SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO SOUTH BUILDING TENTATIVE RULINGS - September 07, 2011

EVENT DATE: 09/08/2011

EVENT TIME:

02:30:00 PM

DEPT.: N-23

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Harry L. Powazek

CASE NO.:

37-2010-00150342-PR-TR-NC

CASE TITLE: IN RE: THE DAVID L. BEDOLLA LIVING TRUST ESTABLISHED JULY 24, 2007 CASE CATEGORY: Probate EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Probate) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion - Other, 06/24/2011
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. Respondents move for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Petitioners lack standing to bring the petition both because they have no immediate pecuniary interest in these proceedings and because they cannot bring an elder abuse claim on behalf of their father as they are not his personal representatives nor do they stand to benefit monetarily from the claim. A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute (CCP 438), the rules governing demurrers apply. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 995, 999.) Lack of standing to sue, which occurs if a plaintiff is not the real party in interest or is not the person in whom the alleged cause of action lies, can be raised by a "general" demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal. 2d 344, 351; Friendly Village Community Ass'n v Silva & Hill Constr. Co. (1973) 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 224.) Probate Code 17200 grants a trust beneficiary standing to petition the probate court "concerning the internal affairs of the trust." (Probate Code 17200 (a).) "Probate Code section 24 defines 'beneficiary' of a trust to include 'a person who has any present or future interest, vested or contingent.'" (Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 517, 524.) Additionally, Probate Code 48 defines an "[i]nterested person," in relevant part as: "(a) Subject to subdivision (b), "interested person" includes any of the following: (1) An heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding. (2) Any person having priority for appointment as personal representative. (3) A fiduciary representing an interested person. (b) The meaning of "interested person" as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding." [Emphasis added.]

CASE TYPE: Trust Proceedings

Event ID: 922080

TENTATIVE RULINGS Page: 1

Calendar No.:

CASE TITLE: IN RE: THE DAVID L. BEDOLLA CASE NUMBER: 37-2010-00150342-PR-TR-NC LIVING TRUST ESTABLISHED JULY
"Probate Code 48 (b) broadly permits the court to determine the sufficiency of a party's interest for the purposes of each proceeding conducted.... Thus, section 48 is designed to provide the probate court with flexibility to control its proceedings to both further the best interests of the estate and to protect the rights of interested persons to those proceedings." (Estate of Maniscalco (1992) 9 Cal. App. 4th 520, 523-524.) A determination of whether a party has standing under Probate Code 48(b), "requires [the trial court] to evaluate the underlying policy considerations regarding a specific probate proceeding in determining whether the person or party is sufficiently interested to intervene." (Id. at 524.) "As we can see from section 48 and the cases that have interpreted it, standing for purposes of the Probate Code is a fluid concept dependent on the nature of the proceeding before the trial court and the parties' relationship to the proceeding, as well as to the trust (or estate). This means that before the issue of standing can be resolved, we must understand the nature of the proceedings so that we may determine the parties' relationship to it." (Arman v. Bank of America (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 697, 702-703.) This is because a "party may qualify as an interested person entitled to participate for purposes of one proceeding but not for another." (Id. at 702.) Respondents' contention that Petitioners have no "pecuniary interest" to support their standing in this matter is without merit. Not only are Petitioners the children of the Trustor, and therefore "interested persons" under Probate Code 48, but they are also contingent beneficiaries under Probate Code 24. Specifically, if they succeed in their request for relief, their mother would immediately receive the benefit of this success, and they, as her likely beneficiaries, would have a future interest in her estate. With respect to the contention that Petitioners lack standing to bring an elder abuse cause of action on behalf of the deceased Trustor, it too must fail. Specifically, Respondents contend that Petitioners are neither the personal representative nor "interested persons" under Probate Code 48 such that they may maintain an elder abuse cause of action. With respect to the latter contention, Respondents contend that in order to qualify as "interested persons" under Probate Code 48, Petitioners must not only be the children of the abused elder, but they must also have a pecuniary interest in the claim. Again, Respondent's argument is without merit. Welfare and Institutions Code 15657.3 (d) delineates who has standing to bring an elder abuse lawsuit after the death of an elder or dependent adult. It provides that "[u]pon petition, after the death of the elder or dependent adult, the right to maintain an action shall be transferred to the personal representative of the decedent, or if none, to the person or persons entitled to succeed to the decedent's estate." Welfare and Institutions Code 15657.3 (d)(1)(C) and (d)(2) provide that "[i]f the personal representative refuses to commence or maintain an action or if the personal representative's family ... is alleged to have committed abuse of the elder," "[a]n interested person, as defined in Section 48 of the Probate Code" "shall have standing to commence or maintain an action for elder abuse." Again, Probate Code 48 (a)(1) provides that "'interested person' includes any of the following: [] (1) An heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding." (Probate Code 48 (a)(1), emphasis added.) In looking at the plain meaning of the statute, it is clear that a child, whether or not he or she can establish a "pecuniary interest," may bring an elder abuse cause of action. The above conclusion is bolstered by the legislative intent behind the elder abuse statute. "The Legislature did not define the operative words in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3, subdivision (d). However, when Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3 was added to the statutory scheme [citation] the Legislature specified that the Elder Abuse Act was intended to 'enable interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults.' (Welf. & Inst.Code, 15600, subd. (j), added by Stats.1991, ch. 774, 2, p. 3476, italics added.) This statement of legislative intent suggests the Legislature intended a broad definition of standing in the context of elder abuse cases." (In re Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220, 227, emphasis added.) "Courts must interpret the standing provision in Welfare and Institutions Code section TENTATIVE RULINGS Event ID: 922080 Calendar No.: Page: 2

CASE TITLE: IN RE: THE DAVID L. BEDOLLA CASE NUMBER: 37-2010-00150342-PR-TR-NC LIVING TRUST ESTABLISHED JULY 15657.3, subdivision (d) to deter, not encourage such abuse. If abusers gain control of an estate, they may not use a restrictive interpretation of standing as an escape hatch." (Id. at 231.)
Based on the above, the motion must be denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Event ID: 922080

TENTATIVE RULINGS Page: 3

Calendar No.: