http://www.google.fr/search?q=bilingualism+in+algeria&hl=fr&start=90&sa=N http://w3.u-grenoble3.

fr/benrabah/

Mohamed BENRABAH 03, rue des Ruires 38320 EYBENS, France Tlphone : 04 76 82 77 75 (bureau) Tlcopie : 04 76 82 41 21 Ml : Mohamed.Benrabah@u-grenoble3.fr Site web : http://w3.u-grenoble3.fr/benrabah/ Professeur de linguistique anglaise et sociolinguistique, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble 3 Sommaire du dossier I. Diplmes II. Activits pdagogiques III. Activits administratives et autres responsabilits collectives IV. Activits de recherche V. Publications Langues : anglais, arabe, franais I. Diplmes 1974 - Licence d'anglais, Universit dOran, Algrie 1975 - Postgraduate Diploma in English Studies, Ealing Technical College, Londres. 1976 - I.P.A. Certificate of Phonetics, University College London, Londres. 1976 - U.C.L Certificate of Phonetics, University College London, Londres. 1977 - Master of Arts (M.A.) de Phontique, University College London, Londres. 1987 - Thse de Ph.D en Phontique/Linguistique : The Intelligibility of Algerian Speakers of English : a Phonetic/Phonological Study , Directeur : John Maidment, University College London, Londres. 2001 - Diplme Habilitation diriger des recherches pour les disciplines Etudes anglophones et Sciences du langage , dlivr par lUniversit Marc Bloch de Strasbourg. Titre : De la didactique de langlais oral la politique linguistique ; Directeur : Claude Truchot, Professeur, Universit Marc Bloch de Strasbourg. II. Activits pdagogiques Enseignements premier cycle Dpartement danglais, Universit dOran : 1978-1983

Phontique et phonologie de langlais Initiation la linguistique gnrale Grammaire anglaise 1987-1994 Phontique et phonologie de langlais Initiation la linguistique gnrale Grammaire anglaise Dpartement de franais, Universit dOran 1979-1983 Phontique et phonologie du franais UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III : 1994-2005 Phontique et phonologie de langlais ; Linguistique gnrale et langue anglaise Grammaire anglaise ; Thme

Enseignements deuxime cycle Dpartement danglais, Universit dOran : 1987-1994 Phontique gnrale et langue anglaise Morphologie et syntaxe de langlais Histoire de la langue anglaise UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III : 1994-1998 Traduction spcialise depuis 2001/2002 Variation et changement linguistique : histoire de la langue anglaise (option de licence) depuis 2002/2003 Les varits de langlais dans le monde : World Englishes (sminaire de Master 1) et cours d e mthodologie (Master 1) depuis 2000/2001 Direction de mmoires de matrise : 25 TER soutenus

Enseignements troisime cycle et concours Dpartement danglais, Universit dOran 1987-1994 Dialectologie et sociolinguistique UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III 1994-1996 Sminaire de DEA sur lintonation de langlais UFR des Sciences du langage, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III 2001-2002 Co-direction avec Mme la Professeure Jacqueline Billiez dun DEA en Sciences du langage (en politique linguistique) soutenu en septembre 2002

UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III 2002-2003 Direction dun DEA dEtudes anglophones (analyse conversationnelle) soutenu en octobre 2003 UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III 2003-2004 : Sminaire de DEA sur la Sociolinguistique et la Linguistique Applique (Monde anglophone) UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III Depuis septembre 2004 : Sminaire (spcialit et mthodologie) de Master 2 sur la Sociolinguistique et la Linguistique Applique (Monde anglophone) UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III Depuis septembre 2005 : Prparation au concours - agrgation : phonologie de langlais UFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III Depuis octobre 2005 : Dirige un tudiant en thse de Doctorat sur la question de lamnagement linguistique au Canada. III. Activits administratives et autres responsabilits collectives Depuis mars 2002 : Responsable des validations dacquis lUFR dEtudes anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III. Depuis 1997 : membre lu du Conseil de lUFR dEtudes Anglophones, Universit Stendhal -Grenoble III (deux mandats). Mars 2004 Janvier 2005 : membre lu du CEVU, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III. Septembre 2002 juin 2004 : Charg de mission communication auprs de la Prsidente de lUniversit Stendhal-Grenoble III. 2001-2003 : membre lu du Conseil dAdministration de lUniversit Stendhal -Grenoble III. 1997-2001 : membre de la Commission de Spcialistes pour la 11me section (Etudes anglophones) et la 7me (Sciences du langage) de lUniversit Stendhal-Grenoble III. 2000-2001 : Coordinateur de la section danglais du Centre de Valence 1995-2000 Co-responsable du premier cycle (1er et 2me niveau DEUG anglais) lUFR dEtudes Anglophones, Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III. 1981-1983 Directeur de lInstitut des Langues Etrangres de lUniversit d'Oran, Algrie. 1980-1981 Chef du Dpartement d'anglais de lUniversit d'Oran, Algrie

IV. Activits de recherche APPARTENANCE A DES EQUIPES DE RECHERCHE ET SOCIETES DE SPECIALITE 1988-1990 Institut des Langues trangres, Universit dOran (Algrie) Chercheur dans lEquipe de Dialectologie et Linguistique Contrastive

1992-1994 Institut des Langues trangres, Universit dOran (Algrie) Directeur de Recherche : Projet de recherche du Ministre Algrien de l'Enseignement Suprieur intitul Linguistique et problmes socio- et psycho-culturels (N 3101/04/92). 1994-1997 *Membre de l'Observatoire sur Les Langues au Maghreb dirig par Gilbert Grandguillaume (Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris) *Membre du Centre de dialectologie arabe (CEDREA) de l'INALCO, Paris. 1994-2002 *Membre du Centre de Recherche d'tudes Anglophones (CREA) de l'Universit Stendhal-Grenoble III. 2001-2006 Membre du centre dEtudes sur les modes de la reprsentation anglophone (C.E.M.R.A.), Universit Stendhal - Grenoble III. Depuis janvier 2007 Membre du centre Linguistique et Didactique des Langues Etrangres et Maternelles (L.D.I.L.E.M), Universit Stendhal - Grenoble III. Depuis novembre 2000 Membre du Comit Editorial de la nouvelle revue internationale Language Policy publi par Kluwer Academic Publishers Group ; premier volume paru en 2002. Les Directeurs de publication (Rdacteurs en chef) : Bernard Spolsky, Professeur au Dpartement danglais de lUniversit de Bar Ilan (Isral) et Elana Shohana, Professeur au Dpartement Sciences de lEducation de lUniversit de Tel Aviv (Isral). Depuis janvier 2001 Membre de la Socit des anglicistes de lenseignement suprieur (S.A.E.S.). Depuis mars 2001 Membre de lAssociation des anglicistes pour les tudes de langue orale dans lenseignement secondaire et suprieur (A.L.O.E.S.). Depuis novembre 2004 Membre du Centre dEtudes Canadiennes, Institut dEtudes Politiques, Universit Grenoble II CONFERENCES, COLLOQUES ET CONGRES 1) Phonetics for Teacher-trainees : some Suggestions , communication prsente au Deuxime Colloque National sur la Didactique de l'Anglais dans le Suprieur, organis du 13 au 16 mars 1989 par l'Universit d'Alger (Algrie). 2) Word-stress as a source of unintelligibility , communication prsente au Seventh Linguistics Conference, organis du 19 au 22 mars 1990 par le Dpartement d'anglais de l'Universit de Yarmouk Irbid (Jordanie). 3) Dialecte et intercomprhension mutuelle , communication prsente la confrence sur Problmes linguistiques et question de dialectes en Algrie : Etat des lieux , organise du 26 au 27 mars 1990 par l'Universit d'Oran (Algrie). 4) On English and Arabic [k] and [q] , communication prsente au First International Congress of Dialectologists organis du 29 juillet au 4 aot 1990 par l'Universit de Bamberg (Allemagne). 5) Learning English segments with two languages , communication prsente au XIIme Congrs International des Sciences Phontiques organis du 19 au 24 aot 1991 par lUniversit dAix-enProvence (France).

6) The influence of urbanization on one dialect group , communication prsente au Sociolinguistics Symposium 9, organis du 2 au 4 avril 1992 par lUniversit de Reading (Grande Bretagne). 7) Attitudinal reactions to language change in an urban setting , communication prsente au First Arabic Sociolinguistics Symposium, organis du 5 au 7 juillet 1993 par l'Universit d'Edinburgh (Grande Bretagne). 8) Politique d'arabisation en Algrie : la planification des ingalits , communication prsente au colloque Arabisation au Maghreb vue par les Arabiss organis par l'Institut du Monde Arabe (Paris) le 23 juin 1994. 9) The role of pronunciation , communication prsente lors de la Journe dtudes du C.R.E.A : Ordre et Dsordre organise le 1er juin 1995 par le Centre de Recherche des Etudes Anglophones de lUniversit Grenoble III, France. 10) Ngation des langues populaires , communication prsente lors de la journe LAlgrie en 1995 : mieux comprendre pour mieux aider organise le 7 octobre 1995 au Palais du Luxembourg (Paris) par Solidarit Laque et le Comit de Soutien aux Forces Laques et Dmocratiques Algriennes 11) Les avatars du franais travers la politique linguistique en Algrie , communication prsente au Colloque sur les Politiques Linguistiques, Mythes et Ralits organis Dakar (Sngal) du 16 au 17 dcembre 1995 par l'AUPELF-UREF en collaboration avec l'Universit de Dakar et l'UFR de linguistique gnrale et applique de l'Universit Ren Descartes. 12) The xenophobic impulse: some reflections on Algeria and the British periphery , communication prsente conjointement avec Keith Dixon (Professeur lUniversit Lyon II) lors de lcole dt organise du 8 au 12 juillet 1996 par lUniversit Grenoble III sur le thme Le Changement culturel en Europe: cultures de la priphrie. 13) Planification linguistique et ractions des individus en Algrie , communication prsente lors de la 4me Journe dEtude sur la Dialectologie arabe du CEDREA lINALCO le 5 dcembre 1997. Journe organise par nos soins sur le thme : Politique/planification linguistique au Maghreb et comportement linguistique de lindividu. 14) Linguistic policies and the Algerian crisis , communication prsente au Colloquium Algeria in Transition : Dynamics and Dilemmas organis du 25 au 26 mars 1998 par le Dpartement de Cultural Studies and Sociology de lUniversit de Birmingham (Grande Bretagne). 15) La question de la langue en Irlande : entre ancien et nouveau , communication prsente lors de la journe dtudes sur le thme conservation et innovation organise le 29 mai 1998 par le Centre de Recherche dEtudes Anglophones (C.R.E.A.) de lUniversit Stendhal -Grenoble III. 16) Ra singing : a reaction to official acculturation , communication prsente la journe Algeria Conference organise le 1er juillet 1999 par Glamorgan University (Grande Bretagne). 17) Language and modernity in Algeria , communication prsente au 34th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology : Multiple modernities in an era of globalization , organis du 11 au 15 juillet 1999 par lUniversit de Tel Aviv (Israel). [sur invitation] 18) Algrie : langues contre langue , communication prsente lors de la rencontre Les Langues de la Mditerrane organise du 26 juillet au 1er aot 1999 par lAssociation Place Publique (Marseille). [sur invitation] 19) Question de culture : la culture linguistique en question , communication prsente au colloque Algrie, la culture en question(s) pour la clbration du 20me anniversaire du Printemps Berbre et organis le 15 avril 2000 la Salle de la CFDT (Paris) par Radio Beur-FM. [sur invitation]

20) An Algerian paradox : Arabization and the French language , communication prsente lors de la rencontre Shifting frontiers of France and Francophonie organise du 31 aot au 2 septembre 2000 par The Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France (ASMCF) et lUniversit de Leicester (Grande Bretagne). [sur invitation] 21) Lhybride chez anglophones et francophones africains , communication prsent e lors de la Journe dtudes du C.R.E.A : Identit et Altrit - lHybride organise le 6 octobre 2000 par le Centre de Recherches dEtudes Anglophones de lUniversit Grenoble III (France). 22) La question linguistique en Algrie , communication prsente lors des rencontres Autour de lAlgrie organise le 18 octobre 2000 par la Bibliothque Municipale de Vienne (France). [sur invitation] 23) Monolithisme ou pluralisme linguistique : le dbat sur la langue aux Etats-Unis , communication prsente la Journe dtudes sur Identit et Altrit - lHybride, organise le 5 & 6 octobre 2001 par le Centre de Recherches dEtudes Anglophones (C.R.E.A.) de lUniversit Grenoble III (France). 24) Le face--face franais-anglais en Algrie , communication prsente lors du colloque international intitul Francophonie-Anglophonie : mdiations-rconciliations dans les socits postcoloniales et organis les 29 et 30 novembre 2001 par le CERELC-PPF Langues et Cultures de lUniversit Stendhal Grenoble III. 25) Langlais comme langue internationale : une lingua franca pour vhiculer quoi au juste ? , communication prsente lors du colloque international organis les 11-12 janvier 2002 sur Rflexions sur limpact des entreprises multinationales amricaines dans la socit par le Centre dInformation et dEtude sur les Stratgies Internationales des Mouvements et Socits Anglophones (CIESIMSA) de lUniversit Stendhal-Grenoble III. 26) Language and politics : the case of Algeria , communication prsente lors du Congrs de la International Political Science Association organis du 30 juin au 5 juillet 2003 Durban en Afrique du Sud. 27) Variabilit en anglais : tude de cas , communication prsente lors du 12me Colloque dAnglais Oral organis les 2 et 3 avril 2004 lUniversit Paris 13 par lAssociation des anglicistes pour les tudes de langue orale dans lenseignement suprieur, secondaire et lmentaire (A.L.O.E.S.). 28) Le franais en Algrie : tat des lieux , communication (plnire) prsente lors du Colloque A.F.L.S. 2004 organis les 3-5 septembre 2004 par lAssociation for French Language Studies (AFLS), Aston University (Birmingham, Royaume Uni). 29) Language as political choice in Algeria : State against society or official monolingualism vs. societal plurilingualism , communication prsente lors du 5th Annual Conference of the International Association of Language and Intercultural Studies (IALIC) : Politics, Plurilingualism and Linguistic Identity, confrence organise du 11 au 14 novembre 2004 par Dublin City University, Rpublique dIrlande. 30) To be or not to be (Arabic/French) bilingual : recent changes in language-in-education planning in Algeria communication prsente lors du 5th International Symposium on Bilingualism, organis du 20 au 23 Mars 2005 par Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona, Espagne. TABLES RONDES, ATELIERS ET SEMINAIRES 1) Invit latelier Ecole, arabisation, islamisme : quels liens ? organis lors du Forum Solidaire Caf Littraire : Algrie : quel espoir ? organis le 4 mai 1996 par lAssociation Collectif de Soutien aux Rfugis Politiques Algriens de Grenoble.

2) Invit la table ronde Cultures plurielles et unit politique lors de la 6me dition des Rencontres dAverros sur le thme La Mditerrane : Questions dIdentit(s) organise le 6 novembre 1999 par lOffice de la Culture de Marseille et anime par Jean Lebrun de France Culture et Thierry Fabre. La rencontre a t diffuse par France Culture ( Radio libre ) le samedi 6 novembre 1999 de 14h 17h30. 3) Invit la table ronde Langues et reprsentations identitaires en Algrie organise le 20 novembre 1999 par le Centre Culturel Algrien (Paris). 4) Invit la table ronde sur Travaux dcritures autour du spectacle Un bateau pour lAustralie de Fellag : Le thtre et lhumour : compagnons incontournables pour tmoigner de lhistoire et de la vie en Algrie organis le 13 mai 2000 par la Maison de la Culture de la Seine Saint Denis (Bobigny). 5) Invit la table ronde Algrie : crivains, artistes et socit civile contre le fascisme organise le 21 octobre 2000 lors du 3me Salon du Livre Antifasciste Givors (19-22 octobre 2000). 6) Invit la table ronde Langues et identits en Arabofrancophonie dans le cadre du sminaire sur LArabofrancophonie, une ralit, un projet organis Paris le 7 fvrier 2001 par le Haut Conseil de la Francophonie. 7) Invit la table ronde intitule Identit(s) algrienne(s) et dmocratie organise le 24 novembre 2001 par les associations grenobloises Algrie au cur et Association Amazigh . 8) Invit la table ronde intitule Les conflits de langues aprs la dcolonisation organise dans le cadre de la semaine du festival Strasbourg-Mditerrane et intitule Mditerrane : espace de rencontres, foyer de tensions ou creuset civilisationnel ? organise le 1er dcembre 2001 au Centre Europen de la Jeunesse. 9) Invit le 26 juin 2001 parler de La politique linguistique en Algrie dans le cadre de latelier du Groupe dtude sur le plurilinguisme europen (GEPE) de lUniversit Marc Bloch - Strasbourg II. 10) Intervention le 20 fvrier 2002 sur Insecure representation : inscurit linguistique dans le monde anglophone , dans le cadre des sminaires organiss par le Centre dEtudes sur les Modes de la Reprsentation Anglophone (C.E.M.R.A) de lUniversit Stendhal -Grenoble III. 11) Invit le 12 dcembre 2002 par lUniversit dAix-en-Provence pour dbattre sur Les politiques linguistiques des tats arabes peuvent-elles chapper au nationalisme . Atelier organis dans le cadre des rencontres Rivages dchanges, rivages de solidarit organis par les universits dAix -enProvence, Marseille et Avignon. 12) Invit la table ronde sur Algrie : quel avenir ? organise dans le cadre de la Lisire Alsace/Algrie pour parler du thme Le conflit de langue . Rencontre organise le 14 dcembre 2002 par La laiterie / Les Lisires, Centre Europen, Strasbourg. 13) La langue comme objet dintervention publique : le cas du Canada et de lAfrique du Sud , communication prsente lors du sminaire mensuel organis le 25 mai 2004 par le Centre dEtudes sur les Modes de la Reprsentation Anglophone (CEMRA). 14) Invit aux Dbats sur la Place Les Etats et les Langues lors de la 3me Fte des Langues de Decazeville, rencontre organise le 26 juin 2004 par lAssociation Mescladis, Decazeville. 15) Langlais la place du franais en Algrie : mythe ou ralit ? , rencontre avec le public dan s le cadre de Place aux Sciences, manifestations publiques organises en octobre 2004 par la ville de Grenoble. 16) Montral laboratoire linguistique. La fin des deux solitudes ? , sminaire prsent le 15 avril 2005 dans le cadre du cours Radioscopie de la Socit Canadienne Contemporaine organis par le Centre dEudes Canadiennes de Grenoble de Institut dEtudes Politiques (IEP) de lUniversit

Grenoble II. Intervention spcialise devenue indispensable pour les tudiants de lIEP en 2005 2006. 17) Invit au 15me Forum des Langues du Monde, rencontre organise les 28-29 mai 2005 par lAssociation Carrefour Culturel Arnaud-Bernard de Toulouse, France. Thme abord : Langue et pouvoir en Algrie . 18) Invit par les Dpartements de Middle East Studies , de Franais et ditalien, et de Linguistique de lUniversit de Seattle (Etats-Unis) pour trois sminaires en avril 2006. 19) Invit au 16me Forum des Langues du Monde, rencontre organise les 27-28 mai 2006 par lAssociation Carrefour Culturel Arnaud-Bernard de Toulouse, France. Thme abord : Langues et bienfaits de la colonisation : le cas de lAlgrie . 20) Invit aux Dbats sur la Place Le Monde est un Mescladis de Lengas lors de la 5me Fte des Langues de Decazeville, rencontre organise le 1er juillet 2006 par lAssociation Mescladis, Decazeville, France. Thme abord : Question de culture linguistique . 21) Invit la 23 dition des Journes de Larrazet ( La France & lAlgrie. Lhistoire et lavenir en partage ), rencontre organise par la Maison de la Culture de Larrazet les 11-12 novembre 2006. Thme abord : Comment je vois mon Algrie de la pluralit ? . ENTRETIENS 1) Interview de Mohamed Benrabah en marge des travaux sur lAlgrie au Palais du Luxembourg, Paris , propos recueillis par Ahmed Hanifi et publis in Dire, N1, octobre 1995, pp.11-13. 2) Entretien avec Mme Cornado Algeria Analysis transmis sur les ondes de la BBC French for Africa le 6 juin 1998. 3) Entretien avec Olivier Muller sur lentre en vigueur le 5 juillet 1998 de la Loi sur lArabisation, transmis sur les ondes de la radio franco-marocaine Mdi I en juin/juillet 1998. 4) Entretien recueilli par P. Quillerier-Lesieur Trois questions Mohammed Benrabah : Bouteflika fait tomber les tabous paru en septembre 1999 sur le site Internet de Radio France International (RFI Internet). 5) Entretien sur les langues en Algrie recueilli par Djillali Bencheikh et retransmis en novembre 1999 sur les ondes de Radio Orient. 6) Invit par Jean Lebrun et Vincent Lemerre pour lmission Pot-au-feu de France Culture sur le franais en Algrie et retransmise en direct le 24 septembre 1999. 7) Entretien avec Yahia Belaskri sur la question linguistique en Algrie dans le cadre de lmission Magazine Rencontre de RFI retransmise en dcembre 1999. 8) Entretien avec Cline du Chn sur larabisation en Algrie et retransmis le 17 janvier 2000 dans lmission Premire Emission (France Culture) anim par Pierre Assouline et consacre Hlne Cixous. 9) Entretien recueilli par Lounis Aggoun Entretien avec un intellectuel : Mohamed Benrabah publi in LAlgrien Rvolt, N3, mai 2000, pp.14-17. 10) Interview avec Sad Yahia-Cherif sur les langues en Algrie et retransmis en direct le 26 avril 2000 sur les ondes de Beur-FM dans lmission Tadukli. 11) Pour une Algrie plurielle tolrante , entretien paru dans Le Dauphin Libr le 26 janvier 2000, p.8.

12) Entretien le 27 septembre 1999 avec Dominique Fournier de Radio Canada Montral pour la prparation pour 2000/2001 dun CD Rom sur le franais dans le monde. 13) Participation le 3 mai 2001 lmission de tlvision Club LCI sur la chane LCI sur le thme La jeunesse en Algrie . 14) Un rgime incapable dvoluer , entretien avec Sylvaine Pasquier paru dans lhebdomadaire franais LExpress du 10 mai 2001, p.47. 15) Participation le 13 mai 2001 lmission de tlvision Ripostes de Serge Moati sur la Cinquime sur le thme La torture : paroles dAlgriens (mission retransmise le 18 mai 2001). 16) Participation le 1er janvier 2002 lmission radiophonique de France Culture Tire ta langue : la langue de Fellag . 17) Invit le 07 novembre 2002 de lmission LEcole des savoirs de RFI sur La rouverture du lyce international dAlger . V. Publications LIVRE 1999 Langue et pouvoir en Algrie. Histoire dun traumatisme linguistique, Paris: ditions Sguier, 350 pages. MONOGRAPHIE 2005 The Language Planning Situation in Algeria, in Current Issues in Language Planning, Volume 6, N 4, pp. 379-502, Clevedon : Multilingual Matters Ltd, 124 pages www.multilingualmatters.net/cilp/006/cilp0060379.htm CHAPITRES DANS OUVRAGES COLLECTIFS 1991 Learning English segments with two languages , 4 pages, in Actes du XIIme Congrs International des Sciences Phontiques, Volume 2, Aix-en-Provence : Universit de Provence Service des Publications, pp.334-337. 1994 Attitudinal reactions to language change in an urban setting , 13 pages, in Y. Suleiman (sous dir.) Issues and Perspectives in Arabic Sociolinguistics, London: Curzon Press Ltd., pp. 213-226. 1996 Ngation des langues populaires , 13 pages, in Actes de la journe de rflexion L'Algrie en 1995: mieux comprendre pour mieux aider, pp.22-28. 1996 L'arabisation des mes , 18 pages, in Foued Laroussi (sous dir.) Linguistique et anthropologie, Presses Universitaires de Rouen, pp.13-30. 1996 Les avatars du franais travers la politique linguistique en Algrie , 6 pages, in Caroline Juillard et Louis-Jean Calvet (sous dir.) Les Politiques Linguistiques, Mythes et Ralits, Beyrouth/Montral : ditions FMA/AUPELF-UREF, pp.55-60. 1998 La langue perdue , 27 pages, in Les Violences en Algrie, Paris : Odile Jacob, pp.61-87. 2001 Language and modernity in Algeria , 8 pages, in Eliezer Ben-Raphael & Yitzhak Sternberg (eds.) Identity, Culture and Globalization, Leiden : Brill, pp.235-242.

2003 Langlais en Mditerrane : une nouvelle lingua franca ? , 22 pages, in Robert Bistolfi et Henri Giordan (sous dir.), Les langues en Mditerrane, collection les Cahiers de Confluences/Mditerrane, Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, pp.73-94. 2004 An Algerian paradox: Arabization and the French language , 13 pages dactylographies, in Christopher Rolfe et Yvette Rocheron (sous dir.) Shifting Frontiers of France and Francophonie, Londres : Peter Lang, pp.49-61. 2004 La question linguistique , 26 pages, in Yahia Belaskri et Christian Chaulet-Achour (dir.), LEpreuve dune dcennie 1992-2002. Algrie arts et culture, Paris : Editions Paris-Mditerrane, pp.83-108. A paratre (2007) Politique linguistique : inscurit au sommet, ouvertures la base , (7 pages dactylographies), P. Lambert, A. Millet, M. Rispail and C. Trimaille (eds), Paris : Editions LHarmattan. A paratre (2007) Montral, laboratoire linguistique ? , (20 pages dactylographies), in Alain Faure et Robert Griffiths (eds) Quest-ce qui fait tenir le Canada ensemble ? A paratre (2007) The language planning situation in Algeria , (115 pages dactylographies), in Robert B. Kaplan & Richard B. Baldauf Jr. (eds) Language Plainning : Africa, Volume 2, Clevedon : Multilingual Matters. ARTICLES 1985 The English short vowels and the native speaker of Algerian Arabic , 8 pages, in Revue des Langues I.L.V.E. (Universit dOran), vol.5, 1985, pp.139-147. 1989 A cross-dialectal phonetic description of Algerian Arabic (I.- consonants) , 16 pages, in Cahiers de Dialectologie et de Linguistique Contrastive, (Universit dOran), Vol. 1, 1989, pp.23-38. 1993 Larabe algrien vhicule de la modernit , 11 pages, in Cahiers de Linguistique Sociale, (Universit de Rouen), Vol. 22, 1993, pp.33-43. 1994 On English and Arabic [k] and [q] , 12 pages, in Zeitschrift fur Dialektologie und Linguistik, Vol.76, 1994, pp. 7-38. 1995 The role of pronunciation , 15 pages, in Idologies dans le monde anglo-saxon, N8,1995, pp.107-121. 1995 La langue perdue , 13 pages, in Esprit, N208, janvier 1995, pp.35-47. [Texte repris dans louvrage collectif cit plus haut 4)] 1996 Des langues pour rsister , 13 pages, in Passerelles Revue d'tudes Interculturelles, N12, automne 1996, pp.171-183. 1997 Word stress A source of unintelligibility in English , 9 pages, in International Review of Applied Linguistics (I.R.A.L.), Vol.35, N3, aot 1997, pp.157-165. 1999 Algrie: les traumatismes de la langue et le ra, 18 pages, in Esprit, N251, mars/avril 1999, pp.18-35. 1999 Les filles contre les mres , 18 pages, in LIDIL. Revue de Linguistique et de Didactique des Langues, N19, juin 1999, pp.11-28. 1999/2000 Arabisation and creativity , 11 pages, in The Journal of Algerian Studies, Vols. 4 & 5, pp.49-58.

2001 Pauvre Algrie... , 3 pages, in Esprit, N6 de juin 2001, pp.186-188. 2001 Poor Algeria , 4 pages, in Mediterraneans/Mditerranens, N12, t 2001, pp.280-283. 2002 Lhybride chez Anglophones et Francophones africains , 16 pages, in Idologies dans le monde anglo-saxon, N13, mars 2002, pp.151-166. 2002 La question de la langue en Irlande : entre ancien et nouveau , 16 pages, in Idologies dans le monde anglo-saxon, N13, mars 2002, pp.167-182. 2002 Ecole et plurilinguisme en Algrie : un exemple de politique linguistique ducative ngative , 9 pages, in Education et socits plurilingues, N 13, dcembre 2002, pp. 73-80. 2003 La communication dans une technocratie post-idologique: langlais comme lingua franca / Communication in a post-ideological technocratic world: English as a lingua franca , 8 pages dactylographies, in http://www.u-grenoble3.fr/ciesimsa/colloques/pdf/ch-6.pdf 2003 Compte-rendu du livre dirig par Laura Wright et intitul The Development of Standard English, 1300-1800 : Theories, Descriptions, Conflicts (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3 pages, in Language Policy, Volume 2, N3, pp.288-290. 2004 Epuisement de la lgitimation par la langue , 22 pages, in Nmsis, Revue danalyse juridique et politique (Revue de lUniversit de Perpignan), N5, 2004, pp.81-102. 2004 Language and politics in Algeria , 20 pages, in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (Frank Cass Editors), Vol. 10, N1, 2004, pp.59-78. 2006 Voyage en Algrie, pays des 66 milliards de dollars de rserve et de limmense dsespoir des jeunes , 16 pages, Esprit, N 12, dcembre 2006, pp.61-75. A paratre (en 2007) Variabilit en anglais : tude de cas (13 pages dactylographies), in Actes du 12me Colloque dAvril sur lAnglais Oral, colloque organis par lAssociation des anglicistes pour les tudes de langue orale dans lenseignement suprieur, secondaire et lmentaire (A.L.O.E.S.). A paratre (en 2007) Language maintenance and spread : French in Algeria (20 pages dactylographies), in International Journal of Francophone Studies, Volume 10. A paratre (en 2007) Language-in-education planning in Algeria : Historical development and current issues (18 pages dactylographies), in Language Policy, Volume 6. ARTICLES DE VULGARISATION 1989 Que deviennent donc nos dialectes ? , in Rvolution Africaine (revue hebdomadaire algrienne), N 1339, novembre 1989, pp.43. 1990 Hors jeu! , in Horizons (quotidien algrien), N1367, 15 fvrier 1990, p.6. 1990 Le bilinguisme est-il une tare? , in Parcours Maghrbins (hebdomadaire algrien), Nouvelle Srie, N 23, 16-29 avril 1990, p.22. 1990/1991 Quand le symbolique lemporte sur la ralit (1re Partie) , in Le Nouvel Hebdo (hebdomadaire algrien), N, 26-31 dcembre 1990, pp.10-11 ; Quand le symbolique l'emporte sur la ralit (2me Partie) , in Le Nouvel Hebdo (hebdomadaire algrien), N 28, 2-8 janvier 1991, pp. 2021. 1992 La modernit passe par larabe algrien (1re Partie) , in LHebdo Libr (hebdomadaire algrien), N 63, 10-16 juin 1992, pp.26-28 ; La modernit passe par larabe algrien (2me Partie) ,

in LHebdo Libr (hebdomadaire algrien), N 64, 17-23 juin 1992, pp.22-24 ; La modernit passe par larabe algrien (3me Partie) , in LHebdo Libr (hebdomadaire algrien), N 65, 24-30 juin 1992, pp.24-26. 1993 La haine de soi (1re Partie) , in Ruptures (hebdomadaire algrien), N18, 11-17 mai 1993, pp.22-23 ; La haine de soi (2me Partie) , in Ruptures (hebdomadaire algrien), N19, (18-24 mai 1993), pp.22-23. 1993 Arabe classique-Arabe algrien/ Le dbat ne fait que commencer , in El Watan (quotidien algrien), N 882, du 25 aot 1993, p.7. 1995 La purification linguistique , in Tlrama Hors-Srie Algrie: la culture face la terreur , mars 1995, pp.36-39. 1998 Quatre Algriens de Grenoble sexpriment , in Interpeuples, janvier 1998, pp.6-14. 1998 Les dnis de larabisation , in Libration (quotidien franais) du 26 juin 1998, pp.4-5. 1999 Bouteflika arrachera-t-il lAlgrie son enfermement ? , in Libration (quotidien franais) du 13 septembre 1999, pp.6-7. 1999 Les dangers de lArabie Saoudite , in Libration (quotidien franais) du 29 septembre 1999, p.8. 2000 Enrico refoul par les islamistes , in Libration (quotidien franais) du 7 mars 2000, p.8. 2001 Le dsespoir algrien , in Libration (quotidien franais) du 2 mai 2001, p.6. 2001 La maldiction du marchal Bugeaud , in Le Figaro (quotidien franais) du 4 mai 2001, p.16. 2001 Bouteflika, lotage consentant , in Le Figaro (quotidien franais) du 18 juin 2001, p.14. 2002 Lurgence dune rforme scolaire en Algrie , in Libration (quotidien franais) du 2 octobre 2002, p.7. 2005 Etat algrien et question des langues , in Linha Imagint (publication de lAssociation Carrefour Culturel Arnaud-Bernard de Toulouse), No. 64, 4me trimestre 2005, pp. 3-7. 2006 Il faut dcoloniser les esprits , in Libration (quotidien franais) du 26 juin 2006, p.28.

http://countrystudies.us/algeria/51.htm

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES

Algeria Table of Contents

The origins of the Berbers are unclear; a number of waves of people, some from Western Europe, some from sub-Saharan Africa, and others from Northeast Africa, eventually settled in North Africa and made up its indigenous population. Because present-day Berbers and the overwhelming majority of the Arabs largely descend from the same indigenous stock, physical distinctions carry little or no social connotation and are in most instances impossible to make. The term Berber is derived from the Greeks, who used it to refer to the people of North Africa. The term was retained by the Romans, Arabs, and other groups who occupied the region, but is not used by the people themselves. Identification with the Berber or Arab community is largely a matter of personal choice rather than of membership in discrete and bounded social entities. In addition to their own language, many adult Berbers also speak Arabic and French; for centuries Berbers have entered the general society and merged, within a generation or two, into the Arab group. This permeable boundary between the two major ethnic groups permits a good deal of movement and, along with other factors, prevents the development of rigid and exclusive ethnic blocs. It appears that whole groups slipped across the ethnic "boundary" in the past-and others may do so in the future. In areas of linguistic contiguity, bilingualism is common, and in most cases Arabic eventually comes to predominate. Algerian Arabs, or native speakers of Arabic, include descendants of Arab invaders and of indigenous Berbers. Since 1966, however, the Algerian census no longer has had a category for Berbers; thus, it is only an estimate that Algerian Arabs, the major ethnic group of the country, constitute 80 percent of Algeria's people and are culturally and politically dominant. The mode of life of Arabs varies from region to region. Nomadic herders are found in the desert, settled cultivators and gardeners in the Tell, and urban dwellers on the coast. Linguistically, the various Arab groups differ little from each other, except that dialects spoken by nomadic and seminomadic peoples are thought to be derived from beduin dialects; the dialects spoken by the sedentary population of the north are thought to stem from those of early seventh-century invaders. Urban Arabs are more apt to identify with the Algerian nation, whereas ethnic loyalties of more remote rural Arabs are likely to be limited to the tribe. The major Berber groups are the Kabyles of the Kabylie Mountains east of Algiers and the Chaouia of the Aurs range south of Constantine. Smaller groups include the Mzab of the northern Sahara region and the Tuareg of the southern Ahaggar highlands, both of which have clearly definable characteristics. The Berber peasantry can also be found in the Atlas Mountains close to Blida, and on the massifs of Dahra and Ouarsenis on either side of the Chelif River valley. Altogether, the Berbers constitute about 20 percent of the population. In the hills north of the Chelif River and in some other parts of the Tell, Berbers live in villages among the sedentary Arabs, not sharply distinguished in their way of life from the Arabic speakers but maintaining their own language and a sense of ethnic identity. In addition, in some oasis towns of the Algerian Sahara, small Berber groups remain

unassimilated to Arab culture and retain their own language and some of their cultural differences. By far the largest of the Berber-speaking groups, the Kabyles, do not refer to themselves as Berbers but as Imazighen or, in the singular, as Amazigh, which means noble or free men. Some traces of the original blue-eyed and blond-haired Berbers survive to contrast the people from this region with the darker- skinned Arabic speakers of the plains. The land is poor, and the pressure of a dense and rapidly growing population has forced many to migrate to France or to the coastal cities. Kabyles can be found in every part of the country, but in their new environments they tend to gather and to retain some of their clan solidarity and sense of ethnic identity. Kabyle villages, built on the crests of hills, are close- knit, independent, social and political units composed of a number of extended patrilineal kin groups. Traditionally, local government consisted of a jamaa (village council), which included all adult males and legislated according to local custom and law. Efforts to modify this democratic system were only partially successful, and the jamaa has continued to function alongside the civil administration. The majority of Berber mountain peasants hold their land as mulk, or private property, in contrast to those of the valleys and oases where the tribe retains certain rights over land controlled by its members. Set apart by their habitat, language, and well-organized village and social life, Kabyles have a highly developed sense of independence and group solidarity. They have generally opposed incursions of Arabs and Europeans into their region, and much of the resistance activity during the War of Independence was concentrated in the Kabylie. Major Kabyle uprisings took place against the French in 1871, 1876, and 1882; the Chaouia rebelled in 1879. Perhaps half as numerous as the Kabyles and less densely settled, the Chaouia have occupied the rugged Aurs Mountains of eastern Algeria since their retreat to that region from Tunisia during the Arab invasions of the Middle Ages. In the north they are settled agriculturalists, growing grain in the uplands and fruit trees in the valleys. In the arid south, with its date-palm oases, they are seminomadic, shepherding flocks to the high plains during the summer. The distinction between the two groups is limited, however, because the farmers of the north are also drovers, and the seminomads of the south maintain plots of land. In the past, the Chaouia lived in isolation broken only by visits of Kabyle peddlers and Saharan camel raisers, and relatively few learned to speak either French or Arabic. Like their society, their economy was self-sufficient and closed. Emigration was limited, but during the War of Independence the region was a stronghold of anti-French sentiment, and more than one-half of the population was removed to concentration camps. During the postindependence era, the ancient Chaouia isolation has lessened. Far less numerous than their northern Berber kin are the Mzab, whose number was estimated at 100,000 in the mid-1980s. They live beside the Oued Mzab, from which comes their name. Ghardaa was their largest and most important oasis community. The Mzab are Ibadi Muslims who practice a puritanical form of Islam that emphasizes asceticism, literacy for men and women, and social egalitarianism.

The Mzab used to be important in trans-Saharan trade but now have moved into other occupations. Some of their members have moved to the cities, where in Algiers, for example, they dominate the grocery and butchery business. They have also extended their commerce south to sub-Saharan Africa, where they and other tribal people trade with cash and letters of exchange, make loans on the harvest, and sell on credit. Of all Berber subgroups, the Tuareg until recently have been the least affected by the outside world. Known as "the blue men" because of their indigo-dyed cotton robes and as "people of the veil" because the men--but not the women--always veil, the Tuareg inhabit the Sahara from southwest Libya to Mali. In southern Algeria, they are concentrated in the highlands of Tassili-n- Ajjer and Ahaggar and in the 1970s were estimated to number perhaps 5,000 to 10,000. They are organized into tribes and, at least among the Ahaggar Tuareg, into a three-tiered class system of nobles, vassals, and slaves and servants, the last group often being of negroid origin. Tuareg women enjoy high status and many privileges. They do not live in seclusion, and their social responsibilities equal those of men. In the past, the Tuareg were famed as camel and cattle herdsmen and as guides and protectors of caravans that plied between West Africa and North Africa. Both occupations have greatly declined during the twentieth century under the impact of colonial and independent government policies, technology, and consumerism associated with the hydrocarbon industry and, most recently, drought. The result has been the breakup of the old social hierarchy and gradual sedentarization around such oases as Djanet and Tamanrasset. Although of considerable importance before independence, the non-Muslim minorities have shrunk to a mere fraction of their former size. Immediately after independence approximately 1 million Europeans, including 140,000 Jews, left the country. Most of the Europeans who left had French citizenship, and all identified with French rather than Arab culture and society. During colonial times, the Algerian and European groups had effectively formed two separate subsocieties having little social interaction or intermarriage except among highly Europeanized Algerians. In the early 1980s, the total foreign population was estimated at roughly 117,000. Of this number, about 75,000 were Europeans, including about 45,000 French. Many foreigners worked as technicians and teachers. http://countrystudies.us/algeria/52.htm

Languages: Arabic and Berber

Algeria Table of Contents

Except for Europeans, ethnic communities in Algeria were distinguished primarily by language. Before the arrival of Arabic-speaking invaders, Berber was the language of the indigenous population. Arabic encroached gradually, spreading through the areas most accessible to migrants and conquerors. Berber remained the mother tongue in many rural areas. Arabic, the language of the majority and the official language of the country, is a Semitic

tongue related to Hebrew, Aramaic, and Amharic. The dominant language throughout North Africa and the Middle East, Arabic was introduced to the coastal regions by the Arab conquerors of the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. Arabic language and culture had an even greater impact under the influence of the beduin Arabs, who arrived in greater numbers from the eleventh century onward. Written Arabic is psychologically and sociologically important as the vehicle of Islam and Arab culture and as the link with other Arab countries. Two forms are used: the classical Arabic of the Quran and Algerian dialectical Arabic. Classical Arabic is the essential base of written Arabic and formal speech throughout the Arab world. It is the vehicle of a vast religious, scientific, historical, and literary heritage. Arabic scholars or individuals with a good classical education from any country can converse with one another. In classical Arabic as in other Semitic scripts, only the consonants are written; vowel signs and other diacritical marks to aid in pronunciation are employed occasionally in printed texts. The script is cursive, lending itself to use as decoration. There has been considerable borrowing of words between Berber and Arabic. In some Arabic-speaking areas, the words for various flora and fauna are still in Berber, and Berber place-names are numerous throughout the country, some of them borrowed. Examples of Berber place-names are Illizi, Skikda, Tamanrasset, Tipasa, and Tizi Ouzou. Berber is primarily a spoken language, although an ancient Berber script called tifinagh survives among the Tuareg of the Algerian Sahara, where the characters are used more for special purposes than for communication. Several Berber dialect groups are recognized in modern Algeria, but only Kabyle and Chaouia are spoken by any considerable number. The Chaouia dialect, which is distinguishable from but related to Kabyle, bears the mark and influence of Arabic. Separate dialects, however, are spoken by the Tuareg and by the Mzab.

http://countrystudies.us/algeria/53.htm

Arabization
Algeria Table of Contents

Of all Arab countries subject to European rule, Algeria absorbed the heaviest colonial impact. The French controlled education, government, business, and most intellectual life for 132 years and through a policy of cultural imperialism attempted to suppress Algerian cultural identity and to remold the society along French lines. The effects of this policy, which continued to reverberate throughout Algeria after 1962, have perhaps been most evident in the legacy of a dual language system. French colonial policy was explicitly designed to "civilize" the country by imposing French language and culture on it. A French report written on the eve of the French conquest noted that in 1830 the literacy rate in Algeria was 40 percent, a remarkable rate even by modern standards. Quranic schools were primarily responsible for literacy in Algeria, as reading meant being able to learn the Quran. Twenty years later, only half the

schools continued to operate as a result of the French colonial policy of dismantling the existing education system and replacing it with a French system. As a result, education was oriented toward French, and advanced education in literary Arabic declined drastically. Dialectical Arabic remained the language of everyday discourse among the vast majority of the population, but it was cut off from contemporary intellectual and technological developments and consequently failed to develop the flexibility and vocabulary needed for modern bureaucratic, financial, and intellectual affairs. The better schools and the University of Algiers aimed at comparability with French institutions and prepared students for French examinations. Gradually, a small but influential Frenchspeaking indigenous elite was formed, who competed with European colonists for jobs in the modern sector. Berbers, or more specifically, Kabyles, were represented in disproportionately large numbers in this elite because the French, as part of their "divide and rule" policy, deliberately favored Kabyles in education and employment in the colonial system. As a result, in the years after independence Kabyles moved into all levels of state administration across Algeria, where they remained a large and influential group. In reaction to French cultural and linguistic imperialism, the leaders of the War of Independence (1954-62) and successive governments committed themselves to reviving indigenous Arabic and Islamic cultural values and to establishing Arabic as the national language. The aim was to recover the precolonial past and to use it, together with Arabic, to restore--if not create--a national identity and personality for the new state and population. Translated into an official policy called arabization, it was consistently supported by arabists, who were ascendant in the Algerian government following independence. Their goal was a country where the language (Arabic), religion (Islam), and national identity (Algerian) were free, as far as practical, of French language and influence. Culturally, the emphasis was on developing the various forms of public communication and on cultivating Algerian themes that could then be popularized through these media. The major effort, however, centered on language, and it was the quest for a "national" language that became the hallmark of arabization and that has aroused the most controversy and outright opposition. Beginning in the late 1960s, the government of President Houari Boumediene decided upon complete arabization as a national goal and began the first steps to promote Arabic in the bureaucracy and in the schools. Arabization was introduced slowly in schools, starting with the primary schools and in social science and humanities subjects; only in the 1980s did Arabic begin to be introduced as the language of instruction in some grades and some subjects at the secondary level. The problems inherent in the process of language promotion immediately came to the fore. One of the most obvious involved literary Arabic, a language in which many Algerians were not conversant. Qualified Arabic teachers were almost totally lacking. Other obstacles included the widespread use of French in the state-run media and the continued preference for French as the working language of government and of urban society. It soon became obvious to students who obtained an education in Arabic that their prospects for gainful employment were bleak without facility in French, a fact that contributed to general public

skepticism about the program. Important as these problems were, the real opposition came from two main quarters: the "modernizers" among bureaucrats and technocrats and the Berbers, or, more specifically, the Kabyles. For the urban elite, French constituted the medium of modernization and technology. French facilitated their access to Western commerce and to economic development theory and culture, and their command of the language guaranteed their continued social and political prominence. The Kabyles identified with these arguments. Young Kabyle students were particularly vocal in expressing their opposition to arabization. In the early 1980s, their movement and demands formed the basis of the "Berber question" or the Kabyle "cultural movement." Militant Kabyles complained about "cultural imperialism" and "domination" by the Arabicspeaking majority. They vigorously opposed arabization of the education system and the government bureaucracy. They also demanded recognition of the Kabyle dialect as a primary national language, respect for Berber culture, and greater attention to the economic development of Kabylie and other Berber homelands. The Kabyle "cultural movement" was more than a reaction against arabization. Rather, it challenged the centralizing policies the national government had pursued since 1962 and sought wider scope for regional development free of bureaucratic controls. Essentially, the issue was the integration of Kabylie into the Algerian body politic. To the extent that the Kabyle position reflected parochial Kabyle interests and regionalism, it did not find favor with other Berber groups or with Algerians at large. Long-simmering passions about arabization boiled over in late 1979 and early 1980. In response to demands of Arabic-language university students for increased arabization, Kabyle students in Algiers and Tizi Ouzou, the provincial capital of Kabylie, went on strike in the spring of 1980. At Tizi Ouzou, the students were forcibly cleared from the university, an action that precipitated tension and a general strike throughout Kabylie. A year later, there were renewed Kabyle demonstrations. The government's response to the Kabyle outburst was firm yet cautious. Arabization was reaffirmed as official state policy, but it proceeded at a moderate pace. The government quickly reestablished a chair of Berber studies at the University of Algiers that had been abolished in 1973 and promised a similar chair for the University of Tizi Ouzou, as well as language departments for Berber and dialectical Arabic at four other universities. At the same time, levels of development funding for Kabylie were increased significantly. By the mid-1980s, arabization had begun to produce some measurable results. In the primary schools, instruction was in literary Arabic; French was taught as a second language, beginning in the third year. On the secondary level, arabization was proceeding on a grade-by-grade basis. French remained the main language of instruction in the universities, despite the demands of arabists. A 1968 law requiring officials in government ministries to acquire at least minimal facility in literary Arabic has produced spotty results. The Ministry of Justice came closest to the goal by arabizing internal functions and all court proceedings during the 1970s. Other ministries, however, were slower to follow suit, and French remained in general use. An

effort was also made to use radio and television to popularize literary Arabic. By the mid1980s, programming in dialectical Arabic and Berber had increased, whereas broadcasts in French had declined sharply. The arabization issue developed political aspects as well. For example, in 1991 when political parties were allowed to form and run in national elections, the Front of Socialist Forces, headed by Hocine Ait Ahmed, representing the Kabyle people, ran on a secular and culturally pluralist platform. Another party, also representing the Kabyle, was the Rally for Culture and Democracy, which ran on a platform defending Kabyle culture and opposing the exclusive use of Arabic at the official level and all programs of arabization.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2e792,49749d64a,0.html

World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Algeria : Berbers

Updated May 2008

Profile

Estimated population in (2004): Between 6.6 and 9.9 million est. Ethnicity: Kabyle, Shawiya, Mozabites and Tuareg First language/s: Tamazight Religion/s: Islam, some Christianity and traditional beliefs Berbers call themselves Imazighen, meaning noble or free born. The term 'Berber' derives from the Greek barbario and the Latin barbari from which Arabs derived the term 'barbariy', meaning primitive or foreign. The Berber-speaking population of Algeria constitutes a little over one quarter of the population and is concentrated in the mainly mountainous areas of Kabylia, Aurs, the M'zab and the Sahara. The Berber culture is not homogenous. Its existing constituent subcultures have relatively little in common outside the common root of their spoken dialects. About half of the Berber-speaking population is concentrated in the mountainous areas east of Algiers Kabylia and this area and its language have been at the centre of most Berber issues in modern Algeria. Over time the Kabyles have moved in large numbers to the cities of both Algeria and France in search of employment. The second largest Berber group, the Shawiya, inhabit the rugged mountains of eastern

Algeria. Two smaller Berber communities are the Mozabites of the area around Ghardaia and the Tuareg nomads of the south. The 12,000 Tuareg, who are nomadic Berbers, live almost exclusively in the mountainous massifs of Ajjer and Ahaggar in southern Algeria. Geographical dispersion of Berber-speakers has hindered the emergence of a common identity. Kabyles are the most cosmopolitan and are more likely to speak French than other groups. All Berbers, except Mozabites, are Sunni Muslims.

Historical context

Berbers are the indigenous inhabitants of the North African littoral, isolated from the rest of Africa by the Sahara Desert. Periods of control by the Carthage and Roman empires were interspersed with the establishment of Berber kingdoms. Most Berbers were Christian prior to the mid-seventh century, when waves of Arab migration into the region brought cultural changes and introduced Islam. Although rural Berber life remained largely unchanged, those living in the cities saw their language, tribal law and oral literary traditions meld with Arabic traditions. From the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries, forced back into the mountain regions by the city-based sultanates, the Berbers refused to recognize central authority or to pay taxes. At independence, Arabic became the sole official language of Algeria. Linguistic and cultural expressions of Berber were forbidden, and this created resentment among Berber-speakers, as did attempts to increase the numbers of Arabicspeakers in the administration. In 1963, Hocine Ait Ahmed, a Kabyle leader of the anti-French resistance, led a revolt against the government. The revolt was crushed, and Ait Ahmed was arrested and sentenced to death; he later fled to France, where he formed the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS). Ahmed Ben Bella, independent Algeria's first leader, linked the Arabization of the state to the success of socialism. Government policy aimed at centralization. The government's authority and its claim to legitimacy was based upon its leadership in the struggle for independence, yet Berbers had played a full part in that struggle. The 1990 Arabization bill projected the complete Arabization of the administration and schools by 1992 and of higher education institutions by 2000. Although the government feared Berber separatism, there appears to be little support for separatism. There is support, however, for a greater recognition of Berber identity and rights for Berber-speakers within a more democratic and

pluralist Algerian state. The most enduring form of Berber opposition has come from broader based cultural movements.

Opposition to Arabization

The Kabyle capital, Tizi-Ouzou, is the bastion of opposition to Arabization. Throughout the 1970s, Berber musicians and poets used a modernized form of traditional Berber music to implicitly criticize the Algerian regime. Although popular demand eventually forced the government to allow such music to be broadcast, singers and groups were not allowed to perform in the Kabyle region. In 1980, when the government banned a lecture on ancient Kabyle poetry at TiziOuzou University, demonstrations and strikes took place throughout the region and other Berber areas, spreading to Algiers. These were met with violence by government troops; over 30 people died and several hundred were injured and arrested. The Berber Cultural Movement, founded in the late 1960s, and other Berber organizations have generally supported the idea of Algeria as a bilingual state, with recognition given to the Berber language and to colloquial Arabic, which, rather than literary Arabic, is the language of the majority of the population. As a result they have often allied themselves to non-Berbers who wish to achieve a more democratic and pluralist society. In 1985 there were further arrests and imprisonment of Berber activists. The spontaneous nationwide protests of October 1988 in which Berbers participated in Algiers and in Kabylia forced the Algerian government to support constitutional change including ending the one-party system. In July 1989 the national assembly passed a new law on political parties that allowed for groups independent of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) to apply for registration and to compete in national elections. Among those parties that applied were the FFS and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), another Berber-based political organization. The new law however prohibited groups based 'exclusively on a particular religion, language, region, sex or race' and states that parties must use only the Arabic languages in their official communiqus.

Tuareg

Tuareg are nomadic Berbers. Raiding and the control of caravan routes were the traditional mainstays of Tuareg economic activities in pre-colonial times, but increasing French control limited raiding and necessitated the development of salt

caravans to Niger. Independence brought the almost total disruption of Tuareg society with its large class of slaves, iklan, brought from Sudan, and former slaves, haratin. Socialist ideology and nationalism committed Algeria to the assimilation of minority groups and the welding of the north and south into a unified state. Freed slaves, haratin, began to rise against the Tuareg and refuse to pay their contract dues for cultivating land. Violent skirmishes resulted in the imprisonment of some Tuareg and a policy of promoting sedentary lifestyles through the construction of cooperatives. By the end of the 1960s the Tuareg had little choice but to assimilate into the Algerian system.

Current issues

In 2001, years of Berber agitation for greater recognition of their Tamazight language, music and culture culminated in rioting, and dozens of deaths. The government amended the constitution in October 2001 to make Berber a 'national', but not an 'official' language. The implementation in January 2005 of further vague government concessions to Berber demands, stemming from the unrest in 2001, has been since been overshadowed by a deal between the government and Islamic extremists. In February 2006, the cabinet of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika declared a sixmonth amnesty for most Islamist militants who were involved in the civil war of the 1990s if they agreed to disarm, but by its expiration fewer than 300 militants had accepted the offer. The sweeping 'law implementing the charter on peace and national reconciliation' also criminalized discussion of the conflict. Some Berber organisations that favour a secular Algerian state, such as the Movement for Autonomy in Kabylie, feared that the Bouteflika government was getting too close to the Islamists, even as this relationship remained ambivalent. In October 2006, the president of the Popular Assembly in the Tizi Ouzou province of the Kabylie region was shot and killed. The government blamed Islamic militants for this and two other assassinations of Berber leaders over the previous 13 months. Major Kabyle centres, especially the key wilaya (province) of Tizi Ouzou, have seen a growth in what one local commentator refers to as 'militant apathy' among the Berberophone electorate. This resulted in historically low turnouts in the legislative elections of May 2007, with a repeat looking likely in munuicipal elections due in November 2007. In addition, there has been an increase in local tensions within nationally based parties including the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS). In the southern town of Berriane, three days of fighting erupted between rival Berber and Arab gangs in May 2008.

http://www.amazighworld.org/history/modernhistory/berber_movement_morocco _algeria.php

The Berber Tamazight Movement in Morocco and Algeria by Amin Kazak, Ph.D.
The Berber Role in the Liberation Struggle The Berber Question in Morocco The Berber Question in Algeria The Berber Question in the Maghreb In July 1994, a delegation of Berbers from Morocco presented testimony on their own behalf at the annual meeting of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, in Geneva. The presentation indicates that Berbers have identified themselves as "indigenous," fulfilling a major criterion for their identification as such by others. Indigenous peoples are recognized operationally through self-definition (as one of several criteria) by both the International Labor Organization and the World Bank. This article seeks to expand the broader consciousness of the global indigenous movement by supporting the recognition of Berbers and elaborating upon the testimony they provided at the Working Group meeting.1

The Berbers have inhabited North Africa for thousands of years and today live in a vast area extending through the several countries that constitute the "Maghreb" region (the western Mediterranean coast of North Africa): Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.2 Although the details of their origins are uncertain,3 it can be asserted that the Berber people inhabited North Africa thousands of years ago; they were situated where they exist today (through the expanse of the Atlas Mountains) at the time when the first invaders of the region who recorded history came upon them. It is further safe to say, then, that the Berber case corresponds to that of any indigenous nation of the Americas.4 A long history of intermixing among different peoples has extended over centuries, however, and the processes of intermarriage, acculturation, cultural diffusion, and ethnocide have made it problematic to find pure strains of race and culture. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the enlarged working definition employed by the International Labor Organization (ILO) to establish Berber identity as indigenous. These criteria, besides self-definition, include isolation, discrimination, marginalization, and most importantly, the occupation of particular territories at the time of the establishment of present state boundaries. The harshness of the discriminatory treatment historically given to the Berbers in North Africa clearly fits them within the expectations of the ILO definition. That treatment has propelled the question of self-definition among Berbers by generating a resistance rooted in their awareness of cultural and national identity. Today, the Berbers are concentrated in six main groups: the Rif, Braber, Shluh, and Soussi, in Morocco, and the Kabyles and Shawiya, in Algeria.5 These main groups are subdivided into numerous tribes that live in the Atlas highlands and along the Mediterranean coast. Cultural relatives of the Berbers include the inhabitants of the Saharan oasis towns of Touggourt,

Ouargla, Ghardaia and Figuig, and the regions of M'zab, Gourara, and Touat (see map on page 11), and the Tuaregs of the central and southern Sahara (see the companion article on Tuaregs in this issue of the FWB). Collectively, the Berbers refer to themselves simply as "Imazighen," which translates as "free and noble men," and has become a major indicator of Berber self-awareness and nationalism. During the third millenium, B.C., the Berbers formed a loosely confederated network of kingdoms behind the coastal areas that fell under the control, first, of Carthage, and later, Rome. The Berber kings had treaties of friendship with both Carthage and Rome.6 In the late seventh century A.D., Muslim Arabs invaded North Africa, and by the end of the ninth century, they had completely subdued the Berber countryside and Islamized most of the Berbers. The arrival of the Arabs prevented the Berber language from developing a written form. Writing was reserved for Arabic, which became the vehicle of propaganda as the new conquerors spread the Holy Word through the Koran. Arabization transformed the Berbers in three distinct stages. The first stage was the initial contact between the Arab invaders. The second began with the arrival of more Arab families from the Mashreg (the east) in the eleventh century. During the third stage, from the 15th to the 17th centuries, Arabization was accelerated by the arrival of Andalusian refugees who had been expelled by Christians from the last lands occupied by Arabs in Spain.7 Although they accepted Islam as a new religion, Berbers also maintained their pre-Islamic cultural and ritual traditions. Islamization and Arabization were never capable of completely erasing Berber culture. Indigenous inhabitants of the lowlands of the Sahara were more directly subjected to the dominance of Arabic influence, but the Berbers who took sanctuary in the highlands of the Atlas Mountains were able to sustain and preserve their own language, culture, distinctive customs and forms of social organization. Among the strongest of these highland peoples, the Kabyles (the largest of the Berber nations) inhabited the mountains east of Algiers. There, on the crests of hills, they built villages in which close-knit, independent, social and political units were composed of extended patrilineal kin groups. Traditionally, Berber local government consisted of a jamaa (village council), which included all adult males and legislated according to local custom and law. Arab efforts to modify that traditional system were not very successful, and it has since then continued to function alongside the civil administrations imposed by a succession of state regimes. Set apart by their territory, language, and well organized village and social life, the Berbers acquired a highly developed sense of independence and group solidarity. Having this unity, they were able to prevent and resist the encroachment of Europeans and Arabs into their territory. They continued to follow the path taken by their ancestors and to believe in the traditional ideals of a society they wanted to preserve.

The Berber Role in the Liberation Struggle

At the beginning of the 19th century, political anarchy and economic dependency in the Maghreb made the region vulnerable to the imperial intentions of Europeans, especially the French. The region was under the control of the Ottoman Turks, in 1830, when the French took control of Algiers and then gradually extended military control over the coastal region.8 From the beginning, French imperial policy in North Africa proved to be destructive and

violent.9 Militarily, the French controlled the whole region, with the exception of wide pockets in the Atlas Mountain highlands (that were inhabited primarily by Berbers). The colonial French deliberately destroyed the local Maghreb economy while opening the gates to settlement by French civilians. The colonial administration used modern capitalistic interpretations of Roman Law as a means to dispossess the population (including the Berbers) of its territorial domain. By confounding pasture land with uncultivated land, and jointly owned property with collective property, and by extending the limits of forest lands, the French confined their colonized subjects to progressively diminished space and resources.10 The colonial policy was intended to divide and rule. Juridically, the French applied their own laws, while breaking down the Islamic legal structure. The policy of containment of Berbers (confining their territorial space), while suppressing the Islamic judicial system, drove a wedge between the traditional Arab elites and the Berber peasants. In Morocco (where the same French colonial policy as that conducted in Algeria led indirectly to the current national crisis between Arabs and Berbers), the French provided segregated schools for the Berbers, while they tried to rally Berber tribes to the tricolor behind Al-Glawi, a powerful caid (tribal leader) whose base was Marrakech.11 The most effective of the divide-and-rule policies was the infamous Berber dahir (decree) of 16 May 1930. The dahir was issued in Rabat ostensibly to set up tribunals to deal with civil cases in Berber-populated parts of the country. The decree established complete systems of penal and criminal justice, based on French law, which deliberately removed both systems from the jurisdiction of the makzen (traditional authorities). The French justified this "reform" on the need to provide formal recognition to Berber customary law, which was a loose body of tribal rules conforming to and supplementary to Koranic law. This was a transparent pretext for expediting French control of the country by creating division between Arabs and Berbers, through exaggerating their differences and antagonisms.12 The French were blind to the effects they created; they were assuming that "uncivilized" indigenous peoples were awaiting the arrival of the "civilization" they themselves possessed. As a result of the destructive consequences of colonial policy, a series of revolts against the French ensued. The Berbers were always in the forefront against the French, and organized their first revolt in eastern Kabylia, from 1859 to 1871.13 By the time of the Algerian revolution to gain independence from the French, after World War II, the Berbers were still leading the attack. The fact that the Berber areas of Kabylia and Aures provided the strategic bases for the revolution leaders indicates Berber involvement from the outset of the struggle.14 Despite the Berber commitment to the cause of national unity and liberation in North Africa, however, the legacy of colonial policy continued into the post-independence era in the form of intensifying antagonism between the Arabs and the Berbers, particularly in Algeria. Both the Algerian and the Moroccan regimes have systematically pursued de-Berberization and Arabization policies as well as discriminatory exclusion of Berbers from equal access to government services and political power, and the enjoyment of economic and cultural rights. The neglect of and deliberate assaults against the Berbers' Tamazight language15 and culture are reflected in the economic policies governing the peripheral rural communities. In the past, these indigenous communities were based on the principle of collective ownership of the means of production and collective methods of dispute resolution. Now, traditional structures

have been seriously eroded under the strong and sustained pressure of the monetary economic system which is founded on concentrated capital, individual ownership of property, and the proletarianization of the poor peasantry now transformed into wage earners who possess neither capital nor the means of production. Berber cultural survival necessitates the comprehension of the multidimensional character of North Africa. To reduce North Africa to one cultural model would be neither possible nor acceptable. Berbers view cultural domination by the Arab-speaking majority and the attempt to capture and convert non-Arabs as simply one more out of many experiences of cultural imperialism to which they have been subjected. Today, Berbers vigorously oppose Arabization and demand recognition of Tamazight as their national language, which they have spoken for 5000 years and which has become the foundation of their collective identity. They also demand respect for the Berber culture and economic development of the Berber homelands. Their demands correspond closely to those enumerated in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

The Berber Question in Morocco

In Morocco, Berber nationalist feelings were embodied in 1984 by a large populist party, the Movement Populaire (Popular Movement) and its charismatic leader, Mahjoubi Aherdane.16 The Popular Movement did not identify itself strictly as representative of the Berbers but rather of "Moroccan rural people." Since the overwhelming majority of the Moroccan rural population is in fact Berber, the Popular Movement became understood as a Berber nationalist party. In 1993, Aherdane's party was reformulated as the National Popular Movement.17 Berbers in Morocco perceive their identity to be threatened primarily by marginalization and exclusion from access to education and media exposure in the country. On 5 August 1991, in an attempt to reinforce the significance of their ethnic identity, a group of Berber cultural associations, including the Moroccan Research and Cultural Exchange Association (in Rabat), the Agadir Summer University Association (in Agadir), the Aghris Cultural Association (in Goulmina), the New Association for Cultural and Popular Arts (in Rabat), the Ilmas Cultural Association (in Nador), and the Soussi Cultural Association (in Casablanca), met in Agadir, Morocco, where they signed the "Agadir Charter" which outlined Berbers demands for the resurrection of the Institute of Tamazight Studies and Research.18 The Institute they proposed would provide the impetus and the framework necessary for any project aiming to promote the Tamazight language and to perform the preliminary tasks of: 1) elaborating a unified alphabetical system to make possible the accurate transcription of the Tamazight language; 2) standardization of the Tamazight grammar; and 3) development of appropriate pedagogical tools for teaching the Tamazight language. The Institute would serve to assist integrating the Tamazight language and culture into various cultural and educational activities, through the insertion of Tamazight language programs at an early stage in the public educational system, and at a later stage, the creation of a department of Tamazight language and culture in every Moroccan university.19 At the time of the Agadir Conference, 1991, a spate of social turmoil was unfolding throughout Morocco. The issues at stake, besides the Berber question, included the violent invasion and annexation of the Western Sahara,20 the corruption of the monarchic dictatorship of King Hassan, and the dubious possibility that Morocco might ever become any kind of democracy. After a series of revolts against the regime and several attempts on King

Hassan's life, the Moroccan government promised to promulgate a new constitution that would permit a more liberal political process, allow opposition political parties to organize, and remove obstacles to the exercise of fundamental civil and political rights of individuals.21 The Moroccan regime managed to placate most of the pressure groups confronting it, including Berber nationalists, through these promises. Despite these changes in the Moroccan constitution that were in fact institutionalized, the government continues to suppress the Tamazight language as a symbol of Berber identity and cultural rights. Although the publication of some newspapers in the Berber language is allowed, editors are often subjected to interrogation by state officials. In March 1994, the Ilmas Cultural Association was prevented from holding a conference on Berber language and writing.22 Similarly, in April 1994, the Moroccan Association for Research and Cultural Exchange was refused permission to organize a special day for Berber theater in the city of Rabat.23 Some Berber activists have been arrested, as well, in a policy that is blatantly discriminatory. Four members from the New Association for Culture and Popular Arts, in Agadir, were put in prison because they published a calendar in the Berber language. On 1 May 1994, Mohamed Hrach Erass, Mbarek Tausse, Ahmed kikche, Ali Aken, Said Jaafer, Omar Darouiche and Omar Ochna were arrested in Er Rachidia after participating in peaceful Labor Day demonstrations. Even though the demonstrations had been authorized by the appropriate officials, and the slogans were familiar to the government, the Berbers were charged with inciting actions threatening law and order and internal state security, chanting slogans attacking the principles of the constitution, and calling for the recognition of the Berber language as an official language.24 Amnesty International (AI) urged the Moroccan authorities to ensure that the activists' trial would be carried out in full accordance with international standards for fairness.25 Due in part to AI's involvement, the Berber issue has acquired recognition as a topic of discussion within the international human rights community. On 3 May 1994, seven secondary school teachers were arrested because they participated in a Mayday demonstration organized by the Democratic Confederation of Workers. They were accused of holding banners in the Berber language and shouting slogans for the recognition of Tamazight in the constitution.26 Such repression demonstrates the vulnerability of the Berber culture and its advocates. It should be no surprise that the campaign to revitalize Berber language and culture has begun to assume stronger forms of resistance.

The Berber Question in Algeria

The Berbers of Algeria have a tradition of political resistance and struggle to regain control of their cultural identity that goes back to the days of the French colony, as outlined above. The context in which they operate is also largely a product of French policy, and within that context, the Berbers tend to be constantly at odds with state authorities. Continuing a policy that originated in Morocco with the dahir of 1930 (explained above), in 1949, the French administration attempted to pass a law in Algeria that would have given an important role to Berber customary principles alongside Islamic law.27 The French policy generated suspicion among the Arabs that there was an active plan for evangelizing the Berbers and Berberizing North Africa.28 The policy's legacy, in the post-independence era, is a lingering atmosphere of mistrust and animosity between Arabs and Berbers. In response,

successive Algerian regimes have pursued policy that has had only one objective: the deBerberization of the country. Antagonistic sentiments between Berbers and the Algerian government became explosive in the "Tamazight Spring" of 1980. Riots were set off when a renowned Berber writer, Mouloud Mammeri, was barred by local Algerian authorities from giving a lecture on ancient Kabyle poetry at the University of Tizi Ouzou. The censoring of Mammeri provoked a strong reaction by the Berbers of the Kabyles, who accused the government of repressing Berber culture. Following the cancellation of Mammeri's lecture, Berber students demonstrated in Algiers and throughout Kabylia, calling for freedom of expression and for recognition of the Berber language and culture. The protesters were violently dispersed by the police and a number of students were arrested. In Tizi Ouzou, students voted in favor of a strike and occupied the University.29 On 20 April 1980, at one o'clock in the morning, the government launched a military operation to retake all the occupied institutions of Tizi Ouzou. Berber students and workers became the victims of widespread repression. Amid rumors that 32 people had been killed during the government onslaught, the Berbers called a general strike first in Tizi Ouzou and then in the entire region of Greater Kabylia. The government reacted by blocking roads and isolating the region from the rest of the country.30 Between 21 and 24 April, the populations of surrounding Berber villages joined the protests in Tizi Ouzou, building barricades to confront the police and government troops. Violent clashes took place between the Berber demonstrators and the police. After government troops subdued the demonstrators, many students, workers and activists were arrested. Under sustained pressure from a highly mobilized Berber community, all those arrested during the four days of rioting were released from custody. In hopes of putting an end to the uprising, the Algerian regime took a number of measures to alleviate certain hardships, making promises to support Berber culture, including the creation of university chairs of Berber Studies. However, these promises largely were deceitful and went unrealized. Following the bloody clashes in Tizi Ouzou (the capital of Great Kabylie), the Mouvement Cultural Berbre (MCB--the Berber Cultural Movement) gained considerable momentum, not only against the state, led by the Front de Liberation National (FLN--the Algerian ruling party), but also against the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalists. The MCB, founded in the late 1960s, has remained the primary ideological counterweight to Islamism.31 In August 1980, the government organized a one month seminar to take stock of the Berber situation. An elaborate project was designed for the advancement of all aspects of Berber culture, the first such democratic experience to have taken place in Algeria since independence. The plan was sent for review to the FLN Central Committee, whose annual meeting was scheduled for September. Once official contacts took place between the FLN and the MCB, however, the government progressively reasserted its authority to uncontested rule. None of the numerous promises made in 1980 were kept, and by 1981 the status quo ante was virtually reestablished.32 While demonstrating its potential as the most significant opposition force in Algeria, the MCB successfully gained considerable popular support throughout Kabylia and the area surrounding Algiers, the capital. During the 1980s, the movement succeeded in inspiring resistance to the regime and even rebellion in other parts of the country. The MCB demanded

that Berber identity and culture be respected and officially promoted. They also specifically demanded, among other things: the official recognition of the Berber component of Algerian identity; the promotion of the Algerian popular culture, be it Arabic or Berber; and the official recognition of Berber language (Tamazight) and colloquial Arabic as national languages and their teaching at all levels of education.33 The Berber demands laid out in 1980 had actually originated in 1967, the year in which the Berber Academy was established in Paris to alphabetize the Berber language. The demands of 1980 thus represented deep-seated and profound grievances associated with political disillusionment with the Algerian state and ideological disaffection with Algerian society. The Algerian state was buttressed by its tripartite bases of power located in the FLN, the army, and government bureau cracy, which had effectively destroyed autonomous political life in the country's postindependence history. Centralized authority had led to a generalized sense of political alienation among many segments of the Algerian population, including the Berbers. The ambiguous mixture of Arab and Berber cultures had created a confusing national identity which was confounded further by government policies regarding language use. Resentment and distrust of the government continued to simmer after the Tamazight Spring, which became understood as perhaps the most momentous political event to take place in Algeria after independence. It had opened the way to an international awareness of the Berber question throughout North Africa, and it led directly to further shocks against the state. By the late 1970s, post-independence Algeria had apparently demonstrated how autonomous economic development could take place free from the hegemonic control of the global capitalist system. There was still, at that time, an economically viable socialist bloc with which to trade. By the mid-1980s, however, the global market was thrown into upheaval by collapse in the prices of oil and natural gas, Algeria's main exports. The debacle led to the breakdown of the Algerian model of development and the failure of state socialism, which had been the operant ideology to that point. Economic deterioration led quickly to social unrest, and Algeria witnessed continuous rioting throughout the late '80s.34 Unlike earlier events, such as the Tamazight Spring of 1980, or the Algiers Casbah riots of 1985, the "Black October" riots of 1988 proved very difficult to control. By the time order was restored, hundreds had been killed and thousands injured in six days (6-11 October). The scope, destructiveness and loss of life rocked the Algerian state to its foundations.35 The riots highlighted several issues. First, the bloody event featured the wide rift between a predominantly youthful population and the old FLN establishment. Second, it revealed an unexpected vulnerability in the economic and political structure of the regime.36 Third, it showed that "autonomous social forces, long regarded as either impotent or subservient to state control, emerged with incredible vigor, if not vengeance, to challenge the hegemony of state power. Workers, farmers, students, Islamists, and Berberists all rose in violent protest of their continued condition of marginality and subordination."37 Finally, it suggested that after three decades of authoritarianism, a radical change in the political structure was needed urgently. After the rioting was suppressed, the Algerian regime once again initiated reform measures to rebuild the confidence of the population. On 3 November 1988, a national referendum was passed to amend fourteen of the constitution's 199 articles.38 In another plebiscite, on 7 February 1989, further constitutional amendments were mandated. One important amendment

was to institutionalize political pluralism to permit representation by all ideological tendencies. "Although there were significant constraints--for example, the associations may not have overtly religious or regionalist platforms--the new frameworks opened the way for a controlled multiparty system to develop."39 Most important of all was an amendment to allow two significant political and social forces, the Islamists and the Berberists, to challenge the FLN regime. In national elections held on 12 June 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won a majority of the votes, demonstrating a major bipolarity in Algerian politics--Islam versus secular society and government.40 The FLN refused to permit the FIS to take power, and Algeria has been in turmoil ever since. The Berbers have been caught in the middle. Some 11,000 people have died in the violence of the past three years. All that has transpired since the 1988 riots, especially the government's efforts to cope with the revolutionary FIS, contributes toward developing the present context in which the Berbers are subjected to hostility and physical attacks by both the government and militant Muslim fundamentalists. The Islamists are strongly opposed to secular Berbers whom they accuse of being atheist-materialists. In the early 1980s (when the revolution in Iran was still a very recent event), the Islamists did not have a sufficiently strong organization to threaten the Berbers, except in Algiers. By the end of the 80s, however, the Islamists' popularity had begun to soar throughout Algeria, especially after the 1988 riots. The rise of Islamism as a popular movement was a threat to the Berber cultural movement for two reasons. First, the FIS called unequivocally for combatting and destroying the Berbers. For example, in 1990 a leader of the FIS called for a jihad against the Kabyles and declared that the only means to get rid of the Berbers was to Islamize and totally Arabize the country.41 Another leader complained that whenever he wanted to go from one side of Algeria to the other he had to cross "Europe" (meaning the Kabyles), which irked his Islamic feelings. He called overtly for eliminating the Berber culture.42 The second reason for the Islamists' attack against the Berbers reflected the policy and attitude of the Algerian regime towards the Islamists themselves. After supporting Islamists in the 1970s, the Algerian government found itself threatened by them later, and in attempting to play one enemy off the other, allowed the Islamists to acquire considerable strength against the Berbers. The Berbers therefore face two threats simultaneously--the Algerian government and the Islamist revolutionaries. Due in great part to its myopic policies, the Algerian government has brought the state into conflict with disaffected democratic opposition groups. These include the two main Berber opposition parties, the Front of Socialist Forces (FSF), led by Ait Ahmed, and the Assembly for Culture and Democracy (RCD), led by Said Saadi. Both parties have a strong Berber constituency. Saadi, who represents the smaller but more strident of the two groups, addresses his followers in the Berber heartland of the Kabyles in their own language. In recent interviews given to the foreign press, Saadi has issued warnings that amount to thinly-veiled threats. He says that, given the government's abdication of its duty to protect its citizens, Algerian Berbers have no choice but to take control of their own lives. He warns of the futility of dialogue with Islamists and claims that opponents of fundamentalism have already formed "armed groups" and "self-defence vigilante cells."43 In late 1993, after armed Islamists attacked several

Berber villages (the Berbers resisted fiercely), Saadi admitted that the "resistance movement" brings with it the danger of civil war. But he said: "we can no longer spend our time burying our dead."44 Berber nationalists say that they have suffered repression for many years and that the government refuses to recognize Berber identity, leading some to expect a full scale Berber uprising against the government in the near future. Meanwhile, the assault by Islamists against the Berbers has reached the proportion of full-scale war. As this article goes to press, there has recently been a series of armed attacks unfolding in the Berber regions of the Kabyles and Shawiya (the town of Batna, in particular).

The Berber Question in the Maghreb

The generalized Berber crisis across North Africa raises the question of whether there is communication among all Berbers. Because they are scattered over a large area separated by mountains and deserts, the potential of communication and unity is generally low. However, the Berber crisis in Morocco and Algeria clearly affects the stability of the region, in which the hegemony of states is challenged by several important questions, including the rights of indigenous peoples. Even though the Maghreb states are parties to the international conventions ensuring the linguistic and cultural rights of all people without discrimination, there are still no official documents or institutions that recognize or confirm the Tamazight dimension of the Maghreb culture. Despite their massive participation in the liberation struggle against the French, Berbers have been forced to fight for their survival. The governments of Morocco and Algeria have vowed through their particular constitutional revisions to respect human rights and work positively to ensure the linguistic and cultural rights of all peoples without discrimination. What happened in 1994 demonstrates serious contradiction with those ideals. No matter what the governments' intentions may be, however, Berbers have succeeded in resisting and slowing down the process of de-Berberisation by making the international community aware of their crisis. Perhaps this political activity will succeed over the long term in preserving the Berber cultural and national identity. http://www.algeria.com/forums/language-langue/18064-quel-avenir-pour-lalangue-amazighe-8.html
Berbers struggle to keep language alive KHEMISSET, Morocco, January 22, 2009 -- On the shop terraces and beside the stalls selling popcorn and underwear, the people of Khemisset, a farming town in northern Morocco, are haggling in Arabic a language not their own. Despite an Arab veneer, Khemisset is mostly peopled by Berbers, descendants of herders and farmers who have inhabited North Africa for thousands of years. It lies on the frontier of a Berber region, showcasing the cultural erosion that has long made Berbers fear for their identity. But after decades of pro-Arab policies, Berbers are increasingly winning support for their language and customs from a state keen to political clashes along ethno-linguistic lines. Berbers are a copper-hued people believed to have reached North Africa around 2000BC. The only record of their arrival may be prehistoric rock carvings of war chariots in the Sahara.

When Arab invaders arrived in the 7th century, the Berbers swiftly adopted Islam. Within a century of the Prophet Mohammeds death, Berber Gen Tariq Ibn Ziad led an a rmy of his countrymen across the Strait of Gibraltar to launch the Muslim conquest of Spain. Today the majority of North Africans are of mixed Berber and Arab ancestry, with most considering themselves Arabs. But a minority have preserved the old customs and language and identify as Berbers. The largest group lives in Morocco, where they make up about one third of the countrys 30 million people. After Morocco gained independence from its coloniser, France, in 1956, the government embarked on a vigorous campaign to Arabise the country, prompting Berbers to organise in defence of their culture. We consider that the whole of Morocco is Berber, said Brahim Akhiate, president of the Moroccan Association of Cultural Research and Exchange, which promotes Berber culture and language. But Moroccans are taught in school that Morocco is an Arab land. Founded in 1967, Mr Akhiates organisation helped spawn a pro-Berber movement that now spans the country. It has faced stiff opposition from a solidly Arabist political establishment. But starting in the 1990s, Morocco began moving cautiously towards embracing its Berber side notably with a pledge in 1994 by the former king, Hassan II, to introduce Berber language in state schools. So far, that has not happened. But the government plans to fulfil Hassans promise by 2012, said El Houssain El Moujahid, secretary general of the Royal Institute of Berber Culture, established in 2001 by Hassans son, King Mohammed VI, to help craft policy on Berber issues. Education in Morocco is partly about instilling civic values and a sense of national identity, said Mr El Moujahid. Teaching the Berber language and culture is part of that philosophy. Last month the institute signed a convention with Moroccos interior minist ry to provide language courses to officials posted in Berber areas, while the government announced that an all-Berber television station would start broadcasting in September, following several delays. For some Berber activists, these measures are not enough. It does nothing to change the fact that the state is Arab while the citizens are diverse, said Ahmed Dgherni, president of the Democratic Moroccan Berber Party, which calls for democratic reforms to promote Berber culture. Last year a court banned Mr Dghernis party on the grounds that it was based on ethnicity, which is illegal in Morocco. The countrys leaders are wary of letting Berber activism get political, fearing the kind of civil unrest that has erupted among Berbers in neighbouring Algeria, said Michael Willis, professor of Moroccan and Mediterranean studies at Oxford Universitys Middle East Centre. However, the state is warming to Berber culture and language as elements of national identity, and as counterweights to growing Islamist currents.

Theyre the only popular movement that can mobilise people outside of the Islamists, Prof Willis said. For Berbers, government support means greater scope to preserve the language that defines them. That language, Tamazight, is a distant relative of Arabic that has splintered into dialects across North Africa. Scholars have lately sought to weld them into a single tongue and have resurrected Tifinagh, a pre-Islamic script used by the Tuareg nomads of the Sahara, who are of Berber origin. But keeping the language alive in Morocco is becoming harder as Berbers and Arabs mingle in the quickening pace of modern life. That is happening in Khemisset, where Arabic-speakers have been settling recently. A rich landscape of grapes, olives and fields of wheat and barley suggests why the region has attracted one outsider after another over the centuries. Lately, economic growth has brought Arabic-speakers while prompting Berber mothers to take jobs that cut down on time for speaking Tamazight with their children, said Fatima Abou Dainane, a pharmacist. I regret not having taught it to my kids, she said. But then where can it lead us? Its just sentimentality. But across the plains in Rabat, Mrs Abou Dainanes daughter, Mouna Benaissa, a 26 year old medical student, vows to master the language that escaped her as a child part of a larger desire to recover the Berber heritage she feels dissolving in the cultural wash of the big city. At first, I was just excited about being here and rejected the Berber stuff, she said. But eventually I realised that I was losing the very thing that made me stand out from the crowd. __________________

#52 (permalink) 2nd March 2009, 21:49

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Super Moderator Rafik Tadjer :

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Une tlvision en Tamazight et une autre coranique seront lances en mars Lundi 2 Mars 2009 -- Une chane de tlvision en Tamazight et une autre consacr au Coran verront le jour dans trois semaines, a indiqu lundi Alger, le secrtaire auprs du premier ministre, charg de la communication, Azzedine Mihoubi. Le ministre qui s'exprimait en marge de l'ouverture de la session de printemps du snat a prcis que les deux chanes diffuseront dans un premier temps pendant huit heures par jour. Cette annonce du ministre n'est pas dissocier du climat prlectoral actuel o les autorits, redoutant une abstention massive des lecteurs multiplient les bonnes nouvelles.

La semaine dernire, le prsident Bouteflika avait annonc depuis Oran la prochaine augmentation du SNMG lors de la runion de la tripartite. Samedi dernier, il avait annonc depuis Biskra l'effacement des dettes des fellahs et des leveurs. Et beaucoup n'excluent pas d'autres annonces dans les prochains jours. __________________

#53 (permalink) 4th March 2009, 22:54

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Amazigh TV channel on Algerian airwaves in March March 4, 2009 -- A television channel in Tamazight and another devoted to the Qur'an will be launched in three weeks, Tout sur l'Algrie quoted state communication secretary Azzedine Mihoubi as saying on Monday (March 2nd). The two channels will broadcast for eight hours a day. __________________

#54 (permalink) 19th April 2009, 05:17

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Abderzak Dourari, directeur du CNPLET, a voqu le dveloppement de tamazight : Le rapport de la commission Benzaghou a disparu Dimanche 19 Avril 2009 -- Cest un membre de la Commission nationale de rforme du systme ducatif (CNRSE) qui laffirme : le rapport ayant sanctionn les travaux de la commission Benzaghou a disparu. Intervenant lors dune confrence, anime hier la maison de la culture Mouloud-Mammeri de Tizi Ouzou, sur les missions du Centre national de standardisation et damnagement de la langue amazighe, le professeur Abderzak Dourari est revenu sur le travail effectu dans la commission Benzaghou, dont certaines recommandations avaient trait lenseignement de tamazight. Selon lui, les recommandations ont t synthtises dans un rapport de 52 mesures applicables qui a t remis la prsidence de la Rpublique. Mais malheureusement, les recommandations ont t abandonnes, regrette demble M. Dourari. Celui-ci na pas manqu de rappeler les divergences qui traversaient la composante

humaine de la commission, balance entre une ouverture moderniste et une orientation franchement conservatrice. Cest dans ce contexte que des choix ont t imposs ltat. Les recommandations de la commission Benzaghou tant remises aux calendes grecques, le ministre de lducation nationale a dcid de faire sa propre rforme quil a dailleurs applique sur le champ, explique lorateur. Tamazight a besoin de ltat -nation, estime le directeur du CNPLET. Si ltat-nation est dpass dans les dmocraties occidentales, chez nous, il constitue un horizon de modernisation, estime le confrencier. Ce dernier dira que linstitutionnalisation de tamazight en tant que langue nationale est le fruit de luttes politiques et sociales, dont les prmices remontent la naissance du Mouvement national et la crise dite berbriste de 1949. Une crise due laffrontement entre deux idologies, lune panarabiste et lautre algrianiste. La question amazigh est ne. Le cheminement a t certes long mais des acquis ont pu tre engrangs entre temps, et ce, grce aux sacrifices de gnrations entires de militants. Le repre le plus lumineux de la question identitaire reste, sans doute, Tafsut Imazighen. Cest que le 20 Avril 1980 constitue un repre indniable pour toute la militance berbre. Ce qui na pas chapp au confrencier qui est revenu sur la dcision du pouvoir dinstitutionnaliser la langue amazigh, via le Parlement en 2002. Cet acquis a t suivi par la cration du CNPLET le 2 dcembre 2003 par arrt excutif 03-470. Lorganisation et le fonctionnement de cet tablissement public caractre administratif sont dfinis par arrt interministriel datant du 21 fvrier 2007. Depuis sa nomination en dcembre 2004 la tte de cet tablissement, M. Dourari ne cesse de se lamenter sur le manque de moyens aussi bien humains et financiers quinstitutionnels. Faisant le parallle avec lIrcam marocain, le confrencier notera quil y a loin de la coupe aux lvres. Ce qui fera dire lintervenant que la prise en charge institutionnelle de tamazight est beaucoup plus en avance au Maroc quen Algrie. Le centre ne peut pas prendre en charge la question. On manque de chercheurs, a-t-il pest. Les chercheurs, il faut les trouver luniversit, mais considre Dourari, quand on apprend que la premire universit algrienne, celle de Tlemcen en loccurrence, est classe au rang de 6 855e sur les 7 000 universits du monde, il faut savoir raison garde. Nous avons ralis un grand gchis dans lenseignement suprieur, rvle-t-il encore. Dourari recommande la cration de plusieurs centres du mme genre, sil on veut que tamazight avance. Bien plus, aux yeux du confrencier, linstitutionnalisation dune acadmie sous tutel le de la prsidence de la Rpublique est plus quindispensable. Auparavant, Madjid Benyaou, enseignant luniversit de Tizi Ouzou, a donn une communication sur la revendication amazigh et ltat-nation. Cet expos de sociologie politique a permis lintervenant de rpertorier deux phases essentielles qua traverses la revendication amazigh depuis lindpendance. Une premire phase marque par lemprise du parti unique, substrat du projet arabo-islamique hgmonique ; et la seconde phase qui date depuis les annes 1990 o ltat devient dsormais rceptif la problmatique identitaire amazigh. Une priode marque par lintgration des rfrents identitaires dans le corpus de ltat-nation. Lors des dbats, un militant du FLN sest cru oblig de dire que cest grce Bouteflika que tamazight a arrach des acquis, avant dtre rappel lordre par des militants de tamazight prsents dans la salle en lapostrophant en ces termes. On vous connat, la campagne lectorale est finie ; on ne vous a jamais vu dans une marche en faveur de tamazight. Son intervention sest termine en queue de poisson, laissant le dbat ceux qui ont des choses dire. Cest ainsi que lpope du Mouvement culturel berbre (MCB) est remise au centre des dbats. Certains intervenants feront remarquer que des acquis ont t arrachs, mais beaucoup reste faire. Mais alors, comment poursuivre la lutte ? Telle est la question de lheure. __________________

#55 (permalink) 20th April 2009, 01:02

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14 ans aprs son introduction lcole : Tamazight attend encore ses beaux jours Lundi 20 Avril 2009 -- Lenseignement de la langue amazighe a t officiellement lanc dans notre pays en 1995. cette poque, louverture des classes pilotes relatives cet enseignement sest faite, conjointement avec le MEN (ministre de lEducation nationale) et le HCA (Haut commissariat lamazighit) au niveau de 16 wilayas. Cette institution, la premire dans lhistoire de lAfrique du Nord, a t cre par dcret prsidentiel le 25 mai 1995. Cest suite laction du boycott scolaire initi par le MCB (Mouvement culturel berbre) durant lanne scolaire 94/95, que des ngociations ont eu lieu entre des reprsentants de la prsidence de la Rpublique et ceux des diffrents mouvements culturels. Le MCB, le MCA (Mouvement culturel amazigh des Aurs), le Mouvement Mzab, le Mouvement touareg avaient rpondu favorablement lappel des plus hautes autorits du pays en vue de mettre fin huit mois de boycott de lcole en Kabylie dans lobjectif dintgrer la langue amazighe dans les systmes denseignement et de la communication ainsi que dans lenvironnement. Rappelons qu lpoque, plusieurs tentatives de briser laction du boycott ont t menes aussi bien par les autorits et les notabilits d e la rgion que par certaines associations. Mais ctait compter sans la mobilisation de la population de la rgion et son adhsion massive aux mots dordre du MCB. Le HCA nat en 1995 Le fruit des ngociations prsidence-mouvements berbres, qui ont dur plus dun mois, a t la signature entre les deux parties des accords historiques du 22 avril 1995. Ces derniers portaient sur lintroduction de tamazight dans les systmes ducatifs, les moyens de communication et dans lenvironnement . Pour le volet pdagogique, les accords prvoyaient des sances de rattrapage pour les enfants du boycott qui avaient, malheureusement, perdu presque une anne de scolarit. Un troisime volet, ayant trait aux sanctions qui avaient frapp certains enseignants prvoyait de les lever. la fin de lanne 1995, tout est pratiquement rentr dans lordre, et la majeure partie des tablissements scolaires, notamment en Kabylie, avaient repris lambiance des classes en dpit de la persistance de certaines tendances du MCB vouloir poursuivre la contestation. Une autre revendication, inhrente cette fois-ci la constitutionnalisation de tamazight se voit greffer celle de son institutionnalisation Le chef de lEtat de lpoque, Liamine Zeroual, qui a sign le dcret porta nt cration du HCA, installa la composante de cette institution le 7 juin 1995 au sige de la prsidence de la Rpublique laquelle elle a t rattache. Ds leur installation, les membres mandats par les diffrents mouvements, lisent parmi eux Mohand Ouidir At Amrane comme prsident de linstitution. Celui-ci tant lun des vtrans parmi les militants de la cause amazighe dont les balbutiements, aprs ceux de 1926 au sein de lENA (Etoile nord -

africaine), se sont fait sentir durant les annes 1940, avec le groupe du lyce de Ben Aknoun. Rhabiliter Tamazight Au sein du CPSC (Comit pdagogique scientifique et culturel) prsid par Mohamed Salah Nedja, docteur dEtat de luniversit de Batna, figurent des crivains, des linguistes, des enseignants universitaires. Ses missions sont darrter et de mettre excution les actions de rhabilitation de lamazighit dans tous les domaines de la vie publique. La deuxime structure formant le HCA, est le CIC (Comit intersectoriel de coordination) compos des six reprsentants des diffrents ministres sigeant au HCA. Les deux comits forment le CPOS (Conseil plnier dorientation et de suivi), instance dlibrante du Haut commissariat lamazighit. Aussitt entrs en fonction, les membres du HCA entreprennent leur premire action. Ils organisent luniversit de Ben Aknoun (Alger), le premier stage officiel de perfectionnement en faveur des enseignants venus des diffrentes rgions du pays. Ce seront ceux-l qui prendront en charge lenseignement de la langue amazighe dans lcole algrienne ds la rentre scolaire de septembre 1995. Ce stage rassemblera, dans leur crasante majorit, des enseignants justifiant de plusieurs annes dexprience en matire pdagogique ainsi que des enseignants matrisant la langue amazighe et ayant exerc durant longtemps dans le mouvement associatif. la fin du stage, ils seront affects au niveau de seize wilayas o ils exerceront en qualit denseignants de tamazight. Ces wilayas sont : Tizi Ouzou, Bouira, Bjaa, Boumerds, Alger, Oran, El Bayadh, Stif, Batna, Khenchla, Oum El Bouaghi, Biskra, Tamanrasset, Ghardaa, Tipaza et Bordj Bou Arrridj. Ainsi donc, lenseignement de cette langue dmarre avec un volume horaire dune deux heures par semaine pour chaque classe. Un fonds documentaire constitu de plusieurs textes adapts et de leons relatives la structure de la langue sera mis la disposition des enseignants. Petit petit, les problmes et entraves seront rencontrs par les enseignants sur le terrain pdagogique. Considre dans les textes comme une matire part entire, tamazight tardera trouver sa place dans les bulletins scolaires avec une note comptabilise et un coefficient. Des manuels seront dits par la suite dans les trois graphies, tifinagh, arabe et latine et dans toutes les variantes rgionales. Or, aucune recherche ni tude nont t faites en dehors de la graphie latine dans laquelle les enseignants ont t forms et toujours travaill. Dans les discours distills lors de la dernire prsidentielle certains candidats nont pas trouv mieux pour retarder la standardisation de cette langue que dvoquer la question de la graphie. Cest dire que tamazight doit encore attendre une volont politique sincre mme de la promouvoir. __________________

#56 (permalink) 3rd May 2009, 00:35

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Salon du livre et multimdia Bouira : Promotion des sites web en tamazight Dimanche 3 Mai 2009 -- Le HCA (Haut Commissariat lAmazighit) organise le traditionnel salon du livre et du multimedia amazighs du 3 au 7 du mois en cours la maison de la culture de Bouira. Dans sa 5e dition, ce salon se distingue par des nouveauts trs importantes pour toutes les tudes et recherches en tamazight. Il sagit des sites web en tamazight, de ses modes de prsence sur le net et un annuaire exhaustif des sites web relatifs tout ce qui touche de prs ou de loin au vaste domaine de

lamazighit. Rappelons que les quatre premires ditions du salon se sont tenues, pour deux dentre elles, Bouira en 2004 et 2005, alors que les deux autres ont t organises lune Oran en 2006 et lautre Boumerds lanne coule. Pendant les cinq jours que durera cette manifestation, de nombreuses activits culturelles, aussi riches que varies, touchant lart, la littrature ainsi que la posie, seront de la partie. Des cafs littraires et des confrences seront anims par diffrents auteurs, universitaires et journalistes tels que Fatma Bekha, Salah At Menguellet et Omar Oulamara. Ces derniers aborderont les uvres Izuran, Les enfants dAyye et La fin de Jugurtha. Deux tables rondes seront au menu de cette activit. La premire se fera autour de la traduction du Coran. La seconde portera sur la dcouverte du braille comme systme dcriture et de lecture pour les non -voyants. Des dmonstrations sont prvues avec la lecture de textes en tamazight, en franais et en braille pour sensibiliser la lecture tactile. Par ailleurs, loccasion de la clbration du Mois du patrimoine, une table ronde est au programme, cette semaine. Elle traitera du patrimoine historique, matriel et immatriel de la rgion de Bouira. Notons que dans le chapitre animation artistique, des rcitals potiques, reprsentations thtrales et artistiques sont au menu de ce salon. En outre, des galas seront anims par des artistes de la rgion, limage de Haddad Fateh et Salim Ounissi. La nouveaut du salon, cett e anne, cest lorganisation du prix , At Amrane Mohand Ouyidir, de la meilleure publication en tamazight dite en Algrie ainsi que des rencontres-hommages lhonneur des personnalits culturelles et artistiques de la wilaya de Bouira. La crmonie de clture sera marque par la remise des prix aux meilleurs lves en tamazight de la wilaya.

www.google.fr : Berber unrest in Algeria: lessons for language policy http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090122/FOREIGN/789789838/1002

Berbers struggle to keep language alive

John Thorne, Foreign Correspondent

Last Updated: January 22. 2009 8:30AM UAE / January 22. 2009 4:30AM GMT

Berber women washiong clothes in the village of Anfgou, High Atlas, Morocco. Eve Coulon / The National KHEMISSET, MOROCCO // On the shop terraces and beside the stalls selling popcorn and underwear, the people of Khemisset, a farming town in northern Morocco, are haggling in

Arabic a language not their own. Despite an Arab veneer, Khemisset is mostly peopled by Berbers, descendants of herders and farmers who have inhabited North Africa for thousands of years. It lies on the frontier of a Berber region, showcasing the cultural erosion that has long made Berbers fear for their identity. But after decades of pro-Arab policies, Berbers are increasingly winning support for their language and customs from a state keen to political clashes along ethno-linguistic lines. Berbers are a copper-hued people believed to have reached North Africa around 2000BC. The only record of their arrival may be prehistoric rock carvings of war chariots in the Sahara. When Arab invaders arrived in the 7th century, the Berbers swiftly adopted Islam. Within a century of the Prophet Mohammeds death, Berber Gen Tariq Ibn Ziad led an army of his countrymen across the Strait of Gibraltar to launch the Muslim conquest of Spain. Today the majority of North Africans are of mixed Berber and Arab ancestry, with most considering themselves Arabs. But a minority have preserved the old customs and language and identify as Berbers. The largest group lives in Morocco, where they make up about one third of the countrys 30 million people. After Morocco gained independence from its coloniser, France, in 1956, the government embarked on a vigorous campaign to Arabise the country, prompting Berbers to organise in defence of their culture. We consider that the whole of Morocco is Berber, said Brahim Akhiate, president of the Moroccan Association of Cultural Research and Exchange, which promotes Berber culture and language. But Moroccans are taught in school that Morocco is an Arab land. Founded in 1967, Mr Akhiates organisation helped spawn a pro-Berber movement that now spans the country. It has faced stiff opposition from a solidly Arabist political establishment. But starting in the 1990s, Morocco began moving cautiously towards embracing its Berber side notably with a pledge in 1994 by the former king, Hassan II, to introduce Berber language in state schools. So far, that has not happened. But the government plans to fulfil Hassans promise by 2012, said El Houssain El Moujahid, secretary general of the Royal Institute of Berber Culture, established in 2001 by Hassans son, King Mohammed VI, to help craft policy on Berber issues. Education in Morocco is partly about instilling civic values and a sense of national identity, said Mr El Moujahid. Teaching the Berber language and culture is part of that philosophy. Last month the institute signed a convention with Moroccos interior ministry to provide language courses to officials posted in Berber areas, while the government announced that an all-Berber television station would start broadcasting in September, following several delays. For some Berber activists, these measures are not enough.

It does nothing to change the fact that the state is Arab while the citizens are diverse, said Ahmed Dgherni, president of the Democratic Moroccan Berber Party, which calls for democratic reforms to promote Berber culture. Last year a court banned Mr Dghernis party on the grounds that it was based on ethnicity, which is illegal in Morocco. The countrys leaders are wary of letting Berber activism get political, fearing the kind of civil unrest that has erupted among Berbers in neighbouring Algeria, said Michael Willis, professor of Moroccan and Mediterranean studies at Oxford Universitys Middle East Centre. However, the state is warming to Berber culture and language as elements of national identity, and as counterweights to growing Islamist currents. Theyre the only popular movement that can mobilise people outside of the Islamists, Prof Willis said. For Berbers, government support means greater scope to preserve the language that defines them. That language, Tamazight, is a distant relative of Arabic that has splintered into dialects across North Africa. Scholars have lately sought to weld them into a single tongue and have resurrected Tifinagh, a pre-Islamic script used by the Tuareg nomads of the Sahara, who are of Berber origin. But keeping the language alive in Morocco is becoming harder as Berbers and Arabs mingle in the quickening pace of modern life. That is happening in Khemisset, where Arabic-speakers have been settling recently. A rich landscape of grapes, olives and fields of wheat and barley suggests why the region has attracted one outsider after another over the centuries. Lately, economic growth has brought Arabic-speakers while prompting Berber mothers to take jobs that cut down on time for speaking Tamazight with their children, said Fatima Abou Dainane, a pharmacist. I regret not having taught it to my kids, she said. But then where can it lead us? Its just sentimentality. But across the plains in Rabat, Mrs Abou Dainanes daughter, Mouna Benaissa, a 26 year-old medical student, vows to master the language that escaped her as a child part of a larger desire to recover the Berber heritage she feels dissolving in the cultural wash of the big city. At first, I was just excited about being here and rejected the Berber stuff, she said. But eventually I realised that I was losing the very thing that made me stand out from the crowd.