to interpretation of statutes in the following
manner:-
14. In Reserve Bank of India V. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.
MANU/SC/0073/1987 this Court stated:-
If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-
maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may
take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover
what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to
fit into the scheme of the entire Act.
In the Interpretation and Application of Statutes, Reed Dickerson, at p.135 discussed
the subject while dealing with the importance of context of the statute in the following terms:
... The essence of the language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even affect the
conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it
belongs. For this reason, language has been called “conceptual map of human experience.
In Balram Kumawat Vs.Union ofIndia and Ors. MANU/SC/0628/2003 this
Court held that if special purpose is to be served even by a special statute, the same may not
always be given any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction nor doctrine of
strict construction should always be adhered to.
15. Cautioning against judicial heroics, in Standard Chartered Bak and Ors. Etc. V.
Directorate of Enforcement and Ors. etc.-(2005)4 SCC 530 ; AIR 2005 SC 2622, the Court
said:-
“67. We are unable to subscribe to the view that by 'judicial heroics' it is open
to the Court to remedy an irretrievable legislative error by resort to the theory of presumed
intention of the legislature. It was contended that the Court should adopt a purposive
construction of statutes. The dicta of Denning L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. V.
Asher,(1949) 2 ALL ER 155, p. 164 were pressed into service for emulation. The view of
Denning L.J., that 'judicial heroics' were warranted to cope with the difficulties arising in
statutory interpretation, was severely criticized by the House of Lords in Magor & st. Mellons
R.D. C. V. Newport Corporation, (1951) 2 ALL ER 839 (HL). Lord Simonds said, “the duty
of the Court is to interpret the word that the legislature has used. Those words may be
ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a
voyage of discovery are strictly limited.” “It appears to me”, said Lord Simonds, “to be a
naked usurpation of legislative function under the thin disguies of interpretation”. Lord
Morton observed: “these heroics are out of place”. Lord Tucker said, “Your Lordships would
be acting in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity if the view put forward by Denning,
L.J., were to prevail.” This disapproval of Denning L.J.'s approach was cited with approval
by this Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. V. Presiding
Officer, Labour Court – MANU/SC/0479/1990.”
18. In view of the aforesaid, this revision petition is allowed and the impugned
order of SLSC dated 17.11.2004 and Tax Board dated 1.2.2006 are quashed and set aside.
item No.3
babulal/