Jurisdiction Eristingcol vs. Court of Appeals 582 SCRA 139 Facts: Petitioner is a residential lot owner at Urdaneta Village.

Private Respondents were the former officers of the Urdaneta Village Association Inc (UVAI). Petitioner alleged that in compliance with the National Building Code and after UVAIs approval of her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and architects fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lot with "concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway"; that for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations (or "CRR") on "Set Back Line" vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on "Set Back Line," is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive. She filed a complaint with the RTC seeking to declare the nullity of UVAIs by laws. A day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a temporary settlement whereby UVAI executed an undertaking which allowed Eristingcols workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI. UVAI filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (or "HIGC") 2 which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners associations. Eristingcol opposed the motion. She argued that UVAI did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the [RTC] after they voluntarily appeared therein "and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking." The RTC denied the MTD(nag voluntary appearance daw ang UVAI). The CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcols complaint. Held: HLURB. In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is well-established. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latters deft phraseology of its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction Rules. In short, the crux of Eristingcols complaint is UVAIs supposed arbitrary implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, a member thereof. Moreover, as in Sta. Clara (had respondent-spouses Gaston been members of SCHA), the controversy which arose between the parties in this case partook of the nature of an intra-corporate dispute. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 535,14 which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over homeowners associations originally vested with the SEC. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides in pertinent part: 2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers: (a) x x x; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home owners association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding; (b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners association registered in accordance therewith. By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SECs original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations.15 Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners associations, were transferred to the HLURB. As regards the defendants supposed embrace of the RTCs jurisdiction by appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcols workers from entering the village, suffice it to state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.16 is quite a long stretch. The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in the case at bench are worlds apart. As found by the CA, defendants appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in connection with Eristingcols application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On defendants supposed agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing Eristingcols workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this temporary settlement cannot be equated with full acceptance of the RTCs authority, as what actually transpired in Tijam. The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case.17 In that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first timefifteen years after the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred by laches from invoking the CFIs lack of jurisdiction. Duero vs. CA 373 SCRA Facts:

According to petitioner, respondent Eradel, entered and occupied his land. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land. Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership against Eradel and two others. A compromise agreement was reached by petitioner and the defendants except Eradel. Consequently, Eradel failed to file his Answer and was declared in default. Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte and judgment was rendered in his favour. Private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded. The trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. The trial court denied the MR. Petitioner filed a motion for execution which was granted. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA. The CA granted the petition and declared that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the action. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it. Held: No. In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the said court,16 believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691 17 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land.18But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution. Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.19 Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. 20 The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. 21 Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. 22 Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances. Donato vs. CA 417 SCRA Facts: Petitioner file a complaint for FE and UD against against 43 named defendants and all unknown occupants of his land in San Andres, Manila. He alleged that private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent. Demand letters were sent but were left unanswered. 20 of the 43 defendants filed a consolidated answer. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation while they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.

The METC renderer judgment against the 23 defendants who failed to answer, ordering them to vacate the premises occupied by each of them. As to 20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment [on the same day sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice. On appeal, the RTC sustained the METC. Thereafter, the CA dismissed the petition for review because the certification against forum shopping was signed by counsel not the petitioner himself the only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed. Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the SC raising the issue of grave abuse of discretion of the CA when it dismissed its petition on a mere technicality. Issue: Whether the proper remedy was filed? Held: NO. The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:[19 Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction . This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Sps. Gonzaga vs. CA 394 SCRA Facts: Petitioners bought a parcel of land with Lucky Homes Inc. The lot was known as Lot 19. Said lot was used as security for petitioners housing loan with the SSS. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent Lucky Homes, through its general manager, informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint. A writ of execution was issued. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction. The CA denied the petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court?

Held: Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.5 We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order
[

or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy: "A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. "It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy." In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not. Escobal vs. Garchitorena 422 SCRA Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Philippine Constabulary. While conducting a surveillance operation on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant, he got involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of Rodney Rafael Nueca. An amended information was filed against him for murder with RTC. He was preventively suspended. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that the court martial and not the RTC which has jurisdiction. The prosecution commenced the presentation of evidence. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The MTD was denied but a preliminary hearing was ordered to determine whether the offense was committed in relation to his office. The trial court initially ruled in the negative but it reversed such decision. The Information was ordered to be amended and that the records of the case be transmitted to the SB. The Presiding Justice of the SB ordered that the case be returned to the court of origin. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC? Held: No. Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 . However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.22 The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law: In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial

Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively. Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Atienza 420 Facts: Petitioner is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines pursuant to the Local Government Code. The Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization.4 Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said Constitution and By-Laws states: All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the "Liga Election Code" or such other rules as may be promulgated by the National Liga Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of existing laws. By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. 5 Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga Election Code states: . There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. Thereafter, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. Mayor Atienza signed and approved the assailed city ordinance and issued E.O. No. 11 to implement the same. Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the SC seeking nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002,1 and respondent City Mayors Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002. Issue: Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts? Held: Yes. We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:16 This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor0 will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts docket. As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,17 the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. (Note: the SC likewise held:
although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. 14 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied). As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.)

Hannah Serrana vs. SB 542 SCRA Facts: Petitioner was appointed as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term by President Estrada. She then discussed and proposed to to President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. Thereafter, petitioner and her siblings, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). President Estrada gave 15million pesos to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Also, that she is not a public officer and assuming in arguendo that she was, she did not commit the crime in relation to her office. Issue: 1. Whether the SB has jurisdiction? 2. Whether petitioner is a public officer? 3. Whether she committed the crime in relation to her office? Held: 1. Yes. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. 2. Yes. Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition feepaying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. 45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. 3. Yes. In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government. (note: according to sir,) Clarita Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan 603 SCRA 348 Facts: Two petitions for forfeiture were filed with the SB against retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias). The petition alleged that the Garcias allegedly amassed and acquired ill gotten wealth. Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder). The plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases. After Forfeiture I, summonses were duly served on respondent Garcias. Instead of filing an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The motion was denied. The Garcias were declared in default. Their MR was also denied. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied pursuant to the prohibited pleading rule. The Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements. The motion was denied. Hence petitioner filed special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari with the SC.

For Forfeiture II, the summonses were only served with Gen. Garcia. In the return, he merely noted that " Im receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic)." Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now covered by the plunder case. The SB denied both the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of summons. The denial of the motion cause petitioner to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Issue: Whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for that matterconsidering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No. 28107has already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB. Held: No. On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioners contention. 1 a vv phi1 Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus: SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.22 In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
(Note: Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, 13 the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus: Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x." 14 Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. 15 Thus "if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.16)

Platinum tours vs. Panlilio 411 SCRA Facts: (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. Branch 62 of the RTC of Makati rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum. A writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and sold. Private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5 million. The motion was denied. Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to Branch 146, RTC of Makati. In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, this time by incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634. Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Platinum moved to reconsider but was denied. Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365

to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and decide it as a separate case. Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals The petitioner elevated the case to the SC assailing the jurisdiction of Branch 62 to try Civil Case No. 96-365. It argues that when Judge Diokno order of allowing the consolidation of the two cases was set annulled and aside, Branch 62 basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished. Issue: Whether branch 62 has jurisdiction? Held: Yes. Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. [6 In general, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[7 Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order. Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case. Manila Bankers vs. Ng Kok Wei 418 SCRA Facts: Respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, Petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. He paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at P860,922.00. Then, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of P729,830.00. Consequently, Petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner). Petitioner returned to the Philippines on April, 1990 only to find out that the turn-over of the unit was reset to May 31, 1990 because various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage). Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities. Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990. On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file an action for specific performance and damages. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium

unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages. The trial court found petitioner liable for damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. A MR was filed but was denied. Hence, this petition for review questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case. Petitioner argues that it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction. Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction? Held: Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction. On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled that the factual findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[7 Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. 18 These exceptions are not present here. GSIS vs. Santiago 414 SCRA Facts: Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from defendant GSIS and was secured with a REM of parcels of land. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant GSIS and the latter foreclosed the REM. The mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by defendant GSIS. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles, however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. The certificate of sale was annotated and inscribed in the TCT of the parcels of land and it indicated therein the lots that were excluded. Then, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership was executed by defendant GSIS over Zuluetas lots, including the lots, which as earlier stated, were already excluded from the foreclosure. Therafter, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to defendant GSIS. After Defendant GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development Corporation, it began disposing the foreclosed lots including the excluded ones. Subsequently, an agreement was reached by the Zulueta and representative Eduardo Santiago, transferring the formers rights and interests over the excluded lots. Plaintiff Eduardo Santiagos lawyer, Atty. Wenceslao B. Trinidad, wrote a demand letter to defendant GSIS asking for the return of the eighty-one (81) excluded lots. Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filed with the RTC an action for reconveyance against GSIS. Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer alleging inter alia that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches and that the complaint stated no cause of action. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assailed decision affirming that of the RTC. A MR was filed but it was denied. The petitioner elevated the case to the SC via petition for review arguing that there was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice be attributed to the petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of title over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale. Issue: Whether the issue of bad faith could be assailed in the SC? Held: NO. At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom. 6 By assailing the findings of
[

facts of the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in its petition. Katon vs. Palanca 437 SCRA Facts: Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of lands located in Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of its re-classification from forest to agricultural land and, thereafter for him to apply for a homestead patent. The In, 1965, Director of Lands favourably declared the land as agricultural land. "Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. In 1999, Petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land. Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. A MR was filed but was denied , for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking its residual prerogative. Hence, this petition. Issue: Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition? Held: Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus: "x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.13 In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules. To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction"15 and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
(Note: the action was more of an action for reversion and not annulment of title nor reconveyance; dismissal was proper because, the action being one for reversion, it is only the Sol Gen who can bring said action, thus, the complaint states cause of action)

Pecson vs. Comelec 575 SCRA

Facts: Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga. Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecson's 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest. The RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. Cunanan filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC issued an Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing the transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department ( ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials2 (Rules) allows this remedy. The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order. Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ of execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting the motion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting the records of the case. Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO but eventually denied Cunanans petition. It ruled that the resolution of the motion for execution pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents. On Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution reversing the ruling of the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's findings of good reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It affirmed the authority of the RTC to order execution pending appeal; it however nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecson's period to appeal). The case was elevated to the SC via petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65. Issue: Whether execution pernding appeal could be granted? Held: Yes. We see no merit in Cunanan's argument. The writ of execution issued by the RTC is a mere administrative enforcement medium of the Special Order - the main order supporting Pecson's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ itself cannot and does not assume a life of its own independent from the Special Order on which it is based. Certainly, its nullification does not carry with it the nullification of the Special Order. This consequence does not of course hold true in the reverse situation - the nullification of the Special Order effectively carries with it the nullification of its implementing writ and removes the basis for the issuance of another implementing writ. In the present case, the reality is that if and when we ultimately affirm the validity of the Special Order, nothing will thereafter prevent the RTC from issuing another writ. Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties) must have not lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending appeal, not for the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of the Rules which does not require the issuance of the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under Section 10 of the Rules.