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H.ERMANN G 0 B R IH
\
PREAMBLE,
The following report is the restalt of a lengthy inter
rogation of HERMANN G-OERING toy officers of the Air-'p/w., Interroga- ;
-—
Eiihreor. ." r s
INTRODUCTION
V
.
PART I.; ._ ;. ALLIED AIR' POWER AND- THE WAR.
-
'
'
PART 11. . . \u25a0. THE G.A.P.
PART 111. JET AIRCRAFT.
\\u25a0
:
PART Yl.. ..THE -RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE RUSSIAN AIR
FORCE.
PART VII. THE JAPANESE.
PART VIII. OTHER CAMPAIGNS AND OPIRATIONS. .
CONCLUSION. . \u25a0 •
6M
1945 0 jo a /i^ «r
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INTRODUCTION I
which GOERING said 'was a fake sine e it was. sent after HITLER f S '.
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of them
-
like you", "If you know^my speeches, you will admit that In none
whether delivered in peace or wartime have I attacked
-
a foreign statesman personally",
'
"I never held an office in the. 1
Nazi party". "I was the most outspoken exponent of the 'State
authority versus the authority of the party"." These quotations \u25a0
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PART I
V
ALLIED AIR POWER AND THE.. WAR
fl
V. v :\u25a0 ™^R S^^Pff^Rp^
-41 \
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NG- claimed,
Without the Allied Air Porce^ \GOERING- ol it would have "been
possible to bring, up German ground .reinforcements- ;in<i: m-'ke full. •
14, •
He particularly stressed .
the part which the. JS Air Force
has. played. : -"Without the American .Air. Force, the war would still
be going on- elsewhere "but cert.--.inly not on German soil".
15.. The; first heavy blow rencie red by our Air Force c -ane in
"fr-i a
the African . i ,o-n End
campaign- ann in TTrf LV., when we attacked Italian
th pn in
then
fir), n-r-irn'r, :\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0;.
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16. ... Another heavy blow, and he considered this to be;, one of
the most decisive factors. In the ultimate outcome .of the war, . was 1 CJ
the xange of our fighters. The man who once boasted that no enemy
bomber would ever fly over G-erman so 11, admitted that he was stunned
"I would have thought it impossible that so many enemy, four-ongined
bombers, could . fly. around for hours over German territory." GOSB.I!\iG
is convinced .that- this was only made possible through our fighter -
escort which, indeed, came as a .-complete surprise to him. He said
that he almost refused to believe I t when our fighters penetrated \u25a0
as 'far as LIEGE, and then HAMOVER, But when two weeks later, fight
rans.. 7 escorting bombers,, even appe area over BEKLiK", he knew that
the result of these long range figh ters would • be tragic. "Der
weitreichende Beglelt jager war' cine<r:: !T1 v n \u0084 \u0084„
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Ground strafing attacks at night were unimportant in
their contribution to.-, the defeat of G-EKMANY.. He said that they,
could be very effective if they were carried cut on a large scale
PART 11.
.
T
*
was an expert in eapons of the Aimy and MV^;< T
and Oberstlt.
21.
BOHM
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OICD- had two liaison officers
IEiDTELBiiCH..
'
the O£W:
.
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Major, BtJCHS
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in
23.
GERMANY.' ;.
Haval-Aviation to all intents
'
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->^nd purposes
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did not exist
/
/
Disposition- of Units
...
Unless interfered with by .HITLER, '\u25a0 GOERING- decided the -
: 24-.
displacing of units from one front to another* Employment of . ;
A/0 Procurement
-
25/ In June/July 1944 procurement was transferred from
MIL.CE. to SPEERv . This resulted in an increase in a/c production •
;
:
29. - Oberst WODARG- was in charge
of Intelligence {I c.) matters
concerning foreign countries-. His aides Included: \u25a0'
burned at KARIMALL-. »i
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INTELLIGENCE.
Organisation
31. Intelligence ('•ic ).-\u25a0'. inform; tion was accorded 'Strict
attention"- and' was .frecruently the, "b. si a .-for -defensive 'and offensive
i:
mation of . general
tions,
value and interest -was. published In Ic-publica
-: . \u25a0•\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'. \u25a0 \u25a0•
... •
;
Sources of Intelligence
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By
Intercepting our 'radio tune-up tr 1- fie It was \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0possible to form an.
Idea of . our .impending operations.
.•3-8. : SROSS-rING.
SCHWENKE, for merly of th.c German Embassy In
WASEINGTOW and technical Ie under WODAEG, was .concerned with.Air
Technical Intelligence collection.
examined,
39 v Enemy a/c were taken to EECHLIN and : there by
Ob erst. PETERSON., . '\u25a0 \u25a0
>
photographic Intelligence..
'
40. The GAF relied to a £re.3. t extent on photographic .intel-li
gence, each Gruppe having a "Bildstßllei!s (Photo Evaluation 'Center.)
The main Ellas tellc .'was with the. QKL.' It" was last transieTrcd; to. '
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was under
scravps-ci
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was
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'extensive,
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the a/c were
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disposed
disposed ~ —
of.
oi App
App-
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L . » ~*.j-
TACTICS.'
Night Pi
. .
~i v-i.Tirii \u25a0i. .1 \vi rii\u25a0 Viiii i. i iii i.
'
54. ITight fighting had already been practiced before the
war with
war' vvx t-a a 3inall force
hJniciix xuxuy of
ox Hesl's
ne i s and Me
uiia rr i« 109 !-S.!
xut/-o. -S. The ruauxow were
±ne results rj. vvert; \u25a0
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not very satisfactory. Then, in"; the summer of 1941 Korps 12-,
consisting of 4 night fighter- groups, was -formed. It was under
the command of G-eneral ICAMMHUBER -was equipped with Me 110 !s and ,
was entrusted with 'the defence against British 4 engine bombers.
Korps 12" v;ao gradually enlarged to consist- of many more' groups
and was finally formed into Jagdkorps' l. In addition to the Me 13.0 "*" \u25a0
,56.
S.-.nG- 8 engined night fighting, as it was practiced at
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£ all too short :-iiid insufficient training due -to lack of -fuel.
»
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Q?q.il attacks. •
,
- '
58. T.'-iil ,;..t tacks on our day bombers were preferred to head-on
attacks, be<-: the closing-in speed in head-on attacks allowed
only too short a firing time; tail attacks, therefore, had accomp
lished better results. In this connection it may "be 'mentioned !
that the fe_;,r of fire power from the t.d.l had to such extent
lowered the morale of the Jagdge.schwa.ders -which were employed
"
in the Defence of the Reich against our four engined bombers' that
GOLTIING found it necessary to' visit all squadrons personally and
give them pop-talks.
.
. Specific
'
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point~ for attack.
. . .
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-,59. Thorpe was no specific point where the (JAP' fighters were
Only when part
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