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CASE DIGESTS
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

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Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006 Azcuna, J. FACTS: The rally was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue where BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated the petitioners right, as an organizations and individuals, of peaceful assembly. RULING: The Supreme Court held that B.P. No 880 is valid and constitutional. It is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes; otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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IBP vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010 Carpio Morales, J. FACTS: IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge. The mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. A criminal action was thereafter instituted against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to public assembly.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavourable action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880 AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law. Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed. The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. (b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. (c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes. Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

Page |5 (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. (d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory. (g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. (h) (i) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

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Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following: (a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly; (c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully; (d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly. Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times. Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines: (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined; (b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards; (c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property. Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows: (a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance; (b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

Page |7 (c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse; (d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: (e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal. Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly; (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf. (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf; (d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly; (f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof; 1. 2. 3 4. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like; the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like; the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares; the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems. Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:

Page |8 (a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years; (c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866; (d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days. Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act. Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly. Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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CASE DIGESTS
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

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Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 Puno, J. FACTS: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009 Velasco, JR., J.

FACTS: Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan): Lehitimong anak ng demonyo! Sinungaling! Gago ka talaga, Michael! Masahol ka pa sa putang babae, o di ba? Yung putang babae, ang gumagana lang doon, yung ibaba, dito kay Michael, ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court is justified in imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on the television program Ang Dating Daan on the ground of host petitioner Sorianos remarks about Iglesia ni Cristos Michael prostituting himself when he attacked Soriano in the Iglesias own television program. RULING: The Supreme Court held that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used. The Supreme Court also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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Austria vs NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999 Kapunan, J. FACTS: Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other private respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his services were terminated. On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications from Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made accountable since it was private respondent Pastor Buhat and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the meeting to discuss the non-remittance of church collection and the events that transpired between him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, wilful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services. 1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. = decision rendered in favor of petitioner 2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent 3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter 4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of respondent. Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good-neighbors. The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affaits are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the given examples. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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Islamic Dawah Council Of The Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003 Corona, J. FACTS: Petitioner Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Dawah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs to oversee its implementation. Petitioner contends that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 46 is not constitutional. RULING: The Supreme Court held that there is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labelled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. Furthermore, the Supreme Court do not share respondents apprehension that the absence of a central administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact that Muslim consumers can actually verify through the labels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the concerned certifying organization.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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Velarde v SJS, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004 Panganiban, J. FACTS: The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions .They alleged that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion. The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons: 1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law. 2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitute a justiciable controversy. Why? a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter. b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution, c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights. It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honoured rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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Taruc vs De la Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005 Corona, J. FACTS: Petitioners were expelled/excommunicated from the PIC by Bishop de la Cruz by reason of disobedience to authority, inciting dissension, and threatening to occupy the parish causing anxiety and fear among the members. Petitioners then filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied so they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo and ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to its being re-filed before the proper forum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to hear cases involving the expulsion/excommunication of the members of a religious institution.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1

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