INTRODUCTION I.

Pre-1987 Constitution CASES:

Planas v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-35925 January 22, 1973 (aka Plebiscite cases) Planas vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs. National Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs. Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs. Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979] Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973, there being no freedom

of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law." Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73. Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention. Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify. Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises. Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under

Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs. Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., 50 SCRA 33 (aka Ratification cases)

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary The Facts: Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases. The Plebiscite Case On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was

amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935

Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. "In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying: "... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion." On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor: ____________________________ "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES "PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. "WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people; "WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary; "WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues; "WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution? "WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite; "WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people; "NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. "Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines "By the President: "ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary" _________________________________ The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." The Issue: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question? 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.) 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? The Resolution: Summary: The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution. Details: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and

therefore non-justiciable, question? On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry." 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88 Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91 Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered.

Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183

Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.

Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 (affirming the validity of Javellana)

Facts

On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a natio nalreferendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martiallaw, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous PresidentialDecree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting andcanvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the peoplein the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that thepeople's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire tohave such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interimlegislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National ReferendumPlebiscite.Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Pr ohibition withPreliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend thatunder the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise theconstituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was institutedby Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power topropose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of theConstitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, hisson, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourthsof all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submitthe question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the appr

oval of suchamendment or revision."In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of allits Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratifiedin accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by theproposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theinterim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shallinitially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace andorder in the country.When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they wereaware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when hecould convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of theinterim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves.In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution wassubmitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold theconvening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposedquestion of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, becausesome of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemedautomatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclus ion since in thatreferendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it.In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment toa Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged inthe amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for theinterim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for thenation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character.In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approvalof the President of any proposed amendment

is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approveor disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do withproposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Occea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 (affirming the validity of Javellana)

OCCENA VS. COMELEC SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-34150 APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments:

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as

far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404] En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively. Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring

what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Phil. Bar Association vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December 20, 1985

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986 FACTS: Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections? HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

II. The 1987 Constitution

III. The State as a Concept A. Elements of a state 1. People 2. Territory 3. Government a. functions: constituent vs. ministrant CASES: ACCFA vs. FLU, 30 SCRA 649

PVTA vs CIR G.R. No. L-32052 65 SCRA 416 July 25, 1975

Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily.

Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No. 444.

HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete.

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration beDENIED.

b. types of government: de jure vs. de facto CASES: Lawyers League vs. Aquino, GR 73748, 5/22/86

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR146710, 3/2/01

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto March 2, 2001 FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign. 2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD: The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president

(president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political. For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

JOSEPH ESTRADA petitioner v GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO respondent G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2,2001Ponente: Puno, J.:FACTS: This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria MacapagalArroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that precipitated thecase at bar thus follows:

1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vicepresident.2.On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and hisfamily of receivingmillions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions of rage.3.There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one byone resignedwithdrawing their support. 4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7Impeachment Trial began. 5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of thepresident.6.January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davideadministeredoath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner leftMalacanang and issueda press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power upon him, thepresident to the vicepresident becoming the acting president7.The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.8.Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency. ISSUES: There are several important issues sprouting in this case. 1. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically inregard thelegitimacy of the Arroyo administration2.WON Estrada merely resigned as President3.WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President4.WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit5.WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity HELD: The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent GloriaMacapagalArroyo as the

de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED . 1. The question on the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration is subject to judicialreview. It is a legal question, which is justiciable.

c. the Government of the Republic of the Phils. d. government vs. administration 4. Sovereignty a. definition b. types: legal vs. political sovereignty c. doctrine of jus postliminium d. effect of suspension or change in sovereignty CASES: Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez, 75 Phil 113 75 PHIL 131 FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the socalled Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law.

ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces. HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign. Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings.

Co kim chan vs valdez tankeh Gr L5

Co kim chan vs valdez tankeh Gr L5

FACTS: a petition for mandamus was flied by herein petitioner. Seeking to continue the proceedings in civil case #3012 which the judge of CFI in manila refused to continue on the ground the proclamation issued by gen. douglasmacarthur had the effect of

invalidating and nullifying all the judicial proceedings nd judgments of the court of the Philippines under thejapanese rule.

ISSUE: whether or not the proclamation of gen.MacArthur nullifies the judicial proceedings.

HELD:no. the proclamation intends only to nullify their laws, whether legislature or judicial which has political complexion. Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the

existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments. In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before

it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Peralta vs. Director, 75 Phil 285 Alcantara vs. Director, 75 Phil 749 FERNANDO, J:Even at this late date, notwithstanding the several occasions where this Court wasleft with no choice but to impose disciplinary sanction, some members of the barunfortunately are still remiss in the fulfillment of their responsibilities, or at the veryleast, in informing this Court of circumstances which, if not justifying, will at thevery least explain their liability to do so. Respondent Enrique A. de la Cruz belongsto such category. As counsel de parte for accused Rodolfo Venzon, he failed to fileappellant's brief within the period which expired on December 22, 1974. As aconsequence, there was the usual resolution addressed to an erring member of thebar for his inability to comply with his sworn duty. Three months passed without aword being received from him. Thereafter, on June 2, 1975, for his failure to file thebrief and to submit the explanation required, this Court, in its resolution, suspendedhim from the practice of the law. In order not to prejudice appellant Venzon, theresolution of this Court likewise saw to it that a counsel de oficio be appointed onthe basis of a strict rotation.At this stage, to be precise on August 26, 1975, came this urgent motion from suchcounsel: "1. That on June 2, 1975, this Honorable Court acting through its SecondDivision ordered the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of law for hisfailure to file appellant's brief in the above-entitled case and to submit hisexplanation thereof within ten days from receipt of the copy of the resolution of theCourt dated February 5, 1975; 2. That the undersigned tried his level best to complywith his duties to this Honorable Tribunal particularly in connection with the brief forthe appellant but due to circumstances beyond his control the failure of appellant'swife to return to the undersigned the transcript of the stenographic notes of theproceedings in the trial court compounded by her assurances that appellant'srelative-lawyer in Manila will prepare the brief as shown by the affidavit . . . was notable to do so; 3. That the undersigned did not receive any copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated February 5, 1975 requiring him to explain why he wasnot able to file appellant's brief and indeed he was taken by surprise when hereceived the copy of the resolution suspending him from the practice of law; 4. That upon verification from the records of this case with the Clerk of Court, undersigneddiscovered that a certain Mrs. Ayalde received the registered letter containing copyof the resolution of this Honorable Court

dated February 5, 1975; 5. That theundersigned does not know personally any person by the name of 'Mrs. Ayalde' andhad never authorized any person carrying that name to receive mail for him,especially registered ones; the undersigned, however, had heard from his wife, Mrs.Felisa B. de la Cruz, the Principal Teacher of Dadiangas North Elementary School,General Santos City, that she has a classroom teacher by that name Mrs. Ayalde; 6. That it is very probable that the letter carrier, upon learning that the undersignedwas out of town that day of March 11, 1975, decided to deliver the letter to Mrs. Dela Cruz at her Office in the school but not finding her there, had Mrs. Ayalde receiveit instead; 7. That it is of judicial notice that the month of March is a very busymonth for Public School Teachers and with all probability Mrs. Ayalde forgot oroverlooked to turn over to Mrs. De la Cruz said registered letter thereafter; . . . ." 1It is his prayer that his suspension be lifted and that he be appointed as counsel deoficio for appellant.What immediately attracts attention is that instead of including an affidavit fromthat "certain Mrs. Ayalde" to whom was attributed the receipt of the copy of theresolution of this Court of February 5, 1975, there was instead a sworn statementby Teresa Venzon, the wife of appellant, which confirmed the fact that the transcriptof stenographic notes was taken by her from respondent for the purpose of enlistingthe aid of a Manila lawyer, a relative of her husband, regarding his appeal and thatshe was unable to bring back with her the aforesaid transcript, which she left withhim. She then, according to her affidavit, assured respondent that the preparationof the brief could very well be entrusted to such Manila lawyer. If that were reallyso, respondent could have filed the formal pleading withdrawing from the case ascounsel. Then he could have avoided the predicament he is in right now. While itwill appear that there is no satisfactory explanation, this Court, in a spirit of leniency, is disposed to lift the suspension not because he had been penalizedenough, three months having elapsed, but also because appellant Venzon, in hisown handwriting at the bottom of an indorsement from the Senior ExecutiveAssistant and Acting Assistant Director Julio M. Alcantara of the Bureau of Prisons, tothe effect that he was notified of the appointment of his counsel de oficio, madeclear that he is withdrawing his appeal. The reason is understandable for in theaffidavit of his wife, she was informed by her husband that "he was able to save thelife of one of the Officers of the Bureau of Prisons in a recent riot that happened andby reason of his good behavior, his parole was already recommended. . . ." 2WHEREFORE, the suspension of respondent Enrique A. de la Cruz is hereby lifted.His prayer to be appointed as counsel de oficio is denied for the reason that in accordance with the express wishes of appellant Rodolfo Venzon, his appeal isconsidered withdrawn. Such withdrawal of appeal then is likewise ordered in thisresolution. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of respondentEnrique A. de la Cruz.Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., are on official leave.

Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil 856 Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil. 856

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines. People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887 People vs. Perfecto 43 Phil 887 FACTS: The Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents, which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. The day following the convening of the Senate, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article regarding what happened. Perfecto was prosecuted for writing an editorial against the Philippine Senate. The editorial in question was alleged to have violated Art. 256 of the Penal Code, punishing insults to Ministers of the Crown.

ISSUE: Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force. RULING: The Supreme Court acquitted him, holding that the particular article, of the said Code had been automatically abrogated, being political in nature, upon the advent of American sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from this spirit which inspires all penal

legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic republic like that of the Unite States. Punishment for contempt of nonjudicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.

People vs PerfectoG.R. No. L-18463FACTS:In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887) the accused was charged with having published anarticle reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. Inthis Court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding thatArticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over thePhilippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of Article256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, thedefendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel Law. In thecourse of the main opinion in the Perfecto case is found this significant sentence: Act No. 292 of thePhilippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected Article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.ISSUES:Whether or not Mr. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code.On the subject of whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented,is in force.HELD: The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in theinformation do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe thatarticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and isinconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Macariola vs. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION 114 SCRA 77 FACTS: 1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition. 2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.

3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. 4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963. 5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc., 6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals with acts unbecoming of a judge. 7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce. ISSUE: Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge? HELD: Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondents order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982 (En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge

Asuncion was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March

6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Macariola vs Asuncion A.M. No. 133-J 114 SCRA 77 May 31, 1982

Petitioner: Bernardita R. Mecariola Respondent: Hon. Elias B. Asuncion, in his capacity as Judge of Court of First Instance (CFI) Leyte

FACTS: Respondent judge rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 2012 for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to him, which he later approved. Among the parties thereto was petitioner Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot was adjudicated t the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

The fifth lot, Lot 1184-E, was sold to a Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of the lot to respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. Spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc, owned and managed by Judge Asuncion.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion charging him with "Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking Art 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, pars.1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of RA No. 3019, Section 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. A certain Judge Nepomuceno however dismissed such complaints. Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion's act does not violate the above-mentioned provisions.

HELD: The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act Unbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time.

Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. Respondent judge purchased the said lot after the decision rendered was already final because no party filed for an appeal within the reglementary period which makes the lot in question no longer the subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, rather from a Dr. Arcadio Galapon.

Petition is hereby DENIED.

Vilas vs. City of Manila, 42 Phil 953 Facts

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditorof the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished. Issue

Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to itscreditor?

Held

No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

B. Concept of Act of State C. Doctrine of the state as parenspatriae CASES: Govt vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil 728 Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest

Facts:

1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake. 2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. As a result, various petitions were filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay with interest.

3.

The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans.

Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action

YES.

The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the people. These principles are based upon public policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities. Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad G.R. No. 9959 35 PH 728, 751-753 December 13, 1916

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.

Cabanas vs. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94 MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974) Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased. Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.

With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." Cabanas v Pilapil Digest Facts: 1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy?

YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest Political Law Parens Patriae Strengthening the Family Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and Francisco then took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money to be placed in favor of her and for her to be the childs trustee and the childs benefits. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy? HELD: The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this countrys tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.