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Ecstatic Time and Individual Existence: On Deweys Naturalized Metaphysics / Ontography It is note worthy that existence is not a generic

trait, but is begged at the outset. Given that there is existence, there will be manifest some traits. A moral of Deweys is that one doesnt know what will happen until after it does. Decision cuts off a intelligent deliberation pre-maturely and takes action. The religious experience is one of being not selfgrounding, related to another and related to mystery. It is a mystery that an individual is so, and the same goes for me. With some patience for neologism, we may call Deweys metaphysics an ontograph, a beautiful work of the art of ontography. A few pages in the last chapter of Experience and Nature attempted to state a view upon which the words metaphysics and metaphysical would make sense on experiential grounds, instead of upon the ground of ultimate Being behind experience serving as its underpinning . . . the sense and point of recognition of generic traits lies in their application in the conduct of life. (LW 16:388f) (cf LW 1:308-310 Dewey emphatically sez that detecting general traits (which experience is such as to enable us to arrive at their identification in a circular sort of way) is not self-sufficient, but helpful for value-securing. The sense and point of recognition of generic traits lies in their application in the conduct of life: that is, in their moral bearing provided moral be taken in its basic broad human sense. His point of view is what must first be got, and his writings, so far as my experience with them has revealed, are expressions of what the world looks like to him, writings from the point of view expressed in the continuity of experience and nature (Nature in Exp, Bernstein 251). When I see a photograph, I get a glimpse of what it is like to see the way the photographer did. The metaphysics as a map must not self-referentially include its mapings in the map, but denotatively announce its methodology as a map discovered in experience (no to self-referencing LW 12:361, methodology of experience in the 1st introduction to Exp & Natu). (Cf. The Norse parable in Exp & Nature combined with "Knowledge as a work of art confers upon things traits and potentialities which did not previously belong to them "(LW 1: 285) ) Any other way, and it wouldnt be denotative. Not only is the map done in the spirit of denotation, where the Secondary Experience which makes use of these objects of reflection can return to Primary Experience and the stuff of primary experience is enriched by the method (LW 1:16), but that there is a metaphysics is part of the denotation the Methodology section of that scientific report, Exp & Nat, says: I am approaching experience with a metaphysics. The report on metaphysics by Dewey sez, here is a metaphysics, it is listed as traits to be found manifested by existences of all kinds. It isnt just a list of traits, its a method. Much as the awareness of art can give the idea of art, it is important that we embrace that this is a metaphysics. We must dwell on the significance of the point of view which perceives fundamentality at every turn. The genius of Deweys metaphysics is that it is natural it grows and develops, it is experienced and informs further expriencing (knowledge modifies the tie Exp & Nature). The content of the list of proposed generic traits is less significant than the form namely, that he has seen the world metaphysically. Form is a dynamic organizational principle (art as experience somewhere). What would the form of naturalized metaphysics be, if the content is the list of traits? I can think of no other way to avoid reductionism than to be democratic in this way. Every kind of existence by right is an equal carrier of certain traits, and by virtue of these their individuality is each their irreplaceably own. (In an early sentence about wisdom and the generic traits in Exp & Nat, Dewey sez the upshot is that existences have an equal footing with each other). Boisvert at least mis-characterizes the spirit of Deweys efforts by, it appears to me, remaining unaware of the significance attached to a metaphysics having to do with manifest traits that are found anywhere there is a there. No thing is really real early in the article Boisvert sez that Deweys metaphysics is inclusive, and then he is worried that the otiose

list of traits couldnt cut the mustard. That formulation, though, that there are generic traits is the most inclusive type of metaphysics there is. An approach to metaphysics as if it were a work of art Dewey revolutionizes the idea of metaphysics by inverting its function. To engage the world metaphysically is to see it as radically non-foundational, ie, the root of anything is not a foundation. Dewey got rid of the turtle supporting the world with a metaphysics. Who would have thought? Everywhere a Deweyan metaphysician turns, there is the experience of nature; the lover of wisdom is finally liberated to respect everything and see with Anaximander the traits of all in all. There are not things that arent experienced and then become experienced. Rather, they are becoming experienced ("the earlier reality is at any and every point on its way to experience. It is only the earlier portion, historically speaking, of what is later experience"{MW3:102). Furthermore, this characteristic of continuity change of reality (as ODwyer might mistakenly refer to it) in the direction of experience is "only apprehended in or realized in experience"{MW3:103).). A dilemma between a metaphysics of existence and a metaphysics of experience is only sustained by a rigid belief in the separation of existence and experience. If something is potentially within the ambit of experience, then by Logic TOI it is existentially involved (definition of potentiality). Why is there such a concern to make assertions about unexperienced subject-matter, when the only way to verify such claims is to have a direct experience of the very subject-matter? But this does not mean that there isnt an in-itself : qualitative isness is precisely this in-itself. The importance of a respect for experience is that assertions are limited to the empirical, and that the empirical is the in-itself. No one knows the in-itself, but everyone experiences it. ( LW 14:112 the occurrence of events are explained, but not the thing in itself the thing itself. It is a mystery that an existence is just what it is, and recognition of this mystery implies a respect for the existence. Intelligence is critical for Deweys philosophy, but it can not replace the presence of existence from which thought emerges as a tool of redisposition.) Dewey is not an idealist, even though the limits of experience are the limits of his world, because experience is of a presence that is, in a way, beyond experience so as to be real (Schelling sez the positive philosophy looks for what is beyond or above experience). (there is a basis beyond all ideas in train that underlies and gives them unity in train Qualitative Thought 194 bernstein) Experience is in nature, not of ideas. The story goes that Kant reconciled the empiricists and the rationalists Dewey has succeeded with a similar adjustment between idealists and materialists. (Context is present (Context & Thought 90, Bernstein ed)) Boisverts article at p 158 introduces the philosophical fallacy, and applies it to the theory of sensedata. They are not antecedent, isolated building blocks of existence. But in the context in which they are, for aught I know could be the case in a digital eye-implant, they are building blocks. This statement, however, is only true in the case that it is; the categorial nature of such an assertion is flagrantly non-Deweyan. Sense-data, brain states, these are all real, they all exist, but only in bounded ways. Perhaps it is warranted to say that a brain state doesnt exist if it must meet the condition as being the cause of conscioussness of qualities, though a brain state specified as to be a condition of such consciousness exists. (Building blocks is an ambiguous metaphor for Sagrada Familia is not merely building blocks, but the blocks that compose it have, in their own histories, been isolated to each other prior to their interaction.) Certainly, they are not what they are purported to be in my observation of a cat on a mat, but a result from an abstractive process undertaken within a particular inquiry is, in many cases, quite lauded by Dewey as an intelligent conclusion, which then can be and should be the antecedent conditions for further constructions, say, a theory of them. In the reply to Nagel about Logic & Existence, Dewey sez that logical constructions exist, truistically in fact.

What in the world do these writers think Dewey believed about the status of things prior to experience? Are they actually concerned to show that, with a little a charitable exegesis, Dewey didnt in fact exclude things unexperienced from the realm of what-is? Why are people so concered about vouchsafing some permanence to unexperienced things especially when they cant even say which things they are trying to vouchsafe. Its fine to think of nature as unexhausted, but that doesnt mean that simple discovery of what was all along there is sufficient. The point of the Norse parable in Exp & Nat is that discovery varies in significance with the significance acquired by what exists. Existence happens in different ways, and I cant understand the concern with whether Dewey did have a metaphysics of existence (or that he couldnt!) as other than committed to some idea of substantial permanence for things (he does not believe in substance, which is why he does not call himself a materialist LW 14:86 Experience, Knowledge, Value: A Rejoinder). All their arguments have to do with existences and events in general where the lesson of Deweys adverbial-adjective-noun mantra is that things exist, particular things. Why make claims about existence as such? Thats why Dewey only speaks about the traits manifest by existence of all kinds empirically observed so far by us (although, in the reply to Nagel, he seems to say that the traits exist) Things exist antecedent to their being objects of knowing, but what is the point of saying they exist prior to or outside of experience? There is no meaning to they anymore, and the speculation spins off into dialectical senselessness. After quoting a statement of mine that only the conclusion of reflective inquiry is known Mr. Woodbridge goes on to say, I conceive the object to exist prior to its being known. I, too, conceive that things had in direct experience exist prior to being known (LW 5:211 Reply to Some Criticisms) This is a delightful and apt illustration of what Dewey means by existence. Existence, like any noun, is the function of some thing, some thing that is existing. The presence of existence in its immediacy is there in experience had. Note the careful way that Dewey avoids speaking with the abstractive style of Woodbridge when he claims that things had, determinate things, are the things that exist. Woodbridge predicates existence to objects irrespective to how these objects are countenanced. Do existences exist? This is a delicate question, and the exploration of it requires a sensitivity toward the meaning of the infinitive word to exist, with hope that the infinitive is more basic in some way than any of its other conjugations, though I suspect that 3rd person singular is the original way of experiencing, as does Dewey with his priveleging of isness to immediate presence. If, in an article on Deweys metaphysics (of existence by ODwyer), a conclusion is reached that events can pre-exist experience, then what is actually said? First off, the possibility for events pre-existing experience is only a possibility gathered together and presented by thought. Possibilities are objects of inquiry, not ontological powers (LW 12:110-13). Second, what is it to exist if that attribute can just be predicated to a subject-matter (viz, event). Has anything with any consequence been said when a conclusion is put down events can pre-exist the experience of them. The fact is, the historical phase of the event prior to its own having been experienced is explicitly allowed by Dewey, since part of the events career is in the experiencing. It is as becoming experienced. I can only think ODwyer could be making a point if he wants to say events pre-exist (what does that mean? Pre-exist?) prior to experience, but they might not ever be experienced what sort of events could these be? The artificiality of such talk as this offends me. To exist is a function of actually existing, and of existence nothing can be said. When things exist they are functionally a presence of isness. If one is going to use the word existence to denote solidity in time-space, fine, but that is a relational term that relates to non-existence and then has nothing to say about the most important part of what is usually meant by exist, the isness. This is the existence that things come into. You want to infer that events exist apart experience? What do you mean? That they are somewhere an experiencer can go? Then what are they, anyway? Which event is it that youre talking about, the one that pre-existed experience? Oh, youre just concerned about events in general. Is that it? In a way, Deweys own brand of realism demands that we do not make claims about something like existence apart from experience, because the reality of

experience admits to exception. (((If existence functions as qualitative isness, if thats what existence does, and all qualities are neither in the organism nor the environment (get quote, Qualitative Thought? but in Exp & Nat the qualities were never in the organism and Logic: TOI 68), and yet the interaction whereby quality coalesces does not just pop into existence (ie, an event does not become but is already becoming (Events and the Future)), then existence is contextual that is, only an interaction of selective behavior births existence as actively existing. Now, if quality is not felt by the inorganic, the force of the argument still remains whatever thing an electron is to us exists in a way for what is in interaction with, it exists for, it is what it is because it selectively behaves in the face of an environment that, in its turn, is composed of selectively behaving entities. This all sounds suspiciously like there is a Being to the electron constitutive of its proper in-itself, but that is to humiliate human experiencers in favor of, say, protons. If one attempts to know what an electron is like, an advantageous avenue leads one to ask what it like to be a proton. The reverie employed in every scientific discovery must, if there is be genuine objective novelty, assume a novel context. I digress. Point being, there is no absolute in-itself to the electron, which is to say there are many in-themselves of each interaction with the thing (or entity, though Dewey preferred thing) we denote as electron.))) Next, Boisvert goes on to quote a paradigmatic facet of the Deweyan perspective: [Reality] designates indifferently everything that happens . . . The only way in which the term reality can ever become more than a blanket denotative term is through recourse to specific events in all their diversity and thatness (MW 10:39). Reality is more than a double-barrelled word (Nature in Experience, 258 Bernstein ed.), because it is functional and genetic. Dewey explains clear as a clarion that real is a denotative term, context-sensitive, and can change hands from thing to thing in the course of life and inquiry, but is basically indifferent (1st Introduction to Exp & Nat). Then, it seems that Boisvert disregards his own advice by asserting that Dewey wants his metaphysics to not be strictly egalitarian, that is, one in which everything is real in the same sense and to the same degree (Hickmans Book 159). Metaphysics simply does not have anything to do with ascription of real or finding what is real. Cunninghams list of 40 traits does not list it. If only the most real existences manifest generic traits, then wed assume that reality should be included on the list, unless reality is so perfectly coextensive with existence in general that it would be trivial to list but in that case, how could there one existence more real than the next? The list of Deweys is not about things but about traits. His metaphysics does not inquire into existentiality, into isness, not into existence, but is a study of traits that are found. It does not mention what is real, because it does not postulate what exists, only how that which exists manifests itself. The problem with asserting that Dewey chose a protypically real is that then he, too, would have committed the philosophical fallacy. To assert that the social exists is to take an abstractive concept and to say its real. Perhaps Deweys steps in this prototype direction are not as well formulated as we might like because even after the Inclusive Philosophic Idea he was still describing his metaphysics as a listing of traits manifest by existences of all kinds. In quick succession, Boisvert declars Dewey wanted a perspective for grasping certain dimensions of the real (159). Existence changes, the real changes, a search for adequacy is too similar to a quest for certainty. When something is real, it really is what it is. Remember that Qualitative Thought had something to say about the copula and the predicate. Anyway, if existence is not grasped or conceptualized, what is the significance of such humility?

Everything has isness a neither predictable nor predicable thatness. I am worried about Boisverts ascription that whatever is real in the fullest sense is in interaction, when he next goes on to say that something not in interaction has no existence I gather that he is saying that a dicriminatory take on an existence that isolates its interacting character is truncated, and has sundered a fuller reality from its rightful originality. I admit I do not understand the relation between existence and reality, since only the fully real exists, what would be the existential status of anything less real? The hitch has to do with event and thus existence. Dewey amplified his claims many times that an event only is in interaction with human behavior, and apart from that nothing. The question to pose is: isnt everything that exists just what it is? And if a thing isnt what it is, is it at all? consider the broken hammer, it is a hammer, that happens to be presently broken, so it isnt what it is an actual way, but potentially it is a functioning hammer. Inquiry states a problem, and now that problem is brought into actuality the hammer is broken. That is a success, and next the inquirer can set himself to fixing the hammer. (In the article on Peirces theory of quality Dewey sez that actuality in the literal sense defines existence, and that quality is potential. We can work with this. Quality is not anything actual, but it is a dominating presence, it no thing, but still determines what will be a thing Dewey calls it a basis or ground (Qualitative Thought). However, potentiality hasnt been actualized until it has, which is to say it is not exerting an actual effect or holding sway until it is called out. Potentiality as potentiality is after the fact of its provisional determination of what is objectively actual. Time and Individuality makes the point that if genuine time is to be real, then potentialities are only actualized (are determinately a potential for some activity, which results in that activity being a possibility). Anyway what is all this talk about hammers for? The qualitative individuality of a person is there, sure, but a tendency is to infer that the persons activity is individualized to the last degree, locatable in an isolated entity. Though a person has individuality, that individuality is not anything, is not actual, until it is takes material and informs it until the qualitative individuality transforms into the communicating world. The temptation, the philosophers fallacy, is to ascribe antecedent existence which is, effectively, ascribe permanent existence. Instead, to see in new discoveries a growth of what came before is to finally see the truth in beauty of emergentism. To discover existence does not allow ascribing antecedent existence to that which exists that would breach the first postulate of nave empiricism. Why is Carnap wrong? Because what is had is already had, and not able to be proven with certainty. A things existence depends on prior conditions if Deweys clear and distinct insistence on context were acknowledged and then, whats more important, applied to passages in his writings that are cited and thereby uprooted from their own proper context, there would be no ground for debate as to whether he was a foundationalist or its opposite. Things have foundations, and what funds a thing is in its a turn a thing, too. Fruit has its roots which are not the direct roots of many other fruit, but the roots themselves depend on their own environment in order to actively root, that is, bear fruit. If I may be forgiven a barbarism of language for the sake of generality of explication, in the immediate presence of a qualitative situation there is an original unity of the situations whatness and thatness; what it is and that it is are only each separable moments in thought, not in existence. That no existential operation can remove the whatness from a thing without thereby cancelling that the thing exists is so obvious that any argument in its support inexorably (to my perspective) spins a circle in the dialectically absurd. Additionally, and more presumptively, every individual is only what it is. This restriction to a unity is a way of expressing that an individual is immediately itself, an undivided whole, but not for that reason simple or without complexity. An individual is not atomic; it can be analyzed, unpacked, enriched, and interpreted as the case may be, but in any event it is itself as a whole and each

distinguished part is only ever a part of that whole. Any individuals whatness is specifically what that individual is (MW 10:39); for if it happened to be the whatness of a plurality of individuals that are, then, since every individual is only what it is, the whatness of a plurality of individuals is not the specific whatness of any of members of the plurality, but . . . From the second point it follows that, since all whatness is originally and existentially attached to an individual thatness, if the whatness is to be abstracted from the concrete individual so that it may move about untethered to its existential homeland, it must have a different and distinct thatness apart from the individual it was taken from a requirement that amounts to this abstracted whatness being an existentially different thing than that from which it emerged. I have kept abstraction in scare quotes because it does evoke the character of the existential operation under question, though with unwanted connotations. Whatness and the thatness belong together in their original wholeness. They belong together so thoroughly that any manner of taking the whatness, holding it apart in thought, such that it appears as an isolated entity, essence, or idea is only done under pain of losing touch with its proper individual existentiality. The process does not produce a distilled abstract which pretends to carry within a relatively diminished form the meaning of the whole in germ, neither is a whatness extracted from the very resources of the thing under question, for this act of plunder would alter the very existential subject-matter by effectively breaking it apart. The existential operation is more like a measurement with an available tool (get quote), or a charcoal rubbing off an engraved stone. If an archaeologist makes a rubbing, no one would mistake the smudged paper for the carved stone, but this feature of common sense doesnt preclude an identification of the content of the ancient engraving to the charcoal on the crisp butcher paper. If there is to be that identity, it is made in turn through another existent medium; in this case a language interacts with the charcoal marks and registers words that impress themselves upon the enormous wax tablet of cultural memory. In all of these cases, a previously existent resource at hand is put to use to take on the whatness of some other thing . . (Art as Experience 60). Maybe the rubbing is all the archaeologists needs for his purposes. The point of all this is that not only does he not leave for home without the stone in his pocket, but he doesnt even carry a part. The new whatness exists , but part of its nature is that it is as separated from its original and aknowledgement of this fact is paramount That is to say universals taken by themselves . . . express dialectic intent, not any matter of fact existence (Exp & Nat). These two points, no whatness without thatness, no thatness without whatness come together in the formula: nothing exists without being what it is. This statement appears needless, trivial, or empty. However, the necessary involvement of the notion of existence with that of what exists is a critical step toward Deweys point of view on nature. Science can grasp what it thinks a thing is, and can do so skillfully, but logically formulated material is no substitute for the having of individual experience (MW 2:284) All of this is to say that a word, a name, an idea, all exist in their own right, but that is just the point an logical formula is not the existent situation from which it emerged, and it would be fallacious to say it is the prior conditions for its own existence. All existences are something more than products; they have qualities of their own and assert independent life.

Dewey has made this point in many places in many ways, and one representative explication is the distinction between immanent meanings and referential meanings. When a storm batters a sailboat so as to rip out a section of grommets from the sail, the sailor who is well accustomed to this sort of experience interacts with the behavior of the boat in such a habituated way that the present flapping sound of the damaged sail is the existence of broken grommets. In its developing interaction with the sailor it is more than that, too. It is also a comprehended problem, a peril, and a cause for swift action considering the contextual severity of the storm. What I have called the whatness (a loose sail in a storm) and the thatness (that this is present) hang together so that a reflective separation of one from

the other is logically valid. In Deweys example, a landlubber is not experienced in a way that would present what that flapping sound is in the same manner as the flapping sound is given for the sailors present experience. To the landlubber the connection of the sound with torn grommets is not immanent but an eventual outcome of a course of inquiry that concludes with a reference from the sound to its source. Though a reference is the sighted goal, the landlubber must have a handle on a given to get there. Some events are clothed with meaning on their own behalf (LW 3:87) which in this case is the immanently meaning that is the sound of a sail flapping. . (Everything that is something without actually being it must by nature seek itself) When Boisvert says quite accurately that events are heterogeneous and temporal, this is however not an ontological claim about reality. They have heterogeneity and temporality, which is to say that in interaction with human behavior these qualities are made manifest by the action of the copula, but such terms as heterogeneity and temporality means they, if anything is to be said of them in themselves or berhaupt, are indefinable. Heterogeneity and temporality are not conditions for definition, but the opposite, growth and novelty. Every naming is hypothetical, always qualified as only standing for the time being. Boisvert finds the irreducibility of isness (Lw1:75) to be a condition of definition, where it is just the opposite. It is the demand for respect of ineffability. Doesnt Knowing & the Known speak against definition as a practice? Specification, characterization. Boisvert also says that duration in time is inseparable from the events definition a definition is rigid and logical; duration is necessary if the event is to manifest itself according to an operational definition. Deweys metaphysics says nothing about existence, but about what is manifest in an interaction with humans. When he says existence is precarious, or it is stable, this use of is is not an equal sign. These are all traits, all manifestations. Interactions. (like cartography or photography one takes a photograph to see what the world looks like in photographs, to frame it a certain way so as to see it through the frame. The photograph as an art selects features that are there and arranges them. By doing this, a good photograph (or at least effective) can show others how to look at things. It can also show others how to take a photograph! A good map can help orient ourselves in the world, and when we put it to use, check it against the facts, it can also show us what a good (or bad) map is like. That feature, showing what a good map is like, is not the intention of the pure map maker, and would be the intention of one who maps the map, so to speak, ie who charts the parts of the map that work well. Why would we be interested in defending or denying the validity of his metaphysics why would someone seek out a map and worry whether or not it is a good one for the job? What is the difference between a drawing that shows how to draw and a drawing that tells how to draw? The former is evocative, the latter is involuted and invocative. With the latter, the lesson ends, but with the former, the showing, one can return again and again and find genuinely new wisdom. Deweys denotative method is the telling, his metaphysics the showing. If one tries to ascertain why it is a good map, we check what it purports to do and how well it does it. Why is Deweys metaphysics a good one? If it is a work of art, it is what is does with and in human experience (Art as Expe 3)) Much as the idea of art is the greatest intellectual achievement in the history of humanity, Deweys metaphysics is put together artfully so that it may reveal the idea of metaphysics the idea of finding continuity, of respecting existence (in the First Introduction to Exp & Nat, near the end, Dewey sez that respect for experience is the first precondition (as if he couldnt emphasize it more!) for goodwill in humanity.) Deweys metaphysics strives to make good on the importance of being sufficiently bold (Philosophy and Civilization) -- there must be faith in ideals, that is to say, in the absence of making them real. Dewey is not an idealist in fact, if the word has become public domain, it might be time to call Dewey an existentialist. For example, the process of inquiry is itself a controlled transformation of a

situation, in which some problem has arisen and is therefore unsettled (or, more likely, the other way round), into one in which the problem has been resolved. But this transformation is existential, not just mental or psychological. For an inquiry is not completed until the hypothesis about how the problem might be solved has been tested; and the operations involved in such testing are physical ones that alter the constituents of the initially unsettled situation. (this is Nagels intro at LW 12:xxi, he refers to LW 12:121f, Dewey also explicitly emphasizes the trans in transform in his own intorductory remarks to Logic TOI) Existency is not a real predicate, which is to say that thought may produce a conclusion but requires testing to be conclusive. Speculation is synthetic (Exp & Nat), analysis cannot be trusted no matter how carefully it is followed, subreptions are part of the process anyway, ideas must be tested if for no other justification than that the existence under question will appear different once it is approached from the newly fabricated point-of-view. The full and eventual reality of knowledge is carried in the individual case, not in general laws isolated from use in giving an individual case its meaning (LW 4:166, Quest for Cert 208) The individual case, the individual existence, is set in contrast to what knowledge has for its objects the individual cannot be known through and through, so as to dissolve in an alembic, but it is used as the test-subject. We could say that an existence having isness means that it has radical heterogeneity (LW 2:64). When it is taken, ordered, in thought as a thing, it is abstracted to a homogeneous identity. Heterogeneity is a testament to the indefinite and interminable fecundity of any natural existence. I can find no other way of understanding how possibilities are called out as if they had antecendent existence unless there is heterogeneity in the every existence. (LW 14:112 the occurrence of events are explained, but not the thing in itself the thing itself. It is a mystery that an existence is just what it is, and recognition of this mystery implies a respect for the existence. Intelligence is critical for Deweys philosophy, but it can not replace the presence of existence from which thought emerges as a tool of redisposition.) Why is heterogeneity imporant? Why is individual existence important? These are required convictions for the respect of experience. (The significance of experience for philosophic method is after all, but the acknowledgment of the indispensability of context in thinking when that recognition is carried to its full term (Context & Thought 108 Bernstein ed.).) There is novelty, there is achievement. And whats more, that novelty is localized to each history. The novelty is just as real, just as genuine, no matter how formally similar instances of it one may have observed. A belief in homogeneity reduces an existence to a one-to-one function, where if you know what goes in, and you know the unitary operation the existence effects, then you know what youll get. It is practical within bounds to have such trust in existence that one can set her watch by, but when a habitual attribution of homogeneity transgresses its reasonable limits, so does the one who holds the habit. When a child learns to speak, it is a real discovery on the childs part, worthy of the greatest approbation, no matter how many children have made a similar discovery before. The heterogeneity in the childs existence eliminates any crutch of necessity we may ascribe or at least makes us respect the genuine novelty. It would be a shameful act of impiety toward experience to ignore the genuine and generative achievement of the child. It is natural in a eulogistic sense, birthing the new, not in the idiomatic sense (which should be stamped out) of only natural (closely allied to only a matter of time it is difficult to underestimate the effect to weal or woe done by little folk sayings such as these.) We are in nature, in interaction, not an any way marbles are in a box, which is a relational in. We must perceive the means as means which means we pereive the consequence as the consequence of means (Nature in Experience has a footnote). If something is new, it didnt exist. If it has not already existed, it must have become. As experienced

things become (there is a bit of irony in the concatenation: naturalistic metaphysics. Nature after nature, depart for a moment from physics, and return. As if he wants to bring metaphysics back to solid earth (of the earth earthy LW 16:115n7). (Context is another term for the immanent presence of a situation any thought formed is bound to its context, and application beyond the limits of the context is not a priori assured, to immanent presence it must return, though, of course, with a difference. Thought must be firmly rooted always in context) Deweys Positive Philosophy sez we must want our object, imaginatively seek it. It is free to construct its own object, and thus does not need to rest wholly upon a foundation. It provides itself with its own beginning. An immediate quality is an actuality before possibility; there is no sense in reasoning up to the oncoming existence of a quality, for it is unique and unpredictable just as much as it is unpredicable of a thought-through causal chain; a quality cannot be a possibility, for a quality is always one of a kind; but it gives a sense for possibility.. Metaphyiscs are to be tested the Subject Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry ends with a boon of metaphysical study (everything is growing, there is always a temporal quality), while Deweys reply to Nagel in the Excluded Middle exchange implies that generic traits are definers of operations that are practically brought to bear on existence. With the idea of a possibility-tree goes that of necessity or cause. They are basically correlates and both problematic for conducting life (the belief in possibility has so much to do with the everyday experience of option, eg items on a menu, poker hands, that possibilities are thought to be pent-up in whats just there. They can be taken advantage of or not (eg in poker), and are basically independent subsistences in the world. Dewey is not pleonastic when he sez we create new futures.) There is no sense to possibility without the corollary. Without stretches of necessity, or at least necessity hemming in what is possible, there would be no determinateness to choices. Dewey did much to undermine this notion of cause. It isnt a generic trait. A belief that there are possibilities border by impossibilities is an instance of the philosophers fallacy isnt it? I find the possibilities through inquiry, they are worked for and disclosed as conclusions to my search, and then if I were to assert that they were there in the past, this is turning what is strictly logical into something ontological. An object of knowledge found at the conclusion of ordered inquiry should not be treated as if it existed all along it exists now, sure, but this existence is different than the immediate presence of being preceding the distillation of this particular existent possibility. If the philosophic fallacy is to be avoided, the realm of existents must be carefully circumscribed by what is manifest and only what is manifest. There is, then, something that is not yet anything, but active, in transaction. With equal insistence that existents are objects of human interactivities, there must be a corresponding space left open for the status of nature when it is at the cusp of interaction. Limiting the field of what exists allows for a new take on the noun exist so as to see it as verbing (to exist), existence is as existence does there is room for growth since there is no principle of conservation of existence. The refusal or at least discomfort in the face of what emergentism strives to articulate is due, at least in part, to a prejudicial notion that existences have some sort of proud independence or indestructibility. They hold their own secrets, their own potentials, their own lifespans. This is an immensely practical view to hold, as day to day its worth inspecting the a particular existent to see what it can do, and then cataloguing where the doing came from for latter when one needs the same action done again. But the fallacy of thinking all existence to be batteries because they have batteriness finds satisfaction in successful inquiry so thorough that it ends up discouraging further inquiry into what has been found out. Been there, done that is the motto, as if the resources were used up. A possibility is a logical or intelligent definition of an operation a possible operation? All that can happen to my conduct is a change in direction I believe to have

possibilities, but that says nothing about the existences themselves apart from intelligence. Deweys metaphysics calls for an affirmative learned ignorance la Pascal (ignorance savante, Penses 327). It may seem oddly put that a philosopher who prizes intelligence would condone a learned ignorance but this is the self-reflective ignorance that avoids evil isms and rigid separations, who is gracious to history and mindful of the unforeseeable, who doesnt cease testing. Naturalism @ Unmodern & Modern 97, 143, 289 (Naturalism is non-materialistic), but most importantly: 303 (Intelligent naturalistic philosophy is by its very nature committed to the doctrine that natural events, as far as they are unaffected by entering into interactivity with human behavior expressive of needs, desires, and purposes, lie totally outside of the categories of means and ends, while (positively put) as soon as intentional or deliberate human activity intervenes, the means-consequences category becomes central) What a sentence! Theres wit right beneath the surface, which plays on the characterization of philosophy; it has a nature (criticism) and all nature should have a generic nature but this nature is only guessed by nature. An existential circle down to fundaments, patently. Anyway: philosophy is concerned with an end, criticism of criticism, and that end commits it to take nothing as fixed in itself, outside of human activity. But this very take is a human interaction an intentional result of deliberation. Philosophy, as an interaction, puts mean-ends into its central focus, but to do so it has to hypothetically take as a principle that these categories are authored and authorized by the philosophers. Naturalized ontology is both doing ontology naturalistically, but also undergoing naturalistic ontology. By this second statement I mean that nature itself gives birth to means-ends. That ontology is natural, nature puts itself into time and presence. Experience is the foreground of nature meaning that experience is natures own, it is natural (LW 16:384) I want to contend that we, as organisms, dont primarily have sensations or sense-experience, but indeed intuitions or qualities. The quality can be had and parsed as a sense-experience, but sensation has no more right of privilege to fundamentalness than an intuition of a dear friends broken heart. Once there are means-consequences, a time-line is generated. We must not see possibilities as latent. Distinguished things in an experience are not, of themselves, distinguishable. But they appear distinguishable, are experienced as distinguishable, ex post facto. The past is then cast as the means, the existentially involved potential, and the present issue is a possibility, a possible consequence, which can be repeated or re-applied in the future. The big point is that an ontology is still historical and one that establishes that time is open, possibilities are not all there and freedom is a real genuine capacity is ultimately not a certainty (Freedom or individuality, in short, is not an original possession or gift [cf. The future as a possession in Art as Experience]. It is something to be achieved [faith in ideals of the future, future issue], to be wrought out. Suggestions as to things which may advantageously be taken, as to skill, as to methods of operation, are indispensible conditions of its achievement. These by the nature of the case must come from a sympathetic and [yet] discriminating knowledge [criticism] of what has been done [the experienced] in the past and huw it has been done [the past experiencing] Inividuality and Experience LW 2:61) . It is a matter of faith in ideals that we set up. Naturalized ontology is an ontology that is natural, not hemmed in by naturalistic limitations. The idea is to thoroughly, positively, do naturalized ontology, not hold on to an ontological wish-list and just trip it to fit a Procrustean naturalistic bed. A conclusion we reach in Dewey, say, that genuine time is real where there is creativity and selection, is itself an end that was reached with reasoning means. Thus we arent studying natura qua natura, but nature in experience. Were trying to show the circle in its circulating. What Dewey has done is just

that. The premise, that any distinction we make of nature is cultural, is in fact cultural just as the theory of separate kinds of experience conforms to the type of experience that now prevails, (UPMP 344) we must make trial whether we will have better success if experience is seen as a whole. These moments of artistic integration, if experienced aesthetically, would not express a future end, but would themselves be the end and the means together. God is the creative moment in every act of individuation adjustment, integration? Religion and the Religious. Deweys lesson is that the fear of being socially determined causes old-fashioned individualism to flee further into ones own in order to assert some ersatz individuality. It is a paradox that an individual is always a surplus beyond social determination, but the potentialities that make a creative individual what that individual is can only be called out by interacting. A corporate existence is the reality, and we must work creatively, responsive and responsible, to fashion a society that determines in the right way. The Big Thought is that one only qualitatively is after an interaction/experience is had potentials are known after a relational determination from without. But what actually goes on is a double-barrelled engagement, in reciprocity. Yet, I am not what is put in relation. Milk is only milk when it is milking; it could be plastic-ing, or maybe someday it would be fuel for cars. Real individuality, time, is a mystery its a great mystery because the individual is always yet an irreducible remainder. No matter the cross-section, there is always something left over an irrational positive existence with a dark ungraspable fringe. Physical traits of nature and patterns of social economies the metaphor between these two is not a rhetorical allegory, but is really really there. Epistemic conditions are in fact ontological denizens of nature are ignorant, and thats how freedom can work itself in.

I must relate Deweys articulation of the word in with the sense of meanings as the form (not matter), and get at his denotation of information. Though Dewey shies from technical presentation, he is no less a technician in his chosen format. Growth must be opposed to the dictate that something cant come from nothing. And growth is not just the unfolding of pent up possibilities, but possibilities (or potentialities) themselves are generated newly. Time and Continuity? Necessity in mechanistic philosophy this asserts that knowing the mass, velocity, and vector (all relational) of every thing that has these, then you would know all future configurations of these relations. Since mechanics is confined to a specific set of relations maybe this predictability is

warrantable. However, it cannot actually predict the universe because it leaves out individuality. I could swap two particles with the same velocity, etc, and the universe would appear as predicted but in fact be different than predicted. Find the citation about cross-section with respect to temporal process. (I think its in Nature in Experience). Youre looking at an ongoing process, every existence has underwayness. Individuals exist but they do not have existentiality or isness. This is why we are tempted to say that individuals are abstractions or it is a contradiction to say that they can neither be nor be conceived with the transactional situation. The Big Three: Emotion, intellect, practical Unmodern 337 / Art as Experience The work of art (work as in what was worked over, but also work as in the infinitive verb used as a substantive, a womans work is never finished the work of art can be at work in a work of art. Dewey is playing with the use of definite and indefinite articles, in this case the indefinite article is much more definitive) is individual and affirms its individuality, brings it to meaning, by affirming the working presence of what is inarticulate as inarticulable. That experience and nature involve each other in an existential circle is brought to light by integrating what is non-conscious into an experience which can only be brought to consciousness with conscious reference to what is hidden and never-to-be conscious. The work of art shows the existential circle as circulating, and a fortiori the individual as relating. DNA exists so that it can be just that. It was the answer to the problematic situation of giving birth to itself. Darwinism is an application of this developmental principle of nature to a limited field of relatively perceptible phases of existence in their eventful precariousness. I do not believe there is a coherent way to explain the existence of electrons, for example, without recourse to a similar storytelling. It would be a breach of method to suppose they have just always been there. An electron was natures way of solving the problematic situation that suggested the existence of electrons. But what was the problem? It cant be said exactly, for we only every have communicative access to aspects of conclusions, never the problems. Even if the problematic quality was cast in an understandable language, it would no longer be the problem itself, but a term that receives its meaning from a new problematic stance toward the problem. All we can intelligently aspire to, and indeed what science does, is to inquire into a continuity that ought to be there. Some state of affairs preceded the stable and regular existence of electromagnetic radiation, and some stretch of history between the Big Bang and the institution of electromagnetism would presumably explain the existence though, to be sure, not from any point of view but that of the inquirers. We can ask la Nagel, What is it like to be an electron? or better, What is it like to be on the verge of becoming an electron? If we take Samuel Butlers egg-comment to its furtherst generalization: nature is only natures way of making new nature. Possibilities are thought of as if they are latent in what is just there, to be decided over, a limit of predictability. From a coin toss to a card game to a career choice, we weigh the possibilities. People defend reality of possibilities by believing the universe to be in a radical way indeterminate, which, if they were pressed, would mean probabilistic. But, retorts the Newtonian, a probabilistic system is actually ballistic fully mechanical. So an argument rages over whether the universe is a block or not, and if freedom is to have any sway, it must be an autonomous decider at nodes of possibilities. But what are possibilities? The future is felt as the possession of possibilities here and now (Art as Exp 18). Possibilities are rooted in present intelligence. The determinist takes a large system of small kinetic bodies and says there are many possible paths it can traverse on its way toward maximum

entropy. Once it reaches the limit, the macrostate is stable to the extent that it can no longer change the system has used up its stock of possibilities and realized its latent or dormant potentiality. Theres no telling which way my cream will whirl and whorl in the coffee, but I know that from any given state there are only so many possible states following before the cream is thoroughly mixed in. One thinks of that moment when the cream first hits the coffee as containing all its possibilities, which will be worked out over time. Generic Traits: In a certain system of discourse, one may consider various types of paint, comparing them against each other by use of a rubric of general paint-related qualities. In this manner, tubes of paint may be substantially different one from the next, but a hierarchical principle by which to organize them could not appear as but ad hoc, let alone would a specific paint present itself as the ur-paint upon all paints depend. A table of qualities that all paints have precludes a well-ordered array in terms of the paints themselves, though allows comparisons to be made on the basis of selected qualities (eg, this is more red than that). But taken all together, and with good conscience, the different paints inhabit a continuous community. I am trying to evoke why a faith in generic traits promotes the searching for continuity paint-qualities teach continuity among paints, mass/velocity teach continuity among kinetic objects, but not all kinds of existence are massive, or colored. If there are traits that all existences have, then everything that is is in continuity. Continuities ought to be sought out, else an understanding or adequate statement of a new view will be undeveloped. All that is is situated must be heeded in order to approach comprehension of whatever is. Why develop the statement of what is? (As living, we love order a taste for disorder is often enveloped in a larger orderly for-the-sake-of, pure revelry for no purpose is very difficult to enact Art as Experie 15) (Unmodern 338 The practical aspect of all experience is Deweys tie-down for why qualities are felt in anticipation of what occurs living is always a going-on thus everything that happens either furthers life or stops it cold, thus there is an anticipatory reference shown in the immediate qualities . . . 340 This does not involve the assumption of the existence of a power or faculty of anticipation, foresight, or prediction belonging to something termed a mind, self, person, or consciousness . . . Impulses and habits have momentum, they reach ahead. Futurity [the essence of the future, the future as it is immediately experienced] colors the qualities of any situation into which organic factors enter as components. [There is no iron-clad reason to exclude these considerations from simpler systems of energies. Protozoa and snowflakes have momentum also, which, if it is not to be resolved into an occult causative force inherent in their spatial location, could rather be cast in terms of their own going-on carried over from a selective going each moment prior. This is not animistic as much as it is an attempt to connect the scientific explanation of a widely observed character which is the bafflingly elegant and effective Principle of Least Action to its more complicated manifestations. Not intending to establish a foundational power or law, but instead to examine the phenomena circumscribed by causality without exonerating an arrow of time from its due quid jure. Causality, if it is an explanatory tool is to be intelligible, depends on an understanding of why things move in the direction they do. So called reverse causation seems to be so troublesome to some because the ideas of temporal direction and causal efficacy have not been kept so firmly apart that these thinkers think reverse causation is a different sort of causation besides just the same in a different direction. The principle of Least Action cant actually explain any event, since it assumes that every virtual motion is not indeed virtual but impossible. It is not an explanation but a tool for prediction. It guarantees its validity by proving the impossibility of anything that isnt provided for by the principle itself. A least action is successful in bridging the old and the new, but how would it be able to foresee what the new is so that it can make the appropriate adjustments? Chop up the total path into smaller portions and the problem persists. If something actually follows what could be described as least action it must be already underway toward a future. Myopia cannot be absolute, but neither is there a

mystical vision of the future. It is important here not to say too little, nor too much, when characterizing the significance of process. And this is not word mysticism but pains must be taken to say what can be said about existence, to treat the process of existing as a function functionally. I just read an article which stated that the successful meme is one [who can] bridge the old context and the new. The unsuccessful meme is one who cannot bridge the gap between contexts and thus cannot make the transition to new contexts and new situations. Where does the successful meme come from? Is there a finite stock of memes, all we have, that then get winnowed down over time? Of course not. But then if it is the successful meme, how can it be what it is before it actually succeeds, before it bridges a gap and is only a bridge? Conscious foresight and imagination makes the generation of solutions fairly easy at certain higher levels but what are we to say about non-conscious generation? The successful meme is not a thing before it functions successfully and memetically ) Because the means-consequences, the meanings, are objective and meaningful. Whereas a quality cannot be expressed, the objects, the products of art, can be shared. And shared experience (necessarily through a form of communication) is the greatest human good (Exp & Nat Communication chapter, p.202 nonSIU edition). Sharing, transaction, is the ur-environment for anything that is, and thus insofar as something is, it is sharing sharing what can be recurrent or repeated, applied to different situations, as a tool would. Take this quote from LTI 68, The pervasively qualitative is not only that which binds all constituents into a whole but it is also unique; it constitutes in each situation an individual situation, indivisible and unduplicable. Distinctions and relations are instituted within a situation; they are recurrent and repeatable in different situations. . . A universe of experience is a precondition of a universe of discourse [but by this it is not implied that experience must be overtly physical or animal; there can be psychical experience that is originarily dumb and inarticulate). Without its controlling presence, there is no way to determine the relevancy, weight, or coherence of any designated distinction or relation. The universe of experience surrounds and regulates the universe of discourse but never appears as such within the latter. When a situation develops, the immediate quality mediating the historical realization, new things are instituted that are the stable embodiment of a quality that is neither precarious nor stable for it is immediate. (Recurrent and repeatable = shareable, meaningful, communicable, expressed and now the expression is proved expressible. By being repeatable, it is testable, the hypothesis has informed existence, vice versa, and now we can go places with the thought. Wherever perception has not been blunted and perverted, there is an inevitable tendency to arrange events and objects with reference to the demands of complete and unified perception. Form is a character of every experience that is an experience . . . Form may then be defined as the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfillment. (art as experience 137) There is a tendency of a situation to become integral integral with regards to what? Its matter, its subject-matter. Dewey sez that need is a generic trait, and we may say obtusely that things need to be what they are; as problematic it is not yet resolved. The line of Schelling: everything that is something without actually being it must by nature seek itself. (Alles, das Etwas ist, ohne es doch noch wirklich zu seyn, muss, seiner Natur nach, sich selber suchen . . . 136) Being, sez Schelling (8:210) is Seinheit, Eigenheit, ipseity, ownness perhaps this what Dewey means by fulfillment, that a quality is stilted, is in becoming, if it is not yet its own in actuality, ie, if the means are not adjusted to the ends in a whole integration. Experience begins as a qualitative whole, and is fulfilled in art as an real thingly whole. In Boisverts words (Metaphysics 151) Integral fulfillment points rather to an objectively relative situation. The subject-dependent orientation of purpose (cf. In Time and Individuality the use of source instead of cause) has disappeared. At the same time, integral fulfillment indicates a procedure, of synthesizing which can occur only in relation to the context in which an existent finds itself. Boisvert walks a fine line with characterizing something as broad as an existent with a behavior as specialized as finding itself. I believe Boisvert uses the

phrase find itself to just place emphasis on that the existent is situated, but from a slightly different angle we can emphasize the activity of finding and take the situated existent as factually situating. The synthetical process is the process of finding oneself, situating oneself. If a situation always has a tensive center, as Alexander claims, then the functional meaning of situation as situating is always striving to form a situation in terms of the concrete. The ideal is striving to achieve reality. The quality is integrating, expressing itself, in the media in which it is found and this further interaction births the qualities transformed existence, to take on form (Art as Experience 124) From the introduction to Sidney Hooks book: To develop an adequate statement and understanding of a new view is all one with ability to see its connections, continuities and completions of what went before. Only miraculous creatures, goddesses springing full grown from the head of Zeus, are exempt from a period of uncertain and precarious growth. The other fact overlooked is that the establishment of these continuities demand a recasting, a re-seeing (re-vising, re-view cf the last paragraph of Nature in Experience), of old beliefs, and the latter resist modification even more than refractory physical substances. (Criticism, philosophy, is so intimately connected with metaphysics, because metaphysics allows for establishing base-lines of continuity Criticism is the revising, and its ability is opened by holding in troth the idea of continuity given as the moral of the generic traits. There is continuity, though the heavens may fall. Even though beliefs resist that passage about the miser and the man of deep convictions philosophy is charged with liberating meanings by making particulars more meaningful. From a quality, a situation, one must think critically to find the ground and state the conclusion this involves the a reconstruction of the past as it suits a development into the new. The establishment (existence) of objective continuity. As if continuity would not be there if it werent established.) In short, the perception of continuity and fulfillment occurs only as old ideas undergo a subtle and pervasive modification (Interesting choice modification. It is as the past, the established, is substantial, but has a modular plasticity, so that without changing in substance, which would be a sort of discontinuous break, it modulates to accommodate what sprang anew. The mere perception of discontinuity is due to a maladjusted mode, one which places selective emphasis on what doesnt speak to the history in question, though stands as a characteristic of the old idea on its own right a right that is put under question in thoughtful criticism. How can a modification be pervasive without being more than a mere modification? Answer: what is being modified are relational distinctions, not the always-more-than-cognitive quality of the whole. There is a certain sense where thought cannot manipulate quality in itself, because quality is always had immediately). By the time a new conception has become a version of what every one always believed, what everyone always believed has undergone purgation and transformation (trans-action implies trans-formation. When a quality is being transformed into determinate distinctions, we should not read it as a move from one form to another, but rather an original stepping-over into form. (In every experience there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate . . . terminal and exclusive. Qualities are terminal but in the mode of indeterminate. They need to be transformed into a determinate embodiment.) The end-in-view is an informing presence when the quality trans-forms or schematizes itself into objective vestments; it takes on embodied form in the processual activity of its realization.) [Bernstein, quoted in Alexander 66, complains that Dewey vacillates between talking about tranforming qualities, and then that qualities are brute, unconditioned. Transform is maybe better rendered as translate, but either way, it is a stepping-over into form. From what? Immediacy that hasnt yet been formed, for anything we can point to, be aware of, is form and indeed informed by the quality that has transformed into this-herenow concrete distinction. It is only immediate because when it is operative, it mediates and is, in its manifestation, mediated (the ground and grounded are adjusting to each other) (From one angle, almost everything I have written is a comment on the fact that situations are immediate in their direct

occurrence and mediated and mediating in the temporal contiuum constuting life experience Experience, Knowledge and Valuation : A Rejoinder. Only a twisted and aborted logic can hold that because something is mediated it cannot be immediately experienced. Art as Experience 119) Why dont the critics just think of it as they would talk quite naturally about the quality of light. Anyway, the realization of qualities is akin to the realization of individuality. They each must take on form in the formal realm of relations. On the other hand, phases of the former beliefs which have to be discarded if the new one is valid are unconsciously but surely read into the new. (Validity is a matter of conscious appraisal? Though some phases/modes are repressed, they cannot totally lose their pedigree?) . . . Just as it takes time to discover the respects in which a new idea completes and organizes old beliefs, so it takes time to detect and eliminate old elements which are so taken for granted [as a situation would be] that they are unconsciously projected, to its undoing, into the new. Gradually, often imperceptibly, an equilibrium is attained as eccentricities are smoothed into connections and engrained habituations are remade. . . There is an important sense in which all conclusive thinking is circular and is justified by its circularity (The Potency of Indifference, the Situation, is an existential Circle that is finally achieved only in the most conclusive integrative thinking. It was with thought at the beginning (see Conduct and Experience something that is not yet a stimulus sustains relations), but only achieved at the end, in an experience given objectively as a product of art). It brings us back at its close to the material which (in)formed its starting point (by being transformed), enabling us to see it as (imaginatively!) a contributing and an enveloped (thereby developed) member of an inclusive whole. This completer vision forms, I take it, the reality of what is termed synthesis. This consists in the perception of material previously isolated and fragmentary as a constituent of a related unity (synthesis is in the perception of unity an epistemological achievement is ontological). Emotion as the disequilibration (Unmodern 335) The break is the disequilibration. Something (=x) breaks. SELECTIVITY Why must sub-atomic particles be selective and moments of creative potential? Does it have something to do with how their existence is only ever a matter of being in transaction? The subject is barred, blank there is nothing that interacts but what is in transaction. In asserting such a claim, I am not such a nothing-butter as Alexander may assume, because the qualitative individuality is no-thing. Objective interaction is the overt means by which the actualized situation is brought into existence (Logic TOI 288, LW 12:288) CONTINUITY: Alexander 98ff; LTI 18f, 23 / LW12:26, 30; Naturalistic means, in one sense, that there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations. Continuity on the other side, means that rational operations grow out of organic activities, without being identical with that from which they emerge . . . . The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities and forms. Thats it. Activities and forms. Not so big and bad, after all. . . . The growth and development of any living organism from seed to maturity illustrates the meaning of continuity. Qualities are actually the marks of ultimate differences, discreteness. (Exp&Nat 267)

Exp&Nature 301 Activities which develop, appropriate and enjoy meanings bear the same actualizing relation to psycho-physical affairs that the latter bear to physical characters. They present the consequences of a wider range of inter-actions, that in which needs, efforts and satisfactions conditioned by association are operative. FUNDAMENTAL EXPERIENCE / Generic Traits Exp&Nat 13, If experience actually presents esthetic and moral traits, then these traits may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physical science. Everything explanation has to end somewhere, and the adequacy of each is determined by the situation. Why did he do that? There are social, biological, psychological, psychoanalytical, phyical, and so on . . . Is one more fundamental than the other? How can we tell? If we take advantage of the word esthetic in a wider sense than that of application to the beautiful and ugly, esthetic quality, immediate, final or self-enclosed, indubitably characterizes natural situations as they immediately occur. (Exp&Nat 82) You cant go wrong with what is. Peirce in Doctrine of Necessity: By saying that we infer it experientially, I mean that our conclusion makes no pretension to knowledge of wheat-in-itself, our altheia, as the derivation of that word implies, has nothing to do with latent wheat. We are dealing only with the matter of possible experienceexperience in the full acceptation of the term as something not merely affecting the senses but also as the subject of thought. C I Lewis quoted at LW 16:235 : to paraphrase, logical analysis only discovers a constant context of experience in which the phenomenon under question will be found. Logical analysis does not discover the substance or cosmic constituents of the phenomenon. Lewis puts substance in scare quotes presumably because he doesnt know what to call this thing (= x). Existences are necessarily particular (eg LW 1:145). That is why they cant be immediately, though they have immediacy (LW 3:77, Everything (=x) which is experienced has immediacy, and that . . . every natural existence [why this qualification?], in its own unique and brutal particularity of existence, also has immediacy . . .To have traits, however, is not to be them.... sensation [is not] immediate, but it has immediacy.), or part the original being / transactional process. Particulars Knowing & Known classifies existences and events with facts as what are known and on their way toward better knowing. Existences are contrasted with functions for inferences in Nature in Experience take an atom: in order for it to be warrantable to assert that an existence is atomic it must meet certain observed conditions. If it doesnt fit any conditions for assertion, if it is unique, what then? Is there such a thing as existence as such? (p 257 Bernstein book) It is impossible to name an immediate event (LW 1:150). There are existences without meaning, that then come to take on meaning (LW 3:89) FORM Alexanders chapter in Hickmans book, p9 LTI 383: Form and matter may become so integrally related to one another that a chair seems to be a chair and a hammer a hammer, in the same sense in which a stone is a stone and a tree is a tree (He conflates technology, organism, and physical as all informed). The instance is then similar to that of the cases in which prior inquiries have so standardized meanings that the form is taken to be inherent in

matter apart form the functioning of the latter (ie, habit has taken form to be proudly independent). These instances exemplify the principle stated in the first part of this chapter; namely, that forms regularly accrue to matter in virtue of the adaptation of materials and operations to one another in the service of specified ends. Form requires a specified (informed) end. Without the idea up ahead, the specified end, there would be no form. Form is a way of working out the existence of an end that is, somehow, divined (Schelling). That is the miracle of qualitative thought: no goddess emerges all at once from Zeuss head, but if it werent for his idealized premonition, he wouldnt be able to give birth. The hunch, the quality, is divined by the haver the quality itself, with no simple location, must have been no less immediate than a wink that upsets the prior moment and sets a situation in motion. The organism feels the inkle of the situation, only at first a tensive hint, so immediate as to feel eternal. It is pervasive, everywhere at once, coloring and qualifying all that attention perches upon. Then the inkling is developed, and from the thinnest ribbons a solid pattern rhapsodically emerges. Following the inkle, a unity develops of reciprocally interweaving strands. (Peirce and the cable metaphor of truth, woven strands of reactions for a complete experience (Dewey in beginning of Ch 4 in Art as Experience)) Object is chosen as the clearly indicated name for stabilized, enduring situations, for occurrences which need so long a span of time, or perhaps so minute a space-change, that the space and time changes are not themselves within the scope of ordinary, everyday perceptual attention (A Terminology for Knowings and Knowns 244) For what do these occurrences (which are essentially in transition) need a span of time? They need it to be what they are. In order to be an object, an occurrence (a species of Event) needs to move beyond the threshold of everyday human attention. Does the occurrence need to be an object? Perhaps human agency actively makes the object or perhaps, strangely put, if it is to be an object, it needs to be an object. Need is a generic trait, because all existences are events they are underway and undergoing, indigent, needful of being themselves. The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form by means of inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives of inquiry." (LTI p. 119.)

PROCESS We establish for our use with respect to both fact and knowledge that we have no "something known" and no "something identified" apart from its knowing and identifying, and that we have no knowing and identifying apart from the somewhats and somethings that are being known and identified. (A Terminology for Knowings and Knowns, JP 231) There is always a process a whole is wholing, a situation is situating. For a fact to be known, for a situation to be a whole, it must be in the process of doing that a process of working out a quality in the act of qualifying. Every existence is an event. And so, from a Something (Indifference, a situation), comes a ground that is grounding the object that is objecting. If we have to establish knowings and knowns in a single system of Fact, we certainly must be free from addiction to a presumptive universe compounded out of three basically different kinds of materials. (A Terminology of KK 239) We are free to see all knowings and knowns by hypothesis in one system, within one Fact. If this is reduction, its not a kind of one to worry over.

CIRCLE Weierstrauss Function. Our position is simply that since man as an organism has evolved among other organisms in an evolution called "natural," we are willing under hypothesis to treat all of his behavings, including his most advanced knowings, as activities not of himself alone, nor even as primarily his, but as processes of the full situation of organism-environment; and to take this full situation as one which is before us within the knowings, as well as being the situation in which the knowings themselves arise (Interaction and Transaction) INKLE The simple imaginative mind may have its rewards in the repetitions [the single pervasive quality is unrepeated, though, Art as Experience 36] of its own silent workings coming continually on the Spirit with a fine suddenness Keats There is given an inkle in the whole transaction. The etymology of this word is dubious, lost in the past so as to be irreducible to any of its earlier relatives. What an inkle is can only be the subject-matter of an inkling. As a matter of fact, the story of its etymological cataloging is tangled and twisted, rife with disagreement and disproved hypotheses. Scholars are not even sure where to assign precedence between inkling and the infinitive to inkle; for the time being it is impossible to decide decisively. From the point-of-view taken by retrospective analysis, that indeterminacy is expressive of fairly precisely the use to which I wish to put the word to work. Only after feeling an inkling would one wonder where it came from; whether or not there must be something that had inkled, or inkles presently to one. All one can say is that the inkling was primary, and then, in reflection, one can suppose that one was inkled to. If consciousness is called into interaction when inquiry is stimulated, it is only natural to assume that consciousness could not be perceptive from the beginning of what it is about to do. It is roused to attention before knowing where to give its attention it feels its way at first, and plays a game of hotand-cold with the subcounscious until it gets its bearings. The inkle is only an inkle to the lucidity of conscious experience it is darkness compared to the clear light of immediately had consummations. But on the subconscious plane, the actualizing relation the inkle plays with regard to consciousness may be repeated analogically in the relation between subconsciosness and its fringe or subfloor. To modify Pascal, the inkle has its reasons the inkling knows nothing of. Perhaps the original logical operator, (because all logic is the stabilizing of tensive situations) a hushed hinting voice, less than a whisper, more immediate and stimulating than a wink. Just as the visible is set in the invisible (Exp & Nat?), so is the logicible set in the unlogicible. Of course, the invisible is only that way for the time being, and can be made visible in a new future there is none the less a moment were what is logicible is a mere thimble in the sea of unlogicible. The Question is what to make of the possibility for vision or logicizing is it there in the invisible, or is such an assertion as the invisible being all along visible (as in: capable of being seen) a breach of immediate empiricism, ie, bad transcendental realism? But fictive things wink as they will. Wink most when widows wince. And as an unsuspected wink would, the inkle obligates a hypothesis (Hypothesis is the Great Power of man our freedom from coersion). What was that about? Much as Heideggers Ruf

brings the hearer into the situation, the inkle initiates a qualitative queerness until the inkling is worked out. A call that says nothing and comes over Dasein from nowhere gives no-thing to understand. This is not idle word-play, for a quality has the strange quality of being no thing yet. It qualifies, and has not yet been tranformed into a well-ordered naming. There can be no absolute beginning to anything; this is a claim bolstered by inference, for a quality is experienced as a discrete break. For the organism, the experience of developing a tensional situation allows only that it could trace its history to the limit of when began the qualitative pervasiveness, a limit that must be experienced as a pre-historic initiation of an inkling. The logic of experience admits an always-alreadiness to any situation where one finds oneself. The problematic situation is as activities not of himself alone, nor even as primarily his, but as processes of the full situation of organism-environment. If the inkle is to be posited as a relation between the biological body and consciousness, as an effect of wider-ranging interactions (quote), then something like an inkle must be present in the kinds of existences concsiousness emerged from as a beneficiary. Selectivity, selection under hypothesis affects all observation (KK), requires a proleptic specification of purpose. Forms regularly accrue to matter in virtue of the adaptation of materials and operations to one another in the service of specified ends. If, say, a nucleic acid is to take on its form, which in fact it has, it must be serving an a specified end. Ultimately, the inkling is of nature to produce itself, for the nucleotide is the solution to the problem of its own existence but it is ultimately a phase of nature. Pre-nucleotide, there was an ensemble of interacting things that we know to have been on the verge of being a nucleotide. Should we say that they took on form to serve a purpose other than being that formed thing? Why not?! But as interacting, they are within a transaction. The whole situation . . . fulfillment . . . ARROW OF TIME The reason there is an arrow of time is because each inkling is as a matter of fact no isolated event. Its beginning is continuous with another closing. If this continuity between events was not the case, it would be at the very least incredibly improbable that every event so far seen is experienced as developing in tandem with an observers developmental direction. The second law has been universally observed, a point of fact made remarkable by its neutrality to direction and self-admitted irrelevancy to necessity. When a change occurs, after it has occurred it belongs to the observable world and is connected with other changes (LW 14:111 Time and Individuality) the light cone and Maxwells demon. Individual change, which is innocent of all law or sovereign in it itself, becomes swept in the first network of interacting elements that observes the individual. The organic responses that enter into the production of the state of affairs that is temporally later and sequential are just as existential as environing conditions. (LTI 107) We can ground that the arrow of time has a single direction, universally observed, on the basis that every thing is in transactional development with the rest things respond, they do not pre-pond. But the response is set with a wider scope of development and our inquiry for the vectorial direction of the arrow of time must just go back to a beginning that never could be. Organic interaction becomes inquiry when existential consequences are anticipated (a specified end); when environing conditions are examined with reference to their potentialities (potentialities that can only be anticipated after they have been called out); and when responsive activities are selected and ordered with reference to actualization of some of the potentialities, rather than others, in a final existential situation.

There is a dimension different from that of existence (LW 12:19 & 59f.) Symbols do not provide any evidence of existence. This may be the difference between immanent meanings (such as existential smoke fire) and inferential meanings (sqrt(16) 4). Existence is the isness, the brutalness, not the intellectual identity of a square-root. There might be a concern that information, the total detailed description of what a thing is, amounts to explaining that it is; the universe could be constituted by representative images and ideas at its most basic level, these just accrue into solids in interactions. Say I go on at length describing a casserole to someone. My interlocutor has a primary experience of the description of the casserole, but is at least a step removed from a similarly primary experience directly of the casserole itself. These words, whether they be poetic or a mere list of ingredients with ratios, amount to a primarily experienced secondary experience with respect to the casserole. Whether or not the casserole exists, the words have equal claim to fundamentality as an experience, and indeed my description is qualitatively individual. There is a that it exists to my words, they have a selective behavior; when my hearer goes to the casserole itself, there is a that it exists expressed by its unique behavior in interaction with the eater that neither beyond, nor less than, my words, but simply irreducibly different. Didnt the words emerge from the casserole? So shouldnt they be more than the casserole? No, no, no the trouble with this term emergentism is that it seems to imply something more than just novelty for better or for worse. If existence/isness is not to amplify the content of the concept of a thing, as in the way that this is a true story amplifies the content of a story, then existence denotes a character that no concept or formal objectivity could contain; its change is more than additive, for it marks an entirely different situation. When a thing exists, and not just conceptually, we say we are in the immediate presence of it (LW 12:127 the situation is existentially present this is the proper use of existence adverbially NB, at p 128 he says that subject and predicate are thought through, neither is just given off the bat). Existence just is that immediacy of qualitative situatedness when one reads a newspaper, the transaction out of which the reading and the read could be distilled is the existence it is not a real predicate because it is by nature ineffable. (Now, existence is often used by Dewey to denote what is manifestly there, what is known and on its way toward better knowing. What I am more concerned about is existency or existentiality whatever the nessness is of existence. (the prior or antecendent existences being subject-matter for knowledge, not the objects of knowledge at all LW 5:212)) What is this distinction made for between existence as manifest and existentiality (isness) as ineffable? Isness is unthinkable, it is unlogicible, it is not existence. Existences are in interaction, and so is the organism the isness is unthinkable and so unorderable. The organism craves order, and must work with and in existences. Now, thinking accomplishes work on its own tier it is an existence (reply to Nagel on Logic/Ontology) and can be the subject-matter of a fulfilled experience. But, relational knowing ignores isness the other lesson of asserting that isness/existence is not a real predicate is that it can not be produced out of relational manipulation manipulation/control must be incorporated with the immanent development of isness, of things having existence. (Without external embodiment an experience remains incomplete Art as Exp 51 now Dewey is certainly not holding an internal/external divide to be natural, but the way we talk and the observed structures of experience force us to go at it this way.) (Time and Individuality ends its discussion on physical science by saying the individual is a temporal career whose future cannot be logically deduced from its past (LW 14:107). Individuality is the uniqueness of the history, of the career, not something given once for all at the beginning which then preceeds to unroll as a ball of yarn may be unwound (LW 14:103) Time is at the heart of being, it enters into the being of physical individuals.) Recall that in Conduct and Experience, a stimulus is always a change in the environment, so that the way of experiencing must be subjective ie internal

with regard to what exists, ie, to what has issued forth and became a stimulus. Conduct and Experience seems to have for its motto that there exists no things in themselves, which is to say that all things are temporally, which is to say that they are open to hypothesis, which is to say that they are each able to be taken as having irreducibility, which is to say that everything that exists has individuality. For its moral: anything that exists has its own qualitative uniqueness, its own way of experiencing, and there is no value inherent to its own terms I mean, an experience is not in itself more or less fundamental or useful than another, because use-value is only ever used in another experience. Metaphysics prevents reductionism from one trait to another, but it also prevents reductionism from one experience to another. If you want to know about psychology, you have to treat the psychic experiences as what they are physiology or chemistry do not explain the qualities. On Metaphysics LW 3 75f (as science); Reply to Nagel about Ontology; Existence and Experience. I sand the wood. I didnt sand the sanded wood, but sanded the unsanded wood. To translate: My experiencing is of the unexperienced become the experienced. Generic Traits are manifested. Another use of manifest in Exp & NatuThe most "deduc-tive" thought in actual occurrence is a series of trials, observations and selections. In one sense of the ambigu-ous word intuition, it is a "series of intuitions/' and logic is ex post facto, expressing a wit that formulates econom-ically the congruities and incongruities that have mani-fested themselves. Any "syllogism" which is such ab initio is performed better by a machine that manipulates symbols automatically than by any "thinker." Also: he doesnt even call them generic traits for the most part. Universal characters, large and constant features (Half-hearted naturalism), general traits, leading categories (nature in experience) ECSTATIC Time No matter how ardently the artist might desire it, he cannot divest himself, in his new perception, of meanings funded from his past intercourse with his surroundings, nor can he free himself from the influence they exert upon the substance and manner of his present being. If he could and did there would be nothing left in the way of an object for him to see. (Art as Experience) out-of-which-through-which-into-which . . . going-to is a characterization of what-is. To make a judgment about the future explicit is not to refer to a non-existent; it is to infer the further becoming of what is going-on. (LW 2:67) Every event has the qualities of pastness, presentness, futurity to pull them apart requires an intellectual effort and such judgments are subject to error. Every situation involves an interdependence of past-present-future temporal factors (unmodern 339). Invol ODwyers article on Rehabilitating the Metaphysics of Existenc hasnt carefully kept to temporal ecstasis a characteristic quote But how does it make sense to say that events without meaning can possibly be meaningful and known once they are experienced?' There is no instant of being experienced the experience of previously meaningless events takes time, develops, meanings emerge

in continuous manner (in the sense of how a geometric line is continuous). If ODwyer would think temporally, there wouldnt be a problem here.

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