THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY (1915)

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Bringing into relief the logical foundations of methods of research in the particular sciences is thus the concern of logic as theory of science. This cannot be developed in its entirety in what follows; rather, a certain particular category (a basic logical element)the concept of timewill be singled out and its structure clarified. What will ultimately be shown is that a central concept is made a problem here, and that its solution also should shed light on the whole logical character of the particular sciences that apply this category. The question now is, on what path can we be most certain of arriving at knowledge of the logical structure of the concept of time in the science of history? When we speak of a special logical structure that belongs to this concept of time, we mean that its content is determined in a peculiar manner by very specific ultimate categorial elements. This determination of the concept time in general into the concept of historical time is what must be brought into relief. It will be presented through the fact that the science of history applies the concept of time in a manner corresponding to its tasks. Accordingly, we will be able to read off the structure of the concept of time in history from its function in the science of history; this peculiar function should in turn be able to be understood on the basis of the goal of the science of history. Therefore, the path we will follow in solving our problem of a logical characterization of the concept of time in the science of history proceeds from the goal of the science of history via the resulting function of the concept of time and to the structure of this concept. The problem can be formulated in the following summary manner: What structure must the concept of time in the science of history have in order for it to be able to begin to function as a concept of time in a manner corresponding to the goal of this science? Thus we will not be presupposing a particular philosophical theory about the science of history and investigating what structure of the concept of time fits in with it but rather proceeding from the science of history as a fact, studying the factual function of the concept of time in it, and from this defining the logical structure of the concept. Should we arrive at a solution to this problem as so formulated, then if we have recognized the concept of time in the science of history as one of its central concepts, it should be possible to determine something general about the logical structure of history as a science. The peculiarity of the structure of the concept of time in the science of history will undoubtedly emerge more clearly if it can be brought into relief in contrast to a different structure of time. In order to make this possible, we shall, before dealing with our actual problem, briefly characterize the concept of time in the natural sciencesand, more precisely, in physics. With respect to the concept of time in physics, we now formulate the problem in the same manner as we did in relation to the concept of time in the science of history and ask: What structure must the concept of time in physics have in order for it to be able to begin to function as a concept of time in a manner corresponding to the goal of physics?