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This paper was a take-home exam written on Immanuel Kant's conceptualization of reason, the

soul and consciousness.


Written by: Shawn Monaghan
January 31, 1997

On Reason

The dialectic of pure reason is viewed by Kant as an illustration, even a proof. A proof that the
illusion inherent in the dialectic of pure reason necessarily eliminates any pretension of reason’s
constitutive nature, but establishes it as an important regulative device, for apprehending the
world. The contradictions entailed within the four antinomies (Ak. 339) brand pure reason as
virtually irrelevant but also as essentially a hindrance to the task of understanding nature. A
'contradiction' in this context, I hope it is unnecessary to state, is the phenomena by which two
contradictory statements are each considered deductively true.
For Kant, pure reason is epitomized by the dialectic as, at least, "irrelevant" in the sense that it
holds virtually no application to the world of experience. Furthermore, pure reason is, at most,
viewed as a hindrance because it leads the metaphysician to think she is ascertaining a valuable
insight into the world of things as they are in themselves. In Kant's view we necessarily do not
have access to the world of noumena only their appearances as they are apprehended by our
senses. Thus, the world we see is the world of appearances not the world of things in themselves.
The metaphysicians first mistake is in the assumption that what they have devised by means of
pure reason apprehends the noumenal world. The mistake is in the application of what are
considered the things in themselves to the deduction of pure reason instead of that which they are
correctly considered -- merely appearances.

For one result at least is unavoidable. As it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason
with itself [the dialectic] -- so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for things in
themselves and not for mere appearances, which they are in fact (Ak. 347)--

That pure reason so readily reveals itself through contradiction and conflict is illustrative of its
fortuitous nature. Perhaps this is even a hint of the regulative nature of reason. When we have
isolated the contradictions from nature from the world (as Kant has here) it becomes clear that
reason contradicts itself merely because its concepts are not properly grounded. These concepts
are thought to come from the world but clearly if the world in itself is considered the source then
the world in itself will be explained by reason. What we have is not the world in itself explained,
but contradictions of an immense nature. Should we then apprehend nature as fertile with
insoluble problems? Nay, says Kant we must take responsibility for the creation of these
concepts that have resulted in insoluble problems and realize the mistake is not that of nature but
one of reason. If we are to learn the lesson of our ways we must realize the true nature of pure
reason herein outlined -- faulty concepts lead to contradictions. Since, Kant contends it is a
mistake to believe we have knowledge of the things in themselves it is a mistake to believe our
concepts are noumenal. It is also a mistake to believe we can understand nature with the concepts
we have so incorrectly drawn far from any relevant application of experiences (Ak. 349). Reason
must necessarily be able to resolve all of its own conflicts it must be able to account for its own
nature and formal structure -- if reason it be. We cannot claim that the world has misled us, that
nature drew us along the garden path. We must account for what should be the fundamental
perspicuity of our own rational methods (Ak. 349). In Kant's conceptualization of reason and the
world the only way we can properly view reason is to be aware that the objects we juggle with
reason are concepts, phantasms of reason.

But if we entirely quit nature or, in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible experience,
and so enter the realm of mere ideas, we cannot then say that the object is inconceivable and that
the nature of things proposes to us insoluble problems. For we are not then concerned with
nature or with given objects at all, but with mere concepts which have their origin solely in our
reason, and with mere beings of thought; and all the problems that arise from our concepts of
them must be solved, because of course reason can and must give a full account of its own
procedure (Ak. 349)

Kant holds up an example of the true use of reason as a mediative tool of the understanding. As
such, we are capable of deducing the a priori synthetic principle of the understanding because
we have not sunk to the destructive discourse of objects as things in themselves. Kant does not
seem to fear that his own deductions from pure reason are suspect. Perhaps this is because he
carefully remains within the realm of possible experience. This quagmire of contradiction is
avoided by Kant in his deduction of a priori cognition through avoidance of objects which are
mere appearance.

Therefore in one way only can my intuition anticipate the actuality of the object, and be a
cognition a priori, viz., if my intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility, which in me
as subject precedes all the actual impression through which I am affected by objects (his
emphasis (Ak. 282)).

Thus, Kant asserts, the problem of how pure mathematics is possible is solved through appeal to
no objects except "those of the senses" (Ak. 283). Objects of which we can only know the
appearances, the qualities as our senses receive them, are problematic objects for the derivation
of pure reason -- they are mere appearances. All that these 'apparent' objects may derive is
'apparent' connection to the world. This 'apparent reason' then begets the dialectic of reason,
nothing but declarations which contradict our rational sensibilities. The dialectic of pure reason
is thus only resolved in the Kantian view in the recognition of the separation of the world of
reason from the world of experience. That which goes well beyond the empirical realm could not
possibly be represented with fidelity to our experiences. The dialectic is not just Kant's proof
from reductio ad absurdum this is the true nature of pure reason revealed as a tool beyond price.
Revealed as an invaluable tool because by its very nature it implicates itself when it is used
improperly. That is, when it is used to deduce the thing in itself from things merely apparent.
The limits of reason in natural science, and mathematics too, are demarcated by this (now often
spoken concatenation) the dialectic. Even mathematics is limited by the world of appearances.
But, Kant wants to claim, neither of these fields suffers from its separation with metaphysics.
And metaphysics itself can benefit from both the realization of the boundary defined by these
transcendental ideas and the boundary itself as a revelation of the lack of completeness of our
investigations within the world (Ak. 353). A world of objects that we cannot comprehend but
only follow the direction that their appearances portend.

About the Soul


We enter the dissertation on the soul with the perspective that reason is not directly applicable to
the world of experience. Reason is a tool that allows us to perfect the faculty of understanding to
ascertain this the path toward objective knowledge. The faculty of understanding is not
diminished but is amplified by reason's instruction, a pedagogy of what should properly be
knowledge, a way towards objective knowledge (Ak.331). Reason is an integral tool to bring
forth the completion of the understanding in the "complex of experiences". This complete
understanding of the complex of the empirical world is not an apprehension of the objects of
experience but an overriding principle of form, of regulation. The ultimate goal, the nature of
ideas, is this bringing of the understanding as close to this global narrative of completeness as
possible (Ak. 332).
The soul, viewed by the faculty of reason and constitutively informed by the understanding,
cannot be immortal or permanent. For the realm of permanence not only necessarily goes beyond
experience but also the soul itself is only very crudely delineated as subject of our understanding,
as an object of experience. The soul as transcendental subject is the "I think" of all of our
perceptions and sensations. It cannot be pictured as the predicate of any other subject and as such
is a mysterious phenomena which our reason wants to apprehend as an object in itself. But,
because it cannot be predicated upon anything else it transcends the world of experience even as
it is the subject of this world. To pretend that it is permanent is to foretell that which no human
has experienced that which is immaterial -- life after death. To derive the soul in this manner is
an unforgivable affront to the understanding which needs to experience that which it can
reasonably know. To limit the soul as merely a subject of experience is an affront to reason
which necessarily divines in fact inspires us to view the soul as though it transcends the mere
world of appearances. The soul is prior to all experience in that it accompanies all apprehension
of the empirical world. But the only evidence we have of the soul is this very insubstantial
subject of all our experiences. This phantasm is an almost internal sensation that there is an ego,
an I, that has the perceptions which make us that which we are. Not only is the soul the subject
of the understanding but also the subject of our reason. It is both the "I think" of reason and the
transcendental concept which is not apprehendable by understanding in any form of intuition
(Ak. 334).
This therefore, is the primary thought of how the soul cannot be permanent. Permanence is only
reasonably considered a concept that we can use as empirically objective knowledge in so far as
we can experientially define and encounter it. Since we cannot experience life after death we
should dispense with all pretensions that our soul shall do so as this is necessarily beyond any
precepts of empirical data. The only evidence we have had of the permanence of the soul has
been as substance of transcendent experience. As with the dialectic of pure reason Kant contends
that our reason only leads us to believe in immortality of the soul because it tries to project its
tenets into the world of things in themselves. Whereas, the substance of reason's premises are
mere "beings of thought" they are not a substance possible within the realm of experience (Ak.
331). In so far as the understanding apprehends the soul, reason's principle of the permanence of
the soul goes well beyond anything conceivable as objective knowledge. The realm of possible
experiences will not reach the soul in this ideal of permanence (Ak. 334). The soul as a being in
itself is unknown to us.
That the soul thus far seems opaque to us is not necessarily forever to remain a mystery. Even
though we cannot reasonably conceive of the soul through the understanding and experience
alone we are not kept from investigating it as a concept as a "being of thought". The limits of
reason as a means of perceiving the soul are not boundaries beyond which we cannot seek but
merely an embodiment of the incompleteness of reason (Ak. 352). The material perception of the
soul as experience are also an incomplete endeavour, but to such a degree that we know we must
seek a greater principle of completeness within reason. The soul itself must inevitably remain
utterly a mystery within empirical endeavours. So we must seek the dialectic as a means of
reaching for the global narrative which tries to satisfy the criteria of completeness but cannot.
This means of grasping the soul through reason does at least provide satisfaction beyond that of
the world of sense, mere appearances to the understanding cannot do it justice. Thus, we enter
into our first real battle between the world of reason and the world of experiences -- Kant’s
conceptualization of the intelligible world.
On Consciousness
We are beings whose very own subject of consciousness (the soul) is indeterminate within the
empirical world. As such, we must lean toward the intelligible world the world of reason to
understand ourselves. For in this sense we cannot be considered denizens of the world of
experience alone. Just as the complex organism has various specialized organs to deal with
multiple tasks of survival, so do we also have a complex organ of understanding which creates
its own concepts and perhaps even its own world. We live in this, the intelligible world of reason
just as much as we live in the empirical world. Thus it seems reasonable that concepts that are
the sole products of this intelligible world should affect us even though they do not exist within
the world of experience. Thus the circle of reasoning that Kant raised as a possible problem is
resolved because we are residents of more than a single world. This other world contains all of
our concepts and ideals. It is the world that contains a regulative principle for our search for the
global narrative for the search for completeness. Is it then not truly a world of its own?
The self-diagnosed problem of circularity that Kant raises is pin-pointed when he posits freedom.
It could be said he does this merely to allow for later justification of moral law. Thus, when he
derives the moral law from freedom he effectively avoids a true derivation of moral law. In this
manner Kant realizes that his reasoning has led him in a circle. Suppositioning freedom and then
using its derivation as the grounds for demonstrating self-legislation (Ak. 450). His task in order
to rescue his moral philosophy is to find a 'natural' source of freedom. His answer to the
circularity of the problem is to reach out to the intelligible world for our nature as a priori
efficient causes. And at the same time recognize that that which we affect once we have made
our decision and acted upon it, is enacted upon the world of experiences. Thus if we separate the
two elements of the circle into the two worlds within which we belong, the circle is no longer a
liability. In fact the circle becomes not a fallacious dead end but a circle of life engendered by
our dual nature of existence (Ak. 450).
Thus, freedom and other concepts of the intelligible world are founded not in nature but from the
rational being itself. Being the sole a priori efficient cause of freedom itself this being cannot
reject this tenet as merely fallacious for there are no grounds for doing so. The natural world is
founded on the grounds of the intelligible world just exactly as the faculties of understanding are
the source of all the sensations we experience (for though the noumena is the ultimate source, the
faculty of understanding synthesizes and shapes it into that which we perceive). Thus the concept
of freedom must be considered not merely supposed but apprehended by the mere fact of
consciousness (Ak. 452).
Reason prescribes limits to the understanding. Kant understands reason's main task as the
separation of the world of sense from the world of understanding (Ak. 452). In recognition of
this capacity of reason it would seem prudent to ascribe to ourselves a wholly synthetical nature.
Never are we truly subject to the determinant causes of nature for we do not passively receive
sensations, we primarily apprehend them in our faculty of mind that allows for the construction
of the world in which we exist. As the cause of our sensuous world, as we apprehend it in the
understanding, and as the sole source of reason itself we are demonstrably agents of free will.
A rational being cannot but ascribe to itself the quality of freedom, for reason must be
independent of the determination of the world of sense (Ak. 452-3). As we see ourselves as free
we transpose ourselves into the intelligible world. We coexist within two "standpoints" the world
of experience as well as the world of reason. As we believe ourselves to be free, we know
ourselves to be autonomous and as such we bring with autonomy the realm of morality. As
rational free beings we must accept the value of our self as a thing in itself and thereby abide by
the categorical imperative as a rational necessity. In this sense we have accepted that to be free is
to know that by our freedom we are limited like no other unfree being can be. We are limited by
the acceptance of freedom and this freedom limits our autonomy within the empirical world but
at the same time as it limits the world of senses it unleashes the world of reason, the intelligible
world (Ak. 453).
In the Prolegomena Kant's first reference to the intelligible world describes it as the world of
noumena. This is a world of things about which we neither know nor can ever know anything
determinate but we can only know appearances (Ak. 315).
There is indeed something seductive in our pure concepts of the understanding which tempts us
to a transcendent use - a use which transcends all possible experience. Not only are our concepts
of substance, of power, of action, of reality, and others, quite independent of experience,
containing nothing of sense appearance, and so apparently applicable to things in themselves
(noumena), but, what strengthens this conjecture, they contain a necessity of determination in
themselves, which experience never attains (Ak. 315).

It seems that Kant almost subverts his own early ideas of the intelligible world with the later one
(above) in his book on morals. For, if the seduction to apply concepts of reason as if they are
themselves applicable to the noumena is a task of meaninglessness then what has Kant done here
with Freedom?
Through this last section in this book (on Morals..) Kant seems to have informed us about the
nature of ourselves as denizens in this intelligible world. If we dwell in the world of noumena are
we not then noumenal ourselves? Of course we are, noumena is thought to be the source of all
appearances. The self which is our subjective seat of consciousness is itself opaque to us. We
cannot perceive the self in its true nature anymore than the other objects of the apparent world.
Kant's solution to the problem of his circularity of thought is intelligible. And his use of the
intelligible world as a means of deriving freedom is also intelligible. What he has done does not
directly contradict any previous part of his works as known to me. Kant deduced that our reason
allows us residence in a world of noumena, then therefore allowing for the deduction of freedom.
A deduction of the self same freedom which he feared was only a machination of circularity. I
agree with Kant, the problem has been resolved. As rational beings we truly appear to be our
own cause in a world of appearances and through this the cause of the objects of our world. I
cannot conceive that such a world would not contain the conceptualization of freedom which
Kant has here determined. That this conceptualization of the intelligible world is intelligible must
now be anothers task to determine. For I have herein dealt with this concept and rendered it
intelligible to myself the question is whether or not others find my dissertation intelligible.

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