160

SOON-WON PARK

influential, and competlng idca3 such as natronali ! modemity, and colonialism. S()mc arc moving even further by rccovenng silenced voices and ignored subjects of the colonial Period, such as peasant farmers, orainary city dwellers, vrorke$, rulal and ulban women, the marginal Poor, and other forSotten PeoPles' All these new studies and iounternanatives will bring density, lichness, and to research on the colonial exPerience, adding dePtlx ro complexity _und"i"tundittg of Korea's Paths to modemity in the twentieth out century and the modem Korean identity shaped by them.

SIX

Colonial Korea in lapan's lmperial

T ele c o mmuni c ati on s N e tw ork
Daqing Yang

1933, a SrouP of prominent govemment, gathered in the Govemment-General fitures and business military, (PreEenFday Seoul). When the (GGK) in Keijd building of Korea clock shuck half past ten, Communications Bureau Directol Yamada

on a mid-January day in

Tadatsugu announced the long-awaited beginning of telePhone scrvice between Korea and JaPan. Hundreds of kilometers away across the Japan Sea, a similar cercmony transPired simultaneously in Osaka. In a short speech read to both gouPs by a rePresentative, Covemor-General Ugaki KazushiSe predicted that the oPening of the telephone connection would further strentthen the economic rnd other bonds between the colony and the home islands As if to tcst the soundness of this vision, officials and business leaders in the lwo cities took tums exchanging greetings across the newly activated line.l To many historians, tlus was Probably nothing more than one of rountless, routine, and inconsequential ceremonies in the life of co_ lonial Korea. Indeed, telecorunumcations-telegraPh and telePhone ronnection by means of wire, cable, or &dio-has rarely been dis, ussed in Englishlanguage works on colonial Korea. when the subiu1 does surface, it is tyPically treatd as an indicator of economic rudcrnization undcr Japanese rule.2

'162
ress in

I)AelNC YANG

Colaniat

Koni n,xt ti,lrcDnt tnicatio

s
reresraphiL

,163

The equati(nr o[ t(,tr,.omnrunications with modernity and prog_ colonlrl Koron hrs dominated th numerous publication; c;_ culatcd by thc J.p.rnosc, liovornmcnt. According to ihis view, Japan rapidly expanded ind modernizcd the ,,primiri;",, com-rrni.utions facilities in Korea aftcr the takcover in 1905, to the gieat benefit of economic and cultural life in the peninsula. A ma;sive historical survey on prewar Japanesc activities in Asia, compiled by Japan,s Ministry of Finance sho(ty after World War II, essentialy ieiteratea this.valuation r To be sure, lapan,s rate of progiess did not go un_ challenged. In his pioneering 1944 work on col;nial Korea, A;drew J. Grajdanzev pointed out that telcoqununications almost exclu_ sively benefited the Japanese population.a civen thar relecornmuni_ cations in colonial Korea has not been considered to merit serious study, it is not surprisint no atreementexists on this issue.5 ln this chaptr, I consider telecommunications development as an cs\ential parl of Japdn'" overd emprre-buitdint e ort, nor o,rjy rn lhc colonization of Korca bur al<o in the e\rab,i"hmenr ot an autailic sphere of inlluence in Northeast Asia. Althouth the modern telecommunications network emerged in Korea to a large extent as one crucial elament in lapan's appdratus tor penerrdtion and dominarion, rts etlfct on economic and social development should not be mini. m'zed..l ar8ue, nor was rts impJct timircd ro the Japanese poputa_ tion. Moreover, as Japan embarked on building a new easi as;an telecornmunicarions nerwork in the 1930s to ;trengthen imperial bonds, Koreat position-in the new empiro also becaie increasingly contested, as maniJested in a protonged power struggle between iokyo and Keijo over control of the network. By examiiing Korea,s in_ corporation into Japans imperial tetecommunicationt network, I hope to shed light on the nature of colonial modernitv in Korea as well as colonjal Korea's evolvinB pldce )n the Japane.e ernpire.

1.i,""*"..--';tl;<..". -"""^
]l lf" *', .]gl' 1l:"T:

ompdny, tintcd N.rsJ.atr wrrh shanshdi and vradi_ \ubmarine cabtes rn edrty lb7t. rn erc-hange ror rran._ :::::_* romdni.,ed teleSrdms mrurnt ovcrsca.. rh. lapanesc "Snvemmcnt qrdnled the company 30-vedr monopolistic righis./ Durinp rhp neo._ trar,ons v! irh Korea that led to the Treaw or r".g*f,, i.iez", ti._ moto ldleaki, ldpan.s rrun;<rer in Ltus>ia, proposed to hjs sovern mcnr thdl ldpan \c(urc the right\ a tr"a,,lrU.rri*."Uj"'""r, i usan ds we ds at another site on the we5t coa5t ol lorea near the Chinose border. These would alow future Iinlage with Chine;e teleSraph lines as an alternative to the Danish *lf!." ff," t"f"g."J was still a n.]w rcchnology then. Attributing the abserr.e of wi. 6.twecn Britain and the Unired States to th'e ,"f"Cr"plr,-" J"p.."* m?gd7in" optrmistically predictcd in the sdme year that were lapan oy *]e8taph. rhe rwo would uecome :: ):'.::,,''f"". sooa neish_ o{,rs5uch utopjdn vision\ soon evapordted, tro*eu"i. ," r,,.",. ,"q tetecommunicatinn, ro Ko."u. in'iis4. ;:-"sj: :onrror rne ureat :)'.Tr Nurthern tdid the lrrst rubmarme tele&aph cable across rhe l.oredn.srrajt at Japan,s reque\t. wr,it" tapan Ju.ceeaea in .riuU_ fl<nrn8 d teteSrdph otfice in pusan and secured a 25_year monoooiu over Korcd s e\rprnal rereSraph traffic. ftus, ., rc'\ary Je.hnotosy. Japan made innovarive "lth"";h ;1"t""';," u.. ., ir," -,J,"1,..0 !v..r^rn,lacrtrtdtint,its own e\pansion in Asia. for the tirst timo, tetetram) coutd be receivcd and sent outsrdc the ldpJnrse-ranSudge I.rpdnese Lsrands, a facr of considorabte ir to the srowins '^p"tance

century. In fact, autonomy in ovcrs(us relccornmunications l(gk obic(live ror Japan JI.r a Ddnish firm, rt" became a straCr"ur No.ttnin

r: k,,,e., r,v r,.rcphone. hl::-i..:l:,ry,ec.r.d @rwcen the two ddle from the l.rr,, nrn.tccnth
l::glap",, *,'n

|inr.

Incorporation and Consolidation

Often characterized as the "nerye of govemment,, telecornmunica_ tions networks have always been an important component of mod_ study of Europe's overseas expansion, ,,[rhe] wab oi power thar ried the colonial empires toSether was made of electriiitv as wel as

em impialism. As Daniel Headdck eloquentty ptuases it in his

sterm and rron."'Althouth

il

w.r< not

uniil the eariy tctos

thar

rwo dpcades, ferecornmunicarrons in Korea increa) rocus.uf intemational rivarry among iapan. chi;a, 1 edch bent on establishjnt predominance on the t. ninsuld. ln I685, a yedr afLer rho conshuction of lhe Japan_Korea irs onn relesrdph tine rrom tho j",,1. :.nil".::*.0", capitdl or seout, rhus senins up tre w",i"rn i,,li,-,:,i" N.urc in Korcr o lto{eslint thdt thi! new route violdted rts monod '!v iap?n demanded the right to construct tetegrdph tine. .[orl to incredse it5 own autonomy. the \orednin,ije cov ,,'rncnt c.nsfrucrd a Southern t{oulo. wrlh ds,irtr"." fr.. i;;;

*i:T

b;.i.,.t; ;;

1&

)AQING YANG

Colonial Korca

ottl

lilt("iunications

165

technicians, linki'rg S{\)ul to Pusan in 1888 As Korea set uP its own telegraph office ncnr thc hP.ncsc one in Pusan and connected them witi couricrs, fff rhe first time JaPan acquired an altemative route of telegraphic linkagc lhrough Korca.lr Durhg thc Sino lapancsc War of 1894-95, advancinS JaPanese troops nJt only took c'vor au maior telegaPh lines in Korea but also constructed military telegraph lines in the south following destruc-

tion of existing lincs in the Peasant uPdsing- After the war, JaPan rctained contr;l ovcr its military lines between Pusan and Seoul, which proved to b an imPortant asset in the war with Russia a decade la1er. Even before formal declaration of that war, iapan rT as able to outmaneuver the Russians by cuttinS off cornmunication between Korea and Russia's stronghold of Port Arthur' Once war broke out, Japanese trooPs again quickty seized control of Korea's telegraph lines. The Russian defeat in the war signaled the end of a period-of relative Korean autonomy, and laPan bcame the dominant Power in the PcninsulaFoi the |apanese, control of the inJormation network in Korea was

a precondition for establishmnt of Political and military domination. The blueprint for postwar Korea adoPted by the ,aPanese cabinet in May 19i04 stipulated pemanent Japanese military and naval bases on ihe penlnsula and JaPanese super'/ision of Korean foreiSn affai$, tovemment finances, and the milway system Japan was also to cont;l Korea's telegraPh, telephone, and Postal systems lf JaPan could not incorporate Korea's communications systems into its own and standardiz; facilities in both countries, it was prePaied to tak over important lines and run them independently ftom the Korean soverr;ent.rr This plan was dul) execuled aftor lhe war' when Ko'

Although the JaPanese made much of thcir mission of developing the Korea; economt the inJomation inlrastructure in colonial Korea vr'as not built Primarily lor business activihs. The telecornmunrcations network in Korea, esPecially lonS-distance telePhones, devetoped largely to meet JaPan s urgent politicat and military desire to consolidate control over the Korean PoPulation'l'l first major challenge to JaPan came in July 1907, when its forceful dissolution of what remaind of the Korean almy ignited a large-scale "political disturbance" across the Peninsula TelegraPh ani telephone lines under JaPanese control were heavily damagcd by Korean guer las, known as the "righteous soldiels." AltbouSh of Jipan quickly repaired them at a cost of !130,000, the Seneral lack its resPonse handicaPPed severely communication efficient means of during the initial staSe of the uPrisinE. One official JaPanese account citcs a campaign in Kangw6n Provine in which Poor telecornmuni cations caused a frequent lack of coordination amont JaPanese troops and Senerated considerable conJusion.l5 SwiJt communication bctween alttocalities in Korca was considered crucial not only for suppressing the Korean rcsistance but also for future policing and seiJrity. Vice Resident-General Sone Arasuke ProPosed a Pemnsulawide police telephone network, which would linl all Police stations, military ba acks, postal branches, and other Sovemment offices, .lllowint them to b reached by telegraPh or telePhone within 24 hours and thus greatly strengthening control of Kofea's extensivc Given the urgent need, this Police telePhone network had to bc as quickly as Possible. In May 1908, JaPan set uP a Policc' lclephone Construction DPartment in Korea, adding telePhonc lines to some existing Postal teleSraPh lines and building new routes (lsewhere. Between June 1908 and SePtember 1910, over 4,000 kilo mcters of new lines spanning some 3,000 kilometers were constructed. A total of 41000 new telephone poles were erected, signifi.rntly alte ng the landscaP of much of the peninsula By the cnd of 1910, over 800 police telephone sets had been installed in securily this Polic telctJosts and post offices at a cost of 1375,000. Although of its the si$ificance from soPhisticated, was far network t,hone (1'mpletion by 1910 cannot be overestimated lT That very yrar, JaPan lorced a heaty of annexation uPon Korea, rendcring it a JaPancsc ( ()lony- Conhol and subsequent expansion of Korea's teleconnnuni, ntn)ns nctwork hnd p.rvod lhc way for anlrcxatn
ronstructed

iea b..ome a Japancse Prolcctorale lkcda Jusabur6, a vetetan bureaucrat in charye of the Tokyo Post and Telegraph Olfice' led a team of ]apanes-e technicians and officiats in taking ovel Korea's .o-*,rrri.ution. facilities. The Koreans fiercely resisted, but Ikeda 13 succeeded after aPplyint considerable corcion ,q' taoan eraduallv assumed control of Korea s lelecornrnunication" syltemiit implemented several reduclions rn teletrdPh rdles btween JaPan and Korea to facilitate its exPanding scoPe-of activities on the'peninsuta. Thsc efforts brought dramatic resultsi traffic increased from a t{ickle of 3,800 telegrams in 1884 to some 100'000 q8 Peri Hnl Dcr v,.Jr a d..adc Ll,r. By lq05 ..mc 41n.000 l'lcFrrm\' counlrir\"' twn llx ,,r -tri.h *,r, i,' J r1",n{-, 1' rv, l"cl Lolw'1n

,I

165

I)AQINGYANC

Coloninl Korm

nt li'l()nrnt

ications

167

To complt'1,, rt\.1{rln,l (,1 K, cJ'5 lele(ommunications syslem' Jafrom ils oan pur, il.rs, ri lln subm.t'in" crblc in lhe Korean Strail lhrl same year' Bv in(lallint new teleVr^

b,"iln.*^"

South Seas lslands Kwanlung

nr, Jrp.rn drd.ticrlly rcduced transmission time On eraoh eouipm, 'i""1,'..',r'i ,i*, ,".k a rele!,rath lo get irom soul {now named 'i to 2 5 hours ra r-piio;o -ir.""',Iolvo droopcd frnm 4 hours 42 minutes i"r.communicalions in Kored' however' did not -'^t-r "i The March First movement in 1919' when Korere'isr.rnce. ".,aicate p..*"f"-"ide dcmonslration5 demandinS indePend' ".lti"""a thal it led to another wave of urt#f f""rn uu *ch

-illion

Terilory
290/6

20%

""." eent erpansion

'urprise ol its police communications ntwork ln addition io new ioLripoine torat JapJn. e authorities with automobiles' thc thc stressed Rentaro' \?inu 'dhanl' Mizuno Mi 'J*"L,#a*,-*""*"r As. districl Imal n"i to in'uff tilephono connections in cvew increased lne chael Robinson reminds rJ', thc colonial Eovernment e{li.iencv and sophislicdtion of its control system even as it sPoke ot "culi,,.ol nute." wtthin two years' timo' over Yl million , ^oaer'ate *rt r**,o *,"na the networl in 3s districl' bclween Pusan and sin,'ii;. The lhree vear\ after March lqlg witnc\sed lhe Sreatest ex.rnsion of new relephone roules in Kored, as ncarly 2'000 kilometers a 40 prLenl incrcace As a rc<ult thp Police lele'omi""t" l' "aa"a, munications network was geatly strngthenod for Enhanced telecommunications soon pioved to be valuable atKang Yi surveillance and control PurPoses ln late 1919, Prince the When temoted to ioin rhe independen.e movemcnt in ShanBhdi KeiJb residerce' hrs lrom prin"e was mi"inB rtre CCi rouna our tlal th; Police througho t Kora and also notified it i-m"Jiut"fy "uUteain i,"r"".n lapan, Manchuria, Siberra' and cven ShanE'rrr!. oii", ""tri.",lo.*aer; by relegraPh' ,aPanese Policemen arrived '*"''i'g in Manchu a iust ui in" e"a""g nuil*uy station across the border the tnin The Pdncc u, it," ror"un'prltt *as disembarking from " *u" tnf"" l*t to f"i;b under heavy scu ty Speedy communication thus sParcd JaPanese autho ties a major Political embarrass_ the March Firsl movemcnl']o menl -i; nol lo;g a(tor telecornmuni' alions in colonial Korea developed ihir i";'"", lies an aPParon the back of Policc communication facilities Herein rule in colonial U. said to characterize JaPan's tftit lo civil ^"y ""i'p".ua"" laicr oPcned d.n;r,l What \lartcd J* d p"licc ncl\aork wac AllhouPh r'sl.ral rl! .

Southern Sakhalin

Korea

37%

12%

Fig.

61 Telcgraphic haflic jn rhe iaPan* emPne, 1935 (sour.e Tishinsh., Dcmu tyoln, DehF lnry:, jdkln ni kdrsrr! c/Ids lTokyo, I93s1, PP 6'F73).

controlled by the colonial Soverrunent and desPite its original intention, this information network also served economic and cultural

purposes. Th influx of JaPanese business as well as agicultural immigrants, together with gradual conomic develoPment and urbani zation in Korca, increased use of eletronic cornmunications The

I"

".".,',.,

"loni.rl E,,vtrnm,nl

'i'ntrrrl

steady advancement in telecornrnunications tchnology in the Iirst dccades of th twcntieth century fu her contributed to this Process. To give just a few examples, in 1923, the army hansfened its wireless facilities to the GGK, and the renamed Keij6 Witele5s added a new dimension to teleSraPhic scruice. The rapid develoPment of wireless technology ushercd in the ate of radio, when station JODK bogan broadcasting in both Japanese and Korean in carly 1927, and .njoyed extraordinary Srowth in subsequent years. Automatic cxrhang telephones were adopted during the 1920s, greatly enhanc,'rg communication capabilities, and long-distance tlePhone seruice lvith Manchuria began in 1924. ln the same yat establishment of a rcduced rate Ior press telegiams contibuted to the flourishinS of ncwspapers.2l ThrouShout the colonial period, Korea was the largest rrripient and originator of tele$aPhic tiaffic with JaPan in the emI'ire (see Fig.6.1).P

16ll

I)AQINC; YANC

Colonial Korci

i1 l

tltcor munication.

169

Tclccommunications and Colonial Modernity

In his study of coloniai Korcn, Andrew Grajdanzev made an interesting obsewation about what may be termed the inJormationintensive behavior of the colonial burcaucracy in Korea. Ihe lapanese govemment in Korea, he pointed out, "is a bureaucracy which is fond of mailing circulars and sendinS telegrams," since "in 1938, 2,206,779 rcle9tams ovt of a total of 11,710,575 were sent rrxlyd, i.e. without charge, becaus they were olficial telegrams,-one-fiJth of the total." In other words, he observed, "a handlul of bureaucrats succeeded in sendinS as many telegrarns as 4,300,000 of the population.",3 This preoccupation with communications on the part of the colonial govenunent is also reflectd in the numerous statistics and other publications on postal and lectronic communications it compiled and issued- Table 6.1, taken from a statistical yearbook compiled by the CGK, was intended to demonstrate colonial Korca's favorable "communication capability" \tstshinryoku) in comparison with other parts of the Japanese empire. A considerable gap appears to have cxisted in the availability oI conrmunications Iacilities btween metropole and peripheral areas in the empire. Cenerally speaking, greater urbanizarion and a larger Japanese population explained the highly developed inJnstructurc
ofJapan proper and the KwantunS Territory. Southem Sakhalin and the South Sa Islands, thinly populated and lackinS transportation but of strategic importanc, relied havily on telecornmunications. Although Korea rivaled Taiwan in the cateSory of the ieleSraph, it laggd in telephone service and usage. In fact, onc the police ntwork was completed in Korea, expansion of telecornmunications infrastructure slowed considerably, due less to a lack of interest than to lack of funds. The colonial government had to abandon its plan to raise public loans for telecorrununicaiions after just one year, and after 1923 telephone users had to shoulder all installation costs. As in Japan proper telephone subscriptions in Korea became a scarce commodity and thercfore a status symbol.?4 How did telecommunications affect the Korean population? ln compa ng statistics on the iapanese and Korcan populations of colonial Korea, Andrew Grajdanzev noted that as of 1938 only one out of every 306 Korean families had a ielephone, compared to one out of every four lapanese families. Therefore, hc concluded, "tele-

phones in Korea arc used almost exclusively by the Japanese.,,rt Grajdanzev was cetainly cotect that th.Japanese population in Ko r(ra enjoyed the benefit of tclecommunications disproportionatety, but it would b misleading to lump all Koreans together. A closer examination of telephone subscriptions during th entire colonial period suggests a somewhat different conclusion (see Fi8. 6.2). Korean subscribers to telephone service increasd steadily from a magcr 5 percent (a18 persons) oI all subscribers in 1910 to nearlv 30 perccnt-ov{-r 17,000-thirty yearq later. Despjte Lhe high coir L,f telephone instaliatior! many considered it indispensab[ to their business.r6In a Iimited way, those Korean subscribcrs were as privileged as the other 70 percent-some 40,000 Japanese-comparcd to the overwhclming majority of their Illow Koreans. The fate of the Korean-lantuage telegram may also yield clues as to how Koreans rclated to telecommunications (see Fig. 6.3). When Japan took over Korea's telecornmunication administration in 1905, it irnmediately abolished ChineseJanguage relegram service and in, stituted lapaneselanguage srvice for all Korea. Both han'g l and EuropeanJanguage sewices continued, but the fomr was largly conJined to domestic service. Th share of iar'giil telegrams in the overall number of tlegrams sent and rcceived in Korea betwen 1905 and 1940 reveals an interesting pattern. The percentage as well as thc number of ft{n?ni telegams increased steadily for the first fifteen years after 1905, probably due to impmvcd communications facilities and selvices and the srandardization of na",8;l teleSrams. The pivotal year of l9l9 registered an all-rime high in ftan,g rcle, gram\ <eni and received in Korea. tthcther or nor thir phen;m.non was connected to the outburst of independence demonstrations, it was probably related to the Srowing activism of rhe educated Ko_ rcan elite. The subsequent decline, on rhe other hand, rcflected Ja_ pan's policy of cultural assimilatio& especia y the increascd use of thc Japanese lanSuage. The percentate of teteSrams in /,an 8,i/ nevar rccovered, and its absolute numbr stayed largely unchanged de_ spiie a steady rise in use of the releSraph by Koreans. Following the forced adoption of Japanese names and the closing of rhe KoreanIanguage press, id, 8tl tele$ams werc finally discontinued in 1941, .rfter a similar sharp reduction in Westernlanguage services in Ko
In justifying the pending abolirion of,mn?nt tclcgram scrvicc,

th.

45,000
40,000 35,000

.e9

pbR:sFrRifrilH3e$ F.{d-r
6i <t

30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 r 0,000 5,000

3.3 ta li

$p'eg.-P.fiQ4$'-3
tts5$F5h$HEfr.pxng {jd

9911199399191939999
Year

Fig. 5.2 Tlephone subkriptioN in (orea, 1905-41 (Sode: Taehan shtnba, Chdn'8i t'oiSsin sh p'rtsinaydn-sn Isaoil, t l,p.592J.

hinSuk.h'ae'

RSSAE$RM$EREsRA
i< i{

.i

3500000

.t
F
5 'i

FH* 5&

ri

'i

p$Hn

s--9

g.;3

F9
EH

3000000 2500000 2000000

r9

-r-

Han,sit

iE d, .l E! 93

r500000
1000000 500000

FARsERseCEShS.eE 6 oo- 6oneFaN$ .i di.j

Ri

EE

5'
EV
3.9
Fi8. 6

?,E:EEig,E

sg: risBgEg; cE i *.s *i st rE e$?f p-: g s ! e6.E d E-oSgo

EE

3 Telegiatu

*nt

in Korca,19ol 4r (Source: Sour.e Taehd

1%61, pp. ss1-52).

hin'gul ch'a*hin-

b!, chdt'Ei t'ongsin sip p'rlsitty,i4-sa lseoul,

9g

B:.;

IE!Ig$i39gs*!EE

9i

172

I)AQINGYANG

Colonial Korca a

dTelecoftnlunications

'173

many reaCCK conclu<t'Ll lrom n survry lhat 'although there are the PoPulalzahon sons for lhr .lcclin, ;'t u\dgc ol Korean lelegrams' transactions are in business lies clo\e rsingly incn r^a i""rt"'. "i Phenomenon' l*'i.oon"",."^ ,n*.imitation often is an uneven and an increasing business' of modern i;;;;"j-;," thc l.rnsu.rg(' iL rhu5. a'similation indu'ed bv mode'"ity ";d *casures and iustilied them in the eves of the

Ior the Japanese population and the urban Korean elite. Even thouth such Korcans were only a small fraction of ihe ntire Korean PoPu_ latior! their incorporation into a JaPancs-dominated modem information network could not but affect the development of Korean capitalism and culture during the colonial Piod and thereafter.

;-,i;;;.ia;;"". il.;il;.;;.t'" administrators'

,apanese '

Telecommunications and ImPedal Integration

served as the main engine Ior telecommunications expansion in colonial Korea dudng ihe first two de_ cades oI Japanese occupatio& imPelial integration assumed that role during the 1930s. As the world economy lormed into increasingly autarkic hadint blocs following the Creat DePression, JaPan's leaderc not only felt the urgent need to strengthen imPerial bonds with the colonies but also considered JaPan amply iustiJied in seeking a self-sufficient economic sPhere in greater Asia 33 By "collapsing space and time," telecommunications Promised to expedite the process of econornic integration. The Korea-JaPan tele_ phone comection achieved in 1933, describd at the begiiming of this chapter, was a major steP in this dircction and also marked the increased emphasis on Japan s own technologies. PreParation for the connection was already under way in 1928, but technical difficulties as well as funding problems in Japan and Korea slowed pfogress. When the German lilm Siemens und Halske succeeded in using submarine relgraph cable foi telephone transmission, ,aPan showed particular interest and requested technical assistance. Politely tumed down, Japans Ministry of Communications (MOC) mobilized its own technical strength and er isted the coopration of the Private firm Nippon Electric Company (NEC), in an all-out effort to develop long-distance telephone transmission technology on its own. In May 1931, a 8loup oI MOC technicians arived in Pusan for an extended experiment to render the etisting telegaph cables capable of speech tmnsmission between Japan and Korea. The Manchurian Incident that took place in the midst of the experunent added new urtency as well as di(iculty to the project. Since all cable ci(uits wre fully utilized during the day fot telegram transmissions, those technicians had to conduct their experiments at ni8ht. A year elaPsed bfore they succeeded llt installing a carrier telePhone system on existrng tclegraph cables. In early 1933, telePhone communication via sub_ marine cables betwecn Japan and continental Asia became Possible for the first timc.x

^ln .ear.d Kordn use was even more remdrkablc dven JaPdn's ,t* """tr"f of the commurucations neworl in Korea tkoughout the adn$nistration of *.i"a or,n"'gn in the 1920s iaito Maioto adoPted legis'dtion to "equalize" f.r"r.t and lapanese opPorlunities in Public service' stahshcs ror

If intemal political control

;"'.;i;;;i ::r";;';#;i

a ii.* i"rait* ifri.* i" the communications bureaucracy indicate of the JaPanese' who occuPied over 70 :;;;;;';;";;**ce ,li ti"'r".* in the cornm;nications Bureau The bias wa' ".li""i :;;;;;""r J.'.".."d in the caleSory of Permdnent emPlovees'

witi the eYceptron Darlicularlv :mong higher-ranking civil srvants' When incieasing numbers of Japanese emsewices were Eansferred else\/here industries in the late le30s' demand for and the ccK beratedrv undertook varito trai; Koreans still' hiSh-ranldnt Positions.redid ihe first Koir"t"ia i"t*& .f.*a to Koreans' and onlv in 1935 to 63 JaPanese above of hannin (compJred ,.r" rr."l8"ri" ,t'" i*3, onlv si\ Kore;ns had Progressed.bvond o. irt,t ". lo 93 JaPanes' and no Korean reached the ii'i. 'it'Jr". ranLr" This practice seems lo deviate somewhat r one r recruitment pattem in late colonial Korea in" ol """"t excrus'ion or Ko'ea"s is that the secrecv ,t a.rnmunications Bureau Direclor Yamada eme5pecially ctitical for counterinlelliSence Purposes'

Iil".,il""i"*'"*t. ;i";;;. i,i;;.;;"nrcation :."n*a,; ;i;;;;ins ;J;;;;;;;;;; fted;

;;;;;;t ** ti" 'Jrl ..1- --or*a i"i^i

lL

illl:il:;;;;;;;;
.rrf"

i"--""."i"^t, ;;;;;, *"' .*" ired pproPria te su Pervisionrl I""-"ii.-"1."""t '^;;;i;;; ;;..d"*cations in cotoniat Korea was simultane_.i""pp*ssion
a

;;:"to

"'i*f ;;'"""hrt;J ;l;";";; t;';;"ai ;l;;*ion i#:#;;;"i )nirt from the immensely poPuur rddio broadcasting after l9'' :fi;i::; ;;;;;;;r Jr pulri.. u"a Private inreraction Primarirv

and of develoPment' since both. wre r) ;.ttrol Although more tesedrch is needed to Korean socletv' it is possible to condude 'n of telecommunication services in Korea

174

I)AQING YANG

Colonial Kores atld l clccontnunications

175

an exPanded telecomEvents on thc contincnt soon ne'essitated and economic PurPoses' political' rn,rr,ications netw.,rt t,)r military, in 1932' laPan s line of naor vo"'t'ut."o

Japan >

rciea

-'Korc.

oii"r'ii" "tt"oiot''"""t vil"t .'"t"nctcd ?"""t i"f""."

> Japan

to the Manchukuo-soviet border' and io srrenBthen militdry facilities in the- north ii:'"';;';".;;; and Mantnu_ Meanwhile, wiih;fforts under way lo integrate JaPan lr (s irto a "lapan-Manchukuo eronomic bloc"' communicahon v 'i, ilian il"t**Tl"'o"l' ""a the conlinent became d toP Pr;ority for.ci telePnone cross-strarl of leaders as well Having achieved the success of technological devel:-;;;,t ", il,IoJ#'ied as a chief agent teiecommunicatron expansion rkouthout the ;il;;]";;;""; cable r" G:+, MOC drafled plans for a new long-dislance in "-"t*. Mukden rrom rokvo thro'rth Kored to reach ;;:l;;"i;;;; and cad! was coirsiaerea a miritdry rink In adI -",ii' *ticv, there would be no tact of funds 'i and betwen laPan the'speciat relaiionshiP i'acr engineer exPlained' a new Japanu tiuaing iir".rrrr'., ^^ir".lr.i""."uf" "t -."fd iacilitate frlrtler contjnental exPansion lt i""ry to connect with the PtosPerous regions along throuth Man' rh. Yanetze River in central China over a land link ln submarine cdble from JaPan to shanshai ;:'t; ';;;t;i";";* would help connct JaPan with EuroP' ir,'" neF was completing a trans-sibe an cable cable would be both a
.

-1-.------o--

Korca > Manchukuo

Uan.rrutuo > Korca

100,000

50,000

$3
Y.ar
Fig. 6.4 Telphone t af{ic (numtsr of c.lls) betw@n

il:;;i;.. ;i;.; ii; .i*i*u ;i#";.;;ilg' *."ii *i"*

(oea

and JaPe and

Man'huluo,

19i2-41 (sour.e: Te'shiBhd, DeMukyoku, D?nnl

"'Ilar

lrolvo,1941], P 393)

Telecornmunication Bureau Pointed out, due to the limited number of radio frequencies, wireless cornmunication could no longer meet the rcquirements of a Sreater communicahons network in East Asia

l'jit'"-. i"iJ.Je li."^ii" i"J [t."

il;;;'.;;

In view of its stnteSic imPotance, the JaPan_Manchukuo route alone, he told the Diet, could conceivably require over hundreds of
channels. Thut the limited wireless Irequencies available to JaPan would be inadequate and had to be rserved rnainly for cornmunication with more distant forcitn countries in EuroPe or the Americas. Moreover, the need for secrcy had bcome Particularly acute' as military, political, and diplomatic communications among JaPan, Manchukuo, and China, now bound in a sPecial relationshiP, rcquired tightened anti-esPionage masules. Here cable enjoyed a decided advantage over wircless, whose messages could easily be intercepted and deciphered. Finally, desPite improvements in wteless technology, the problem of atmosPheric interfelence with wireless conrmunications prsisted, A cable communications network Provided not only tithter security but also the caPacity to handle th voluminous traffic betlveen laPan and its sPhere of inlluence in ad_ tacent areas. AlthouSh conshuction costs were hiSher, an underground cable would be more permanent, and therefole more apPro_ priate, forJapan's lasting impedal enterPrise rZ

il""ri. iiJr'".i, ili"pan-Ko'ea-i4a"cli"kuo s l'i.hw,v ""il; and a b\.wav

s .able nerworl in East Asia' ba5d on JaPan inteF in "r.ai-".",i. i*t'".r.gy," rePresented a majorrhifl Japan's oecaues natloial teletommunications Po'icy During the Prevro'rs japan had praced its hoPes for telecommumcation in the emergmg w needed to .,^-i."a to ,"au." Uottt construrtion costs and the effortsof the nonil""i'. t"ii.t "-n. rn foreign counlries Developmenl transmisterePhone lons-disrance i;H."i -i- :;; :"J;. tstem ior and other MoC technician5 in taPan Sr'i"voshi .i^" over wireless "-ri".r" r"l-Ot, ,if ,.itlie balance in tavor of cable ffi" "' t".t*ti" requirel"' ,-""nr., were Japan's new emPire'building iJ*oriaut"a its Political and militdry a sharp increase in telecomnunica' esi". :;;;;i;; "oninent' (see Fig 6 r1 As the director or Moc's

sre*'"#i""TlilJ#';ii.il

-l'l'l l" l#h;"irv

l1:=J;;;;;. ";;'";i"J

176

DAQINGYANG

telephonc cablc lhrking )aPan and the continent Proved not only shategically indisPensable but also highly PoPular. AJter tele-

NIANC]I{{TK[JO
o

phone service bcgan in l93J between Japan and Korea, demand soon ;utstripped capa;ily. Durint the first ten days after servi(e began on day ;anuary15, an avcrage of close to a hundred telephone calls Per cirthe sin8le reachint nearly and btlveen Korea placed was JaPart telephone some 30 120 Later, of daily capacity cuifs maximum

calls per day were exchanged between JaPan and Manchukuo ini\o tially, but the nurnber soared to about 130 in less than two years Her;, the potitical-mililary concems of emPire-building and businesys interest in what were called "nutrition lines"-Profit-generating rcutes - coincided. -Construction of the JaPan-Korea-Manchukuo cable b8an in the early winter oI1935 in Manchukuo and in November 1936 in Korea MC provided not orily much of the technical expertise but also over Yt million oI the total !11 million requked in Korea alone. Morc than halJ a rrillion men, the majority Korear! were mobilized Ahead of schedule in SePtember 1939, construction of the m0 kilometers of cable in Korea, bu ed one metel underSrcund along the rnain north-south highway, with twenty relay stations en route, was com_ pleted.ao The cable from Tokyo to Mukden via Keii6 was some 2,600 tlometeis in len$h, the longest underground telePhone cable in the world at that 6m; (see MaP 6,1). The some ylo million Poured into the project siSniJicantly strengihened communications among the *uee areas.{ Japan-Manchukuo telePhone capacity increased by 24

lapafi

Sc6

otRtsA

Vcllow Sca Pactfrc

@ccaa

channels and Japan-Korea by 10 with telex and facsimile sewices as c well, using equipment developed entirely by JaPan With anotheitechnological victory in sighL conlident technocftts in the MOC in Tokyo drew uP Plans for unified control of the soonto-becompletd lonS-distance telecorrmunications network in East Asia. Not iurprisingly, they sought to iustify such an unPrecedented extension of iuthority largely by emPhasizing the technological im-

O cilt

Map 6.1 Th hpan-Ko@-Manchuleo longdisi2nce cable network (so!rc: Tebhin, sh6, Komukyoku, Ni.t':Mdn rna*u denua thists, ekki k ikaku kny6 Fokyo,193Zl).

Derative.o

ln conhast to the open-wire line of the Meiii Period,

i\/oC report declared, non-loaded cables were a uniquely JaPanse technology, a step ahead of the advanced countries in the West, thus requirinj maintenance by knowledgeable technicians to Prevent in-

terrupti;ns. The frequenay of such accidenls on long-distance cables, acco;ding to MOC'S own lests, increased in ProPortion to the square of the disiance. MOC considred cunent maintenance levels far from

I78

I)AQINC YANG

Coloniol Korca

ad

l.leconnunicalions

179

soon lo \officicnl for J r.'bl( slr"l'hinB from Tokyo lo Mukden {and that ali and it was necessary iil"ir'"".i".',, .,o',"i. st.i"r'"'t' rorrow a sintre chain or corn'nand under by add'^illt Atso, further savinSs could be exPected I'jli.iT" -it*"..rrwav, news' broadcast relay' and aero*utical "r:r.t\ i;;;i',.t* puii;.. rn" uoc '"p"'t alcu:d th:ttecruucdr n,'rDos oi futurc East As;an telecornmuocatons' ',i"h". rl^i*"t","*"te ol the JaPan-Korea-Manchukuo cable cir)iil'" "i^"in-L."o*ted direcrlv to rhe Moc only under its uniro Moc' could rhe lons-distance circuits of "."J,ii*o;iu rurrirl ,r'I funchon of our imPortant Mriorul Policy s artery" and rorcerr'rrrv advance laPdn e .r"*. u,ii, it{ot utiott policy in Last Asia

-:tii;;;';t.l:J;;

;:ff;;il

""""*'..'

illt ;il';#i,:#;;

'"l:il;i;;;."dons

Colonial Autonomy and Impedal lntegration

a narArd,ino lhat the history of telecornmuni(ations is not simPly LY'","" *.r"n"i of techni'al effi'iencies' communications the instrusuggests shiJring the focus from *t"il'" e";"ring g'oups PerPtuarrv netotiate whatever ;Presentation' and knowredge withhistory the illumindtes persPctive :-:-;; ,." .",itatle " ms new cabre laPan's rong-aistance ;"#";;;;-;;;;-n"nchutuo ePochan simPly not was imDerial telecommunications networx achievemenl; it al5o exacerbated Political -lil^-,".*"G*t in Moc the empire As JaPanese technotrars :::'"*.;;;""ft* technothe or liu#;"a -n"oi the imDact #;H";;t;;?;'t* ";"diated arrected bv the new imperiil asenda' #;.i:;;;;;^ i-,i"" ul'".i"t ."t'ia" *'e home istands as well

i"ti" lii],liliJ* n"-;;i"i.;;;;;;i. ;1;J ;;;;t";'

"*;'fi;;;;'";;;;;"i':."1":l-:1 j55ii";li*-i;i:#*il1 peninsula corncro

cable network into the

The new overall Plans i" ,rt" r"r;, '"T"i oir." "*pitl'the earlv 1030s neiessarily meant redefining L-'"-*"i""r".i" as rorea Aiter Minami liro arrived in Korea of outbreak th "r"J..i'iit36 and Particuldrlv f;llowing l'"ilt*"-.."'"ii" "forward War in 1937, the idea of Korea as the "*::;':;;..."

jaPan envisioned Jor

ili.ili*

*l'#t",ffi

,ti".i*",l.t

t'";'il' zenshin heitan kichi) sa\ned 'Jntin*i" "" a JaP"nese Professor at Keii6lmPe"" o"s*'tiTdkeo'

"',ii^""'lit'" ".a -"ior

given its cxPonent of the idea' erPlained'

political stability, level of industrialization, and abundant cheap energy and labor, Korea was the ideal supply base for Japan s further continental operations, be it war against the Soviet Union or expansion into China. In fact, Korea would become the "second atcni [homeland]," he prcdicted, and in case of conflict with the United States, lapan could entrust its continental enterprise to Korea and devote itself to troubles in the Pacific.G Such visions also guided those in the colonial goverunent. Domoto Tatsuo, a Japanese official in GGK, took pains to dehneate the va ous interprctations of the "continental base" theory, adding thaL as Koreans incrcasingly became involved in Manchukuo, China, and Imer Mongolia, Japan's continental expansion would increasingly become a ioint JapaneseKorean enterprise.aT This implied that, after more than two decades of Japanese rule, colonial Korea had moved closer to becoming a core area in an ever-expanding Japanes impe um in Asia. A former commander of the Kwantung Army, Govemor-General Minami adopted a series of measures aimed at strengthening ties with Manchuria under the slogan "Korea and Manchuda as one" (Man-Sen ichi'11yd).Si^ce colonial Korea was aspiring to project its influence beyond its borders, it must first overcome obstacles of space and time by improving means of communication and hansportation. In a meeting behareen Minami and Kwantunt Army leaders, it was decided to construct fourteen bndSes across border rivers t'etween the two areas. Korea relinquished control of telecommunications facilities in the prcdominantly Korean-populated Kanto 0iandao) ara across the border in Manchuria to the new Manchurian Teletraph and Telephone Company (MTT) in retum lor rate cuts between Kantd and Korea. Moreovet conJerences Ior milway coordination with Manchukuo and North China were held.s In addition to Manchukuo, Nodh Chifla was another promising economic ftontier for Korea. Although still cornmanding a dominant position, Japan's share in Korea's extemal trade began to declne somewhat in the late 1930s. On the other hand, Manchukuo and Japanese-occupied areas in China became inceasingly important partners, jointly claiming 83.6 percent in 1938 and 88.2 prcent in 1939 of Korea's trade with the East Asia region outside Japan's Iormal empirc.re The Koran population in China proper increased almost eightlold within Iive years aftet 1937,n The Korean Tmde Association (KTA) boldly predicted that Korea would "take the

180

I)AQINCYANC

Coloniol Korcq at l

'Iclccomfiufiications

181

initiative" in tho North China trade, desPite Possible comPetition from goods produccd in Japan and Manchukuo Direct sea routes frcm iorcan-ports to North China were established. and the imPact of Korea's erowinq tr.rdc with North China on telecommunications was noted in Kor;d. A l'.TA iournal emphasized that the "caPitalisl world economv" was characterized by the intemational fluctuation of commodity pdces, exchange rates, and the stock market' which made efficient communication essential for market exPansion The
links associahon stressed the urgent need for direct communication 5l between North China and Korea as well as low rates Telecommunications became an incrasingly imPortant Priority fo! the colonial qovernment due to industrialization at home and

trade a.tiviw ab;oad At the 1936 Conjerence on Korean Industtial JaPan laand Economic Policy, business leaders from Korea and s': Erpanservice mented hieh leleqram rates and scarce telephone .lnn oI telC"commi..icahons in Korea be(ame a maior agenda at the the conJercnce convened by the GGK in SePtember 1938 to coPe with new conditions in East Asia after outbreak of the Sino-JaPanese War' The colonral government admitted that inadequate telecoruNnication facilihes in Korea were causint numerous delays and Poor oI srvice. The conlerence recorffnended a wide rante oI exPansions and telePhone telecommunication facilitiesr extension of telegraPh of Iines, conversion of Lrare wiles to more secure cables, adoPtion of sPcial equiPment, and imProvement high-speed telegraphic "servLes aviation, weather forecasting, and sluPfoi coinmunicatiott Dinp. tr the meantime, control over alt forms of commu^ication by inein, of.".sotsftip and radio inlelli8ence Salhering was to be strenethened. G;ven radio's great role in educatinS the PeoPle' unifvine"opinion, and stabilizintthe Public order, the CCK pointed out' redroaicast facilities must b gteatly exPanded, and public radio Soviet the to broadcast ceiverc and high-power radio stations to to ii't Lt" -i h Soviet broadcasts to Asia must be estabuJott the ""i lished.$ In resPonse to the growing business concems voiced at between conference, the GGK soon eitablished radiotelePhonic linl(s and Tianiin' Beijing, and in Korea Keiio and P'y6ngyang, Pusan, Shanehai in China in 1939. Al"though the "second nairhi" ProPosition, calling for industriali' "Korea as well as imPrial exPansion beyond it as a "forzation of ward basc," qenerated much e;thusiasm among lhe IaPane5 in Korca, it mct iv;ttr slept;cism out5ide thc Pcninsuld For in\tancc'

questions arose in the Japanese Diet as to the disruptive consequences of an aggressively expanding Korea on existing national boundaries.s The KwanhrnS Army, on the other hand, averred that the primary purpose of a "Iorward base on the continent" was to shen#hen military preparations in Manchukuo.s Even those in Korea realized that Korea mitht assume rcles other than simply being a "forward base." Given its unique geographic locatioD as Professor Suzuki pointed out, Korea itself could also serve as a vital strategic linl between insular Japan-"the center of leadership" - and the vast continent of Asia-the sub(egions in the Greater East Asian economic zone. By the late 1930s, th peninsula itself supported the impotant Pusan-Keijduiju-Mulden Gilway trunk line. The oceans on both sides of the peninsula leaturcd sealanes linking Japan with Manchukuo and China, effectively tuming both the Japan Sea and the Yellow Sea into "Japanese lakes." In short, Korea must also bcome the "route to the continent" (laiflft, dfo).56 The "route" theory semed to coincide with the role of "organic linl" assigned to Korea in MOC'S discussions about the new cable network. Therefore, considerable ambituity, if not disagreement, emerged over the primary role oI colonial Korea in the new empire. By coining the phrase "Korea as lhe hanamidi and, Manchuria as the stage,"

thus comparing Korea to the runway in the kabuki theater that serves as a secondary but independent state, Govemor-General Minami did not clarify the matter.57 As we shall see, how to make Korea function smoothly as a "route to the continent" was no simple question. ln {act, Japan s attempt to establish an empire-wide telecommunications network in the late 1930s made it clear that impe al integration would not be attained as asify as technical experts in
Tokyo had hoped.

Telecommunications and Colonial Autonomy

During the months bfore conskuction of the Japan-Korea-Manchukuo cable began, MOC officials negotiated a temporary understanding with GGK that allowed MOC engineers into Korea for construction work and the use of MOC equipment. Soon tterwardt MOC beSan making aEangements for long.term maintenance of the cable network and proposed stationing MOC engineers on a permanent basis inside Korea. In early October 1935, shortly aJter construction began, MOC engineer Matsumae Shigeyoshi accompanied

182

I)

QINCYANC

Colonkt Korca

Tetecontnunications

183

the chief of tho orwly crcated JaPan-Manchukuo TelePhone Construction Section on .r visit to Koija to discuss the matter with GGK officials. InterestinSly, Malsumae's repeated allusions to unilied control of lonS-distancc nctwork in advanced countries in the West bolstered his iall Ior a unified system of control and maintenance of the highly technical non-loaded cable network Teclurology t'ecame s an unwittint ally of MOC hegcmony The MOC plan for unified (rcad: cenEalized) control over this telecommunicitions system might have made Perfect sense from Tokyo's pEPective, but Proved unaccePtable to the GGK. Arguably the mostimportant colony in the JaPanese empire, Korca had legally enjoyed virtual autonomy, since its governol-geneml in theory reoorted directlv to the emperor.e Previous telecommunications issues 'lnvotving theiome islands and the cotonv had been re\olved by biIateral agreements btween Sovernment agencies. This Proved impossible with the MOC ProPosal: although the colonial adminishation in Korea welcomed the new network in Korea, since it would boost its own telecommunications infrastructure, it made no secret of its disapproval of MOC contrcl. Not Persuaded by MOC'S iustilications, GGK proposed that uniJied maintenance must filst be imnlemented in ihe home islands and Manchukuo before being erieruled to Ko.ea. This was a slumblins block for MOC, since the Kwantung Army had earlier rejected MOCS Plan of unified control and Drop;sed the new MTT be mdde responsjble lor maintenance' Thus a.rring their meetints with GGK officials, MOC bureaucrals had to downplay the siSniJicane of the Portion of the cable in Manchukuo, since Kwantung Army opPosition made it impossible to carry out their Plans in Manchukuo. In response to GGK insistence that Korea be allowed to attemPt its own maintenance, Matsumae retorted that this would be like two good neiShbors erecting hiSh walls.s Tension consequently mounted between the MOC, which, largely on technical grounds, demanded cenhalized control and mai.rtinance of the new cable, and the GGK Cornmunications Bu_ reau, which saw this as an intrusion. ln the end, MoC presented to GGK a carefully worded memorandum that noted the new cable was just "passing through Korea and would in no way affect the jurisdiction of the CGK." To make the deal more Palatable, MOC Promised to lase surPlus circuits to rcK at favomble ntes-a major enticement, given the colonial 8ovemment's limited funds. The GGK Bureau of Communications

War and moved to a different alena. By the end oI the 1930s ]apan had acquired rhe technological ca_ pacity to link all telecommunications lacilities into one si+le ner work in East Asia, promising imperial iniegration under To-'kyo. In

administrative iuiisdicriorr which has alwavs ben feared lhere."d The coloni.l bueaucracy suspe.led that if ir gave in on teleconunurucattons, other areas under their jurisdiction, such as aviation and insurance, would be next. As a shorttem solution. MOC had to secure an imFriat ordinance in t938 ro nuke limired MOC oFrations in Korea legal.6 As a more fundamental solution, however, the ministry had to modify its strateSy by using a semipd_ vate company, the Intemational Telecommunicatiom Co"po.utiorl for construrtion and maintenance outside rapan proper. The problemol conflicting interests coula noi beresolved simply . by removint a clEracter on a sign, however. The tug-of_war over ih! status of Korea within the empfue continued till the ;ve of the pacific

relented, with the proviso that maintenance work inside Korea b entrusted to a private company.6t The conllict between MOC and the colonial administration in Ko_ rea involved more than quibblint amont petty bureaucmts. In a pri, vate meetin& Ono Rokuichi, superintendent_general in Korea, expressed uneasiness at the prospct that if allowed into Korea, MOC employees would be in direct contact with local administrations as well as ordinary people.6, Disagrment ovet the cohmunications network even,affected the tovemor-general himself. On an inspec_ tion tour near Kaes6ng, Minami tir6 was apparently disturbed t; see Minisry of Comnunications (TeishinshO) on signs for the Japan_ Korea-Manchukuo cable then under construction. yamada Tada_ tsugu, chief of the GGK Communications Bureau, proposed simply changiry "ministry" to "bureau.,, When a MOC engineer in 'ihe entourage objected, asserting that the cable belonged to the Ministry oJ Communications in Tokyo Minami was enragdd. ,,Korea is under the jurisdiction of the Sovemor-generat directly ippointed by the em_ percr. What autho ty on earth does ihe Minister of Conmunications have to build facilities herc?" ln the end, as a complomise, the word "ministry" was dropped from all signs, and consEuction proceeded. Only the ambiguous terrn "communications,, rcrrained.6l Why was GGK so recalcitrant on such a seemingly Eivial matter? As one MOC bureaucrat bluntly stated to hjs colleagues in Tokyo, "extension of MOC autho ty to Korea is a probbmk invasion of

the

184
.edliw, howt v( t,

I)AQINGYANC

Colonhl Korea andTelet:onr

unicalions

185

i.?'ii'rlo".'.

'-i.lna' to underm[ chukuo, and China thrcatcncd r'r'iritic\ tor rhe Pubric' miritary'

i.",

ltt

sewY'Pnr'rl" ' rPcralion of telecommunication

it*Lroru"'

or

<"f"""11ffi#:: y?l; P"!:::llll-

::il;;i. i;;;;;'.',

::it*;l*::'f :::il:["'[:lT#:i*"^f$ffi :"':';l"fi ; ;;'ui-r"" n'on

iru;:':?;;'
lj'*J,,v.r" ..**"a "".r"tio".. :5;il;;; ;;li

ii""i."-*^,* " lt"i'"t"i i i."?*1it ill-'.i-*"*,ti"i.

r"

ii';::ffi;iffi;;;'in"wrv _'-'
^
^r^hlFm

on lelecnmmunication matters l.*r",ii"i*""ti-al tieatiesKorea as well as other colorual adl.i"i*l"o* ""Jut "olomes' of "JaPanese n"a signed under the umbrella cateSory -*.ii"ii,j* .r'"tt" i'r klecommurucahons"' essentially delegating

terecommurucations conrerof all to dcvelop the necessary coordination JaPdr' rePLesennnt altt'"rgt almost all the delegates "sino-JaPanese ioint-venture" telecommurucd(onsensus "; c*na and Manchukuo were laPanese' Asian Easl after much deliberation was an in tate 1940 to ensure smooth com"tuy r'"cidrafted 6 e*puna"a **ere or inlruence the MOC' arose' deain wth r'otea Pitled against

rn-

]'1"".i"r'i^ i."ili..l"' '" "l'aoc. At the second East Asian Telecommuruca' 'r." in october t940'. Korea's colonial blueducrats ex"ai* l i**""*

policy," with grave consequences. As a practical matter, non of the institutional adjustments required could be accomplished within the sho time available before the new Telecommunications Pact took effect on April 1.63 Despite these efforts to persuade the CGK MOC'S worst nighr mare came true at the general conlerenc in January 1941. Korea's reprsentative, alter consulting with Keija, refused to sign the pact. MOC officials responded by calling Korea's refusal to participate as a member of the imperial government "suspicious." lt was a major embarrassment to MOC that the primary obstacle to unity in East Asian telecommunications should be lapan's own colonial government in Korea. To rescue the pact, MOC had to accede to the GGK'S demand by entering into a separate agreement with Korea that promised to tleat Korea as an independent entity in Fast Asian telecoffmunications matters.@ Clearlt the GGKS obstinacy was not just for theatrical effect. Shortly after this episode, a Japanese official from the GCK Bureau of Communications iustiJied its action to his counterparts frcm other areas in the empire:

rhis Practice and insisred lilJ*.,, ao*tor'ction with Asian signatory in the Proposed EasL L";;;-"^ indePendent bv represented been had korea llt?.'"#J."i."; pact Although from official an l;;:;':;^.". intemalioml treaties' exPlained rore in the East Asian terecomil';;. ;|,;il; ";;;e Prominent china and Manl",,,lr"J"ii.* ."*.* now that rhe Pact included in dealing :i;il;:'6"; ;"; ^" toins to Ioseits relatve autonomv with such areas in the new imPerium " -'rtt6t'"il""fit" be*atter differently )n a memo sent to Korea for signing the Pacl' it desrribe-d a fo.e t" tan,rury ff+f conlerence and Ko-rea" as the "core ol East :ii.^.i""t

on being

In Korea, we must pay cloe attention to goveming an alien PoPle (! in more ways than can be imgined in ]apan proper. We must 'rir?or!) measurs appropnate lor the situation. Things not in accoradopt special
dance with this principle, even if lhey are extremely ntional and Prfecdy leSitimate, are considered inappropriate and even illegitimate in Korca. We

public senants in KoEa camot forget even for a ridnute this principle of govening an alien people.To Statements like ttus seemed incongruous with, iI not contradictory to, the official policy of "Japan and Korea as a single body"

;ifi i;;;*" i. llijinll'i

in dealings

"iu"t illl)"i"".Ji.'*

^i', il68*."'"J'i""'*'h:'-qig".T:"ii'hi:fi ;:.'T,111 with Manchuria and ctuna

til

t"tween Japan axi' o'f a broader Fast Asia in cooPeraton "e china Ultimarelv ttris ctcl would include and sPhere the Grearer East isian co-ProsPeritv

(naisen ittai) n lorce since the late 1930s. That resistance to the total eradication of a separate Korean identity would come from the colonial burcaucmcy itself may be ironic but not inconceivable.Tl Complete obliteration of the diJferences between Korea and Japan would inevitably jeopardize the separate sphere of authodty the Japanes bureaucracy in Korea enioyed. This tendency toward autonomy had been at least in part reinJorced by the relative stability in per5onnel in the GGK bureaucracy. Although occasional lateral transfe$ to

(enlral Sovernment in external Korea's independence lrom the "verMoc impried' wourd not onrv ab(obut arrcr rhc "rund''monrars or narionar

i;;H;;;;i;';ancrs' ;T::':;:#;;"'*nt

other colonies or even Japan prolxr were possible -GK Communications Bureau Director Yamada Tadatsugu himself had served in the Kwantung Territorics - thos serving in the rcK hnded to have

grown up and stryod in Korea 7, Thc lack of personnel tran-sfcrs

fl

186

)^QtNc YANG

Colo iel Kon\

Ml trlrcotnnnnicatiorls

1,87

could only rcinn'rco tho growth of a separate identity for the Japanese servinS in Koren vis'i-vis Japanese in ,apan. In this context, even relativoly mundanc issues such as different pay scales might bacome a sourcc of friction. ReferrinS to the prospct of MOC oprating inside Korra, a GGK official hinted that its own employees would be displcased to work side by side with MOC people since the latter's chances for promotion were better. As a bureaucrat, he was voicinS a real albeit limited concem. Despite high-sounding rhetoric, thc governmcnts in both Tokyo and in Kijo were often dominated by bureaucratic self-interest.

phy in generating the ground ronditions for urban imperialism in

the late ninetecnth century, James Carey has noted that the cable and teleSraph, in addition to sea powcr, turned Westem colonialism into imperialism. a system in which the center of an empirc could dictate, ftther than respond, to the mar8in.7r Thc redefinition of colonial Ko rea is an example o{ such a tmnsition: colonialism, in which power and authority rested with the domestic govemor, tcame impc alism, in which power and authority were absorbd by the impe al

Conclusion
Essentially, this chapter has explored two paradoxes. The first reflects the character of Japan's colonial policy in Korea. Introduced and expanded primarily as a modem means of colonial control, thc telegraph and telephone under Japanese rule not only served to strengthen the colonial adminishation but also provided new op portunities, however limited and unevnly distributed, to the native population. Few would deny that it was under Japanese rule that the telegraph and telephone first gained widespread use in Korea. The incoryoration of Korea into a Japan-dominated telecorununications network helped create a pcculiar kind of modernity that can bst be called "colonial." Although Koreans in incrcasing number could and did send telegrams, for example, the relative decline of KoreanlanguaSe telegrams rcveals that colo al assirnilation under the Japanese was succeeding exactly because it included not just coercion but The second paradox arises partly from the nature of a communications network itself. Japan s new East Asian telecorrmunications network was a double-ed8ed sword. Promising to collapse space and time within the imperium, it also threatened to upset the uneasy balance between the imperial center and the colonial periphery.

Although in tmnsportation and other arcas coordination between Tokyo and the colonial Bovemments was by no means smooth/ the conflict btween GGK and MOC over the new East Asian telecommunication network was particularly serious, in part due to the instantaneous naturc of telecommurucations and thc issue of control and governance it cntailed. This phenomenon was not entirely new in the anna's of impcrial history. WritinS aboul lh. rolc of telegra

capital. Essentially, the contest over teleconrmunications, the ultimate medium of control, illustrates the thomy political problem oI imperial inteSration versus colonial autonomy and in tuln helped redefine the future role of colonial Korea in the new empire. Bureaucratic inJightint notwithstandin& Korea's importance in Japan's imperial telecornmunications network waxed during the Pacific War. As increased communications between Japan and North China occupied more and more circuits on the Japan-Manchukuo cable, construction of a second cable linking Keijo with northem Manchuria began, eventually rcaching W6rsan by the end of the war. Domcstic service in Korea had to be reduced to meet the need of ttuough haffic and air defense. The Korean Strait in the sourh became th biggest bottleneck for telecornmunications haffic, especially because a plarned cable linking Japan and cenhal China directly failed to matedalize. Although a second non-loaded submarine cable across the strait was laid in December 1943, it soon ceased functioning due to technical problems. To ensure the vital link b tween Japan and th continent, an ultra-short,wave (VHF) connection was established, but the rclay station in Tsushima also ceased operation, due to a lire. In a last minute push, the Japanese undertook construction of new direct, cross-channel facilities that needed no rclay points. Ironically, the work was completed on August 15, 1945, the day of Japan's sunender.z The colonial telecommunications infraskucture continued to play a role in postcolonial Korea, however. An Amedcan survey in the late 1940s describd the telecommunications network in southem Korea as "small and in many respects obsolete by American stanclards," after years of poot maintenance, but considered it "generally adequaie to meet the existing needs." To supplement these rapidly dcterioradng lines, the Republic of Kora goverunent purchased wireless equipment from the American electronics Siant RCA.7s In June 1950, (iv('ycrrs aftcrJapan's cmpirc had disintcgrarcd, the

188

)AQINC YANG

Korcan peninsula wrs cnSullcd in a new conflict. Badly in need of communication facilitic$, U.S. forces found the underground "Mukden cable" running throuSh the peninsula a crucial asset. Throughout the war, Amcrican cngineers repaired Japanese cables and rcpeater stations, to maximize the cable's use as a trunk line for trooPs in Korea and as the vital link bctween General MacArthur's headquarte$ in Tokyo and U.S. forces in the peninsula. As the treat artery of communicatior! a U.S. Army officer recalled, the Mukden Cable was a "God-sent &ift."76 Interestinglt Americans were not the only ones taking advantate of Japan's imperial legacies. The same cable also se ed as a major communications lir* for North Korea and China, which joined the war in October 1950. lacking sparc parts to repair damages to the cable between Sinrijiu and Pyongyan& Chinese enginee$ resorted to nemoving Portions oI the nonloaded cable the Japanese had laid along the former ManchukuoUSSR frontier.z Thus, in a marurer that no one would have Predic'ted, what remained of JaparlB imFrial telecommunications network contributed to postcolonial Korea's hansition to the new Cold

PART

II

Colonial Modernity and Identity

war world order.z