Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 32, No. 2 (2010), pp. 25879 DOI: 10.

1355/cs32-2f 2010 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Religion and Conict in Southern Thailand: Beyond Rounding Up the Usual Suspects
CHRISTOPHER M. JOLL

This article takes clues from Mark Juergensmeyers comparative study of religious violence and develops Imtiyaz Yusufs proposal that the southern violence represents a conict between the competing exclusive ethno-religious worldviews of Thai satsanaa and Malay agama. It moves beyond the routine rounding up and interrogation of the usual suspects in two ways: rst, by including a range of uncivil elements of Thai Buddhism, and second, by examining often ill-conceived Thai interference in Islamic matters. The article also poses questions about the usual suspects, beginning with a description of Islamic movements which contribute to an increasingly divided Islamic community less able to prevent and limit Islamic violence. The paper investigates the Islamic credentials of the insurgency and distinguishes between the presence of jihadi rhetoric with a developed jihadi rationale, a recent development in southern Thailand. The article argues for the localization of the global, a process which features local actors and agents that are informed by parochial and highly ethnocized version of Islam that is countering occasionally uncivil Buddhist opponents, as an approach for studying violence in the Thai south. Keywords: South Thailand, Southeast Asian Islam, ethno-religious conicts, Islamic activism, Jihad.

CHRISTOPHER M. JOLL is a Patani-based Visiting Research Fellow at the Muslim Studies Center, the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.
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The present conict in Thailands far south continues to attract much attention from academics and analysts. While applauding approaches framing aspects of this conict in the wider context of Thai society that is facing a range of crises, many remain concerned with establishing local connections to global jihadi movements.1 Such an approach resembles the rounding up of the usual suspects ordered by inspector Louis Renault in the closing scene of the 1942 classic movie Casablanca. Anthony Johns likens this to studies of Southeast Asian Islam where the interrogation of the usual suspects has become a routine exercise. While there may be ways to make people talk, there are many more questions to ask and interrogators are capable of putting into suspects mouths what they want them to say. In short, there is the need to discover ways and means of moving beyond what has become habitual, of nding new questions to ask and more suspects to round up.2 This article sets out to achieve a number of goals in the discussion on the role of religion in Thailands southern conict since 2004. Before asking new questions of Thailands southern Malay Muslims, the paper begins by rounding up some unusual suspects, specifically, the uncivil elements of Thai Buddhism. This approach resembles that of Juergensmeyers study of religious violence which examines the logic of violence by Christians, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and Buddhists.3 The article also seeks to develop Imtiyaz Yusufs persuasive proposal that the southern violence represents a conict between the competing exclusive ethno-religious worldviews of Thai and Malay religions. Attempts at a clear and coherent discussion of religion in southern Thailand are complicated by more than the inseparability of Islam and Malayness. Dynamics viewed as religious also relate to local history, politics, education and economics. For instance, chronic unemployment explains the ease with which young Malay men are recruited by insurgents, for two reasons.4 First, the large number of Malay Muslim migrant workers in Malaysia means that many parents are unable to protect their children from being recruited by the insurgents, and these recruits themselves would be less attracted to the movement if they were engaged in gainful employment. Joining such movements like a religious education and involvement in dawah (Arabic for Islamic missionary movements) groups bolster the cultural capital of unemployed Malays. Second, the reduction of space shared by ethnic Thais and ethnic Malays in southern Thailand has been perpetuated by the preference of Malay Muslims for private schools teaching Islam (PSTI) (rongrian soon satsana

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Islam), or reformed pondok over Thai state schools. Not only do PSTI students have less contact with Thai Buddhists, but on graduation are also less equipped to nd places in Thailands modern economy.5 This article begins by rounding up some new suspects in the ethno-religious conict, before beginning the important task of asking new questions about the usual suspects. Rounding Up New Suspects Michael Jerrysons research on the role played by monks in southern Thailand offers correctives to what he regards as the misconception that Buddhism is a mystical and inherently peaceful religion. This, according to Jerryson, has led to a lack of attention to the role of Buddhists in a number of conicts.6 The context for Jerrysons study is the attack in 2004 of nine Buddhist temples ( Wat) in which four monks were killed, and two others injured. The most highly publicized of these was the murder of monks and novices at Phromprasit temple in Panare in October 2005. Following this incident, the Sangha committee of Patani published a twenty point declaration which included calls for the abolition of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) (of which more later). Despite assertions by McCargo that this initiative was backed by elements of the military, and the names of some monks were included without their consent, the Patani Sangha claimed the NRC to have shown little interest in the plight of local Buddhists. Leading southern monks gave interviews slamming the rhetoric of human rights and suggesting this did not apply to the murdered monks. Moreover, as they also pointed out, while all presidents of the Islamic councils in the three southern provinces had been invited to join the NRC, southern monks had not.7 This would not be the only controversy the NRC would be involved in, as its conclusions were criticized as amounting to an exoneration of Islam in the conict.8 Between 2004 and 2007, sixteen wat were attacked, leaving ve monks dead, and seventeen injured.9 In the most violent districts, these attacks reduced the number of monks making their early morning rounds for alms, with those continuing to do so receiving assistance from the government including military escorts and bulletproof vests.10 Attacks on southern temples also resulted in their militarization.11 While often opposed by the southern abbots, fortied temples functioned as barracks and depots for military hardware. The end result was that Malay Muslims identied temples with the Thai military and places where eeing Buddhists would seek refuge.12

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In addition to militarized temples, Jerryson documents a covert initiative in which military monks have been assigned to guard southern Buddhist temples and fellow monks.13 While the ordination of active soldiers is prohibited, and the 1905 Thai Military Service Act made monks exempt from military service, the Thai Buddhist tradition of temporary ordination creates space for circumventing the guidelines for Buddhist soldiers. Soldiers are granted a four month paid leave for ordination; and seventy-ve soldiers were ordained, for instance, on Queen Sirikits birthday in 2005. Jerryson argues such leniency to have been further extended by covert military monks who are ordained but do not put down their weapons nor abandon their military duties.14 Like much of the southern insurgency, military monks are shrouded in secrecy. Drawing comparisons with Sri Lanka and Cambodia, Jerryson views Thailands southern conict as having activated the latent tendency for militant Buddhism.15 Dismissing suggestions by specialists in Thai Buddhism such as Charles F. Keyes that Buddhism plays a positive civic role in Thai democracy, McCargo cites Jerrysons ndings to demonstrate the uncivil nature of Buddhism in Thailand. The anti-Islamic polemics by the inuential scholar-monk Prayudh Payutto are seen by McCargo as providing robes of respectability for growing Buddhist intolerance. In addition to calling for the abolition of the NRC, southern abbots also expressed sympathy for the heavy-handed tactics of the Thai military.16 During the drafting of the 2007 Constitution, monks also advocated that Buddhism be made the national religion.17 Members of the royal family have also become involved in religious controversy. In addition to the security provided by the police, army, and village defence volunteer system (Chor Ror Bor), Buddhist villagers successfully petitioned Queen Sirikit for additional security during her stay in Thaksin Ratchanives Palace in Narathiwat in 2004. This led to an additional village defence volunteer system being formed, referred to as Or Ror Bor. While originally envisaged as a mixed force composed of both Buddhists and Muslims, the International Crisis Group (ICG) claims that they consist almost exclusively of the former. In addition, these groups are based in temple compounds, and are explicitly mandated to protect Buddhist minorities. 18 Another incident involving the Queen took place following the fatal shooting in Narathiwat of two palace ofcials on 16 November 2004. The Queen delivered an emotional speech to an audience of over a thousand people that was also broadcast on national television. In it, the Queen declared that Thais were determined to die for their compatriots, and urged Buddhists not to

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be intimidated, to remain in the region and to take shooting lessons which she herself would also undertake to do. While noting the judiciously worded speech which the King made to police and army ofcers the next day, McCargo comments that this was not the sort of royal intervention liberals had hoped for.19 Over and above the volunteer schemes charged with the defence of Buddhist and Muslims communities, a number of paramilitary organizations are also present in southern Thailand.20 These include the clandestine group, Ruam Thai (Thais United) that is led by Police Colonel Phitak Iadkaew, and boasts 6,000 members. Recruits are trained in a two-day course in private rented facilities. In addition to raising awareness of security risks, and providing basic military training (with their own weapons) for self-defence, Non-Violence International claims commando training is also provided. Those who complete the training are also permitted to work alongside the police wearing police-like uniforms and to carry combat weapons. Accusations of vigilante-style attacks against Muslims by Ruam Thai led to Phitaks transfer out of the area, though subsequently the decision was reversed following protests from Buddhist residents in Yala.21 The existence of armed Buddhist and Muslim civilians has contributed to displays of sectarian violence. One of the most infamous examples followed an incident on 14 March 2007 in which a passenger van was ambushed in the Yaha district of Yala province. Nine Buddhist passengers were shot at point-blank range (only one of whom survived), but the Muslim driver was spared. While not without precedent summary executions of Buddhist civilians also occurred in the late 1970s it is worthwhile to describe the reaction to this incident. On the evening after the ambush, two attacks on Muslim civilians in Yaha took place. The rst was a grenade attack on the Almubaroh mosque in the Patae sub-district. The second, which occurred an hour later, was an armed attack on a tea shop in Padaeru village (Katong sub-district) in which a Muslim patron was killed. On the same night, unidentied gunmen drove around the predominantly Muslim village of Kuan Ran (Bukit Toreng), ring at random. On the night of 17 March a pondok in Sabayois Pien sub-district was attacked: grenades were thrown, and huts were sprayed with bullets from shotguns and M16 assault ries, killing two and injuring eight. Muslim villagers picketed the pondok, and accused Rangers of perpetrating the attack and kept up their protest for over a month. On 26 March local Buddhists staged a 2,000-strong counter-protest outside the town hall in Sabayoi, demanding that Rangers and Border Patrol Police remain in the

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village. On 27 May seven bombs exploded in Had Yai, killing one and injuring twelve, followed the next day by a bomb explosion in the Buddhist section of the market in Sabayoi town which killed four, and injured twenty-six. On 31 May 2007, young men sitting opposite the Kolomudo mosque in Sabayois Chanae sub-district were red upon by gunmen from two pickup trucks, leaving ve dead and two injured.22 Camroux and Pathan comment that calls from the Queen and senior monks for the defence of Thai Buddhists not only increased the ow of weapons and number of self-defence organizations and paramilitary groups, but increased the the spectre or at least the language of civil war.23 While these suspects will reappear in my treatment of government involvement in Islamic affairs, let us now consider new questions that can be asked of the usual suspects. New Approaches to the Usual Suspects The need for a nuanced and sophisticated approach to the study of Islamism in Southeast Asia is widely acknowledged. Over and above data obtained through interrogation (and occasionally torture) John Sidel raises concerns over the ltering effects of both non-Muslim and Muslim police, military or intelligence personnel many of whom have strongly anti-Islamist views on data collection.24 Limited explanations are also proposed, such as Islamism activity in Indonesia being most commonly attributed to the militant organization Jemaah Islamiyah. The ICG criticizes conceptions of Islamism that lump together under one banner a range of activism. Not only does the ICG argue Islamic activism is superior to the nebulous term Islamism, but that Islamic activism takes the following three forms: political Islamism; missionary activism; and jihadi movements.25 The nature of Islamic activism varies depending on assessments at the time on the nature of the predicament being faced, the nature of political activism, and the place (if any) of violence. All three forms exist in southern Thailand, including the jihadi wing of the Salayya movement (al-Salayya al-jihadiyya). Because of its importance, this paper moves on to describe the two forms of missionary activism that presently exist in the far south. The rst, but least important, of these is the Tablighi Jamaat, a South Asian revivalist movement established in 1926, which arrived in Thailand in the 1980s. The Tablighi Jamaat is primarily concerned with the revitalization of Islamic practice at the grassroots level among nominal Muslims living in Muslim-minority contexts.26

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The success of the Tablighi Jamaat in southern Thailand can be attributed to the following: its emphasis on face-to-face oral contact with Muslim communities through regular visits; avoidance of religious controversies; and access to large numbers of unemployed or under-employed Muslim young people. The second is the Salayya (or Sala) movement a name derived from Salaf al-Salih (venerable ancestors in Arabic) of seventhcentury Arabia, which is locally referred to as either kaum mudo (in Malay) or kanat mai (in Thai).27 Its origins are in the modernist and reformist agendas of al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Mohammed Abduh (d. 1905), and Rashid Rida (d. 1935), who were alarmed that the majority of the worlds Muslims were living under European colonial rule. Salasm is a movement dened by a methodology that emphasizes: (1) the authoritative example of the seventh-century al-Salaf al-Salih; (2) ijtihad (Arabic for independent interpretation) over taqlid (blind imitation); (3) the eradication of bidah (illegitimate religious innovation); and (4) mentoring (mulazamah in Arabic) from Salayya mentors in the Middle East. In the 1920s under Ridas leadership, the Salaf movement joined the more austere Wahhabi movement. Subsequent to their acquisition of economic power in the 1970s, the Saudi-based movement would eclipse the more broadly based Salaf movement. The most important proponent of Salasm in southern Thailand was Shaykh Muhamwhmad Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani (Haji Sulong) (18951945), who became inuential in the politics of the region in the 1930s after his return to Patani. 28 Salafism is most commonly found in Muslim-majority contexts where they seek to eliminate local customs viewed as bidah, co-opt existing institutions and ulama, and establish and train new ones. An emblematic example of the latter is the establishment of Yala Islamic University by its founding Rector, Saudi-educated Dr Ismail Lut Japakiya. Lut functions as the unofcial head and principle articulator of Saudi-style Salasm in the far south. As well as conating these forms of missionary activism, rarely do commentators of transnational movements in southern Thailand mention these as modern examples of local Islamic thought and practice being impacted from the outside. While the Indian Ocean trade connected (not separated) Southeast Asia from the Middle East, Patanis connection was guaranteed by its natural harbour and proximity to trans-peninsula trading routes. This was the route that in the fourteenth century brought Shaykh Said of Pasai, credited with persuading the Raja of Patani to adopt Islam. This route was also

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used by luminaries such as Shaykh Daud bin Abdullah bin Idris al-Fatani (Shaykh Daud al-Fatani) (17691847), Shaykh Zain al Abidin (Tuan Minal) (18201913), Shaykh Wan Ahmad bin Muhammad Zain al-Fatani (Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani) as they travelled to Mecca (via Aceh). As noted below, it was not outsiders, but Malays from Patani such as Haji Sulong and Lut who introduced such Islamic modernism and reformism. Advances in transport and communication across the Indian Ocean strengthened this existing connection at a time when the Muslim world was marked by change and occasional trauma. For instance, the Wahhabi occupation of Mecca and Medina in 1803 and 1805 inspired the Padri rebellion in Minangkabau (180732), which derived its name from the Dutch who referred to returning pilgrims seeking to repeat the accomplishments of Wahhabis as padres. By the 1890s, sailing vessels carrying cargo and independent pilgrims had disappeared from the Indian Ocean. These had begun to be replaced in the 1860s by steamers that travelled along shipping lanes controlled by the British and Dutch colonial powers.29 In 1884, the Ottomans established a Malay printing press in Mecca that was run by Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani, the most famous ulama from Patani. Printing presses in the Middle East, and later Singapore, disseminated modernist and reformist developments in the Malay world through journals such as al-Manar (The Lighthouse) and alImam (The Leader).30 The tumultuous events of the 1920s such as the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate and the denitive Wahhabi capture of the Haramayn in 1926 impacted Muslim Southeast Asia. For example, the formation of the worlds largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), came out of the desire for a Javanese protest delegation to be sent to Mecca. As the impact of Salasm increased in southern Thailand, so did the traditionalist backlash. Where successful, Salasm in southern Thailand succeeded in substantially reforming Malay customary Islam, Arabicizing the religious lexicon and introduced attire such as the full-faced veil (niqa b) for women. Even among communities that rejected such reforms, aspects of traditional Islam were affected. This led to widespread confusion over Malay ethnic, cultural, and religious identity and authority.31 While the decline in authority of religious leadership is not unique to either Islam or Thailand (as the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines and the Sangha in Thailand demonstrate), what is unique in south Thailand is the traditionalist elite being marginalized by both reformist elements and the Thai state, as described below.32

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Revisiting Thai Interference A point rarely raised in discussions of competing ethno-religious elements in southern Thailand is that the entry of Islamic reformism noted above roughly coincided with increased interference by Siamese and Thai governments. While this interference had commenced over a century earlier, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 ofcially brought the former Malay sultanate of Patani under Siamese control. During the reign of King Vajiravudh (r. 191025) who emphasized allegiance to the Thai nation, monarchy, and Buddhism the Compulsory Primary Education Act of 1921 required all Malay children to attend Siamese primary school for at least four years. In 1932, ve years after Haji Sulongs return to Patani, the absolute monarchy was replaced with a constitutional monarchy, and Patani became one of Thailands three southern-most provinces. During the governments of General Phibulsongkhram (193844 and 194857), a range of ultra-nationalist polices were promulgated whose effects would last for decades. As well as enforcing the 1921 Compulsory Primary Education Act, the Thai Custom Decree (Rathaniyom) became law in 1939. This forbad designations other than Thai and advocated a homogeneous society based on the Thai nation, monarch and Buddhism. The Thai language was promoted as well as a range of modern and Thai behaviours. Malays, for instance, were forbidden from wearing traditional clothing. In 1945, the Patronage of Islam Act established the King of Thailand as the patron of Islam in Thailand, and mandated the creation of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (under the Ministry of Interior) which was headed by the Chularajamontri (or Shaykh al-Islam) who would act as both the symbolic leader of Muslims in Thailand and royal advisor on Islamic issues. On the basis of the governments successful control of Buddhism through the Sangkharat, Surin Pitsuwan argues control rather than patronage was its primary purpose.33 The lack of respect and interest in the Chularajamontri in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat is well known; as Surin explains, Malay Muslims preferred to follow their own ulama such as Haji Sulong who functioned as the de facto Shaykh al-lslam before his death in mysterious circumstances.34 Legislation promulgated between 1960 and 1971 forced traditional pondok schools to register as PSTI and required them to teach the Thai national curriculum. The severity of the response to these initiatives is explained by the local importance of pondok schools which provide more than just a religious education. Through these

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schools, local Malay identity is constructed and maintained, and a range of social and religious functions are performed. Thai government educational initiatives led many Malay Muslims to pursue Islamic education in the Middle East and South Asia, which ultimately led to the state having less control over Islamic matters. With specic reference to Indonesia, Michael Laffan argues reformism to have coexisted (rather than clashed) with sultans, and colonial or postcolonial authorities until they attempted to intervene in dening or manipulating Islam. When this occurred, the seeds of violence on the disenchanted fringes of Islamic movements were sown.35 Thai interference, Salaf activism, and traditionalist resistance described above produced unprecedented change, diversity and division in southern Thailand, and provided the context in which violence could occur more easily. The persuasiveness of John Sidels proposal that Islamic violence in Southeast Asia relates to its weakness rather than its strength is proven by its currency in recent studies. McCargo emphatically denies suggestions of Islam in southern Thailand as being resurgent, aggressive and wielding arms with a condent ourish. Rather, southern violence has emerged from the combined effects of fragmented, weak and insecure Islamic institutions, and a disappointed, dissenting, and divided MalayMuslim community. Rather than religion, the conict represents a complex political problem centering on questions of legitimacy. Militant movements are one element of political dynamics brought about by the Thai states unsuccessful and corrosive attempts to co-opt Malay Muslim elites that resulted in their involvement in managing Muslim affairs being jeopardized.36 Reconsidering Islamic Credentials Malay resistance has undergone a number of changes since the time when movements such as GAMPAR (Gabungam Melayu Patani Raya) and the Patani Peoples Movement (PPM) which employed orthodox guerrilla tactics, were led by the Malay elite, and were motivated by Malay nationalism were active. Since 2004, militants have employed a decentralized cell structure and attacks have been better coordinated and increasingly sophisticated: Chaiwat SathaAnand has described the militant movement as a network without a core.37 Over and above militants being Muslims, what are the Islamic credentials of the insurgency? This author concurs with Liows assessment that assertions that Islam plays no role in southern violence, or that it lies at the heart of it, are equally erroneous.

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Despite the dearth of information on its ideological drivers, Liow, through interviews with past and present insurgents, and analysis of the contents of the limited booklets and pamphlets, nds a fairly cogent map of some ideological pillars.38 Many have proposed that a radical Islamist ideology has been grafted onto nationalistic narratives, which is corroborated by the presence of leaets replete with jihadi rhetoric.39 Sungunnasil argues that as well as representing the only authentic and detailed statement of radical Muslim militant views in the deep South, Berjihad di Patani restates the struggle in explicitly religious terms (see below).40 The weakness of such claims are exposed by Chaiwat SathaAnands study of violence in southern Thailand between 1976 and 1981 that examined PULO leaets found at the scene of insurgent attacks. Besides claiming responsibility, these leaets offered justications for their actions. These included emphasizing the distinctiveness and superiority of Islam, calls for unity among Muslims (to support their aim of establishing an independent Islamic Patani state), claims that ghting kars was a Muslim obligation, and that those who refused to do so were hypocrites (munak).41 Thus one can be legitimately skeptical of claims that jihadi rhetoric is either a post-11 September 2001 or post-2004 development. The most analysed tract in the post-2004 era is the Jawi booklet entitled Berjihad di Patani, discovered on one of the victims of the April 2004 Krue Se mosque attacks.42 A number of rebuttals of Berjihad di Patani have been written, including by Thai Islamic authorities. The rst and only one to have been written in Malay was by Lut. In it, he addressed misperceptions about the role of Islam in the conict, and religious pluralism in Islam. He emphasizes that only a recognized religious authority is permitted to declare jihad, and that this was only possible after other avenues such as dawah had been pursued.43 There has been disagreement about the extent to which Berjihad di Patani reveals traditionalist or Salaf positions on jihad. The employment of a range of invisibility and invulnerability medicine, and zikir (chanting of the names of Allah) in the April 2004 attacks is widely viewed as precluding the latter.44 Once again, there is nothing new in this. A number of studies have mentioned Su tariqa (Su brotherhoods) being involved in past Malay separatist groups.45 Despite advocating the Shaite school of jurisprudence and the restoration of the Patani sultanate (over a pan-Islamic state), Abuza and Sungunnasil argue Berjihad di Patani to be a sala-jihadi on the basis of its discourse on martyrdom (shaheed),

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and Muslim apostasy or hypocrisy (takr).46 There are a range of explanations for why most of the victims of the violence since 2004 have been Muslims. While private vendettas, Buddhist militias, and the involvement of rogue elements of the Thai security forces cannot be ruled out, militants have also targeted Muslims declared to be collaborators or hypocrites. Abuza argues that militants insistence that Islam is incapable of triumphing without having rst been purged of corrupting impurities and incorrect interpretations leads to the conclusion that a war is being waged against the Muslim community. As such violence in southern Thailand is as much a cultural war as a traditional insurgency.47 Does the presence of jihadi rhetoric prove the existence of a developed jihadi rationale? McCargo comes to a number of negative conclusions about Islam and jihad in south Thailand . Neither jihadi rhetoric, the role religious teachers and schools in recruitment, swearing ceremonies, nor magic prove the conict is primarily a religious one: instead, it is regional. McCargo states, Islam has something to do with it, but it is not about Islam. Having dismissed Islamic goals or theology as motivations, McCargo proposes Islam to function as a rhetorical and legitimizing resource and ideological framework that is selectively and pragmatically invoked. By justifying jihad on the basis of injustice or aggression, local jihadi ideology is viewed as simplistic, populist, lacking historical or theological foundations, and ultimately representing attempts to capitalize on popular global discourse about jihad. The abandonment of state programmes encouraging Islamic teachers to teach correct religious doctrines is cited as evidence of the relative unimportance of jihadi rationale in the far south.48 This is corroborated by Liows examination of unpublished Jawi works on jihad which make no attempt to differentiate between general jihad and jihad qital (armed struggle); silence on jihad qital being fard kifaya (group responsibility performed by individuals) or fard ain (individual responsibility); no mention of the imperative of mujahidin requiring parental permission; and silence on the details of religious authorities capable of mandating jihad qital.49 By contrast, Luts doctoral dissertation provides a thorough conceptualization of Islamic and non-Islamic societies, and the effects these have on the application of Islamic law in which Lut advocates Muslim accommodation to different contexts.50 A number of lands (dar) exist. The two most important are Dar Al-Islam (house of Islam) where a Muslim ruler is present and the sharia is upheld, and Dar Al-Harb (house of war). Others include: (1) Juristic

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Dar Al-Islam (distinct from the above by the presence of a Muslim ruler who actively implements the sharia); (2) Nominal Dar Al-Islam (where non-Muslims allow Muslims to practise and implement aspects of sharia, or Muslim rulers in Dar Al-Islam fail to implement sharia); and (3) Dar As-Sulh (Arabic for land of peace treaty which is the transitory sub-category of Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb). Lutfi affirms the defence of Dar Al-Islam as an individual obligation (fardhu ain), and that Dar Al-Islam is not converted into Dar Al-Harb by being ruled by non-Muslims. Rather, this requires Muslims being unable to practise their major religious obligations. Whenever this happens, emigration (hijrah) is an obligation for all those able to do so. This imperative of migration might explain Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani departure following Patanis defeat in 1836.51 Aligning himself with classical scholarship, Lut forecloses the possibility of multiple Dar Al-Islams existing at the same time. Modern nation states are therefore considered excusable based on the juristic concept of dhrurat (Arabic for emergency) that temporarily permits the prohibited. Nevertheless, Muslims are required to use all possible means to rectify this situation. Liow acknowledges this amounting to support for a transnational caliphate of sorts, that runs contrary to conventional understanding of international relations. This is, however a position that Lut does not explicitly mention. Another issue addressed by Lut is Muslims living in Dar Al-Harb being obliged to migrate to a Dar Al-Islam to avoid religious persecution and/or restrictions on religious freedom. However, it is not obligatory for Muslims living in Dar Al-Harb whose religious freedom is guaranteed. Where an invasion or coup detat brings about nominal Dar Al-Harb, Dar Al-Islam must be re-established through jihad declared through a considered collective legal opinion based on independent interpretation (ijtihad). Furthermore, if unsuccessful, neighbouring Muslims are obliged to offer assistance. In addition to Luts insistence that Islam forbids the spilling of Muslim blood, what is the relevance of his jurisprudential classication of lands and people to this discussion of the Islamic credentials of the insurgence? First and foremost, Luts claims that the provinces of Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat are nominal Dar Al-Islam differ from that of militants. Secondly, there is no strict division between Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb that is perpetually at war with each other. Nevertheless, Liow concedes ambiguity to exist on the obligation of Muslims in southern Thailand to reclaim former Dar Al-Islam through jihad. Based on the classical scholars, which Lut aligns himself with, this is a possibility.52

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Local or Global Suspects Many claims and counter-claims about the global jihad connection in southern Thailand have been made. Commentators have noted that the absence of suicide attacks and legal opinions ( fatwa ) suggests jihad does not exist. Rather than a pan-Islamic caliphate, the goal of the militants is the religious sacred community, of an imagined Malay nation of Patani.53 Foreign operatives who have visited southern Thailand have been treated with mistrust, and their agenda to expand the conict beyond the three southern provinces has been rejected.54 Claims that decapitations have been inspired by insurgents in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East (who behead their victims as a form of execution) are questionable as beheadings in south Thailand are performed post-mortem. Rather than the local presence of global jihadism, Camroux and Pathan argue for the localization of the global.55 These resemble proposals by French sociologist Olivier Roy who argues Islamic neo-fundamentalism is both the product and agent of globalization. One of the effects of globalization is the unprecedented numbers of Muslims living outside traditionally Muslim countries. One of the results of this is neo-fundamentalists de-territorializing Islam by emphasizing the supranational ummah over statist politics.56 I consider concern for, and questions about, foreign ghters being present in the far south as misguided for at least three reasons. First and foremost, neither non-Malays nor Malays from elsewhere imported the jihadi fringe of the Salaf movement, al-Salayya aljihadiyya rather it was Patani Malay Muslim veterans of the Afghan Mujahidin who did so, such as those who founded Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP). As is well known, success in Afghanistan against a superpower had an intoxicating, life-changing and radicalizing effect on these alumni, many of whom went on to form other networks.57 Second, religious developments in present-day southern Thailand have historically featured mobile and multilingual Malays who select appropriate and mediate elements of Islam encountered abroad. As many mobile polyglots were members of Southeast Asias hybrid communities, these have been referred to as Islams creole ambassadors.58 While most major streams of Islamic thought and practice in the Middle East and South Asia are found in Southeast Asia, the processes of selective appropriation, along with the presence of pre-existing Islamic and non-Islamic features, resulted in local Islams resembling their Middle Eastern antecedents but with some distinguishing features.59

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Third, increased disposable income, access to the Internet and affordable air travel now perform the roles which steamers and printing presses played a century earlier: Muslims in present-day southern Thailand are connected to the worldwide ummah without the need to perform the haj or enrol in foreign madrasas or training camps. John Bowen notes that treatments of transnational Islam are often concerned with Muslim migration and transnational organizations and neglect transnational Islamic space.60 Islams universality is demonstrated in its ritual elements, institutional innovations, communication and history of movements. Arabic is not only the language of the Koran, it is also the language in which mandatory prayers (salat) are performed, and religious scholarship is written. The imperative of seeking religious knowledge from the highest possible authority has contributed to the creation of networks of authority, learning and communication. While including recognized centres in the Middle East, these also include a range of Internet sites, and cable television channels accessed by millions of Muslims, access to which does not require Muslims to leave their locales.61 The importance of local mediators, long-standing connectedness and transnational Islamic space facilitated by the Internet all contribute to local co-option of religious metaphors that legitimize actions, increase appeal and further recruitment. What is surprising is that the conict has remained as insular as it has. This can be seen as conrming Yusufs thesis of Malays in the far south adhering to a highly ethnocized form of Islam.62 With regard to suggestions that analysts must decide between internationalist jihadism and Malay ethno-nationalism as the insurgencys ideological motivation, Sascha Helbardt claims these elements are found together. For instance, jihad is mandated by Patanis invasion and occupation by the kar Siamese. Liow adds that despite appropriating a range of religious metaphors, and making claims of being involved in a religious conict, insurgents in the far south are motivated by local ideas and vehicles of transmission. Nevertheless, past grievances have been repackaged into a narrative that provides further meaning and intelligibility for its consumers. While a range of extremist views have local currency, the conict remains rooted in insecurity about cultural and ethnic identity, and historical grievances. While the importance of pondok schools in recruitment and indoctrination is undeniable, this is not due to the Islamic studies content of their curriculum. Rather, pondok function as conduits for disseminating local histories that emphasize narratives of oppression and colonization. Liow therefore proposes

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religion to have animated the narrative of Malay ethno-nationalism, injecting further meaning and intelligibility into the drive for selfdetermination. A point that has recently been emphasized by a number of commentators is that the geographical footprint of the armed insurgency has not changed for over one hundred years, remaining in the specic cultural, historical and political milieu of the Malay-dominated far south.63 The involvement of Muslims of both Salaf and traditionalist orientation further conrm the absence of theological coherence of this highly localized, diffuse and religiously eclectic insurgency.64 Conclusions In discussing the role of religion in the southern insurgency there is a need to move beyond rounding up and the routine interrogation of the usual suspects. An example of this is the southern conict being increasingly framed in the wider context of Thailands widespread violence and instability. This article has introduced new suspects in the treatment of religious issues. Together with their involvement in Islamic affairs, which undermined local leadership and inadvertently contributed to creating a context more conducive to violence, the article has described the Thai militarys militarization of southern Buddhist temples. A number of Buddhist militias also operate in the far south, some of which have the Queen as their patron and their presence has contributed to violence occasionally demonstrating sectarian characteristics. Together with the controversial crushing of the Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan security forces in 2009, these conrm the presence of uncivil forces in Buddhist-majority countries in Southeast Asia.65 In addition to including new subjects, the article moved beyond a routine interrogation of the usual suspects by drawing attention to the impact of missionary activism in south Thailand, particularly through the Salaf movement, which coincided with increased interference in Islamic matters by Bangkok. Together with a range of traditionalist reactions, these led to unprecedented divisions which created a context in which religious violence could more easily occur. I have not only raised questions about jihadi rhetoric having been conated with jihadi rationale, but that the latter is a recent development. I regard there being at least two reasons for questions about foreign ghters being irrelevant. In addition to the presence of transnational Islamic space, all Islamic movements are locally mediated by mobile Malays, as demonstrated in the impact

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of Haji Sulong and Ishmael Lut. Avoiding the equally erroneous assertions that Islam plays no role or that it lies at the heart of it, the religious ideology of Muslim insurgents resemble those elsewhere, but with a specic geographical footprint. This localized version of the global is informed by an ethno-religious Malay Islam which is competing with a Thai Buddhist state and security forces that contain uncivil elements. NOTES
1

See Marc Askew, Conspiracy, Politics and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailands Deep South, Policy Studies 29 (Washington, D.C. and Singapore: East-West Center Washington and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007); International Crisis Group, Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, in Asia Report N129 15 March 2007 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007); International Crisis Group, Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency, in Asia Report N80 28 August 2008 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008); Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Coup and the Southern Thailand Conict, Crossroads 19, no. 1 (2008); Duncan J. McCargo, Mapping National Anxieties: Thailands Southern Conict, RUSI 154, no. 3 (2009): 5461; Duncan J. McCargo, Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?, Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (2006): 3972; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Untying the Gordian Knot: The Difculties in Solving Southern Violence, in Divided over Thaksin: Thailands Coup and Problematic Transition, edited by John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). For the global Jihad connection see Zachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand and Its Implications for Southeast Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009); Peter Chalk, The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Understanding the Conicts Evolving Dynamic, Rand Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 5 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008); Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009); Aurel Croissant, Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences since 2001, Strategic Insights 5, no. 2 (2005): 117; Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, Conict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005). A.H. Johns, Perspectives of Islamic Spirituality in Southeast Asia: Reections and Encounters, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 6. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Comparative Studies in Religion and Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). On the issue of recruitment see International Crisis Group, Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand, Asia Report N170 22 June 2009 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008).

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David Camroux and Don Pathan, Borders of/on the Mind, Borders in Jungles: Islamic Insurgency and Ethno-Religious Irredentism in Southern Thailand, in Promoting Conict or Peace through Identity, edited by Nikki Slocum-Bradley (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), p. 96. See Michael K. Jerryson, Sacred Fury, Sacred Duty: Buddhist Monks in Southern Thailand (Santa Barbara, CA: University of California, 2008), p. 49. Also Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, Buddhist Warfare (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009). Duncan J. McCargo, Thailands National Reconciliation Commission: A Flawed Response to the Southern Conict, Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (January 2010): 8081. For a discussion of the NRC, see ibid. Jerryson, Sacred Fury, op. cit., p. 94. Ibid., p. 151. For more on militarized temples, see N.J. Melvin, Conict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Pattani Insurgency, SIPRI Policy Paper 20 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007). Michael K. Jerryson, Appropriating a Space for Violence: State Buddhism in Southern Thailand, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (January 2009): 9, 13. Ibid., pp. 1333; Jerryson, Sacred Fury, op. cit., pp. 21029. Duncan J. McCargo, Buddhist Democracy on Trial: Thailands Southern Conict, in Religion and Democracy in Thailand, edited by Imtiyaz Yusuf and Canan Atiligan (Bangkok: Konrad-Adenauner-Stiftung, 2008), p. 74. Jerryson, Appropriating a Space for Violence, op. cit., p. 24. McCargo, Buddhist Democracy on Trial, op. cit., pp. 63, 69, 71. See Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Fluid Terrain of Islamism in Southeast Asia, NBR Analysis 19, no. 4 (October 2004). International Crisis Group, South Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, Asia Report N140 23 October 2007 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007), p. 19. Duncan J. McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 1920. International Crisis Group, South Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, op. cit., esp. pp. 1421. Non-Violence International, Charged September/October, 2007 <http://www. nonviolenceinternational.net/seasia/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i d=104&Itemid=1#_Toc181639694>. The above is based on the account in International Crisis Group, South Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, op. cit., pp. 2124. Camroux and Pathan, Borders of /on the Mind, Borders in Jungles, op. cit., p. 91. John Thayer Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: Much Ado About Nothing?, Asian Affairs 39, no. 3 (2008): 34041. On the issue of torture, see

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Amnesty International, Thailand: Torture in Southern Counter-Insurgency (London: Amnesty International, 2009).

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International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North Africa Report N37 2 March 2005 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005), pp. 1, 17. For general treatments of the Tablighi Jamaat in South Thailand, see Alexander Horstmann, The Inculturation of a Transnational Islamic Missionary Movement: Tablighi Jamaat Al-Dawa and Muslim Society in Southern Thailand, SOJOURN 22, no. 1 (January 2007): 10730; Alexander Horstmann, The Tablighi Jamaat, Transnational Islam, and the Transformation of the Self between Southern Thailand and South Asia, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 1 (January 2007): 2640; Farish A. Noor, Pathans to the East! The Development of the Tablighi Jumaat Movement in Northern Malaysia and Southern Thailand, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 1 (January 2007): 725; Farish A. Noor, The Tablighi Jumaat Movement in the Southern Provinces of Thailand Today: Networks and Modalities, Working Paper Series No. 174 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009). For description of the kaum muda in Southeast Asia see William R. Roff, Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction Amongst Malays, 190041, in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, edited by Sharon Siddique Ahmad Ibrahim and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 12332; William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 5690; William R. Roff, Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s1990s: Exemplars, Institutions, and Vectors, Journal of Islamic Studies 9, no. 2 (April 1998): 21028. The following provide summaries of Haji Sulong: Chalermkiat Khunthongpetch, Haji Sulong Abdul Qadir: A Rebel or a Hero of the Four Southern Province (Bangkok: Matichon, 2004); Joseph Chinyong Liow, Religious Education and Reformist Islam in Thailands Southern Border Provinces: The Roles of Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir and Ismail Lut Japakiya, Journal of Islamic Studies 21, no. 1 (January 2010): 2958. Michael F. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 36, 49. For more on al-Imam and Al-Manar, see Abu Bakar Hamzah, Al-Iman: Its Role in Malay Society 19061908 (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1991); Azyumardi Azra, The Transmission of Al-Manars Reformism to the Malay-Indonesian World: The Cases of Al-Imam and Al-Munir, Studia Islamika 6, no. 3 (October 1999): 7597. Yusuf, Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 9, 13. Alexander Horstmann, Approaching Peace in Patani, Southern Thailand Some Anthropological Considerations, Journal Asia Europe Journal 6, no. 1 (January 2008): 6263. Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 349. Surin Pitsuman, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, 1985), p. 103. On recent examples of Thai control and interference to inuence the 2005 Provincial Islam Committee elections see Duncan J. McCargo, Co-optation and Resistance

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in Thailands Muslim South: The Changing Role of Islamic Council Elections, Government and Opposition 45, no. 1 (January 2010): 99113; McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 1920.
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Pitsuman, Islam and Malay Nationalism, op. cit., p. 147. For more on the Chularajamontri, see Imtiyaz Yusuf, Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming the Ofce of the Chularajamontri/Shaikh Al-Islam, Journal of Islamic Studies 9, no. 2 (April 1998): 27798; Imtiyaz Yusuf, The Role of the Chularajamontri (Shaykh Al-Islam) in Resolving Ethno-Religious Conict in Southern Thailand, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 27, no. 1 (January 2010): 3153. Michael F. Laffan, The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (August 2003): 39798. McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 1920. Cited in ibid., p. 181. Joseph Chinyong Liow, Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conict, in Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia, edited by Scott Helfstein (Westpoint, NY: The Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, 2009), pp. 75, 79, 92, 94. For a portrayal of the various forms which religious motivation take, see Marc Askew, A Tale of Two Insurgents, Bangkok Post, 19 July 2009. Chalk, The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand, op. cit., p. 12. On militant leaets, see Duncan J. McCargo, Patani Militant Leaets and the Uses of History, paper presented at The Phantasm in Southern Thailand: Historical Writings on Patani and the Islamic World, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1112 December 2009. Wattana Sungunnasil, Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad Di Patani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks, Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (January 2006): 128. Sabrina Chua provides a summary of his main ndings in Political Islam in Southern Thailand: A Radicalisation?, paper presented at the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2005, pp. 6265. Anonymous, Berjihad Di Patani [Waging Jihad in Patani]. Full English translations of Berjihad di Patani are provided by Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua, Conict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand , op. cit., pp. 11845. For discussions of its contents, see Joseph Chinyong Liow, International Jihad and Muslim Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative Interpretation, Asia Policy 2 (July 2006): 97103; Joseph Chinyong Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology and Politics, Policy Studies 24 (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2006), pp. 3942; Sungunnasil, Islam, Radicalism, and Violence, op. cit., pp. 12430; Yusuf, Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 1415. Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, Islam Agama Penjana Kedamaian Sejagat [Islam as the Pathway to Harmony] (Alor Star: Pustaka Darussalam, 2005). See Joseph Chinyong Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand: Tradition and Transformation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 12027; Joseph Chinyong Liow, Local Networks and Transnational Islam

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in Thailand (with emphasis on the Southernmost Provinces), in Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conict Dynamics, edited by R.W. Hefner (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), p. 203.

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For treatments of the attack on Krue Se, see McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 13839; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, The Silence of the Bullet Monument: Violence and Truth Management, Duson-Nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004, Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (January 2006): 2930; Sungunnasil, Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 12930. Saroja Dorarirajoo, Violence in the South of Thailand, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5, no. 3 (2004): 468. Referring to Pitsuman, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 25155. Hugh Wilsons study of Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen mentions his reservations about the spontaneous emergence of groups with magic-religious overtones associated with the invulnerability cults. See Hugh E. Wilson, Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen and the Dilemma of Partisan Duality, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 23, no. 1 (January 1992): 52. See Imtiyaz Yusuf, The Ethno-Religious Dimension of the Conict in Southern Thailand, in Understanding Conict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand, edited by Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt (Bangkok: KonradAdenauner-Stiftung, 2006), p. 181. On the increased acceptance of the nationstate, and the abandonment of the concept of the Islamic state within political Islamism see International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, op. cit., p. 6. Zachary Abuza, The Islamist Insurgency in Thailand, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 4, 2006 <http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.59/ pub_detail.asp>. McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 17677, 188. Hassan Nikmatullah, Jihad Fi Sabillillah Pengertian Dan Bidang [The Understanding and Call for Struggle in the Way of Allah], unpublished manuscript. For Liows treatment see Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 12729. Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 11320. Ismail Lut Japakiya, Ikhtilaf Al-Darayn Wa Atharu-Hu Fi Ahkam Al-Munakahat Wa-L-Muamalat [The Effect of the Two Dars (Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb) on Islamic Personal and Transaction Laws], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 1998). Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand, op. cit., p. 118. For an excellent discussion of the important period between 1785 and 1838, see Francis R. Bradley, When Patani Became Pattani: The End of the Mandala State, 17851838, paper presented at The Phantasm in Southern Thailand: Historical Writings on Patani and the Islamic World, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1112 December 2009. Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand, op. cit., p. 119. Sascha Helbardt, Autonomy of Southern Thailands Insurgency: Some Preliminary Insights <http://asiapacic.anu.edu.au/newmandala/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/ Anatomy-of-Southern-Thailand%E2%80%99s-Insurgency.pdf>. National Reconciliation Commission, Overcoming Violence with the Power of Reconciliation (Bangkok: National Reconciliation Commission, 2006), p. 37.

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Camroux and Pathan, Borders of/on the Mind, Borders in Jungles, op. cit., p. 94. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: C. Hurst, 2002). Neo-fundamentalism share: the conservatism and literalism of Islamism; salasms concerned with the defence of a pristine Islam from external inuences; and jihadist-salasm that emphasize physical external threats to Islam. International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, op. cit., p. 16. Christopher M. Joll, Islams Creole Ambassadors, paper presented at the Phantasm in Southern Thailand: Historical Writings on Patani and the Islamic World, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1112 December 2009; Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds, op. cit., p. 9; Laffan, The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 398. Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia, Analysis Paper 9 (Washington, D.C.: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, the Brookings Institution, 2005), p. 16. For an excellent treatment of transnational Islamic movements see, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conict Dynamics (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008). John R. Bowen, Beyond Migration Islam as a Transnational Public Space <http://artsci.wustl.edu/~anthro/articles/Beyond%20migrationon.pdf>. Liow, Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conict, op. cit., p. 93. Liow, Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conict, op. cit., pp. 75, 79, 80, 92, 94. On the issue of geographical footprint see Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan, Confronting Ghosts: Thailands Shapeless Southern Insurgency (Sydney, NSW: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2010), pp. 23, 44. Liow and Pathan, Confronting Ghosts, op. cit., p. 44. International Crisis Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report N191 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010).

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