The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue Author(s): Hayward R. Alker, Jr.

Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (Sep., 1988), pp. 805-820 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962492 . Accessed: 14/03/2012 08:31
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THE DIALECTICAL LOGICOF THUCYDIDES' MELIANDIALOGUE

HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR. Instituteof Technology Massachusetts theformalizable the realisttraditionhas underappreciated quality of Thucydides'scientific investigations, neorealist teachers and writers have political generallyfailed to see the normativeand dramaticalfeatures of Thucydides' science, each an expression of his dialectical epistemology and ontology. Nicholas approach to Rescher'spartial formalization of dialectics as a controversy-oriented approachto textual underknowledgecumulationand KennethBurke'sdramaturgical in the Meliandialogue. Thus argumentation standingare both shown to fit Thucydides' argumentationproduces new knowledge about the inner determinantsof Athenian simultaneouslyit dramaticallyreveals the constitutingpracticalrationale imperialism; of Athenian actions to be unjust. Once Thucydides'determiningessences of power politics are properly uncovered, their false "eternal,mathematicalnecessity"can be more polimetrics" appropriatelycriticized.A case is thus suggestedfor a "neoclassical about practical choices in parfundamentallygrounded in "politicalargumentation" ticularcontexts than in ahistoricallaws, inductivestatistics or deductivemathematics.

If

In writing his classic study of the PeloponnesianWar, Thucydidessought "an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of humanthingsmust resembleif it does not reflect it" (1.22).1 For twentieth-century realists, this has typically meant seeking timeless truths, or even mathematical laws, about the state's eternal, selfsearchfor power, or the need to interested balance against it. Werner Jaeger'sreference to "this political necessity, the meremathematicsof power politics"conveyed such a message to the Germanspeakingworld of the 1930s. Indeed, in a book widely renownedfor its penetrating account of Greek civic culture, Jaeger asserts that as evident in Sparta'sfearful response to the growth of Athenian power, this "necessity""is defined [by Thucydides]as the true cause ... of the

[Peloponnesian] war" (1976, 488; for similarviews of other modem realistssee Wight 1978, 24 and Morgenthau 1978, 8-9, 38). Would not any other social scientistin our own century,if desirousof emulating the increasinglyuniversalvalidity of the naturalsciences and committedto building up reliableknowledgegroundedin the deductive certainty of axiomatic formal argumentand the "positive"evidence of our senses, also want to claim as their own Thucydides'search for "the clearest data," and his standardof objectiveprecision: "the accuracyof the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible"?Would they not also want to "havewritten [sucha] work, not as an essay which is to win the applauseof the moment, but as a possession for all time" (1.23)? Influencedby apparently similar contemporary epis-

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temological trends (developmentallydescribed as "positivism,""logical positivism," "logical or analytical empiricism," and "criticalrationalism" in Alker 1982), leading expositors of "scientific" neorealism focus their frequent, typically positive citations to Thucydides' classic on such instrumental, lawlike, causal analyses of state actions, possibly extended to include the structural -determinants of these actions (Keohane1983, 1986; Waltz 1979). Despite their objections to the imprecision,logical inconsistency, and empiricalnontestabilityof too much traditional realism, contemporary neorealists still seek timeless laws of power politics, independent of moral praise or blame; they wish these laws to be objectively and falsifiably delineated with what Jaegertook to be mathematical precision. Thucydides' work is equally well known today for the fatalistic, moral cynicismof the Athenianstatementin the Melian dialogue (or conference) that "right,as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strongdo what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (5.89). Associated with doubts concerningthe possibility of deriving constructive, practical "lessons from history," one finds aspects of this critical tone in denials by structuralneorealiststhat some policies or states have a more moral characterthan others (Waltz 1979, 127, 187n.). Morehistoricallyaccurate (but almost as bleak)is Keohane's appraisal that "classical Realism, with its philosophicalroots in a tragicconception of the humancondition, directsour attention in the twentieth century to the existentialsituationof modem humanity.... But Realism, whether classical or structural, has little to say about how to deal with that situation"(Keohane1983, 519). Surely Thucydides is one of the first2 'scientific historians"(a phrase used in Jaeger 1976 and Strauss 1978, chap. 3; and supported by Keohane's arguments
806

[1983, 506-101 for continuities in the "hardcore"of the realists'"research program"from Thucydidesto Waltz). But I think his epistemological conception of "scientifichistory" or "scientificpolitics" can more accuratelyand suggestivelybe describedas a morallyengagedversion of dialecticallogic, whose closest descendant is argumentation theory (Barth and Krabbe 1982; Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger 1987). His historiography combines a commitment to factual accuracy with what we would now call a dramaturgical perspective on human affairs(Harreand Secord1972). Ignoringits dialectical origins, we seem almost to have forgotten that his scientificpolitical history is at the same time one of the greatest morality plays ever written, in essence a Greektragedy. To better understand the relevance of Thucydides' insights and historicalpolitical science for today's problems, I shall focus on the dialectical ways in which he presents, reconstructsand uses the Melian dialogue. I shall amplify the argument that Thucydides consciously used a sophisticdialecticin the writingof this dialogue (Finley1939, 1942). He did this with a style and degreeof formalizable rigor that compares favorably with more conventional contemporarymodes of logical and statisticalanalysis. In contemporary language, his polimetrics sought to uncover, through critical, rational argumentation, the inner determinative structures, the criticizableand partlychangeable constitutivepracticesof Greekpolitics.

The Melian Dialogue As PartiallyFormalizableDialectics

Neither Popular Rhetoricnor Apodictic but FormalDebate Thereare severallevels of discussionin the dialogue,each with different epistemo-

Thucydides'Melian Dialogue
logicalimport.The firstlevel concernsthe lectic," which he consideredappropriate type of negotiationto take place between for politicalinquiry,the realmof arguable opinions about contingent or "probable" the Meliansand the Athenians;it leads to agreementin favor of formal disputation. truths. Here dialectical inferences "must the Meliandia- startfrom premisesthat commandgeneral The evidencefor treating logue as a classical disputationor debate assent ratherthan universalor necessary is explicit within Thucydides'text. Con- truths"(Aristotle 1964, 83, 153). Except sistentwith their oligarchicpolitical char- for his somewhat more positive, demoacter, initially derivedfrom Sparta, their cratic conception of rhetoric, Aristotle's parent state, the Melians "did not invite Rhetoric and his Topics-together the [the Athenian] representativesto speak first great Western treatise on dialectical before the people [as would be the custom argumentation-will assert the same disin a democratic state like Athens], but tinctions several decades later (Arnhart asked them to make the statement for 1981, chap. 2). which they had come in front of the governing body and the oligarchicc]few" CoerciveIrrationalities (5.84). The Atheniansput a good face on in the Dialogue this choice by treatingit as a preference This agreementon the desirabilityof a for serious argumentrather than for the set speechesof popularrhetoricby which dialectical mode of political discussion the masses might be "led astray": they occurs in the realm of practical reason, propose that the Melians "shouldinstead where arguments start from reasonable interruptus whenever we say something assumptions,where strict deductionsare controversial and deal with that before often not appropriate,where better argugoing on to the next point" (5.85). The ments still do not claim deductive cerAthenianspropose point by point philo- tainty. But this realm is not completely nor does agreementextend sophical debate about controversialmat- "dia-logical"; to a second level of argumentabout the ters ratherthan popular rhetoric. The kind of argumentenvisionedis also topic of discussion. The Athenian pronot what the Greeks (and Aristotle) posal only to discuss matters of selfwould call apodictic (deductive, axio- interestis describedwithout objection as matic, or necessary)reasoning. I suspect "scarcelyconsistentwith" the expectation their model of such reasoning was geo- of a reasonableexchange of views in "a metric deduction, which had already calm atmosphere."The Melians see the achieved significantresultsby the end of Athenian invasion of their island as a the fifth century B.C. My evidence is the "presentthreat" of making war against Melian statementthat disputants"should them, evidencethat they have come "prebe allowed to use and to profit by argu- pared to judge the argument [them]ments that fall short of a mathematical selves"(5.86). The Atheniansdo not deny accuracy"(5.90). Since their lives depend this coercive element. A similarresponse occurslater (5.90), when the Meliansnote upon their persuasiveness,they want to that they can not strictly that the Athenians "forceus to leave jusmake arguments prove but againstwhich effectivecounter- tice out of account and to confine ourselves to self-interest" right after the might not be made. arguments Both partiesclearly have in mind some Athenians have asserted that for "prackind of uncoercedformal disputation(or tical people, the standard of justice dependson the equalityof power to com"dia-logic,"[Habermas 1971]) before a (5.89). Evidently,Thucydidesthinks pel" judge and an audience.To use Aristotle's theoristswho argumentation like modem "diaof the in realm are terminology,we
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Figure 1. Rescher's Simplified Formulation of Dialectical Move Sequences
A. PROPONENT MOVES i. a OPPONENT COUNTERMOVES C.
(5) (2) Cautious denial
t-P__

PROPONENT REPLIES
Provisoed counterassertion P/O & 10 (a prima face case)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _

Vs (6)

(1)

Categorical asserttert 1p "I assert that P" possibly associated with a "a (3) --P/fl

Please prove that P" or " P is compatible with all you have said or conceded." Provisoed denial &t 'Typically s V - P obtains

Categorical counterassertion I-R. Provisoed counterassertion ,/TN & I T.

(7)

(Ia) Provisoed assertion which "P generally, typically obtains when 0 does, ceterls parlbus and I assert that O"
&K

thatRo,," provided

(8)

Strong distinction/exception P/(R, &.T,) & l(R, & T,)

p'o

to

(4)

;" t Weak distinction/exception

I cautlousjyasser

(6) _I (7
X

Categorical counterassertion (O & R2)

which serves as a
prima facde case for P.

-P thecase,atleast "Isn't
for those 0 for which R2 holds?"

- P/(O & RI) & t(O & RI)

(fPoiodcutrseto

Provisoed counterassertion

- (O & R2)/Tz & IT: (8) Strong distinction/exception PI(Q&R2&T4)&l(O&RA2&T4)

Source: Rescher 1977, 6-15. "Itwould also be possible to claim an entailment, such as P 1S1 or (vis-a-vis move la) Q FS), and then indirectly attack either P or Q with cautious or "provisoed" denials of SI or S2.

in would considerthis conduct"irrational [such a] dialecticalsituation."3 I next want to show a continuity between past and present epistemologies that has been neglectedby neorealistwriters:despitethe coerciveirrationalities, the thirdlevel of substantivediscussionin the Melian debate, the debateproper, can be partially formalizedand scientificallyrationalizedaccordingto NicholasRescher's pragmatic version of dialectical inquiry (Rescher 1977; another application is Alker 1984). I shall emphasizethe practical, truth-revealing contributionof this mode of scientific discourse. Except for her neglect of formalizability,Jacqueline de Romilly makes the same point about dialectical creativity in clarifying Thucydides'achievement:"Thanksto the dialogueform, the only one in the whole of the History, the particular and the general mingle together. This form en808

ablesmaieuticsto take the place of formal demonstration,so that the complete pattern Thucydideshas in mind is revealed little by little, in all its aspectsdown to its deepest foundations" (1963, 274). The Greek root meaning of maieutics is particularlyapt: "midwifery." Rescher'sDialecticalLogic This demonstration requires first a summary of Rescher'sformalization of the move and countermove possibilities within formal disputation, perhaps "the clearest, and surely historicallythe most prominent, instance of dialectical process."4This formalizationis illustratedin Figure 1. Rescher recognizes that other, more or less formal characterizations of rationalargumentation exist (e.g., Lorenzen and Lorenz1978). But this simplified version is adequatefor his primarypur-

Thucydides'Melian Dialogue
pose: to exhibit the "socialnature of the groundrules of probativereasoning,"the establishing of our factual knowledge through a social process of controversyorientedrationalargumentation. Rescher'sdialectical logic starts from, and fits, a social-legalscenario involving roles: the profour unequal,truth-seeking ponent, the opponent,the judgeor "determiner,"and an audience. The proponent tries to establisha thesis, which the opponent attempts to discredit by insightful questions, denials or counterassertions directed against the proponent's assertions or their deductiveimplications.The proponent, like a legal claimant under Greco-Romanlaw, bears the burden of proof. Not only must he or she make an assertion, or "commitment,"as part of every turn and avoid repetitions, but these assertionsshould nontautologically develop the argumentwith new grounds, distinctions, supportive theses or conditional reformulations. (Reformulations, such as moves la, 5, 8, and 8' in Figure the proponent's 1, are said to "discharge" responsibilityto defend a previous categorical assertion.) The proponent's role, like his or her categorical assertions (symbolically preceded by exclamationpoints in the stylized tree of possibilities in Figure 1), is one; the opponent'sposithus a "strong" one. tion is, relativelyspeaking,a "weak" Every unattacked assertion of the proponent becomes, at least temporarily,a "concession" by the opponent. Whenever the opponentmakesa distinctionas a way of limiting the scope of strong assertion, the strongerform of the assertionis also treated as a "concession." Although the opponent may develop counterarguments, he or she is not requiredto. The opponent'srole requiresonly "weak"or "cautious"assertions (symbolically preceded by a dagger)at each turn. Characteristically, each cautious assertion may be reformulatedas a question, that is to say, move 2 may be read as "Isn't the opposite of your thesis consistent with everything you have so far asserted or conceded?" Rescher'sdeterminermakes judgments on either formal or material criteria:the former include illicit circularities in reasoning,inconsistenciesand incoherencies within one'sbeliefsystem, and formal logical errors; the latter focus on the plausibility or implausibilityof the proponent's "living," i.e. undischarged or unconceded, commitments. Appropriate evidential plausibility standardsfor participants and judges include source reliability and authoritativeness;the relative strengthsof supportiveevidencefor rival theses;and the simplicity,regularity,uniformity (with other cases), and presumptive normalityof such theses, where these featuresare seen as supportive of inductive systematization.A proponent must deepen the groundingand improve upon the reasoning supporting his or her original theses; 'an opponent must be judged for success or failure in finding weak links in such support. The judge additionally oversees the conduct of the argument.A major initial simplification (presumablyadequate for Rescher'spurposes in the early stages of his book),is the assumptionthat erroneous evidentialclaims either are not made by the participants or are immediately corrected by the judge. Thus the determinerrole has implicitlylimitedthe move possibilitiesof Figure1, where, for example, no circularities of reasoning are exhibited.This assumptionhas the important consequencefor Rescher'smodel of formal disputationthat disputingparties address themselvesto matters of evidential substanceratherthan to the proprieties of formalor evidentialreasoning.Formally, this will mean that the major dialogical connective of presumptive support, the (weak or strong) assertionof P "provisoed"upon grounds Q, P/Q, is never directly attacked in his examples. Indeed, when such questions are directly

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discussed in his later chapters, Rescher still does not provide a direct, formalized way of attackingP/Q. Only indirectchallenges, involving the making of distinctions (or the allowingof exceptions)in the grounds supporting such assertions, are allowed. For example, although the strong exception move 8 of Figure 1, P/(R1 & T3) & I(R1 & T3), indirectly denial attacksthe opponent's"provisoed" -P/R1 in move 3, the focus formally is on the second part, the strong distinction !(R1& T3), which "addsT3"to the oppoin orderto pronent'sweak assertionTR1 duce a strongly qualified reformulation, or "rewrite,"of it. Taking pains to subsume standard forms of sentential and syllogistic logic Rescherneverwithin his own approach,5 theless emphasizes the differences be-and the standard tween his formalizations contemporary one. Thus - symbolizes "negation"or "the denial of" the subsequent proposition, as it does in modem sententiallogic, but for Rescherthe weak assertion T P suggests a need for substantive "refinement," not necessarily total rejection. As we have just seen, Rescher's & also sometimes involves a much more substantialcombinatorialrewriting than the modern, purely formal logical and. The "provisoed"or presumptiveinference from Q to P, P/Q, is very different from either the Q D P ("QimpliesP") or Q F P ("Q entails P") of standardmodem symboliclogic. Considerthe way P/Q is read: "Pnormally,generally,typically, or as a rule follows from Q, ceteris paribus."Becausethis key inferentialrelation is only presumptive,it does not unconditionally support detachment of a conclusion Q from P & (P D Q). Hence, '.'indialectical (as opposed to deductive) reasoningan assessmentof the cognitive standingof a thesisneverleaves its probative origins behind altogether."Alternatively, without detachment each dialectical argumentrequiresinspection of the entire history of its derivation.
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A PartialFormalization of the Melian Dialogue As a test of the applicabilityof Rescherian formalizations,I shall offer and then discuss a formalizationof the first major substantive debate in the dialogue, whether the submission of Melos to Athens, either voluntarily or through coercion, can be said to be in each of their formalinterests.An italicizedRescherian ization of each of the seven "moves"or in that debatewill be placedunder "turns" the corresponding Crawley translation text, with my interpretiveinsertions in that text indicatedby square brackets. (I leave the formal analysis of the second part of the debate, concerning the prudence of Melos's hope for deliverance,to others.)
Move 1. Athenians.(a) We will now proceedto show you that we are come here [seekingMelian submission,voluntarily,if possible]in the interest of our empire,and that [what]we are going say [is in your interest,i.e., is] for the preservation of your country; Let P1 = Melian submission is in Athenian andP2 = voluntaryMeliansubimperialtinterest missionis in its (andAthens')interest.
IP = I(P1&P2)

exercisethat (b) as we would fain [preferably] empire over you without trouble [through Melos'svoluntarysubmission], Let Q = imperially,Melos's voluntarysubmission is desireable. P1/Q & IQ for the good of us both. (c) andsee you preserved Let R = preservationof Melos via voluntary submission.
P2/R & IR

Move 2. Melians.And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve. [submit, become slaves] as [it is] for you to rule? Let P2 = P21 & P22, where P21 = Athenianinterestin ruleand P22 = Meliangood from voluntary submission.
t(-P21 & ~-P22)

Move 3. Athenians.(a) [You would] avoid. sufferingthe worst;

Thucydides'Melian Dialogue
Let W = Melos'savoidingthe worst.
P22/W & 1W

Athenianinterestvis a ers, and I3 = particular vis weakerislanders.

I I12 (d) and weaker islanders too than the others; it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape.
P/IMI & I2 & IW & I(II & 12 & IO)

(b) [we would gain a morevaluabletributary] by not destroying[you]. LetX = greaterAtheniantributary gain.
P21/X & IX

Move 4. Melians. [Why could we not remain] neutral,friendsinsteadof enemies,but allies of neitherside? Let N = Melos's friendly neutrality and l= Athens'interest. -PA(I & N) & t(I & N) Move 5. Athenians. (a) Your hostility cannot hurt us, V (I & N) will be an argument to our (b) as your friendship subjectsof our weakness, Let S = subjects'regard for Athenianpower. - I/(- S/N) & 1(- S/N) (c) and your enmity of our power. I/(S/-N) & I(S/-N) Move 6. Melians. Is that your subjects'idea of fair playLet T = (- S/N) & (S/I- N), i.e., "that"
no distinction between people . . . unconnected with you and . . . your own colonists or else

rebelswhom you have conquered? Let -D = (making)no distinction. T j -D& tD Move 7. Athenians. (a) (Yesl Our subjects]see no difference betweenright and wrong; I- D
(b) those . . . still . . . independently do so

becausethey are strong, and if we fail to attack them it is becausewe are afraid. Let N1 = still being independent, - SI = their strength, and N2 = not being attacked by Athens, and -S2 = Athens' being afraid to attack. - D/(Ni/ - S1 & N2/ - S2) & I(N1/S1 & N2/S2) (c) [Sol that by conquering you we will increase [the] . . size ... [and]securityof our empire. We rule the sea and you are islanders, LetI, = increasein imperial size and security,12 = Athenianinterestas sea rulervia a vis island811

The flow of Thucydides' argumentation evidences a truly remarkable fit with Rescher's rulesof dialecticallogic. As one kind of evidence, note the clear and repeated use of the specializedterminology of argumentation: proceed to show; and how, pray; argument; distinction; and thereforeare terms of argumentative art that any broadlyliteratephilosophical scholar will recognize. Secondly, there is the explicitlyindicated"turntaking" mandated by Rescher; the more demanding requirementthat previous argumentsbe met with new argumentationalso holds. Although compound theses were not mentionedin Figure1-they are an easy, naturaland common complicationof that formalism-the argument forms, from categoricalassertionslike (la) to the "provisoed" counterassertionsof (3a-b) and the weak distinction of move 4, clearly conform to Figurel's evolving grammar of move, countermove, and reply possibilities. Coincident with their major show of force, the Athenians are the proponent, they articulatethe majorthesesof this discussion, and they offer an argument sketch for them. As opponents, the Melians regularly question, or weakly assert their views (2, 4, and 6). As I observed first hand in Uppsala at Lars Udehn's 1987 public doctoral thesis defense, the polite, cautious, carefully questioning, cooperative yet critical truth-seeking style of Melian interventions is still practicedin European universities 24 hundred years later (Steven Lukes was the "opponent";see also the neglected discussion of debates in Rapoport 1960.)

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Unlike standardformallogic, Thucydides' logic-his dialectic-is not tautological. Ratherit is a rule and standardGoinginto the detailsof the argumenta- governed, hence partially formalizable, tion formulae above opens up a deeper practicalepistemology.Within it there is examinationof some key issues raisedby always the possibility of new supporting both P1 and P2 Rescher'sproposal. Thus one finds there or criticalreformulations: strong supportfor the centralityof ceteris are attacked and defended in a "proparibus inference in (at least classical) visoed" way, with (7d) being a very sigof probativegrounds political argumentation,thought of as a nificantrestatement kind of "provisoed"assertion that sub- for P1, clearlymore persuasivethan those sumes standardformal inferenceand en- offered in the preliminary argument courages novel, more adequate substan- sketch. subIn this light, the Melian attempt to As for Rescher's tive reformulations. Athenianimperialinterestso sumptive approachtoward standardfor- reformulate mal logic, it is harderto map Thucydides' as to make it consistent with Melian approachinto the modem sententialcal- neutrality-the weak distinctionof move culus. But there are at least several cases 4-is an especiallycreative, revealing, as where roughly equivalentversions of the well as practicallycrucial,reformulation.7 Not only does it makepossiblethe knowlsame proposition,e.g., P1, P2, I, S. N, T, and D (and their negations)are logically edge enhancementdue to the "internal substituted for each other in a modem relations"account of (7c), but practically and way. Moreover, an apparently analytic it is a valiant, if ultimatelyinadequate claim appearswhen the Athenianinterest tragic, effort to deterAthens' attack. in controllingislandsis somehow deduced Note that in the subsequentround the without furtherevidencefrom its interest Atheniansare put on the defensive,to the and internalnatureas a power who "rules extent that they are induced explicitly to the seas" (7c). (Aron 1984 [p. 29] nicely assert the denial of the Melian neutrality to requirement for maritime thesis. The argumentative spells out the requirements supportthis new, negativeclaimproduces domination.) Beyondincludingsomethinglike stand- (5b-c), which in turn allow the most ard deductive inferencewithin his infor- revealing-and for a relatively neutral mal but formalizable dialectical logic, Greek determiner, probably decisiveThucydides here seems to have encom- move by the Melians: their inferential passed importantaspects of the "internal assertion of the Athenians' underlying relations"of Atheniandomination.Brief- warrant of no difference,no differentialy, "internal relations," like Hegel's tion, no distinction in conduct expected relationship,are those from neutrals, colonists, and rebels, master-bondsman that (at least partially)constitutethe iden- which at (7a) the Athenians clearly actities (or essences) of the entities being cept. For a society in which (accordingto related. Variously formalized in the Aristotle), justice is defined among eduHegelian, Marxian, and analytical tradi- cated citizensin termsof proportionality, logical rela- or appropriatedistinction,not only does tions, these identity-affecting tionshipsare usefully clarifiedin Bhaskar this admission speak against the Atheni1986, Elster1978, and Olman 1971. Since ans on this point, but it contradictstheir not to talk of the justiceof shifts to anothertopic own preference the argumentation at this point, one is led to believe that at their actions. least the sketchof a deeper,provisionally Reschertalks of dialecticalnegation as plausible (and in effect conceded) ex- more than displacement,as "refinement." The formally correctlaw of double negaplanationhas been introduced. FurtherReflections on This Correspondence
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tion (. -p = p) is pragmaticallyabandoned, replacedby the possibility of an original thesis being aufgehoben, preserved in a refined form through a feedback "cycle of probative dialectic"that arises out of constructive,critical debate (1977, 67). His claimthat his controversyoriented dialectics produces cumulative, new knowledge, is eitherclearly or tentatively supported by each of the admissions (7a-d) of the seventh round of the Melian debate. Rescher'spreferencefor a dialecticsof probative reasoning, one that does not challenge "provisoed"assertions per se, however, seemssomewhattoo restrictive. If one recognizesthat P1 might aptly be respecifiedas I/M, where M = (Melian) submission,one sees more clearlythe intimate connectionsbetweenthe earliestand Indeed, later stages of the argumentation. the challengesto P1can all be said to challenge this implicit assertive connective. (See Devereux 1985 for the next steps here; reliable formalizations concerning contextually inferred elements are not, and may never be, easy to come by.) Consonant with the possibility of deeper, more internally or characteristically revealing reformulations,a contemporary restatement of Thucydides' dialecticallogic is as follows: Think (like Thucydides) of reality as layered and define scientificprogressas the uncovering of the deeper, dialectically inner, determininglayers or characteristicdispositions. (Systemic,political, economic, sociocultural,and ecologicalrelationships may also play such inner, identity-affecting roles.) Recognizingthat political systems are open and "autopoietic" (Bhaskar 1986), hence not apodictically decomposable, it is appropriatethat investigative inferences areall in the classicallytentative, ceterisparibusmode of reasoning rather than the ontologically flat statistical sense of ceterisparibusrelationships going back to Ando and Fisher 1962 and Ando, Fisher, and Simon 1963. Be813

cause classical ceteris paribus reasoning corresponds closely to the "default reasoning" and "nonmonotonic inference" of contemporary artificial intelligence researchon commonsensereasoning, which allow rationally defensible, nonadditive reconceptualizations,I am approachcan be optimisticthat Rescher's improved upon by more rigorous, internality-sensitiveformalizationsof dialectical, political reasoning (see Winograd 1980 and Reichman1985).

Other Dialectical Elementsin Thucydides'Historiography

of We have now a betterunderstanding Thucydides'"logic,"in the classical, dialecticalsenseof his (only partlyformalizable) standards and procedures of valid argumentation and knowledge cumulation. In the one case where we have carefully examinedits exercise, it has moved us more and more towardhis ontology of things,his conceptionof the innercharacter of imperialsystems, states, and statesmen. We have not yet clarified and explained the exceptional, dramatic,moral force of the Meliandialogue.Nor have we linked Thucydides'exceptionalhistorical analysis of the Melian episode to the rest of his book. Each of these concerns also has a dialecticalaspect. EventsData and Speechesin Thucydides'Science Let us begin with the way Thucydides interrelatesevents and speeches. Just as Finley observes (Thucydides 1951, xii), Thucydides' historiography "uniquely combinedopposite tendenciesof dialectic and observation, of generalizationand observation." Throughout the book, speeches regularlycome before the great actions (or "motions"). This sequencingis an explicit aspect of his interpretive, explanatorymethodology:'My habit has been to make the speakerssay what was

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in my opinion demandedof them by the various occasions, of course adheringas closely as possible to the generalsense of what they really said" (1.21). But this searchfor contextualappropriateness does not override the awesome sense 'of free, responsible, criticizable moral agency that this sequencing also conveys. Given the likelihood that many of the speecheswere written or rewritten after the narrativewas nearlyfinished(as Jaeger[1976, 342-47] and Romilly [1963, 275-86] argue), dialectically it is highly plausible to look for Thucydides' own critical interpretations of events, their motives, and consequencesin the oppositions apparent in almost all of them. Indeed, the central role of the Melian massacre in postwar denunciations of Athenianimperialism suggeststo Romilly a distinctive, quasi-legal significancefor Thucydides' last revisions of the work, making it a "study[of] the policy of conquest as a whole, in relation to certain criticismsthat had recentlybeen made of it" (p. 286). Does not Thucydides' account of Athens'responseto the Mitylenerevolt (a more seriousaffrontthan Melianneutrality, but occurringearlier in the war [3. 1-501) contrast favorably with Athenian behavior at Melos? Cleon, "themost violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most powerfulwith the commons" argued for the same standard as implementedin Melos-killing all male defenders and enslavingthe others-with similar statementslike "if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish [all] the Mityleniansas your interestrequires"; but Diodotus recommends "moderate chastisements,"killing the oligarchic leaders of the revolt, not potentially proAthenian democratic masses, who had indeed turned against the Mitylenianoligarchs.Diodotus carriesthe day in a close vote with a final appealthat "goodpolicy against an adversary is superior to the
814

blind attacksof bruteforce"(3.49). Given Thucydides'stated preferencefor a much more limited form of democracy (8.97), Cleon's excesses may be seen as structurally linked to a commons that is too large. Even more momentous comparisons criticallylink Athenianrationalizations in the Melian episode with Pericles'original statementsof Athenianwar aims and the immediatelyfollowing Siciliandebatebetween Nicias and Alcibiades,the principal instigatorof the fateful Sicilianinvasion. Nicias arguesagainst"risking thingspresent for the sake of things future and uncertain,"against the "madnessof attacking a land which, if they prevail, they cannot hold," and against falling "sick of a fatal passion for what is beyond your reach"(6.1-13). Alcibiades, on the other hand, not long afterhavinghelpedundermine Nicias's interim peace with Sparta by a spiteful trick (5.44), boasts that his "folly"(or "madness") broughtbenefitsin alliances against Sparta and asserts that the Sicilian cities are unpatriotic, inhabited by "motleyrabbles."He defends his extravagantsendingof a recordseven chariots to the Olympic games, scorns Nicias's do-nothingpolicy, calls for supporting their allies on distant Sicily, suggests that the initiation of a second front will "humblethe pride of the Peloponnesians," and concludes that "a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quickerway to ruin"than inaction: "The safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutionsfor better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can" (6.17-20). The interestof the multitude in the allies' exaggerated(and not disinterested)reports of great wealth in Sicilian temples and treasuries helps Alcibiadescarry the day. How clearly this debate, which repeats the themeof post-Periclean Athens'inherent aggressiveness,ironically replays the devastating stricturesagainst groundless hopes in the Meliandialogue!How Alcibi-

Thucydides'Melian Dialogue
ades' remarkscontrast unfavorablywith Pericles' speech at the beginning of the war! LikeNicias much later, Pericleshad been "moreafraidof [Athens']own blunders than of the enemy's devices," possessing many "reasons to hope for a favorable issue, if [the citizens] can consent not to combineschemesof freshconquest with the conduct of the war" (1.143). On this contrast, Thucydides himself makes a rare explicit judgment, not in a speech,but in commentsthat constitute his encomium for Pericles at his death, 21/2years after the war began:
of his previsions... becamebetThe correctness ter known by his death. He told them to wait
quietly, ... to attempt no new conquests....

[Rather,]what they did was the very contrary, allowingprivateambitions... to lead theminto projectswhose success would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons. [Moreover,] committing even the conduct of state affairsto the whims of the multitude... producedA host of blunders,and amongstthem the Sicilianexpedition;thoughthis failednot so much througha miscalculation of the power [of
the Sicilians] . . . as through a fault in the senders, .... choosing rather [than continuing to help] . . . to occupy themselves with private

cabals for the leadershipof the commons, . . . [which] first introducedcivil discord at home. (2.65-66)

The above extensive and ratherexceptional quote confirms, then, the interpretation we have made on other grounds, that deliberativespeecheslike the Melian dialogueare to be comparedfor their implicit judgmentalimplicationsabout the motives of the principal actors in Thucydides'history (see Mefford1985). Thucydides'SymbolicOppositions and PrincipledContradictions Frequently,the debatersare leaders of different city-states or their contending factions; sometimes they are spokespersons for-or almost mythical symbols of -a frail but larger collective will politically composed out of contradictoryinputs. Finley elaborates an oppositional
815

themewe have alreadyseen in the Melian dialogue'sexplanatoryaccount(Thucydides 1951, xii-xiii): Athensis characterized as a naval power, based on an extensive commercial economy and political democracy(excludingwomen and slaves but typically includingmany of the militarily and economically necessary oarsmen); Sparta's nature is that of a land power, based on helot agriculture,controlledby a conservativeoligarchyand a weak, rotating monarchy. Athens "encouragesenterpriseand initiative;Sparta emphasizestenacityand tradition." These differencesare discussedat length in the introductory sections (5.84-85) and the later parts (5.97, 99, 107-11) of the Melian conference. Straussputs some of these oppositions (and others) into a partial hierarchy of dialecticaldistinctions:"Justas humanity divides itself into Greeksand barbarians, Greekness in its turn has two poles, Sparta and Athens. The fundamental opposition of motion and rest returnson the level of Greekness;Sparta cherishes rest whereas Athens cherished motion" (1978, 157). Even more remarkable(and extreme)is his argument,"[In]the Peloponnesian War . . . one sees Greeks at their peak in motion; one sees the beginning of the descent. The peak of Greekness is the peak of humanity. The Peloponnesian War and what it implies exhausts the possibilities of man. . . . All human life moves between the poles of war and peace, and between the poles of barbarism and Greekness. By studying the Peloponnesian War Thucydides grasps the limits, . . . the nature of all humanthings. It is for this reasonthat his work is a possession for all times (1978, 157). Despite their ethnocentricexcess, consonant with our Rescherian analysis, these truly remarkablequotations point to the deepest answers Thucydidesgave to the quest signaledby his words quoted in my opening paragraph. Raymond

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Aron has made rather similar points: "Politicsis dialectic when it unfolds between men who mutually acknowledge each other. It is war when it brings into
opposition men who . .. wish to remain

strangersto one another.... By the same token, we perceive why war is the completion of politics and at the same time its negation" (1984, 23). The common thoughtis at once dialecticalin its revelatory search for fundamental,substantial and heroppositionsand transformations meneutical in its reconstructivesuggestions of a grammar of motives, and of opposed organizing principles spanning or generatingthe space of possiblehuman political activity (see Alker 1982 and Habermas1973). Thucydides'Greek Tragedy At last we are ready for the crucial of the second thesis in this reconstruction Melian dialogue: Thucydides' scientific study of power politics is essentially dramatic and ultimately tragic. Because the failuresof both the Melians(a Spartan colony) and their opponents, the Athenians, are revealedin that dialogue, a larger Greek tragedyis suggestedby it. The first argumentis a textual one. At the same time that it is a turningpoint in entire"scientific history,"the Thucydides' Melian dialogue is pure drama (cf. Aron 1984, 28). To quote Cornford, at the point in the Melian conferencewhere the dialogue begins, "the historian changes from narrativeto full dramaticform, prefixing as in a play, the names-'Athenians,' 'Melians'-to the speeches"(Cornford 1971, 174-87). The dialogue was in fact a principalfeature of Greek tragedy of the period as practiced by Euripides and others. By Thucydides'shifting into this form, Cornfordargues, the dramatic ironies of this pivotal turning point are highlighted.These concernboth the blind hubris, Eros,insolence, and pre-Christian
816

hope infectingboth the Atheniansand the Melians. The second argumentfor the dramatic nature of Thucydides'Melian dialogue is more substantive, with essentially the same tragic conclusion. It begins by noting how Thucydides' use of dialectical substance, "the overall category of dramatist," conforms to the dramatist's search for the roots of human action in verbal terms, for instance, symbolic oppositions, and principled contradictions. Strauss and Aron have already shown us how, "whenmen are treatedin terms of other things, men may even be said to speak for the dumb objects [or forces] of nature"(Burke1969, 33). Burke then offers a directly relevant, dialectical conception of tragedy (and science):
Galileo speaks of experimentaltesting as an "ordeal." Statedbroadly, the dialectical(agonistic) approachto knowledgeis throughthe act of assertion,whereby one suffersor calls forth as the kind of knowledgethat is counter-assertions the reciprocal of his act. This is the process embodied in tragedy, where the agent's action passion, and from the involves a corresponding of the passion[by the originalagentor sufferance the empatheticobserver]there arises an underthat transtandingof the act, an understanding scendsthe act. In this final state of tragicvision, intrinsicand extrinsicmotivations are merged. factorspar... Althoughpurelycircumstantial ticipate, . . . they bring about a representative
kind of anecdote . . . that belongs with the

kind of character.(1969, 33) agent'sparticular

anecdote," As a Burkean"representative the Melian episode reveals the blindness of "tyrannicalEros,".of blind Athenian hubris and its insolent defiance of the gods. (Cf. Burke 1969; Cornford 1971; and Strauss 1978, 225-27; Alker [1987] Thucydisuggestsformallyreconstructing dies' narrativein terms of the fundamental tragic notion of a "mythical actor's self-annihilation.") Burke even claims that "we can . . . catch glimpses of a relation between dialectics and [Platonic]mathematics. . . in the fact that mathemata means both

Thucydides'Melian Dialogue
things learned . . . and the mathematical sciences"and that "we can discernsomething of the 'tragic'grammarbehind the Greekproverb'sway of saying 'one learns 'ta patematamathemata,' by experience'; the sufferedis the learned"(1969, 39-40). As Strausssays, the Peloponnesian"War surpassed the Persian War in regard to human suffering," caused (intrinsically) by men and (extrinsically) by nature (1978, 150). It turns out, then, that the Melian dialogue is a key scene in a classicalmorality play about mightand right, not simply an eternal statement of the mathematical truths of realpolitik. An increasingly blind, arrogant,lustful, imperiousAthens will pay for its failings with the lives of many of its citizens and, eventually, with its independenceas well. Like the most thoughtful modern realists, Thucydides joins normative, descriptiveand explanatory investigations pointed toward the suffering-based "learning" of moral lessons. behind, but to be theirequals"(1987,2, 6; Der Derian's emphasis). As equals, they could exhibit their practical, moral capacitiesfor arrivingat reasonable,just bases for concerted political action in times of need. His book thus suggeststhat certain aspects of a neoclassical orientation can legitimatelybe attributedto the presenteffort as well. NeoclassicalPolimetrics

I have objected to the view of mathematicalrealpolitikderivedfrom Thucydides' work and attributedto him by many realistand neorealistinterof Thucydides' preters. By showing how much of his analysis they (and deductive behavioral modelers like Zinnes 11975])have lost, I have tried to motivate and to legitimatea more comprehensive form of rigorous, partly formal, political analysis. The dialectical methodology of Thucydides' classic work has been available in principle since the dawn of scientifichistory, yet the above formal analysis of the Meliandialoguestill seems, to this author, full of as yet unrealizedpotential. On the Appropriation For one trainedin the powers of formal of the Classics analysis, that exercise suggests what a neoclassicalpolimetricsof politicalactiviIn a recent, postmodernisttreatise, On ties and constitutional structureswould Diplomacy, James Der Derian has attempted "to explain a[n international look like (cf. Alker 1975). It would be a political] system by studying the genesis polimetrics dialectically grounded in of its internalrelations,which are seen as humanexperience,focusedon contextualstandpractical-normative expressionsof alienated powers." A stu- ly appropriate dent of a leading classicist of our era, ards of just conduct and institutional Hedley Bull, Der Derian, too, cites the worth. Whether addressing empirical authorityof Aron and Thucydidesas sup- topics or arguing policy alternatives, its would be argumentation "logic" port for his own approach,quotinga pas- preferred sage pointing ironically to subsequent theory, using classical ceteris paribus Athenian injustice:the Corcyranssay to inference, reasoning. Quasi-experimental Athenian and Corinthianrepresentatives conventional mathematical probability on the eve of the outbreakof the Pelopon- and statistics, and deductive modeling nesianWar, "Everycolony, if it is treated would be seen as special cases or comproperly, honours its mother city, and ponents of this more general approach. only becomes estrangedwhen it has been (Dunn 11982]anticipates many of these treated badly. Colonists are not sent arguments; Campbell [1982] concedes abroad to be slaves of those who remain most of them.)
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We have seen how politicalargumentation, if grounded in a cooperative, uncoerced, truth-seeking orientation and used skillfullyto ask the rightquestionsthose that critically probe the essential justifications-can suggest key determinants and consequences of sociopolitical identities, actions, relations, institutions, or contexts. Polimetrics built up from a foundation in political argumentationcan help reveal the underlying, contestibly legitimate political orders (constitutions), the principled practices and constitutive relationships that, if known, will make possible further, even more penetrating,policy-relevantdiscussions of a criticaland reconstructive sort. Its cumulative results are unlikely to be timelesslaws; its universalsare more likely to reflecthegemonicor pluralistic political achievements. Der Derian's genealogical approach is justifiedas an effort to refutethe existence of any ahistorical, timeless, defining essenceof international politics. To study discursively, genealogically, historically the internalrelations of power politics is to deny its eternal reality. My own rereading of Thucydides'Melian dialogue suggestsa similar,open-ended,dialectical epistemology of practical knowledge cumulation,ideally to be combinedwith competingsets of hypotheses concerning the inner and outer determinants of Athenian (and Spartan) actions. It thus locates itself where any epistemologically self-consciouscontemporaryapproachto internationalpolitics ought to be-in the midst of contendingclaims about lessons of the past and possibilitiesfor the future. Thus we too may participate in the engaged, dramatic, but relatively objective and rigorouskind of historicalpolitical analysisthat Thucydideswas engaged in. Like the Athenians and their Greek friendsbeforethe war, we can scientifically appeal to dialecticaljudgements,relatively unconstrained argumentand counterargument,"impartiallaws . . . [and]
818

differencessettled by arbitration"(1.7677). We can join different sides of the inner contradictions of "Greeks" and "barbarians,"enlisting Thucydides' (or Euripides' even more antimilitaristic) insights in our own political-scholarlydebates. By dialecticallyengagingourselves in the endless, passionate search for objectively accurate and motivationally superiorhistoricalaccounts, we critically renew the past and help createthe future.

Notes
Since the 1980 draft of this paper, supportedby NSF grantnumber7806707to the Centerfor InternationalStudiesat MIT,a JohnT. and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation grant to that centerand to the SwedishCollegiumfor AdvancedStudiesin the SocialSciences havefurthered its refinement. Among the manycommentators on earlierdrafts,I am most indebtedto KarlW. Deutsch,ErikDevereux,Roger Karapin, andF. J. Tickner.DwainMeffordproposed I try to formalize Thucydides' dialogues. 1. The customary form of citationis to the books and paragraphs of the Greek text. Exceptwhere a secondarysource is cited, my quotationsare taken from the Crawley translation(Thucydides1951), now in the publicdomain. 2. Jaeger(1976, 483) arguesthat Hecataeusfirst took "the scientific and rational approachto the facts of humanlife as the essenceof history,"while Herodotous gets the credit for introducing "the religious and dramatic element" into history. A more globally valid view should take into account ChineseConfucianism, Legalism,and Taoism(Freiberg 1977). 3. Barthand Krabbe(1982,58) associatewith the opponent'srole "anunconditional rightto criticize" proponent'sassertions, and reconstructthe pragmatic rules of logical argumentation to includerule FD E5super: "Whenparty N performsa speechact that is not among those permittedto N by the rules of this systemof formaldialectics,or if it performs a non-permitted,nonverbal action that reduces the otherparty'schancesof winningthe discussion,then N has lost all its rights in the discussionand N's behavioris to be calledirrational with respectto the situationby the companythathas presentdialectical adoptedthis system of formal3dialectics" (p. 63). 4. My partialsummaryof Rescher's (1977)argument, including quotations, are taken primarily from chapter1, pages 1-34; see also chapters2 and 5. 5. Indeed,Rescher suggeststhathis formaldialec-

Thucydides'Melian Dialogue
tics goes nicely with Aristotle'sformal syllogistic Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading, reasoning,modifiedto includean "all-things-beingMA: Addison-Wesley. equal"operator(1977, 13-14). He follows Aristotle Alker, Hayward R., Jr. 1982. Logic, Dialectics, on this point, who arguesthat syllogisticprinciples Politics. In DialecticalLogics for the Political and to diaapply both to axiomaticdemonstration Sciences,ed. author. PoznanStudiesin the Philectic (Aristotle1964, 153-59). vol. losophy of the Sciencesand the Humanities, An even more ambitioussynthesizingmove be7. Amsterdam: Rodopi. tween the dialecticaland standard,that is, formal Alker,HaywardR., Jr.1984. Historical Argumentaand deductive, logical traditions is due to Paul tion and Statistical Inference. Methods Historical who definesthe standard logicalconstants Lorenzen, 17:164-73,270. -&, v, -, if... then-dialectically (i.e., argumenAlker, HaywardR., Jr. 1987. FairyTales, Tragedies tationally), in terms of strip rules for their use in and WorldHistories.Behaviormetrika 21:1-28. "criticaldialogues"betweenproponentsand oppoAndo, Albert, and FranklinM. Fisher.1962. Two nents. "Sucha 'social'definitionof the logical conTheorems on CeterisParibus.AmericanPolitical stants may be regardedas a theoreticalelaboration ScienceReview56:108-13. of Wittgenstein's notion of a language game."It sugAndo, Albert, Franklin Fisher,and HerbertSimon. 'garb"' gests a new "dialogicalor argumentational 1963. Essays on the Structureof Social Science for "modem propositional and predicate logics" Models. Cambridge: MIT Press. to be demonstrably equivashownby PaulLorenzen Aristotle. 1964. Prior and PosteriorAnalytics. Ed. equates"classical logic with a lent to them.Lorenzen and trans.JohnWarrington. New York:Dutton. logic of cooperativedebates (dialectics,in Plato's Arnhart,Larry. 1981. Aristotle'sPolitical Reasonintuiand Aristotle's sense),and [twentieth-century] ing. DeKalb:NorthernIllinoisUniversityPress. tionistic(constructive) logic with a logic of competi- Aron, Raymond. 1984. Politics and History. New tive debates(eristics)" (Barthand Krabbe1982, 12, Brunswick: Transaction Books. 24, 55). The set of 21 definitionsand 40-odd rules Barth,E. M., and ErikC. W. Krabbe.1982. From proposedfor bringingboth Cartesianmonological Axiom to Dialogue. Berlin:de Gruyter. axiomaticsand post-Hegelianassociative thinking Bhaskar,Roy. 1986. ScientificRealismand.Human into the discursive,socially and rationallyarguable London:Verso Books. Emancipation. realmis given in chapter3 of the Barthand Krabbe Burke, Kenneth. 1969. A Grammarof Motives. text, from which one rule was cited in note 3. The Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof Calirelevant original papers are collected in Lorenzen fornia Press. and Lorenz1978. Further integrations and elabora- Campbell,Donald T. 1982. Experiments As Argutions, of direct relevance to political science, are ments. Knowledge3:327-37. clearlyneeded. M. 1971. Thucydides Cornford,Francis Mythistori6. Apparently,Sergeev's recent,rich, philosophicus. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania cally informedformalizationof Thucydides'arguPress. mentationomits the discussionof internalrelations Der Derian, James.1987. On Diplomacy:A Gene(Sergeev1986). His publishedpaper cites the Euroalogy of Western Estrangement.New York: pean literature of note 3 and the 1980 versionof the Blackwell. presentpaper. Devereux,Erik.1985.Processing PoliticalDebate:A 7. "Recognition of the centralrole of distinctions Methodologyfor Data Productionwith Special in the dialecticalenterprise-based on the division Application to the Lincoln-DouglasDebates. (dihairesis)of key concepts-goes back at least to Bachelor's thesis. Massachusetts Institute of the Socrates of Plato's Phaedrusand is doubtless Technology. present in the theory and practice of the early Dunn, William N. 1982. Reforms as Arguments. Sophists" (Rescher 1977, 12, n. 13). Later (pp. Knowledge3:293-326. descriptionof "constructive nega66-67), Rescher's Eemeren, F. H. van, R. Grootendorst, and T. tion"exactlyfits the creativityof Meliandistinction Kruiger. 1987. Handbook of Argumentation making:'When P/Q is succeededby - P/(Q & R), Theory.Providence:Foris. thereis not justthe displacement fromP to - P, but Elster, Jon. 1978. Logic and Society. New York: also the refinement(amplification,improvement) Wiley. from Q to (Q & R) . . : it advances the discussion Finley, John. 1939. The Origins of Thucydides' and shifts the issue onto a more sophisticated Style. HarvardStudiesin Classical Philology50: ground." 35-84. Finley, John. 1942. Thucydides.Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress. References Freiberg, J. W. 1977. The Dialecticin China:Maoist and Daoist. Bulletinof Concerned Asian Scholars 9:2-19. Alker, HaywardR., Jr. 1975. Polimetrics.In HandHabermas,Jurgen. 1971. Knowledgeand Human book of Political Science, vol. 7, ed. Fred"I. 819

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Interests.Boston:Beacon. Habermas, Jurgen. 1973. Theory and Practice. Boston:Beacon. Harri, Rom, and Paul Secord. 1972. The Explanation of SocialBehavior.Totowa, NJ:Rowman& Littlefield. Jaeger,Werner.1976. Paideia: The Idealsof Greek Culture. Vol. 1. Trans. G. Higet. New York: Oxford UniversityPress. Keohane, Robert. 1983. Theory of World Politics. In PoliticalScience,ed. Ada W. Finifter.Washington:AmericanPoliticalScienueAssociation. Keohane, Robert, ed. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics.New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress. Lorenzen, Paul, andKunoLorenz.1978.Dialogische Logik.Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Mefford, Dwain. 1985. Changesin ForeignPolicy across Time. In Dynamic Models of International Conflict, ed. Urs Luterbacherand MichaelWard. Boulder:LynnRienner. Morgenthau,Hans. 1978. Politics among Nations. 5th ed. New York:Knopf. Ollman, Bertell. 1971. Alienation. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. Rapoport, Anatol. 1960. Fights, Games, and Debates.Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. Rachel.1985. How to Get Computers Reichman, To TalkLike You and Me. Cambridge: MIT Press. Rescher,Nicholas. 1977. Dialectics. Albany: State Universityof New York Press. Romilly, J. de. 1963. Thucydidesand Athenian Imperialism. New York:Barnes& Noble. Sergeev, Victor. 1986. Struckturapoliticherskoy argumentatsii v (<Meliyskom dialoged Fukidida (The structureof argumentation in Thucydides' Melian dialogue). In Matematikav. izuchenii srednevekovykh povestvovatel'nykh istochnikov, ed. B. M. Kloss. Moscow: Nauka. Strauss, Leo. 1978. The City and Man. Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress. Thucydides.1951. The PeloponnesianWar. Trans. RichardCrawley.Introduced by JohnH. Finley, Jr. New York:ModernLibrary. Waltz, KennethN. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading,PA: Addison-Wesley. Wight, Martin. 1978. Power Politics. Ed. Hedley Bull and CarstenHolbraad.New York:Holmes & Meier. Winograd,Terry. 1980. ExtendedInferenceModes in Reasoningby ComputerSystems. Artificial Intelligence 13:5-26. Zinnes, Dina. 1975. The ScientificStudy of International Politics. In Handbookof Political Science, vol. 8, ed. FredI. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby.

Hayward R. Alker, Jr. is Professor of Political Science, MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, Cambridge,MA 02139.

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