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Military Intelligence Service

APO 696,US Army


XVJiiae 1945

A.P.W.I.D* (Ninth Air Force Adv)-65/l-945


373.2
'SUBJECT.: \u25a0
Enemy Intelligence Summaries ??,. -^ \u0084-.. p. '-/I
\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0
• X 0U UsU s

TO See Distribution

H.ERMANN G 0 B R IH
\

PREAMBLE,
The following report is the restalt of a lengthy inter­
rogation of HERMANN G-OERING toy officers of the Air-'p/w., Interroga- ;

tion Detachment / Questionnaires prepared by USS TAP and Air MinistrS

were covered by this interrogation. . . ]

The interrogation dealt also with information of a gen­


eral and historical .nature which .often led to liberal discussions
on basic issues. It will readily be seen that "by this means ..
considerable light \?vas shed on the events which took place behind
the scenes of the play enacted by the leading characters" of the
Nazi hierarchy. It was apparent that the totalitarian regime had "
not run as smoothly as its leaders would have made it seem, and, \ :
surprisingly enough, one of the chief causes was HITUiR'S con­
stant trespassing on G-OERING !S private operational premises.
How much constant interference affected. the overall
policy of the Luftwaffe eaid accelerated its doom is shown in the

reflections of the P/W who, by his very nature, pretended to be

unaware of the disastrous part that he himself had played in this

.regard. The report shows how HITLER concerned himself continuous^


ly with the .smallest technical decisions.
years when G-OERING-'S star
- During the last two
to use; his own words , was descending,
-
this interference assumed proportions which caused G-OERING- to
exclaim: "You had a great -ally in your aerial warfare the

-—
Eiihreor. ." r s

INTRODUCTION
V

.
PART I.; ._ ;. ALLIED AIR' POWER AND- THE WAR.
-
'
'
PART 11. . . \u25a0. THE G.A.P.
PART 111. JET AIRCRAFT.

PART IV. .ALLIED .STRATEGIC BOMBING

PART V. . . THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN.


BRITAIN.

\\u25a0

:
PART Yl.. ..THE -RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE RUSSIAN AIR
FORCE.
PART VII. THE JAPANESE.
PART VIII. OTHER CAMPAIGNS AND OPIRATIONS. .
CONCLUSION. . \u25a0 •

6M
1945 0 jo a /i^ «r
*> \u25a0
, t-

M). \u25a0
'*\u25a0
V,,
"\
.< /
M
INTRODUCTION I

Reichsmarech^Ll a^EEMAM •QDESOGjReich-sKi.ii^^t^:. fpr £ir,


.1. £ir,

Supreme Commander of the GAP, Prime fflCTjsr of PRUSSLff, Pre&iden


Pre&iden

of the State Council, President of Eeichs&asto 'Sr


Forestry and G-ame, President of the 9§i^^cJ^s^feS^^|ftr-ph Council
'Sr
-
-
a series of titles and offices, which he
proudly enumerated himself was a willing; fel^p^^'
-
half * i^c^^^^
M^Mf^tos
2. P/W. stated his readiness to tell everything
DOintins- out, however,
out. however, that his matters v/asJr
u&*jfimjj
*
pointing that knowledge
his knowledge GAP matters
of GAP
of was \u25a0

confined to those of a more organizational nature, in accordance


with the office he laeld. Technical details were dealt with by,
his various staff experts. . He made particular mention of his aide,
Oberst YON: BRAUCHITSCH, : who was later separately interrogated and'
his information, when cross-checked against GOERING- 1 S statements ,
was incorporated^ into this report.
, . 3. GOERING- tried hard to make a case for himself , and, des­ -
pite rumors to the contrary, .is far from being mentally deranged.
In fact he must be considered a very, "shrewd customer", a great
actor and professional liar who most likely made some 'mental
reservations, trying to keep what he might consider a few aces
up his. sleeve in order to have some bargaining power if and
when the need arises. It may be added 'that &OERING-- still considers
himself the legal successor to ADOLF HITLER, stating however:
"This is no longer of importance
'
but it may
'
be quite interesting
for 'you". ':."\u25a0 ; . \u25a0

A* GQERING spoke with pathos and drama about the events


leading to his arrest by the SS, his liberation by a Luftwaffe
Unit, and then his final capture by US troops on 6 May 1945. He
stated that
- at 0300 on 21 April he left BERLIN for Southern GER­ '
"• •
MANY.. \u25a0. . •
\u25a0

5. During the night of 22 April,. Generaloberst KOLLER


followed GOERING to BERCHTESGADEN and reported to him" that HITLER
had decided to stay and die; in. BERLIN. Thereupon, GOERING sent
a telegram to. HITLER informing him that-, in view of- HITLER'S for­
mer appointment of GOERING as his' successor, he would assume- full
control of the German Reich unless he received orders to the'
contrary by. 2200 hours. He^was encouraged in his actions -by a1a 1

remark which HITLER is supposed to -have made when reminded, that


it was high time to start negotiations witlv the Allies "1 shall
never do that", .HITLER 4.s supposed to have said, "GOEEIWG can
.
do it much better" t . . \u25a0* •'' \u25a0
\u25a0

6. The telegram was sent at 1500 : hours on 23 April,, and at


2200 hours, GOERII\TG was arrested l)j SS' troops, A. telegram signed
by^, HITLER , then arrived asking him to resign all his offices.
According to GOERING'S interpretation this referred only to the
offices he was holding at that time and did not include" his appoint­ "
ment as HITLER'S successor. A sec ond t ele gram si gned'. Fii.hr er
\u25a0

which GOERING said 'was a fake sine e it was. sent after HITLER f S '.

death by BORMAM,i?he secretary of the NSDAP, sentenced him and his


family to death.
'
V/hile he was standing there surrounded by 'SS men, members
7.
of the 12 LN.Regt (Air Signal Regt) passed by. Upon seeing him,. .
they ran forward to greet arid cheer their beloved commander. GOER­
.
ING-., swiftly weighing up the \u25a0situation and finding that the Luft­
waffe men: outnumbered the SS,' ordered them to, charge the SS,
- -
whereupon' the SS -Commander rather willingly as GOERING claimed
let him go.

ilJ^^^ w t
#:-:-t.' "
(j, h /:

\u25a0j j
*' ;***«&

8. aOBRING-'S comment on his liberation is characteristic.


of his pompous vanity up to the end "It was i. one of the most.,
beautiful moments of my life to stand there again in froilto f my
. " :
troops, and see them present arms for their Commander-in-Ohi ex.
This liberation, G-OERING- continued, gave him back his freedom of
action. It was shortlived, however, as the Americans were even
then closing in on him. . \u0084

9. Further reference "willbe' made in the course of this


report to the differences which existed .among the leaders of .
aSHMAIY- par ticularly^ between (xOSRTNG and HITLER. Some light'
willbe : thrown on the entire complex of events preceding the
final collapse of the Third Reich. GOERING f S statements will
be quoted verbatim, whenever practicable, in order" to preserve
the genuine character of his reaction to certain questions and
problems under discussion. .
'
10. It must be borne in mind that throughout the entire
interrogation G-OERING- made partly subtle, partly obvious efforts
to clear himself. Hot only did he render HITLER responsible
for almost all mistakes made by the German High Command 1 in gen­
eral and by the Luftv/affe in particular but he also took great
, ,
pains to show that he himself was not such a bad fellow after
all., "Next to being a German, 1 favor the. West; J... am a European

of them
-
like you", "If you know^my speeches, you will admit that In none
whether delivered in peace or wartime have I attacked
-
a foreign statesman personally",
'
"I never held an office in the. 1

Nazi party". "I was the most outspoken exponent of the 'State
authority versus the authority of the party"." These quotations \u25a0

may serve to underline the above statement.. . \u25a0,


\u25a0

\u25a0-<

PART I
V
ALLIED AIR POWER AND THE.. WAR

THE ROLE OF 'THE AIR FORCE IN GENERAL <


11. Although the Air Forces may render a decisive contri­ ;

bution towards the winning of a 'war, they alone, in the opinion

Air Forces can not occupy.


" a great
of G-OERING, will never bring
can.
nation to Its knees. -."The
only disrupt,,- interfere: and
The?/
destroy' and thus prepare for 'the eventual last fight leading to
.
' "
final occupation and victory. .. : \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 • •
:

12. (This sof tening-up process should follow certain set:;


rules which he called his "Evangelium" , The: first objective at
the; beginning of a war must always be to destroy the enemy's
Air Force, completely disregarding all other targets. The Air
Force is the heart of military power and resistance, and only
when this is destroyed, should other. targets be .attacked; ; the \u25a0

priority to be given .to these other targets would obviously de­


pend on the economics of the country under attack; . G-OERING-^S
views on the assigning" of, target priorities In G-ERMANY are out­ "
"
lined in Part IV. . \u0084.

. \u25a0,

THE ROLE OF THE. ALLIED AIR FORCES IN THIS MAR


.13. GOBRING attributed our victory over GEB.MANY to two . ,

main factors, the. successful invasion and, above- all, -the"/irresist­


ible'numerical superiority of the Allied s!ir. Forces.' Aside from-
all -other aspects,, ne, emphasised the devastating^ effect of such
superiority .on the morale of the ground forces. "The Allies, owe'
the success of the invasion to their Air- Forces.- They prepared
the invasion; they 'made it possible, and-, they carried it through".

fl
V. v :\u25a0 ™^R S^^Pff^Rp^
-41 \
*a
fi
r>
fa y t

**&iJK» fa •a .. -J
*
NG- claimed,
Without the Allied Air Porce^ \GOERING- ol it would have "been
possible to bring, up German ground .reinforcements- ;in<i: m-'ke full. •

use of armored units i

14, •
He particularly stressed .
the part which the. JS Air Force
has. played. : -"Without the American .Air. Force, the war would still
be going on- elsewhere "but cert.--.inly not on German soil".

15.. The; first heavy blow rencie red by our Air Force c -ane in
"fr-i a
the African . i ,o-n End
campaign- ann in TTrf LV., when we attacked Italian

th pn in
then
fir), n-r-irn'r, :\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0;.

airfields. He claimed that .the G-AF was helpl-ess against, these

attacks because of the refusal of the t Italians, to allow the Germans


to adjust the .airfields to their, own ow: needs. When' these objections
were finally overcome , GOEEII3G' trie^ Ed to render Allied attacks in­
effective by building what he called air-force fortresses
system of runways built on; either side of a major road and conneGte ;
with each ojther hj taxi -strips, pr. .0 tec ted by hecvy flak-concentra- .
tions. The -purpose of such fortre ss es was to maintain a sufficient
number; of runways even under, the hea viest carpet-bombing attacks
Three such fortresses were completed in :lIAXY: IIAXY and others were
started in FRANCE, HOLLAND, and BEjLG lUM. • He. claimed that his
theory -had proved sound since the fortresses stood up under heavy
attacks. . In practice., however, they were not of much help sinc-e
scheme .
sufficient : aircraft were never ay J... iJ _L c uu i.v cLt\.o J_tAJ__L. iXiO C. U-t Ui.-t;

\u25a0.'\u25a0\u25a0.
.
:j.,

16. ... Another heavy blow, and he considered this to be;, one of
the most decisive factors. In the ultimate outcome .of the war, . was 1 CJ

the xange of our fighters. The man who once boasted that no enemy
bomber would ever fly over G-erman so 11, admitted that he was stunned
"I would have thought it impossible that so many enemy, four-ongined
bombers, could . fly. around for hours over German territory." GOSB.I!\iG­
is convinced .that- this was only made possible through our fighter -
escort which, indeed, came as a .-complete surprise to him. He said
that he almost refused to believe I t when our fighters penetrated \u25a0

as 'far as LIEGE, and then HAMOVER, But when two weeks later, fight
rans.. 7 escorting bombers,, even appe area over BEKLiK", he knew that
the result of these long range figh ters would • be tragic. "Der
weitreichende Beglelt jager war' cine<r:: !T1 v n \u0084 \u0084„

GOERING believed that nl t r:.ids were effective and


.17.
had good results inasmuch as they 3,used great damage to industrial
installations. Beyond this, he ca ,1-led them terror raids ks they,
not so much, by intention. but rathe in effect, were not confined
to definite targets, and actually in most cases hit residential
sections,.

\u25a0_18,-'
Ground strafing attacks at night were unimportant in
their contribution to.-, the defeat of G-EKMANY.. He said that they,
could be very effective if they were carried cut on a large scale

19. /The effect of our stra Xi t gi c bombing Is dealt with In


detail in Part IV.. . \u25a0 :

PART 11.

4_ili_J \-t • SI. a V .


X LV.xiiJ.ilXiJll-L ± J I\l j.t.l'lU ± U-UJ. 'w ±±j.b
'\u25a0}-TTrpT,"H T5
1 i

o-nd ii.'\u25a0\u25a0; p Pol iC'-i pci

20. Milt 1J ttlonsMp 1 tt n HIOCLER and the SAP was summed*


(
"
ip by COPEIJC VvJth the V(^ at does Jack Imow about the Air

.
T

Force?" ( 'lo sic klcine r^n s die Luftwaf fa vo-rstellt ".)


1
'
.
hIILI'R, GOLriHG kne a lot conct mlno .1 liSc,ry Jl4t£pidq»r>f\^ fn »
- 4
W'
MM I
V
>. * \u26 6 /
A .Jh

*
was an expert in eapons of the Aimy and MV^;< T

\'V '^%«ll' "


solutely no t^iu^ ."bout the .Air E'orce. w
Ini^t;lmnVt^%^AW, Tie
left all Eatuiis of G-aF policy to 3-OT RlNG .\^Jjy^fertHt; o
f'inninj of
lj4£
l
ho\'ev fj,, allied air attacks i:ioie_sud, he bec^ .nr~ ue]­
vous, lor t cDfliidwnce in GOERIIJG- an~l hegctn to lute ifre, Wltl1
the exception of an Adjutant of the Luft^ffe, Obeint v. BELO'/ ,
who is Jio\ r believe J to be de.^d, thtxe -..is no G-aE man on .iITGLH'S
General St~>iT to -^r'vise him.
OKL, OKW and. Navy

and Oberstlt.
21.
BOHM
\u25a0
-
OICD- had two liaison officers
IEiDTELBiiCH..
'
the O£W:
.
\u25a0
Major, BtJCHS
\u25a0.
'

22. There -was no liaison officer of the OEW.with the OKL.


The.. Puhrer took care 'of that himself ;' . \ /..\u25a0"' \u25a0/\u25a0•\u25a0 \u25a0 •\u25a0

in
23.
GERMANY.' ;.
Haval-Aviation to all intents
'
. . \u25a0
->^nd purposes
\u25a0.-..' '; .
did not exist
/
­ /

Disposition- of Units
...
Unless interfered with by .HITLER, '\u25a0 GOERING- decided the -
: 24-.
displacing of units from one front to another* Employment of . ;

units in the West was -the problem of Luftwaffenkoimnahd.o West


(mcl 2' Jagdkorps) while Jagdkorps
'
I;and "later . Jagdkorps 9 handled
; '
the Question, in G-ERMAHY. . : .\, \u25a0

A/0 Procurement

-
25/ In June/July 1944 procurement was transferred from
MIL.CE. to SPEERv . This resulted in an increase in a/c production •
;

although the average quality of the a/c suffered somewhat. . (The ;.


number of good a/c, however:, still surpassed the former production
figures. -'; ; .
'
'. . '../: : \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 v :\u25a0 ,
' '
\u25a0.'\u25a0.•..•\u25a0-\u25a0 . .\u25a0 '.\u25a0'. . "
\u25a0

m line wilgh his growing distrust -of G-OERING-', HITLEK


26.*
ordered the production of jet a/c be turned over to SS G-ruppen
fiihrer KAMiuLER. . . . \u25a0- \u25a0
'
...
Personnel
. \u25a0GOERIHG-'S private secretary was a Fraulein LI.MBEHOSB of .
27.
\u25a0

BERCHTSSG-ADEN to whom,, he said, he very s-eldona. dictated any .orders


and who could, therefore, not be considered as a valuable source.
of 'information-.. In line with his normal . procedure, G^ERIKG would
give oral orders to his Duty Adjutant, vvho, in'.' turn, passed .them-"',
on to the. Chief .,..\u25a0". ..'\u25a0\u25a0.' . \u25a0

28. Responsibility for the . drafting of orders was delegated


by G-OERING- to the. appropriate .department. G-OERIIG- himself dictated
only proclamations. ; \u25a0

:
29. - Oberst WODARG- was in charge
of Intelligence {I c.) matters
concerning foreign countries-. His aides Included: \u25a0'

Oberstlt. KIEMTZ (WEST)


Major OWE (EAST) \u25a0.
-
The office of the Ie
longing to the DAE'
was last located at a. cs'tle
near VIASSERBURG/IKN. :
formerly, be­-
.
'
\u25a0
-
P erso nal 3?11e s
'
30* . GrOERIN.G- claimed that all his personal files had been -
destroyed. ITone of "these were in the ELM, since he very seldom
went there; instead, he used an office in the building of the
Prussian' State Ministry. All the Adjutants 1 filce 'vei c supcosedly
1

burned at KARIMALL-. »i

0%
*'"" m^

i\
¥

•»
**
""""?

j
INTELLIGENCE.
Organisation
31. Intelligence ('•ic ).-\u25a0'. inform; tion was accorded 'Strict
attention"- and' was .frecruently the, "b. si a .-for -defensive 'and offensive
i:

operations unless '


overridden.oby :: the Eiihrer. Intelligence infor­ j

mation of . general
tions,
value and interest -was. published In Ic-publica
-: . \u25a0•\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'. \u25a0 \u25a0•
... •
;

Sources of Intelligence
\u25a0\u25a0

32. Important sources of Information included foreign news


'
papers,' magazines <and "broadcasts, and pertinent excerpts -taken
therefrom were wired, to. BERLIN.' Allied -newspapers, for. instance,
announced our Intention to emplpy Russian bases' long before the ,
plan Materialized and this Inform"
.
.tion was the basis for the. sub­
sed uent at tacic, on POLTAVA Radio- Interceptions were used exten- .
sively to obtain information on missions- of .-pur Air -forces.
!

By
Intercepting our 'radio tune-up tr 1- fie It was \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0possible to form an.
Idea of . our .impending operations.

33. of the Rese xch Council, vxOERINGp had access


As President
to intelligence inform ..'.tion collected by a department of -this:-'
organization;, . It was the job of this department, to.- monitor all -
telephone traffic within the Reich- -.. Including embassies.,- hotel
hotels-^
foreign personalities and other SQ arces

54. G-O'ERING considered, as most important the' information


derived from 'P/W interrogation',., which -he stated \u25a0\u25a0.-, enahlecT them
often to tcdte effective counter-me asures. P/W Interrogation was \u25a0

carried out by GAP interrogators a t the Dulags which were opened.,:


on demand,, \u25a0to SB personnel who'.que stioned P/W oninorale-and o^ther
general Tssues. The proper Dulag Interrogation was. concerned only
with Air Force matters and was so GOERIKG said conducted on
- \u25a0•­

a- comradeship basis. HITLER suspected .that 80|iie Interrogators at


the Irulags were Anglophiles and, therefore, ordered their transfer

35* The information gained from p/W Interrogation was so - '


voluminous, that' onljr .excerpts from the most Important Iter<is were
referred, to G-OEEIB3-. Occasionally he- saw an important p/W himself
Air.Teggijaical Intelligence
36. . RSGHLI'Ei was the 'center of Air Technical Intelligence

37. When ask^d whether for e igh patent applications' were


screened by the GAll before issu'a nee he exclaimed: !!They could
h-we gone to hell three times if they had " not done so, patents
never bothered me ~ 'German, or' foreign.

.•3-8. : SROSS-rING.
SCHWENKE, for merly of th.c German Embassy In
WASEINGTOW and technical Ie under WODAEG, was .concerned with.Air
Technical Intelligence collection.
examined,
39 v Enemy a/c were taken to EECHLIN and : there by
Ob erst. PETERSON., . '\u25a0 \u25a0
>

photographic Intelligence..
'
40. The GAF relied to a £re.3. t extent on photographic .intel-li
gence, each Gruppe having a "Bildstßllei!s (Photo Evaluation 'Center.)
The main Ellas tellc .'was with the. QKL.' It" was last transieTrcd; to. '

.WASSEEBURG AM 1M area in Southern. GEEMABI. . - - . \u0084

- 6
-
6o£;.
was under
scravps-ci
a/6 "per'; month came, back from the repair-shops
\
oeing tj
— - —~
salvaged;,
!
*_>
was
j
,
jnore

j

or
•"
~ —
otherwise
. ..
'extensive,

otnerv/rse —
the a/c were
~ _ - ~~ — —
disposed
disposed ~ —
of.
oi App­
App-
_,. ~.
L . » ~*.j-

'but this J-.t..^.i.ij-C


figure showed
WUU CriiUViCU a -marked' decline
ijiiXD
"' iJ.C^ fbllowing
'0.0. -f- X UX-J-
' VV iJLgj on OliC disrup­
-UXi the U.XOXUJJ-" C, lIICIX
XVCJLL U. C U
"
-L
\u25a0

tion of t!ie railway system r > '-- •


'
. . \u25a0
\u25a0
\u25a0

TACTICS.'
Night Pi
. .
~i v-i.Tirii \u25a0i. .1 \vi rii\u25a0 Viiii i. i iii i.

'
54. ITight fighting had already been practiced before the
war with
war' vvx t-a a 3inall force
hJniciix xuxuy of
ox Hesl's
ne i s and Me
uiia rr i« 109 !-S.!
xut/-o. -S. The ruauxow were
±ne results rj. vvert; \u25a0
.i«!

not very satisfactory. Then, in"; the summer of 1941 Korps 12-,
consisting of 4 night fighter- groups, was -formed. It was under
the command of G-eneral ICAMMHUBER -was equipped with Me 110 !s and ,
was entrusted with 'the defence against British 4 engine bombers.
Korps 12" v;ao gradually enlarged to consist- of many more' groups
and was finally formed into Jagdkorps' l. In addition to the Me 13.0 "*" \u25a0

it was equipped '.••\u25a0ith.Ju 88 !s and He 219* s. . L

Lately 5Me 262 f s were available for night fighting


55*
over BSRLIIr of which 'only 1-2 were operational at any one. time*
The average claims wer-el-2 a/c shot down pcr _ night by .these a/c. 1

,56.
S.-.nG- 8 engined night fighting, as it was practiced at
\u25a0

the beginning, of the summer of 1943 by 9 G-ruppen was considered


. effective only if there were sufficient a/c to -allow them to
stay close to a definite target as these single engined a/c were
not equipped v.rlth W/T instruments. Twin engined a/c for night '
fighting wore considered to be more effective. •

:)'\u25a0\u25a0 \u0084,•'-. ' .


\u25a0
\u25a0
'. r^*"

57. :In the fall of 1943 night fighting


' s ;nd
was improved' by
using ozpcriencod
. bomber
. pilots on
. Me 109
' v-?
Pw 190* s. . Newly
. .
\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0
X : ."\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.,\u25a0:\u25a0.'\u25a0..\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0
\u25a0
, .\u25a0 \u25a0
'.\u25a0\u25a04. ; \u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.
' .\u25a0. \u25a0 '\u25a0 TT. \u25a0v^
*
* \u25a0 \u25a0 \u25a0\u25a0"\u25a0 '\u25a0\u25a0,'\u25a0. **\u25a0-.. \u25a0.\u25a0,'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 '\u25a0. <-r

trained pilots were as a rule less successful because of tiieir

£ all too short :-iiid insufficient training due -to lack of -fuel.

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Q?q.il attacks. •
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58. T.'-iil ,;..t tacks on our day bombers were preferred to head-on
attacks, be<-: the closing-in speed in head-on attacks allowed
only too short a firing time; tail attacks, therefore, had accomp­
lished better results. In this connection it may "be 'mentioned !

that the fe_;,r of fire power from the t.d.l had to such extent
lowered the morale of the Jagdge.schwa.ders -which were employed
"
in the Defence of the Reich against our four engined bombers' that
GOLTIING found it necessary to' visit all squadrons personally and
give them pop-talks.

.
. Specific
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-,59. Thorpe was no specific point where the (JAP' fighters were
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* to ?K>rk in tliia field -witb. the greatest .
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loured .-.ni'ong. the Reaearca-RinA

• 68, Professor .ESAU.

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present status of this y?ork,'

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69. G-O.URIi^Gr mentioned several neu


in the ae\r'elop:aent stige:­ s

/"Hat-cer" 70.
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a bomber stre'iui..at' a" very high epeea.

causing the- fatter" to split into thre -


clnit.ecl. down
' .to earth. "Natter^ 1 :had air "
flights..-
flights.- , . .

. 71, En2Tian", "Rheintochter"


"^'assorfal.l",
.are the -code ri -
names for rux-io controlled Flak- rockets. .These were handed over
1

to a speci :1 st-;.ff under LORNBBRGrSE * - More information on thenv-"' ' '

can be obtained fron? General yon" AXTHELM. .

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