Dario Martinelli: "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics :: People, Paths, Ideas", DOI: 1 0.

1007/978-90-481-9249-6 Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2010, - A Philosophical Introduction by Carl Christian Glosemeyer Andersen, Mag.art, Lecturer at Nansenskolen - Humanistic Academy of Norway Date: 18.06, 2013 23:32:49 CEST There has been a revolution in our way of understanding and conduct research on animals behavior and their cognitive abilities. It is an ongoing revolution in the past 25 years primarily due to the life-giving combination of ethology, cognitive psychology and zoosemiotics into a unified research branch. Dario Martinelli's "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics", 2010, is an excellent example of what has happened and happens in research right now. He's Italian, lives in Lithuania where he is Full Professor of Musicology, Kaunas University of Technology. Moreover he is Adjunct Professor of Musicology and Semiotics, University of Helsinki. Martinelli is a leading zoo-semiotician and is also connected as Adjunct Professor of Methodologies of Semiotics and Communication Studies, University of Lapland. Martinellis's book is the first of its kind that wants to provide a representation of the part of semiotics known as "zoosemiotics", the study of animal communication systems. Zoosemiotics has tasked to study "semiosis" within living zoo-biological systems which means "how signs are constructed, organized, assembled, distinguished, interpreted, codified and so forth." The book is divided into three main parts: (1) The first chapter is definitely the longest (about 50% of the text) and constitutes a brilliant overall critical introduction and review of the special field of main issues, ideas, concepts and key representatives within the now 50-year history of zoosemiotics, (2) secondly, a systematic review from A to Z of all the discipline's core concepts, and finally (3) a longer text that raises the central question of wether ethical issues should be included or not as a separate area within the study of zoosemiotics. In the first part Martinelli emphasizes that zoosemiotics, unlike biosemiotics, deliberately is limiting its field of research within the scientific ethological study of animals "Umwelt" understood as "a subjectively experienced animal world and their behavior within the framework of signs and symbol exchange of gestures (semiosis)". The exploration of other animal species' Umwelt offers of-course on a number of practical scientific, theoretical and philosophical issues, issues that Martinelli enters and discusses in a very enlightening way. As Martinelli puts it, the problem is "to investigate the possibility of adapting almost objective perspective towards phenomenon that are by nature subjective". The classical, cartesian problem of the relationship between body / mind and "theory of mind" pops up naturally as we move into these areas: "How come that our thoughts, that are totally different from a physical event or entity, do affect our actions?(...) Can we interpret mind through matter?(...) (E)very subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view", and Martinelli refers among other things to Thomas Nagel's famous essay "What is it like to be a Bat?" (1974). Have we any chance to know what "the other" can feel and think?

This is an issue that almost seems insurmountable, at least when it comes to research on other species than ourselves. A well known ethologists, Marian Stamp Dawkins expresses this kind of problem explicit in the title of her introduction to modern ethological studies in her book "Through Our Eyes Only" (1993). Martinelli would primarily make use of the analogy method: We can understand the behaviour and Umwelt of other animals based on what we know about ourselves: "I perceive my mind, from the inside, only through external ways. (...) In other words a primary status of "their" and "our" life is the perception of the animated body ". This is a clear pragmatistic, philosophical choice, a choice that otherwise is developed within the so-called cognitive sciences. Moreover, advances in brain physiology in recent years made it possible to conduct studies directly on and in animals' sensory organs, - "Merkwelt "- , and not only in the" Wirkwelt ", which is the way animals act and behave. The terms above are taken from one of ethology's most important founders, Jacob von Uexkll. The book has moreover a thorough introduction to Uexkll's ideas and influence. Martinelli displays a refreshing philosophical and ethical approach to his field of study, rather than a purely descriptive. The book is almost devoid of fear to record and enter philosophical issues, and Martinelli has several interesting references to philosophers and important philosophical themes. Somewhere in "A Critical Companion" he says explicitly "(A)nd if semiotics is, as it is, a philosophical discipline , (....) then it is probably true that as semioticians we have an ethical imperative." For Martinelli human culture constitutes a key research area and should be central within zoosemiotics. Martinelli's critical showdown with biosemiotics and its tendency to metaphysical speculation is largely very interesting and enlightening. The author finds it quite remarkable how little bio semiotics has to say about the cultural sphere and the human animal, understood as semiotic being. According to Martinelli bio semiotics has completely omitted human related issues, with the result that "culture" is perceived as a purely human concept. In this way the human being and the humanity will stay on o n e side of a demarcation line, while all the other animals will find themselves on the other. It's possible that Martinelli in some respect overstates the "antagonism" between these two semiotic disciplines in his critical review, especially when it comes to the "Copenhagen school" represented by its Danish leading bio semiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer. What Jesper Hoffmeyer is concerned, he has in his pre-semiotic period in the 80 's published a series of interesting books, all dealing with an echo philosophical perspective and a critical analysis of the cultural sphere of society and economics. I am thinking i.e. on "A Natural History of Culture" and his heavily Bateson-inspired "Nature in The Head". In the latter he highlights the nature of signs and code systems all of which make up important parts of the book. A major concern in Martinelli's "Companion" is to explore the prevalent forms of reductionist tendencies in animal research and to investigate some of the key consequences that would follow in the wake of dealing with bombastic dichotomies in research. Such "prejudices" will all could lead to a distinct form of extreme anthropocentrism where research can easily get the wrong path and lead to large negative ethical and moral consequences. Martinelli displays a refreshing philosophical and ethical approach to his field of study, rather than a purely descriptive. The book is almost devoid of fear to record and enter philosophical issues, and Martinelli has several interesting references to philosophers and important philosophical themes. Somewhere in "A Critical Companion" he says explicitly "(A)nd if semiotics is, as it is, a philosophical discipline , (....) then it is probably true that as semioticians we have an ethical imperative." I understand Dario Martinelli's critical project as an important form of deconstruction of our "grand stories". Their main functions are to sustain and continue our dominant prejudices in culture as a priori fundamental truths. Such prejudices can well be seen in the light of Dawkin's theory of our cultural "memes". They have some of the same features as the horse blinders. When a leading philosopher and semiotician as John Deely apparently relatively innocent talks

about the "Semiotic Animal "(2010), this label for him is only intended to apply to man and man alone. Martinelli, however, will not make any absolute qualitative distinction between the human animal and other animal species. He maintains the idea of a Darwinian gradualism, where there are but "degrees" of differences between humans and other animals, rather than categorical qualitative ones. As far as I can see, Martinelli's thinking about these processes coincides with Gregory Bateson's (and C. G. Jung's) famous distinction between "creatura" and "pleroma" as Bateson treats these concepts in "Mind and Nature" (1979). The qualitative differences we create notions of, that means creatura, are just events situated in our heads - in nature,pleroma, there are no such distinctions. Is "culture" something that is unique to man alone? Martinelli finds strong indicia in modern biology that all support his claim: "Culture" is not only reserved man. Great Apes by the way transfer their acquired knowledge on to the subsequent generation. They work together, learn from each other and can form tools that they use as instruments. And - how would you understand and interpret the complex social interactions and communication that maintain the honey bee society? The emergent, qualitative differences we see in nature are controlled by digital distinctions, but the processes taking place in nature itself are but gradualistic and analogue, Martinelli claims. Being able to see homo sapiens as the last emergent supplementation in a continuous evolutionary process, doesn't prevent us, in other words, at the same time to be able to see and focus on man as a specific and unique being, considered on its own terms. But then this perspective also applies to all other animal species, each in particular having their very specific,unique skills and talents that make each species fit in the art of survival. Dario Martinelli's book is in my opinion clearly characterised by a beneficial anti-reductionism. The critic runs like a red thread through the entire work. The author opens up for a meaningful and continuous study of other animals' Umwelt where he wants that the research, as far as it is possible, should be carried out on the animal's own terms. Martinelli does from this perspective, strongly criticise C.L. Morgan and his famous reductionist "cannon". It reads: "In no case should actions or behaviours be interpreted as the result of a superior psychic faculty, when it is possible to interpret them as a result of an inferior faculty." Darios antireductionistic argument against the Morgan's Cannon has by other zoo-semioticians been baptised "Martinelli's Cannon" and reads: "In no case should actions or behaviours be interpreted as a result of an inferior psychic faculty, when it is possible to interpret them as a result of a superior faculty." The historical background of the "Morgan's Cannon" leads back to Germany in 1905-1907 and is related to the famous phenomenon of " Der kluge Hans ", a horse who was said to have mathematical abilities. The horse and his trainer, Orlov Trotter, brought about a series of performances in Germany around the turn of the century. The explanation for this strange phenomenon was due solely to the unique ability of Hans to interpret his coach and the audience's almost imperceptible small gestures so he exactly could "know" when to stop scratching with his hoof on the ground when the answer was right! Around the turn of the century there was a relatively broad, general view that animals, when it comes to the end, might not be so particularly different in essence from us humans. Darwin's theory of evolution had step by step taken root in people's mind. The biologist and psychologist Oscar Pfungst's disclosure of the case "Der Kluge Hans" in 1907 let instantly the air out of the balloon.The horse turned out to be just as stupid as the bull(!). The horse didn't understand even the simplest calculations. Dario Martinelli scrutinises this biased conclusion and turns it on the head. Although the horse was not gifted with our human numeracy, the horse after all exhibited unique abilities and skills in other areas that far exceed ours. Der Kluge Hans was able to read and interpret the 'invisible' small bodily signs and gestures of humans as easily as we can solve 2 + 3 = 5. Neither footage, horse connoisseurs, biologists or magicians had initially managed to reveal the horse's hidden abilities during the shows Trotter and Hans were a part of. Through a long and ongoing historical period man and horse have had a close and special form of interaction, in which the horse has

learned a unique ability to interpret human's slightest hints and commands. The same skills can, however, be said to have occurred between man, cats and dogs through our common cultural history of mutual interests. Soon the framework for the ongoing exploration of animal cognition was reorganised so that in future studies, scientists could rule out any form of "Clever Hans effect". Sterile, technically fabricated laboratory research was one of the results in the wake of "Der Kluge Hans". Animal behaviour was understood as j u s t "instinctive" without any cognition. The theory of instincts was almost supreme in more than 50 years and is still very prevalent. Martinelli picks the biased instinct theory apart point by point. "Instincts" function mostly like a "black box" in which researchers could place all inexplicable findings and put the label of "just instinct" on them. From now on studies on animals in their natural environment were no longer seen as strictly scientific because the researcher din't have the same control over research conditions as compared to what one had in the controlled laboratories. Researchers as a consequense were required to carry large, impersonal masks over their faces in order to prevent the possibility of influencing the animals and the test results while the tests were running. All scientific procedures became standardized and impersonalised in additional behavioral experiments with animals. Such standardisations of course made any possibility of a deeper explorations of various animal species difficult. The complex compound of animals' Umwelt and their natural behavior in their native habitat were excluded. One such example could be a closer examination of the possibility of language skills of different animal species in their natural environment outside the laboratory. Behaviourism garbled also research on interspecific communication, such as between humans and animals. The fear of "Der Kluge Hans" effect is still, according to Dario Martinelli, very prevalent in many research environments, where a positivist approach to animal behaviour and their abilities often totally rules the research. Thanks to some important 'dissidents' from the dominant ruling opinion, biosemiotics and zoosemiotics arise in the mid 60s. Here we find, among others, thinkers and scientists such as Thomas Sebeok, Donald R Griffin and Gregory Bateson. Dario Martinelli rightly emphasises especially the importance of the Hungarian Thomas Sebeok. He is the pioneer that connects the American pragmatism and its triadic sign theory (C. S. Peirce) with the Latvian ethologist Jacob von Uexkll and his Umwelt-term so that they together form an overall theory of zoo-semiotics. Without being able to go into detail here, I will particularly emphasise Dario Martinelli's very thorough and meaningful review of the terms "mimicry","deception","play" and "aesthetics". The analysis can be read in the first half of the book. His thinking is literally bursting with creativity and originality. After reading Martinelli's review of animal behaviour and communication, one will have a better understanding of how extraordinarily complex the communicative systems are composed. Take for example something as "innocent" as cats or dogs playing with each other. When two dogs meet, and want to play rather than fight each other, they exchange a series of different gestures. Together these gestures signal to the other that now it is just a "fighting play" that should go on. One of the dogs performs for example the well-known species-specific gesture for "play" by bending the head and body down, stretching his paws forward while barking eager and simultaneously turns his head quickly back and forth from side to side. If the other dog responds with the same type of gestures, the game suddenly is going on. During the play session the play is maintained "playful" and as "play" by constantly repeating the specific, different signs indicating what the relationship should be. Many of the same gestures will appear also in interspecific contexts, e.g in play between people and dogs. Martinelli's detailed review of these four mentioned concepts, "mimicry", "deception", "play" and "aesthetics", builds up gradually to an overall surprising, but very

interesting aestheticphilosophical idea: "Art" can be understood to have an evolutionary path that starts with the ability of the individual animal species to perform mimicry, deseption and lie. These properties depend not only on the ability to communicate on one level, but involves simultaneously the will to meta-communication on another. That indicates that the playful dogs at the same time have to distinguish between, and simultaneously connect, two different cognitive levels with each other. On one level the dogs' barking suggests that this might be about an impending fight. On the meta level however the message in the relationship is modified to only mean "I just want to play". The dogs' bodily gestures, such as head bowed and eager movements back and forth, are therefore to be interpreted as a response to the first utterance in which gestures are seen as a correction in the direction of pursuing further play behaviour. The next step in animal development pointing towards the human artistic expression is consequently the show of play by countless animal species. The play of animals can take place both intra - as inter-specific. "Aesthetics" is considered by most of us first and foremost to be a mere human expression, the author claims. However, there is clear evidence from a number of animal species which all together testify that man must share this aesthetical ability along with them! Martinelli is in this respect referring especially to Karl von Frisch who points out the obvious signs of aesthetic dimensions that we can observe and recognise in the actions of the bower bird ("Animal Architecture", 1978). These male birds build complex structures of twigs, leaves and flowers that serve as shelter or recess or cottage for mating game. Every male bird is very resourceful in terms of building up its construction and then decorate it with 'all the world's delights': Stones, shiny shards of glass, beautiful floral and foliage, all in an effort to attract the female's attention and interest. Frequently the male bird breaks off a small branch and then bits at the end of the twig so that the splitting can serve as a form of brush or paint brush. Then the male bower bird crushes with its beak the berries which he has picked in the woods, all shining in different shades of blue and paints the entrance of the bower with the most beautiful nuance of blue with his 'brush'. The blue colour of the entrance looks very similar to the nuance of the plumage of the male bower bird, so the choice of the colour is not random. When the male now and then discovers withered flowers on the construction, it picks out the withered immediately and replace them with fresh new ones. Frisch has often observed how the birds can step a little back or aside to consider their creation of appropriate distance. Carl von Frisch also found that the bowerbirds put rocks in the shape of a path. These rocks decorate the entrance systematically in such a way that the largest stones are placed farthest from the entrance, and the smallest closest so that the female bird can get the illusion of watching a track, where her perspective leads right into the male's 'paradise'! Martinelli also draws attention to the complicated question if it is just man, and man alone that can be said to 'have' a language. Many bio- and zoo-semioticians will reserve language ability to be applied to homo sapiens alone. The aforementioned John Deely represents such a position, and he is representative of many philosophers and scientists in bio- and zoosemiotics itself. Perhaps the most influential thinker in the 21st-century is the German fundamental ontologist Martin Heidegger. Throughout his philosophical work he is strongly convinced that it is only man, and man alone, who "has" a "language" and thereby can be said to 'have' an "Umwelt". (See Brett Buchanan: "Onto-ethology", 2010). This opinion is so widespread and universal in philosophy, biology, ethology and zoology, that one could easily be tempted to not wanting to venture into the field at all. Dario Martinelli dares without much reluctance to challenge this anthropocentric notion. He has many good arguments for his claim that several animal species have shown clear signs of linguistic abilities that, in

principle, are not totally different from the human being. Birds are found to have "dialects" when they sing, and depending on where they are located, they are able at any time to change their song mode so that they can communicate with their own anywhere. Bird songs must be learned and practiced before eventually being perfected. Several bird species demonstrate a rich variety of bird songs. They can imitate other species so lifelike, that they are fooled into thinking the song is one of their own kind. One of the most astounding examples of birdsong imitation is documented to take place by the famous Lyre Bird. This bird is known to mimic almost any types of sounds that occur in its environment. Its mimicry can involve the singing of other bird species or the sound of a chainsaw, car alarms or cameras that create unmistakable mechanical sounds when zooming and the "iris" closes with a distinctive "click." It is also shown that birds are titling each other with their own proper names, exactly the same as dolphins do. Martinelli refers to many similar examples of language actions in animals, examples indicating that animals may have linguistic abilities. The author addresses in this respect a powerful critique against none other than Thomas Sebok himself, - the founder of zoosemiotics. Sebok retained all his life through the view that "language" was an ability that only belonged to homo sapiens alone. The higher primates can undoubtedly perform advanced communication with varied use of symbols to convey different messages, but Sebeok finds no evidence of any language acts la man. Until I read "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics" I was strongly inclined to reserve man alone the "right" to use the language as a media for communication and model for our thinking. Now I'm far more open to Martinelli's convincing arguments. Examples he points out, all indicate that there actually can exist linguistic abilities in other species than ourselves, examples which one can justify to denote with the term "language." I have personally been very intrigued by Irene Pepperberg's 30-year long study of "Alex", one Gray parrot who now sadly died some years ago. Alex could spend far more than 150 words. He had learned concepts and demonstrated rational mind where he could differentiate between types of matter and fabric and he could operate with 7 different colours and five different shapes. Alex distinguished between size and number of figures which he presented to the experiments with Pepperberg. Alex has also demonstrated that he understood abstract concepts like "bigger", "same", "smaller" and "different". Additionally did Alex distinguish between prepositions like "over" and "under." The most amazing thing was that Irene Pepperberg had managed to train Alex to speak American so she could pursue a sort of direct 'conversation' with Alex in many different ways. Martinelli mentions of course Alex as one of several ethological language studies, conducted on different animal species. He is especially interested in the chimpanzee Whoshoe who was trained to use ASL (American Sign Language). Washoe could after long and patient training demonstrate astonishing linguistic abilities and major cognitive systems, capabilities, that without much doubt have revealed chimps as possible language animals. Thy are able to express joy, sorrow and care that have striking similarities with human expressions. They also demonstrated that they have great abilities to lie and deceive others, and they show clear signs of having a 'theory of mind'. Similar findings have been made with the Gray parrot Alex, the caledonian crow and other corvid birds, whales and dolphins. Washoe has also demonstrated his ability to make use of the ASL-language as a cognitive model for thinking in such a way, that he could form completely innovative words and concepts using their metaphorical use of language. Washoe, already familiar with ASL words for "water" and "bird", spontaneously could combine and form a new term for an animal he had not yet learned the name of. Once Washoe noticed a white swan on the water, he was asked by his couch what he was looking at. He spontaneously signalled "water bird" using his sign language! A ring Washoe noticed he could immediately name as "a finger bracelet". He had not yet learned the word for "ring", but combined spontaneously two well-known concepts "finger" and "bracelet" to form a new term. To this observation Dario Martinelli comments: "This is rather a convincing proof that language is used precisely as a modeling system, other than a mere communication device". A similar famous example of linguistic behaviour Martinelli clearly shows by the female gorilla "Koko". She is also trained in ASL. One day Koko and her trainer Penny Patterson were sitting together, the coach asked Koko if she

wanted something to drink. She would. When Patterson asked her what body part she used to drink with, there was a strange session taking place. Koko looked for a moment thoughtfully at her trainer before she ostentatiously pointed to her eye. After receiving laughter from Patterson, Koko then pointed on her nose, then the ear, before she made a strange "grin" pointing to her mouth and satisfied took the bottle to her mouth to start drinking. The author sees the example as a wonderful illustration of "Monkey humour". For Martinelli these illustrating observations show that both chimpanzee and gorilla can use language as a model for thinking. All these above mentioned species also prove to be able to score highly on the "mirror test". It is a test that can demonstrate whether the animals (including humans) have an opinion of himself as a "self". High rate on these mirror tests provides a basis for looking at these species as acting subjects and personalities, not totally different from us humans, Martinelli claims. Dolphins and whales score by the way significant on mirror tests, and both species have a very complex and diverse communication pattern which suggests that they address each other with their own unique personal names. The same qualities appear also in some bird species. Several animal species, including corvid birds, score equally significant in the mirror tests. Ethologists claim that dolphins and corvids are just as much gifted as chimpanzees what cognitive abilities are concerned. If we for a while turn our attention away from birds and mammals and focus on the social Umwelten of insects, cognitive ethology reveals in different species a series of complex communication patterns taking place between the members of the group. The Nobel Prize winner in ethology (1973), the early mentioned Karl von Frisch, received his award for his lifelong study of honey bee communication. It is worth noting that he as early as in the 1920s describes the complex "wagging tail communication" among the dancing bees as "symbolic language ". If we will follow the call we have found in "Martinelli's Cannon", it is perhaps appropriate to ask ourselves to stay open to further exploration of the linguistic competences of animals. Martinelli has with his outstanding book opened up an exciting alternative view of language which currently doesn't seem to be generally accepted. In the final part of his book Martinelli raises the important question of whether zoosemiotics should move into the ethics and morality area or not. Is it even possible to stick to a purely descriptive account in the study of human and other animal behaviour, communication and interaction, without having an ethical perspective on what we are observing and doing? The very last chapter doesn't quite cope with the rest of the book. I have among other things some trouble following the author's diligent use of Francis Bacon's famous concepts, called 'idola mentis'. Martinelli uses Bacon's well-known concepts "idola trebis", "idola specus", "idola agora" and "idola theatri" as a theoretical zoosemiotic categorisation and mapping of various human prejudices as they show up in our cultural perceptions of people, animals, ethics and morality. Martinelli's use of 'heavy' graphic shapes in the last section of his book seems almost to be bordering on the absurd, especially considering the fact that Francis Bacon in modern eco-philosophy is known as a manipulative person with a very hostile view of women and nature. Francis Bacon among others supported the Inquisition to force the "truth" out of the female "witches" during the church's interrogation. It is also Bacon who is well known for using a variety of metaphors he has chosen directly from the Inquisition torture on people. He describes inbound how the new, modern sciences, using the inductive method, should 'squeeze' the truth out of the mountains ores and the natural hidden 'female' cavities, for the benefit of mankind. Paradise is for Bacon no longer to be searched for in a world hereafter. "Utopia" is already lying hidden in front of our feet. The tasks of the natural sciences are to uncover the secrets of nature. With the aid of our growing knowledge in the natural sciences humanity would in the near future force "mother nature" to her

knees. I find it somewhat strange that Martinelli doesn't also choose simultaneously to make the reader aware of this side of Francis Bacon's philosophy when the author puts such emphasis on applying Bacon's famous 'Idola mentis' in his zoosemiotical analysis. Fortunately this is my only serious, critical comment on a book, which for me has already meant more than most I've read in recent years. Just as weak as I find the first half of the last chapter of his book, just as strong I will highlight the conclusion of Martinelli's chapter of ethics and morality. The moment Martinelli enters the discussion of explicit echo philosophical character, he is again on a par with the other chapters in the book. Here he is obviously on familiar ground and goes into the important discussion about whether nature can also be said to have "intrinsic values". He delves into the ongoing conflict which consists in ethics and eco-philosophy between wanting to prioritize the anthropocentric values versus a biocentric point of view. It is enlightening and very pleasing to follow Martinelli's critical revision of the denigrated anthropocentrism and see his own priorities. They go in the direction of wanting to maintain what the author labels a "critical anthropocentrism" in zoosemiotic studies combined with a biocentrism and its pursuit of environmental ethical issues. I understand Dario Martinelli's choice of perspective as an important ethical choice. There are several voices in eco-philosophy and eco ethics nowadays that in their eagerness to avoid anthropocentrism, "rinse the baby out with the bath water". For example, when James Lovelock as a response to our current widespread decimation of plant and animal species on earth with no visible difficulty states that species at all times have been eradicated in evolution, then I do pass ("The Revenge of Gaia. Why the Earth is Fighting Back and How We Can Still Save Humanity", 2006). This is an extinction first and foremost due to human folly and greed, and the decimation and extinction are taking place at a pace that is unknown in history. Lovelock has also seemingly small trouble to preach the breakdown probability for one half of the world's population in the near future. We are too many people on Gia already, says Lovelock. I do agree with him. But when he states without any doubt that Gaia will straighten out the mess that humanity has caused during its history, then he expresses what I would call pure misanthropy. It is not primarily his prediction I disagree in. It is very likely that Lovelock is right in his gloomy prophecies. What really bothers me is that Lovelock has chosen a unilateral biocentric or ecocentric perspective on the state of affairs. Based on his perspective Lovelock is choosing the prioritising of nature and Gaia above the human potential future. As I read and understand "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics" Martinelli is fortunately on a completely different planet than James Lovelock. Instead of talking about the mythical Gaia, he chooses to stick to the concrete, vibrant animal life on Earth. Dario Martinelli has written a book permeated by a deep love and respect for all life. He expresses at the same time both the scientist's and the philosopher's critical wonder and combines the candour of man and his ability to express empathy, love and wisdom in his research on life and the living. It is this kind of "humanistic perspective" I find as a clue in Martinelli's scientific work. I am considering Dario Martinelli's book in its entirety as formidable. I know I'm going to have the book with me further on in my own work. More than ever I want to continue to move in the same terrain as the author. With the release of "A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics" the author has brilliantly placed terrain open for further research and wonder.