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FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF KEY PLAYERS

United States
Americas interests are currently limited, especially given the unfolding strategic pivot to East Asia. Once
it is largely disengaged from Afghanistan, Washingtons primary interests in the region will be to avoid major
instability so that open door access to the regions ample natural resources can be maintained.
The regions increased orientation to either the West (desired) or Far East (tolerated as inevitable) is considered
preferable to the uninhibited inuences of either Russia or lran. Washington also values Azerbaijan for the
continued regional access it provides in both containing lran's ambitions and facilitating U.S. counter-terrorism
activities in the wider region.
The biggest challenge facing America is that virtually any regime destabilization dynamic likely decreases
Western inuence in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus. As a de facto autocrat employing a managed
democracy" ruling style, llham Aliyev will - in the event of instability - turn rst to Turkey (now itself troubledj
and then to either Moscow or Beijing before submitting to the Wests negative interpretations of the politically
repressive actions he will undoubtedly undertake to preserve his rule.
Bottom line:While U.S. interests are modest, they are easily damaged by dynamics beyond anyone's control
and the likely responses of great powers that are closer by.
Russia
Moscow's primary desire is to remain the sole arbiter of the South Caucasus' future - to include any emerging
energy connectivity to both the West and East. To ensure Russia's strategic ownership" of the South Caucasus
is to assure itself that continuing negative dynamics in the North Caucasus can be contained. The unfolding
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Arab Spring only accentuates this rewall" mentality.
Currently, Moscow evinces no desire to see the South Caucasus destabilized - just the opposite.However,
any destabilization dynamic is likely to force Moscow to act in a comprehensively exploitative manner, lest the
region be lost to either the West or East.
Iran
Tehran has multiple outstanding issues/fears regarding Azerbaijan, as both sides can avail themselves of the
temptation of stoking irredentism across their shared border. But lran's fundamental problem with Azerbaijan
is the existential threat" it presents - namely, Azerbaijan is an ethno-religious twin" that chooses secularism
and friendship with the West over theocracy and confrontation. Given current events (Syria, nuclear program
controversiesj, Tehran is unlikely to stoke instability in Azerbaijan, even as it is a likely target for such a lashing
out" if lran feels suitably threatened. Over the longer term, a nuclear lran is likely to make mischief in the region
with far more condence (see Soviet adventurism in the Third World following the codication of nuclear parity
with the U.S. via the SALT accordsj.
Turkey
ln Ankara's eyes, Azerbaijan is a means to a larger end: Turkey serving as an energy-connectivity bridge between
the Caspian and the West and as a model of proper development for lslamist regimes throughout the wider
region. ln general, it favors Azerbaijan's progressive power build-up (military buildup includedj but isn't looking
for regional instabilities to advance its interests.
China
Beijing favors regional stability above all, because a stable environment facilitates China's long-term build-up
of access to energy resources.
Europe/NATO
Europe's interests mirror those of the U.S., with the added desire to directly access the region's energy supplies
so as to reduce dependency on Moscow. But Europes participation in any unleashed great game dynamics
in the South Caucasus will be minimal for a host of resource/attention-span reasons.
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MOST PLAUSIBLE DESTABILIZATION SCENARIOS
(FROM CROWD VOTE)
1. Azerbaijans internal situation deteriorates due to a combination of near-term Arab Spring-like
dynamics and a long-term drop in global energy prices: Aliyev is forced to repress the population to
maintain his rule, isolating the regime from the West and forcing him into an uncomfortable choice between
Moscow and Beijing for help in the near-term. Russia is most likely to benet from this scenario, but
Tehran's willingness to take advantage is a dangerous wild card.
2. To divert from internal instability (see Scenario #1), the Aliyev regime forces a splendid little war
with Armenia/the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, resulting in Moscows stabilizing intervention: This
dynamic is fraught with spinning-out-of-control" possibilities, especially given Turkey and lran's current
strategic stressors and how those tempt both players toward all in responses designed to settle scores
(Turkey with Armenia, lran with Azerbaijanj.
3. Iran lashes out against Azerbaijan following joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities: Muted
versions of this strategy are arguably unfolding today as Tehran grows increasingly concerned over
U.S.-lsraeli-Azerbaijani security cooperation. Assuming regime survival in Tehran (and likely regime
strengtheningj, this would represent score-settling with an eye towards expansionism.
4. Chinese equity resource investments trigger domestic frictions in Azerbaijan and a wider strategic
competition: As much as Ankara, Moscow and Tehran may prefer growing Chinese inuence in the South
Caucasus over alternatives (Western inuence for Moscow and Tehran, and lranian and Russian inuence
for Ankaraj, Beijing's growing nancial heft naturally forces some countering responses from each. ldeally,
Baku continues playing all sides against one another, but in both success and failure, rapid socio-economic
change likely challenges Aliyev's autocratic rule.
5. Russia leverages own Azeri minority vis--vis Baku: Here Moscow targets ethnic Azeris and Azerbaijani
seasonal workers with legal" restrictions designed to blackmail Baku into a more accommodating stance
regarding Russia's regional schemes (Customs Union, Eurasian Union, etc.j - the goal being to reduce
Azerbaijan's growing Western orientation and lock in" Russian inuence in the face of mounting Turkish,
lranian and Chinese efforts to do the same.
6. Moscow encourages Iran to press maritime claims in Caspian Sea as a way to bolster both states
naval fortunes there: This is basically a maritime version of the standard Moscow strategy of encouraging
mutual irredentism among smaller neighboring powers, thus forcing Russia's stabilizing" interventions
that reduce Western inuence/presence.
7. Iran st|rs up Azerba|jan's domest|c s|tuat|on to |nuence 2013 pres|dent|a| e|ect|on: This can be
considered a possible fellow traveler to any of the other scenarios. This would be done via covert (funding
of, and support to, opposition parties) and overt (propaganda) means, and would logically include a covert
cyber campaign designed mostly to harass and discredit the Aliyev ruling clan. This is a low risk/high
reward strategy.
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PRELIMINARY INSIGHTS REGARDING INTERESTS AND
DESTABILIZATION SCENARIOS
lran is the only regional great power currently incentivized toward serious destabilization of the South
Caucasus. Muted efforts targeting Azerbaijan are already being pursued, and far more vigorous versions of
these efforts can be mounted with relative speed in response to ongoing and future Western/lsraeli efforts
to destabilize Tehran. ln the latter pathways, Russia would likely allow a certain amount of lranian meddling
to unfold so as to increase local demand for Moscow's stabilization" services.
Moscow prefers today's frozen conict" among Azerbaijan, Armenia and the NKR versus a re-ignition, but
would pursue maximal inuence operations in the event of the latter's unfolding. ldeally, Moscow would
prefer the same sort of changed regime" in Azerbaijan that now exists in Georgia - namely, a friendly
oligarch-type leader.
Moscow can always go overboard" in its efforts to combat hostile actors in the North Caucasus (triggering
instability in the South Caucasus as a resultj but this is unlikely so long as the well-seasoned vladimir Putin
rules there.
There are many pathways to Baku unleashing a splendid little war" dynamic, but Aliyev's strong preference
is to continue playing off Western and Far Eastern suitors. A second Nagorno-Karabakh war would force
the regime to choose sides - rather permanently.
The most plausible triggers to a second Nagorno-Karabakh war surround Azerbaijan's signicant military
build-up (ongoingj and Armenia's growing sense of resource scarcity and limited economic development
pathways - given the isolating dynamics created by the frozen conict." This combination of dynamics
appears unsustainable over the long term, rendering an if question into a when equation.
There are no strong destabilization scenarios that are exclusively cyber in nature. The region simply lacks
sufcient lT dependency to make that possible. However, the Aliyev regime is susceptible to all the same
destabilizing dynamics made possible in the Arab Spring via social networks (organizing dynamicsj.
The Act-of-God" category triggers (natural disaster, biological outbreak, unexpected death of Aliyev, etc.j
all appear to favor a general diminution of Western inuence, as a circle-the-wagons response from Baku
would only harden its authoritarian credentials, threatening existing strategic collaborations with Western
powers and likely creating greater dependencies on Turkey, Russia and/or China. Any such outcome would
harm Western efforts to contain lranian ambitions, to include its nuclear programs. American regional
counterterrorism efforts would also be negatively affected.
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