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LAW BLOCK B BATCH 2015

Law 109 (I-B) Finals Reviewer

Criminal Law 1 Consolidated Reviewer
Edited by Roberto Miguel O. Raeses 8/27/2011

Consolidated reviewer for Criminal Law 1 under Prof. Dan Peruelo Calica. Digests were either culled from various sources (contributions of blockmates, etc.) or written by the editor himself. Notes and annotations were taken from Reyess annotations of the RPC.

Raeses 1

General Principles of Criminal Law

A. Definitions
Criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for their punishment [Reyes, The RPC, Book I, 16th Revised Edition] It is that branch of public substantive law which defines offenses and prescribes their penalties. It is substantive because it defines the states right to inflict punishment and the liability of the offenders. It is public law because it deals with the relation of the individual with the state.

Crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or commanding it. [Reyes, supra, at 1, citing I Bouviers Law Dictionary, Rawles Third Revision, 729]

B. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege The maxim has its roots in history. It is in and common law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the essence then that while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be imposed a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on jurisdictio rather than guvernaculum. The judiciary as the dispenser of justice through law must be aware of the limitation on its own power. [Concurring opinion, Justice Fernando, People v. Cabural] Sources of Philippine Criminal Law
a. The Revised Penal Code (Act no. 3815) and amendments thereto b. Special criminal laws c. Penal provisions in other laws d. Local ordinances
accordance with both centuries of civil law

Reyes: 1. There are no common law crimes in the Philippines. Common-law crimes, known as the body of principles, usages and rights of action, which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature, are not recognized in this country, unless provided by law. 2. The State has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down rules of criminal procedure. States, as part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion to creating and defining criminal offenses. (People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120, 124) 3. The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution has certain limitations in the enactment of penal legislation. 1. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. (Art. III, Sec. 22) 2. Mo person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (Art. III, Sec. 14[1]) 4. An ex post facto law is one which: 1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; 2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; 5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a

Raeses 2 former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429, 431) A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382, 395)
Const. (1987), art. II, sec. 1 The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

RPC, Art. 5: Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation. RPC, Art. 21: Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

C. State authority to punish crimes

Sources:
Const. (1987), art. II, sec. 5 The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Const. (1987), art. VI, sec. 1 The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120 (1922) Facts: The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where the were two young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result of the accident. Issue: WON Act No. 2886 (SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense) under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional. Held: Yes. Since the provisions of this General Order (No. 58) have the character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self- evident, even if the question is considered only on principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative body. United States v. Pablo, 35 Phil. 94 (1916) Facts: Andres Pablo, a policeman, reported that he saw Rodrigo and Malicsi in the jueteng arena and then testified on the contrary during the trial. He was charged with perjury and convicted under Act. 1697 which was said to have repealed articles 318 and 324 of the penal code.

Raeses 3 Issue: WON defendant can be punished for perjury Held: Yes. Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its decisions, was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code relating to false testimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code; and as the said final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed.
Const. (1987). art, III Sec. 19 1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

2.

Limitations:
Const. (1987), art. III Sec. 1 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Sec. 14 1. 2. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Sec. 20 No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non- payment of a poll tax. Sec. 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. *See definition of ex post facto law on page 1 and bill of attainder on page 2.

Sec. 18 1. 2. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Reyes: A right which may be waived is the right of the accused to confrontation and cross- examination. A right which may not be waived is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The reason or principle underlying the difference between rights which may be waived are personal, while those rights which may not be waived involve public interest which may be affected. (2 Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 Edition, 748) *Refer to Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 115, Sec. 1 for the relevant statutory rights of the accused on page 4

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Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 115 Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. (b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. (c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. x x x (d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. x x x (g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf. (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. (i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.

Civil Code, Art. 2 Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984) Facts: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander;

and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the towns police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of carabaos & carabeef from one province to another. Issue: WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982 Held: No. The said order isnt enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because its a penal regulation published more than 2 mos. later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in A2 of the CC & 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word laws in article 2 includes circulars & regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential EOs having general applicability should be published in the OG. It provides that every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation wasnt in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda & Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. Doctrine: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice & fairness dictate that the public

Raeses 5 must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette. Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Held: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollary access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (6 AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. *Refer to page 3 for the relevant constitutional provision (Art. III, Sec. 22) and page 1 for the definition of an ex-post facto law. In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429 (1970) Facts: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation contests validity of RA 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process rights of association, freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law Issues: 1. WON it violates three rights? 2. WON it is an ex post facto law? Held: 1. No. Its set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal protection of laws. 2. No. Ex post facto law defined: a. Makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when done. b. Aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was c. Inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed d. Alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests e. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of right which when done was lawful f. Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty. Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed after approval of law People v. Villaraza, 81 SCRA 95 (1978) Facts: On December 3, 1975 an assistant fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the city court

Ex-post facto law

Raeses 6 of CDO for having issues two bouncing checks. Judge Villaraza, upon confirming that the accused had waived his right to the second stage of preliminary investigation, directed the case be elevated to the CFI. The CFI of Misamis Oriental, returned the case to the city court. Disagreeing with the CFIs decision, Judge Villaraza once again raised it to the CFIwith the belief that estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under P.D. No. 818, which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended Art. 315 of the RPC. Issue: WON Puerto is punishable with prision mayor medium under P.D. 818 which amended Art. 315 of the RPC. Held: No. The penalty of prision mayor medium imposed by P.D. 818 applies only to swindling committed on or after October 22, 1975. The increased penalty does not apply to Puerto to the estafa committed on October 16, 1974. To do so would make it an ex-post facto law, which is clearly repugnant to Art. 21 and 22 of the RPC and Sec. 12, Art. IV of the Constitution. U.S. v. Diaz-Conde, 42 Phil. 766 (1922) Facts: On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco accomplished and delivered to the defendants a contract (named Exhibit B) which stated that the Oliveros and Lianco had borrowed from the latter a sum of three hundred pesos (Php 300), and by virtue of the terms of said contract, Oliveros and Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five percent (5%) per month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made on the January 10, 1916. On May 1, 1916, Act no. 2655 or the Usury Law came into effect. The law stated that that the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, [] shall be 12% per annum. Any amount of interest paid or to be paid in excess of that fixed by law is considered usurious, therefore unlawful. A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on May 6, 1921, charging the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint they were arrested, charged, and pleaded not guilty. On September 1, 1921, the case was finally brought on for trial. At the end of the trial, with consideration to the evidences cited in court, Hon. M. V. del Rosario, judge, found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P120 and, if they cannot meet their debt obligations, the defendants would suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence each of the defendants made an appeal. Issue: WON the Usury law would apply to the appellants considering that they executed the contract before the passage of said law. Held: No. The court held that the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed. A law imposing a new penalty, liability or disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the time of the contract were made must govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its commencement, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. To make it applicable in the present case would make it an ex- post facto law.

Bill of attainder
*Refer to page 3 for the relevant constitutional provision (Art. III, Sec. 22) and page 2 for the definition of a bill of attainder. People v. Ferrer 48 SCRA 382 (1972) Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti- Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the

Raeses 7 Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved on June 20 1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CPP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: 1. WON or not RA 1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. 2. WON RA 1700 violates freedom of expression. Held: 1. No. In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of Sec. 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person. The statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Sec. 44 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act are given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Sec. 8. 2. Yes, but it is justified. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The existence of substantive evil justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter.

D. Characteristics of Criminal Law General:

Const. (1987), Art. VI, sec. 1 The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Civil Code, Art. 14 Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)

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Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines, 10 February 1998 (Visiting Forces Agreement) Article V Criminal Jurisdiction 1. Subject to the provisions of this article: (a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines. (b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines. 2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States. (b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines. (c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security means: (1) treason; (2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense. 3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply: (a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article. (b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to: (1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and (2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty. (c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case. (d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the United States request. (e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken. (f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.

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(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction. 4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article. 5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are subject to Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United States personnel. 6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so. 7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense. 8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities. 9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled: (a) To a prompt and speedy trial; (b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense; (c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses; (d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses; (e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines; (f) To have the services of a competent interpreter; (g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine law, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance. 11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not

Raeses 10
be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts. Republic Act no. 75 An act to penalize acts which would impair the proper observance by the republic and inhabitants of the Philippines of the immunities, right, and privileges of duly accredited foreign diplomatic and consular agents in the Philippines Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take upon himself to act as a diplomatic, consular, or any other official of a foreign government duly accredited as such to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with intent to defraud such foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or any person, or in such pretended character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from person or from said foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or from any officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of value, shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code. Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attach, who shall act in the Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to, and registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, aside from other penalties that may be imposed by law. Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or mislead, within the jurisdiction of the Republic, wear any naval, military, police, or other official uniform, decoration, or regalia of any foreign State, nation or government with which the Republic of the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, unless such wearing thereof be authorized by such State, nation, or government, shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized and received as such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court. Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines, in the service of an ambassador or a public minister, and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such service; nor shall the said section apply to any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a public minister, unless the name of the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who shall upon receipt thereof post the same in some public place in his office. All persons shall have resort to the list of names so posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take copies without fee. Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other manner offers violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three years, and fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of the court, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code. Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable only in case where the country of the diplomatic or consular representative adversely affected has provided for similar protection to duly accredited diplomatic or consular representatives of the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing like or similar penalties for like or similar offenses herein contained.itc-alf Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved: October 21, 1946

Raeses 11
Republic Act no. 7055 An act strengthening civilian supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the armed forces of the Philippines, other persons subject to military law, and the members of the Philippine national office, repealing for the purpose certain presidential decrees Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1. Members of the Armed forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless, of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 70 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No, 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances. Sec. 2. Subject to the provisions of Section 1 hereof, all cases filed or pending for filing with court-martial or other similar bodies, except those where the accused had already been arraigned, shall, within thirty (30) days following the effectivity of this Act, be transferred to the proper civil courts: Provided, That the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall, upon petition before commencement of trial and with written consent of the accused, order the transfer of such excepted case or cases to the proper civil courts for trial and resolution. Sec. 3. Presidential Decree Nos. 1822, 1822-A, 1850 and 1952, and all acts, general orders, executive orders, and other presidential issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette orin at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Presidential Decree no. 1850 Presidential decree no. 1850 - providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the integrated national police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the armed forces of the Philippines WHEREAS, under Section 12, Article XV of the Constitution, the State shall establish and maintain an integrated national police force whose organization, administration, and operation shall be provided by law; WHEREAS, under and pursuant to existing laws, the various municipal/city police and fire departments and jails have been integrated into law-enforcement units under the operational control and organization set-up of the Philippine Constabulary; WHEREAS, in the interest of discipline and public service, it is desirable that members of the Integrated National Police be subject to trial by courts-martial under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the "Article of War for the Armed Forces of the Philippines," for all crimes of offenses which are heretofore cognizable by the civil courts; WHEREAS, as a complementary measure, there is a need to clarify existing provisions of law relating to jurisdiction of courts-martial and the Tanodbayan/Sandiganbayan and the regular civil courts over crimes and offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E, MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree: Section 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police

Raeses 12
who commit any crime of offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts- martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached before hand unless otherwise provided by law. As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards. Section 2. Segregation of Criminal Cases of Armed Forces and Integrated National Police from Civilian Co-accused. In cases where there are two or more accused one or some of whom is or are civilian(s), the case against the latter shall be segregated from accused Armed Forces or Integrated National Police member, and filed with the appropriate civil court for trial in accordance with existing laws; Provided, however, that should such civilian accused waive in writing civil court jurisdiction and submit himself to court-martial jurisdiction, then the whole case involving members of the Armed Forces or the Integrated National Police as well as the civilian(s) shall be referred for trial to a court-martial. Section 3. Appointing Authorities. (a) Where uniformed member(s) of the Integrated National Police are charged. The President of the Philippines and the Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police are hereby empowered to appoint general, special and summary courts-martial for the trial of uniformed members of the Integrated National Police. The Constabulary Regional Commanders/Directors, Integrated National Police may appoint special and summary courts-martial, and when empowered by the President, they may also appoint general courts-martial. Other subordinate field commanders of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police may appoint summary courts-martial when empowered by the President. (b) Where military personnel and Integrated National Police members are commonly charged. The court- martial shall be appointed by the appointing authorities specified in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. Section 4. Composition of Courts-Martial. Membership, whether military personnel or Integrated National Police members, in a general or special court- martial for the trial of a member of the Integrated National Police shall be in a ratio as determined by the appointing authority; Provided, however, that the number of Integrated National Police personnel detailed shall not be less than one-third of the total membership of the court. Section 5. Administrative Action. Court-martial action against uniformed personnel of the Integrated National Police as herein provided shall not preclude the taking of administrative action against said personnel as may be warranted pursuant to the provisions of existing law. Section 6. Transitory Provisions. All cases pending before the civil courts against military personnel in the active service Integrated National Forces of the Philippines or against Integrated National Police personnel where, on the effective date of this Decree, the accused have been arraigned, shall continue to be tried and decided by said civil courts. All other cases against such personnel shall be tried by courts-martial or disposed of pursuant to this Decree. Section 7. Promulgation of Rules. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall formulate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this Decree, which shall, upon recommendation of the Minister of National Defense, be subject to the approval of the President. Section 8. Appropriations. The amount of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of the funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated to carry out the purpose of this Decree and, thereafter, such amounts as may be necessary for this purpose shall be included in the annual appropriation of the Integrated National Police. Section 9. Repealing Clause. All laws, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, which are contrary to, or

Raeses 13
inconsistent with, the provisions of this Decree, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 10. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 4th day of October, the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-two.

U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901) Facts: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was acting in the line of duty. Issues: 1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI. 2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offence under the penal code. 3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, WON the military character sustained by the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals. Held: 1. Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty. 2. Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW isnt in the RPC, physical

assault charges may be pressed under the RPC. 3. No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character brought before them for trial (R.A. No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was service connected. If this were true, it may be used as a defense but this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case. Doctrine: Jurisdiction of the civil courts is not affected by the military character of the accused. Reyes: 1. Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with general courts-martial over soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2. The RPC or other penal laws is not applicable when the military court takes cognizance of the case. When the military court takes cognizance of the case involving a person subject to military law, the Articles of War apply. 3. The prosecution of an accused before a court-martial is a bar to another prosecution of the accused for the same offense. 4. Offenders of war crimes are triable by military courts. 5. There are exceptions to the general application of Criminal Law in the Philippines. The opening sentence of Art. 2 of the RPC says that the provisions of this Code shall be enforced within the Philippine Archipelago, except as provided in the treaties and laws or preferential application. (i.e. Treaty VFA) Art. 14 of the new Civil Code provides that penal laws and those of public safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law

Raeses 14 and to treaty stipulations. (i.e. Law of preferential application R.A. no. 75, which favors diplomatic representatives and their servants; Principle of public international law immunity for (1) sovereigns and other chiefs of state, (2) ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident and charges daffaires.) Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1945) Facts: By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385. The petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese & active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power of Commander of the US Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based proclamation on reasons that apprehended have violated due allegiance to US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus. Issues: 1. WON the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation? [Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, cannot be seriously questioned.] 2. WON this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected? Held: 1. No. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political dept, & not the judicial dept, to determine if war has ended. Fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun doesnt mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, w/c clearly it hasnt. Delivery w/in power of military authorities to make even before was terminated. 2. No. Civil Courts shouldnt interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil & criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our countrys faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities. Liang v. People, 323 SCRA 692 (2000) Facts: Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the Metropolitan TC of Mandaluyong City for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow worker w/ 2 counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge then received an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the agreement bet ADB & the govt. MeTC judge, w/o notice, dismissed the two criminal cases. Prosecution filed writ of mandamus & certiorari and ordered the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest. Issue: WON the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court. Held: No. He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity. That a person is covered by immunity is

Raeses 15 preliminary. Due process is right of the accused as much as the prosecution. Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty. Under Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission of a crime is not part of official duty. On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation isnt a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling w/in the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation doesnt affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction Immunity from the exercise of local jurisdiction may be generally classified as absolute or relative. Absolute and Relative Immunity: A foreign sovereign could not, without his consent, be made a defendant in the courts of another sovereign. In a newer and restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, such exemption has been recognized only with respect to sovereign or public acts of state and not necessarily with respect to its so-called private acts. Regardless of whether an individual is constitutionally the actual head of state or only its nominal head, he or she enjoys complete immunity from suit in the territory of another state. And whatever the sovereign may do in the territory of another state, he is immune from all prosecution, civil or criminal. 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: heads of diplomatic missions, such as acting ambassadors or nuncios, or internuncios and charges daffaires are exempted from the exercise of local jurisdiction. The remedy of a local state is to consider him persona non grata. Immunities of consuls: Consuls do not belong to the class of diplomatic agents. They do not enjoy immunity from local jurisdiction from private or commercial transactions not connected with consular duties. Honorary consuls: Are appointed to perform limited curricular duties. They have no specific definition in the Vienna Convention. Their immunities are limited to the level necessary for their proper exercise of official consular functions. Consular employees at a post headed by an honorary consul and members of the honorary consuls family are granted none of the privileges provided in the convention. Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State: Officers representing the sovereign state are exempted from local jurisdiction. Immunity of Officials of International Organizations: The immunities enjoyed by the UN includes immunity for UN assets from any legal process; from search, requisition, expropriation, confiscation, and any sort of interference; of archives; freedom from all financial controls, moratoriums, or other monetary regulations; freedom to hold funds in any desired currency or metal; freedom to transfer funds; an absolute exemption of all assets and revenue from all direct taxes; exemption from all customs duties as well as from any foreign trade prohibitions on needed goods; guarantee of most favored diplomatic treatment; exemption from censorship, etc. Officers of the UN enjoy immunity from local jurisdiction. Similarly, representatives of the European Economic Community and the EURATOM

Raeses 16 possess customary diplomatic privileges and immunities. Members of special diplomatic missions enjoy civil and criminal immunities, and are exempted from customs duties and inspections. Immunity of Intergovernmental International Organizations: Intergovernmental international organizations are granted privileges and immunities to secure them from legal and practical independence in the performance of their duties. (Jenks, International Immunities, London [1961]) Immunity of Non-Governmental Intergovernmental International Organizations: The principle of immunity from suit has been extended to these organizations in order to give them freedom of performance of their activities. Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity: the privileges of diplomatic officials are not altogether unlimited. Restrictive theory limits immunity to public acts and excluding all commercial or private acts. Immunity of As Hoc Diplomats: members of official missions and delegates traveling abroad to attend international conference are accorded diplomatic immunity while in the performance of their official functions. Proper procedure for Liang v. People: The court should have inquired whether the crime committed was in connection with his official duties pursuant to the agreement between the Government of the RP and the ADB. His immunity was not absolute, as the principle of restrictive immunity applies to him. was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended that original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Issues: 1. WON the US SC has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al & such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Phils. 2. WON original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines Held: 1. No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It also provides that the original jurisdiction of this court shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al. 2. The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. According to Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFIs. As a result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFIs. The original jurisdiction conferred to SC by the

Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1936) Facts: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila was subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to this saying that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his objection

Raeses 17 Constitution jurisdiction. was not an exclusive U.S. v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7 (1910) Facts: Bull, the master of the steamship STANDARD, carried, transported and brought into the port & city of Manila, aboard said vessel, 677 head of cattle & carabaos, w/o providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty & unnecessary suffering to the said animals. He failed to provide stalls & suitable means for tying & securing said animals in a proper manner. Bull even caused some of the said animals to be tied by means of rings through their noses and permitted others to be transported loose in the hold & on the deck of said vessel w/o being tied or secured in stalls. Bedding for all the said animals was not provided as well. Hence, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, many of said animals were tossed upon the decks of hold of said vessels, cruelly wounded, bruised & killed. All acts contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 & No. 275 of the Phil. Commission. Issues: 1. WON the trial court was with jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. 2. WON Act No. 55, as amended, is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitutions of the US. 3. WON Whether or not the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Held: 1. Yes. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense. When the vessel came w/in 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands w/c embraces the entrance to Manila Bay, she was w/in territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was thus done w/in American waters, & the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the offense & the person of the offender. The treaty does not deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed onboard a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another w/c amount to a disturbance of the order/tranquility of the country. A fair & reasonable construction of the language requires us to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the

Territorial
RPC, Art. 2 Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship; 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

Const. (1987), Art. I The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. V *Refer to pp. 8-10 for full text

Raeses 18 order/tranquility of the country. The offense of Bull, master of the said vessel, was a violation of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. Hence, neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the courts of the Phil. Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case. 2. No. The Constitution of the US operates only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, & by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the US, it may regulate foreign commerce w/ such territory. This Act has remained in force since its enactment w/o annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to have been met w/ the bodys approval. 3. No. The evidence is SUFFICIENT to support the conviction. 15 of the said cattle had broken legs & 3 others have died, due to their broken legs. The said cattle were transported & carried on the deck & in the hold of said ship, w/o suitable precaution & care for their transportation to avoid danger & risk to their lives & security. Doctrine: Offense committed on board a foreign merchant vessel while on Philippine waters is triable before our court (Reyes). Reyes: 1. There are two rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard foreign merchant vessels. a. French Rule such crimes are not triable in the courts of that country, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or the safety of the state is endangered. b. English Rule such crimes are triable in that country, unless they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management thereof. This is the rule followed in the Philippines. 2. Crimes not involving a breach of public order committed on board a foreign merchant vessel in transit not triable by our courts. 3. Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over offenses committed on board foreign warships in territorial waters. In case vessels are in the ports or territorial waters of a foreign country, a distinction must be made between merchant ships and warships. The former are, more or less, subjected to territorial laws. Warships, on the other hand, are always reputed to be the territory of the country to which they belong and cannot be subjected to the laws of another state. People v. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573 (1910) Facts: Between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as August 19, 1909)s everal persons, Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti. It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu. Issue: WON a local court can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port Held: Yes. The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts

Raeses 19 of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty. U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917) Facts: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making the search found the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug. Issue: WON the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has been proven? Held: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this case, it is to be noted that 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands Import and bring should be construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. The importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the port, and the importation is complete before the entry to the customhouse. Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging from the size of the amount brought. People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19 (1922) Facts: On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to

Raeses 20 indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs. Issue: 1. WON the local court has jurisdiction over the case. 2. Does Art. 153 of the Spanish penal code which punishes Piracy still apply? Held: 1. Yes. Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal or any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes had not territorial limits. 2. Yes. All laws previously in force shall remain force until amended or repealed. Doctrine: Pirates are considered hostis humani generis. Therefore, they can be tried anywhere. People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729 (1922) Facts: Wong Cheng smoked opium while aboard merchant vessel Changsa, anchored in Manila Bay 2.5 miles from shore. Issue: WON Philippines has jurisdiction over Merchant ships in its territory? Held: Yes; smoking within territory allows substance to produce pernicious effects, which is against public order. It is also an act of defiance of authority. Miquiabas v. Commanding General, 80 Phil. 262 (1948) Facts: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the US army in the Philippines who had been charged of disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the US army in violation of the 94th article of War of the US. He was arrested and a General Court-Martial was appointed. He was found guilty. As a rule, the Philippines being a sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the US shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within said portions of territory. Issues: 1. WON the offense has been committed within a US base thus giving the US jurisdiction over the case. 2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed forces Held: 1. No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was committed is not w/in a US base for it is not names in Annex A or B of AXXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) & is merely part of the temporary quarters located w/in presented limits of the city of Manila. Moreover, extended installations & temporary quarters arent considered to have the same jurisdictional capacity as permanent bases & are governed by AXIII pars. 2 & 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in the beyond the jurisdiction of military courts. 2. No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as a member of the US armed forces. Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the US Army does not make him a member of the armed forces.

Prospective
RPC Art. 1 Time when Act takes effect. - This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-two. Art. 21 Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

Raeses 21
RPC Art. 22 Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

A person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten (10) years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, burto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. [Revised Penal Code, Art. 62(5) as amended by R.A. No. 7659, sec. 23]

Civil Code, Art. 4 Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)

Reyes: 1. Prospective, in that a penal law cannot make an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed. As provided in Article 366 of the RPC, crimes are punished under the laws in force at the time of their commission. 2. Whenever a new statute dealing with crime establishes conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused, it can be given a retroactive effect. Unless: 1. Where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of action. (Tavera v. Valdez, 1 Phil. 463, 470- 471) 2. Where the offender is a habitual criminal under Rule 5, Article 62, RPC. (Art. 22, RPC) 3. The Repeal of penal laws have different effects. 1. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law

shall be applied, except when the offender is a habitual delinquent or when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or existing causes of action. 2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied. 3. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act which penalized under the old law is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated. 4. When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense under the old law, the accused cannot be convicted under the new law. 5. A person erroneously accused and convicted under a repealed statute may be punished under the repealing statute. 6. A new law which omits anything contained in the old law dealing on the same subject operates as a repeal of anything not so included in the amendatory act. Who is a habitual delinquent? Reyes: A person is a habitual delinquent if within a period of 10 years from the date of his last release or last conviction of the crimes of (1) serious or less serious physical injuries, (2) robo, (3) hurto, (4) estafa, or (5) falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a time or oftener. Requisites: 1. That the offender has been convicted of any of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification. 2. That after the conviction or after serving his sentence, he again committed, and, within 10 years from his release or first conviction, he was again convicted of any of the said crimes for the second time. 3. That after his conviction of, or after serving sentence for, the second offense, he again

Raeses 22 committed, and, within 10 years from his last release or last conviction, he was again convicted of any of said offenses, the third time or oftener. Who is a recidivist? Reyes: A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the RPC (People v. Lagarto, G.R. No. 65833, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 611, 619) Requisites 1. That the offender is on trial for an offense. 2. That he was previously convicted by final judgment of another crime. 3. That both the first and second offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code; 4. That the offender is convicted of the new offense. *There is recidivism even if the lapse of time between two felonies is more than 10 years. **Pardon does not obliterate the fact that the accused was a recidivist; but amnesty extinguishes the penalty and its effects. Who is a quasi-recidivist? Reyes: Any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. (Art. 160) Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971) Facts: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions. They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for complex rebellion with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal. Issue: WON Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favorable to the accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied retroactively) Held: Yes. Judicial decisions favorable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. CC also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision. In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., supra *Refer to page 5 for the digest of this case. People v. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389, (1983) Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent

Raeses 23 Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages. Issues: 1. WON CFI erred in convicting defendant- appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person. 2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights. 3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party. Held: 1. No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. Its accepted that victim was the original aggressor. 2. Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites: 1. Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. A536 of the CC also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession 2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In case, killing was disproportionate to attack. 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation)

Raeses 24 Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault wasnt deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered 3 degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor. 3. No. He isnt liable for subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to fines only & not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages & costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its commission, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to RPC Art. 22. People v. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999) Facts: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering Peoples Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, & poked a knife at the latters throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind & shot him 6 times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder & that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove Floridas unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 yrs. Issues: 1. WON the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in 1994) is applicable 2. WON RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years. 3. WON trial court erred in convicting accused of murder 4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which wasnt proven & that the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion perpetua due to to the absence of an aggravating circumstance. Held: 1. No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law. 2. Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866. It is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance, no longer as a separate offence. According to the Art. 22 of the RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is favorable to the accused. Thus, insofar as it spares accused- appellant a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, RA 8294 has to be given retroactive application. 3. No. For self-defense to prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case, defendant failed to prove

Raeses 25 unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim approached him with a bolo was inconsistent to the witness statement of the victim being in a prone position in the table. This does not constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing, the last two requisites have no basis. 4. Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as described by A248 RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be imposed in according to Art. 63(2) of the RPC. People v. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998) Facts: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; & Enrile v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the TC & the CA. Issue: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700. Held: No. 1. Art. III of the Constitution & RoC 117 state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet. 2. They are different offenses. RA 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms. However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, & since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didnt raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion People v. Lacson, 382 SCRA 365 (2002) Facts: Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been slain in a shootout w/ the police, 2 witnesses surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-out. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against 97 officers & personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. On Nov. 2, 1995, after 2 resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the SB 11 information[s] of murder against the defendant & 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman & in a re-investigation, the information[s] were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of charges, the case was later transferred from the SB to the RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by RA 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the prosecution recanted their statements while the 7 private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, & (3) dismiss the cases should the TC find lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed. It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the DOJ new affidavits of new witnesses w/c it began to investigate & to file w/ the RTC. The respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed w/ the CA a petition stating that 8, Rule 117 of the

Raeses 26 2000 Rules on Crim. Pro. bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the CA denied. On June 6, 2001, 11 Information[s] for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the RTC QC. The new Information[s] charged as principals 34 people, including respondent Lacson & his 25 other co-accused in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of probable cause & an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed & the new cases as mere revivals. Under 8 2000 RCP 117, the cases were dismissed. Issue: WON 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the 11 information[s] against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. Held: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given RPC Art. 22. There can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need of proof to show the ff. facts: 1. provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused 2. whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party 3. whether the 2 year period to revive the case has already elapsed 4. whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 yr period. The respondent expressed consent, but the records dont reveal whether the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive w/ regards to the 2-year bar, if w/in or without. Because of this, both prosecution & defendant must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence. People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267 (2003) Facts: Before the court is the petitioners MFR of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of 8 RCP 117 on the dismissal of the cases Q-99-81679 & Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting & killing of 11 male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant. Issues: 1. WON the requisites for the applicability of 8, 2000 RCP 117 were complied w/ in the Kuratong Baleleng cases Was express consent given by the respondent? Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims? 2. WON time-bar in 8 RCP 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively. Held: 1. No. Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal, 2) offended party notified, 3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally, 4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, w/c in this case hasnt been done. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.

Raeses 27 2. No. Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved & the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, & the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 yr & 3 months to work instead of 2 yrs. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The 2-yr period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State & the accused. It shouldnt be emasculated & reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state & adversely affect the administration of justice. People v. Lacson, 413 SCRA 20 (2003) Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial. Issues: 1. WON the 5 Associate Justices can inhibit themselves from deciding in the MFR given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments. 2. WON the application of the time-bar under 8 RCP 117 be given a retroactive application w/o reservations, only & solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. Held: 1. The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while 8 secures the rights of the accused, it doesnt & shouldnt preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application 2. No. The Court isnt mandated to apply rules retroactively just because its favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State & the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust & oppressive consequences to the State & to the victims of crimes & their heirs.

Construction/Interpretation of Penal Laws

Reyes: Penal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243; People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 728) The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the State may be invoked only where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its interpretation. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for the application of the rule. (People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664)

Raeses 28
Const. (1987), Art. III, Sec. 14(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Spanish text of the RPC prevails over its English translation.

Retroactive application if favorable to the accused. (RPC, Art. 22)

*Refer to page 21 for the full text for Art. 22

Prescribed, but undeserved, penalties

RPC, Art. 5, 2nd par.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Raeses 29

Felonies and Criminal Liability

A. Felonies
RPC, Art. 3 Definition. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (d+olo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

5. Omission should be construed as inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an act. If there is no law that requires a person to perform a certain act, failure to do such act would not result in a felony and would therefore not be punishable by the RPC.

Act
People v. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 309 (1990) Facts: Appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. that the CA erred in convicting him of murder qualified with treachery and evident premeditation from a previous case on the sole basis of Huntorias (eye witness) account. Previous case: That appellant with his 3 robust sons along with brother and sister Fausta and Rogelio conspired to kill Augusto and Faustas landlord, Peacerrada. The victim sustained 16 stab, puncture, and lacerated wounds, 5 of which were fatal. The lone eyewitness was Huntoria who claimed that he saw all 6 accused ganging up on the victim, but he failed to state who actually did the stabbing or hacking. All the accused petitioned for parole except for appellant Issues: WON the appellant had committed the felony of murder with treachery and evident premeditation. Held: No. The Court held that the prosecution was unable to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt because: (a) Huntoria was a poor eyewitness (took 8 months to come forward and wanted to get in the good graces of his landlords family) and was unable to supply any information as to what the appellant actually did (the act) in his alleged participation in the murder; (b) it was illogical that the appellants 3 robust sons together with Augusto and Fausta would bring their aging 65-year old father to the victims house just to participate in the killing considering the appellant

Reyes: 1. Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by the RPC. 2. Felonies have certain elements. 1. That there must be an act or omission. 2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal Code. 3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa. (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 309, 324) 3. Act must be understood as any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that the same be actually produced, as the possibility of its production is sufficient. (People v. Gonzales, supra) But the act must be one which is defined by the RPC as constituting a felony; or, at least, an overt act of that felony, that is, an external act which has direct connection with the felony intended to be committed. (Art. 6) 4. The act must be external, because internal acts are beyond the spere of penal law.

Raeses 30 lived a good kilometer away from the scene of the crime; (c) the prior investigations were sloppy and provided no decent evidence to support the appellants participation in the murder. Doctrine: Felony must involve an act (any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world) or omission. The act of hacking or stabbing the victim was never proven to have been done by the appellant. Therefore, the accused had not committed a felony.
RPC, Art. 116 Misprision of treason. - Every person owing allegiance to (the United States) the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, who conceals or does not disclose and make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason. Art. 137 Disloyalty of public officers or employees. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power, or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them. (Restored by E.O. No. 187) Art. 208 Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses. Art. 213 (2) (b) Frauds against the public treasury and offenses. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any public officer who: 2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty or any of the following acts or omissions: (b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially. Art. 223 Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished: 1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty. 2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance. Art. 234 Refusal to discharge elective office. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office. Art. 275 (1) Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one's own victim. The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon: 1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense.

Raeses 31
Presidential Decree no. 953 Requiring the planting of trees in certain places and penalizing unauthorized cutting, destruction, damaging and injuring of certain trees, plants and vegetation WHEREAS, the planting of trees on lands adjoining the edge of rivers and creeks in both a measure of beautification and reforestation; and WHEREAS, the planting of trees along roads and areas intended for the common use of owners of lots in subdivisions will provide shade and healthful environment therein; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree: Section 1. The following shall plant trees: 1. Every person who owns land adjoining a river or creek, shall plant trees extending at least five meters on his land adjoining the edge of the bank of the river or creek, except when such land, due to its permanent improvement, cannot be planted with trees; 2. Every owner of an existing subdivision shall plant trees in the open spaces required to be reserved for the common use and enjoyment of the owners of the lots therein as well as along all roads and service streets. The subdivision owner shall consult the Bureau of Forest Development as to the appropriate species of trees to be planted and the manner of planting them; and 3. Every holder of a license agreement, lease, license or permit from the Government, involving occupation and utilization of forest or grazing land with a river or creek therein, shall plant trees extending at least twenty (20) meters from each edge of the bank of the river or creek. The persons hereinabove required to plant trees shall take good care of them, and, from time to time, remove any tree planted by them in their respective areas which has grown very old, is diseased, or is defective, and replant with trees their respective areas whenever necessary. Section 2. Every owner of land subdivided into residential/commercial/industrial lots after the effectivity of this Decree shall reserve, develop and maintain not less than thirty percent (30%) of the total area of the subdivision, exclusive of roads, service streets and alleys, as open space for parks and recreational areas. No plan for a subdivision shall be approved by the Land Registration Commission or any office or agency of the government unless at least thirty percent (30%) of the total area of the subdivision, exclusive of roads, service streets and alleys, is reserved as open space for parks and recreational areas and the owner thereof undertakes to develop such open space, within three (3) years from the approval of the subdivision plan, in accordance with the development plan approved by the Bureau of Forest Development and to maintain such parks and recreational areas. Section 3. Any person who cuts, destroys, damages or injures, naturally growing or planted trees of any kind, flowering or ornamental plants and shrubs, or plants of scenic, aesthetic and ecological values, along public roads, in plazas, parks other than national parks, school premises or in any other public ground or place, or on banks of rivers or creeks, or along roads in land subdivisions or areas therein for the common use of the owners of lots therein, or any species of vegetation or forest cover found therein shall, be punished with imprisonment for not less than six months and not more than two years, or a fine of not less than five hundred pesos and not more than five thousand pesos, or with both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court, except when the cutting, destroying, damaging or injuring is necessary for public safety or the pruning thereof is necessary to enhance beauty, and only upon the approval of the duly authorized representative of the head of agency or political subdivision having jurisdiction therein, or of the Director of Forest Development in the case of trees on banks of rivers and creeks, or of the owner of the land subdivision in the case of trees along roads and in other areas therein for the common use of owners of lots therein. If the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers thereof responsible for the offense, and if such officer or officers are aliens, in addition to the penalty herein prescribed, he or they shall be deported without further proceedings before the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Nothing in this Decree shall prevent the cancellation of a license agreement, lease, license or permit from the Government, if such cancellation is prescribed therein or in Government regulations for such offense.

Raeses 32
Section 4. Any person who shall violate any provision of Section one hereof, or any regulation promulgated thereunder, shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six months but not more than two years, or with a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos, or with both such imprisonment than fine at the discretion of the court. If the offender is a public officer or employee, he shall, in addition, be dismissed from the public service and disqualified perpetually to hold public office. Section 5. Any person who shall violate the provision of Section 2 hereof, or any regulation promulgated thereunder, shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than two (2) years but not more than five (5) years, or with a fine equivalent to the value, at current valuation, of the area representing thirty percent (30%) of the total area of the subdivision, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court. Section 6. The Director of Forest Development shall issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Decree. Section 7. All laws, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. Section 8. This Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation. Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six. Presidential Decree no. 1153 Requiring the planting of one tree every month for five consecutive years by every citizen of the Philippines WHEREAS, more abundant natural resources, particularly forest resources, will prevent floods, droughts, erosion and sedimentation, and will increase our water supply needed to generate more power, expand farm productivity, and meet the ever increasing demand for domestic consumption of our exploding population; and WHEREAS, to achieve a holistic ecosystem approach to forest resource management, to prevent irreversible consequences of human activities on the environment, and to promote a healthier ecosystem for our people, it is time to make an urgent call upon our citizenry to plant trees: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the following: Section 1. It is the policy of the State to call upon every citizen of the Philippines to help, as a duty and obligation, to conserve and develop the resources of the country. Section 2. In furtherance of said policy, every citizen of the Philippines at least ten (10) years of age, actually residing therein, unless physically disabled to do so, shall plant one tree every month for five (5) consecutive years. Section 3. The planting of such trees shall be done in any of the following places: (a) In lands or lots owned by his family; (b) In lands or lots leased by his family with the consent of the owner thereof; (c) In lands which are parts of public grounds or places such as plazas, schools, markets, roadside and parks, and (d) In lands of the public domain designated by the Presidential Council for Forest Ecosystem Management, hereafter referred to as the Council, such as appropriate forest lands, grazing or pasture lands, mineral lands, resettlement lands, civil and military reservations. Section 4. The trees to be planted shall be fruit-bearing, shade, ornamental or forest trees, and the same shall be taken care of for at least two years after each planting and replaced if the same die, are diseased or are defective. Section 5. The Council, in consultation with the appropriate government agencies, shall issue such rules and regulations which may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Decree and Letter of Instruction No. 423 whenever applicable. Section 6. Any person who violates any provision of this Decree or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder shall be punished with a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or, in appropriate cases, with disqualification to acquire or enjoy any privilege granted exclusively to citizens of the Philippines, such as the

Raeses 33
acquisition either through sale, free patent, homestead, or lease of public lands, enjoyment of a franchise to own or operate a public utility or the grant of lease, license or a privilege involving natural resources; and for a period of five years be disqualified to hold public office, to graduate from any educational institution at all levels, to take any bar, board or civil service examination, and to practice any profession licensed and regulated by the Supreme Court or the Professional Regulation Commission. Section 7. This Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation. Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of June in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.

not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. There is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation. Mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime does not constitute the cooperation required in Article 14 of the Penal code.

Punishable by the Revised Penal Code

Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege *Refer to page 1 for the definition, as elucidated by Justice Fernando
RPC, Art. 3 *Refer to page 29 for the full text of the provision Art. 5 Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation. Art. 21 Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

Omission
People v. Sylvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil. 353 (1931) Facts: Martin Atienza was convicted as principal by direct participation and Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime of arson by the CFI. On the night of November 25, 1950, while the defendants and Nicolas De la Cruz and his wife were gathered after dinner, Martin Atienza ordered them to take their furniture out of the house as he was going to set it on fire to get revenge on the people of Masocol, who instigated the charge of adultery against him and Silvestre and drove them out of town. As Atienza had a gun in hand, nobody said anything. The de la Cruz couple left to alert the barrio lieutenant, but before they got there they heard the cries of Fire! Fire! and looked back to see their home on fire. The fire destroyed about 48 houses. Romana was accused for listening to her co- defendants threat without raising a protest, and not giving the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Issue: WON Silvestres failure is an omission that belongs properly to the meaning in Art.3 and hence, punishable. Held: No. Mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, is not punishable. An accomplice is one who does

How committed
RPC, Art. 3 *Refer to page 29 for the full text of the provision Act. 365 Imprudence and negligence. Any person who,

Raeses 34
(Cont.) by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) 3. In felonies committed by means of dolo or with malice and in felonies committed by means of fault or culpa, the acts or omissions must be voluntary. 4. A person causing damage or injury to another, without malice or fault, is not criminally liable under the RPC.

Dolo
Reyes: 1. The word deceit in the second paragraph of Art. 3 is not the proper translation of the word dolo. Dolus is equivalent to malice, which is the intent to do an injury to another. (I Whartons Criminal Law 180) When the offender, in performing an act or in incurring an omission, has the intention to do an injury to person, property or right of another, such offender acts with malice. If the act or omission is punished by the RPC, he is liable for intentional felony. 2. There are certain requisites for dolo or malice. In order that an act or omission may be considered as having been performed or incurred with deliberate intent, the following requisites must concur: 1. He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act; 2. He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do the act; 3. He must have INTENT while doing the act or omitting to do the act.

Reyes: The provisions contained in this article shall not be 1. Art. 3 classifies felonies, according to to applicable: the means by which they are committed, into (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. Thus, the second 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is paragraph of the aforementioned article equal to or lower than those provided in the first states that felonies are committed not only two paragraphs of this article, in which case the by means of deceit (dolo) but also by mean court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree of fault (culpa ). be imposed in the period than that which should which they may deem proper to adistinct pply. 2. There is, obviously, a difference between intentional and culpable felonies. In the former, the act or omission of the offender is malicious . In the language 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with
violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant

Raeses 35 3. When a person acts without freedom, he is no longer a human being but a tool. Therefore, a person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force is exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 12, par. 5) So also, a person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 12, par. 6) 4. Without intelligence, necessary to determine the morality of human acts, no crime can exist. Thus, the imbecile or insane, and the infant under nine years of age, as well as the minor over nine but less than fifteen years ol and act without discernment, have no criminal liability, because they act without intelligence. (Art. 12, pars. 1, 2 and 3) 5. Intent to commit the act with malice, being purely a meantal process, is presumed and the presumption arises from the proof of the commission of an unlawful act. 6. All three requisites of voluntariness in intentional felony must be present, because a voluntary act is free, intelligent, and intelligent act. (U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, 495) apply article 549, but article 554 of the Penal Code. Held: 1. No. Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (Art. 1, Penal Code.) 2. No. The argument which the defense advances, based on article 554, which in connection with 553 punishes the setting fire to a building intended for habitation, in an uninhabited place, does not apply, because the article question refers to an edifice intended for human habitation in an uninhabited place at a time when the same is unoccupied. It is article 549, which punishes with the very severe penalties of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua "those who shall set fire to any edifice, farmhouse, hut, shed, or vessel in port, with knowledge that one or more persons were within the same," that must be applied. Doctrine: As intent is largely a mental process, there is always a presumption of intent aising from overt acts. U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911) Facts: On 2 October 1900 justice of the peace Rafael B. Catolico had 16 cases against 16 distinct individuals each one for violating a contract with one Juan Canillas. All cases were decided in favor of Canillas; and all 16 cases appealed, depositing P16 as required by law and filing a bond of P50. On 12 October 1900 Canillas proved to Catolico that each of the bonds were insolvent. As a result, Catolico ordered the cancellation of the bonds filed and ordered the 16 to file another bond. Canillas then asked for the court to declare final judgment for each of the 16 cases and at the same time asking that the sums deposited by the defendants be delivered to him. Catolico agreed. Attorney for the defendants in the 16 cases then filed a complaint against Catolico for malversation of public funds. Catolico was convicted and now appeals.

Presumption of Intent
U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909) Facts: Five individuals, among them being the accused herein, went to the house where Pedro Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul were living, and there inquired after some carabaos that had disappeared, and because these above-mentioned inmates answered that they knew nothing about the matter, ordered them to leave the house, but as the three men named above refused to do so the accused Catalino Apostol, set fire to the hut and the same was burnt down. Issue: 1. WON proof of criminal intent is needed. 2. WON due to the burnt hut being situated in an uninhabited place, it is not proper to

Raeses 36 Issue: WON Catolico committed a crime when he believed he was performing an innocent act Held: No, he did not commit a crime. 1. Essential elements for malversation of public funds were not present o accused did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person o he did not permit anybody else to convert it To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accomplished by a criminal intent or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as in law is equivalent to criminal intent The maxim is actus non facit reum nisi mens rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained it to be innocent Doctrine: The presumption of criminal intent does not arise from the proof of the commission of an act which is not unlawful. awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. On their appeal, appellants contended that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged. Issue: WON the accused were guilty of kidnapping. Held; No. it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon. With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a- vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate

General and Specific Intent

People v. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 (1993) Facts: The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti- Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense. On January 13, 1988 in Quezon City, the said accused Isabelo Puno and Enrique Amurao, being then private individuals, feloniously kidnapped Maria del Socorro Sarmiento for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be

Raeses 37 purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention. *Highway robbery does not apply here either. Accused are only guilty of simple robbery. Doctrine: In some felonies, proof of particular specific intent is required. (i.e. kidnapping, homicide). People v. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003) Facts: Marlon, Leon & Ronald Delim were convicted for murder of Modesto Delim, resident of Bila, Sison, Pangasinan. Modesto is the adopted child of Marlons Dad. Marlon, Manuel & Robert are brothers & Leon & Ronald are their nephews. Around 6:30 pm, January 23, 1999, Modesto and family were preparing to eat dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald arrived. Marlon poked gun, other two grabbed, hog tied and gagged Modesto. They herded him out of the hose and went to the direction of Paldit. Leon and Manual guarded Rita & Randy until 7 am and told them to stay put. They searched for him for 3 days and reported to police three days after the incident. Randy with relatives found Modesto in the housing project in Paldit under bushes. He was dead due to gun shot wound on head. Issues: 1. WON case is murder or kidnapping? 2. WON prosecution had sufficient evidence? 3. WON there was conspiracy? 4. WON witness testimonies were valid? 5. WON alibi warranted? 6. WON there was treachery and other aggravting circumstances? Held: 1. Murder: when primary purpose is to kill, deprivation is incidental and doesnt constitute kidnapping (US v. Ancheta). Specific intent: active desire to do certain criminal acts or particular purpose (example, murder and kidnappingkill and deprive victim of liberty) motive: reason which prompts accused to engage in particular criminal activity (ex. Kidnap for ransom) essential for kidnapping. Information: described murder and kidnapping not specified. Yes. Prosecution proved intent to kill with their knives and handguns, 5 gun shot wounds and 4 stab wounds (defensive). Furthermore, the pieces of circumstancial evidence were convincing: Rita and Randy testified events. Rita claimed she heard 3 gunshots and accordingly, decomposing body was found with gunshot wounds and stabs. Yes. Conspiracy is when two or more persons agree and decide to commit a felony. This is proven by acts of criminal. Before during and after crime committed and that accused had same purpose and united in execution; act of one act of all. Wharton criminal lawactual presence not necessary if theres direct connection bet actor and crime Yes. Inconsistencies mean and even strengthen. It was not rehearsed No. Positive identification over alibi. Unable to prove that they were in another place and impossible to go to crime scene No. Treachery and taking advantage of superior strength was not proven as there was no witness or evidence. The unlicensed firearm and dwelling was further not included in information.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

Important snippets from the case: Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of

Raeses 38 accused for the crime charged such as murder. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. may have impelled its commission is very relevant. 2. Generally, proof of motive is not necessary to pin a crime on the accused if the commission of the crime has been proven and the evidence of identification is convincing. 3. Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. It is immaterial when the accused has been positively identified. 4. Where the defendant admits the killing, it is no longer necessary 5. Motive is important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killing. 6. Where the identification of the accused proceeds from an unreliable source and the testimony is inconclusive and not free from doubt, evidence of motive is necessary. 7. Where there are no eyewitnesses to the crime, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons, motive is relevant and significant. 8. If the evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of motive is essential. 9. Proof of motive is not indispensable where the guilt is otherwise established by sufficient evidence. 10. While the question of motive is important to the person who committed the criminal act, yet when there is no longer any doubt that the defendant was the culprit, it becomes unimportant to know the exact reason or purpose for the commission of the crime. 3. Generally, the motive is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the

Intent and Motive

Reyes: 1. Intent is different from motive. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. (People v. Aposaga, No. L-32477, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 574, 595)

An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. Or, the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there is none, but that simply it is not known to us, for we cannot probe the depths of ones conscience where it may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. (People v. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255, 256) One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not prevent an act from being a crime (i.e. Mercy killing). 2. Motive need not always be established, although there are cases where the determination of motive aids in the evaluation of a felony. 1. Where the identity of a person accused of having committed a crime is in dispute, the motive that

Raeses 39 offense. Such words or deeds may indicate the motive. (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 649) 4. Disclosure of the motive aids in the the completion of the proof of the commission of the crime. 5. Proof of motive alone is not sufficient to support a conviction. Existence of a motive, though perhaps an important consideration, is not sufficient proof of guilt. Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no reliable evidence from which it may be reasonably deduced that the accused is the malefactor. 6. Lack of motive may aid in showing the innocence of the accused. Issue: WON the accused is guilty of murder. Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of murder. Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in all respects and civil indemnity increased to P30K. It was proven that he had motive in killing Cagampang: he had knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm; this was motive enough to kill him, as part of NPAs agaw armas campaign or killings perpetrated by NPA for the purpose of acquiring more firearms. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified. Also, his flight implies guilt. The prosecution witness, Victorina Cagampang, may have minor inconsistencies in her testimony but this does not diminish her credibility that is part of being human. What is important is that she had positively identified the accused as the assailant and that her testimony is corroborated by other witnesses. Furthermore, the accuseds alibi was unacceptable because it was self-serving and uncorroborated. It cannot overrule positive identification, it was merely 15-20 minutes away from crime scene and Perol was at work. People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 (1988) Facts: Usman Hassan, 15 yrs. Old of Samal Tribe in Zambo City was convicted of murder of Pichel. Pichel was stabbed to death at fruit paradise while sitting at his red Honda motorcycle, waiting for friend Jose Samson who was buying fruits. Issue: WON conviction is valid Held: No. Conviction reversed. Acquitted. The Medico Legal found two stab wounds from front but the Samson claimed that Pichel was stabbed once from behind. Procedure followed was also improper. The accused was presented to the witness alone and in confrontation, not police line up. He was also denied right to counsel, particularly when identification took placethis qualifies for uncounselled confession. The witness was also questioned 2 days after incident and sworn 4 days after. The fruit vendor as well as the companion of

People v. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623 (1988) Facts: On 30 December 1980, 7:30 PM, Vicente Temblor alias Ronald (accused-appellant) went to Julius Cagampangs house in Agusan del Norte, to buy cigarettes. Cagampang, while opening a pack of cigarettes, was shot! The accused (and another person, Anecito Ellevera) demanded Victorina Cagampang (Julius wife) that she brings out her husbands firearms. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Victorina gave a suitcase to Temblor, who then took the .38 caliber which was inside, and fled. In August 1981, Temblor, an NPA, surrendered (it was actually a mass surrender of NPAs) after hiding in the mountains. In 26 November 1981, he was arrested by Buenavista police at the public market and then detained at municipal jail. Regarding the murder of Cagampang, Temblors alibi was that day until the next, he was with his father for drinking and pulutan. On 8 June 1982, the accused was convicted and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpertua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim P12,000. He appealed. *** In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred: (1) in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer, and (2) in rejecting his defense of alibi.

Raeses 40 the accused was not investigated. In fact, they did not pursue other suspect. Also, the knife was not tested. Further notable are the facts that the age of the accused was observed without medical basis, that the accused did not run away and that he had no motive, which, in People vs. Verzo was considered important when there is doubt in the identity of culprit and reiterated in People vs. Pervelo which stated that identification is tenuous. Furthermore, no motive was established. People v. Delim, supra *Refer to pp. 36 37 for the digest of this case. See important snippets from the case for notes pertaining to intent and motive. the accused believed them to be. In other words, the act done would not constitute a felony had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. Furthermore, the act done by the accused would have constituted (1) a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, (2) an absolutory cause, such as that contemplated in Art. 247, par. 2, or (3) an involuntary act. 5. There exists no crime of resistance when there is a mistake of fact. 6. When the accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a defense.. U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910) Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, & believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Issue: WON Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact. Held. Yes. Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intruder under A11, par. 1, of the RPC, which requires, to justify the act, that there be: 1. unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, 2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, & 3. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah

Mistake of Fact
Reyes: 1. While ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith (ignorantia legis non excusat), ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused from criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat). Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused injury to another. He is not, however, criminally liable, because he did not act with criminal intent. An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal intent which arises upon the commission of a felonious act. (People v. Coching, et. Al., C.A., 52 O.G. 293, citing People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257) 2. Mistake of fact has certain requisites to be a valid defense. 1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. 2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful. 3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused 3. Lack of intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the facts of the case. 4. In mistake of fact, the act done would have been lawful, had the facts been as

Raeses 41 Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under Art. 11 of the RPC, there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in the act of the person making the defense. Doctrine: Mistake of fact is a valid defense as long as the requisites are met. (Refer to item no. 2 of Reyess annotations under mistake of fact.) People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943) Facts: Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get hi dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back toward the door, simultaneously fired at him with their revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal. Issue: WON the accused can use mistake of fact as a valid defense. Held: No. Both accused are guilty of murder. Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of law who are trying to capture him that killing him would be justified. Doctrine: Careless on the part of the accused does not allow for the usage of mistake of fact as a valid defense. failing to do an act must also be voluntary, there must be freedom and intelligence on the part of the offender, but the requisite of criminal intent, which is required in felonies by dolo, is replaced by the requisite of imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence is, in law, equivalent to criminal intent. (U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 507) But in felonies committed by means of culpa, the mind of the accused is not criminal. However, his act is wrongful, because the injury or damage caused to the injured party results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the accused. 2. Felonies committed by means of culpa has certain requisites as well. 1. He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act; 2. He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do the act; 3. He is IMPRUDENT, NEGLIGENT or LACKS FORESIGHT or SKILL while doing the act or omitting to do the act. 3. In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. 4. Mistake in the identity of the intended victim is not reckless imprudence. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such an unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.

Culpa
Reyes: 1. Criminal intent is replaced by negligence and imprudence in felonies committed by means of culpa. In felonies committed by means of culpa, since the doing of or

Elements
People v. Carmen, 355 SCRA 267 (2001)

Raeses 42 Facts: The trial court rendered a decision and the accused-appellants were all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder after having performed a cultic healing pray-over which resulted to the death of Randy Luntayao. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Issue: WON accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. Held: Yes. Conviction modified to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Killing a person w/ treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, its presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. In murder qualified by treachery, its required only that there is treachery in the attack, & this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may arise from the proof of the criminal act. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended. The strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder. Art. 365, of the RPC, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but w/o malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, & other circumstances regarding persons, time, & place. The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latter's death. The accused had no intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victim's ailment. TC's reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the contrary. Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, theres no treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, & manner of execution to ensure the safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim. Important snippet from the case: Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

Distinguished from dolo

People v. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439 (1988) Facts: The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as minimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for Samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Raeses 43 Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements. Issue: WON conspiracy is present, thus affirming the charge of murder. If not, what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused? Held: 1. No. Conspiracy is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed. Since there was no animosity between Miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda. Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against Miranda is individual and NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him. 2. Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased, Pugay is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide On the other hand, since the evidence is insufficient to establish qualifying circumstances of treachery and conspiracy, and given the mitigating circumstance that he never intended to commit so grave a wrong, Samson is guilty of homicide.

B. Crimes defined and penalized by special laws

Reyes: 1. There are three classes of crimes. The RPC defines and penalizes the first two classes of crimes, (1) the intentional felonies, and (2) the culpable felonies. The third class of crimes are defined and penalized by special laws which include crimes punished by municipal or city ordinances. 2. When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. 3. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. (U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128) In the first, there must be criminal intent; in the second, it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. 4. In those crimes punished by special laws, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense.

Raeses 44 5. Good faith and absence of criminal intent not valid defenses in crimes punished by special laws. (For specific exemptions, refer to pp. 56-58 of Reyess annotations of the RPC, 17th edition.) funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the

Crimes Mala in se and Mala prohibita

Reyes: 1. There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms. Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Rawles 3rd Revision) 2. In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? 3. The term mala in se refers generally to felonies defined and penalized by the RPC. When the acts are inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other hand, there are crimes in the RPC which were originally defined and penalized by special laws, like use of opium, malversation, brigandage and libel. 4. The term mala prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986) Facts: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient

Raeses 45 reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions. Issues: 1. WON BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. 2. WON BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract. 3. WON it violates the equal protection clause. Held: 1. No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. 2. No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. 3. No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. Magno v. C.A., 210 SCRA 475 (1992) Facts: Petitioner Magno was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but he did not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter

Raeses 46 referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit. However, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest. As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank. To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipment. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." For having issued the four (4) checks that later bounced, petitioner was charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P Blg. 22. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for one year in each criminal case and to pay complainant the respective amounts reflected in the subject checks. Issue: WON petitioner should be punished for the issuance of the checks in questions. Held: No. By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipment subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the lease- purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.

Raeses 47 To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients. This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law (B.P Blg. 22) in question, using the "mala prohibita" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest degree. A Theory of Crime and Punishment by David G. Nitafan 1. Magno v. Court of Appeals: For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. (Quoting Paras, J.) still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge of voluntariness there is no crime. (Quoting Paras, J.) The much abused theory of malum prohibitumthat the only point of inquiry in this kind of offense is, whether the law has been violatedwas already clearly relegated to the background in favor of the teleological idea of fairness and justice. The Lozano doctrine, which uses the theory of malum prohibitum as justification, was a haphazard ruling and its effect is a perversion of the criminal process, because payees of dishonored are using the threat of criminal sanction to enforce collections of their credits. Three classes of crimes are recognized in the second and third paragraphs, Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code (Refer to page 29 for the full text of the provision). 1. Crimes mala in se are unlawful facts accompanied by evil intent. The Code calls these crimes dolo offenses. This class of crimes is based on the general condition of penal liability under the legal maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, or the mens rea doctrine, under which the unlawful act alone does not amount to guilt unless it is accompanied by a guilty mind. Offenses mala in se require malice or malicious intention. The term dolus, as an element of the mode of commission of this class of offenses, involves a complex idea, which consists of several elements; freedom, intelligence, and intent. The violation must be a voluntary

2.

3.

4.

5.

Raeses 48 act, otherwise it will not amount to a crime, or stating it in another way, no criminal liability is incurred. 2. There are crimes which, by the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitute the offenses punished by the statute. These are the crimes mala prohibita, where in determining the existence of the crime, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? Traditional concept: the act is evil because it is prohibited. An offense malum prohibitum is an act made wrong by legislationa forbidden evil. With the latest rulings applying the theory of malum prohibitum, the traditional concept of the theory has been exploded. Knowledge of the prohibition is now a requirement, so that in charging an offense the information must now state not mere unlawfulness of the act but that it was done knowingly or willfully, otherwise the information is insufficient to charge an offense. corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other fact, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. [] In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.

Relation of RPC to special laws

RPC, Art. 10 Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909) Facts: Accused Go Chico was charged with a violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which punishes any person who shall expose to public view any flag, banner, emblem or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippines. Even if the accused acted without criminal intent without criminal intent, the lower court convicted him. Issue: WON the conviction of the accused is proper. Held: Yes. The display of a flag or emblem used, particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance of governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most

Reyes: 1. Art. 10 is composed of two clauses. In the first, it is provided that offenses under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Code. The second makes the Code supplementary to such laws. The first clause should be taken to mean only that the Penal Code is not intended to supersede special penal laws. The latter are controlling with regard to offenses therein specially punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Dissent of Justice Perfecto, People v. Gonzales, 82 Phil. 307)

Raeses 49 2. IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES 1. Special laws- defined in U.S. v. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584, as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Penal Code. It is a statute enacted by the legislative branch, penal in character, which is not an amendment to the RPC. Special laws usually follow the form of American penal law. 2. Supplementary the word means supplying what is lacking; additional. Some provisions of the Penal Code are perfectly applicable to special laws. 3. Unless the latter should provide the contrary. - 3. The provisions of the RPC on penalties cannot be applied to offenses punishable under special laws. 4. Offenses under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC relating to attempted and frustrated crimes. 5. The special law has to fix penalties for attempted and frustrated crime. The penalty for the consummated crime cannot be imposed when the stage of the acts of execution is either attempted or frustrated, because the penalties for the attempted and frustrated crime is two degrees or one degree lower, respectively. The special law does not provide for penalty one or two degrees lower than that provided for the consummated stage. The special law has to fix a penalty for the attempt and a penalty for the frustration of the crime defined by it, in order that the crime may be punished in case its commission reached only the attempted or frustrated stage of execution. 6. When a special law covers the mere attempt to commit the crime defined by it, the attempted stage is punishable by the same penalty provided by the law. 7. Art. 10, RPC, is not applicable to punish an accomplice under the special law. 8. Plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance is not available to offenses punishable under special laws. 9. No accessory penalty, unless the law provides therefor. 10. Special laws amending the RPC are subject to its provisions.

C. Criminal Liability How incurred

RPC, Art. 4 Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Reyes: 1. Criminal liability is incurred by any person in the cases mentioned in the two paragraphs of Art. 4. The article has no reference to the manner criminal liability is incurred. The manner of incurring criminal liability is stated in Art. 3, that is, performing or failing to do an act, when either is punished by law, by means of deceit (with malice) or fault (through negligence or imprudence). 2. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. But there are cases where the consequences of the felonious acts of the offender are not

Raeses 50 intended by him. In those cases, the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. In view of par. 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him. One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of ones illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences. (U.S. v. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310) 3. IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN PAR. 1 OF ART. 4. 1. Committing a felony. Not mere performance of an act. A felony is an act punishable by the RPC. If it is not punishable by the code, it is not a felony. The felony committed should be one committed by means of dolo, that is, with malice, because par. 1 of Art. 4 speaks of wrongful act done different from that which he intended. If the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the offender, his liability should be determined under Art. 365, which defines and penalizes criminal negligence. The act or omission should not be punished by a special law, because the offender violating a special law may have the intent to do an injury to another. In such case, the wrongful act done could not be different as the offender did not intend to do any other injury. When a person has not committed a felony, he is not criminally liable for the result which is not intended. 2. Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are: (1) mistake in the identity of the victim; (2) mistake in the blow, that is when the offender intending to do an injury to another person actually inflicts it on another; and (3) the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended. Under par. 1, Art. 4, a person committing a felony is still criminally liable even if- 1. There is a mistake in the identity of the victim error in personae. 2. There is a mistake in the blow aberratio ictus. 3. The injurious result is greater than that intended praeter intentionem. The first paragraph of Art. 4 has certain requisites. 1. That an intentional felony has been committed; and 2. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. Any person who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes the latter to do something resulting in the latters injuries, is liable for the resulting injuries. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186, quoting 38 Am. Jur. 695) Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all natural and logical

4.

5.

6.

7.

Raeses 51 consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of event, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when: 1. There is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or 2. The resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. *Refer to pp. 78-79 of Reyess annotation of the RPC, 17th edition, for the examples of causes which are not considered efficient intervening causes. 8. There are certain requisites before death is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. 1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in normal health. 2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted. 3. That death ensued within a reasonable time. (People v. Datu Baginda, (C.A., 44 O.G. 2287) 9. A supervening event may be the subject of amendment of original information or of a new charge without double jeopardy.

Raeses 52
RPC, Art. 14 (1) Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances: 1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.

RPC, Art. 14 (3) Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances: 3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.

RPC, Art. 13(3) Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances: 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.

RPC, Art. 48 Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act
No. 4000.)

RPC, Art. 49 Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed: 1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period. 2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period. 3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. (Arts. 61, 62, 65)

Reyes: 1. (Art. 14 [1]) Failure in official duties is tantamount to abuse of office. 2. Same. It is not aggravating when it is an integral element of, or inherent in, the offense. 3. (Art. 13[3]) This mitigating circumstance can only be applied when the facts show that there is a notable and evident disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences. (US v. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904, 907) 4. Same. Intention, being an internal state, must be judged by external acts. 5. Same. It is not applicable when the offender employed brute force. 6. Same. It is applicable only in offenses resulting in physical injuries or harm. 7. (Art. 48) This provision requires the commission of at least two crimes. But the two or more grave or less grave felonies nmust be the result of a single act, or an offense must be a necessary means for committing the other. 8. Same. A complex crime is only one crime, even if two or more crimes are actually committed. The offender has only one criminal intent. 9. Same. Two kinds complex crimes: 1. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. 2. When an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

Raeses 53 10. Same. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. (1) That only a single act is performed by the offender and (2) that the single act produces (a) two or more less grave felonies, or (b) one or more grave and one or more less grave felonies or (c) two or more less grave felonies. 11. Same. Two or more less grave felonies. In the case of a compound crime, the offenses involved should be either both grave or both less grave, or one of them a grave felony and the other less grave. 12. Same. Light felonies are produced by the same act should be treated and punished as separate offenses or may be absorbed by the grave felony. 1. Several light felonies resulting from one single act not complex. 2. When the crime is committed by force or violence, slight physical injuries are absorbed. 13. Same. When an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (1) That at least two offenses are committed, (2) that one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other, and (3) That both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute. 14. Same. Necessary means does not mean indispensable means. 15. Same. In complex crime, when the offender executes various acts, he must have a single purpose. 16. Same. There is no complex crime when one offense is committed to conceal the other. 17. Same. No complex crime when one of the offenses is penalized by a special law. 18. Same. When two or more crimes are committed but (1) not by a single act, or (2) one is not a necessary means for omitting the other, there is no complex crime. 19. Same. Thgere is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, robbery, or other common crimes. 20. Same. When two crimes produced by a single act are respectively within the exclusive jurisdiction of two courts of different jurisdiction, the court of higher jurisdiction shall try the complex crime. 21. Same. Art. 48 is intended to favor the culprit. In directing the penalty for the graver offense shall be imposed in its maximum period, Art. 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes through separate but distinct acts. (People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 542-543) 22. Same. The penalty for complex crime is the penalty for the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. 23. Same. When two felonies constituting a complex cime are punishable by imprisonment and fine, respectively, only the penalty of imprisonment should be imposed. 24. Same. This provision only applies when the Code does not provide a definite specific penalty for a complex crime. 25. One information should be filed when a complex crime is committed. 26. Same. When a complex crime is charged and one offense is not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other. 27. Same. Art. 48 does not apply when the law provides on single penalty for the special complex crime. 28. Same. Plurality of crimes consists in the successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of which are no conviction has been declared. 29. Same. Kinds of plurality crimes (1) formal or ideal and (2) real or material plurality 30. Same. A continued crime is not a complex crime. A continued crime is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a

Raeses 54 single impulse and operated by a force that is not intermittent, however long a time it may occupy. (22 C.J.S., 52) 31. Same. In material plurality, each eact constitutes a separate crime, while each act in a continued crime constitute only one crime. 32. (Art. 49) It only applies when there is a mistake in the identity of the victim of the crime, and the penalty for the crime committed is different from that for the crime intended to be committed. 33. Same. It has no application in cases where a more serious consequence not intended by the offender befalls the same person. 34. Same. It is applicable only when the intended crime actually committed is punished with different penalties. 35. Same. Art. 49 imposes the lesser penalty to be applied in its maximum period, while Art. 48 applies the penalty for the more or most serious crime in its maximum period. 36. Same. Rule no. 3 in Art. 49 is not necessary, because the cases contemplated in the said rule may be covered by Art. 48. 37. (Art. 14[3]) The four circumstances enumerated in the provision can be considered single or together. If all are present, they have the weight of one single aggravating circumstance. 38. Same. It is applicable only to crimes against persons or honor. 39. Same. With insult or in disregard. There must be evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party. (People v. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548, 550-551) 1. There must be difference in the social condition of the offender and the offended party. 2. The circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies in cases where the victim is of tender age as well as of old age. 3. Sex in the circumstances enumerated refer to the female sex, not the male sex. 40. Same. It is not applicable when: 1. The offender acted with passion and obfuscation 2. There exists a relationship between the offended party and the offender. 3. The condition of being a woman is indispensable in the commission of the crime. 41. Same. Disregard of sex is absorbed in treachery. 42. Same. That the crime be committed in the dwelling of the offended party 1. The abuse of confidence which the offended party reposed in the offender by opening the door to him; or 2. The violation of the sanctity of the home by trespassing therein with violence or against the will of the owner. 43. Same. Offended party must not give provocation. As may be seen, a condition sine qua non of this circumstance, is that the offended party has not given provocation to the offender. When it is the offended party who has provoked the incident, he loses his right to the respect and consideration due him in his own house. 44. Same. Provocation must be: 1. Given by the owner of the dwelling 2. Sufficient, and 3. Immediate to the commission f the crime 45. Same. There must be close relation between provocation and commission of the crime in the dwelling. 46. Same. Because the provocation is not immediate, dwelling is aggravating. U.S. v. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310 (1909) Facts: The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were engaged in work on a

Raeses 55 mine located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native laborers. Mann discharged one of these laborers named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ him again, because he was a thief and a disturbing element with the other laborers. A few days afterwards, sometime after 6 o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three of four others, went to the mine to look for work. The defendant, caught sight of Saldivar, ordered him off the place, exclaiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue, Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no move to leave, and although the order was repeated, merely smiled or grinned at the defendant, whereupon the latter became enraged, took three steps toward Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where the handle of Saldivar's bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered. (dio vueltas - spun around helplessly) and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister's house, which stood about 200 yards away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he reached the door of the house, and was buried some two or three days later. Issue: Whether or not Brobst is guilty of homicide and not homicide as a result of reckless negligence. Held: Yes. The evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt that the defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow with his closed fist; and that was far in excess of such authority, and was, therefore, unlawful, and cannot be excused or justified as an exercise of necessary force in the exercise of a right The deceased came to his death as a result of the blow inflicted by the defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was employed as a laborer in defendant's mine; his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died, he left her house in apparent good health and went to the mines to look for work; a short time afterwards he received a violent blow on his lower left side, a region of the body where many of the vital organs are located; and immediately thereafter, he stared up the short trail leading to his sister's house, and died as he reached the door. In the absence of evidence of any intervening cause, we think there can be no reasonable doubt that his death resulted from the blow. In the case at bar the evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary, intentional, and unlawful infliction by the accused of a severe blow on the person of the deceased; and while it is true that the accused does not appear to have intended to take the life of his victim, there can no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him some injury, at least to the extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain upon him, and he is therefore, criminally responsible for the natural, even if unexpected results of his act, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, which prescribes that: Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit. In such cases the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural consequences of hi illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such consequences, but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge in this case. People v. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196 (1984) Facts: Valentina Mananquil y Laredo was accused of parricide allegedly committed as follows: On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as

Raeses 56 a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee bottle. She was angry of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "puta buguian lakaw galigaon" The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame. The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written statement where she admitted having burned the victim. Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. due to pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary. Issues: 1. WON or not appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given; 2. WON or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death. Held: 1. Yes. No denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be released later. Furthermore almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations contained therein 2. Yes. The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-mortem findings immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Art. 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. People v. Iligan, 191 SCRA 643 (1990) Facts: At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and his companions Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On the way they met the accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix quickly said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his nephew fall,

Raeses 57 Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed. Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while and even passed the house of Quinones, when they noticed that they were no longer being chased the three decided to head back to Quinones house. On the way back the three accused suddenly emerged from the road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked Quinones Jr. on the forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy ran. Upon returning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted. The postmortem examination report and the death certificate indicates that the victim died of shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident. Issue: WON the accused are liable for the victims death given that it was due to a vehicular accident and not the hacking. Held: Yes. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony has been committed and that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was considered superficial by the physician is immaterial. The location of the wound intended to do away with him. The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles pass any moment; the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him and was run over by a vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the proximate cause of the victims death. Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any qualifying circumstances People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751 (1998) Facts: Beronga, Sabalones, cabanero and Alegarbe were convicted of 2 counts of murder and 3 counts of frustrated murder of Glenn tiempo, Alfred nardo, rey bolo, reogelio presores and nelson tiempo. A shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Manuela Comp, Talisay Cebu led to these deaths. Issues: 1. WON prosecution witnesses and evidence are credible. 2. WON alibis acceptable. 3. WON correct penalty imposed. Held: 1. Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses. There was positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of cars headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing because the conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding, though, to the co-accused because it is used as circumstantial evidence corroborated by one witness. The inconsistencies are minor and inconsequential which strengthen credibility of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus (mistake in blow), mistake does not diminish culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae.

Raeses 58 2. No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive identification. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt 3. No. Under RPC A248, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period to death. There being no aggravating/mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA however erred in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated murder. Under RPC A50, the penalty for a frustrated felony is the next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony xxx. Because there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstance as the CA itself held, the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its medium period. People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950) Facts: Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela) and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the injured parties, as the information filed against him provided. Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him, but was later found after duly admitting his intention to kill the President, the lower court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced with the highest capital punishment, for the murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela) and to the multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas et al. Issue: WON the conviction of the accused was proper. Held: No. The case is clearly governed by the first clause of article 481 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
1

President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties. The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder. *The accused committed a mistake in blow (aberratio ictus), hence the application of Art. 48. People v. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150 (1933) Facts: Appellant, deeply affected by the knowledge that his daughter had been impregnated by the victim, made efforts to force victim to legitimize marry his daughter. Although the victim agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never complied with his promise. Incensed, the appellant went into the victims office. Upon hearing the victim refuse once again, appellant whipped out his penknife and stabbed him in the face. Due to his lack of control of the

Raeses 59 movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the victim, killing him. Issue: WON conviction of the appellant was proper in view of the circumstances. Held: Yes. The appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased. In his testimony the appellant affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two. There was no intention to kill him, as that would frustrate his efforts to get the deceased to marry his daughter or at least provide some support. In view of the foregoing, the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased as well as his voluntary surrender to the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation should be taken into consideration. Appellants contention of self-defense has no merit as he provoked and commenced the aggression. Defense counsels claim for application of Art. 49 of the RPC2 has no merit for it is only applicable in
Article 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed: 1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period. 2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period. 3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall
2

cases where the crime committed befalls a different person (aberratio ictus). Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 (1957) Facts: The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighborhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to the amount involved. Issue: WON Medina Transportation was liable for the deaths and damages incurred by the passengers. Held: Yes. The case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
be imposed in its maximum period.(Read also Arts. 61, 62, and 65)

Raeses 60 There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695- 696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs- appellants in their brief. It is as follows: . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Impossible Crimes
Reyes: 1. The commission of an impossible crime is indicative of criminal propensity or criminal tendency on the part of the actor. Such person is a potential criminal. According to positivist thinking, the community must be protected from anti- social activities, whether actual or potential, of the morbid type of man called socially dangerous person. 2. To be classified as an impossible crime, certain requisites must be met. 1. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property. 2. That the act was done with evil intent. 3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual. 4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the RPC.

Raeses 61
RPC, Art. 4 (2) Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred: 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Art. 59 Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.

d. Infanticide (Art. 255) e. Abortion (Arts. 256, 257, 258 and 259) f. Duel (Arts. 260 and 261) g. Physical injuries (Arts. 262, 263, 264, 265 and 266) h. Rape (Art. 266-A) Felonies against property: a. Robbery (Arts. 294, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302 and 303) b. Brigandage (Arts. 306 and 307) c. Theft (Arts. 308, 310 and 311) d. Usurpation (Arts. 312 and 313) e. Culpable insolvency (Art. 314) f. Swindling and other deceits (Arts. 315, 316, 317 and 318) g. Chattel mortgage (Art. 319) h. Arson and other crimes involving destruction (Arts. 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325 and 326) i. Malicious mischief (Arts. 327, 328, 329, 330 and 331) If the act performed would be an offense other than a felony against persons or against property, there is no impossible crime. 2. Were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. In impossible crime, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property, because: (1) the commission of the offense (against persons or against property) is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means

Reyes: 1. IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN PAR. 2 OF ART. 4 1. Performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property. In committing an impossible crime, the offender intends to commit a felony against persons or a felony against property, and the act performed would have been an offense against persons or property. But a felong against persons or property should not be actually committed, for, otherwise, he would be liable for that felony. There would be no impossible crime to speak of. Felonies against persons: a. Parricide (Art. 246) b. Murder (Art. 248) c. Homicide (Art. 249)

Raeses 62 employed is either (a) inadequate; or (b) ineffectual. Inherent impossibility of its accomplishment. This phrase means that the act intended by the offender is by its nature one of impossible accomplishment. (Art. 59) There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime. 2. In impossible crime the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the Code. 3. The purpose of punishing impossible crimes is to suppress criminal propensity or criminal tendencies. Objectively, the offender has not committed a felony, but subjectively, he is a criminal. People v. Balmores, 85 Phil. 493 (1950) Facts: Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the following information filed against him in the Court of First Instance of Manila: The accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly by overt acts, to wit; by then and there tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number. He presented the falsified ticket. exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said number has won, fraudulently pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket Said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the crime of estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some causes other than this spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended and arrested the said accused right then and there. Issue: WON said act constitutes an impossible crime Held: No. It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not exercised due care. Intod v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52 (1992) Facts: In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land

Raeses 63 dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured Issue: WON said act constitutes an impossible crime Held: Yes. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

Stages of Commission Definitions

RPC, Art. 6 Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Reyes:

Raeses 64 1. Consummated - A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. 2. Frustrated - It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. 3. Attempted - There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 4. Development of crime. From the moment the culprit conceives the idea of committing a crime up to the realization of the same, his act passes through certain stages. 1. Internal acts, such as mere ideas in the mind of a person, are not punishable even if, had they been carried out, would constitute a crime. Intention and effect must concur. Mere intention producing no effect is no more a crime than a mere effect without the intention is a crime. 2. External acts cover (a) preparatory acts; and (b) acts of execution. a. Preparatory acts ordinarily not punishable. Hence, proposal to commit a felony, which are preparatory acts, are not punishable, except when the law provides for their punishment in certain felonies. (Art. 8) b. Acts of execution they are punishable under the RPC. The stages of acts of execution attempted, frustrated and consummated are punishable. 5. Attempted felony there is an attempt when the offender begins the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. He has not performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony. Elements of attempted felony: 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony. 3. The offenders act is not stopped by his own voluntary desistance; 4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 6. IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 6 (Attempted felony) o Commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. A felony is deemed to have been commenced through overt acts when (1) there are external acts and (2) such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. Overt act some physical activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. 7. Indeterminate offense it is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature in relation to its object is ambiguous. 8. The intention of the accused must be viewed from the nature of the acts

Raeses 65 executed by him, and not from his admission. The intention of the accused must be ascertained from the facts and, therefore, it is necessary that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. Acts susceptible of double interpretation must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted crime (People v. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 707) In offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed. (I Groizard, p. 99) The overt acts leading to the commission of the offense are not punishable except when they are aimed directly at its execution, and therefore must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (I Viada, p. 47) 1. Directly by overt acts. the law requires that the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts. Only offenders who personally execute the commission of a crime can be guilty of attempted felony. The word directly suggests that the offender must commence the commission of the felony by taking direct part in the execution of the act. 2. Does not perform all acts of execution. If the offender has performed all acts of execution nothing more is left to be done the stage of execution is that of a frustrated felony, if the felony is nt produced; or consummated, if the felony is produced. 3. By reason of some cause or accident. In attempted felony, the offender fails to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony because of some cause or accident. 4. Other than his own spontaneous desistance. If the actor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his own spontaneous desistance, there is no attempted felony. The law does not punish him. The desistance may be through fear or remorse. (People v. Pambaya, See 60 Phil. 1022) It is not necessary that it be actuated by a good motive. The Code requires only that the discontinuance of the crime comes from the person who has begun it, and that he stops of his own free will. (Albert) 9. The desistance should be made before all the acts of execution are performed. 10. The desistance which exempts from criminal liability has reference to the crime intended to be committed, and has no reference to the crime actually committed by the offender before his desistance. 11. In attempted felony, the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. 1. Subjective phase - that portion of the acts constituting the crime, starting from the point where the offender begins the commission of the crime in that point where he still has control over his acts, including their (acts) natural course. F between these two points the offender is stopped by any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated, provided that the crime is not produced. The acts then of the

Raeses 66 offender reached the objective phase of the crime. 12. Frustrated Felony Elements: 1. The offender performs all the acts of execution; 2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence; 3. But the felony is not produced; 4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. 13. IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 6 (Frustrated Felony) 1. Performs all the acts of execution. In frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the acts of execution. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. This element distinguishes frustrated felony from attempted felon. In attempted felony, the offender does not perform all the acts of execution. He does not perform the last act necessary to produce the crime. He merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 2. Would produce the felony as a consequence. All the acts of execution performed by the offender could have produced the felony as a consequence. 3. Do not produce it. In frustrated felony, the acts performed by the offender do not produce the felony, because if the felony is produced it would be consummated. 4. Independent of the will of the perpetrator. Even if all the acts of execution have been performed, the crime may not be consummated, because certain causes may prevent its consummation. These certain causes may be the intervention of third persons who prevented the consummation of the offense or may be due to the perpetrators own will. If the crime is not produced because of the timely intervention of a third person, it is frustrated. If the crime is not produced because the offender himself presented its consummation, there is no frustrated felony, for the 4th element is present. Note that the 4th element says that the felony is not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Hence, if the cause which presented the consummation of the offese was the perpetrators own and exclusive will, the 4th element does not exist. 14. Frustrated felony distinguished from attempted felony. 1. In both, the offender has not accomplished his criminal purpose. 2. While in frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence, in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. In other words, in frustrated felony, the offender has reached the objective phase; in attempted felony, the offender has not passed the subjective phase. 15. Attempted or frustrated felony distinguished from impossible crime. 1. In attempted or frustrated felony and impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender is not accomplished. 2. But while in impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender cannot be

Raeses 67 accomplished, in attempted or frustrated felony the evil intent of the offender is possible accomplishment. 3. In impossible crime, the evil intent of the offender cannot be accomplished because it is inherently impossible of accomplishment or because the means employed by the offender is inadequate or ineffectual; in attempted or frustrated felony, what prevented its accomplishment is the intervention of certain cause or accident in which the offender had no part. 16. Consummated felony a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution are present. 17. IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 6 (Consummated felony) o All the elements: necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In consummated felony, all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment must be present. Every crime has its own elements which must all be present to constitute a culpable violation of a precept of law. 18. When not all the elements of a felony are proved- when a felony has two or more elements and one of them is not proved by the prosecution during the trial, either (1) the felony is not shown to have been consummated, or (2) the felony is not shown to have been committed, or (3) another felony is shown to have been committed. Hence, all the elements of the felony for which the accused is prosecuted must be present in order to hold him liable therefor in its consummated stage. 19. Manner of committing the crime. 1. Formal crimes consummated in one instant, no attempt. (i.e. slander, false testimony) 2. Crimes consummated by mere attempt or proposal or by overt act. (i.e. flight to enemys country [Art.121]) 3. Felony by omission. there can be no attempted stage when the felony is by omission, because in this kind of felony the offender does not execute acts. He omits to perform an act which the law requires him to do. 4. Crimes requiring the intervention of two persons to commit them are consummated by mere agreement. (i.e. betting in sport contests) 5. Material crimes There are three stages of execution attempted, frustrated, consummated, (i.e. rape, homicide). 20. There is no attempted or frustrated impossible crime.
RPC, Art. 7 When light felonies are punishable. - Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property.

Reyes: 1. Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided. (Art. 9, par. 3) 2. Light felonies punished by the RPC: 1. Slight physical injuries. (Art. 266) 2. Theft. (Art. 309, pars. 7 and 8) 3. Alteration of boundary arks. (Art. 313) 4. Malicious mischief. (Art. 328, par. 3; Art. 329, par. 3) 5. Intriguing against honor. (Art. 364) 3. IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES

Raeses 68 1. With the exception of those committed against persons or property. General rule: Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, UNLESS they are committed against persons or property. If thats the case, they are punishable, even if they are attempted or frustrated only. U.S. v. Eduave. 36 Phil. 209 (1917) Facts: The accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part. Fortunately the girl was able to survive The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such at the time the crime here charged was committed The accused is charged with frustrated murder. We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had killed the complainant. Issue: WON the accused is to be charged with frustrated murder. Held: Yes. The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. On the other hand, attempted murder is defined as when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntarily desistance. Hence the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that period between the point where he begins and the points where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated. People v. Enriquez, 281 SCRA 103 (1997) Facts: Accused Enriquez and Rosales were supposed to sell 6 kg of marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, but were caught red- handed in a buy-bust operation: Rosales had just delivered the drug, while Enriquez peddled sale to agents. Sale and delivery of marijuana is punishable under the aforementioned statute. Issue: WON attempted delivery of the prohibited drug is applicable in the case at bar.

Raeses 69 Held: No. Offense penalized by a special law and not the RPC, hence no such thing as attempted delivery. Incomplete delivery, granting it is true, is inconsequential. Mere act of conveying drugs punishable, immaterial whether or not place of destination is reached. Doctrine: If the act is punishable under a special law, the stages of execution cannot be applied. People v Listerio, 335 SCRA 40 (2000) Facts: Araque brothers went to Muntinlupa to collect money from a certain Tino. Being unable to collect, they started on their way home. However, before they could do so, Listerio et al, accosted and attacked them with bladed weapons and lead pipes, killing Jeonito Araque and wounding his brother Marlon Araque. Issue: WON the conviction of attempted homicide at least in terms of Marlon Araque was correct. Held: No. It should have been frustrated homicide. Accused only left when victims became unconscious. Gravity of wunds should not be the determinative factor but whether or not the subjective phase in the commission of a crime has been passed. *Refer to item 11, sub-item 1 on page 65 for the definition of the subjective phase.
(Cont.) Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.

Specific Felonies Rape

RPC, Art. 335 When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. 2. 3. by using force or intimidation; When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and When the woman is under twelve years of age

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

People v. Erinia, 50 Phil. 998 (1927) Facts: The accused endeavored to have carnal knowledge with victim (3 years old + 11months). The attempt foiled from further violating the child by the appearance of victims parents and sister. Physician found inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, but no signs of penetration. Mother saw that genitals was covered with sticky substance, however, no proof was shown to corroborate such an allegation. Issue: WON this was considered consummated rape. Held: No, this was merely frustrated rape. It was suggested penetration was impossible due to the age of the child, but for rape to be consummated only partial penetration was required, up to the labia. However, as no such proof of penetration was evident, benefit of the doubt was accorded to the accused, hence only frustrated rape *Later rape cases have dismissed Erinia as a stray decision, and is therefore not controlling. People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980 (1925) Facts: Domingo Hernandez, 70 yrs old charged of raping his 9 yr old step granddaughter, Conrada Jocson with threat to kill if she/doesnt give in to his wish. Aggravating: (1) related, (2) grave abuse of confidence since they lived in same house. Issue: WON act is consummated rape Held: Yes, plus there is an aggravating circumstance.

Raeses 70 1. People v. Rivers: rupture of hymen not necessary as long as there is proof that theres some degree of entrance of male organ within labia of the victim. 2. Physical exam findings: hymen intact, labia and vaginal opening inflamed, abundance of semen, she felt intense pain. People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 (1990) Facts: At around 1:30 am, after attending a party, Abayan came home to her boarding house. As she knocked at the door, Orita suddenly held her and poked a knife at her neck. She pleaded for him to let her go but instead of doing so, Orita dragged her upstairs with him while he had his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand holding and poking the balisong at the victim. At the second floor, he commanded Christina to look for a room. Upon finding a room, Orita held her against the wall while he undressed himself. He then ordered her to undress. As she took off her shirt, he pulled off her bra, pants and panty, and ordered her to lie on the floor. He then mounted her and, pointing the balisong at her neck, ordered he to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. In this position, only a portion of his penis entered her, so he ordered Abayan to go on top of him. With him lying on his back and Abayan mounting him, still, he did not achieve full penetration and only part of his penis was inserted in the vagina. At this instance, Abayan got the opportunity to escape Orita because he had both his hands and the knife on the floor. Abayan, still naked, was chased from room to room with Orita climbing over the partitions. Abayan, frantic and scared, jumped out of a window and darted for the municipal building and was finally found by Pat. Donceras and other policemen. Due to darkness though, the failed to apprehend Orita. In the medico legal, Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude had the following findings: circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck, linear abrasions below left breas, multiple pinpoint marks at the back, abrasions on both kness, erythemetous areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal cavity tight, no discharges noted Issue: WON rape is consummated Held: Rape was consummated. Perfect penetration is not essential. For the consummation of rape, any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient to qualify as having carnal knowledge. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim, he actually attains his purpose and from that moment, the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. *According to Orita, there is no more frustrated rape. People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 (2000) Facts: Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four year old Crysthel Pamintuan. Campuhan was caught by childs mother on April 25, 1996 at around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of Corazons brother was allegedly kneeling in front of the child with both their pants downa dn child was crying ayoko, ayoko while Primo forced his penis into childs vagina Issue: WON crime is consummated rape Held: No. Modified to attempted rape 1. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape. Mere touching of external genitalia considered when its an essential part of penetration not just touching in ordinary sense (People v. Orita). Labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated (People v. Escober) 2. Attempted no penetration or didnt reach labia/mere grazing of surface 3. Failed to prove that penetration occurred. Mothers testimony questionable with regards to her position relative to Primo and child. They failed to establish how she could have seen actual contact in her position

Raeses 71 4. Mans instinct is to run when caught. Primo could not have stayed or to satisfy his lust even if .. seeing Corazon 5. Child denied penetration occurred 6. People v. Villamor: consummation even when penetration doubted: pains felt, discoloration of inner lips of vagina or red labia minora or hymenal tags not visible. Now seen in case, Medico legal officer, though penetration not needed to prove contact, no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact. Hymen intact. Interesting metaphors: shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency, strafing the citadel of passion, bombardment of the drawbridge. Held: Yes. Aggravating Circumstance, public possession 1. He performed all acts of execution as required by RPC Art. 3. He didnt need to take it out of the building 2. Spanish Supreme Court: taking first caught by police still consummated no proof of contrary; pickpocket got money but returned it later on, still consummated; took money even if its on top of safe, still consummated. People v. Dino, 45 O.G., 3445 Facts: Accused Dino found guilty as accomplice in the crime of qualified theft and sentenced to penalty from 3 months 11 days of arresto mayor, to 1 year 8 months 21 days of prision correccional. Appellant was driver of US Army, and after dropping off articles in the port in South Harbor in Manila, he was found with 3 boxes of 10 caliber .30 army rifles (carbines). Issue: 1. WON crime is consummated theft. 2. WON conviction as accomplice was proper. Held: 1. No. The court held in this case the crime of theft cannot be said to be consummated, since the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentary, and in the case at bar, this fact can only be seen to have occurred if the carbines passed the MP checkpoint. Therefore, the appellant should be convicted of frustrated theft. 2. No. Since the passing of the truck through the MP checkpoint was an essential part to the consummation of the crime, the appellant should be considered a principal instead of an accomplice, since he directly participated in the commission of the crime. Aristotel Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007

Theft
RPC, Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent. Theft is likewise committed by: 1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner; Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

2.

3.

U.S. v. Adiao, 38 Phil. 752 (1918) Facts: Tomas Adiao, customs inspector, got a leather bag costing P0.80 from baggage of T. Murakami and kept it in his desk where it was found by other employees Issue: WON act is consummated theft.

Raeses 72 Facts: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon tried to steal boxes of Tide from SM Super Sale Club in North Edsa. Security guard Lorenzo Lago witnessed this and stopped the taxi that the 2 were riding in trying to escape with the goods. The accused ran and Lago fired a warning shot to alert the other guards, causing the apprehension of the accused. RTC of QC convicted both of the crime of consummated theft. Petitioners appealed, but only Valenzuela was considered to have filed the appeal since Calderon was considered to have abandoned the appeal. Issue: WON crime is consummated theft. Held: Yes. The Court said that the Dino ruling has not been held as precedent by the court. It also discussed that a felony has a subjective phase or that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and ends with the last act performed by the offender, which would produce the felony. Elements of Theft: 1. That there be taking of personal property 2. That the said property belongs to another 3. That the taking be done with intent to gain 4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner 5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things For the theft to have been frustrated, certain factors are to be considered: 1. That the felony is not produced 2. That such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator It is Congress, and not the courts, which is to define and punish crime, and it has defined theft as to having the 5 elements mentioned abovethe elements not including ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Theft cannot have a frustrated stage, since unlawful taking produces the felony in its consummated stage.

Robbery
RPC, Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.

People v. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703 (1935) Facts: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a store of cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was unfastening another when a patrolling police caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping inside store as it was early dawn. Convicted of attempt of robbery Issue: WON crime is attempted robbery? Held: No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical relation to a particular and concrete offense which would lead directly to consummation. Necessary to establish unavoidable connection & logical & natural relation of cause and effect. Important to show clear intent to commit crime. In case at bar, we can only infer that his intent was to enter by force, other inferences are not justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from nature of acts executed. Acts susceptible of double interpretation cant furnish ground for themselves. Mind should not directly infer intent. Spain SC: necessary that objectives established or acts themselves obviously disclose criminal objective. People v. Salvilla, 184 SCRA 671 (1990) Facts: April 12, 1986, at about noon time Petitioner, together with Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio (all surnamed Canasares), staged a robbery at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard. They were

Raeses 73 armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. On their way inside the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an employee there who was on her way out for her meal break, and informed her that it was a hold-up. They went inside the office and the petitioner pointed his gun at Severino Choco, the owner, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimmie. They informed Severino that all they needed was money. Severino asked Mary to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000 cash (P5000 acc to the defense) and handed it to the petitioner. Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his 2 daughters and Rodita were kept inside the office. According to the appellant, he stopped Severino from getting the wallet and watches. At about 2:00 of the same day, the appellant told Severino to produce P100,000 so he and the other hostages can be released. Severino told him it would be hard to do that since banks are closed because it was a Saturday. The police and military authorities had surrounded the lumber yard. Major Melquiades Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused and appealed to them to surrender. The accused refused to surrender and release the hostages. Rosa Caram, OIC Mayor of Iloilo City, joined the negotiations. Appellant demanded P100,000, a coaster, and some raincoats. Caram offered P50,000 instead. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary in going out of the office. One of the accused gave a key to Mayor Caram and with the key, Mayor Caram unlocked the door and handed to Rodita P50,000, which Rodita gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office. The police and military authorities decided to assault the place when the accused still wouldnt budge after more ultimatums. This resulted to injuries to the girls, as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Marys right leg had to be amputated due to her injuries. The appellant maintained that the money, wallet and watches were all left on the counter and were never touched by them. He also claimed that they never fired on the military because they intended to surrender. Issues: 1. WON the crime of robbery was consummated 2. WON there was a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender Held: 1. Yes. The robbery shall be deemed consummated if the unlawful taking is complete. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of robbery. The respondent claimed that none of the items (money, watches and wallet) were recovered from them. However, based on the evidence, the money demanded, the wallet and the wristwatch were within the dominion and control of the appellant and his co-accused and thus the taking was completed. it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber or that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it. 2. No. The surrender of the appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in their favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, surrender must have the following requisites: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested, (2) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent, and that the surrender was voluntary. The surrender by the appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of.

Raeses 74

Murder
RPC, Art. 248 Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. With evident premeditation. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

People v. Borinaga. 55 Phil. 433 (1930) Facts: On March 4, 1929, an American named Harry H. Mooney, contracted with Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan. On the morning of same date, Lawaan and his men went to Mooneys shop and tried to collect the whole amount fixed by the contract notwithstanding that only 2/3 of the fish corral was finished. Mooney refused to pay and Lawaan threatened him that if he did not pay, something would happen to him. On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor Perpetua Najarro and was seated with his back being to the window. Perpetua

saw Borinaga from the window strike with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately, knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair uninjured while Borinaga fled to the market place. Borinaga was persistent and after nearly ten minutes, returned with knife in hand to renew attack but was unable to do so because Perpetua turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him. Above instances gave rise to CFI of Leyte convicting Borinaga and sentencing him to 14 years, 8 months and a day of reclusion temporal, with accessory penalty and costs. Court held that 1) homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced; 2) murder was in the heart and mind of the accused; 3) aggressor stated his purpose and even apologized to his friends for not accomplishing that purpose; 4) blow was directed towards vital organs; and 5) means used were suitable for accomplishment therefore, crime qualifies as murder. Issue: WON the crime committed is attempted murder. Held: No. The crime committed is frustrated murder. The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author performs all the acts of execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of the accused to establish a lesser crime than that of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a wanton disregard of the sanctity of human life fully meriting the penalty imposed in the trial court. People v. Sy Pio, 94 Phil. 885 (1954) Facts: Sy Pio shot three people early in the morning of September 3, 1949. Tan Siong Kiap, Ong Pian and Jose Sy. Sy Pio entered the store at 511 Misericordia Sta Cruz Manila and started firing with a .45 caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose Sy. Upon seeing Sy Pio fire at Jose Sy, Tan asked what is the idea?

Raeses 75 thereupon, Sy Pio turned around and fired at him as well. Tan was shot at his right shoulder and it passed through his back. He ran to a room behind the store to hide. He was still able to hear gunshots from Sy Pios pistol, but afterwards, Sy Pio ran away. Issue: WON accused is guilty of frustrated murder. Held: No. Accused is guilty of attempted murder. 1. Sy Pio had to turn around to shoot Tan Siong Kiap. 2. There is sufficient proof. (Uncontradicted testimony of the victim, admissions made to Lomotan, testimony of physician, etc.) 3. Assignment of error must be dismissed. Offended party spent P300 for the hospital fees. 4. The fact that he was able to escape which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant- appellant that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. The defendant appellant knew that he had not actually performed all acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. People v. Trinidad, 169 SCRA 51 (1989) Facts: Trinidad accused of 2 counts of murder & 1 count frustrated murder. Accused in member of INP in Nasipit. Crime occurred in Butuan between El Rio & Agfa while they were in a Ford Fiera bound for Davao. Trinidad shot & killed Soriano & Laron while he shot and injured Tan Issue: WON conviction is proper? Held: Affirmed. Murder and attempted murder. Trinidad alibi is weak and overridden by Tan and Commendadors positive identification. Though some discrepancies in testimonies are found, these are trivial. Distance between Trinidad & 2 deceased immaterial. Important is that he shot them. Tan has no seen ill motive to falsifiably testify against Trinidad. It is attempted and not frustrated murder because he failed to execute all acts due to moving vehicle and this shielded Tans body and his wound was not fatal thus not sufficient to cause death (People v. Pilones) People v. Ravelo, 202 SCRA 655 (1991) Facts: The accused-appellants are members of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) stationed at a checkpoint near the airport of Tandag. At approximately 6:30 PM of May 21, 1984, accused- appellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano. They then detained Gaurano at the house of Pedro Ravelo, one of the accused. Thereafter, they assaulted, attacked, and burned Gaurano, with the intent of killing the latter. Reynaldo Gaurano died on May 22. At about 1AM of May 22, the accused-appellants also kidnapped by means of force Joey Lugatiman. The latter was also brought to Ravelo's house where he was tortured. At 5AM, Lugatiman was transferred to the house of accused-appellant Padilla. There he was tied to the wall with a nylon line and was told he would be killed at 9AM. Shortly after, accused-appellants had to attend to Gaurano; Lugatiman was thus left alone. He was able to escape. He reported what happened to him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC convicted the accused-appellants of murder of Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman. In this appeal, counsel for the accused aver that the lower court erred in finding that accused-appellants are guilty of frustrated murder. Counsel further contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to kill, which is an essential element of the offense of frustrated murder. The trial court merely relied on the statement of the accused-appellants stating they would kill Lugatiman to establish intent to kill. Issue: WON the statement by the accused stating that Lugatiman would be killed is sufficient proof of intent to convict a person of frustrated murder

Raeses 76 Held: No. In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal expression is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a statement of the aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself. Shortly after, Isabela Holgado, Maria Guttierez, and Hilarion Holgado arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Marcelino Panaligan, the cousin of Isabelo and Arcadio, also arrived and ordered Arcadio and the workers to resume their work. With this, they all simultaneously struck with their bolos. Marcelo Kalalo slashed Arcadio while Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed Marcelino Panaligan. Both Arcadio and Marcelino died instantly. Marcelo Kalalo then took a revolver from the belt of the lifeless Marcelino, and fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then also fleeing from the scene. Issues: 1. WON the appellants Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo, Felipe Kalalo, and Gregorio Ramos are guilty of murder or of simple homicide. 2. WON Marcelo Kalalo is guilty of discharge of firearms or attempted homicide Held: 1. The court held that the appellants are merely guilty of homicide for the crimes of killing Arcadio and Marcelino as no mitigating circumstance has been proved. The accused and the deceased were both armed. Marcelino has a revolver while the accused have bolos. The risk was even between the two parties. 2. It was held that he is guilty of attempted homicide. Evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion Holgado while the latter was fleeing from the scene. This fact simply shows that he was then intent on killing Hilarion Holgado. he has performed all acts necessary to commit the crime but failed by reason of causes independent of his will (poor aim, victim succeeded in dodging his shots).

Homicide
RPC, Art. 249 Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

People v. Kalalo, 59 Phil. 715 (1934) Facts: Appellant Marcelo Kalalo and Isabel Holgado had a litigation over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Calumpang, Batangas. Marcelo Kalalo cultivated the land in questions during the agricultural years 1931-1932 but when the harvest time came, Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted thereon. Marcelo filed complaints against Isabel, however these were dismissed by the CFI of Batangas twice. On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Hodalgo decided to have the said land plowed and employed several workers for that purpose. Arcadio Hodalgo together with the hired workers went to plow the land early that day. Marcelo Kalalo who had been informed thereof, proceeded to the land together with his brothers Felipe Kalalo and Juan Kalalo, brother in law Gregorio Ramos, and Aejandro Garcia. Five of them are all armed with bolos. Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt, respectively of the Kalalo brothers, followed them thereafter. Upon their arrival, they ordered those workers of Isabel and Arcadio Hodalgo to stop.

Penalties to be imposed in relation to stages of commission

Raeses 77
RPC, Art. 6 *Refer to page 63 for the full text of the provision RPC, Art. 7 *Refer to page 67 for the full text of the provision RPC, Art. 50 Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. RPC, Art. 51 Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. RPC, Art. 52 Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated crime. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony. RPC, Art. 53 Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. RPC, Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime. The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony. RPC, Art. 55 Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime. The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony. RPC, Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony. RPC, Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime. The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.

Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony

RPC, Art. 8 Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. RPC, Art. 115 Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Penalty. The conspiracy or proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be punished respectively, by prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P10,000 pesos, and prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P5,000 pesos. RPC, Art. 136 Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection. The conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat shall be punished by prision mayor in minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00).

Raeses 78
RPC, Art. 141 Conspiracy to commit sedition. Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
(Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

(Cont.) eriods it being sufficient for the imposition thereof that the initial steps have been taken toward carrying out the purposes of the combination. Any property possessed under any contract or by any combination mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, and being the subject thereof, shall be forfeited to the Government of the Philippines. Whenever any of the offenses described above is committed by a corporation or association, the president and each one of its agents or representatives in the Philippines in case of a foreign corporation or association, who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent the commission of such offense, shall be held liable as principals thereof. RPC, Art. 306 Who are brigands; Penalty. When more than three armed persons form a band of robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or kidnapping persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom or for any other purpose to be attained by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed highway robbers or brigands. Persons found guilty of this offense shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period if the act or acts committed by them are not punishable by higher penalties, in which case, they shall suffer such high penalties. If any of the arms carried by any of said persons be an unlicensed firearms, it shall be presumed that said persons are highway robbers or brigands, and in case of convictions the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period.

RPC, Art. 186 Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon: 1. Any person who shall enter into any contract or agreement or shall take part in any conspiracy or combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial means free competition in the market; 2. Any person who shall monopolize any merchandise or object of trade or commerce, or shall combine with any other person or persons to monopolize and merchandise or object in order to alter the price thereof by spreading false rumors or making use of any other article to restrain free competition in the market; 3. Any person who, being a manufacturer, producer, or processor of any merchandise or object of commerce or an importer of any merchandise or object of commerce from any foreign country, either as principal or agent, wholesaler or retailer, shall combine, conspire or agree in any manner with any person likewise engaged in the manufacture, production, processing, assembling or importation of such merchandise or object of commerce or with any other persons not so similarly engaged for the purpose of making transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce, or of increasing the market price in any part of the Philippines, of any such merchandise or object of commerce manufactured, produced, processed, assembled in or imported into the Philippines, or of any article in the manufacture of which such manufactured, produced, or imported merchandise or object of commerce is used. If the offense mentioned in this article affects any food substance, motor fuel or lubricants, or other articles of prime necessity, the penalty shall be that of prision mayor in its maximum and medium

Reyes: 1. (Art. 8) IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES 1. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. Conspiracy and proposal to commit are two different acts or felonies: (1) conspiracy to commit a felony, and (2) proposal to commit a felony.

Raeses 79 2. Only in the cases in which the law specifically provides a penalty therefor. Unless there is a specific provision in the RPC providing a penalty for conspiracy or proposal to commit a felony, mere conspiracy or proposal to commit a felony is not a felony. General rule: Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are not punishable. They are ppunishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. When the conspiracy relates to a crime actually committed, it is not a felony but only a manner of incurring criminal liability, that is, when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Requisites of conspiracy: 1. That two or more persons come to an agreement;. agreement presupposes meeting of the minds of two or more persons 2. That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony. the agreement must refer to the commission of a crime. It must be an agreement to act, to effect. To bring about what has already been conceived and determined 3. That the execution of the felony be decided upon. the conspirators have made up their minds to commit the crime. There must be determination to commit the crime of treason, rebellion or sedition Direct proof is not necessary to establish conspiracy. Quantum of proof is required to establish it. Requisites of proposal: 1. That a person has decided to commit a felony; and 2. That he proposes its execution to some other person or persons. There is no criminal proposal when: 1. The person who proposes is not determined to commit the felony. 2. There is no decided, concrete and formal proposal. 3. It is not the execution of a felony that is proposed. 9. The crimes in which conspiracy and proposal are punishable are against the security of the State or economic security. People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968) Facts: On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as Sigue-Sigue and OXO were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters. In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, OXO members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty- two defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue of final judgments. They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed Sigue-Sigue sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths. Issues: 1. WON conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder

2.

3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

Raeses 80 2. WON an aggravating circumstance of quasi- recidivism is present in the commission of the crime? Held: 1. Yes. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co- conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of Sigue-Sigue gang (OXO members were from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz. 2. Yes. In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi- recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime. US v. Bautista, 6 Phil. 581 (1906) Facts: In 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos in Hong Kong, for the purpose of overthrowing the government of the United States in the Philippine Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.

Raeses 81 Islands by force of arms and establishing a new government. Francisco Bautista (1), a close friend of the chief of military forces (of the conspirators) took part of several meetings. Tomas Puzon (2) held several conferences whereat plans are made for the coming insurrection; he was appointed Brigadier-General of the Signal Corps of the revolutionary forces. Aniceto de Guzman (3) accepted some bonds from one of the conspirators. The lower court convicted the three men of conspiracy. Bautista was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment and a P3,000 fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years imprisonment and P1,000. Issue: WON the accused are guilty of conspiracy. Held: Yes, Bautista and Puzon are guilty of conspiracy. Bautista was fully aware of the purposes of the meetings he participated in, and even gave an assurance to the chief of military forces that he is making the necessary preparations. Puzon voluntarily accepted his appointment and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance. This may be considered as an evidence of the criminal connection of the accused with the conspiracy. However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. He might have been helping the conspirators by accepting bonds in the bundles, but he has not been aware of the contents nor does he was, in any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to those bonds. *See RPC Art. 136: Crimes against public order: conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d etat, rebellion or insurrection.
RPC, Art. 9 Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. - Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with article 25 of this Code. Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned article. Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both, is provided.

Classification of Felonies
RPC, Art. 7 *Refer page 67 for the full text of the provision and Reyess explanation.

Reyes: 1. IMPORTANT WORDS OR PHRASES 1. To which the law attaches the capital punishment. Capital punishment is death penalty. 2. Or penalties in any of their periods are afflictive. - Although the word any is used in the phrase, when the penalty prescribed for the offense is composed of two or more distinct penalties. The higher or the highest of the penalties must be an afflictive penalty3. If the penalty prescribed is composed of two or more periods corresponding to different divisible penalties, the higher or maximum period must be that of an afflictive penalty. If the penalty is composed of two periods of an afflictive penalty or of two periods corresponding to different afflictive penalties, the offense for which it is prescribed is a grave felony. 3. Penalties which in their maximum period are correctional. When the
3 Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal

Raeses 82 penalty prescribed for the offense is composed of two or more disctint penalties, the higher or highest of the penalties must be a correctional penalty. If the penalty prescribed is composed of two or more periods corresponding to different divisible penalties, the higher of maximum period must be that of correctional penalty4. If the penalty is composed of two periods of a correctional penalty, like destierro and arresto mayor, the offense for which it is prescribed is a less grave felony. 4. The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided. When the code provides a fine P200 for the commission of a felony, it is a light felony. If the amount provided for by the Code is more than P200, then it is a less grave felony, because according to art. 26, a fine not exceeding P6k is a correctional penalty. If the amount provided for is more than P6k, then it is a grave felony, because, according to Art. 26, a fine exceeding said amount is an afflictive penalty. Althought Art. 26 provides that a fine not less than P200 is a correctional penalty, Art. 9 which defines light felonies should prevail, because the latter classifies felonies according to their gravity, while the former classifies the fine according to the amount thereof.
4

Prision correctional, arresto mayor, suspension, destierro

Raeses 83

Circumstances Which Criminal Liability

Affect

prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. 3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. 4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present; First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. 6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

Reyes: 1. Imputability is the quality by which an act may be ascribed to a person as its author or owner. It implies that the act committed has been freely and consciously done and may, therefore, be put down to the doer as his very own. (Albert) 2. Responsibility is the obligation of suffering the consequences of crime. It is the obligation of taking the penal and civil consequences of the crime. (Albert) 3. While imputability implies that a deed may be imputed to a person, responsibility implies that the persom must take the consequence of such a deed. 4. Guilt is an element of responsibility, for a man cannot answer for the consequences of a crime unless he is guilty. (Albert)

A. Justifying Circumstances

RPC, Art. 11 Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression. Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites

Reyes: 1. Justifying circumstances are those where the act of a person is said to be in accordance with law, so that such person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liability. There is no civil liability, except in par. 4 of Art. 11, where the civil liability is borne by the party benefited by the act. 2. The law recognizes the non-existence of a crime by expressly stating in the opening sentence of of Article 11 that the persons therein mentioned do not incur any criminal liability. 3. There is no crime committed, the act being justified. 4. The circumstances mentioned in Art. 11 are matters of defense and it is incumebt

Raeses 84 upon the accused, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him to the satisfaction of the court. Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. (People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366) There must be an actual physical assault upon a person, or at least a threat to inflict real injury. In case of threat, the same must be offensive and positively strong, showing the wrongful intent to cause an injury. (U.S. vs. Guysayco, 13 Phil. 292, 295) When theire is no peril to ones life, limb or right, there is no unlawful aggression. Peril to ones life. Actual that the danger must be present that is, actually in existence. Imminent that the danger is on the point of happening. It is not required that the attack already begins, for it may be too late. Peril to ones limb. When a person is attacked, he is in imminent danger of death or bodily harm. It may be actual or only imminent. It includes peril to the safet of oens person from physical injuries. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon. Thus, insulting words addressed to the accused, no matter how

Self-Defense
Reyes: 1. When the accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. It must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it and it cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate ompetent evidence but, in itself, is extremely doubtful. 2. Self-defense includes not only the defense of the person or the body of the one assaulted but also that of his rights, that is, those rights the enjoyment of which is protected by law. 3. Requisites of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel. Aggression must be unlawful. Two kinds of aggression: (1) lawful (i.e. fulfillment of a duty), and (2) unlawful.

Raeses 85 objectionable they may have been, without physical assault, could not constitute unlawful aggression. (U.S. v. Carrero, 9 Phil. 544) Mere belief of an impending attack is not sufficient. A strong retaliation for an injury or threat may amount to an unlawful aggression. Retaliation is not self- defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making a defense. The attack made by the deceased and the killing of the deceased by defendant should succeed each other without appreciable interval of time. When the killing of the deceased by the accused was after the attack made by the deceased, the accused must have no time nor occasion for deliberation and cool thinking. The unlawful aggression must come from the person who was attacked by the accused. Nature, character, location, and extent of wound of the accused may belie claim of self-defense. When the aggressor flees, unlawful aggression no longer exists. HOWEVER, if it is mere retreat to take a more advantageous position, the unlawful aggression still exists. The rule now is stand ground when in the right. The reason for the rule is that if one flees from an aggressor, he runs the risk of being attacked in the back by the aggressor. Mere threatening attitude is not unlawful aggression. Threat to inflict real injury as unlawful aggression. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude, not preceded by outward and material aggression, is not unlawful aggression, because it is required that the act be offensive and positively strong, showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor to cause an injury. When intent to attack is manifest, picking up a weapon is sufficient unlawful aggression. Aggression must be real, not merely imaginary. An aggression that is expected is still real, provided it is imminent. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. This requisite presupposes the existence of unlawful aggression, which is either imminent or actual. The second requisite of defense means that (1) there be a necessity of the course of action taken by the person making a defense, and (2) there be a necessity of the means used. Both must be reasonable.

Raeses 86 The reasonableness of the necessity depends upon the circumstances. When only minor physical injuries are inflicted after unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, there is still self-defense if mortal wounds were inflicted at the time the requisites of self-defense were present. The person defending is not expected to control his blow. Whether or not the means employed is reasonable, will depend upon the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition, character, size and other circumstances, and those of the person defending himself, and also the place and occasion of the assault. First two requisites common to three kinds of legitimate defense. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The one defending himself must not have given cause for the aggression by his unjust conduct or by inciting or provoking the assailant. It is present when: 1. No provocation at all was given to the aggressor by the person defending himself ; or 2. When, even iof a provocation was given, it was not sufficient; or 3. When, even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or 4. When, even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of March 5, 1902 and of April 20, 1906) Requisite of lack of sufficient provocation refers exclusively to the person defending himself. 4. The Battered Woman Syndrome. Recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at least, incomplete self- defense. Battered woman a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. It is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension- building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 5. Flight is incompatible with self-defense. People v. Boholst-Caballero, 61 SCRA 180 (1974) Facts: Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricideshe allegedly killed her husband, Francisco Caballero, using a hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had a

Raeses 87 daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated and abused his wife. After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with her friends and when she was on her way home she met her husband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused her of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife and thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab wound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she surrendered herself to the police along with the torn dress that she wore the night before. Issue: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in legitimate self-defense Held: Yes. 1. Burden of proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this case, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms that the said victim, the husband, was the aggressor. With her husband kneeling over her and choking her, accused had no other choice but to pull the knife tucked in his belt line and thrust it into his side. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife was drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of the testimony of the accused. Based on the re-enactment of the incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to lunge the knife into husband's left side. 2. Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the ground then choking her just because she was out caroling at night constitutes unlawful aggression, There was imminent danger of injury. Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being choked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife and plunge it into husband's side in order to protect herself. Reasonable necessity does not depend upon the harm done but on the imminent danger of such injury. Lack of sufficient provocation. Provocation is sufficient when proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused (Cunigunda) to warrant the attack of her husband. All that she did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband was to be out caroling at night.

People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366 (1947) Facts: The deceased was the banker in a game of black jack. The accused posted himself behind the deceased acting as a spotter of the latters cards and communicating by signs to his partner. Upon discovering the trick, the deceased the accused almost came to blows. Subsequently, while the accused was seated on a bench the deceased came and forthwith gave a blow with a pingahan, but the accused avoided the blow by crawling under the bench. The deceased continued with second and third blows, and the accused in a crawling position fired with his revolver. A hand to hand fight ensued, the deceased with his dagger and the accused using his bolo. Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away, but was followed by the accused and another fight took place, during which a mortal blow was delivered by the accused, slashing the cranium of the deceased. Issue: WON Alconga was justified in killing the deceased.

Raeses 88 Held: No. There were two stages in the fight between the accused and the deceased. During the first stage of the fight, the accused, in inflicting several wounds upon the deceased, acted in self- defense, because then the deceased, who had attacked the accused with repeated blows, was the unlawful aggressor. But when the deceased after receiving several wounds, ran away, from that moment there was no longer any danger to the life of the accused who, being virtually unscathed, could have chosen to remain where he was and when he pursued the deceased, fatally wounding him upon overtaking him, Alconga was no longer acting in self-defense, because the aggression begun by the deceased ceased from the moment he took flight. United States v. Mack, 8 Phil. 701 (1907) Facts: The accused was sitting on a bench a few feet back from the street, in the town of Tacloban, in the Province of Leyte, in an open space some 3 or 4 feet, width, between the tienda or content of a woman named Olimpia and another building. The deceased, with another policemen, approached the place directed Olimpia to close her tienda, and, later, ordered the accused and another soldier who was standing nearby to go to their quarters. The accused did not obey this order, and it is probable that some words passed between the soldiers, the policemen, and the woman which angered the deceased, though the weight of the evidence clearly maintain the contention of the accused that he did and said nothing to provoke or offend the deceased, except in so far as his failure to obey the order to go to his quarters may have had that effect. The deceased, who was standing some 10 or 12 feet from the accused, cursing and abusing him for his failure to obey the order, wrought himself into a passion dragged himself free from his companion, who was endeavoring to restrain him and take him away, and started toward the accused, at the same time drawing his bolo and brandishing it in a threatening manner. Thereupon the accused got up, drew his revolver, and the deceased having then approached within a distance of from 3 to 6 feet, the accused fired three shots, one of which took effect in the left breast of the deceased, just above the nipple, and another in the back of his head. Issue: WON Mack can invoke self-defense. Held: Yes. It affirmatively appears from the evidence of record that there was an unprovoked, illegal aggression on the part of the deceased, as held by the trial court, after a careful analysis of the testimony; and further that there was reasonable necessity for the use of the means employed by the accused to defend himself from this unlawful aggression. Mere physical superiority in no protection to an unarmed man, as against an assailant armed with a large bolo, and if it be true that the deceased was under the influence of liquor when he made that attack, his intoxication probably rendered him the more dangerous unless he was so drunk as to be physically helpless, which is not suggested in the evidence. A murderous attack with a formidable-looking bolo is a very different from an assault with a small chisel or a piece of bamboo, and the fact that this court has held that the taking of life was not reasonably necessary in defending oneself against assault in the latter cases does not sustain a ruling that taking the life of one's assailant in the former case may not become reasonably necessary in the defense of one's person, as we think it was in the case at bar. People v. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643 (1932) On February 23, 1931, the accused, a resident of Buenavoluntad, in the municipality of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis, was engaged with others in the gratuitous labor of hauling logs for the construction of a chapel in the barrio above-mentioned. At about 5.30 o'clock in the afternoon on the day mentioned, when the laborers were resting from the work of the day, one Segundo Cubol happened to pass the place where the accused was sitting. Prior to this date the accused had rendered five and one-half days service to Cubol, and as the latter passed, the accused said to him, "Segundo, pay me for the five

Raeses 89 and one-half days work for which you owe me." Cubol replied, "What debt!," an exclamation which was followed by an insulting expression. At the same time he struck the accused with his fist. The accused arose from the log upon which he was sitting and moved backward, trying to escape, but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with his fists. As the accused receded he found himself cornered by a pile of logs, the wings of which extended out on either side, effectually preventing any further retreat. As Cubol pressed upon him, the accused drew his bolo and delivered a blow on Cubol's right shoulder. Upon this Cubol lunged at the accused with the evident intention of wresting the bolo from the accused. To prevent this, the accused struck two other blows with the bolo, inflicting two deep cuts on Cubol's forehead above the left eye. One of these blows broke through the cranium. The other made a cut extending from the left eyebrow to the nose and upper lip. Upon finding a seat on a log nearby. A witness, named Francisco Villegas, who came up in a moment, after learning something about the matter, asked Cubol whether he had struck the accused blows with his fist. Cubols replied that he had. The witness Villegas then turned to the accused, who was standing a short distance away, and told him to put up his bolo and go to the poblacion. Acting upon this suggestion the accused immediately repaired to the office of the justice of the peace and surrendered himself to the authorities. Cubol lived only an hour or so, and died from the effect of the wounds received. In one of the pockets of the deceased a knife was found, and the accused testified that, when he struck the deceased with his bolo, the latter was attempting to draw a knife from his pocket. Issue: WON accused can invoke self-defense. Held: Yes. The person assaulted must, in such case, either resist with the arms that nature gave him or with other means of defense at his disposal, short of taking life. But that rule contemplates the situation where the contestants are in the open and the person assaulted can exercise the option of running away. It can have no binding force in the case where the person assaulted has retreated to the wall, as the saying is, and uses in a defensive way the only weapon at his disposal. One is not required, when hard pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to the extent of the injury which a reckless and infuriated assailant might probably inflict upon him (Browell vs. People, 38 Mich., 732). And it was not incumbent on the accused in this case, when assailed by a bully of known violent disposition, who was larger and stronger than himself. On the contrary, under the circumstances stated, he had the right to resist the aggression with the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it must be considered to have been given in justifiable self-defense. Upon this point it may be recalled that the deceased, when asked about the circumstances of the homicide, admitted that he himself was the aggressor; and it is noteworthy that he used no word placing blame upon the accused. Reyes: 1. The defense of rights requires also the first and second requisites (unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it) present in the three classes of defense mentioned in Arts. 1, 2 and 3 of Art. 11. 1. Attempt to rape a woman defense of right to chastity 2. Defense of property can be invoked only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. 3. Defense of home

Defense of honor
People v. Luague, 62 Phil. 504 (1935) Facts: In the morning of February 18, 1935, while the accused Natividad Luague was in her house situated in Lupuhan, barrio of Agpagi, municipality of Calatrava, Occidental Negros, with only her three children of tender age for company, her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare having gone to grind corn in Juan Garing's house several kilometers away, Paulino Disuasido came and began to make love to her; that as Natividad could not dissuade him from his purpose, she started for the kitchen where Paulino followed her,

Raeses 90 notwithstanding her instance that she could by no means accede to his wishes, for Paulino, bent on satisfying them at all costs, drew and opened a knife and, threatening her with death, began to embrace her and to touch her breasts; that in preparing to lie with her, Paulino had to leave the knife on the floor and the accused, taking advantage of the situation, picked up the weapon and stabbed him in the abdomen; and that Paulino, feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through the window and falling on some stones, while the accused set forth immediately for the poblacion to surrender herself to the authorities and report the incident. The theory the prosecution, which we consider a trifle unsubstantial is as follows: The accused Wenceslao Alcansare, thinking that Paulino importuned his wife with unchaste advances, out of jealousy, decided to get rid of him. His chance to bring about his plan can when, in the morning of the crime, Paulino happened to pass in front of the house of the spouses with his friend Olimpio Libosada. The accused wife invited Paulino to drop in, which the letter and his friend did. The spouses met them at the threshold. The accused wife asked Paulino whether he had a knife and as the latter answered in the affirmative, she asked him to lend it to lend it to her because she wanted to cut her nails, to which Paulino willingly acceded, while the accused wife was cutting her nails, she asked Paulino where he came from and the latter answered, turning his head around, that he came from the house of one Inting, whereupon the accused wife slashed him in the abdomen. Paulino tried to return the blow but the accused husband picked up a stone and struck him in the forehead. Wounded in the abdomen and in the forehead, Paulino fled therefrom. Issue: WON the accused can invoke defense of honor/self-defense Held: Yes. Natividad Luague's act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido, unaided her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare, and in the circumstances above set out, constitutes the exempting circumstance defined in article 11, subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code, because, as stated by a commentator of note, "aside from the right to life on which rest the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to party acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony." (1 Viada, 172, 173, 5th edition.) "Will the attempt to rape a woman constitute an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense?" asks the same commentator. "We think so," he answer, "inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, cannot her very existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of judicial redress, in an outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim, for, as the Roman Law says: quum virginitas, vel castitas, corupta restitui non protest (because virginity or chastity, once defiled, cannot be restored). It is evident that a woman who, imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability provided by this article and subsection since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage." (1 Viada, 301, 5th edition.) People v. De la Cruz, 61 Phil. 344 (1935) Facts: The accused, a woman, was walking home with a party including the deceased, Francisco Rivera. It was already dark and they were passing a narrow path. When the other people were far ahead, the deceased who was following the accused suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts, kissed her, and touched her private parts. He started to throw her down. When the accused felt she could not do anything more against the strength of her aggressor, she got a knife from her pocket and stabbed him. Issue: WON accused can invoke defense of honor Held: Yes. She was justified in making use of the knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor since she had no other means of defending herself.

Raeses 91 People v. Jaurigue, 76 Phil. 174 (1946) Facts: The deceased was courting the accused in vain. One day, the deceased approached her, spoke to her of his love which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced her and kissed her on account of which the accused gave him fist blows and kicked him. Thereafter, she armed herself with a fan knife, whenever she went out. One week after the incident, the deceased entered a chapel, went to sit by the side of the accused, and placed his hand on the upper part of her thigh. Accused pulled out her fan knife and with it stabbed the deceased at the base of the left side of the beck, inflicting a mortal wound. Issue: WON accused can invoke defense of honor Held: No. The means employed by the accused in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive. The chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, including her father and the barrio lieutenant, inside the chapel. Under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. with sugar cane, at a distance of about 100 meters from his granary. For the purpose of ascertaining who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night, accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the person who might return to get the palay. Guillermo Ribis appeared and attempted to carry the palay away him, but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the struggle which ensued, Ribis fell down and died instantly. Issue: WON there is defense of property. Held: No. Defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. (People v. Apolinar) The bolo worn by the deceased was in its sheath and hanging from his waist. It can not be concluded that the deceased even intended to assault his murderers with his bolo either before he was attacked by them or during the fight. Without unlawful aggression and the other requisites which would exempt the accused from criminal responsibility, the appellant and his two companions assaulted Ribis with sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, and therefore, the said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-principal by direct participation, fully convicted, together with his codefendants who are already serving their sentence. People v. Narvaez, supra Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk

Defense of property
People v. Apolinar, 38 OG 2870 Facts: The accused, armed with a shotgun, was looking over his land. He noticed a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that the man had stolen his palay, the accused fired in the air and then at him, causing his death. Issue: WON accused can invoke defense of property Held: No. Defense of property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. United States v. Bumanglag, 14 Phil. 644 (1909) Facts: On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag noticed that 40 bundles of palay which were kept in his granary were missing. He searched for the missing palay the following morning and found them in an enclosed field which was planted

Raeses 92 things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages. Issues: 1. WON CFI erred in convicting defendant- appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person. 2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights. 3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party. Held: 1. No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. Its accepted that victim was the original aggressor. 2. Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites: 1. Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. A536 of the CC also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession 2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In case, killing was disproportionate to attack. 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault wasnt deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted

Raeses 93 instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered 3 degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor. 3. No. He isnt liable for subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to fines only & not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages & costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its commission, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to RPC Art. 22. 3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the making a defense had no part therein. The phrase in case means in the event that. Reason: Although the provocation prejudices the person who gave it, its effects o not reach the defender who took no part therein, because the latter was prompted by some noble or generous sentiment in protecting and saving a relative. United States v. Esmedia, 17 Phil. 260 (1910) Facts: Ciriaco Abando, his wife, and their son, Santiago, lived in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sibalom, in the barrio of Bongbogan, Province of Antique. Gregorio Esmedia, father of these two accused, son-in-law of Ciriaco Abando and brother- in-law of Santiago Abando, lived in the same barrio. These tow families lived very near to each other and owned adjoining rice lands. Before this trouble occurred there had been a dispute between these two families relative to the ownership of the rice land then occupied by Ciriaco Abando. About 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th of June, 1909, Ciriaco Abando instructed his son, Santiago, to go to a certain place in his rice field to let out the water in order that they could plant rice the said field. In compliance with these instructions of his father, Santiago proceeded to the place designated, and while at work doing what he had been ordered by his father to do, Gregorio Esmedia appeared on the scene and started a quarrel with Santiago. Soon thereafter Gregorio drew a dagger and stabbed Santiago in the back. Santiago fell to the ground, but arose immediately and attacked Gregorio with his bolo, inflicting several wounds on the said Gregorio in consequence of which he fell to the ground. Before this trouble finally terminated the two accused and Ciriaco Abando appeared in that immediate vicinity.

Defense of relative
Reyes: 1. Relatives that can be defended. 1. Spouse 2. Ascendants 3. Descendants 4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same degrees 5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree Relatives by affinity, because of marriage, are parents-in- law, son or daughter-in-law, and brother or sister-in-law. 2. Basis: Founded not only upon a humanitarian sentiment, but also upon the impulse of blood which impels men to rush, on the occasion of great perils, to the rescue of those close to them by ties of blood. (Albert) 3. Requisites of defense of relatives: 1. Unlawful aggression; 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and

Raeses 94 These two accused contend that they were working in their rice field nearby, and on seeing Ciriaco Abando and Santiago Abando attacking their father, Gregorio, they started to the place to render their father assistance, Ponciano starting first; that when Ponciano got near the place of the trouble he was met by Ciriaco and Santiago who attacked him with bolos and clubs and that he, Ponciano, in self- defense, knocked them both down, and after they had fallen the other accused, Mena Esmedia, arrived. Ponciano further contends that he did not use a bolo in this fight, but used a club only. Issue: WON the two accused can invoke defense of relative Held: YES to Santiago, but NO to Ciriaco. Under the provisions of No. 5, article 8 of the Penal Code, the two accused are exempt from criminal responsibility for having caused the death of Santiago Abando, inasmuch as it has been shown that they inflicted these wounds upon him in defense of their father who was fatally wounded at the time. They honestly believed, and had good grounds upon which to found their belief, that Santiago would continue his attack upon their father. They are, however, guilty of having caused the death of the old man, Ciriaco Abando. When they attacked and killed him the other trouble had terminated and they were not in danger of bodily harm from him. 2. Basis: What one may do in his defense, another may do for him. 3. Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives mentioned in par. 2 is considered a stranger.

Avoidance of a greater evil or injury

Reyes: 1. Although, as a rule there is no civil liability in justifying circumstances, it is only in Par. 4, of Art. 11 where there is civil liability, but the civil liability is borne by the persons benefited. 2. Requisites: 1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; 2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; If evil sought is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, Par. 4 of Art. 11 is not applicable 3. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it 3. The greater evil should not be brought about by the negligence or imprudence of the actor People v. Norma Hernandez, 55 OG 8465 Facts: Maria Norma Hernandez and her parents were charged with serious slander by deed by Vivencio Lascano. Vivencio had courted Maria and after months of courtship, Maria finally accepted Vivencio. Vivencio brought his parents to Marias home so they could talk about marriage; when they came with his 12 aunts, they brought 30 chickens and 3 goats and asked for Marias hand in marriage. The parents of both parties agreed to the marriage. The date was set, Vivencios parents agreed to buy the wedding dress among other clothes, to advance P20 for fetching the sponsors of the wedding and to repair the roof of the house of one of Marias uncles. A marriage license was already secured and a wedding gown sewn and bought. Vivencio and his parents made preparations for a wedding feast by cleaning their house and yard, setting up a

Defense of stranger
Reyes: 1. Requisites: 1. Unlawful aggression; 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and 3. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. Defense must be actuated by a disinterested or generous motive, whe it puts down revenge, resentment, or evil motive as illegitimate. (Albert)

Raeses 95 temporary shed and stove and slaughtering goats, pigs, chickens. On March 18, The guests came but Maria was nowhere to be found; Vivencio and his parents waited for her up to 12 midnight but she never came which resulted to their great shame and humiliation. The CFI acquitted her parents, but Maria was found guilty and sentenced her a fine and imprisonment. Maria claims that she did not love Vivencio and that her parents had forced her to agree to the marriage. On March 11, without her parents knowledge, she left for Mindoro to avoid the marriage. Issue: WON Maria acts constituted serious slander by deed Held: No. Marias act in going to Mindoro with the deliberate purpose of preventing the celebration of the marriage with Vivencio because she did not love him, does not constitute the crime of slander by deed. Malice, which is an essential requisite of slander, was absent because in changing her mind, she was merely exercising her right not to give her consent to a marriage after mature deliberation. She had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant to Art. 11, par. 4 of the RPC. If a party to an agreement to marry who backs out should be held liable for the crime of slander by deed, then that would be an inherent way of compelling said party to go into a marriage without his or her free consent. Ty v. People, 439 SCRA 220 (2004) Facts: Tys mother was confined in Manila Doctor's Hospital to which a medical bill amounting to 600,000 pesos was made to be paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then instituted criminal actions against Ty for violation of BP22. In her defense she alleged that she issued the checks involuntarily because her mother threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. She further claimed that no consideration was obtained by her because all the checks were made as payment to the medical bills. Issue: WON avoidance of a greater evil can be invoked in the case at bar Held: No. In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills. The Court thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.

Fulfillment of duty
Reyes: 1. Requisites: 1. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; 2. That the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due

Raeses 96 performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. People v. Delima, 46 Phil. 738 (1922) Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail. Poiiceman Felipe Delima found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered his surrender but Napoleon answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it, fired his revolver but didn't hit Napoleon. The criminal tried to ran away, not throwing his weapon; the policeman shot him dead. Delima was tried and convicted for homicide; he appealed. Issue: WON the accused acted in fulfillment of duty Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held that the killing was done in performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the obligation to surrender and his disobedience with a weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The action was justified by the circumstances. People vs. Belbes, 334 SCRA 220 (2004) Facts: Accused together with Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned to maintain peace and order at the prom of Pili Brgy. High School. At 9:00 pm, two students approached them and their teacher saying someone was making trouble. Accused and Pat. Pabon who were armed with an armalite and .38 caliber respectively, responded forthwith. Meanwhile, Fernando Bataller and two of his company. Bataller was drunk and was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the schools temporary building when the bamboos broke. At this instance, the accused and Pat. Pabon appeared and without warning Accused fired his gun. Bataller fell and the two patrolmen fled. Accuseds version of the facts: Upon responding and arriving at the scene: Bataller was a little tipsy but not vomiting. They introduced themselves as policemen but Bataller didnt mind them. Bataller then stabbed Pabon with a knife which accused said he knew because he saw the glint of the blade and he was only 1 meter away from Pat. Pabon. The latter unfortunately was not hit. After two more thrusts were made towards him, Pabon retreated but accused was stabbed in his lower left shoulder. The accused firearm was slung over his shoulder. As Bataller made another thrust, Accused gave a shot, which after doing so, Bataller suddenly grabbed the firearm. Batallers two other companions had also ganged up on him. They struggled with each other and the gun went off. It was semi-automatic, so one squeeze at the trigger would fire a shot. After the armalite went off, Bataller fell. He took the knife and that was the time people started to gather. They went to the police station and turned over the knife. Pat. Pabons testimony corroborated with the accused except the part when accused fired a warning shot and the deceased companions ganging up on accused. Accused pleaded not guilty invoking self-defense in the performance of his official duty Issue: Was the trial court correct in holding accused-appellant guilty of murder? Held: No. It was modified to HOMICIDE. To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor, (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. It is incumbent upon an accused who has admitted to inflict fatal injuries to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence in order to avoid criminal liability. Appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of self- defense on the face of mortal danger while on police duty. The knife used by the deceased was not even subjected to fingerprinting. The accused wound was only examined after 21 hours making self-infliction a possibility. If it was true that accused and Bataller grappled face to face, then the victim should not have been hit sideways. TIME FACTOR! It took only about 6 seconds from the time the accused left his seat until the gunshots

Raeses 97 were heard. There are two requisites to invoke self- defense in the fulfillment of a duty: 1. that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right 2. that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office The first requisite is present for it was admittedly a performance of his duty. However the second one is lacking for the killing need not be a necessary consequence on the performance of his duty. He exceeded his duty which is only to maintain peace and order when he fired his armalite without warning. Thus, it would account only as an INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE. ON MURDER: Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For it to be a qualifying circumstance, 2 conditions must concur: 1. the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate 2. the means, method or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender 3. None of the two conditions were committed. Likewise, suddenness of an attack does not necessarily imply treachery. Thus, ruling out murder. Homicide resulting from reckless imprudence is not recognized either. 3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. People v. Beronilla, 96 Phil. 566 (1955) Facts: Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at the outbreak of war and continued to serve as mayor during the Japanese occupation. Dec 19, 1944 accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col Arnold. Simultaneously, he received a memorandum issued by Arnold authorizing them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage or aiding the enemy. He also received a list of all puppet government officials of Abra, with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions placed Borjal under custody and asked residents of La Paz to file case against him. He also appointed a 12-man jury composed of Labuguen as chairman and others, plus Alverne and Balmaceda were prosecutors; Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Inovermo as counsel for the accused, later Atty. Barreras voluntarily appeared as counsel for Borjal. The jury found Borjal guilty on all counts and imposed death penalty. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to Headquarters of Infantry for review. Records were returned on April 18, 1945 with approval of Arnold. On the same day, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the execution to Arnold, the latter complementing Beronilla. Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others involved in the Borjal case were indicted by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized, under RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. All the accused (except Labuguen who filed and granted amnesty by the AFP), filed their application to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission, which denied their application on the ground that they

Lawful order of superior

Reyes: 1. Requisites: 1. That an order has been issued by a superior. 2. That such order must be for some lawful purpose.

Raeses 98 were inspired by purely personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for trial on merits. On July 10, 1950 Beronillo, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico were convicted as conspirator and co-principals of crime murder. They appealed. Issue: WON accused appellants are guilty of murder; and WON they should be granted amnesty. Held: The records are ample to show that Beronilla acted pursuant to the orders of the Infantry Headquarters. Although it was alleged by the state that there was a radiogram from certain Col. Volkmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, on the illegality of Borjal's execution, there are no sufficient evidence to show that it was known to Beronilla. Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold approving the decisions of Beronilla prove otherwise. The testimony of Rafael Balmaceda, relative of Borjal was also unreliable. The state claims that the appellants held grudges against late Borjal, but court said that the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that they were impelled by malice. In fact, prior to the execution, Beronilla sent the decision for review. The lower court also found that Borjal was really guilty of treasonable acts. The court held that the accused- appellants just acted upon the orders of superiors and criminal intent was not established. Even assuming the accused-appellant are guilty of murder, they should not be denied of the amnesty on the ground that the slaying took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control. The court held that any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the amnesty proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused.
RPC, Art. 12 Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. 2. A person under nine years of age. 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education; otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said article 80. 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. 5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of irresistible force. 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause.

B. Exempting Circumstances

Reyes: 1. Definition: Excemtping circumstances (non-imputability) are those grounds for exemption from punishment because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any of

Raeses 99 the conditions which make the act voluntary or negligent. 2. Basis: Based on the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. 3. There is a crime committed but no criminal liability arises. 4. In justifying circumstances, there is neither a crime nor a criminal. No civil liability, except in par. 4 (causing damage to another in state of necessity). In exempting circumstances, there is a crime but no criminal liability. There is civil liability, except in pars. 4 and 7 (causing an injury be mere accident; failing to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause) of Art. 12. 5. Dementia praecox is covered by the term insanity. Schizophrenia is its current incarnation. 6. Based on the complete absence of intelligence. People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87 (1937) Facts: 12 Dec. 1934 - Celestino Bonoan met Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard Bonoan say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around & saw Bonoan withdrawing his right hand, w/c held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, "I will pay you," but Bonoan simply replied saying that he would kill him & then stabbed Guison 3 times on the left side. The incident was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco. Bonoan was arrested on the day itself. Bonoan admitted to stabbing Guison. Guison was taken to PGH where he died 2 days later. 5 January 1935 - Prosecuting attorney of Manila filed an information charging Celestino Bonoan with the crime of murder. 16 January 1935 - Bonoan's defense counsel objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the psychopathic hospital. The court issued and order requiring the Director of the hospital to report on Bonoan's mental condition. A report was rendered by Dr. Toribio Joson. 23 March 1935 - the case was called for arraignment again, the defense objected and again the court filed another order requiring the doctor who examined Bonoan to appear in court to report on Bonoan's mental condition. 26 March 1935 - Dr. Toribio appeared before the court for the inquiry. The court issued another order asking to summon other doctors from the hospital and to put Bonoan under another doctor, Dr. Jose

Insanity
Reyes: 1. While the imbecile is exempt in all cases of criminal liability, the insane is not so exempt if it can be shown that he acted during a lucid interval. An imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children between two and seven years of age. 2. To constitute insanity, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence or that there be a total deprivation of the freedom of the will. 3. The defense must prove the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, because the presumption is always in favor of sanity. (People v. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204,206) 4. When a person was insane at the time of the commission of the felony, he is exempt from criminal liability. When he was sane at the time of the commission of the crime, but he becomes insane at the time of the trial, he is liable criminally.

Raeses 100 Fernandez, for closer observation. Dr. Fernandez filed his report on 11 June 1935. 28 June 1935 the case was called again, Dr Fernandez showed up in court and reported that Bonoan was still not in a condition to defend himself. 21 January 1936 - Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that Bonoan could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial as he was "considered a recovered case." 27 February 1936 - Bonoan was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" and the trial was held. To prove motive and mental normalcy of Bonoan the prosecution called on Damaso Arnoco who testified that the reason for Bonoan's attack was that Guison owed him P55 and would not pay him back. Bonoan had bought the knife with which he stabbed Guison for 50 centavos and had been waiting 2 days to kill him. He acquired this information when he arrested and questioned Bonoan. Bonoan was charged with the murder of Carlos Guison, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay P1K to indemnify the heirs of Guison. The defendant appealed the case and his counsel cited that the lower court had erred in finding that Bonoan had dementia intermittently and not immediately prior to the commission of the offense, in finding that the accused did not show any abnormality either in behavior, action, language, appearance, or action that he was mentally deranged, in finding that the burden of proof lay in the defendant to prove that he was mentally deranged at the time of the crime, and in not acquitting Bonoan. at the time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity. (Philippines uses this) 2. That an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. 3. Prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing the fact rests upon the defendant. To prove insanity the evidence must be clear and convincing. The courts need to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. In the separate reports given by Dr. Toribio Joson and Dr. Fernandez they both diagnosed Bonoan to be unstable, stating that "he will always have troubles and difficulties with this world of realities." Bonoan was diagnosed with dementia praecox which is a mental disease that disqualifies a person from legal responsibility for his actions. In these people homicidal attacks are common because of the delusions that they are being interfered with or that their property is being taken. The court was of the opinion that Bonoan was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charge with and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability. Judgment: Judgment of the lower court REVERSED. Defendant appellant ACQUITTED but to be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or any other hospital for the insane. Imperial, dissenting: "The dissenting opinions, in establishing the conclusion that the accused was then in the possession of his mental faculties or, at least, at a lucid interval, are based on the fact admitted by the parties and supported by expert testimony, that the accused before the commission of a crime, had been cured of dementia praecox and later of manic depressive psychosis." The inference of the majority that the accused was insane is not

Issue: WON Bonoan was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. Held: Yes. There are 3 different theories used 1. Insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of insanity

Raeses 101 sufficiently supported by evidence. No attention was given to the decision of the judge who originally tried the case, which should have been done because he was able to observe Bonoan, the witnesses, the evidence and the testimonies. This court generally gives importance to the conclusions drawn by the judge who tried the case in first instance unless there is a clear contradiction in the evidence and the decision, which is not the case here. Diaz, dissenting: The appellant committed the crime when he was sane or at least during a lucid interval. He had motive to kill Guison [55php], as clearly stated by the arresting police officer. The law presumes that everyone is sane, and insanity is an exception, to be established by clear proof and it is not usually permanent. There is no evidence or record that can prove that Bonoan was insane at the time he committed the crime, or that he was continuing to suffer from insanity from the date of the commission of the crime. Where it is shown that the defendant experiences lucid intervals, the crime is assumed to have been committed during one of them, unless proven otherwise. Concepcion, dissenting: There is no evidence or record to prove that Bonoan was insane at the time he committed the crime, and there were no records to show that he had suffered a relapse of the condition he had sought treatment for at the San Lazaro hospital years before the crime was committed. Bonoan had been sane for 9 years [or at least "socially adjustable"]. The attack of insomnia before the event is not clear proof that he was insane or suffering a bout with insanity at the time of the crime, it merely presents a possibility, and the innocence to the accused cannot be based on a mere possibility. The accused when questioned by the police immediately after the crime did not exhibit insane behavior. It cannot be said that Bonoan stabbed Guison because of a hallucination because Guison actually owed him money and this was confirmed by the fact of his saying "I am going to pay you" before he was stabbed. This shows the motive for aggression [vengeance] People v. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 (1980) Facts: Felicula (Feling), married to Honorato Ambal, was mortally wounded, having 7 incised wounds in different parts of her body. She died 40 minutes later. Honorato admitted to killing his wife. The immediate provocation for the assault was a fight, because Feling had not bought medicine for Honorato, who then had influenza. She told him that he was better off dead, so he attacked her. He was charged with parricide. He pleaded not guilty. His defense was insanity. Dr. Cresogono Llacuna said that Ambal suffered from a minor psycho-neurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is NOT INSANITY. He was normal but nervous, and HAD NO MENTAL DISORDER. Trial court concluded that his behavior immediately after the incident showed he wasnt insane and that he acted like a normal human being. Issue: Should Ambal be exempted from criminal liability by reason of insanity? Held: NO. Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. Imbecile: person marked by mental deficiency; must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. Insanity: one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder; there must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the lease discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Passion and motives of anger, hatred, etc, is not insanity either. Neither is being weak-minded. The court presumes that a person is of sound mind

Raeses 102 unless there is positive proof stating otherwise. In this case, no such proof has been given. People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151 (1981) Facts: 8 Sep. 1970 - around 2pm Ernesto Puno entered the bedroom of 72 y.o. Francisca Col also known as Aling Kikay, in Little Bagio, barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal. Aling Kikay was on the bed, when Puno entered & insulted her by saying "Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog." Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her on the head several times with a hammer until she was dead. The assault was witnessed by Hilaria dela Cruz who was present in the room during the attack, and by Lina Pajes, a tenant in the next room. After killing the old lady Puno went into the next room, where the girls had taken refuge & made the following confession & threat "Huag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin nunyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or according to Lina "pinatay ko na ang iyong matanda. Huag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang pahihigantihan ko." After Puno left, Lina called the police. Puno fled to his parents' house then later on to his second cousin, Teotimos house. 10 Sep. 1970 - Puno's father surrendered him to the police. He was brought to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal. He was charged with murder in the municipal court. Puno's wife, his sister in law and his 2nd cousin all testified in court describing his appearance [bloodshot eyes] and his behavior immediately before and after them murder, [boxing the dog, having an imaginary bumble bee flying around him, singing, etc..] The defense presented 3 doctors to prove insanity but the doctors instead proved that Puno had acted with discernment when he killed Aling Kikay. Dr. Araceli Maravilla of Dr. Jose Reyes Memorial hospital said Puno was an outpatient who could very well live with society even if he was afflicted with schizophrenic reaction. Dr. Reynaldo Robles stated that Puno had schizophrenic reaction but that this condition was "not socially incapacitating" Dr. Carlso Vicente of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno acted w/ discernment & could distinguish right from wrong. 21 October 1970 - Puno was indicted for the murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard for sex. Puno was sentenced to death and ordered to pay P22K to the heirs of the victim

Issue: WON Puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay. Held: No. Record from Puno's stay at the National Mental Hospital stated that he had been an out patient for schizophrenia in 1962, recovered, had a relapse in 1964, improved and in 1966 his sickness remained UNIMPROVED. Treatment continued in San Lazaro Compound up to 1970 where he was relieved of symptoms and did not come back for medication. It cited that he was quiet and as usual manageable. The report stated that he "is presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms", but persons suffering from schizophrenia may retain some of the residual symptoms but it wouldn't affect their discernment of right and wrong. The court says: "in the light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstance surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed, the victim'' The court cited that had he been a homicidal maniac he would have killed Lina and Hilaria too. The evidence should prove clearly that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime.

Raeses 103 Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or total deprivation of freedom of wilt. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Two aggravating circumstances, dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the age of the victim are off set by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and the offender's mental illness (mild schizophrenic reaction) which diminished him of his will power but did not deprive him of consciousness of his acts. Judgment: Medium penalty for murder imposed. Death penalty is set aside. Accused is sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA Makasiar, dissenting: The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He was mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay). His medical records properly evaluated & confirmed undeniably establish the fact that he had been ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His record for treatment stated him to be "unimproved" upon discharge and his out patient record merely stated him as "improved" not "recovered" or "unimproved". Appellant was treated 18 times in the National Mental Hospital and Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in a span of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental illness. This was confirmed by Dr. Carlos Vicente. People v. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860 (1991) Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal. Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in February 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR. The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense: Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in deep thought always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also times that her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bother to buy medicine as the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way home, she heard people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around. She asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's the only cure for my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a number of days, I would die. That same day, the accused went to Manila. Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim who

Raeses 104 testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Issue: WON the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged. Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act. Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act. However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts. It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused has lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane when he committed the act. The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal weapon, that he ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim. (This was taken from the TC's decision). Judgment: questioned decision AFFIRMED. People v. Yam-id, 308 SCRA 651 (1999) Facts: Julius Cantutay and Jerry Tejamo passed by the house of the accused who greeted them Good Evening, unsheathed a long bolo and ran after the two. Appellant caught up with Jerry and stabbed him on the left portion of his back, then held him by the hair and hacked him on the nape. As Jerry fell to ground, the appellant further stabbed him on the right side of his back then the appellant knelt over the prostrate body of Jerry and sucked the blood from his neck . At the automatic review at the Supreme Court, the appellant admitted to killing Jerry and pleaded insanity as his defense which contends that he has schizophrenia. Issue: WON the appellant can use the defense of insanity in killing of Jerry Tejamo Held: No. Insanity must be proven beyond reasonable doubt to exist before or at the very moment the crime was committed, by whoever invokes it as a defense. Defense failed to discharge its burden of proving that accused-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. Also, no evidence was presented that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime and the fact that the defense of insanity was not even raised during the trial of the case gives the impression that is but an afterthought. People v. Belonio, 429 SCRA 579 (2004) Facts: RTC found Randy Belonio y Landas guilty of the murder of Ramy Tamayo and sentenced him to death. The night of a wake, Ramy decided to buy cigarettes from a store. Ramy was occupying that space in front of the opening to pay when the accused Randy Belonio arrived. Randy tried to force

Raeses 105 his way in front of the opening and as a consequence, he bumped on Ramy. Jennifer and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The accused came over and sat on the other end of the bench and conversed with Ramy. The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, delivered a stabbing blow with a dagger which was concealed in his hand. Randy Belonio raised the defense of insanity and relied on the expert assessment of his witness, Dr. Antonio Gauzon, who certified that he is suffering from schizophrenia triggered by abuse of shabu and marijuana. RTC found appellant guilty of Murder and that he had full control of his mental faculties. Issue: WON appellants defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance is tenable. Held: NO. Appellant is found GUILTY of murder. The defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that appellant was insane. The evidence adduced by the defense is sorely insufficient to establish his claim that he was insane at the time he killed Tamayo. Belonios acts tend to establish that Belonio was well aware of what he had just committed, and was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would not have attempted to escape and go into hiding. Evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of alleged abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Dr. Guazons report was silent as regards the incidents occurring prior to or during the circumstance for which Belonio stands trial. insanity and must be clearly proven. (People v. Gimena, 55 Phil. 604) People v. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255 (1933) Facts: Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and guests were entertained in the house, among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her in the abdomen. He also attacked Fred and Luis and tried to attack his father, after which, he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months pregnant at that time, died five days later as a result of the wound. The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime, the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to come down and fight. When he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, had a severe stomachache that's why he went to bed in the early afternoon. The defendant stated that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadila held his feet. That's why he got up and it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down; he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then, he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way. Issue: WON defendant acted while in a dream. Held: Yes. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, werent voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

Somnambulism
Reyes: 1. Another case of lack of intelligence. 2. Somnambulism or sleepwalking, where the acts of the person afflicted are automatic, is embraced in the plea of

Raeses 106 The apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us. Although an extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. In the case at hand, the court found not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of (read: he loved his wife dearly, he tried to attack his father in whose house the lived and the guests whom he invited), but also motives for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica, an expert witness in the case, stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind. The wife's wound may have been inflicted accidentally. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife, but that he was defending himself from his enemies. b. Conditional responsibility between 9 and 15 years. c. Full responsibility 18 or over (adolescence) to 70 (maturity). d. Mitigated responsibility over 9 and under 15, offender acting with discernment; 15 or over but less than 18; over 70 years of age. Senility although said to be the second childhood, is only a mitigated responsibility, 5. Discernment: mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial. a. May be shown by: i. Manner of committing the crime. ii. Conduct of offender. 6. The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. 7. Age may be determined through: a. Birth certificate b. Baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents c. In the absence of the above, information from child himself/herself d. Testimonies of other persons e. Physical appearance of the child People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 (1939) Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena

Minority
Reyes: 1. Under nine years to be construed nine years or less. 2. Age of absolute irresponsibility raised to fifteen years of age. Republic Act No. 9344 otherwise known as Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raised the age of absolute irresponsibility from nine (9) to fifteen (15) years of age. 3. Children above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted without discernment exempt from criminal liability. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that a minor who is over 15 but under 18 years of age has acted with discernment, in order for the minor not to be entitled to this exempting circumstance. 4. Periods of criminal responsibility a. Absolute irresponsibility 9 years and below (infancy).

Raeses 107 on the nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter. The court held that in committing the act, the accused acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that to determine whether or not there was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into consideration: a. The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed. b. The state of mind at the time the crime was committed c. The time he had at his disposal d. The degree of reasoning of the minor Issue: WON the accused acted with discernment Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial. People v. Navarro, 51 OG 4062 Facts: Luisa Navarro 13 years old who was approached by agents of the Price Enforcement Division of PRISCO asking frot he price of one tin of Hersheys Cocoa. She was arrested after allegedly selling cocoa 11 cents more that ceiling price. Found guilty of violating E.O. 447 in connection with Sec 12 of RA 509- Anti- Profiteering law and was sent to the custody of Phil. Training School for Girls Issue: WON Article 12 par 3 can be applied despite being charged with violation of a special law Held: Yes. Nothing in the law says that RPC is not suppletory to their provisions (Art10) While intent is immaterial in crimes mala prohibita, the circumstances, which exempt from criminal liability, are based on lack of intelligence, intent and spontaneity. In the language of art 12 (3), state has the burden of proving that the minor acted with discernment. Discernmentbeing more than mere understanding is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. In the instant case, accused did not fully grasp the importance of the question and there was no record that she was a merchant. Such minor, over 9 but less than 15 is not criminally responsible. Remiendo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184874 (2009) Facts: Petitioner was a minor above 15 but below 18 years old when he raped a minor when the latter was left alone in her house. He threatened to kick the latter if she would shout for help. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appeal invoked suspension of sentence pursuant to RA 9344. By the time he was convicted by the trial court, he was already 22 years old Issue: WON petitioner is exempt from criminal liability and entitled to suspension of sentence under sec 38, 40 of RA 9344 Held: NO. Since he is above 15but below 18, finding of discernment is necessary to determine exemption from criminal liability. His act of waiting for victims parents before defiling her and

Raeses 108 threating to kick her if she shouts prove that the petitioner can differentiate b/w right and wrong. Sec 38 and 40 can no longer be availed since by the time sentence was imposed, he was already 22 years old. Sec 40 provides that if the child in conflict with law has reached 18 years while under suspended sentence, the court can determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with the act or to order execution of sentence or to suspend the sentence for a certain period until the child reaches maximum age of 21 years. Sierra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182941 (2009) Facts: Petitioner was 15 years old when he raped a minor. He was convicted of rape where penalty was reclusion perpetua and a fine. During the pendency of appeal to CA, RA 9344 took effect. CA affirmed the conviction and denied the defense of minority since age was not established by presenting birth certificate but only alleged testimonies of petitioner and his mother. According to them, burden of proof of age is upon the prosecution Issue: Who has the burden of proof in establishing age of accused and can RA 9344 be given retroactive application? Held: Minority is usually established through birth certificate of the child, baptismal certificate, testimonies of other persons and physical appearance. In case of doubt, minority should be in favor of the child. Minority in this case was established by testimonies of he petitioner and his mother. This was not objected to by prosecution and did not even present contrary evidence. Law should be given retroactive effect since it is favorable to the accused as provided for by the RPC. Case is dismissed and petitioner is referred to appropriate local social welfare. 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or intention of causing it. 2. Accident: something that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly forseeable consequences. 1. Presupposes lack of intention to commit the wrong done. 3. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory. 1. Accident: a fortuitive (sic) circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happen. 2. Negligence: failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand without which such other person suffers injury. People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931) Facts: On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife. She refused and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.

Negligence
Reyes: 1. Elements: 1. A person is performing a lawful act;

Raeses 109 Issue: WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of accident. Held: Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised Penal Code 1. There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence. No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam. On the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other. 2. The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Bindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal. 3. If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. He was only trying to defend his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was perfectly lawful. U.S. v. Tanedo, 15 Phil. 196 (1910) Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the victim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother & Uncle. The accused went into the forest upon the recommendation of the deceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens. Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard a human cry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one, Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, & later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning & a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime. There was no enmity between the accused and the deceased. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest & intentionally shooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused appealed. Issue: WON the accused is guilty Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. Also, according to: Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of causing it. Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.

Raeses 110 In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, nor is it disputed that the accused was engaged in a legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to kill the deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act and his concealment of the body. The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the state to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit." Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction. Decision: Judgment of Conviction is reversed, the accused acquitted, and discharged from custody. Pomoy v. People, 439 SCRA 439 (2004) Facts: Balboa was arrested for being one of the suspects in a robbery. Sergeant Pomoy went to the cell of Balboa and started to escort him to the investigation room. When they reached the main building, 2 gunshots were heard and Pomoy was still holding the gun with Balboa lying in a pool of blood dead. The lone witness said that Pomoy and Balboa were grappling possession of the gun with Pomoys right hand on the handle with Balboas left hand over the right hand of Pomoy and such hand positions did not change when the gun was out of the holster. The witness did not see who pulled the trigger. Pomoy was convicted of homicide by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals because he was said to have control of the gun as he held it and 2 shots were fired. Issue: WON Pomoy had control of the gun. Held: The testimony of the witness showed that Pomoys right hand was trying to maintain possession of the gun while the left hand was warding off Balboa. Under such circumstance, Pomoy could not have coolly and effectively released the safety lock, aim and fire at Balboa. The grappling was fierce and vicious. The logical conclusion is the safety lock was released through the scuffle and accidentally fired as the .45 pistol immediately replaces the empty bullet with a new one making it prone to accident/ The location of the wound cannot be taken into account as the nozzles direction was continuously changing in the struggle. His defense of the possession of his gun was a lawful act. No intent or negligence was proven and he even had precautionary measures keeping the gun in the holster. The circumstance was beyond the control of Pomoy. Pomoy is AQUITTED.

Irresistible force/Uncontrollable fear

Reyes: 1. Irresistible force 1. Elements: 1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force. 2. That the physical force must be irresistible. 3. That the physical force must come from a third person. 2. Passion or obfuscation cannot be irresistible force. 3. Basis: complete absence of freedom 2. Uncontrollable fear 1. Elements: 1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater than or at least equal to, that which he is required to commit; 2. That is promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. 2. Duress as a valid defense should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb and should not be

Raeses 111 speculative fanciful or remote fear. The accused must not have opportunity for escape or self- defense. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense. Speculative, fanciful and remote fear is not uncontrollable fear. In irresistible force, the offender uses violence or physical force to compel another erson to commit a rime; in uncontrollable fear, the offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a crime. Basis: complete absence of freedom. when the burial took place. Their failure to report the crime is not an offense punished by the Penal Code. United States v. Exaltacion, 3 Phil. 339 (1904) Facts: On March 26, 1903, Liberate Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco were charged with rebellion willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the government of the US, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society (whose purpose was to overthrow the government by force of arms). Exaltacion and Tanchinco claim that they were captured by armed bandits and were compelled to sign documents (containing oath taken in the name of God and a covenant to carry out superior orders of the Katipunan Society and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother country) under threat of death. Exaltacion and Tanchinco reported the incident to the governor, lieutenant of volunteers and the president of Meycauayan. Witnesses testified to this fact as well. Issue: 1. WON the defendants are guilty of the crime of rebellion 2. WON defendants incur criminal liability when they signed the documents? Held: No. The evidence for the prosecution and the documents signed by the accused is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court below. The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the Contreras Band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves to the authorities as soon as they were released is corroborative of their innocence. Guilt of defendants was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

3.

4. 5.

6.

United States v. Caballeros, 4 Phil. 350 (1905) Facts: Robert Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were convicted as accessories to the crime of assassination or murder of four American school- teachers, having buried the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime. They were allegedly coerced. Issue: WON the defense under Art12(5) is tenable Held: Yes. Not only is Baculis confession that he only assisted in the burial of the corpses because he was compelled by the murderers, but this was corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Sabate. Sabate said that he was present when the Americans were killed; that Baculi was not a member of the group of murderers but he was in the banana plantation gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns forced him to bury the corpses. As for Caballeros, there was no proof that he took any part in the execution of the crime; there was conclusive proof to the contrary. Sabate and Baculi declared that Caballeros did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence

Insuperable cause

Raeses 112 Reyes: 1. Elements: 1. That an act is required by law to be done; 2. That a person fails to perform such act; 3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable cause. 2. Basis: Absence of intent. U.S. v. Vicentillo, 19 Phil. 118 (1911) Facts: Municipal Pres. Vicentillo was found guilty of illegal and arbitrary detention after detaining Ney for three days without bringing the latter to the proper judicial authority for trial. Issue: WON Pres. acted arbitrarily and without legal authority in such detainment Held: No. It was conclusively proven that neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. People v. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530 (1936) Facts: Josefina was seen going to the bushes apparently to respond to a call of nature. When she emerged from the bushes her clothes were stained with blood and she was weak and dizzy. Neighbors helped her go up to her house and later found a dead newborn in the bushes. Issue: WON she is guilty of infanticide Held: No. Evidence does not show that she willfully, consciously or imprudently left her child when she was continuously ill, dizzy, and inexperienced as to childbirth. 2. Other absolutory causes. Aside from the justifying and exempting circumstances, there are also other absolutory causes (Arts. 6, 20, 124, 247, 280, 332, 344) 3. Instigation is an absolutory cause. 1. Must be made by public officers or private detectives 4. Entrapment is not an absolutory cause. 5. There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for while in the latter case the instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself become a co-principal, in entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. 6. There is neither instigation nor entrapment when the violation of the law is simply discovered. 7. Assurance of immunity by a public officer does not exempt a person from criminal liability. People v. Lua Chu, 56 Phil. 44 (1931) Background of Case: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of the Shipments of Opium coming from Hongkong, who represented agents of the real Owners of Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated w/ Samson & Natividad of the Customs by paying them an amount of P6K for the opium to be released safely from Customs. On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the former consult the real owners on how to proceed the payment of P6K & will come over to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners. On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary represented by Captain Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the conversation between Samson & Uy Se Teung. On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain Buencosejo and a stenographer named Jumapao from a law firm and hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to witness the conversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu.

Instigation and entrapment

Reyes: 1. Absolutory causes: those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.

Raeses 113 Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff. important facts: 1. Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the Opium. 2. Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners named Tan and another located in Amoy. 3. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se Tieng. 4. A Customs Collector had a conversation before when Samson was on vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu and agreed on the business of shipping the Opium. The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson & Captain Buencosejo showed up & caught them in the act & arrested the two Chinese. The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu & confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins). Facts of Case: An Appeal was made by Uy Se Tieng & Lua Chu & made 10 assignments of errors made by the TC in its judgment. Appelants Held Point of Defense Juan Samson 1. A public official shall be induced the involved in the crime if: defendants to He induces a person to import the commit a crime for opium. personal gain Does not take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards does take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the crime & to arrest the offenders. 2. Even though Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drugs, the ff should be noted that held Samson not guilty for the crime: The accused have already planned and actually ordered the opium without the consent or participation of Juan Samson. Did not help the accused to successfully implement there plan rather, Samson assured the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers. Not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedures

Trial judge refusal of exclusion of Juan Samson in the witness stand even though he was already dismissed from the Customs secret service In accepting 1. The transcript contains the transcript certain admissions made by taken down by the defendants. Jumapao as the 2. Stenographer attested that true & correct it was faithfully taken down. conversation 3. Corroborated by statement between Juan of Juan Statement in the Samson & Uy court. Se Tieng Concluding Remarks: Entrapment 1. The practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions 2. It is a scheme or technique ensuring the apprehension of the criminals by being in the actual crime scene. 3. The law officers shall not be guilty to the crime if he have done the following: a. He does not induce a person to commit a crime for personal gain or is not involved in the planning of the crime. b. Does take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. Instigation: This is the involvement of a law officer in the crime itself in the following manners: a. He induces a person to commit a crime for personal gain

Raeses 114 b. Doesnt take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime & to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. c. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards does take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders. United States v. Phelps, 16 Phil. 440 (1910) Facts: BIR employee Smith (under the guise of Lockwood) came to Phelps house and asked if Phelps knew anyone who could assist Smith to smoke opium. Smith acted like he was having convulsions and he needed to smoke opium but refused to be brought to the hospital, so Phelps helped him find a Chinaman who prepared opium. At the opium house, a Chinaman gave them a pipe of opium, which Smith took as evidence to get a warrant of arrest. Phelps was arrested 40 minutes later. The Chinaman testified that he prepared the opium after repeated demands by Smith. Issue: WON Phelps was instigated Held: Yes. Smith not only suggested but also stated that he desired to commit the offense and would pay the expense necessary for the commission of the act. When an employee of the Government encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. Phelps is not guilty. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the appellant acquitted. 1. Ordinary mitigating those enumerated in subsections 1 to 10 of Art. 13. Those mentioned in subsection 1 of Art. 13 are ordinary mitigating circumstances, if Art. 69, for instance is not applicable. 2. Privileged mitigating a. Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen years of age and his case falls under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, the following rules shall be observed: (1) A person under fifteen years of age, and a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age who acted without discernment, are exempt from criminal liability; (2) Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age who acted with discernment, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. (As amended by RA No. 9344) b. Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable for reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability x x x, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. c. Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three

C. Mitigating Circumstances
Reyes: 1. Mitigating circumstances are those which, if present in the commission of the crime, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to seduce the penalty. 2. Basis: Mitigating circumstances are based on the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or on the lesser perversity of the offender. 3. Classes of mitigating circumstances.

Raeses 115 periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period x x x, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances: x x x. (5) When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances. x x x. 4. Privileged mitigating circumstances applicable only to particular crimes. 1. Voluntary release of the person illegally detained within 3 days without the offender attaining his purpose and before the institution of criminal action. (Art. 268, par. 3) The penalty is one degree lower. 2. Abandonment without justification of the spouse who committed adultery. (Art. 333, par. 3) The penalty is one degree lower. 5. Distinctions. 1. Ordinary mitigating circumstance is susceptible of being offset by any aggravating circumstance; while privileged mitigating cannot be offset by aggravating circumstance. 2. Ordinary mitigating, if not offset by an aggravating circumstance, produces only the effect of applying the penalty provided by law for the crime in its minimum period, in case of divisible penalty; whereas privileged mitigating produces the effect of imposing upon the offender the penalty lower by one or two degrees that that provided by law for the crime. 6. Mitigating circumstances only reduce the penalty, but do not change the nature of the crime. Where the accused is charged with murder, as when treachery as a qualifying circumstance is alleged in the information, the fact that there is a generic or privileged mitigating circumstance does not change the felony or homicide. If there is any ordinary or generic mitigating circumstance, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, the accused should be found guilty of the same crime of murder, but the penalty to be imposed is reduced to the minimum of the penalty for murder. If there is a privileged mitigating circumstance, the penalty for murder will be reduced by one or two degrees lower. In every case, the accused should be held guilty for murder. The judgment of the trial court that the mitigating circumstance of non-habitual drunkenness changes the felony to homicide is erroneous, because treachery is alleged in the information and the crime committed by the appellant is that of murder. The mitigating circumstance reduces the penalty provided by law but does not change the nature of the crime. (People v. Talam, C.A., 56 O.G. 3654)
RPC, Art. 13 Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances: 1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 2. That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80. 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.

Raeses 116
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito) his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. 6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. 8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings. 9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts. 10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.

2.

3.

Reyes: 1. Par. 1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter. 1. Refers to justifying and exempting circumstances. Self-defense (Art. 11, par. 1); Defense of relatives (Art. 11, par. 2); Defense of stranger (Art. 11, par. 3); State of necessity (Art. 11, par. 4); Performance of duty (Art. 11, par. 5); Obedience to order of superior (Art. 11, par. 6); Minority over 9 and under 15 years of age (Art. 12, par. 3); Causing injury by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4); and

4.

5.

Uncontrollable fear. (Art. 12, par. 6) Same. When all the requisites necessary to justify the act are not attendant. Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, and defense of stranger. Unlawful aggression must be present, it being an indispensable requisite. What is absent is either one or both of the last two requisites. Same. Par. 1 is applicable only when unlawful aggression is present but the other two requisites are not in any of the cases referred to in circumstances Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Art. 11. Art. 13, par. 1, applies only when unlawful aggression is present, but the other two requisites are not present. (Guevara) When two of the three requisites mentioned therein are present (for example, unlawful aggression and any one of the other two), the case must not be considered as one in which an ordinary or generic mitigating circumstance is present. Instead, it should be considered a privileged mitigating circumstance referred to in Art. 69 of this Code. If there is no unlawful aggression, there could be no self-defense or defense of a relative, whether complete or incomplete. Same. Incomplete justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury. If any of the last two requisites is absent, there is only a mitigating circumstance. Same. Incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of duty. Since the Supreme Court considered one of the two requisites as constituting the majority, it seems that there is no ordinary mitigating

Raeses 117 circumstance under Art. 13, par. 1, when the justifying or exempting circumstance has two requisites only. 6. Same. When all the requisites necessary to exempt from criminal liability are not attendant. 7. Same. Incomplete exempting circumstance of minority over 9 and under 15 years of age. The case of a minor invoking this circumstance is specifically covered by Art. 68. 8. Same. Incomplete exempting circumstance of accident. If the second requisite (performance of a lawful act) and the first part of the fourth requisite are absent (without fault), the case will fall under Art. 365 which punishes a felony by negligence or imprudence. In effect, there is a mitigating circumstance, because the penalty is lower than that provided for intentional felony. If the first requisite (performance of a lawful act) and the second part of the fourth requisite (without intention of causing it) are absent, it will be an intentional felony. The 2nd and 3rd requisites will not be present either. In this case, there is not even a mitigating circumstance. 9. Same. Incomplete exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear. If only of the requisites of uncontrollable fear as an exemting circumstance is present, there is only mitigating circumstance. 2. Par. 2. Impliedly repealed by RA 9344. An offender fifteen (15) or over but under eighteen (18) years of age is exempt from criminal liability should he/she act without discernment. 3. Same. Diversion and Diversion Program under RA 9344. Diversion refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic, pasychological, or educational background without resulting to formal court proceedings. (Section 4[j], Rep. Act. No. 9344) Diversion Program refers to the program that the child in conflict with the law is required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an offense without resorting to formal court proceedings. (Section 4[j], Rep. Act. No. 9344) 4. Same. System of Diversion. Children in conflict with the law shall undergo diversion procceedings without undergoing court proceedings subject to the following conditions: 1. Imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years. Law enforcement officer or Punong Barangay with the assistance of the local DSWD officer or other members of the Local Councils for the Protection of Children (LCPC) established in a all levels of local government shall conduct mediation, family conferencing and conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous modes of conflict resolution in accordance with the best interest of the child with a view to accomplishing the objectives of restorative justice and the formulation of a diversion program. 2. In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years of imprisonment. Local DSWD officer shall meet with child and his/her parents or guardians for the development of the appropriate diversion and rehabilitation program, in coordination with the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC). 3. Imposable penalty for the crime committed exceeds six (6) years imprisonment. Diversion measures may be resorted to only by the court. (see Section 23, Republic Act No. 9344) 5. Same. Contract of Diversion. If during the conferencing, mediation or conciliation, the child voluntarily admits the commission of the act, a diversion program shall be developed when appropriate and desirable

Raeses 118 as determined under Section 30. Such admission shall not be used against the child in any subsequent judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings. The diversion program shall be effective and binding if accepted by the parties concerned. The acceptance shall be in writing and signed by the parties concerned and the appropriate authorities. The local social welfare and development officer shall supervise the implementation of the diversion program. The diversion proceedings shall be completed within forty-five (45) days. The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended until the completion of the diversion proceedings but not to exceed forty-five (45) days. The child shall present himself/herself to the competent authorities that imposed the diversion program at least once a month for reporting and evaluation of the effectiveness of the program. Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of diversion, as certified by the local social welfare and development officer, shall give the offended party the option to institute the appropriate legal action. The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended during the effectivity of the diversion program, but not exceeding a period of two (2) years. (Sec. 26, Rep. Act. No. 9344) 6. Where diversion may be conducted. Diversion may be conducted at the Katarungang Pambarangay, the police investigation or the inquest or preliminary investigation stage and at all 1evels and phases of the proceedings including judicial level. (Section 24, Republic Act No. 9344) 7. Duty of the Punong Barangay or the Law Enforcement Officer when there is no diversion. If the offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian does not consent to a diversion, the Punong Barangay handling the case shall, within three (3) days from determination of the absence of jurisdiction over the case or termination of the diversion proceedings, as the case may be, forward the records of the case of the child to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the appropriate court, as the case may be. Upon the issuance of the corresponding document, certifying to the fact that no agreement has been reached by the parties, the case shall be filed according to the regular process. (See Section 27, Republic Act No. 9344) If the offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian does not consent to a diversion, the Women and Children Protection Desk of the PNP, or other law enforcement officer handling the case of the child under custody, to the prosecutor or judge concerned for the conduct of inquest and/or preliminary investigation to determine whether or not the child should remain under custody and correspondingly charged in court. The document transmitting said records shall display the word "CHILD" in bold letters. (Sec. 28, Rep. Act No. 9344) 8. Determination of age of child in conflict with the law. The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties. If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in

Raeses 119 the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended. In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law. (Section 7, Republic Act No. 9344) 9. That the offender is over 70 years of age is only a generic mitigating circumstance. 10. Basis: The mitigating circumstance in paragraph 2 of Art. 13 are based on the diminution of intelligence, a condition of voluntariness. 1. It is appreciated when the victim dies. 9. Not applicable to felonies by negligence. 10. Applicable only to offenses resulting in physical injuries or material harm. 11. Basis: Intent, an element of voluntariness in intentional felony, is diminished. People v. Ural, 56 SCRA 138 (1974) Facts: Ural was convicted of murder by the Zamboanga CFI sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and orderinh im to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola, in the sum of P12K and to pay the costs. The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, former detention prisoner who witnessed what happened. Ural, a policeman, boxed the deceased, Felix Napola, a detention prisoner, inside the jail. As a consequence of the fistic blows, the deceased collapsed on the floor. The accused stepped on the prostate body and left. After a while he returned with a bottle poured its contents on the recumbent body of the deceased, ignited it with a match and left the cell again. As a consequence, the victim later on died of the burns. The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Art 248(3), RPC) Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong can be appreciated in thie case at bar. Held: Yes. The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Art 14(1), RPC) but it failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed." (Art.13(3), RPC). The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the pro-portion of the means employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. Thus, it may be deduced from the proven facts that the accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being only to maltreat him, such that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts 64(4) and 248, RPC)

Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong

Reyes: 1. This circumstance can be taken into account only when the facts proven show tat there is a notable and evident disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences. (U.S. vs. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904, 907) 2. Intention, being an internal state, must be judged by external acts. Intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the proportion of the means employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. 3. The weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted, and the manner it is inflicted may show that the accused intended the wrong committed. 4. Not applicable when the offender employed brute force. 5. Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong mitigating in robbery with homicide. 6. Appreciated In murder qualified by circumstances based on manner of commission, not on state of mind of accused. 7. Not appreciated in murder qualified by treachery. 8. Lack of intent to kill not mitigating in physical injuries.

Raeses 120

Sufficient provocation
Reyes: 1. Provocation is understood as any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating any one. 2. Requisites: 1. That the provocation must be sufficient. Sufficient adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. Dependent on the act constituting provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, the place and the time when the provocation is made. 2. That it must originate from the offended party. 3. That the provocation must be immediate to the act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by the person who is provoked. 3. Difference between sufficient provocation as requisite of incomplete self-defense and as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self- defense, it pertains to its absence on the part of the person defending himself, while as a mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party. 4. Provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime. 5. Basis: Diminution of intelligence and intent. People v. Leonor, 305 SCRA 285 Facts: In the morning of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a dentist by profession, was at her clinic at the third floor of the Hermanos Building, Bicutan, Paraaque, Metro Manila, when a man entered and inquired about the cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee, the man, who was later on identified as Christopher Leonor, said that he would come back and then left in a hurry. Minutes later, Leonor came back[,] and Dr. Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco was preparing her dental instruments when Leonor barged in and demanded money. Dr. Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was] on the table. On hearing this,

Leonor stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, grabbed her watch and ran away. Dr. Tarlengco struggled out of the clinic and saw the man running out of the building, Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help. Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr. Tarlengco shouting, Tulungan ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng taong iyon. Baquilod noticed that Dr. Tarlengco was referring to the man running out of the building, coming from upstairs. Baquilod chased Leonor up to Daang Hari Street where he was joined by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted by people running after a person with bloodied shirt. When Galeno and Baquilod caught up with Leonor, Baquilod grabbed Leonors hand and took therefrom a Titus wristwatch and P900 cash. When queried, Leonor readily answered, Sir, hindi ko naman gusto po ito. Ginawa ko lang ito dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko. Leonor was brought to the Paraaque Police Block Station, PO3 Interia who was instructed to investigate proceeded to Dr. Tarlengcos clinic, where they saw, among other[ ] [things], a bloodied balisong (fan knife) at the ground floor of the Hermanos building. Baquilod turned over the watch and money he took from Leonor to Interia. Thereafter, Galeno and Interia returned to the police station where they were interrogated. Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation can be invoked in the case at bar. Held: No. CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and bad words justify retaliation with a knife. Such claim is undeserving of belief and does not entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance prior provocation by the offended party.

Immediate vindication of a grave offense

Reyes: 1. Requisites: 1. That there be a grave offense done to the one committing the feloy, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees; 2. That the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense. A lapse of time is allowed between the vindication and the doing of the grave offense.

Raeses 121 The word immediate used in the English text is not the correct translation. The Spanish text uses proxima. provocation from came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax. Issue: WON immediate vindication of a grave offense is available as a mitigating circumstance in this case. Held: While it may be mere trifle to an average person, it evidently was a serious matter to an old man, to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. The accused was given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. In this case, the age of the accused and the place were considered in determining the gravity of the offense. People v. Pajares, 210 SCRA 237 (1992) Facts: Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila, is the same Renato Perez who is the victim in Criminal Case No. 85-40580 for Frustrated Homicide. He testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and the deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy something. They were walking abreast with each other, the deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead of him, when appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the back of his head. The latter ran a short distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to help Viojan. he, too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting him at the back below the left shoulder. He then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the baseball bat but the latter's companions, namely: Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost consciousness. He was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was treated for the injuries he sustained. He identified in court the baseball bat used by Pajares. Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication can be applied in the case at bar. Held: Yes. Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated in his favor. While it may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter

2. Distinguish vindication. 1. In the case of provocation, it is made directly only to the person committing the felony; in vindication, the grave offense may be committed also against the offenders relatives mentioned by law. 2. In vindication, the offended party must have done a grave offense to the offender or his relatives mentioned by the law; in provocation, the cause that brought about the provocation need not be a grave offense. 3. In provocation, it is necessary that the provocation or threat immediately preceded the act, i.e., that there be no interval of time between the provocation and the commission of the crime; while in vindication, the vindication of the grave offense may be proximate, which admits of an interval of time between the grave offense done by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused. 3. Same. Reason for difference. Greater leniency in the case of vindication is due undoubtedly to the fact that it concerns the honor of a person, an offense which is more worthy of consideration than mere spite against the one giving the provocation or threat. 4. Basis to determine the gravity of offense in vindication. Social standing, place and time when the insult was made. 5. Basis: Diminution of the conditions of voluntariness. United States v. Ampar, 37 Phil. 201 (1917) Facts: During a fiesta, an old man 70 years of age asked the deceased, Patobo, for some roast pig. In the presence of many guests, the deceased insulted the old man, saying: "There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." A little later, while the deceased was squatting down, the old man

Raeses 122 (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People v. Benito, G.R. No. L- 32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor. 8. Provocation and obfuscation arising from one and the same cause should be treated as only one mitigating circumstance. 9. Vindication of grave offense cannot co- exist with passion and obfuscation. 10. Exception When there are other facts, although closely connected. But where there are other facts, although closely connected with the fact upon which one circumstance is premised, the other circumstance may be appreciated as based on the other fact. (People vs. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601) 11. Passion or obfuscation compatible with lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. 12. Passion or obfuscation incompatible with treachery. 1. Vindication or obfuscation cannot be considered when the person attacked is not the one who gave cause therefor. 13. Passion and obfuscation cannot co-exist with evident premeditation. 14. Passion or obfuscation distinguished from provocation. 15. Passion or obfuscation distinguished from provocation. 1. Provocation comes from the injured party; passion or obfuscation is produced by an impulse which may be caused by provocation. 2. Provocation must immediately precede the commission of the crime; in passion or obfuscation, the offense which engenders perturbation of mind need not be immediate. It is only required that the influence thereof lasts until the moment the crime is committed. 3. In both, the effect is the loss of reason and self-control on the part of the offender. United States v. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217 (1909) Facts: For about 5 years, the accused and the deceased lived illicitly in the manner of husband and wife. Afterwards, the deceased separated from the accused and lived with another man. The accused enraged by such conduct, killed the deceased.

Passion or obfuscation
Reyes: 1. Requisites: 1. The accused acted upon impulse. 2. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produced passion or obfuscation in him. 2. Rules for application of this paragraph. Passion or obfuscation may constitute a mitigating circumstance only when the same arose from lawful sentiments. For the above reason, there is no mitigating circumstance when: 1. The act is committed in a spirit of lawlessness; or 2. The act is committed in a spirit of revenge. 3. Exercise of a right or fulfillment of duty is not a proper source for passion or obfuscation. 4. No passion or obfuscation after 24 hours, or several hours or half an hour. 1. The defense must prove that the act which produced passion or obfuscation took place at a time not far removed from the commission of the crime. 2. The crime committed must be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fear. 5. Obfuscation when relationship is illegitimate is not mitigating. 6. The cause producing passion or obfuscation must come from the offended party. 7. Basis: Passion or obfuscation is a mitigating circumstance because the offender who acts with passion or obfuscation suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent.

Raeses 123 Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can be invoked. Held: No. Even if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscation because of jealousy, the mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which originate from legitimate feelings, and not those which arise from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions. United States v. De la Cruz, 22 Phil. 429 (1912) Facts: The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his common-law wife upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a common acquaintance. Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can be invoked in the case at bar. Held: Yes. In this a case, the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. The facts in this case must be distinguished from the case of U.S. vs. Hicks where it was found that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man. With a clean and well- prepared weapon, he entered the house; disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design. In this case, the cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of the accused was his vexation, disappointment and anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do. In the present case, however, the impulse was caused by the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. 3. A diseased mind, not amounting to insanity, may give place to mitigation. 4. Basis: Diminution of intelligence and intent. People v. Javier, 311 SCRA 576 (1999) Facts: 1. Dec 1954: Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier was married to Florentina Laceste. They begot 10 children. On June 96, after 41 yrs of marriage, Javier admitted killing his wife. 2. Testimonies of SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, a desk investigator, and Consolacion Javier Panit & Alma Javier, daughters of the sps: 3. Between 23am, Consolacion, who lived 10- 15m. away, heard her mom shouting, your father is going to kill me! (translated from local dialect). She ran outside & met her sister Alma who was weeping & informed her of their parents quarrel. Together, they went to their brother Manuels house, about 70-80m. away from their parents house. 4. Upon reaching the latter, Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother in their bedroom and his father, wounded in the abdomen. 5. Their father, Eduardo, confessed to son Manuel that he killed his wife and thereafter stabbed himself. 6. April 1997: RTC held Javier guilty of the crime of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of PhP50K as moral damages and PhP21,730 as actual expenses. 7. In his appeal, Javier claims he killed his wife because he was suffering from insomnia for a month and at the time of the killing, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he was doing. He claims that he was insane then. Issues: 1. WON accused-appellant Javier can claim mitigating circumstances of illness and of passion and obfuscation 2. WON he should be sentence to suffer a lower penalty Held: 1. No to both. On illness, since Javier has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance. OSG found no sufficient evidence or medical finding to

Illness

Reyes: 1. Requisites: 1. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will- power. 2. That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. 2. When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it may be an exempting circumstance.

Raeses 124 support his claim. For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the presence of the following requisites: 1. Illness must diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender, and 2. Such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. For the circumstance of passion and obfuscation of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the presence of the ff requisites: 1. There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind, and 2. Such act w/c produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during w/c the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. The defense never presented any medical record of the accused nor was a psychiatrist presented to validate the defense of insanity. None of the elements-requisites were proved to be present & in his testimony, Javier even stated that he was not jealous of his wife. Equally important, the defense, during the trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of illness & passion & obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-appellant. The alleged mitigating circumstances are mere afterthought to whittle (to shape) down his criminal liability. 2. Yes. The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se is not punishable by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties. The application of the lesser of greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the accused, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. 2. Over 60 years old with failing eyesight, similar to over 70 years of age mentioned in par. 2. 3. Outraged feeling of owner of animal taken for ransom analogous to vindication of a grave offense. 4. Outraged feeling of creditor, similar to passion and obfuscation mentioned in par. 6. 5. Impulse of jealous feeling, similar to passion and obfuscation. 6. Manifestations of Battered Wife Syndrome, analogous to an illness that diminishes the exercise of will power. 7. Esprit de corps, similar to passion and obfuscation. 8. Voluntary restitution of stolen property, similar to voluntary surrender mentioned in paragraph 7. 9. Extreme poverty and necessity, similar to incomplete justification based on state of necessity. 10. Testifying for the prosecution, analogous to plea of guilty. Canta v. People, 353 SCRA 250 (2001) Facts: 1. Narciso Gabriel acquired a cow upon its birth on March 10, 1984 2. Narciso left it with his sister in law Erlinda Montes, then he left it with Generoso Cabonce, then with Maria Tura, and then with Gardemo Agapay. 3. Agapay took the cow up a mountain for grazing and it was gone when he came back for it 4. Hoof prints led him to Valejos house and he was told that Canta had taken it. 5. Narciso instructed Maria Tura to get the cow. She met Canta who said that he gave it to his father, the barangay captain. They went to fathers house and Tura recognized cow. Canta said he will consult with his father on what to do and call her about it later. 6. Canta didnt call so Narciso reported it to police 7. In the investigation Canta admitted he took cow, but he contended that it was his cow. He lost it Dec 3 1985. He produced 2 certificates of ownership dated March 17, 1986 and Feb 27, 1988. 8. Narciso presented certificate of ownership dated Mar 9 1986 signed by municipal

Analogous circumstances
Reyes: 1. Must be of similar nature and analogous to those mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 9 of Art. 13.

Raeses 125 treasurer. I contained a description of the cow including identifying marks (cowlicks on the head, back and legs; coloring). 4 previous caretakers certify that this is the cow they took care of. 9. Canta said that he got the baby cow as payment for taking care of Pat. Villanuevas cow. It was born on Dec 5, 1984 and was lost Dec 2 1985. He reported loss to Padre Burgos. 10. His uncle said he saw the cow under the care of Agapay. Canta went to the Agapays grazing place with the mommy cow to see if the baby cow would drink its milk, it did so Canta assumed the baby cow was his. 11. He brought it to his father and Maria tried to get it but Cantas father refused and asked Narciso to come by so they can discuss. Narciso never came by. Canta took cow to Padre Burgos. Issues/Held/Ratio: 1. Cantas Certificate of Ownership a. It was not filed by the municipal treasurer, but by Cantas friend Franklin Telen who was a janitor at the municipal treasurers office. Telen issued certificate on March 24, 1986 but he antedated it Feb 27, 1985 at the request of Canta who assured Telen that he owned the cow. No registration recorded in municipal records. b. Trial Court said: Obviously Canta took the cow using strategy and stealth considering Agapay was separated by a hill and couldnt see him. Canta tries to justify taking the cow with a certificate of ownership but Telen said he antedated the certificate. c. It is clear Canta falsified and manipulated the certificate of title. He only got it after the incident happened on March 14, 1986. His claim has no leg to stand on. CA agrees. 2. Petitioner Canta claims good faith and honest belief in his right to the cow a. Brought mother cow and calf suckled its milk b. Compared marks on the cow to the recorded marks on his certificate. Match. c. He turned over cow to barangay captain, and later to police when the dispute began 3. 4. 5. d. Filed complaint against Nicolas for cattle rustling. Cattle Rustling requisites a. Large cattle is taken b. It belongs to another No question cattle belongs so Narciso Gabriel a. Taking without consent of owner Canta took cow from Agapay even if he knew Agapay was holding it for Narciso. a. Taking done by any means method or scheme He falsified certificate of ownership, a scheme a. Taking is with or without intent to gain Canta concocted a ploy to obtain ownership so he had an obvious intent to gain a. Taking without violence or intimidation No violence a. Fact that Canta went to barangay captain does not prove good faith. He already committed a crime, also the barangay captain was his father. b. Calves suckle on strange cows. It dont have to be the mom. Petitioner says that even if his certificate of ownership is not in order it does not mean he did not believe in good faith that the cow was his. Merely mistake of fact. a. His certificate was FRADULENT. Negates good faith. b. If he had been responsible he could have verified ownership of cow first. He was negligent c. He was NOT justified to take cow, tried to take law into own hands MITIGATING circumstances a. Analogous with voluntary surrender, which has the ff elements b. Offender not actually arrested In the case: Canta not yet arrested. There was no complaint filed against him when he surrendered cow. The intent to unconditional submission was there. Also there was intent to save authorities the trouble of search and capture. He voluntarily took cow to municipal hall of Padre Burgos and put it in custody of authorities. Can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender a. Offender surrenders to authority b. Surrender is voluntary c. PD 533 Anti-Cattle Rustling Law is not a special law. Its penalties are discussed in RPC.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

Raeses 126 14. DECISION: One mitigating circumstance equals the case be fixed in minimum period. CA decisions lessened. 4 yrs. 2 mos. (minimum) 10 yrs 1 day maximum. Reyes: 1. Definition. Aggravating circumstances are those which, if attendant in the commission of the crime, serve to increase the penalty without, however, exceeding the maximum of the penalty provided by law for the offense. 2. Basis: Greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony as shown by: (1) the motivating power itself, (2) the place of commission, (3) the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5) the personal circumstances of the offender, or of the offended party. 3. Four kinds of aggravating circumstances. 1. Generic Those that can generally apply to all crimes. Par. Nos. 1, 2, 3 (dwelling), 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, except by means of motor vehicles, are generic aggravating circumstances. 2. Specific Those that apply only to particular cimes. Par Nos. 3 (except dwelling), 15, 16, 17 and 21 are specific aggravating circumstances. 3. Qualifying Those that change the nature of the crime. Art. 248 enumerates the qualifying circumstances which qualify the killing of a person to murder. 4. Inherent Those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the crime. (Art. 62, par. 2) 4. Qualifying circumstances distinguished from generic aggravating circumstance. 1. The effect of a generic aggravating circumstance, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, is to increase the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the maximum period, but without exceeding the limit prescribed by law; while that of a qualifying circumstance is not only to give the crime its proper and exclusive name but also to place the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed by law for said crime. (People v. Bayot, 64 Phil. 269, 273) 2. A qualifying circumstance cannot be offset by a mitigating circumstance; a generic aggravating circumstance may be compensated by a mitigating circumstance. 3. A qualifying circumstance to be such must be alleged in the information. If it is not alleged, it is a generic aggravating circumstance only. Aggravating circumstances (a) which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law, or (b) which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. (Art. 62, par. 1) Same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof (Art. 62, par. 2). Aggravating circumstances which arise: (a) from the moral attributes of the offender, or (b) from his private relations with the offended party, or (c) from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate the liability of the principals, accomplices, and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. The circumstances which consist (1) in the material execution of the act, or (2) in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therei. (Art. 62, par. 4) Aggravating circumstances not presumed.

D. Aggravating Circumstances

5.

6.

7.

8.

RPC, Art. 14 Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances: 1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.

Raeses 127
2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. 3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. 4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. 5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, or in his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship. 6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense. Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. 7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune. 8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. 9. That the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. 10. That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. 11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise. 12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or intentional damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin. 13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation. 14. That craft, fraud, or disguise be employed. 15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense. 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. 18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose. 19. That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken. 20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 5438, approved Sept. 9, 1968.) 21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission.

Insult to public authorities

Reyes: 1. Basis: Greater perversity of offender, as shown by the lack of respect for the public authorities. 2. Requisites: 1. That the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions. 2. That he who is thus engaged In the exercise of said functions is not the person against whom the crime is committed. (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19

Raeses 128 Phil. 150, 156; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307, 317) 3. The offender knows him to be a public authority. 4. His presence has not prevented the offender from committing the criminal act. Meaning of public authority. A public authority, sometimes also called a person in authority, is a public officer who is already vested with jurisdiction, that is, a public officer who has the power to govern and execute the las. The councilor, the mayor, the governor, etc., are persons in authority. The barangay captainand barangay chairman ae also persons in authority. (Art. 152, as amended by P.D. No. 1232, Nov. 7, 1977) Not applicable when crime is committed in the presence of an agent only. An agent of a person in authority is any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of perons in authority. (Art. 152, as amended by BP Blg. 873) The crime should not be committed against the public officer. If the crime is committed against a public authority while he is in the performance of his official duty, the offender commits direct assault (Art. 148.) without this aggravating circumstance, because it is not a crime committed in contempt of or with insult to him, but a crime directly committed against him. Knowledge that a public authority is present is essential. Lack of knowledge on the part of the offender that a public authority is present indicates lack of intention to insult the public authority. Presence of public authority has not prevented offender from committing the crime. An offense may said to have been committed in contempt of a public authority when his presence, made known to the offender, has not prevented the latter from committing the criminal act. Facts: Floro Rodil was found guilty of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court for the death of Lt.Masana. Version of the prosecutor April 24, 1971 around 1:00 pm Masana together with Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang Market. While they were eating, their attention was called by Rodil who was outside blowing his whistle. Masana, in civilian clothing, accompanied by Fidel went outside and asked Rodil, after identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked under his shirt had a license Instead if answering Rodil attempted to draw his gun but Fidel grabbed the gave and gave it to Masana. The three went inside the restaurant and Masana wrote a receipt for the gun and he asked Rodil to sign it but the appellant refused to do so. Masana refused to return the gun to Rodil and as Masana was about to stand up Rodil pulled out his dagger and stabbed Masana several times on the chest and stomach causing his death after several hours. The companions of Masana took the accused into custody. Version of the defense Rodil is claiming self-defense Rodil together with his wife were eating inside the restaurant and while they were waiting for their food Masana approached and inquired whether he was a member of the Anti-smuggling Unit. Rodil answered in the affirmative and Masana invited him to join him in his table. Rodil accepted the invitation. During their conversation Masana asked for identification of Rodil and the latter showed his ID. Masana told Rodil that his ID was fake and Rodil insisted that it was genuine. Masana was demanding that Rodil surrender his ID to him but Rodil refused. When Rodil refused Masana pulled out his gun and hit the accused on the head with its handle for 2 times and as a result blood gushed out from his head and face. Rodil pulled out his dagger and stabbed Masana and then ran out of the restaurant. Rodil went to the direction of the Municipal building where he intended to surrender.

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People v. Rodil, 109 SCRA 308 (1981)

Raeses 129 On his was he met the Chief of Police and he was accompanied to the municipal building and was given first aid treatment. Issues: 1. WON self-defense can be availed by Rodil. 2. WON the crime committed was murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed (sic) with assault upon an agent of authority. 3. WON the AC disregard of rank should be appreciated Held: 1. No. Self-defense must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence Accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense. Court cannot perceive how the refusal of the accused to give his ID could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt. It is the accused who had every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned. 2. Crime committed was homicide (No complex crime but there is a general aggravating circumstance) Murder it was established by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting mortal wounds. No treachery assailant & victim was face to face. Attack wasnt treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the same w/ his hand. Force of warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bump his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him. Failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially to insure its execution, w/o risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. Such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. 3. Yes. Whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present. Mesana identified himself as a PC officer and the accused is merely a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status. Rank refers to a high social position or standing Cases wherein the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated o People vs. Benito clerk murdered assistant chief of the personnel transaction division o People vs. Torres murder of Col. Salgado and injuries to Gen. Castaneda o People vs. Valeriano murder of district judge Chief of Police (Panaligan) was present during the incident. Panaligan was the one who wrested the dagger from Rodil and the accused knew him to be the chief of police. Chief of police is considered a public authority or a person in authority for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically

Raeses 130 duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the law Dissent: Melencio-Herrera Contempt of, or which insult to public authorities to be considered as aggravating, it is essential that: Crime is committed in the presence of a public authority, not a mere agent of the authorities Public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions and is not the person against whom the crime is committed. Masana is not a public authority nor a person in authority he is a mere agent of a person in authority Disregard of the respect due to rank There must be a difference in social condition of the offender and the offended party Offender and offended are of the same rank the aggravating circumstance does not apply Difference in rank bet a lieutenant and officer of anti-smuggling unit is not such of a degree as to justify consideration of disrespect of rank due to the offended party. The home is a sort of sacred place for its owner. He who goes to anothers house to slander him, hurt him or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. (Viada, 5th edition, Bol. II, pp. 323-324) 4. Offended party must not give provocation. If the offended party provoked the incident, he loses his right to respect and consideration due him in his own house. (People vs. Ambis, supra) 5. Meaning of provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. a. Given by the owner of the dwelling b. Sufficient, and c. Immediate to the commission of the crime. If the above conditions are present, the offended party is deemed to have given provocation, and the fact that the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party is not an aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, if any of those conditions is not present, the offended party is deemed not to have given provocation, and the fact that the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party is an aggravating circumstance. 6. There must be close relation between provocation and commission of the crime in the dwelling. 7. Because the provocation is not immediate, dwelling is aggravating. 8. Owner of dwelling gave immediate provocation dwelling is not aggravating. 9. Prosecution must prove that no provocation was given by the offended party. 10. The offender need not enter the dwelling for the circumstance to apply. 11. If the crime took place outside the dwelling, it is still aggravating if the commission of the crime was begun inside. 12. Dwelling is not included in treachery. People v. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511 (1978) Facts: 13-yr old Margarita Paleng filed complaint against Amado Daniel alias Amado Ato for the crime of rape. On Sept 20, 1965, Margarita, a native of Mt Province, arrived in Baguio City from Tublay c.

Note: The ruling in this case directly contradicts Reyess statement with regard to the Chief of Police being mere agent. In the case at bar, the chief of police is now a person of authority as well.

Dwelling
Reyes: 1. Dwelling must be a building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort. A combination house and store (People vs. Magnaye, 89 Phil. 233, 239), or a market stall where the victim slept is not a dwelling. 2. Basis: Greater perversity of offender, as shown by the place of the commission of the offense. 3. What aggravates the commission of the crime on ones dwelling? a. The abuse of confidence which the offended party reposed in the offender by opening the door to him; or b. The violation of the sanctity of the home by trespassing therein with violence or against the will of the owner. (Dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal, People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635, 637)

Raeses 131 in a Dangwa bus. She was then en route to her boarding house in Guisad as she was a high school student at the Baguio Eastern High School. While she was waiting inside the bus, the accused Daniel came and started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag. She did not allow the latter and instead called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor but was merely shrugged by them. It seemed that they were also afraid of the accused. Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100meters away. The accused followed her and rode and sat beside her. When Margarita alighted in Guisad, she was again followed by the accused. Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him. He pulled a dagger 8 inches long and threatened her saying, If you will talk, I will kill you. Because of her fear, Margarita fell silent. She was then forced to lie down w/ the accused placing a handkerchief in her mouth and holding a dagger to her neck. Her attempts to flee was to no avail as she was only 4 ft 8 inches tall & 95 lbs while Daniel was 5 ft 7 inches tall and weighed 126 lbs. The accused was successful in having carnal knowledge of Margarita. Thereafter she lost consciousness. When she recovered, Daniel had already gone. For his defense, Daniel asserts that he and Margarita have known each other since 1963 and this was in fact the 2nd time he had carnal knowledge of her. Also, he alleges that he promised to marry Margarita and was actually surprised the she filed the complaint against him. Medico-Legal report indicated that Margarita was a virgin before the incident complained of. the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of w/c the law seeks to protect and uphold.

Nighttime/Disguise
Reyes: 1. Par.6. (Nighttime). Basis: Time and place of the commission of the crime and the means and ways employed. 2. Same. When aggravating. a. When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or b. When especially sought for by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity (People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568, 578); or c. When the offender took advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity. (U.S. vs. Billedo, 32 Phil. 574, 579; People vs. Mathagon, 60 Phil. 887, 893) Although nocturnity (sic) should not be estimated as an aggravating circumstance, since the time for the commission of the crime was not deliberately chosen by the accused; yet, if it appears that the accused took advantage of the darkness for the more successful consummation of his plans, to prevent his being recognized, and that the crime might be perpetrated unmolested, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity should be applied. 3. Same. Nighttime may facilitate the commission of the crime, when because of the darkness of the night the crime can be perpetrated unmolested, or interference can be avoided, or there would be greater certainty in attaining the ends of the offender. (People vs. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 887, 894) 4. Same. Nighttime need not be specifically sought for when (1) it facilitated the commission of the offense, or (2) the offender took advantage of the same to commit the crime. 5. Same. Nighttime should be understood, according to Viada, as that period of darkness beginning at end of dusk and ending at dawn. Nights are from sunset to sunrise. (Art. 13, Civil Code) 6. Same. The information must allege that nighttime was sought for or taken

Issue: WON the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated in the case at bar. Held: Yes. The crime committed by Daniel is rape w/ the use of a deadly weapon w/ the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a dwelling as the term is used in Art 14 (3) RPC. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns

Raeses 132 advantage of by the accused or that it facilitated the commission of the crime. 7. Same. Not aggravating when the crime began at daytime. a. The commission of the crime must begin and be accomplished in the nighttime. b. The offense must be actually committed in the darkness of the night. c. When the place of the crime is illuminated by light, nighttime is not aggravating. 8. Par. 14. (Disguise). Disguise is the use of any device to conceal identity. 9. Same. The purpose of the offender in using any device must be to conceal his identity. People v. Bermas, 309 SCRA 741 (1999) Facts: Lower court ruling: Rustom Bermas and Galma Arcilla were found guilty of Multiple Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, with evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of nighttime, with the use of high powered firearms, and with intent to kill. Rustom Bermas worked in a mining firm and was a councilman for Brgy. Liguan while Galma Arcilla was a member of the PC Company, with the position of Asst. Detachment Commander, and was in possession of an Armalite M-16. On April 20, 1985, at around 8:30 in the evening, at the sea of Albay, Arturo, Abion, Antonio Abion, Renato Abion, Teodoro Cas, Jesus Lotera, Catalino Bellen, and Expedito Bonaobra (barangay captain) were aboard a fishing boat named Sagrada Familia, owned by the Abion family, for the purpose of catching fish. The accused Rustom Bermas and a masked companion, which the courts held to be Galma Arcilla, approached the party through a small paddled boat. They circled the fishing boat Sagrada four times which gave survivors/witnesses Bonaobra and Renato Abion opportunity to recognize Bermas as the one paddling the boat. Bonaobra asked Arturo to remove the shade of the gas lamp so they could recognize Bermas companion but they still could not due to the mask he was wearing. Bonaobra asked Bermas if they were fishing. The accused said yes, and that they were looking for somebody. He then asked Bonaobra who owned the fishing boat and Bonaobra told him it was Jose Abion. The two accused pretended to paddle away. When they were about 7 meters away, Bermas companion fired his Armalite m16 rifle at Bonaobra and his companions. They heard 2 volleys fired at them. They lay down but could not avoid the attack. After 5 minutes, Renato, upon instruction from his father Arturo, crawled to turn off remaining pressure gas lamp and loosen the anchor. He then lost consciousness. The boat was carried away by the currents of the sea and into the shore, where they were found by Jose, Rudy, and Santiago Abion the following morning. Arturo Abion and Catalino Bellen were already dead. Renato Abion, Jesus Lotera, and Bonaobra were seriously wounded, such that had they not received medical attention, they would have died from said wounds. Antonio Abion was also injured though not as grave. Teodoro Cas was missing, and his body was found 3 days later in a neighboring town in Albay. Santiago found 2 slugs inside the fishing boat, which he surrendered to the police. Prior to the night in question, the following events happened: October 13, 1984 at a public dance at Namanday, Albay, Arcilla was involved in a fistfight with Leopoldo Abion. He boxed Leopoldo in the chest leaving him writhing in pain on the ground. Thereafter, the Abion brothers arrived to get even with Arcilla and Daniel Abion was able to hit appellant on the face with a piece of wood. Rustom Bermas, the usual confederate and companion of accused, arrived to seek revenge for Arcilla, but Daniel had already left. October 14, 1985 Galma Arcilla, with a group of armed men forced open a window in Santiagos house looking for the latter. Santiagos pregnant wife was so scared, she miscarried. April 4, 1985 Rustom Bermas pounded on a table and said to Santiago, I will bring home the Baraka. Baraka is the appellation (title/label) of the Abion family. This was considered a death threat to the family. On appeal: Defendants defense was alibi, insisting that they were at a different place at the time of the crime in question. Arcilla further contends that lower court erred in ruling it was he who was the masked companion since none of the witnesses identified him as the masked man who fired at the victims. There was also that question of the firearm,

Raeses 133 and that the one used to commit the felony was not the same one he was issued with, and that the firearm he owned was not in his possession that night. Bermas claims he had no motive to kill and that conspiracy was not proven. Issues: 1. WON defendants alibi can be accepted. 2. WON the aggravating circumstance of nighttime may be appreciated. 3. WON the aggravating circumstance of disguise may be appreciated. Held: 1. No. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Defendants defense of alibi easily crumbles in the weight of evidence presented against them. Although the witnesses were unable to identify the masked man, it is of no moment because there were enough circumstantial evidence on which the ruling could be based on. The facts established are enough to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to warrant a conviction. Physical evidence speaks more eloquently than all the witnesses put together. The firearm used in the felony was found to be exactly the one issued to Galma Arcilla. That he allegedly left his gun in the custody of another person was dubious because the military requirement is to leave firearms at the headquarters where it would be safer. He also failed to satisfactorily explain where and how the missing ammunitions were used. In sum, court held that Arcilla had been lying in order to exculpate himself. With regard to Bermas contention that he had no ill motive since the quarrel was between Arcilla and the Ambions, court held that proof of ill motive becomes irrelevant in the face of positive identification. Bermas was positively identified by Bonaobra and Renato Ambion. Conspiracy is proven by the specific acts done with such closeness and coordination with the one who executed the criminal act. In this case, Bermas act of paddling to and from the boat, as well as his silence while the victims were being gunned down by his companion, was enough to warrant a conspiracy. He must be equally liable as co- principal. It was also a well-known fact that he was a close companion of his co-accused and they were frequently seen together, as testified by other witnesses. Treachery was appreciated in this case because it satisfied the requirements that a) malefactor employed means of execution to ensure his safety from retaliatory acts of the victim b) said means were deliberate. Essence of treachery is in the swift and unexpected attack on unsuspecting and unarmed victims. 2. No. Nighttime was not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. The mere fact that the offense happened at night was not enough to sustain a finding of nocturnity. It only becomes an aggravating circumstance when the following requisites are present: 1. It was specially SOUGHT by the offender 2. It was TAKEN ADVANTAGE by him, or 3. It FACILITATES commission of the crime by insuring immunity from capture. In this case, nothing suggests that it was consciously resorted to. 3. Yes. Disguise, however, was appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because of appellants use of a mask.

Evident premeditation
Reyes: 1. Basis: Ways of committing the crime, because evident premeditation implies a deliberate planning of the act before executing it. 2. Evident premeditation may be considered as to principal by induction. 3. Essence of premeditation. Execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. (People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 369)

Raeses 134 4. The premeditation must be evident. There must be evidence showing that the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time when the crime was conceived by him and the time it was actually perpetrated. 5. Requisites: 1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime; 2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and 3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. 6. The date and time when the offender determined to commit the crime essential. 7. The premeditation must be based upon external acts and not presumed from mere lapse of time. (U.S. vs. Ricafort, 1 Phil. 173, 176) 8. Mere threats without the second element (external acts) does not show evident premeditation. 9. Existence of ill-feeling or grudge alone is not proof of evident premeditation. 10. Three hours or less considered sufficient lapse of time. 11. Why sufficient time is required. The offender must have an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of what he planned to do, an interval long enough for his conscience and better judgment to overcome his evil desires and scheme. (People vs. Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58, 64) 12. There must be sufficient time between the outward acts and the actual commission of the crime. 13. Conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation. 14. Evident premeditation and price or reward can co-exist. 15. When victim is different from that intended, premeditation not aggravating. 16. It is not necessary that there is a plan to kill a particular person. For premeditation to exist, it is not necessary that the accused plan to kill a particular person. United States v. Manalinde, 14 Phil. 77 (1909) Facts: The accused, Manalinde, who pleaded guilty confessed that his wife died about one hundred days before; that he was directed by Datto Mupuck to go huramentado and to kill the two persons he would meet in the town; that if he was successful in the matter, Mupuck would give him a pretty woman on his return; that in order to carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotobato, he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves; that he traveled for a day and a night from his home; that upon reaching the town, he attacked from behind a Spaniard named Igual, and immediately after, he attacked a Chinaman named Choa, who was close by; and that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons. Both victims died as a result. Issue: WON the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is established by the facts. Held: Yes. Those facts establish the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. The three requisites of evident premeditation are illustrated by the facts: First requisite: On a certain date, Manalinde accepted the proposition that he would turn hurmentado and kill the first two persons he would meet in the market place. On said date, the offender is said to have determined the crime. Second requisite: He undertook the journey to comply therewith and provided himself with a weapon. The journey and the carrying of the weapon are acts manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination to commit the crime. Third requisite: After the journey for a day and a night, he killed the victims. One day and one night constitute a sufficient lapse of time for the offender to realize the consequences of his contemplated act.

Treachery
Reyes: 1. Basis: Reference to the means and ways employed in the commission of the crime. 2. Meaning of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself

Raeses 135 3. arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Rules. 1. Applicable only to crimes against the person. 2. Means, methods or forms need not insure accomplishment of crime. 3. The mode of attack must be consciously adopted. Treachery cannot be presumed. The suddenness of the attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victims helpless position was accidental. The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be simply deduced from presumption as it is necessary that the existence of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty incurred by the culprit. The mode of attack must be consciously adopted. 1. The accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. 2. The mode of attack must be thought of by the offender, and must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. Treachery cannot be appreciated where there is nothing in the record to show that the accused had pondered upon the mode or method to insure the killing of the deceased or remove or diminish any risk to himself that might arise from the defense that the deceased might make. Requisites: 1. That at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and 2. That the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Treachery must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Guiding principles. 1. When the aggression is continuous, treachery must be present in the beginning of the assault. 2. When the assault was not continuous, in that there was an interruption, it is sufficient that treachery was present at the moment the fatal blow was given. 10. Treachery is not to be considered as to the principal by induction when it is not shown that the principal by induction directed or induced the killer of the deceased to adopt the means or methods actually used by the latter in accomplishing the crime. 11. Treachery, abuse of superior strength, and means employed to weaken the defense, distinguished. 1. Treachery means, methods or forms of attack are employed by the offender to make it impossible or hard for the offended party to put up any sort of resistance. 2. Abuse of superior strength the offender does not employ means, methods or forms of attack; he only takes advantage of his superior strength. 3. Means employed to weaken the defense employs means but the means employed only materially weakens the resisting power of the offended party. 12. When there is conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the offenders. 13. The mastermind should have knowledge of the employment of treachery if he was not present when the crime as committed. 14. If the intervention of other persons did not directly and especially insure the execution of the crime without risk to the accused there is no treachery. 15. Treachery, evident premeditation and use of superior strength are absorbed in in treason by killings. 16. Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men, by a band and means to weaken the defense. 17. Nighttime inherent in treachery. 18. Craft is included in and absorbed by treachery. 19. Age and sex are included in treachery. 20. Treachery cannot co-exist with passion or obfuscation. People v. Sangalang, 58 SCRA 737 (1974) Facts: June 9, 1968, 6 a.m.: Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut in Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a

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Raeses 136 nearby coconut tree. His wife Flora Sarno was left inside the hut. While on top of the tree, Cortez was struck by a valley of shots. He later on fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree. Flora went outside & was supposed to help his husband but the five persons each armed w/a long firearm fired at her too. She went back to the hut for cover but she was able to recognize the 5 as Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel, Eleuterio Cuyom & Laureano Sangalang. The latter was known to Flora & her bro Ricardo since childhood. The five left after about 5mins & when she returned to her husband, he was already dead. L Ricardo Sarno, Floras bro who lived nearby, heard the gunshots too. He went out & saw Sangalang shooting Cortez w/a Garand carbine. He was supposed to help Cortez but he was fired upon by the men too. Sarno & Flora executed sworn statements & based on these, a complaint against the 5 offenders was filed. Only Sangalang was arrested. CFI convicted him of murder & was sentenced to RP. Defense: Sangalang claims that during that time, he was in Sampaloc, Manila to borrow money from a certain Gatdula for the tuition fees of his children. He likewise impugns the credibility of Mrs. Cortez & Ricardo. Issues: 1. WON Sangalangs alibi is admissible 2. WON the qualifying AC of treachery (alevosia) should be appreciated. Held: 1. No. Discrepancies in the testimonies of Sarno & Mrs. Cortez are not glaring and instead these strengthen their credibility & show that they did not rehearse their testimonies. Cortez & Sarno clearly & consistently testified that Sangalang was among those who shot Ricardo. Their unwavering identification negates Sangalangs alibi. Although motive for killing was not proven, it was not shown either that Cortez & Sarno were impelled by malicious desires to falsely incriminate Sangalang. 2. Yes. When the crime happened, victim was on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed & defenseless. The assault was unexpected. He didnt give any immediate provocation. Deliberate & surprise attack insured victims killing w/o any risk to the offenders arising from any defense w/c the victim could have made. Thus, offense is murder. Treachery absorbs the AC of band. Evident premeditation, though alleged, was not proven.

Ignominy
Reyes: 1. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. 2. Applicable to crimes against chastity, less serious physical injuries, light or grave coercion, and murder. People v. Torrefiel, 45 OG 803 Facts: The accused and his companion were guerillas of the USAFFE. On their way to their headquarters, they stopped at the house of the offended party and asked her husband for khaki clothes. The offended party accused them of being looters. They then decided to bring the spouses to their headquarters supposedly to investigate the accusations. The accused was initially assigned to accompany the husband and his companion the wife. However, the accused was lost on their way, which led to the escape of the husband. He eventually kept up with his companion, who, after realizing that the husband escaped, left the wife with the accused to look for said husband. The wife then testified that the accused, after winding cogon grass around his genital organ, raped her. Issue: WON the aggravating circumstance of ignominy can be appreciated. Held: Yes. The court appreciated the aggravating circumstance stating that the manner of commission augmented the wrong done by increasing the pain and adding ignominy thereto. People v. Alfanta, 320 SCRA 357 (1999)

Raeses 137 Facts: The offended party testified that, while sleeping in the living room of a friend, was suddenly pulled and boxed by the accused, and then covered her mouth with his hand. With a bolo, the accused allegedly ordered her to go out, climb up the fence to the next house. The accused then ordered her to undress and to separate her legs. She was then raped. Allegedly, the accused also inserted his genital organ in her genital organ. The accused defense was that they were sweethearts. The court rejected this theory, it being belied by the offended party stabbing him, after which she reported the incident to the police. The court also appreciated two aggravating circumstances. Issue: 1. WON the aggravating circumstance of nighttime can be appreciated. 2. WON the aggravating circumstance of Held: 1. Yes. Nighttime: The accused took advantage of the time in order to facilitate the crime without being recognized. 2. Yes. Ignominy: While the accused claimed that the manner in which the rape was done was normal for lovers, the court did not think so. Spouse, Ascendant, Descendant, Legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or, Relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. 5. Same. Same. When mitigating and when aggravating. As a rule, relationship is mitigating in crimes against property, by analogy to the provisions of Art. 332. It is aggravating in crimes against persons in cases where the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender or when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level. 6. Same. Same. If the crime against persons is any of the serious physical injuries, the fact that the offended party is a descendant of the offender is not mitigating. But when the offense committed is less serious physical injuries (Art. 265); or slight physical injuries (Art. 266), relationship is a mitigating circumstance, if the offended party is a relative of a lower degree of the offender; and an aggravating circumstance, if the offended party is a relative of a higher degree of the offender. 7. Same. Same. Relationship is neither mitigating nor aggravating, when relationship is an element of the offense. 8. Same. Same. In crimes against chastity, relationship is always aggravating. 9. Same. Intoxication. Mitigating (1) if intoxication is not habitual, or (2) if intoxication is not subsequent to the plan to commit a felony. Aggravating (1) if intoxication is habitual; or (2) if it is intentional (subsequent to the plan to commit a felony). 10. Same. Same. The accuseds state of intoxication must be proved. 11. Same. Same. Drunkenness must affect mental faculties. 12. Same. Even if intoxication is not habitual, it is aggravating when subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. 13. Same. Same. Presumption is that intoxication is accidental.

E. Alternative Circumstances
Reyes: 1. Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. 2. Basis: nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. 3. The alternative circumstances are: 1. Relationship; 2. Intoxication; and 3. Degree of instruction and education of the offender. 4. Same. Relationship.

Raeses 138 14. Same. Same. Non-habitual intoxication, lack of instruction and obfuscation are not be taken separately. 15. Same. Degree of instruction and education of the offender. Low degree of instruction and education or lack of it is generally mitigating.. High degree of instruction and education is aggravating when the offender avails himself of his learning in committing the crime. Lack of sufficient intelligence is required in illiteracy. Lack of sufficient instruction is not mitigating when the offender is a city resident who knows how to sign his name. 16. Same. Same. Lack of instruction must be proved by the defense. It must be positively and directly proved and cannot be based on mere deduction or inference. 17. Same. Same. The question of lack of instruction cannot be raised for the first time in appellate court. 18. Same. Same. Ordinarily, low degree or lack of instruction is mitigating in all crimes. 19. Same. Same. High degree of instruction as aggravating. Degree of instruction is aggravating when the offender availed himself or took advantage of it in committing the crime.
RPC, Art. 15 Their concept. - Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender. The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Intoxication
People v. Camano, 115 SCRA 688 (1982) Facts: Feb. 17, 1970 bet. 4 & 5 p.m. in Nato, Sagnay, Camarines Sur: Camano, after drinking liquor, stabbed Godofredo Pascua w/a bolo while the latter was walking along the barrio street almost in front of the store of one Socorro Buates. Pascua sustained 2 mortal wounds w/c caused his death. Afterwards, Camano went to the seashore of the barrio where he found Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house in a kneeling position w/both arms on top of the fence & his head stooping down. Camano then hacked Buenaflor w/the same bolo sustaining 8 wounds w/c caused latters death. No proof of any altercation between the accused & victims prior to the incidents. 3 yrs before the incident, the victims had a misunderstanding w/the accused. Camano asked for Pascua to tow his fishing boat w/the motorboat owned by Buenaflor but the two refused to do so. Camano resented such refusal. Even if they were seen drinking together later on, the friendly attitude was more artificial than real. Camano refused to associate w/the 2 & a neighbors attempt to reconcile the 3 was repeatedly refused. And in instances when Camano was drunk, hed even challenge Buenaflor to a fight & announce his evil intention to kill them. Prosecution: Camano surrendered upon demand of the peace officers. He admitted that he owned the bolo used in the killing & such was hidden under the table of his house. Patrolman Baluyot found the bolo at the place indicated by Camano. The bolo was still stained w/human blood. He likewise admitted that killed Pascua & Buenaflor in self-defense but he refused to sign his statement. He was charged w/murder attended by evident premeditation & treachery.

Raeses 139 Defense: Camano claims that he went fishing early morning of Feb. 17. Buenaflor, upon seeing that he had a big catch, demanded a percentage for the fishery commission. Camano refused to pay & saw Buenaflor called him hard headed. He went home afterwards. After dinner, he prepared to go out to sea again. While standing in the yard of his house, he saw Buenaflor & Pascua having a drinking session w/a group of men at the score of Socorro Buates. He claims that the Buenaflors group approached him & w/o any provocation, Pascua boxed him. Buenaflor punched him also. He claims that when Pascua was about to bolo him, he was able to grab the bolo from Pascua. Pascua then fell on the ground & the rest of the group ran away except for Buenaflor who approached him. Buenaflor was also armed w/a bolo w/c prompted Camano to bolo him. Buenaflor ran away once he was wounded but Camano ran after him claiming that former had a gun at home w/c he might use to shoot Camano later on. Thus, he hacked Buenaflor to death. He denies killing Pascua & claims that the fight was due to a heated argument & their drunkenness. CFI Camrines Sur: sentenced Camano to death. Claims of Camano are w/o evidentiary support & are mere fictions. His cousin & lone witness, Nemesio Camano is not credible either. His testimonies had a lot of inconsistencies. Besides, if Camano were really innocent, he should have produced more witnesses considering that the crime was committed in broad daylight w/many people witnessing it. But only Nemesio was presented. Nemesio & Camanos testimonies were changed many times too. Evidence show that he is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt w/evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength & intoxication. Appeal: Camanos counsel claims that the accused is only guilty of homicide & not murder. 3. WON the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 4. WON death is a cruel & unusual penalty & not proper in the case at bar. Held: 1. No. Evident Premeditation is present when the offender had carefully planned the killing. a. Requisites: a) time when offender determined to commit the crime; b) act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; c) sufficient lapse of time bet the determination & execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act & to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. b. No proof of the requisites in this case. Trial court merely concluded that crime was premeditated due to the incident w/c occurred 3 yrs ago. But such did not establish the time when Camano decided to commit the crime. It can only establish his motive for killing the victims. Previous incidents wherein Camano challenged Buenaflor to a fight did not reveal a persistence of criminal design since theres no proof that he was making plans in between those threats & the consummation of the crime. 2. Yes. Amado Payago, one of the men drinking w/Pascua & Buenaflor during the incident, testified that Camano attacked Pascua from behind. Such is a measure w/c ensures the accomplishment of criminal act w/o any risk to the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may put up characterizing treachery. Payagos testimony is further strengthened by the nature & location of the wounds sustained by Pascua w/c show that the point of entry of the stab wounds were at the back & point of exit were in front. Buenaflor was hacked while he was in a kneeling position. The attack was sudden, unexpected & lethal such as to disable &

Issues: 1. WON evident premeditation should be appreciated. 2. WON treachery should be appreciated

Raeses 140 incapacitate him from putting up any defense. 3. No. ITS MITIGATING. Camanos counsel claims that there was no proof of accuseds intoxication at the time of the killing other than Payagos testimony that he saw Camano drinking in his house about 30 meters away. No police report/doctors certification was presented either. Furthermore, theres no proof that accused purposefully got drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense. If intoxication should be appreciated it should be used as mitigating circumstance since it diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts & comprehend fully the consequence of his acts. Mitigating if accidental, not habitual or intentional & not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It must be indubitably proven. Aggravating if habitual or intentional. Habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. Habit should be actual & confirmed. Not necessarily a daily occurrence but it must lessen the individuals resistance to evil thought & undermine will power making its victim a potential evildoer. No proof that Camano was a habitual drinker although he used to get drunk every now & then. Even Pagayos testimony does not establish the habitual drinking of Camano. The intoxication not being habitual & since accused was in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime, intoxication should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. 4. No. Camanos counsel claims that the penalty violates Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the Consti w/c provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. Harden vs. Dir of Prisons: DP is not cruel, unjust or excessive. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death but the punishment of death is not cruel w/in the meaning of that word as used in the Consti. It implies something inhuman & barbarous, something more that the mere extinguishments of life. Aquino dissenting: Premeditation is aggravating thus accused should be sentenced to 2 RPs. Makasiar concurring: Voluntary surrender will also mitigate guilt of the accused. He had a choice to surrender or not when demanded by the policemen who didnt place him under arrest nor did they have any arrest warrant.

Raeses 141

Persons Criminally Liable

RPC, Art. 16.

A. In Grave and Less Grave Felonies

Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals. 2. Accomplices. 3. Accessories. The following are criminally liable for light felonies: 1. Principals 2. Accomplices.

4. 5. 6.

7.

3. An artificial or juridical person cannot act with malice or negligence. 4. Other penalties consisting in imprisonment and other deprivation of liberty, like destierro, can be executed only against individuals. (Albert) Officers, not corporation, are criminally liable. Juridical persons are criminally liable under certain special laws. Only the officers of the corporation who participated either as principals by direct participation or principals by induction or by cooperation, or as accomplices in the commission of an act punishable by law are liable. Passive subject of crime. The holder of the injured rights: the man, the juristic person, the group and the State.

Reyes: 1. Treble division of persons criminally liable. This division rests upon the very nature of their participation in the commission of the crime. When a crime is committed y many, without being equally shared by all, a different degree of responsibility is imposed upon each and every one of them. In that case, they are criminally liable either as principals, accomplices or accessories. 2. Active subject and passive subject of crime. In all crimes there are always two parties, namely; the active subject (the criminal) and the passive subject (the injured party). Art. 16 enumerates the active subjects. 3. Only natural persons can be active subjects of crime. Only natural persons can be the active subject of crime because of the highly personal nature of the criminal responsibility. 1. The RPC requires that the culprit should have acted with personal malice or negligence. An artificial or juridical person cannot act with malice or negligence. 2. A juridical person, like a corportation, cannot commit a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious intent is required.

Principals
RPC, Art. 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

Reyes: 1. Difference between a principal under any of the three categories enumerated in Art. 17 and a co-conspirator. The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the three categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the RPC and a co- conspirator who is also a principal is that while the formers criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a general rule, the latters responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.

Principals by direct participation

Raeses 142 Reyes: 1. Two or more persons may take direct part in the execution of the act, in which case they may be principals by direct participation. 2. Requisites: a. That they participated in the criminal resolution; b. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. 3. Conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, par. 2) a. To be a party to a conspiracy, one must have the intention to participate in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 4. Silence does not make one a conspirator. 5. Conspiracy transcends companionship. 6. Existence of conspiracy. The existence of conspiracy does not require necessarily an agreement for an appreciable length prior to the execution of the purpose, since from the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. (People v. Binasing, et al., 98 Phil. 908) 7. Proof of conspiracy. a. In the absence of collusion among the declarants, their confessions may form a complete picture of the whole situation and may be considered collectively as corroborative and/or confirmatory of the evidence independent therefrom. b. It is not essential that there be proofs as to the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. c. Formal agreement or previous acquaintance among several persons not necessary in conspiracy. d. Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. 8. When there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders is liable only for the act performed by him. 9. Conspiracy is implied when the accused had a common purpose and were united in its execution. 10. Unity of purpose ad intention in the commission of the crime. a. Spontaneous agreement at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create just responsibility. b. Active cooperation by all the offenders in the perpetration of the crime will also create joint responsibility. c. Contributing by positive acts to the realization of a common criminal intent also creates joint responsibility. d. Presence during the commission of the crime by a band and lending moral support thereto, also create joint responsibility with the material executors. e. Where one of the accused knew of the plan of the others to commit a crime and accepted the role assigned to him and he actually performed the role. 11. There may be conspiracy even if there is no evident premeditation on the part of the accused. 12. Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 13. A conspirator is not liable for anothers crime which is not an object to the conspiracy or which is not a necessary and logical consequence thereof. 14. A person in conspiracy with others, who had desisted before the crime was committed by the others, is not criminally liable. 15. When there is conspiracy, it is not necessary to ascertain the specific act of each conspirator. 16. When there is conspiracy, the fact that an element of the offense is not present as regards one of the conspirators is immaterial. 17. There could be no conspiracy to commit an offense through negligence.

Raeses 143 18. In cases of criminal negligence or crimes punishable by special law, allowing or failing to prevent an act to be performed by another, makes one a co-principal. 19. The principals by direct participation must be at the scene of the crime, personally taking part in the execution. 20. When the second requisite is lacking (culprits personally took part), there is only conspiracy. 21. There is collective criminal responsibility when the offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must be the same for all. 22. In the absence of previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime, or community of criminal design, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by him. Siaga, who remained below in the tienda and engaged the woman in conversation while the other defendants went up into the house, should only be held as a accomplice (accessary before the fact) as defined in the Penal Code, and not as a principal. Issue: WON defendant Eustaquio Siaga should only be held liable as accomplice? Held: No. The defendant Siaga acted concurrently with the other defendants, and must be held to have been present with them aiding and abetting them in the commission of the crime by remaining below and talking with the woman in order to distract her attention from what was going on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently serving as a guard to warn his companions in case there should arise any necessity for giving an alarm. When the other defendants came down out of the house he went away with them. This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and aids and abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the time of its perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part in its material execution, is guilty as a principal. We have also held that one who stands as guard near the place where a crime is committed to keep others away or to warn his companions and fellow conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a direct part in the commission of the crime and is therefore guilty as a principal under article 13 of the Penal Code.

United States v. Diris, 26 Phil. 133 (1918) Fact: Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, received from the railroad company, more than P400 in payment of certain land expropriated by that company, and that the defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was present when the money was counted and paid over to his uncle. Thereafter, after Fulgencio Seal left the house leaving his wife in charge of their tienda, the three defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio Siaga engaged the woman in conversation while the other two defendants went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and took the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for P100. After the discovery of the commission of the crime, The nephew when found admitted the theft of the money and promised that if the uncle would not make any trouble about it he would try and recover it from the other defendants. At the trial the defendants denied that they were the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris denied that they were present at the house on the morning in question. However, they were convicted for the crime of robbery. On appeal, defendant Eustaquio

Principals by inducement
Reyes: 1. The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal by direct participation committed 2. Two ways of becoming principal by induction. a. by directly forcing another to commit a crime, and By using irresistible force. By causing uncontrollable fear. b. by directly inducing another to commit a crime. By giving price, or offering reward or promise. By using words of command. 3. Requisites

Raeses 144 a. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and b. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. It is necessary that inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the principal by direct participation, that is, without such inducement the crime would not have been committed. The indicement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been performed. To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced by the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime. 4. A thoughtless expression without intention to produce the result is not an inducement to commit a crime. 5. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. 6. In order that a person using words of command may be held liable as principal under paragraph no. 2 of Art. 17, the following five requisites must all be present: a. That the one uttering the words of command must have the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. b. That the one who made the command must have an ascendancy or influence over the person who acted. c. That the words used must be so direct, so efficacious, so powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion. d. The words of command must be uttered prior to the commission of the crime. e. The material executor of the crime has no personal reason to commit the crime. 7. Ascendancy or influence as to amount to moral coercion is not necessary when there is conspiracy. 8. One who planned the crime committed by another is a principal by inducement. 9. If the crime committed is not contemplated in the order given, the inducement is not material and not the determining cause thereof. 10. Distinguish principal by inducement from the offender who made proposal to commit a felony. a. In both, there is an inducement to commit a crime. b. In the first, the principal by inducement becomes liable only when the crime is committed by the principal by direct participation; in the second the mere proposal to commit a felony is punishable in treason or rebellion. The person to whom the proposal is made should not commit the crime; otherwise, the proponent becomes a principal by inducement. c. In the first, the inducement involves any crime; in the second, the proposal to be punishable must involve only treason or rebellion. 11. Effects of acquittal of principal by direct participation upon the liability of principal by inducement. a. Conspiracy is negatived (sic) by the acquittal of the co-defendant. b. One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission ofa crime without first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by another. People v. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788 (1934) Facts: Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against by the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a building in which was located a store belonging to the appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and his codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson Issue: WON the appellant is criminally liable as principal by direct participation.

Raeses 145 Held: No. In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly forced or induced another or others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the commission of the offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal Code, article 17.) They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and personally take part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same end. (Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal Code Ann., 144.) In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in the burning of the building. In fact, the prosecution lays stress on appellant's absence from the scene of the fire as one of the suspicious circumstances indicating his guilt. United States v. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913) Facts: Panglima Indanan, accussed is the headman of Parang. On Mar. 24, 1912, Indanan ordered the killing of Sariol to his men Akiran, Kalyakan & Suhuri in the Chinese Cemetary asserting that Indanan had an order to that effect from the governor. The CFI found Indanan guilty of the crime of murder & sentencing him to be hanged. Issues: WON Indanan is guilty of murder by inducement. Held: Yes. A13(2), of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime "who directly force or induce others to commit it." Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says: They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on par. 9 of A8 (page 28), we have already said that he who suffers violence acts w/o will & against his will, is no more than an instrument, & therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime. One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real & moving cause of the crime & w/c was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act & was sufficient for that purpose. Weve already seen in our commentary on par. 12 of A8 that the 1 who physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted w/ due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the 1 who orders, i.e., upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior isnt due to the superior & thus not necessary, & doesnt, thus, exempt him from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime. The pacto by virtue of w/c 1 purchases for a consideration the hand w/c commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because w/o such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been committed. But this doesnt mean that the 1 who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility; on the contrary, such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime. We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto & the pacto there are similar means by w/c another may be induced to commit a crime w/c also make the 1 who offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of A13(2). But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice & such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance & great influence

Raeses 146 over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. People v. Kiicihi Omine, 61 Phil. 609 (1935) Facts: Defendants appeal from a decision of the CFI finding them guilty of frustrated homicide, w/ the AC that advantage was taken of their superior strength, & sentencing them each to suffer an IS from 6 yrs of prision correccional to 12 yrs of prision mayor. Defendants Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano were working under co-defendant Kiichi Omine, the overseer or manager of the hemp plantation owned by Angel Pulido. The 4 defendants lived together in a house on the plantation. Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pulido permission to open a new road through the plantation. Acdg to Omine, Pulido did give his permission thats why he began working on the new road. But acdg to Pulido, he refused to grant this request because there was already an unfinished road. As Pulido and his son along w/ 2 others were returning home from a cockpit, they noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants were destroyed by the construction of the new road. Angered by this, they went to the defendants house and there happened a violent altercation resulting to the owner Pulidos death from a wound by a bolo struck in his breast. Issue: WON Kiiche Omine is a principal by induction. Held: No. Although it is alleged that Kiichi Omine uttered words of inducement to Eduardo Autor, it would be insufficient to make him a principal by induction. Eduardo Autor though working under the direction of Omine was still being paid by Pulido. Moreover, it is necessary that inducement be made directly w/ the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime. It must be precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that w/o it the act wouldnt have been performed. Moreover, as words of direct inducement, it is essential that such advice or words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. Hence, the 3 co-defendants of Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido. Judging from the nature of the wound, w/c was abt 11 inches in length, it is probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and w/o being aimed at any particular part of the body. Moreover, as Autor struck the offended only once, it is indicative that it was not his intention to take the offended partys life. Wherefore, Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves w/ a sentence of 1yr 8 mos & 21 days of prision correccional, since the offended party was incapacitated for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than 90 days, and not of frustrated homicide. The rest of the co-defendants are acquitted.

Principals by indispensable cooperation

Reyes: 1. To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each case. (People vs. Apelgido, 56 Phil. 571, 576) 2. Requisites: a. Participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and b. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act, without which it would not have been accomplished. People v. Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700 (1988) Facts: Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto when he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue. Camantigue joined Abadilla in the resto and they both smelled the

Raeses 147 marijuana smoke from the table of Vicente Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre. Camantigue collared the 2 & said Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano? He forced them up, holding 1 in each hand but Capalad pulled out a knife & started stabbing Camantigue at the back. Camantigue let go of Montealegre to get his gun but Montealegre restrained Camantigues hand to prevent the latter from defending himself. They grappled & fell on the floor. Capalac fled and Camantigue pursued him firing some shots. Then he stopped and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalac was found slumped in the street, with a bullet to his chest. Both he and Camantigue died the next day. Montealegre on the other hand, escaped through the confusion. He was later apprehended. Montealegre was correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, qualified by treachery, w/ assault upon a person of authority.

Issue: WON Montealegre was rightly considered a co-principal for having corroborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. Held: YES. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue 7 times and Montealegre holding on to victims hands to prevent him from drawing the pistol and defending himseld, as Abadilla had testified. While it is true that Montealegre did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue for resisting the attack against him. Montealegre was a principal by indispensable cooperation under A17(3), RPC. The requisites of this provision Participating in the criminal resolution, i.e., theres either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose & intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; & Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act w/o w/c it would not have been accomplished. But although there was no evidence of prior agreement between Capalad & Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court has consistently upheld such view in previous cases (People v. Laganson, People v. Cercano, People v. Garcia Cabarse, Dacanay v. People)

People v. Simbra, 117 SCRA 242 (1982) Facts: Sergio Tolibas was charged and found guilty of the crime of rape of one Gresilda Gonzales, a 16- yr old girl. Prosecutions version: One night, Gonzales left her house to fetch water from the artesian well. In the public market. About 36 meters away from her house, along an unlighted portion of the road, appellant Tolibas and one Simbra, both smelling of tuba, accused her. Simbra grabbed her by the arms while Tolibas quickly covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Helping each other, they dragged the girl to a serin, where the bad deed happened. During the first commission of rape, Simbra was the one who succeeded having carnal knowledge while Tolibas held the girls arms and covered her mouth. Simbra succeeded twice. Afterwards, it was Tolibas who had carnal knowledge of the girl 3 times while Simbra was holding the complainant. After the commission of the crime, the two brought the girl to the house of Tolibas sister, where she was fetched by her aunt. Police interrogation followed. Defenses version: Gonzales was Simbras sweetheart and what happened in the serin was done with the consent of the girl. Issue: WON Simbra was a principal by indispensable cooperation. Held: Yes. Appellants version is hard to believe. Tolibas committed the crime of rape through direct participation when he himself had carnal knowledge of the girl. And, when he aided Simbra, he committed another crime of rape through indispensable cooperation. He is hereby guilty of two crimes of consummated rape.

Accomplices

RPC, Art. 18.

Accomplices. - Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

Reyes:

Raeses 148 1. Quasi-collective criminal responsibility. Between collective criminal responsibility and individual criminal responsibility, there is the so-called quasi-collective criminal responsibility. In quasi-collective criminal responsibility, some of the offenders in the crime are principals and the others are accomplices. 2. The participation of an accomplice presupposes the commission of the crime by the principal by direct participation. 3. In case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal. 4. When the participation of an accused is not disclosed, he is only an accomplice. 5. An accomplice does not have previous agreement or understanding or is not in conspiracy with the principal by direct participation. 6. Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense. 7. Requisites: a. That there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; i. Principal originates the original design. ii. Accomplice merely concurs. iii. Knowledge acquired: 1. When the principal informs or tells the accomplice of the formers criminal purposes. 2. When the accomplice saw the criminal acts of the principal b. That he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and i. Moral aid may be through advice, encouragement or agreement. c. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. 8. The accomplice intends by his acts, to commit or take part in the execution of the crime. 9. The community of design need not be to commit the crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a common purpose to commit a particular crime and that the crime actually committed was a natural or probable consequence of the intended crime. 10. Principal in general and accomplice, distinguished. An accomplice is one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce others to commit it, or who does not cooperate in the commission of the crime by another act without it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. 11. Principal by cooperation and accomplice, distinguished. Participation of an accomplice is not indispensable as in the case of a co-principal by cooperation. 12. Principal by direct cooperation and accomplice, distinguished. a. In both, there is community of criminal design. b. No clear-cut distinction between the acts of the accomplice and those of the principal by direct participation. In case of doubt, it shall be resolved in favor of lesser responsibility. c. Between or among principals, there must be conspiracy; but between the principals and the accomplices, there is no conspiracy. People v. Nierra, 96 Phiil. 1 (1980)

Raeses 149 Facts: Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra and Pagano Nierra, her brother-inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos City. In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house Gaspar Misa, a convicted murderer who had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony Thereafter, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a package containing a caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that he (Misa) had been hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout when the killing would be perpetrated. Thereafter, the unwary Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach, witnessed the actual killing. On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city police department. He signed a confession admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and implicating the other accused therein. , Misa testified at the preliminary in-vestigation. In his testimony, he admitted again the killing and confirmed his confession implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas Thereafter, Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as co-conspirators, were charged with murder aggravated by reward, treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu City. Issue: WON Dublin and Rojas are criminally liable as accomplice. Held: Yes. After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co- conspirators they should be punished as co- principals. However, since their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder form of liability may be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other cases). In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character (See People vs. Ubia, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061). People v. Doble, 114 SCRA 131 (1982) Facts: Late in the night of June 13, 1966, 10 men, almost all heavily armed w/ pistols, carbines and thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a motor banca & proceeded to Navotas,Rizal to rob the beach-bank Prudential Bank & Trust Co. Said bank wad an unusual banking hours, open from midnight till 8AM. Once docked in Navotas and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, 8 men disembarked from the banca and proceeded to their mission. Once inside, they started firing at the banks ceiling, walls & door of the vault. The 8 men then returned to the waiting motor banca w/ about P10.5K & sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed & injured. Among those who got killed were agents of the law. Only 5 of the 10 men were brought to trial, the rest still remain at large. 2 of the 5 accused were acquitted. It is only Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin appealing in the charge of bank robbery committed in band, w/ multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority. Issue: WON defendant is an accomplice. Held: Yes. First, as to appellant Simeon, evidence shows that the malefactors met in his house to discuss the plan to rob the bank. This circumstance alone doesnt conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its consummation by some act w/o w/c it would not have been committed. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy w/c is not punishable. Simeon then was not a principal both by agreement

Raeses 150 and encouragement for his non-participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proven that he had received any part/fruits of the looted money as to make him an accessory. As recommended by SolGen, Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal w/ no sufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Next, as regards Romaquin & Doble, the malefactors who waited in the banca, both contend that their extra-judicial statements upon w/c their conviction was principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, torture and maltreatment, and in violation of basic constil rts to counsel and against self-incrimination. However, it must be noted that they didnt present any medical cert to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted. More so that their testimonies match each others. And it should also be noted that Celso Aquinos testimony, as one of the accused, admitted that no violence was inflicted on him to procure his statement. This is evidence enough that the appellants could not have been dealt w/ differently as their co-accused Aquino who was allowed to give his statement freely. The extra-judicial statements of the appellants are convincing to show that their liability is less than that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation. Cresencio was merely in-charge of the banca and had no knowledge of the concrete plan and execution of the crime. The mastermind obviously did not extend confidence in him as he was only asked to provide a banca just a few hours before the commission of the crime. Nor was Romaquin considered a principle malefactor as there was a gun pointed at him by Cresencio to prevent him from fleeing away from the scene, evident to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose and that his acts were not voluntary. An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Art 17 RPC, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. There must be a community of unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given to supply material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense. In this case, the appellants cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction w/c makes the driver a mere accomplice. But it isnt established by evidence that in the mtg held in the house of Simeon that they all agreed to kill and not just rob. The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient but evidence fails to establish their conspiracy w/ the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed several people. Wherefore, Doble & Romaquin are guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band. The penalty imposable upon appellants is prision mayor min. The commission of the crime was aggr by nighttime & the use of a motorized banca. There being no MC, both appellants should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of prision correccional from 5 yrs, 4 mos, 21 days to 8 yrs of prision mayor as maximum. People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 (1991) Facts: Ludovico, Virgilio, and Conrado were stoning the house of Marcial. After the two women inside protested their acts, the three went up the house. While inside the house, Ludovico boloed both women inside, as well as a child. Issue: WON defendants are liable as accomplices. Held: Yes. It is reasonable to believe that Conrado and Virgilio merely stood by as Ludovico was boloing the two deceased women. Their presence gave Ludovico the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did. This is similar to the case of US v. Balili where it was held that one who goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, effectively supplies the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.

Accessories
RPC, Art. 19 Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.

Raeses 151
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. RPC, Art. 20 Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.

Reyes: 1. An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three ways: 1. Profiting from the effects of the crime 2. Concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discover 3. Assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. 2. An accessory must have knowledgeof the commission of the crime, and having that knowledge, he took part subsequent to its commission. 3. Knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence.

4. Two classes of accessories are contemplated in paragraph 3 of Article 19. 1. Public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public functions. i. Requisites 1. The accessory is a public officer 2. He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the principal. 3. The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions. 4. The crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. 2. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of the crime - guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. i. Requisites: 1. The accessory is a private person 2. He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime. 3. The crime committed by the principal is either (a) treason, (b) parricide, (c) murder, (d) an attempt against the life of the President, or that the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. 5. One who kept silent with regard to the crime he witnessed is not an accessory. 6. Conviction of an accessory is possible notwithstanding acquittal of principal if the crime was in fact committed, but the principal not held criminally liable because of an exempting circumstance.

Raeses 152 7. Apprehension and conviction of principal not necessary for the accessory to be held criminally liable. 8. Arraignment, trial and conviction of accessory during the pendency of a separate case against the principal are null and void. Accessory may be prosecuted and convicted when principal is not yet apprehended. 9. Principal, accomplice and accessory, distinguished. 1. The accessory does not take direct part or cooperate in, or induce the commission of the crime. 2. The same does not cooperate in the commission of the offense by acts either prior thereto or simultaneous therewith. 3. The participation of the accessory in all cases always takes place after the commission of the crime. 10. Exemptions in Art. 20. Based on ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of ones name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in the article. 11. Principals related to accessories exempt from criminal liability. 1. Spouse 2. Ascendant 3. Descendant 4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister or relative by affinity within the same degree. 12. Accessory is not exempt from criminal liability even if the principal is related to him, if such accessory (1) profited by the effects of the crime, or (2) assisted the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. People v. Talingdan, 84 SCRA 19 (1978) Facts: Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his own house in Abra on June 24, 1967 by Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, Bides and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife [whom cannot be charged with parricide because no certificate or proof of marriage could be presented by the prosecution]. The murder was witnessed by Corazon [12], the eldest child of Bernardo and Teresa. She testified to the crime committed by the accused-appellants. Summary of Corazons testimony: Prior to the violent incident, Bernardo and Teresa have had several conflicts in their married life. She would often withdrew from their house. The longest even for more than 3 weeks. It was suspected that Teresa is having an illicit affair with Talingdan, a policeman who lives nearby. Two days before the crime, Teresa was slapped several times by Bernardo after a violent quarrel. She sought the help of Talingdan who challenged Bernardo to come down, but the latter refused. Then, Talingdan left after shouting "If I will find you someday, I will kill you." Two days before the commission of the crime, Corazon overheard her mothers meeting with the other accused-appellants about their plot to kill her father as one of them said, Shall he elude a bullet? Corazon was then driven away by her mother saying, You tell your father that we will kill him. On the night of the murder, Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother talking with the other accused-appellants in their batalan armed with long guns. After a while, Teresa went inside the room to put her baby to sleep. After eating supper alone, Corazon told her father about the persons outside but he ignored her. He went to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door then he was fired at. Talingdan and Tobias fired their guns again. Bides threatened to kill Corazon if she would ask for help. Corazon confessed to her fathers relatives the identities of the murderers during his burial. The trial court found them guilty of the offense and so the five accused appealed to their conviction. Trial Court: Murder. Life imprisonment with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000 Contention of the Accused: Teresa denied having an illicit affair with Talingdan, having quarrels with or being maltreated by the victim, and leaving home for so long. She contends that her in-laws used her daughter to testify against her because they dont want Teresa from the start. She even added that Bernardo had some enemies during his lifetime. Talingdan said that he escorted the Mayor as a bodyguard, while the other three accused also claimed that they were at a certain Mrs. Bayongans house during the night of the murder. Contention of the People: The sworn statement of the 13-year old Corazon was true. She knew the accused because they live nearby. Besides, the accused-appellants testimonies are indefensible and futile. Moreover, her mother claimed to have no suspect in mind during the investigation in their

Raeses 153 house although she was in conspiracy with the other four accused. Issue: WON Teresa is an accessory. Held: Yes. There are two aggravating circumstances present, treachery and evident premeditation, with no mitigating circumstances to offset the accused-appellants. Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and are sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Teresa Domogma is guilty as accessory to the same murder, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. Teresa was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her. After Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory --- par. 2 and 3 of Article 19, RPC. Vino v. People, 178 SCRA 626 (1989) Facts: At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left. Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan. Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the costs. Issue: WON Vino is an accessory. Held: Yes. Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory. In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had been proven in the separate case

Raeses 154 against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612 ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979 WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties; WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties;lawphil.net WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory after the fact and punished lightly; WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the following: Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti- Fencing Law. Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows: (a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing. Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated: (a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. (b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos. (c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos. (d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos. (e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos. (f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos. Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be liable. Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated

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thereunder shall upon conviction be punished as a fence. lawphi1.net Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval. Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine. RULES AND REGULATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1612, KNOWN AS THE ANTI-FENCING LAW. Pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, known as the Anti-Fencing Law, the following rules and regulations are hereby promulgated to govern the issuance of clearances/permits to sell used secondhand articles obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof: I. Definition of Terms 1. "Used secondhand article" shall refer to any goods, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact been used. 2. "Unlicensed dealer/supplier" shall refer to any persons, partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage in the business of dealing in or of supplying the articles defined in the preceding paragraph. 3. "Store", "establishment" or "entity" shall be construed to include any individual dealing in the buying and selling used secondhand articles, as defined in paragraph hereof. 4. "Buy and Sell" refer to the transaction whereby one purchases used secondhand articles for the purpose of resale to third persons. 5. "Station Commander" shall refer to the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police within the territorial limits of the town or city district where the store, establishment or entity dealing in the buying and selling of used secondhand articles is located. II. Duty to Procure Clearance or Permit 1. No person shall sell or offer to sell to the public any used secondhand article as defined herein without first securing a clearance or permit for the purpose from the proper Station Commander of the Integrated National Police. 2. If the person seeking the clearance or permit is a partnership, firm, corporation, or association or group of individuals, the clearance or permit shall be obtained by or in the name of the president, manager or other responsible officer-in-charge thereof. 3. If a store, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other establishment or entity has a branch or subsidiary and the used secondhand article is acquired by such branch or subsidiary for sale to the public, the said branch or subsidiary shall secure the required clearance or permit. 4. Any goods, article, item, or object or anything of value acquired from any source for which no receipt or equivalent document evidencing the legality of its acquisition could be presented by the present possessor or holder thereof, or the covering receipt, or equivalent document, of which is fake, falsified or irregularly obtained, shall be presumed as having been acquired from an unlicensed dealer or supplier and the possessor or holder thereof must secure the required clearance or permit before the same can be sold or offered for sale to the public. III. Procedure for Procurement of Clearances or Permits 1. The Station Commanders concerned shall require the owner of a store or the president, manager or responsible officer-in-charge of a firm, establishment or other entity located within their respective jurisdictions and in possession of or having in stock used secondhand articles as defined herein, to submit an initial affidavit within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice for the purpose thereof and subsequent affidavits once every fifteen (15) days within five (5) days after the period covered, which shall contain: (a) A complete inventory of such articles acquired daily from whatever source and the names and addresses of the persons from whom such articles were acquired. (b) A full list of articles to be sold or offered for sale as well as the place where the date when the sale or offer for sale shall commence. (c) The place where the articles are presently deposited or kept in stock. The Station Commander may, at his discretion when the circumstances of each case warrant, require that the affidavit submitted be accompanied by other documents showing proof of legitimacy of the acquisition of the articles. 2. A party required to secure a clearance or permit under these rules and regulations shall file an application therefor with the Station Commander concerned. The application shall state:

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(a) The name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the persons, in case of an individual or, in the case of a firm, corporation, association, partnership or other entity, the name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the president, manager or officer-in- charge. (b) The article to be sold or offered for sale to the public and the name and address of the unlicensed dealer or supplier from whom such article was acquired. In support of the application, there shall be attached to it the corresponding receipt or other equivalent document to show proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article. 3. The Station Commander shall examine the documents attached to the application and may require the presentation of other additional documents, if necessary, to show satisfactory proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article, subject to the following conditions: (a) If the legitimacy of acquisition of any article from an unlicensed source cannot be satisfactorily established by the documents presented, the Station Commander shall, upon approval of the INP Superintendent in the district and at the expense of the party seeking the clearance/permit, cause the publication of a notice in a newspaper of general circulation for two (2) successive days enumerating therein the articles acquired from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, the names and addresses of the persons from whom they were acquired and shall state that such articles are to be sold or offered for sale to the public at the address of the store, establishment or other entity seeking the clearance/permit. In places where no newspapers are in general circulation, the party seeking the clearance or permit shall, instead, post a notice daily for one week on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the town where the store, firm, establishment or entity concerned is located or, in the case of an individual, where the articles in his possession are to be sold or offered for sale. (b) If after 15 days, upon expiration of the period of publication or of the notice referred to in the preceding paragraph, no claim is made with respect to any of the articles enumerated in the notice, the Station Commander shall issue the clearance or permit sought. (c) If, before expiration of the same period for publication of the notice or its posting, it shall appear that any of the articles in question is stolen property, the Station Commander shall hold the article in restraint as evidence in any appropriate case to be filed. Articles held in restraint shall be kept and disposed of as the circumstances of each case permit, taking into account all considerations of right and justice in the case. In any case where any article is held in restraint, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to advise/notify the Commission on Audit of the case and comply with such procedure as may be proper under applicable existing laws, rules and regulations. 4. The Station Commander concerned shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the application, act thereon by either issuing the clearance/permit requested or denying the same. Denial of an application shall be in writing and shall state in brief the reason/s therefor. 5. The application, clearance/permit or the denial thereof, including such other documents as may be pertinent in the implementation of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 shall be in the forms prescribed in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E" hereof, which are made integral parts of these rules and regulations. 6. For the issuance of clearances/permit required under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612, no fee shall be charged. IV. Appeals Any party aggrieved by the action taken by the Station Commander may elevate the decision taken in the case to the proper INP District Superintendent and, if he is still dissatisfied therewith may take the same on appeal to the INP Director. The decision of the INP Director may also be appealed to the INP Director-General whose decision may likewise be appealed to the Minister of National Defense. The decision of the Minister of National Defense on the case shall be final. The appeal against the decision taken by a Commander lower than the INP Director-General should be filed to the next higher Commander within ten (10) days from receipt of notice of the decision. The decision of the INP Director- General should be appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision. V. Penalties 1. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by Section 6 of P.D. 1612 or who violates any of the provisions of these rules and regulations shall upon conviction be punished as a fence. 2. The INP Director-General shall recommend to the proper authority the cancellation of the business license of the erring individual, store, establishment or the entity concerned. 3. Articles obtained from unlicensed sources for sale or offered for sale without prior compliance with the provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and with these rules and regulations shall be held in restraint until satisfactory evidence or legitimacy of acquisition has been established. 4. Articles for which no satisfactory evidence of legitimacy of acquisition is established and which are

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found to be stolen property shall likewise be held under restraint and shall, furthermore, be subject to confiscation as evidence in the appropriate case to be filed. If, upon termination of the case, the same is not claimed by their legitimate owners, the article/s shall be forfeited in favor of the government and made subject to disposition as the circumstances warrant in accordance with applicable existing laws, rules and regulations. The Commission on Audit shall, in all cases, be notified. 5. Any personnel of the Integrated National Police found violating the provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 or any of its implementing rules and regulations or who, in any manner whatsoever, connives with or through his negligence or inaction makes possible the commission of such violations by any party required to comply with the law and its implementing rules and regulations, shall be prosecuted criminally without prejudice to the imposition of administrative penalties. VI. Visitorial Power It shall be the duty of the owner of the store or of the president, manager or responsible officer-in-charge of any firm, establishment or other entity or of an individual having in his premises articles to be sold or offered for sale to the public to allow the Station Commander or his authorized representative to exercise visitorial powers. For this purpose, however, the power to conduct visitations shall be exercise only during office or business hours and upon authority in writing from and by the INP Superintendent in the district and for the sole purpose of determining whether articles are kept in possession or stock contrary to the intents of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and of these rules and regulations. VII. Other Duties Imposed Upon Station Commanders and INP District Superintendent and Directors Following Action on Applications for Clearances or Permits 1. At the end of each month, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to: (a) Make and maintain a file in his office of all clearances/permit issued by him. (b) Submit a full report to the INP District Superintendent on the number of applications for clearances or permits processed by his office, indicating therein the number of clearances/permits issued and the number of applications denied. The report shall state the reasons for denial of an application and the corresponding follow-up actions taken and shall be accompanied by an inventory of the articles to be sold or offered for sale in his jurisdiction. 2. The INP District Superintendent shall, on the basis of the reports submitted by the Station Commander, in turn submit quarterly reports to the appropriate INP Director containing a consolidation of the information stated in the reports of Station Commanders in his jurisdiction. 3. Reports from INP District Superintendent shall serve as basis for a consolidated report to be submitted semi- annually by INP Directors to the Director-General, Integrated National Police. 4. In all cases, reports emanating from the different levels of the Integrated National Police shall be accompanied with full and accurate inventories of the articles acquired from unlicensed dealers or suppliers and proposed to be sold or offered for sale in the jurisdictions covered by the report. These implementing rules and regulations, having been published in a newspaper of national circulation, shall take effect on June 15, 1979. FOR THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY DIRECTOR- GENERAL, INP: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829 PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to effectively contain them; WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the following: Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts: (a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats; (b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in

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the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases; (c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction; (d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes; (e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts; (f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases; (g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender; (h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases; (i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court. If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed. Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-one.

B. In Light Felonies
*Refer to p. 141 for Art. 16. Reyes: 1. Accessories are not liable for light felonies. 2. Rules a. Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated. (Art. 7) b. But when light felonies are committed against persons or prope c. rty, they are punishable even if they are only in the attempted or frustrated stage of execution. (Art. 7) d. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies. (Art. 16) e. Accessories are not liable for light felonies, even if they are committed against persons or property. (Art. 16)