Dario Martinelli: "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics :: People, Paths, Ideas" , DOI: 1 0.

1007/978-90-481-9249-6 Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2010, Reviewed by Carl Christian Glosemeyer Andersen, Mag.art, Lecturer at Nansenskolen - Humanistic Academy of Norway Dato: 14. mai 2013 23:32:49 CEST There has been a revolution in our way of understanding and conduct research on animals behavior and their cognitive abilities. It is an ongoing revolution in the past 25 years primarily due to the life-givin g combination of ethology, cognitive psychology and zoosemiotics into a unified research branch. Dario Martinelli's "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics", 2010, is an excellent example of what has happened and happens in research right now. He's Italian, lives in Lithuania where he is Full Professor of Musicology, Kauna s University of Technology. Moreover he is Adjunct Professor of Musicology and S emiotics, University of Helsinki. Martinelli is a leading zoo-semiotician and is also connected as Adjunct Professor of Methodologies of Semiotics and Communica tion Studies, University of Lapland. Martinellis's book is the first of its kind that wants to provide a representati on of the part of semiotics known as "zoosemiotics", the study of animal communi cation systems. Zoosemiotics has tasked to study "semiosis" within living zoo-biological systems which means "how signs are constructed, organized, assembled, distinguished, in terpreted, codified and so forth." The book is divided into three main parts: (1) The first chapter is definitely t he longest (about 50% of the text) and constitutes a brilliant overall critical introduction and review of the special field of main issues, ideas, concepts and key representatives within the now 50-year history of zoosemiotics, (2) secondl y, a systematic review from A to Z of all the discipline's core concepts, and fi nally (3) a longer text that raises the central question of wether ethical issue s should be included or not as a separate area within the study of zoosemiotics. In the first part Martinelli emphasizes that zoosemiotics, unlike biosemiotics, deliberately is limiting its field of research within the scientific ethological study of animals "Umwelt" understood as "a subjectively experienced animal worl d and their behavior within the framework of signs and symbol exchange of gestur es (semiosis)". The exploration of other animal species' Umwelt offers of-course on a number of practical scientific, theoretical and philosophical issues, issues that Martinel li enters and discusses in a very enlightening way. As Martinelli puts it, the p roblem is "to investigate the possibility of adapting almost objective perspecti ve towards phenomenon that are by nature subjective". The classical, cartesian problem of the relationship between body / mind and "th eory of mind" pops up naturally as we move into these areas: "How come that our thoughts, that are totally different from a physical event or entity, do affect our actions?(...) Can we interpret mind through matter?(...) (E)very subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view", and Martinell i refers among other things to Thomas Nagel's famous essay "What is it like to b e a Bat?" (1974). Have we any chance to know what "the other" can feel and think?

This is an issue that almost seems insurmountable, at least when it comes to res earch on other species than ourselves. A well known ethologists, Marian Stamp Dawkins expresses this kind of problem ex plicit in the title of her introduction to modern ethological studies in her boo k "Through Our Eyes Only" (1993). Martinelli would primarily make use of the analogy method: We can understand the behaviour and Umwelt of other animals based on what we know about ourselves: "I perceive my mind, from the inside, only through external ways. (...) In other w ords a primary status of "their" and "our" life is the perception of the animate d body ". This is a clear pragmatistic, philosophical choice, a choice that otherwise is d eveloped within the so-called cognitive sciences. Moreover, advances in brain physiology in recent years made it possible to condu ct studies directly on and in animals' sensory organs, - "Merkwelt "- , and not only in the" Wirkwelt ", which is the way animals act and behave. The terms abov e are taken from one of ethology's most important founders, Jacob von Uexkll. The book has mor eover a thorough introduction to Uexkll's ideas and influence. Martinelli displays a refreshing philosophical and ethical approach to his field of study, rather than a purely descriptive. The book is almost devoid of fear t o record and enter philosophical issues, and Martinelli has several interesting references to philosophers and important philosophical themes. Somewhere in "A C ritical Companion" he says explicitly "(A)nd if semiotics is, as it is, a philos ophical discipline , (....) then it is probably true that as semioticians we hav e an ethical imperative." For Martinelli human culture constitutes a key research area and should be centr al within zoosemiotics. Martinelli's critical showdown with biosemiotics and its tendency to metaphysical speculation is largely very interesting and enlighteni ng. The author finds it quite remarkable how little bio semiotics has to say abo ut the cultural sphere and the human animal, understood as semiotic being. Accor ding to Martinelli bio semiotics has completely omitted human related issues, wi th the result that "culture" is perceived as a purely human concept. In this way the human being and the humanity will stay on o n e side of a demarcation line, while all the other animals will find themselv es on the other. It's possible that Martinelli in some respect overstates the "antagonism" betwee n these two semiotic disciplines in his critical review, especially when it come s to the "Copenhagen school" represented by its Danish leading bio semiotician J esper Hoffmeyer. What Jesper Hoffmeyer is concerned, he has in his pre-semiotic period in the 80 's published a series of interesting books, all dealing with an echo philosophical perspective and a critical analysis of the cultural sphere o f society and economics. I am thinking i.e. on "A Natural History of Culture" and his heavily Bateson-inspired "Nature in The H ead". In the latter he highlights the nature of signs and code systems all of wh ich make up important parts of the book. A major concern in Martinelli's "Companion" is to explore the prevalent forms of reductionist tendencies in animal research and to investigate some of the key c onsequences that would follow in the wake of dealing with bombastic dichotomies in research. Such "prejudices" will all could lead to a distinct form of extrem e anthropocentrism where research can easily get the wrong path and lead to larg e negative ethical and moral consequences. Martinelli displays a refreshing phil osophical and ethical approach to his field of study, rather than a purely descr iptive. The book is almost devoid of fear to record and enter philosophical issu es, and Martinelli has several interesting references to philosophers and import ant philosophical themes. Somewhere in "A Critical Companion" he says explicitly "(A)nd if semiotics is, as it is, a philosophical discipline , (....) then it i s probably true that as semioticians we have an ethical imperative." I understan d Dario Martinelli's critical project as an important form of deconstruction of

our "grand stories". Their main functions are to sustain and continue our domina nt prejudices in culture as a priori fundamental truths. Such prejudices can wel l be seen in the light of Dawkin's theory of our cultural "memes". They have som e of the same features as the horse blinders. When a leading philosopher and sem iotician as John Deely apparently relatively innocent talks about the "Semiotic Animal "(2010), this label for him is only intended to apply to man and man alon e. Martinelli, however, will not make any absolute qualitative distinction betwe en the human animal and other animal species. He maintains the idea of a Darwini an gradualism, where there are but "degrees" of differences between humans and o ther animals, rather than categorical qualitative ones. As far as I can see, Mar tinelli's thinking about these processes coincides with Gregory Bateson's (and C . G. Jung's) famous distinction between "creatura" and "pleroma" as Bateson trea ts these concepts in "Mind and Nature" (1979). The qualitative differences we c reate notions of, that means creatura, are just events situated in our heads - i n nature,pleroma, there are no such distinctions. Is "culture" something that is unique to man alone? Martinelli finds strong indicia in modern biology that all support his claim: "C ulture" is not only reserved man. Great Apes by the way transfer their acquired knowledge on to the subsequent generation. They work together, learn from each o ther and can form tools that they use as instruments. And - how would you unders tand and interpret the complex social interactions and communication that mainta in the honey bee society? The emergent, qualitative differences we see in nature are controlled by digital distinctions, but the processes taking place in nature itself are but gradualis tic and analogue, Martinelli claims. Being able to see homo sapiens as the last emergent supplementation in a continu ous evolutionary process, doesn't prevent us, in other words, at the same time t o be able to see and focus on man as a specific and unique being, considered on its own terms. But then this perspective also applies to all other animal species, each in part icular having their very specific,unique skills and talents that make each speci es fit in the art of survival. Dario Martinelli's book is in my opinion clearly characterised by a beneficial a nti-reductionism. The critic runs like a red thread through the entire work. The author opens up for a meaningful and continuous study of other animals' Umwe lt where he wants that the research, as far as it is possible, should be carried out on the animal's own terms. Martinelli does from this perspective, strongly criticise C.L. Morgan and his famous reductionist "cannon". It reads: "In no cas e should actions or behaviours be interpreted as the result of a superior psychi c faculty, when it is possible to interpret them as a result of an inferior facu lty." Darios antireductionistic argument against the Morgan's Cannon has by other zoosemioticians been baptised "Martinelli's Cannon" and reads: "In no case should a ctions or behaviours be interpreted as a result of an inferior psychic faculty, when it is possible to interpret them as a result of a superior faculty." The historical background of the "Morgan's Cannon" leads back to Germany in 1905 -1907 and is related to the famous phenomenon of " Der kluge Hans ", a horse who was said to have mathematical abilities. The horse and his trainer, Orlov Trotter, brought about a series of performances in Germany around the turn of the century. The explanation for this strange phenomenon was due solely to the unique ability of Hans to interpret his coach and the audience's almost imperceptible small ge stures so he exactly could "know" when to stop scratching with his hoof on the g round when the answer was right! Around the turn of the century there was a relatively broad, general view that a nimals, when it comes to the end, might not be so particularly different in esse nce from us humans. Darwin's theory of evolution had step by step taken root in people's mind. The b

iologist and psychologist Oscar Pfungst's disclosure of the case "Der Kluge Hans " in 1907 let instantly the air out of the balloon.The horse turned out to be ju st as stupid as the bull(!). The horse didn't understand even the simplest calcu lations. Dario Martinelli scrutinises this biased conclusion and turns it on the head. Al though the horse was not gifted with our human numeracy, the horse after all exh ibited unique abilities and skills in other areas that far exceed ours. Der Klug e Hans was able to read and interpret the 'invisible' small bodily signs and ges tures of humans as easily as we can solve 2 + 3 = 5. Neither footage, horse conn oisseurs, biologists or magicians had initially managed to reveal the horse's hi dden abilities during the shows Trotter and Hans were a part of. Through a long and ongoing historical period man and horse have had a close and special form of interaction, in which the horse has learned a unique ability to interpret human 's slightest hints and commands. The same skills can, however, be said to have o ccurred between man, cats and dogs through our common cultural history of mutual interests. Soon the framework for the ongoing exploration of animal cognition was reorganis ed so that in future studies, scientists could rule out any form of "Clever Hans effect". Sterile, technically fabricated laboratory research was one of the res ults in the wake of "Der Kluge Hans". Animal behaviour was understood as j u s t "instinctive" without any cognition. The theory of instincts was almost supreme in more than 50 years and is still ve ry prevalent. Martinelli picks the biased instinct theory apart point by point. "Instincts" function mostly like a "black box" in which researchers could place all inexplicable findings and put the label of "just instinct" on them. From now on studies on animals in their natural environment were no longer seen as strictly scientific because the researcher din't have the same control over r esearch conditions as compared to what one had in the controlled laboratories. R esearchers as a consequense were required to carry large, impersonal masks over their faces in order to prevent the possibility of influencing the animals and t he test results while the tests were running. All scientific procedures became standardized and impersonalised in additional b ehavioral experiments with animals. Such standardisations of course made any possibility of a deeper explorations of various animal species difficult. The complex compound of animals' Umwelt and t heir natural behavior in their native habitat were excluded. One such example could be a closer examination of the possibility of language s kills of different animal species in their natural environment outside the labor atory. Behaviourism garbled also research on interspecific communication, such as betwe en humans and animals. The fear of "Der Kluge Hans" effect is still, according to Dario Martinelli, ver y prevalent in many research environments, where a positivist approach to animal behaviour and their abilities often totally rules the research. Thanks to some important 'dissidents' from the dominant ruling opinion, biosemio tics and zoosemiotics arise in the mid 60s. Here we find, among others, thinkers and scientists such as Thomas Sebeok, Donal d R Griffin and Gregory Bateson. Dario Martinelli rightly emphasises especially the importance of the Hungarian T homas Sebeok. He is the pioneer that connects the American pragmatism and its triadic sign the ory (C. S. Peirce) with the Latvian ethologist Jacob von Uexkll and his Umwelt-ter m so that they together form an overall theory of zoo-semiotics. Without being able to go into detail here, I will particularly emphasise Dario M artinelli's very thorough and meaningful review of the terms "mimicry","decepti on","play" and "aesthetics". The analysis can be read in the first half of the b ook. His thinking is literally bursting with creativity and originality. After r

eading Martinelli's review of animal behaviour and communication, one will have a better understanding of how extraordinarily complex the communicative systems are composed. Take for example something as "innocent" as cats or dogs playing with each other. When two dogs meet, and want to play rather than fight each other, they exchange a series of different gestu res. Together these gestures signal to the other that now it is just a "fighting play" that should go on. One of the dogs performs for example the well-known sp ecies-specific gesture for "play" by bending the head and body down, stretching his paws forward while barking eager and simultaneously turns his head quickly b ack and forth from side to side. If the other dog responds with the same type of gestures, the game suddenly is going on. During the play session the play is ma intained "playful" and as "play" by constantly repeating the specific, different signs indicating what the relationship should be. Many of the same gestures wil l appear also in interspecific contexts, e.g in play between people and dogs. Ma rtinelli's detailed review of these four mentioned concepts, "mimicry", "decepti on", "play" and "aesthetics", builds up gradually to an overall surprising, but very interesting aestheticphilosophical idea: "Art" can be understood to have an evolutionary path that st arts with the ability of the individual animal species to perform mimicry, desep tion and lie. These properties depend not only on the ability to communicate on one level, but involves simultaneously the will to meta-communication on another . That indicates that the playful dogs at the same time have to distinguish betw een, and simultaneously connect, two different cognitive levels with each other. On one level the dogs' barking suggests that this might be about an impending f ight. On the meta level however the message in the relationship is modified to o nly mean "I just want to play". The dogs' bodily gestures, such as head bowed a nd eager movements back and forth, are therefore to be interpreted as a response to the first utterance in which gestures are seen as a correction in the direct ion of pursuing further play behaviour. The next step in animal development pointing towards the human artistic expressi on is consequently the show of play by countless animal species. The play of ani mals can take place both intra - as inter-specific. "Aesthetics" is considered b y most of us first and foremost to be a mere human expression, the author claims . However, there is clear evidence from a number of animal species which all toget her testify that man must share this aesthetical ability along with them! Martinelli is in this respect referring especially to Karl von Frisch who points out the obvious signs of aesthetic dimensions that we can observe and recognise in the actions of the bower bird ("Animal Architecture", 1978). These male birds build complex structures of twigs, leaves and flowers that serv e as shelter or recess or cottage for mating game. Every male bird is very resourceful in terms of building up its construction and then decorate it with 'all the world's delights': Stones, shiny shards of glass , beautiful floral and foliage, all in an effort to attract the female's attenti on and interest. Frequently the male bird breaks off a small branch and then bits at the end of t he twig so that the splitting can serve as a form of brush or paint brush. Then the male bower bird crushes with its beak the berries which he has picked in the woods, all shining in different shades of blue and paints the entrance of the b ower with the most beautiful nuance of blue with his 'brush'. The blue colour of the entrance looks very similar to the nuance of the plumage of the male bower bird, so the choice of the colour is not random. When the male now and then discovers withered flowers on the construction, it picks out the w ithered immediately and replace them with fresh new ones. Frisch has often observed how the birds can step a little back or aside to consi der their creation of appropriate distance. Carl von Frisch also found that the bowerbirds put rocks in the shape of a path. These rocks decorate the entrance systematically in such a way that the largest stones are placed farthest from the entrance, and the smallest closest so that

the female bird can get the illusion of watching a track, where her perspective leads right into the male's 'paradise'! Martinelli also draws attention to the complicated question if it is just man, a nd man alone that can be said to 'have' a language. Many bio- and zoo-semioticians will reserve language ability to be applied to ho mo sapiens alone. The aforementioned John Deely represents such a position, and he is representati ve of many philosophers and scientists in bio- and zoosemiotics itself. Perhaps the most influential thinker in the 21st-century is the German fundament al ontologist Martin Heidegger. Throughout his philosophical work he is strongly convinced that it is only man, and man alone, who "has" a "language" and thereby can be said to 'have' an "Umwe lt". (See Brett Buchanan: "Onto-ethology", 2010). This opinion is so widespread and universal in philosophy, biology, ethology and zoology, that one could easily be tempted to not wanting to venture into the fi eld at all. Dario Martinelli dares without much reluctance to challenge this ant hropocentric notion. He has many good arguments for his claim that several anima l species have shown clear signs of linguistic abilities that, in principle, are not totally different from the human being. Birds are found to have "dialects" when they sing, and depending on where they are located, they are able at any ti me to change their song mode so that they can communicate with their own anywher e. Bird songs must be learned and practiced before eventually being perfected. S everal bird species demonstrate a rich variety of bird songs. They can imitate o ther species so lifelike, that they are fooled into thinking the song is one of their own kind. One of the most astounding examples of birdsong imitation is doc umented to take place by the famous Lyre Bird. This bird is known to mimic almos t any types of sounds that occur in its environment. Its mimicry can involve the singing of other bird species or the sound of a chainsaw, car alarms or cameras that create unmistakable mechanical sounds when zooming and the "iris" closes w ith a distinctive "click." It is also shown that birds are titling each other wi th their own proper names, exactly the same as dolphins do. Martinelli refers to many similar examples of language actions i n animals, examples indicating that animals may have linguistic abilities. The a uthor addresses in this respect a powerful critique against none other than Thom as Sebok himself, - the founder of zoosemiotics. Sebok retained all his life thr ough the view that "language" was an ability that only belonged to homo sapiens alone. The higher primates can undoubtedly perform advanced communication with v aried use of symbols to convey different messages, but Sebeok finds no evidence of any language acts la man. Until I read "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics" I was strongly inclined to reserve man alone the "right" to use the language as a media for communication and model for our thinking. Now I'm far more open to M artinelli's convincing arguments. Examples he points out, all indicate that ther e actually can exist linguistic abilities in other species than ourselves, examp les which one can justify to denote with the term "language." I have personally been very intrigued by Irene Pepper's 30-year long study of "A lex", one Gray parrot who now sadly died some years ago. Alex could spend far mo re than 150 words. He had learned concepts and demonstrated rational mind where he could differentiate between types of matter and fabric and he could operate w ith 7 different colours and five different shapes. Alex distinguished between si ze and number of figures which he presented to the experiments with Pepperberg. Alex has also demonstrated that he understood abstract concepts like "bigger", " same", "smaller" and "different". Additionally did Alex distinguish between prep ositions like "over" and "under." The most amazing thing was that Irene Pepperbe rg had managed to train Alex to speak American so she could pursue a sort of dir ect 'conversation' with Alex in many different ways. Martinelli mentions of cour se Alex as one of several ethological language studies, conducted on different a nimal species. He is especially interested in the chimpanzee Whoshoe who was trained to use ASL (American Sign Language). Washoe could after long and patient training demonstr

ate astonishing linguistic abilities and major cognitive systems, capabilities, that without much doubt have revealed chimps as possible language animals. Thy a re able to express joy, sorrow and care that have striking similarities with hum an expressions. They also demonstrated that they have great abilities to lie and deceive others, and they show clear signs of having a 'theory of mind'. Similar findings have been made with the Gray parrot Alex, the caledonian crow a nd other corvid birds, whales and dolphins. Washoe has also demonstrated his ability to make use of the ASL-language as a co gnitive model for thinking in such a way, that he could form completely innovati ve words and concepts using their metaphorical use of language. Washoe, already familiar with ASL words for "water" and "bird", spontaneously co uld combine and form a new term for an animal he had not yet learned the name of . Once Washoe noticed a white swan on the water, he was asked by his couch what he was looking at. He spontaneously signalled "water bird" using his sign langua ge! A ring Washoe noticed he could immediately name as "a finger bracelet". He had not yet learned the word for "ring", but combined spontaneously two well-kno wn concepts "finger" and "bracelet" to form a new term. To this observation Dario Martinelli comments: "This is rather a convincing proo f that language is used precisely as a modeling system, other than a mere commun ication device". A similar famous example of linguistic behaviour Martinelli clearly shows by the female gorilla "Koko". She is also trained in ASL. One day Koko and her trainer Penny Patterson were sitting together, the coach as ked Koko if she wanted something to drink. She would. When Patterson asked her what body part she used to drink with, there was a stra nge session taking place. Koko looked for a moment thoughtfully at her trainer b efore she ostentatiously pointed to her eye. After receiving laughter from Patte rson, Koko then pointed on her nose, then the ear, before she made a strange "gr in" pointing to her mouth and satisfied took the bottle to her mouth to start dr inking. The author sees the example as a wonderful illustration of "Monkey humou r". For Martinelli these illustrating observations show that both chimpanzee and gor illa can use language as a model for thinking. All these above mentioned species also prove to be able to score highly on the " mirror test". It is a test that can demonstrate whether the animals (including h umans) have an opinion of himself as a "self". High rate on these mirror tests p rovides a basis for looking at these species as acting subjects and personalitie s, not totally different from us humans, Martinelli claims. Dolphins and whales score by the way significant on mirror tests, and both species have a very compl ex and diverse communication pattern which suggests that they address each other with their own unique personal names. The same qualities appear also in some bird species. Several animal species, including corvid birds, score equally significant in the mirror tests. Ethologists claim that dolphins and corvids are just as much gift ed as chimpanzees what cognitive abilities are concerned. If we for a while turn our attention away from birds and mammals and focus on th e social Umwelten of insects, cognitive ethology reveals in different species a series of complex communication patterns taking place between the members of the group. The Nobel Prize winner in ethology (1973), the early mentioned Karl von Frisch, received his award for his lifelong study of honey bee communication. It is worth noting that he as early as in the 1920s describes the complex "waggi ng tail communication" among the dancing bees as "symbolic language ". If we will follow the call we have found in "Martinelli's Cannon", it is perhaps appropriate to ask ourselves to stay open to further exploration of the linguis tic competences of animals. Martinelli has with his outstanding book opened up an exciting alternative view of language which currently doesn't seem to be generally accepted.

In the final part of his book Martinelli raises the important question of whethe r zoosemiotics should move into the ethics and morality area or not. Is it even possible to stick to a purely descriptive account in the study of hum an and other animal behaviour, communication and interaction, without having an ethical perspective on what we are observing and doing? The very last chapter doesn't quite cope with the rest of the book. I have among other things some trouble following the author's diligent use of Fr ancis Bacon's famous concepts, called 'idola mentis'. Martinelli uses Bacon's we ll-known concepts "idola trebis", "idola specus", "idola agora" and "idola theat ri" as a theoretical zoosemiotic categorisation and mapping of various human prejudices a s they show up in our cultural perceptions of people, animals, ethics and morali ty. Martinelli's use of 'heavy' graphic shapes in the last section of his book s eems almost to be bordering on the absurd, especially considering the fact that Francis Bacon in modern eco-philosophy is known as a manipulative person with a very hostile view of women and nature. Francis Bacon among others supported the Inquisition to force the "truth" out of the female "witches" during the church's interrogation. It is also Bacon who is well known for using a variety of metaph ors he has chosen directly from the Inquisition torture on people. He describes inbound how the new, modern sciences, using the inductive method, should 'squeez e' the truth out of the mountains ores and the natural hidden 'female' cavities, for the benefit of mankind. Paradise is for Bacon no longer to be searched for in a world hereafter. "Utopia" is already lying hidden in front of our feet. The tasks of the natural sciences are to uncover the secrets of nature. With the ai d of our growing knowledge in the natural sciences humanity would in the near fu ture force "mother nature" to her knees. I find it somewhat strange that Martinelli doesn't also choose simultaneously to make the reader aware of this side of Francis Bacon's philosophy when the autho r puts such emphasis on applying Bacon's famous 'Idola mentis' in his zoosemioti cal analysis. Fortunately this is my only serious, critical comment on a book, w hich for me has already meant more than most I've read in recent years. Just as weak as I find the first half of the last chapter of his book, just as s trong I will highlight the conclusion of Martinelli's chapter of ethics and mora lity. The moment Martinelli enters the discussion of explicit echo philosophical character, he is again on a par with the other chapters in the book. Here he is obviously on familiar ground and goes into the important discussion about wheth er nature can also be said to have "intrinsic values". He delves into the ongoing conflict which consists in ethics and eco-philosophy between wanting to prioritize the anthropocentric values versus a biocentric poi nt of view. It is enlightening and very pleasing to follow Martinelli's critical revision of the denigrated anthropocentrism and see his own priorities. They go in the dire ction of wanting to maintain what the author labels a "critical anthropocentrism " in zoosemiotic studies combined with a bio-centrism and its pursuit of environ mental ethical issues. I understand Dario Martinelli's choice of perspective as an important ethical ch oice. There are several voices in eco-philosophy and eco ethics nowadays that in their eagerness to avoid anthropocentrism, "rinse the baby out with the bath water". For example, when James Lovelock as a response to our current widespread decimat ion of plant and animal species on earth with no visible difficulty states that species at all times have been eradicated in evolution, then I do pass ("The Rev enge of Gaia. Why the Earth is Fighting Back - and How We Can Still Save Humanit y", 2006). This is an extinction first and foremost due to human folly and greed , and the decimation and extinction are taking place at a pace that is unknown i n history. Lovelock has also seemingly small trouble to preach the breakdown probability fo

r one half of the world's population in the near future. We are too many people on Gia already, says Lovelock. I do agree with him. But when he states without a ny doubt that Gaia will straighten out the mess that humanity has caused during its history, then he expresses what I would call pure misanthropy. It is not pri marily his prediction I disagree in. It is very likely that Lovelock is right in his gloomy prophecies. What really bothers me is that Lovelock has chosen a uni lateral biocentric or ecocentric perspective on the state of affairs. Based on h is perspective Lovelock is choosing the prioritising of nature and Gaia above th e human potential future. As I read and understand "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics" Martinelli is fo rtunately on a completely different planet than James Lovelock. Instead of talking about the mythical Gaia, he chooses to stick to the concrete, vibrant animal life on Earth. Dario Martinelli has written a book permeated by a deep love and respect for all life. He expresses at the same time both the scientist's and the philosopher's critical wonder and combines the candour of man and his ability to express empat hy, love and wisdom in his research on life and the living. It is this kind of "humanistic perspective" I find as a clue in Martinelli's sci entific work. I am considering Dario Martinelli's book in its entirety as formidable. I know I 'm going to have the book with me further on in my own work. More than ever I want to continue to move in the same terrain as the author. Wit h the release of "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics" the author has brilliant ly placed terrain open for further research and wonder.

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