Facts and Lessons of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Safety Improvement

Facts and Lessons of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Safety Improvement -The Operator Viewpoints-
February, 2012 Tokyo Electric Power Company
All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
What I will present

1Overview of the Earthquake and Tsunami
- Damages at Fukushima NPSs -What made the difference between Fukushima Daiichi(1F) and Fukushima daini(2F) ?
2. How we responded ?
- How the accident developed - What difficulties existed
3. Other Relevant Items

-Accident Management -Presumption of Reactor Core State by Analysis Code -Hydrogen Explosion -Spent Fuel Pool
4. Current Status and Roadmap toward Decommissioning 5. Lessons Learned and Countermeasures
1
Overview of the Earthquake and Tsunami

Fukushma Daiichi(1F) Fukushma Daini(2F)
Unit 1Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4
Unit 4 Unit 3 Unit 2 Unit 1
Overview of Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1F) and Fukushima Daini NPS (2F) Plant
In Unit Operation Since 1 2 3 1971.3 1974.7 1976.3 1978.10 1978.4 1979.10 1982.4 1984.2 1985.6 1987.8 Power Main Output Contractor (MWe) BWR-3 460 GE Plant Type BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-5 BWR-5 BWR-5 BWR-5 BWR-5 784 784 784 784 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 GE/Toshiba Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba Pre-earthquake Status Operating Operating Operating Shutdown for maintenance Full core offloaded to spent fuel pool Shutdown for maintenance
1F
4 5 6 1
GE/Toshiba Shutdown for maintenance Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba Toshiba Operating Operating Operating Operating
3
2F
2 3 4
Great East Japan Earthquake

Time: Place: 2:46 pm on Fri, March 11, 2011. Offshore Sanriku coast (northern latitude of 38 degrees, east longitude of 142.9), 24km in depth, Magnitude 9.0 Intensity: Level 7 at Kurihara in Miyagi Miyagi prefecture Upper 6 at Naraha, Tomioka, Okuma, and Futaba in Fukushima pref. Lower 6 at Ishinomaki and Onagawa in Miyagi pref., Tokai in Ibaraki pref. Lower 5 at Kariwa in Niigata pref. Level 4 at Rokkasho, Higashidori, Mutsu and Ohma in Aomori pref., Kashiwazaki in Niigata pref.
Issued at 14:53 on March 11, 2011
1F 2F

epicenter
Seismic Intensity Distribution
Hypocenter Distribution
by Earthquake Research Institute, the University of Tokyo
4th-largest magnitude on record in the world

Seismic Observed Data

Comparison between Basic Earthquake Ground Motion and the record of intensity
Observed data Observation Point (The lowest basement of reactor buildings) Maximum Response Acceleration (Gal) Horizontal (N-S) 460 348 322 281 311 298 254 243 277 210 Horizontal (E-W) 447 550 507 319 548 444 230 196 216 205 Vertical 258 302 231 200 256 244 305 232 208 288 Maximum Response Acceleration against Basic Earthquake Ground Motion (Gal) Horizontal (N-S) 487 441 449 447 452 445 434 428 428 415 Horizontal (E-W) 489 438 441 445 452 448 434 429 430 415 Vertical 412 420 429 422 427 415 512 504 504 504
Unit 1 Unit 2
1F
Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 1
2F
Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4
: The recording time was about 130-150 seconds

Tsunami observed at 1F

Height: about 10m
Flooding in 1F
Tank(Height:5.5m)
2011/3/11 15:42 Date 2011/3/11 15:42
2011/3/11 15:42 Date 2011/3/11 15:42
Date 2011/3/11 15:43
2011/3/11 15:43
2011/3/11 15:43 Date 2011/3/11 15:43
2011/3/11 15:43 Date 2011/3/11 15:43
2011/3/11 15:44 Date 2011/3/11 15:44 7
Damages by Tsunami at 1F
Heavy oil tank floated
Large size crane moved
Damages by Tsunami at 1F
Sea water pumps are all damaged.
Inundated Areas at 1F
Inundation throughout almost all areas where main buildings sited
Units 1~4: Inundation height in areas where principal buildings sited: OP approx. 11.5m~15.5m (Localized inundation height in southwest area: OP approx. 16m~17m) Unit 5 & 6: Inundation height in areas where principal buildings sited: OP approx. 13m~14.5m
Almost whole area was flooded
Fukushima Daiichi
Unit 6
Unit 5
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4 Radwaste Processing building
Elevation of major Unit-5,6 buildings: O.P.13m
Elevation of major Unit-1-4 buildings: O.P.10m
C)GeoEye
10
Location of Sea Water Ingression into Buildings at 1F
O.P.+4m O.P.+4m
Unit 6
Unit 5
Turbine building Reactor building
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
O.P.+10m
O.P.+13m
Unit 6 D/G building

Openings at the ground level from which sea water could flow into buildings Openings connected to underground trenches/ducts where sea water could flow into buildings
3u Emergency D/G air inlet louver
11
Inundated Areas at 2F
Inundation occurred throughout all areas along the sea, but it was not observed to have inundated over the slope and into areas where major buildings are sited. Run up of tsunami centered on the south side of Unit 1
Inundation height in sea side area: OP approx. +7.0~7.5m Inundation height in areas where principal buildings sited: OP approx. 12~14.5m Inundation height in area south of Unit 1: OP approx. + 15~16m
Limited area was flooded
Inflowed intensively
Elevation of major Unit-1-4 buildings: O.P.12m
C)GeoEye
12
Tsunami damage at 2F
[Overall view of 2F]
(2) (3) (1)Tsunami run-up
(1)
C)GeoEye
(2)Tsunami damage in lowlying areas (shallow draft quay)
(3) No damage to the Unit 3 and 4 Turbine Building
13
Location of Sea Water Ingression into Buildings at 2F

Units 3 & 4 Sea side of turbine building Inside Unit 1 heat exchanger building
Heat exchanger building

Turbine building Reactor building
Openings at the ground level from which sea water could flow into buildings Openings connected to underground trenches/ducts where sea water could flow into buildings
14
Tsunami Height 1F v.s. 2F

1F
Ocean-side area
Inundation height apx. O.P. +11.5 15.5m

Main building area Inundation height Safety measures has apx. O.P. +14-15m taken against 5.7m Tsunami height Turbine building Site level O.P. +4m
Water Pump
Reactor building
Design basis Assumed highest tsunami water heightlevel tsunami O.P.+5.7m O.P. +6.1m +5.7m
49
Assumed highest Base level tsunami water level O.P. 0m O.P. +5.7m
Site level O.P. +10m (Units 1-4*) * Site level on Units 5 and 6 is O.P. +13m
breakwater Water intake
Base level O.P. 0m
Inundation height apx. O.P. +7.0 ~ 7.5m Ocean-side area Main building area
2F
Design basis tsunami height O.P.+5.2m
Reactor building
Safety measures has taken against 5.2m Tsunami height Site level Hx building O.P. +4m Site level O.P. +12m breakwater Water intake
Turbine building
Base level O.P.0m
O.P.Onahama Peil
15
Differences in Tsunami between 1F and 2F

Fukushima Daiichi Tsunami of various magnitudes at a depth of around 150m were amplified at the same rate and struck at each nuclear power station Peaks coinciding Tsunami height: High Fukushima Daini
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 10
Postulated Tsunami Source Model
Maximum tsunami heightm
Same amplification rate

50 [m] Water depth [m] 100
150
Peaks not coinciding Tsunami height: Low
Sea floor displacement [m]
Time T
Water level fluctuation from each block
Warm colored blocks generated massive tsunami wave heights 16
Permitted Design Basis(1) Tsunami assessment

Historical tsunamis of Iwate and Miyagi coast were larger than that of Fukushima Approved design basis at Fukushima NPS was 3.1-3.7m
3.11.2011 tsunami heights (m) Historical tsunami heights (m)
Inundation Run-up
Fukushima NPSs Fukushima NPSs

Preliminary results by The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group( http://www.coastal.jp/ttjt/) 07 May 2011
Tsunami assessment in construction permit

Unit Ground Level R/B,Tb/B m 1F 1-4 1F 5-6 2F1-4 10.2 13.2 12 Pumps m 4 4 7 Tsunami Heightm Design Basis 3.1 3.1 3.7 5.2 7-7.5 17 Modified in 2002 (2009) 5.7 (6.1) 11 march 2011 14-15
Permitted Design Basis(2) Tsunami assessment

Tsunami Assessment was revised based on the JSCE (Japan Society of Civil Engineers) Method,2002
English edition http://www.jsce.or.jp/committee/ceofnp/Tsunami/eng/tsuna mi_eng.html
In JSCE- 2002, assumed 8 earthquakes individually. March 11 Earthquake occurred over several areas simultaneously.
Earthquake #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 2011/3/11 source area Magnitude 8.2 8.4 8.3 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.9 8.1 Earthquake 1952 Nemuro-oki 1968 Tokachi-oki 1896 Meiji-Sanriku 1611 Keicho-Sanriku 1793 Miyagi-oki 1978 Miyagi-oki 1938 Fukushima-oki 1677 Enpo-Bousou 18
All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric http://outreach.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eqvolc/201103_tohoku/#Inversion 2011/3/18 Power Company, Inc.
Damages of transmission line & Shinfukushima substation by earthquake

Collapse of filled soil & sand Transmission tower collapse
Tower collapse
Collapse
CGeoEye
- About 10 km away from both 1F and 2F site - Important switchgear station from which electricity of 1F & 2F is transmitted to Tokyo area
500kV Disconnector
275kV Circuit Breaker

19
Power supply of Unit 1-4 @ 1F after Tsunami

Okuma Line 1L, 2L: Receiving circuit breaker damaged in earthquake Okuma Line 3L: Renovation work in progress Okuma Line 4L: Circuit breaker shutdown by protection relay activation Ohkuma 4L Ohkuma 3L Ohkuma 2L
Shutdown by earthquake Shutdown by Tsunami
Ohkuma 1L
3SB 4B 4A
3SA 3B 3A 2B 2A
2SB
2SA
1S 1B 1A
4D 4E
4C
3D
3C
2D 2E
2C
1D
1C
DG 4B
DG 4A
DG 3B
DG DG 3A 2B
DG 2A
DG 1B
DG 1A
The DG lost the function due to either M/C failure, loss of sea water system, or DG main unit failure.
20
Power supply of Unit 5/6 @ 1F after Tsunami

For transmitting generated power
Futaba 1L
Futaba 2L Yonomori 2L
For transmitting generated power
Yonomori 1L
5A
5B
5SA-1
5SA-2
5SB-1
5SB-2
6A-1
6A-2
6B-1
6B-2
5C
5D HPCS Shutdown by earthquake
6C
6D
DG 5A
DG 5B
Shutdown by Tsunami Survived after Tsunami DG HPCS DG 6A
DG 6B
21
2F Offsite Power was secured after the Tsunami

Offsite Power
Tomioka Line Iwaido Line 66kV
One 500 kV line was available. 66 kV lines were outage because of scheduled maintenance and substation trouble but recovered.
P
/
500kV H STr
: Cooling Pumps : Diesel Generator
Unit #1, 2 STr
Unit #3, 4 STr
6.9kV
6.9kV
6.9kV
6.9kV
P
/ /
P
/ /
P
/
P
/ /
P
/
P
/ /
P
/
P
/
1H
1A
1B
2H
2A
2B
3H
3A
3B
4H
4A
4B
Emergency Power for Unit #1
22
Integrity of Power Supply System After the Tsunami at 1F and 2F

1F:No off-site power available
Fukushima Daiichi
Unit 1 Power panel Emergency DG DG 1A DG 1B Emergency use Regular use
Emergency use
Can/can not be used
2F:Off-site power survived

Fukushima Daini
Unit 6
Can/can not be used
Unit 2 Power panel DG 2A

Can/can not be used
Unit 3 Power panel DG 3A DG 3B M/C 3C M/C 3D M/C 3A M/C 3B M/C 3SA M/C 3SB P/C 3C P/C 3D P/C 3A P/C 3B P/C 3SA P/C 3SB DC125V main bus panel 3A DC125V main bus panel 3B RHRS A RHRS B
Can/can not be used
Unit 4 Power panel DG 4A

Can/can not be used
Unit 5 Power panel DG 5A(*2) DG 5B(*2) M/C 5C M/C 5D M/C 5A M/C 5B M/C 5SA-1
Unit 1
Can/can not be used
Unit 2
Can/can not be used
Unit 3
Can/can not be used
Unit 4
Can/can not be used
Power panel DG 6A DG 6B air-cooled HPCS DG M/C 6C M/C 6D HPCS DG M/C M/C 6A-1 M/C 6A-2 M/C 6B-1 M/C 6B-2
Power panel DG 1A DG DG 1 M/C 1C M/C 1D M/C 1H M/C 1A-1 M/C 1A-2 M/C 1-1 M/C 1-2 M/C 1SA-1 M/C 1SA-2 M/C 1SB-1 M/C 1SB-2
Power panel DG 2A DG 2 DG 2 M/C 2C M/C 2D M/C 2H M/C 2A-1 M/C 2A-2 M/C 2-1 M/C 2-2
Power panel DG 3A DG 3 DG 3 M/C 3C M/C 3D M/C 3H M/C 3A-1 M/C 3A-2 M/C 3-1 M/C 3-2 M/C 3SA-1 M/C 3SA-2 M/C 3SB-1 M/C 3SB-2
Power panel DG 4A DG 4 DG 4 M/C 4C M/C 4D M/C 4H M/C 4A-1 M/C 4A-2 M/C 4-1 M/C 4-2
Can/can not be used
(*2)
(*2) (*2) (*2)
(*2)
(*2) (*2)
DG
M/C 6.9KV M/C
DG 2B (*1) air-cooled M/C 2C M/C 2D M/C 2E M/C 2A M/C 2B M/C 2SA
DG 4B (*1) air-cooled M/C 4C M/C 4D M/C 4E M/C 4A M/C 4B
(*2)
M/C 1C M/C 1D M/C 1A M/C 1
M/C 1S
M/C 2SB
M/C 5SA-2 M/C 5SB-1 M/C 5SB-2 P/C 5C P/C 5D P/C 5A P/C 5A-1 P/C 5B P/C 5B-1 P/C 5SA P/C 5SA-1 P/C 5SB DC125V P/C 5A DC125V P/C 5B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 1C P/C 1D P/C 1A
P/C 2C P/C 2D P/C 2E P/C 2A P/C 2A-1 P/C 2B P/C 2SB DC125V P/C 2A DC125V P/C 2B RHRS A
P/C 4C P/C 4D P/C 4E P/C 4A P/C 4B DC125V main bus panel 4A DC125V main bus panel 4B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 6C P/C 6D P/C 6E P/C 6A-1 P/C 6A-2 P/C 6B-1 P/C 6B-2 DC125V DIST CENTER 6A DC125V DIST CENTER 6B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 1C-1 P/C 1C-2 P/C 1D-1 P/C 1D-2 P/C 1A-1 P/C 1A-2 P/C 1B-1 P/C 1B-2 P/C1SA P/C1SB DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 2C-1 P/C 2C-2 P/C 2D-1 P/C 2D-2 P/C 2A-1 P/C 2A-2 P/C 2B-1 P/C 2B-2 DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 3C-1 P/C 3C-2 P/C 3D-1 P/C 3D-2 P/C 3A-1 P/C 3A-2 P/C 3B-1 P/C 3B-2 P/C 3SA P/C 3SB DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
P/C 4C-1 P/C 4C-2 P/C 4D-1 P/C 4D-2 P/C 4A-1 P/C 4A-2 P/C 4B-1 P/C 4B-2 DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B RHRS A RHRS B
480V P/C PC
DC power supply Sea water system
Regular use
125V DC
P/C 1B P/C 1S DC125V main bus panel A DC125V main bus panel B
DC
A SW B
RHRS B
Sea Water System
O: operable
X:
damaged
*2 functionality lost due to the damage of sea water system
*1 functionality lost due to inundation of power panels
23
1F Unit 1 Schematic System Diagram (After Tsunami )

Stack
D/W vent valve
SRV
IC
RPV
Tb
Condenser H/W SLC
Gen
W
Sea :Operable
S/C vent valve
RFP
CP
CRD
:Inoperative due to power loss : Briefly

Operative
CS CCSW
CCS Sea
from CST H/W
CST HPCI
MUWC DD FP Filtrated Water Tank
D/G
Sea
24
1F Unit 2 Schematic System Diagram (After Tsunami)

Stack
SRV D/W vent valve
Tb
RPV
Condenser H/W
Gen
W
Sea :Operable :Inoperative due to power loss :Inoperative
SLC
MDMDRFP S/C vent valve TDTDRFP LPCP
CRD
HPCP
CS RHRS Sea
RHR
from CST H/W
HPCI RCIC
CST CST
D/G
MUWC DD FP
Filtrated Water Tank
Sea
25
1F Unit 3 Schematic System Diagram (After Tsunami)

Stack
D/W vent valve RPV
SRV
Tb
Condenser H/W
Gen
W
Sea :Operable :Inoperative due to power loss :Inoperative
SLC
MDMDRFP S/C vent valve TDTDRFP LPCP
CRD
HPCP
HPCI
from CST H/W CST CST
CS RHRS Sea
RHR
RCIC
D/G
MUWC DD FP
Sea
26
2. How we responded ?
- How the accident developed - What difficulties existed - What were effectively utilized
27
Status of 1F 1-3 immediately after the Tsunami

Fallen into the Station Black Out (SBO):
All safety and non-safety systems driven by electricity were unavailable. No lights in the control rooms, R/Bs, T/Bs, etc. No important instrumentations for Unit 1 &2 due to loss of AC power sources and DC 125V batteries; the reactor water level/ pressure, drywell pressure, wet-well (S/C) pressure, etc. ; Operators were totally blind!
The instrumentation of Unit 3 was available immediately after the tsunami but only lasted for about 30hours.
Almost no communication tools between the Emergency Response Room and workers at the field: only hotline and land-line phone were available between the ERR and each control room.
The sea water systems were totally destroyed: no ultimate heat sink
28
Progress made by each plant towards cold shutdown (outline)

1F Units 1 - 4
Units 1-3 in operation Unit 4: outage in progress
[Power supply] Total loss of off-site power supply and DG [Sea water system] Total loss
1F Units 5 & 6
Outage in progress
2F Units 1 - 4
In operation
[Power supply] One off-site power supply system secured [Sea water system] Total loss apart from Unit 3
[Power supply] Emergency DG 6B start up [Sea water system] Total loss
Water injection using RCIC

Water injection using IC, RCIC, HPCI
Water makeup by MUWC (DG6B power used for Units 5, 6)

Installation of temporary RHRS Installation of temporary power supply 3/19 Alternative RHRS was started and the spent fuel pool and reactor were cooled
PCV Venting, SRV operation & Sea water injection Switch to freshwater
Heat removal route has been continuously improved Currently the closed cycle cooling is in function
Sea water was initially injected into the spent fuel pool; currently injecting freshwater
3/12 Unit 3 cold shutdown
Units 1, 2, 4 Water injection using MUWC

RHRC motor was replaced Installation of temporary power supply
3/14
RHR startup
3/20 Units 5, 6 cold shutdown
3/14 Units 1, 2 cold shutdown 3/15 Unit 4 cold shutdown 29
Chronology of Accident (Fukushima Daiichi)

SF Pool Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Reactor
Power Supply
Unit 5-6
One D/G survived
Common SF Pool
March 11, 14:46
Earthquake
Cooling by injecting fresh water
12th 13th 14th 15th 17th 20th 21th 22th 23th 24th 25th 26th 27th 31st
Start injecting
Rx Building Explosion
sea water
Start injecting
Suppression Chamber Depressurization
Start injecting sea water

Rx Building Explosion Rx Building Explosion
sea water Start watering (sea water, fresh water)
Start injecting sea water
Start watering (sea water, fresh water)
Reactor cooling shutdown Switched from D/G to offsite power Fresh water injection
Recover Main Control Room lighting

Recover Main Control Room lighting Switch from sea water to fresh water
Received electricity from offsite Start cooling by existing system

Switch from sea water to fresh water
Switch from seawater to fresh water Switch from seawater to fresh water
Start watering fresh water
1F Unit 1 Plant Parameter and Operation

Earthquake Tunami 15:27 14:46
Core Damage Started due to MAAP Analysis
Unit 1 R/B Explosion 15:36

Fuel Range (A) (mm) Fuel )(Bmm Range (B) (mm)
)(Amm
Rx Water Level [mm]
500 0 300 0 100 0
In Ope ration(Ove r Scale )
Rx water level data revealed incorrect afterward

3/11 18:00 3/1 2 0 :0 0 3 /12 6:00 3/12 12:00
0(TAF)
-100 03 /11 -300 0 12:00 3/1 2 1 8:00 3 /13 0:00
Rx Pressure [MPa]
1 0.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
8.7 MPa abs 7 .2 8,7 .3 5 ,7 .4 1 MPa abs 7.0 MPa abs
Rx Pressure (A) (MPa) Rx Pressure (B) (MPa)
3/ 11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/1 2 6:0 0
3/12 12:00
3 /12 18:00
3/1 3 0:0 0
D/W & S/C Pressure [MPa]
1.000 0. 954MPa abs 0.800 0.600 0. 53MPa abs 0.400 0.200 0.000 3/11 12:00
S/C Pressure (A) (MPa) D/W Pressure (B) (MPa)
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
IC HPCI SRV
FP/Fire Engine
14:52 No Operation No Operation
18:18 - 25 21:30 Operation Unclear
4:00 Fresh Water Order for Vent Preparation 0:06
80t
14:53 19:04Sea Water 14:30 D/W Pr decrease confirmed
PCV Vent
Order for Vent 8:03
31

Earthquake 14:46 Tunami 15:27 Unit1 R/B Explosion 15:36 Unit3 R/B Explosion 11:01
Impact sound 6:00-6:10
Rx Water Level [mm]
6000 4000 2000

In Operation (Over Scale)
Fuel Range (A) (mm) Fuel Range (B) (mm)
0(TAF) 0
-2000 3/11 12:00 -4000 3/11 18:00 3/12 0:00 3/12 6:00 3/12 12:00 3/12 18:00 3/13 0:00 3/13 6:00 3/13 12:00 3/13 18:00 3/14 0:00 3/14 6:00 3/14 12:00 3/14 18:00 3/15 0:00 3/15 6:00 3/15 12:00 3/15 18:00 3/16 0:00
Rx Pressure [MPa]
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
8 .7 M Pa abs 7 .4 4 ,7 .5 1 ,7 .5 8 M Pa abs 7 .0 M Pa abs
3/11 12:00
1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000 3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
0 .9 5 4 MPa abs
S/C Pressure (MPa) D/W Pressure (MPa)
0 5 . 3 MPa abs
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
(2:55)
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
RCIC HPCI SRV FP/Fire Engine PCV Vent
Operation confirmed
(13:25)Out of Service Judged
No Operation
Depressurization
~18:00
Valve Condition Unclear

2Valves Open
Order for Sea Water Injection 19:Sea Water Preparation 12:05 (11:00 Vent Line Small Vent Valves Opened Configuration Completed Order for Vent Preparation 17:30 All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
32

Earthquake Tunami 14:46 15:27
Rx Water Level [mm]
6000 4000 2000
Unit1 R/B Explosion 15:36
Unit3 R/B Explosion 11:01
I n O pe ra tion (O ve r Sc ale )

3/14 18:00 3/15 0:00
Fuel Range (A) (mm) Fuel Range (B) (mm) Fuel Range (mm) Wide Range (mm)
3/15 6:00 3/15 12:00 3/15 18:00 3/16 0:00
0(TAF) 0
-2000 3/11 12:00 -4000
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
Rx Pressure [MPa]
8 .7 MPa 7 .4 4 MPa,7 .5 1 MPa,7 .5 8 MPa 7 .0 MPa
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000
0 .9 5 4 MPa
0 .5 3 MPa
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
(16:03)
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
RCIC HPCI SRV

D/D-FP FP/Fire Engine
(11:36) Trip
Automatic Start
(12:35)
(2:42) Stop
~9:08Depressurization Order for Preparation 17:12
After HPCI shut down, water injection using D/D FP was implemented, however not possible due to high reactor pressure
(22:15) Stop due to running out of fuel
PCV Vent
Fresh Water 9:2513:12Sea Water 16:30Sea Water Order for Vent Preparation 17:30 (8:41 Vent Line Configuration Completed All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
33
(Ref.) Fukushima Daini Unit 1 Plant Parameter and Operation

Earthquake Tunami 14:46 15:23 Cold Shut Down14:46 Overscale
Rx Water Level [mm]
7000 5000 3000 1000 -1000 3/11 12:00
0(TAF)
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
D/W & S/C Rx Pressure Pressure [MPa] [MPa]
8 .7 M Pa abs 7 .4 7 ,7.5 4 ,7 .6 1 MPa abs 7 .0 MPa abs
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000
0 .7 2 3 MPa abs
0 .3 8 MPa abs
3/11 12:00
3/11 18:00
3/12 0:00
3/12 6:00
3/12 12:00
3/12 18:00
3/13 0:00
3/13 6:00
3/13 12:00
3/13 18:00
3/14 0:00
3/14 6:00
3/14 12:00
3/14 18:00
3/15 0:00
3/15 6:00
3/15 12:00
3/15 18:00
3/16 0:00
RCIC HPCS SRV MUWC RHR PCV Vent No Operation(

Inoperative due to submersion of power source and inoperative auxiliary cooling system)
Pressure Control 3:50 ~ Depressurization 0:00 ~ Restoration of RHR system

(18:30 Vent Line Configuration Completed
3:45 ~
34
Major Activities at 1F Factors disturbing the recovery work (inside the building)
Due to lack of power sources, initial recovery activities had to be conducted in complete darkness, without any instrumentation, and without most communications means.
Scram response
Deteriorated operability due to the tsunami Preparations for water injection Preparations for venting Water injection started Venting
Work in complete darkness. Many scattered objects were also on the floor.
Connected temporary batteries to recover instrumentations.
35
Major Activities at 1F Factors disturbing the recovery work (inside the buildings)
Instruments were monitored wearing a full face mask with a flashlight in complete darkness Checking indicated values only with a flashlight in complete darkness
Scram response
Supervising at a deputy supervisors desk wearing a full face mask in complete darkness
36
Major Activities at 1F Factors disturbing initial recovery of instrumentations and power supply
Used batteries taken from cars for recovery of important instrumentations. Put Engine-Generators to provide power for the control room lightings and PCV vent valve actuation.
Scram response
Tried to connect a mobile power truck to P/C 2C with temporary cable. The hydrogen explosion of Unit 1 caused damage of the temporary cable. Hurdles for the work: Darkness and suspensions due to aftershocks, tsunami alarms, Puddles, openings of manholes, debris and other obstacles caused by the tsunami, Influence of the hydrogen explosions
Image of mobile power truck
37
Major Activities at 1F Factors disturbing alternative water injection into the reactors
Scram response
1. Tried to inject fresh water using the diesel driven fire protection pump (DDFP): failed.
Unit 1: mechanical problem of the DDFP Unit 2: the DDFP was flooded Unit 3: the RPV pressure was too high
2. Injection of fresh water from underground water tank (16units/site40m3/unit) using the fire engine pumps : succeeded but did not last for long time 3. Injection of sea water using the fire engine pumps. Hurdles for the work:
Interruptions due to aftershocks and tsunami alarms Damages of the fresh water lines due to the earthquake Debris and damages of the gates caused by the tsunami R/B explosions (debris, damage of fire engines and other devices, injury of field workers and fear of another explosion) No lights. Problem with the PHS telephone and radio communication
38
Major Activities at 1F Factors disturbing the recovery work (outside the buildings)
Many obstacles on access routes disturbed access to the field.
Scram response
Vehicles had to avoid passing over fire protection hoses laid in the field. Almost no communication tools between the ERC and workers at the field were available.
39
Major Activities at 1F Factors disturbing the Primary Containment Vessel Venting Operation
Scram response
No power source for the MO-valve No power source to the solenoid valve Low IA pressure to actuate the AO-valve High radiation level in R/B
Manual operation Engine driven generator Engine driven air compressor
Deteriorated operability due to the tsunami Preparations for water injection Preparations for venting
IA
MO MO 210
Ruptured Broke at disc 0.549MPabs 0.549MPabs
Exhaust stack
Shift workers operation to AO AO Closed 83 manually open valve
D/W maximum operating pressure: D/W 0.528MPaabs 0.528MPabs Venting pressure: 0.954MPabs 0.954MPaabs
Cylinder
RPV
Solenoid valve
AO 1
AO AO 90 Closed
AO
Closed
Water injection started

Cylinder
D/W
IA
AO MO 213
Venting
AO Closed 72 Solenoid valveReserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. All Rights
AO
Self-contained breathing apparatus 40
3.Other Relevant Items
41
How the Pre-planed Accident Management Worked

(The Tsunami was beyond AM )
Facilities Shutdown Injecting water Outline
Recirculation Pump Trip Alternative Rod Insertion Alternative Injection by MUWC /FP Automatic ADS
Practical use at 1F-13

:CRs are fully inserted :Injected from AM coupler :Using Fire engineMUWC & FP are downed as loss of AC power etc. :Manual operated as loss of power :Inoperable as loss of AC power
at 2F-1
.Containment Alternative Cooling by Drywell Cooler Cooling

Restoration of CCS Hardened Vent
: Manual operated : Inoperable as loss of power including the next(1~4) plant (But operable 1F5,6 BUS tie) : Cooling and Electric supply facilities are Inoperable
apply
(prepared line up)
Support of Safety Facilities
Interchangeability of 6.9kV & 480V Power Sources Restoration Procedure Guidelines (RHR & D/G)
no relation couldn't apply partially apply

42
Presumption of Reactor Core State by Analysis Code (MAAP ) etc. Unit 1

Almost no fuel was left at the original position, and fuel completely moved downward after it damaged. The moved fuel likely damaged RPV and is assumed that most of it had dropped to the bottom of PCV. Dropped fuel is assumed to have caused core concrete reaction. As of Nov.21, water injection is conducted through the feed water system and the temperature at bottom as well as inside the PCV remain stable below 100. Therefore, it is evaluated that all the moved fuel is expected to be cooled directly by water injection. It is also evaluated that the core concrete reaction has been stopped. Erosion depth by core concrete reaction: 0.65m
43
Presumption of Reactor Core State by Analysis Code (MAAP ) etc. Unit 2 & 3
Even though the fuel was damaged, it is assumed that there has been no large damage of the RPV that would make a large amount of fuel dropped to the bottom of PCV. There is a range in the evaluation result from part of damaged fuel dropped to the bottom of PCV to Almost all the fuel is left inside RPV. If the part of damaged fuel were to have dropped to the bottom of PCV, it can be assumed that core concrete reaction was caused. Currently, water injection is conducted through the feed water system and CS system. The temperature in the PCV remain stable below 100. Therefore, it is evaluated that all the moved fuel is expected to be cooled directly by water injection. It is also Erosion depth by core concrete reaction: Unit 2: 0.12m evaluated that the core concrete reaction has been stopped. Unit 3: 0.20m
44
Hydrogen Explosions at Units 1 and 3 R/B

Hydrogen is supposed to have leaked through heat affected seals on the D/W flange, hatch and electric penetrations.
Reactor building
5th floor
D/W flange
4th floor 3rd floo r
Move to upper floor by stairs or through hatches

2nd floor
RPV
Hatch Electric penetration

1st floor
45
Hydrogen Explosion at Units 4 R/B

Hydrogen generated in the Unit 3 reactor back-flowed into Unit 4 through SGTS line.
Unit 4 reactor building
5th floor south5 side exhaust duct
Exhaust stack
4th level west-side 4 exhaust duct
5F
4F
4th 4 level east-side exhaust duct
Venting gas flow

3 -----4 GL
3F
Back-flow gas
SGTS A O A O AO
SGTS
A O
AO
AO
Unit 3 Unit 4
AO
AO
AO
2F
SGTS
SGTS
1F
46
Measurement Result of Unit 4 SGTS Radiation Dose
47
Number of Stored Fuel Assemblies and Decay Heat in Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
LOPA caused loss of cooling Largest Heat load in Unit 4, but Rx well and DS pit was full Water injected by helicopter, fire engines, and then concrete pumps No fuel was uncovered in any pools Now all pools are cooled by heat exchangers
Water level (top of fuel rack =0m)
Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation
Stored fuel assemblies Irradiated fuel Unit 1 SFP Unit 2 SFP Unit 3 SFP Unit 4 SFP Unit 5 SFP Unit 6 SFP Common SFP 292 587 514 1331 946 876 6375 Fresh fuel 100 28 52 204 48 64 0
Decay heat (MW) As of March 11 0.18 0.62 0.54 2.26 1.01 0.87 1.13 As of June 11 0.16 0.52 0.46 1.58 0.76 0.73 1.12 48
Conditions of SFPs
Unit 3 SFP (Water surface and underwater) Unit 4 SFP (Water surface and underwater)
As many debris have fallen into the SFP, the status of the fuel racks and fuels can not be confirmed.
Although some debris have fallen into the SFP, it can be confirmed that the status of the fuel racks and fuels are normal. 49
. Current Status and Roadmap towards Decommissioning
Inside wall Grating
Inside of 1F unit 2 PCV

50
Accumulated Water Processing Facilities

Filtrate Tk
Conc. Waste liq. Storage Tk Evaporative Concentration
Apparatus
Conc. Saltwater Receiving

Tk Freshwater Receiving Tk
Desalination Plant
Reactor Bldg.
Buffer Tk
#1:91.2m3/d,FDW #2:187.2m3/d,FDW/CS #3:288m3/d,FDW /CS
Wastewater
Supply Tk
High Temp. Incinerator Bldg.
PCV RPV
Turbine Bldg.
SPT(B) Process Main Bldg.
Condenser
Cesium Adsorption Facility
Cumulative treated volume: approx.246,810m3

(As of Feb.21, 2012)
Sludge Vessels
Accumulated Water in Turbine Building

51
Temperature inside PCV got low and stable
52
Monitoring Data (at Site Boundary of Fukushima Daiichi)

Monitoring data at the site boundary of Fukushima Daiichi shows continuous decrease at each monitoring post. Air dose rate measured at onsite monitoring posts :Sv/h as of 0:00 onJan. 16th , 2012 Dose Rate Trend at the Site Boundary of Fukushima Daiichi 4 19
12 11 14 11 West 32
Unit6 Unit5
284
Unit1 Unit2 Gate Unit3 Unit4 27 Main Gate
88 67
Monitoring Post(MP-1~8) Temporary Monitoring Post
53
Release Rate of Radioactive Cs from unit 1-3 Decreased Dramatically

Release rate (Bq/hour)
Approx. 800 trillion Bq/hour 1015
(approx. 8.0 1014 Bq/hour) *1
*1: Total release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was calculated based on release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-137 as of Mar 15 mentioned on the report of the 63rd Nuclear Safety Commi ssion of Japan. Total release rates (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 as of Mar.25 and Apr.5 were calculated by the same way. *2: Total release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was calculated based on average concentration of Cs-137 in the air measured near the west boundary of the site from June 20 to June 28. Total release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was calculated based on average concentration of Cs-137 in the air measured near the west boundary of the site from July 26 to August 12. *3: Total release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was estimated utilizing the results of dust concentration measurement at the upper parts of the reactor buildings and the sea. *4: Total release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was estimated utilizing the results of dust concentration measurement at the upper parts of the reactor buildings (incl uding Unit 1 reactor building cover and Unit 2 PCV gas control system exit) and the sea.
1013
Approx. 2.5 trillion Bq/hour

(approx. 2.51012Bq/hour)*1
Approx. 0.29 trillion Bq/hour

(approx. 2.91011 Bq/hour)*1
Approx. 1 billion Bq/hour 1011

(approx. 1.0109Bq/hour)*2 (approx. 2108Bq/hour)*2
Approx. 1/13,000,000 of the release rate immediately after the accident
Approx. 0.2 billion Bq/hour Approx. 0.2 billion Bq/hour

(approx. 2108Bq/hour)*3
109
3/15
3/25 -3/26
4/4 -4/6
6/20 -6/28
7/26 -8/12
9/1 10/3 11/1 11/26 -9/17 -10/13 -11/10 -12/6
Evaluated period
54
Mid-and long term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning(1/2)

Dec. 16th 2011(Step 2 Completed) Step 1,2
<Achieved Stable Conditions> -Condition equivalent to cold shutdown
Within 2 years Phase 1
Period to the commencement of the fuel removal from the Spent Fuel Pools (Within 2 years) -Commence the removal of fuels from the spent fuel pools (Unit 4 in 2 years)
-Reduce the radiation impact due to additional emissions -Significant Suppression of from the whole site and radioactive waste generated after the accident (secondary waste materials via water processing Emissions and debris etc.) Thus maintain an effective radiation dose of less than 1 mSv/yr at the site boundaries caused by the aforementioned. -Maintain stable reactor cooling and accumulated water processing and improve their credibility. -Commence R&D and decontamination towards the removal of fuel debris -Commence R&D of radioactive waste processing and disposal Actions towards systematic staff training and allocation, improving motivation, and securing worker safety will be continuously implemented.
55
Mid-and long term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning(2/2)

Within 2 years Phase 2
Period to the commencement of the removal of fuel debris (Within 10 years) -Complete the fuel removal from the spent fuel pools at all Units -Complete preparations for the removal of fuel debris such as decontaminating the insides of the buildings, restoring the PCVs and filling the PCVs with water. Then commence the removal of fuel debris (Target: within 10 years) -Continue stable reactor cooling -Complete the processing of accumulated water -Continue R&D on radioactive waste processing and disposal, and commence R&D on the reactor facilities decommission Actions towards systematic staff training and allocation, improving motivation, and securing worker safety will be continuously implemented.
Within 10 years
Within 30-40 years Phase 3
Period to the end of the decommissioning (In 30-40 years)
-Complete the fuel debris removal

(in 20-25 years) -Complete the decommission (in 3040 years) -Implement radioactive waste
56
5.Lessons Learned and Countermeasures
57
Lessons Learned and Countermeasures

Thorough equipment protection measures against tsunami to prevent power loss and loss of the heat removal function are important. Preventing the flooding of buildings
Embankment Flood Barriers & Walls
Preventing the flooding of important equipment

Water tight doors in R/B etc.
Embankment
Watertight Doors
Flood Barrier Wall

58

Regardless of the initial cause of the accident, flexible alternative measures with improved applications and mobility to prevent core damage against long simultaneous loss of AC and DC power and long loss of heat removal function are important.
Enhancing high-pressure & low-pressure cooling water injection Manual startup of steam-driven cooling water injection equipment Preparation of mobile power trucks and backup water source Establishment of water injection means using fire engines Enhancing reactor depressurization Preparation of spare batteries and gas cylinders Enhancing heat removal and cooling Mobile power trucks Backup AC power Preparation of spare replacement motor for emergency sea water systems Preparation of a portable mobile heat exchanger (pump, heat exchanger set) Securing power for monitoring instruments
To RHR To SFP Sea All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
Heat exchanger truck 59

From the perspective of defense-in-depth, it is important to take further measures in case core damage does occur.
Top vent
Preventing hydrogen accumulation in R/B

Opening holes on the roof of R/B (top vent) etc.
Suppressing the release of radioactive materials

Preparation for water injection to the PCV through fire engines, etc Backup AC power and modification of design to facilitate PCV venting
It is important to prepare further equipment and auxiliary facilities for support of on-site response.
Debris removal equipment Communication methods Lighting equipment Protective equipment (protective wears, masks, APDs etc.)
60

Without newly built Emergency Response Center, the post-accident activities could not have been carried out.
Seismically Isolated ERC
Laminated rubber bearing
Sliding bearing
Measures taken after Niigata Chuetsu Oki Earthquake were effective: Emergency response center in robust building (Seismic isolation, Shielding, Communication, etc.) Underground water tank and Fire Engines (3/site)
61
Embankment (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS)

Gate
Access road
Gate Access road Access road
T.P.+15.0m line
T.P.+15.0 lene
T.P.+15.0
Unit 11-4
T.P.+15.0
Unit 55-7
T.P.+15.0 3.0 T.P.+12.0
10.0 T.P.+5.0
: Reinforced concrete wall (image)
:Clay embankment image

62
Flooding barriers
R/B Louver
Louver Door
Ventilation hole
Flood barrier plate (balcony type) Flood barrier plate (closing type) Flood barrier wall
R/B
Flood barrier plate Watertight door

63
Watertight doors
64
Penetrations sealed with silicon rubber
65
Backup AC Power (Air Cooling GTG & Mobile Power Truck )

Mobile power trucks Air cooling GTG
66kV BUS
Construction Power Tr
Emergency M/C
M/C 1C
500KVA Mobile power trucks
Air cooling GTG

4500KVA
66
Enhancing Reactor Depressurization

Manual switching by low pressure
2nd floor of R/B

System B
SRVs with ADS function
System A
Manual switching by low pressure
Stand-by
Regular use
Stand-by
Regular use
System B cylinders
System A cylinders
N2 supply
N2 supply
Spare cylinders
Temporary switch Temporary Spare Battery

SRV
NO
Temporary Battery
Accumulator
67
Low Pressure Injection by Fire Engine

R/B
MCC1C-1-2 MCC1C-1-3 O O O
Run out
MCC1C-1-5 O
Inoperative
FPFP-MUWC Tie Line
RHR
Coupling for fire fighting
GTG
Emergency M/C
M/C1C P/C1C-1 MCC1C-1-2
Mobile Power Truck
Fire Engine
MCC1C-1-3
MCC1C-1-5
Sea water
68
Water Reservoir
Fresh water tank T.P.+13.0m
Water pipe
Water reservoir T.P+45.0m 18,000m3
Well
Fresh water tank T.P.+12.0m
69
Alternative Heat Removal

Temporary Submerged Pump
Mobile Power Truck Tr Truck 500kVA6600V 6600V400V
To Submerged pump
75kW 75kW
Alternative Heat Exchanger Vehicle Temporary Submerged Pump
P Sea water Tr Hx
Alternative Heat Exchanger vehicle
Prepared connector
T/B
T/B
Temporary Submerged Pump
R/B
RHR Hx FPC Hx
Trench
MO
RHRIW Hx (A)
Sea water intake channel

70
PCV Venting (Ensuring Actuation)

R/B
SGTS(A)
Vital UPS
PCV
Spare IA
AO
MCC1C-1-1
R/B BF1
Exhauster
Operation at Main Control Room
SGTS(B )
SGTS
Manual operation
MO
RPV
Rupture Disk
Stack
GTG Emergency M/C M/C1C
Vital UPS
D/W IA S/C
AO
Mobile power trucks
Spare
R/B BF4
P/C1C-1
MCC1C-1-1 MCC1C-1-4
Vital UPS
71
PCV Venting (Manual Operation at Field)

R/B
SGTS(B) SGTS(A) SGTS Exhauster
Manual Operation
PCV
AO
R/B BF1
Rupture Disk
RPV
Stack Manual operation possible
D/W S/C vent prior use

AO
S/C
R/B BF4
Open
AO-valves modified so that manual operation is possible with a ratchet wrench
72
R/B top vent
R/B Wire Lever block
73
Provision of Heavy Machinery

Crawler hydraulic shovel Crawler hydraulic shovel
Wheel hydraulic shovel
Wheel loader Wheel loader Wheel loader
Wheel loader
74
Image of Light Oil Storage Facility
GTG
GTG
Mobile power truck Other cars and MiniMini-tanker (900 ) heavy machinery
Fixed oil feed pump
Feed throat
Filler throat
Feed throat
Filler throat
Feed throat
Filler throat
Tank 1
Tank 2
Tank 3
Underground oil storage facility Underground light oil tank (50K:2.4mX11.7m)X3
75
Portable PHS Antenna (Image)
Cable drum 100m
Web camera (for future)
Storage rack Door 300mm 650mm 520mm
IP PHS antenna
IP phone
Junction box
To ERC
Switch
Fiber cable drum
Portable Generator
76
Added Monitoring Cars
Portable Monitoring Post
Ionisation chamber type survey meter
Dust Sampler
vane anemometer
Portable generator
Satellite cell-phone
77
In Closing
Achieved Stable Conditions Condition equivalent to cold shutdown Significant suppression of radioactivity emissions Commenced the phase 1of Mid-and-long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4 Phase 1: Period to the commencement of the fuel removal from the Spent Fuel Pools (Within 2 years) Implementing measures to enhance safety of Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS. Deployed mobile power trucks, additional fire engines, spare pumps and motors, etc.
78
Thank you for your attention!
79

Facts and Lessons of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Safety Improvement

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Facts and Lessons of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Safety Improvement -The Operator Viewpoints-

February, 2012 Tokyo Electric Power Company

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

What I will present

3. Other Relevant Items

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Overview of the Earthquake and Tsunami

Unit 1Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

Unit 4 Unit 3 Unit 2 Unit 1

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Great East Japan Earthquake

Issued at 14:53 on March 11, 2011

Seismic Intensity Distribution

4th-largest magnitude on record in the world

Seismic Observed Data

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 1

Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

: The recording time was about 130-150 seconds

Height: about 10m

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

2011/3/11 15:42 Date 2011/3/11 15:42

2011/3/11 15:42 Date 2011/3/11 15:42

Date 2011/3/11 15:43

2011/3/11 15:43 Date 2011/3/11 15:43

2011/3/11 15:43 Date 2011/3/11 15:43

2011/3/11 15:44 Date 2011/3/11 15:44 7

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Large size crane moved

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Almost whole area was flooded

Unit 4 Radwaste Processing building

Elevation of major Unit-5,6 buildings: O.P.13m

Elevation of major Unit-1-4 buildings: O.P.10m

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Location of Sea Water Ingression into Buildings at 1F

Turbine building Reactor building

Unit 6 D/G building

3u Emergency D/G air inlet louver

Limited area was flooded

Elevation of major Unit-1-4 buildings: O.P.12m

(2)Tsunami damage in lowlying areas (shallow draft quay)

(3) No damage to the Unit 3 and 4 Turbine Building

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Location of Sea Water Ingression into Buildings at 2F

Heat exchanger building

Turbine building Reactor building

Tsunami Height 1F v.s. 2F

Inundation height apx. O.P. +11.5 15.5m

breakwater Water intake

Base level O.P. 0m

Base level O.P.0m

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Differences in Tsunami between 1F and 2F

Postulated Tsunami Source Model

Maximum tsunami heightm

Same amplification rate

Peaks not coinciding Tsunami height: Low

Sea floor displacement [m]

Water level fluctuation from each block

Warm colored blocks generated massive tsunami wave heights 16

All Rights Reserved 2012The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

(2) (2) (*2)