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Cross-badging,or selling the same car with cosmetic changes under different brand names, has not worked so far in India. This case study looks at where the problem lies: is the strategy at fault or the execution?
By N. Madhavan
Executive Summary:
auto bild
VW Vento
Skoda Rapid
n January 2012, Japanese Welcome to the strategy of crossauto major Nissans Indian badging, or selling the same car subsidiary Nissan Motor under different brand names a India sold 1,855 units of its concept new to India, but used for compact car Micra. The same decades in the United States and month French carmaker Europe to boost sales. Renault launched its compact Automobile makers resort to car Pulse in India. In February this cross-badging to save on engineeryear, Micra sales were down to ing, design and product develop608 units, while Pulse sold 420 ment costs, to achieve economies units. of scale, to reduce the lead time in Turn to sedans. In August bringing a new product to the mar2012, Nissans sedan Sunny sold ket, and to widen their product 2,757 units. In September that portfolio and get better returns year Renault launched its sedan, with incremental investment, Scala. By February this year Sunny says Vijay Kakade, Director, sales had fallen to 1,191 units, Automotive and Transportation while Scala sold 620 units. Practice, Frost & Sullivan. It costs And guess what? Nissan and at least `300 crore to develop a car Renault are not even competitors. for India. But cross-badging reThey have been strategic partners quires merely tooling changes an since 1999. Micra, Pulse, Sunny investment of less than `20 crore. and Scala are all products of the It would have cost Renault India a Nissan-Renault alliance. lot more time and money to deOr take German car manufacvelop a compact car, or a sedan turer Volkswagens sedan Vento. It had it chosen not to cross badge sold 3,474 units in India in Nissan models. October 2011. A month later, carIndeed, reports claim Nissan maker Skoda launched its sedan will soon fill a big gap in its product Rapid. Ventos sales have since portfolio it has no compact sports fallen to 1,909 by February this utility vehicle (SUV) by crossbadging the highly successful year. Once again, Skoda is part of Renault Duster. Cross-badging the Volkswagen group Vento and offers a clear value proposition to Rapid are from the same stable. the manufacturers and helps In fact, Micra and Pulse are them expand the market, essentially the same cars, says Nitish Tipnis, Director, with some cosmetic differMarketing and Sales, ences, made in the same `300 Hover Automotive factories, but sold uncrore Nissans master der different names. franchisee in So too are Sunny Minimum cost of India. and Scala, or developing a new car But does Vento and for India it? In India, R a p i d .
hy has the cross-branding strategy not worked in the automobile market in India? The similarity of the features in cross-branded products, despite the products belonging to different companies and sporting different brands, is an important reason for lower consumer preference. While buying automobiles, do Indians value the product more or the brand? There is no easy answer. Automobile buying is a high-involvement process for the consumer, she is willing to spend time, effort and energy to arrive at the decision. Consumers actively search for information from multiple sources and analyse it, comparing products and brands. The fact that a model and brand from one company looks very similar to another model and brand from a different company will spur the consumer to look for an explanation rather than search for the differences between the two. The differences in price points of the two further accentuate her need for an acceptable explanation. The similarity of the physical features overrule the brand value quotient. If physical features were discernibly different, the brand would act as a decisive force in consumer choice. Cross-branding strategy fails because it takes away from consumers the powerful rationalising argument that justifies their decision to make a choice that entails financial, social and psychological risk. Will consumers be more tolerant of cross-branding behaviour in future? Most likely, yes. Consumer familiarity with the product class and gradual acceptance of this new rule of the game will reduce resistance to the cross-branding phenomenon. At this point in history of automobile industry in India, cross-branding is driven essentially by production and manufacturing considerations than by consumer logic.
1,855 units
Combined Micra and Pulse sales today ((Feb 2013)
(January 2012):
1,028 units
Cross branding fails because it takes away the powerful rationalising argument that justifies consumers decision to make a choice
Professor of Marketing, IIM-A
both attempts so far have been failures. Cross-badging did not expand the market; on the contrary, it shrank. The extent of failure is such that the combined volumes of Scala and Sunnys sales in February this year was 1,811 units, which is lower than the number Sunny alone sold 2,757 units before Scala was launched, says Kakade. The same is true for the NissanRenault products. While some attribute this to the slowdown, which is squeezing the entire industry, a closer look at the numbers shows that the fall in sales of the original brand is far higher than the overall decline in the market. Why has cross-badging not worked? Examples from other countries have established that brand loyalty is critical to the success of cross-badging. But neither Nissan (nor Renault) nor Volkswagen have been around long enough in India to win the fierce brand loyalty that cross-badging banks upon. Worse, while a fully loaded Micra costs `5.61 lakh today, a Pulse with similar features is priced at `5.76 lakh. Few will see sense in paying more for essentially the same car simply to flaunt the Renault label.
2,757 units
Combined Sunny and Scala sales today (Feb 2013)
(August 2012):
1,811 units
For crossbadging to succeed, manufacturers first need to establish their brands well in the market
Rakesh Batra, National
Leader, India Automotive Practice, Ernst & Young
The same applies to the sedans, Scala and Sunny. Volkswagen did the opposite, pricing Skodas Rapid lower than Vento. But that left Vento customers feeling short changed, apart from lowering the resale value of both cars. There may have been some gaps in communication too. Crossbadging offers clear value to car manufacturers but what about the customers, says Abdul Majeed, Partner and Leader- Automotive Practice, PwC. It is very important to communicate the value proposition to the consumer. Others claim the Indian market is not yet mature enough for this particular strategy. Indian customers have not evolved to a level where they understand the nuances of cross-badging, says B.V.R. Subbu, automotive entrepreneur and former President, Hyundai Motor India Ltd. Not only is the Indian consumer primarily value driven, but the auto market is also highly competitive with well entrenched and aggressive players. There are no shortcuts like crossbadging to brand building, large investments are essential. It is
3,474
3,280
BT receives scores of responses to its case studies. Below is the best one on EID Parry (March 3, 2013)
Your case study on EID Parry shows how the company has created shared opportunities for all stakeholders farmers, intermediaries, society at large as well as the company itself. EID Parry looked at opportunities through the lens of shared value which led it to take strategic initiatives, resulting in innovative approaches such as cashless farming. By redefining productivity in the industry value chain, EID Parry could garner a smooth supply of cane, and reap a high return on investment. Not only did EID Parry profit, it also laid the foundations of a new sustainable business model. The existing scenario also played a significant role in creating EID Parrys business model. Government regulations relating to command area have had a major impact on industry dynamics. They created fear in the minds of farmers of being exploited by sugar manufacturers and discouraged them from growing sugarcane. They also restricted the operations of the sugar manufacturers. Within the contours of the regulations, EID Parrys model has created a perfect ecosystem, built on interdependence of farmers and the company. In the future, I foresee two possible developments. The farmer-sugar manufacturer interdependence may get diluted. There may even be disruption in industry dynamics leading to a reconfiguration of the elements making up the value chain. This could well happen if sugar manufacturers shift their priority from farm development to efficient procurement.
Sanjay Gupta wins a Harvard Business School Press pocket mentor