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TURKEYSDELICATEPOSITION BETWEEN NATOANDTHEESDP

DR.RAMAZANGZEN

AssociateProfessorofInternationalRelations
DepartmentofInternationalRelations AtlmUniversity Ankara Tur key

March2003

The author, Assoc.Prof.Dr.Ramazan GZEN, is Head of the Department of International Relationsof AtlmUniversity, Ankara.HereceivedhisB.A. fromtheFaculty of Political Science of Ankara University, his M.A. from the Graduate School of European and International Studies of Reading University in England and his Ph.D. from the Department of Politics also at Reading University. He is the author of a book (in Turkish) titled Foreign Policy under American Supremacy: the Gulf War, Turgut zal and the

Aftermath (Ankara: Liberte 2000) and is one of the editors of a book (in Turkish) titled TurkeysForeignPolicyAgenda:Identity,Democracy,Security(Ankara:Liberte,2001).He
is also the author of numerous articles written in English and Turkish on Turkish foreign policyinparticularandoninternationalrelationsingeneral. Email:rgozen@hotmail.com

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thisworkwould nothave beenpossible for metocompleteandpublishwithoutthe supportandencouragementofseveralindividualsandinstitutions. Firstofall,Iwouldliketoexpressmydeepestandmostsincerethanksandgratitude to the Center For Strategic Research (SAM), particularly to its esteemed Chairman, AmbassadorMuratBilhan,and his hardworkingteamofcollaboratorsandcolleagues from the SAM headed by Mr.Ouz Ate and asissted by Ms.Emel DerinzTekin, and for their unlimitedandindustriouseffortinthepreparationoftheworkforpublication. This bookisanupdated/expanded versionofthe researchreportpresentedtoNATO as fulfilment of NATOs Individual Research Fellowship Programme NATOEAPC 2000 2002.SoIwouldliketothankNATOforsupportingmyproject. In addition, my sincere thanks go to my colleagues Prof.Dr.Hseyin Bac and Assoc.Prof.Dr.hsanDafortheiracademicsupportatthecommencementoftheproject. Lastbutnotleast,IamgratefultomybelovedwifeHatice,sonSleymanFarukand daughterAyeSenafortheirpatience,andmoralandtechnicalassistancetoitscompletion. AndImustexpressmyenduringloveandblessingtoAhmetYavuzwhopassedaway prematurelyjustbeforethestartofthiswork.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines Turkeys recently emerging delicate position between NATO andtheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP)inabroadeningsecurityarchitecture in Europe. It rests on three arguments. Firstly, a new and broader security architecture has been established in Europe. In the process, while NATO has emerged as the most comprehensiveandcapableorganisationintheestablishmentofabroadersecuritystructurein Europe, it has encouraged a division of labour among the NATO members and European institutions, the most importantof which is the European Union. However, the EUs ESDP created such institutional and operational mechanisms that six nonEU European NATO membersweremarginalised,ifnottotallyexcluded,fromtheESDPprocess.Thisproduced aseriousdebateandevenakindofriftamongtheNATOAlliesduetoitsnegativeeffectson themanagementofdivisionoflabour.Secondly,itwillbearguedthatamongthesixnonEU European NATO countries, Turkey is the most negatively affected fortwo reasons. Firstof all,TurkeyscurrentassociatemembershipstatusintheEUsfirstandthirdpillars,aswellas intheWesternEuropeanUnion,asthesecurityanddefencepillarofEUintegration,wasnot matchedbyasimilarstatusintheESDP.Moreover,Turkeysverycentral/integralpositionin NATO was barely taken into consideration. This was a rather awkward and undesirable developmentbecause itcreatedanumberofcomplications inNATOEUrelationsandco operation, inTurkeysrelationswiththeEU,and intherealisationoftheESDP itself. As a result,thesedevelopmentsputTurkey intoadelicateposition betweenNATOandtheEUs SecurityandDefencePolicy.Becauseofthosecomplications,itwillbearguedthirdlythata solution has be found to bring an end Turkeys delicate position between NATO and the ESDPsothatTurkeyshouldbefullyintegratedintotheEuropeansecurityarchitectureunder theESDP.Thus,thelastpartofthestudyfocusesontheprocessoffindingasolutiontothe crisis between Turkey and the EU, in particular on the Ankara Agreement and the Brussels Document,aswellasonotherpossiblealternativesandoptionswhich,Ithink,arefeasiblein thisrespect.

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TURKEYSDELICATEPOSITIONBETWEENNATOANDTHEESDP CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.....iii Abstract..........iv Abbreviations..vi 1. INTRODUCTION........1 2.TOWARDSANEWSECURITYARCHITECTUREUNDERNATO....3 2.1.DevelopmentoftheSecurityArchitecturewithintheNATOFramework...5 2.2.DivisionofLabourintheConstructionoftheSecurityArchitecture...8 2.3.NATOEURelationswithintheSecurityArchitecture:RivalsorPartners?11 3. TURKEYSDELICATEPOSITIONINTHENEWSECURITY ARCHITECTURE..14 3.1.TurkeyinNATO:TheCentralPosition16 3.2.TurkeyandtheEU/WEU:TheMidwayPositions22 3.3.TurkeyandtheESDP:TheMarginalPosition..28 4.COMPLICATIONSOFTHEDELICATEPOSITION..55 4.1.NATOEUCooperationDisrupted...55 4.2.TurkeyEUIntegrationProcessParalysed...58 4.3.EuropeanSecurityandDefencewithoutTurkey?.61 5.TOWARDSTHESOLUTIONAFTERSEPTEMBER11...63 5.1.MinimalSolution:TheAnkaraAgreement65 5.2.TheFormalSolution:TheBrusselsDocument..67 5.3.SatisfyingSolution:MakingTurkeyanAssociateMemberoftheESDP...70 5.4.OptimalSolution:FullIntegrationintotheESDP...72 5.5. PerfectSolution:TurkeyasMultidimensionalSecurityProvider.74 6. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTUREANDTURKEY..75 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...78

ABBREVIATIONS

BLACKSEAFOR:BlackSeaNavalCooperationTaskForce BSEC:BlackSeaEconomicCooperation CFE:ConventionalForcesinEurope CFSP:CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy CJTF:CombinedJointTaskForce EAPC:EuroAtlanticPartnershipCouncil ESDI:EuropeanSecurityandDefenceIdentity ESDP:EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy EU:EuropeanUnion EUGAC:EUGeneralAffairsCouncil EUMC:EuropeanUnionMilitaryCommittee EUMS:EuropeanUnionMilitaryStaff EUPSC:EUPoliticalandSecurityCommittee IFOR:ImplementationForce ISAF:InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce KFOR:KosovoForce MPFSEE:MultinationalPeaceForceSouthEasternEurope NAC:NorthAtlanticCouncil NATO:NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation OIC:OrganisationofIslamicConference OSCE:OrganisationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope PfP:PartnershipforPeace SAM:CenterforStrategicResearch SECI:SoutheastEuropeanCooperativeInitiative SEEBRIG:SouthEasternEuropeBrigade SEECP:SouthEastEuropeCooperationProcess SFOR:StabilisationForce UN:UnitedNations WEU:WesternEuropeanUnion

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1. INTRODUCTION

WhenthefiftyyearlongColdWarendedintheearly1990s,notsurprisinglyanumber of new developments, some positive and some negative, emerged. In the midst of these developments,althoughtheoldsecurityandpoliticalstructureinEuropecollapsed,anewone has notyetbeenestablished.There isanongoingprocesstocreateanewsecurityorderin and around Europe, which can be called the Broader European Security Architecture. Although there are a number of international organisations such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organisation for Security and Co operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe for establishing a viable security architectureinEurope,twoofthem,NATOandtheEU,havebeenplayingagreaterrolein theprocess.WhileNATOhastransformeditselfinternallyandexternallytowardscreatinga newsecurityorder,theEUhasalsobeentryingtohaveamorecapableandeffectivesecurity anddefencepolicyastheEuropeanpillarofNATOscomprehensivesecuritysystem. And quite understandably, almost all of the European countries have been deeply affected, to varying degrees, by these developments and changes. One of them is Turkey. Indeed, Turkeys Cold War position was radically influenced and modified by the new developments,alongwithsomeclaimsthatTurkey is nowoutoftheEuropeansecurityand
1 politicalorder.

Themainobjectiveofthisstudyistoanalysetheimpactofverycriticalandsignificant developments in the European security architecture on Turkeys position, including its security,defenceand foreignpolicy.Theprojectwas motivatedbythe followingquestions: HowhastheEuropeansecurityarchitecturebeenshaped?Whatarethecharacteristicsofthe newEuropeansecurityarchitecture?WhereisTurkeylocatedwithinthisarchitecture?What isTurkeyspolicytowardtheEuropeansecurityarchitecture?AndwhyhasTurkeysposition intheEuropeansecurityarchitecturecometoaverydelicatepoint? To answer these questions, the project will evolve around three arguments. Firstly, it will be argued that NATO showed its prowess and dynamism by adapting itself tothe new securityenvironmentfollowingtheendoftheColdWar.NATOssecurityagendaandarena weretransformedinsuchawaythatthenewNATOcametoencompassthewholeofEurope and its surrounding areas as well as new kinds of security problems that are categorised as

For instance, Edward Mortimer, Is this our frontiers?, Financial Times, 3 April 1990 Sedat Ergin, Trkiyeninstratejiknemiazalyor,Hrriyet,15June1990.

nonArticle5issues.Asaresult,asthesecuritybordersoftheEuropeangeographybroadened ingeographical,functionalandinstitutionalsenses,NATOactedasanumbrellaorganisation forthebroadeningsecurityarchitectureunderwhichothersubformations,oneofwhichisthe EU,havealsodeveloped. Secondly, Turkey has a rather delicate position within the emerging security
2 architecture. This resulted from the fact that Turkeys connection to the new security

architecturehasbeenmultiplexedatvariouslevelsanddegrees.Turkeyhasthreelevels/types ofpositionswithinthenewsecurityarchitectureinEurope:Itis located,simultaneously,at thecentrethroughNATO,atthemidwaythroughtheEU/WEUandatthemarginthrough theEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP). Sucha multiplexedand multivaried delicateposition createssomecomplications not only forTurkeysownsecurity,defenceand foreignpolicy, butalsoforthedevelopmentof the security architecture in Europe. So the third part of the project will focus on the complicationsofTurkeysdelicateposition.ItwillbearguedthatTurkeysdelicateposition hashadsomenegativeoutcomesandthatitmaycontinueinthefutureifunresolved.Because ofthat,therehavebeenimportanteffortstofindaviableandrespectableformulatobringan endtoTurkeysdelicateposition. The lastsectionwill focusontheefforts made,aswellasotherpossibilities,tofinda solutiontothedelicateposition,especiallyaftertheSeptember11incidentanditsensuing developments.

ForananalysisofTurkeysuncertainpositionseeHeinzKramer, AvrupaveAmerikaKarsndaDeien Trkiye,trans.byAliimen(stanbul:TimaYaynlar,2001),Chapter12.

2. TOWARDSANEWSECURITYARCHITECTUREUNDERNATO

In the postCold War era in which the old security order collapsed, the European continentanditssurroundingregionshavebeenpassingthroughacriticalperiodfromtheend oftheCold Wartowardsanewsystem inwhich security,politics,economyandsocietyare becomingincreasinglyinterrelated.Likeworldpoliticsingeneral,theEuropeanpoliticaland security order is in transition. A new European political and securityorder has been in the making foralongtimeandwillcontinuetobesointhenear future.Thefuturestructureof theEuropeanpoliticalandsecurityorderwilldeterminethesecuritysituationnotonlyofthe European countries but also of those countries inside and outside the European geography. Aboveall,theconceptofsecurity,whichisthemostbasicissueforhumanbeings,hasgained
3 newdefinitions,understandingsandapplications.

Thereisnowanoverwhelmingconsensusonthenotionthatthetermsecurityhasbeen broadenedandmultipliedinconceptual,geographicalandfunctionalsensesinEuropeandin
4 the world as a whole. Conceptually, the term security now implies notonly the socalled

hardsecurity,whichcanbedefinedasfeelingsecure/safefromforeignmilitaryattacks,the invasion of foreign armies, the danger of strategic or tactical missiles, weapons of mass destructionandbrutalaggressions,aswasthecaseduringtheColdWar.Italsoincludesthe socalled soft security, which can be defined as feeling secure/safe from political oppression, hunger, environmental pollution, social fragmentation, human tragedy, immigration, unexpected effects of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and
5 biological) and so on. Geographically, the borders of European security have broadened

fromtheWesternEuropeanregiontootherregions,towardsCentralandEasternEurope,the Balkans, the Mediterranean region and even towards the Caucasus, Central Asia and the MiddleEast.AlthoughWesternEuropeperseremainsasecureislandofpeaceandstability,
6 itisinfluencedbydevelopmentsaroundEurope. Thus,functionally,theconceptofsecurity

JamesSperlingandEmilKishner,RecastingtheEuropeanOrder:SecurityArchitecturesandEconomicCo operation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) Barry Buzan, People,States & Fear: AnAgenda nd ForInternationalSecurityStudiesinthePostColdWarEra (NewYork:HarvesterWheatsheaf,2 ed.1991).
4

Itismentionedinseveralsources:Forexample,NATOsStrategicConcept1991agreedbytheHeadsofState and Government, The North Atlantic Council, 8 November 1991, Rome, in NATO Handbook Documentation (Brussels:NATOOfficeofInformationandPress,1999)SperlingandKirchner, op.cit.
5

See Colin McInees, Themilitary security agenda,in G.Wyn Rees (ed.), International Politics in Europe: See Barry Buzan, Introduction:The Changing Security AgendainEurope, in Ole Waever, et al., Identity,

TheNewAgenda (London:Routledge,1993).
6

MigrationandtheNewSecurityinEurope(London:PinterPublishers,1993).

now includessocial,economicand cultural issues.Notonlystatesecurity butalso societies and individuals are threatened by ethnic nationalism and separatism, terrorism, refugee movements,religiousandideologicalfanaticism,fatalillnesses(e.g.AIDS),andsoon.These securityconcernsanddevelopmentsarenotlimitedtocertain countriesorregionsmostofthe countriesintheworldareequallyaffectedbysuchdevelopmentsoutsidetheirborders. In other words, security risks are now interdependent within the global arena. No country is totally immune from these security risks, be it soft security problems or hard securityproblems.There isalso interdependencebetweenthe issues/problemsanddifferent partsof the world. Namely, classical regional borders have been blurred and eroded by the influence of worldwide economic, social, political and military problems. For example, the borders of the Middle East have been extended towards Central Asia and vice versa. The sameistrueforEuropesregionalborders.ItisnowdifficulttodefineEuropeinColdWorld terms because its borders have enlarged towards the east and the south. As result of these
7 security interdependencies, there emerged a new security complex in Europe that can be

called the Euroasian security complex with a transatlantic connection. It includes the territories and peoples from the transatlantic area through the European continent up tothe Mediterranean,CentralAsianandMiddleEasternregions. A numberofpiecesofevidenceand indicatorscan be foundtoprovetheexistenceof interdependence between Europe and the Euroasian security complex, but two of them are especially important. The first one is the pattern of wars during the new era following the ColdWar.ItcanbearguedthattheGulfWarof19901991andtheBalkanWarof19921995 affectednotonlythesecurityoftheMiddleEasternandBalkancountriesbutalsothatofmost Western European countries in various ways. All of the regional countries directly or indirectly feltthe impactofthesewarsontheirown securitytovaryingdegrees.Almostall countries feltthenegativeconsequencesoftheriseofoilpricesandthecostsofwarduring theGulfWaraswellasthenegativeimpactofrefugeeexoduses,immigrationsandthefearof expansionofthewarstothebordersoftheEuropeanUnioncountriesduringtheBalkanwar. Furthermore,theSeptember11incidenthasprovedthatevenasuperpowercancomeundera terroristthreat. The second important indicator of the growing interdependence of security is the expansion of European international institutions towards these regions. In parallel and concomitanttothebroadeningsecurityenvironmentinEurope,newsecurityunderstandings, arrangements and mechanisms emerged in order to manage and control the negative
7

ForthetermsecuritycomplexseeBarryBuzan,People,States&Fear, op.cit.

consequencesofthesemultiplesources.Twoofthem,thoughinterrelated,canbetakeninto consideration,particularlyduetotheirconformitywiththebroadeningsecurityarchitecturein Europe.Thefirstoneistheapproachcalledcommonsecurity,whichsuggeststhatsecurity could not be achieved by unilateral means, but only by cooperation on issues of common
8 concern. The second one is the theory of security community. Indeed, the security

community is anoutcomeofdiplomatic, institutional, militaryandpolitical arrangements.It is a comprehensive framework for security in a certain area. The security community is defined as a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a real assurancethatthe membersofthatcommunitywill notfighteachotherphysically, butwill
9 settle their disputes in some other ways. The idea of security community argues that

members of such a community not only do not fight each other, but also do not hold an expectationofwarwitheachother,notthattheyarenecessarilymoresecureagainstexternal
10 attack inside than outside such a community. These two theories have been put into

practicebyNATOandtheEUinthebroaderEuropeansecurityarchitecturesincetheendof theColdWar.

2.1.DevelopmentoftheSecurityArchitecturewithintheNATOFramewor k First of all, NATO, as the most experienced and capable organisation in the field of militarysecurity,hastransformeditselfandgainedanewstructureandrole.Inthelightofthe criticaldevelopmentsinthepostColdWarera,NATOadaptedandtransformeditselfinorder tocopewithnewsecuritychallengesinsuchawayastocreateakindofsecuritycommunity frameworkforanumberofcountries,rangingfromtheUStothebordersofChinainCentral AsiaandtotheMiddleEast. NATOs security architecture can now be defined as a kind of security community because it is composed of several sovereign states which have dependable expectation of peaceful change, expect no bellicose activities from other members and therefore
11 consistentlypracticeselfrestraint. Theparticipantsarenotonlythefullmembersbutalso

allcountrieshavingaconnectionwithNATOatvariouslevels.Itdoesnotimplythatthereare no problems or disputes between the countries within the security community of NATO.
8 9

R.Vayrynan(ed.), PoliciesforCommonSecurity (London:SIPRI/TaylorandFrancis,1985).

Emanuel Adler and Micheal Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),p.6.
10

JamesE.DoughertyandRobertL.PfaltzgraffJr.ContendingTheoriesofInternationalRelations(NewYork: rd Harper&Row,Publisher,3 ed.,1990),fn.34,p.4612.


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AdlerandBarnett,op.cit.

Indeed, it is possible to see some crises, disputes, confrontations and conflicts of varying degreesbetweensomemembers.ThethrustofNATOhasbeentodevelopclosecooperation anddialoguewithallcountriesandtoprovideanumberofopportunitiesandmechanismsfor themtocometogetherandresolvetheirproblemsbypeacefulmeans.Thus,countriesprefer talkingwiththeiropponentundertheNATOumbrellaratherthangoingtowar. RightatthebeginningofthenewerainEurope,aftertheendoftheColdWar,NATO setitsfundamentaltaskinthoseterms:Toprovideoneoftheindispensablefoundationsfora stablesecurityinEurope,basedonthegrowthofdemocraticinstitutionsandcommitmentto the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate and
12 coerceanyEuropeannationortoimposehegemonythroughthethreatoruseofforce.

Since then, NATOs framework has been broadened towards the construction of a
13 security community by the inclusion of new members, partnerships and dialogues. The

EuroAtlanticPartnershipCouncil(EAPC),formedin1997,bringstogether44countriesfrom Europe and Asia. By coming together and signing the EAPC Basic Document, the partners reaffirmedtheirjointcommitmenttostrengthenandextendpeaceandstabilityintheEuro Atlanticareaonthebasisofsharedvaluesandprincipleswhichunderlinetheircooperation,
14 notablythosesetoutintheFrameworkDocumentofthePartnershipforPeace.

TheimportanceoftheEAPCisthatitbringstogether44EuropeanandAsiancountries and provides a platform for them to resolve their problems by dialogue, cooperation and consultation. Indeed, the communication among so many officials within the framework of NATO isagreatopportunity for improvingpeaceandstability intheregion.Itsimportance was strikingly expressed by Joseph W. Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who said:AswesitaroundthetableinBrussels,oneofthemoreremarkablethingsiswhenwe have a meeting with the partners. We not only have the 19 NATO nations, but 26 partner nations sitting around that table. Foreign ministers from 45 nations, the defence ministers from45nationsandthechiefsofdefencefrom45nationstalkaboutcommonproblems.That
15 isaprettyremarkableaccomplishmentforourareaandforthealliance.

12 13

NATOsStrategicConcept1991, op.cit.,p.286.

ForananalysisofNATOstransformationsee,DavidYost,NATOTransformed:TheAlliancesNewRolesin InternationalSecurity (WashingtonD.C.:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,1998).


14

Fordetails,TheNATOHandbook,50thAnniversaryEdition,(Brussels:OfficeofInformationandPress,1998 1999),p.8486.
15

Joseph W. Ralston, The priorities for European Security, Insight Turkey, Vol.3, No.2, AprilJune 2001, p.99100.WhenI(theauthor)visitedNATOHQinBrusselsinJune2001,IhadafeelingthatNATOhasbeen suchadiplomaticandpoliticalforumoftheEuroasiancountries,thatrepresentativesofthesecountriesgathered and formed a small miniature of the Euroasian General Assembly where they talk about their security and politicalproblems.

InadditiontopoliticalcooperationundertheEAPC,thePartnershipforPeaceinitiative waslaunchedin1994andtheEnhancedPartnershipforPeacein1997,bringingtogether27 countries for joint militaryactionsandother issues,fosteringpeace,stability andsecurity in


16 the Euroasian security complex with a transatlantic connection. Moreover, NATOs close

dialogue with six Mediterranean countries launched in 1994 also aims to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean and in Europe, whose security is closely linked
17 with security and stability in the Mediterranean. The Founding Acton Mutual Relations,

Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in 1997, the establishmentofinstitutionalconnectionsbetweenNATOandRussiain2002andtheCharter foraDistinctivePartnershipBetweenNATO andUkrainesigned in1997 mustbeaddedto theabovearrangementsasindicatorsofbroadeningbordersofthesecuritycommunityinthe region. ThenewNATOhasdefineditsnewroleintheseterms:ThepeoplesofNorthAmerica and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy,humanrightsandtheruleoflaw.Asanagentofchange,asourceofstabilityand theindispensableguarantorofitsmemberssecurity,ourAlliancewillcontinuetoplayakey role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe, a Europe of cooperation and
18 prosperity.

Such a community of states, if not of societies, throughout the region, has some commonsecurityvaluesandexpectations.Thefirstandthemostimportantofallisthatthere is no colossal military threat, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, to threaten NATO countries and other nonEuropean parts of the world in general. Ideological and politicalmilitaryconfrontationbetweenWesternEuropeandEasternEuropenolongerexists. Instead,thereemergedmoreconventionalandlocalsecurityproblemssuchastheGulfWar, wars,conflictsandcrisesintheBalkansandtheArmenianinvasionofAzerbaijaniterritory, etc. The methods for resolving these problems have also been transformed. Now, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian rescue operations have gained greaterimportancethanmilitaryfightingandbuildup.Themilitaryconfrontationsasseenin

16 17 18

NATOHandbook,op.cit.,p.86102. Ibid,p.105106.

The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Governments Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Rome, 8 November 1991, NATOHandbook:Documentation (Brussels:OfficeofInformationandPress,1999),p.300.

the Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo lasted a shorttime and remained limited, focusing on making peacebetweentheconflictingparties. In view of the above changes, NATO also developed new military concepts and structures during the 1990s. NATOs new concept of Combined Joint Task Forces serves this purpose: to conduct contingency operations, peacekeeping operations and crisis managementoperationsinregionsoutsidetheAllianceareaofresponsibility.Soitisdesigned tolaunchnonArticle5operationsaswellasArticle5operationsifneeded.Itscomposition reflects the nature and spirit of the security community because all the aforementioned countries havearighttocontributetoits formation,aswasseen inIFOR/SFORand KFOR peacekeeping forces for bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. It was an important achievement for NATO to be of service for the peace and stability of the security
19 community.

NATOs main role is to provide a political platform as well as to launch military operations.However,NATOhassuggestedburdensharingfortheconstructionofthesecurity architecture in Europe. Thus, NATO has divided some of its responsibilities with other regionalorganisationsinthearea.

2.2.DivisionofLabourintheConstructionoftheSecurityArchitecture NATO provides the overall framework and platform for the countries interested in joiningtheEuropeansecurityarchitecture.ButNATO is notsufficientenoughtohandleall aspects of the security architecture therefore, it prefers to have a division of labour among internationalinstitutionsintheregiontoachievethesameobjectives.Asthesecurityofall Alliesisindivisible...TheachievementoftheAlliancesobjectivesdependscriticallyonthe equitable sharing of roles, risks, and responsibilities, as well as the benefits of common
20 defence... In that respect, NATO declared its readiness and support for the division of

labour among the OSCE,the WEU and the EU,and other international bodies interested in cooperationwithNATOundertheprinciplesoftheUnitedNations. TheOSCEcombinestheelementsofbothsecurityinterdependenciesbetweenthearena andtheagenda:TheOSCEterritory,ranging fromVancouvertoVladivostok,comprisesall of the AtlanticEuropean region but excludes the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean areas. Mostimportantly,theOSCEssecurityconceptisaverycomprehensiveone:Itfocusesonthe security interdependence among economic, humanitarian and military issues. During the
19 20

Yost,op.cit.,p.77. NATOsStrategicConcept1991, op.cit.,Article36.

1990s although it involved in the resolution of territorial conflicts such as the Nagorno KarabakhdisputebetweenAzerbaijanandArmenia,itdidnothaveagreatimpact.Themain reason for its failure is the fact that the OSCE does not have the developed and efficient militaryandorganisationalcapabilitiesofNATO. The EU plays double roles in the construction of the security architecture in Europe: The first one is to contribute to the economic, political and social integration of European countries that are eligible to be members of the EU within the framework of the European Union. Thus the EU is enlarging its amalgamated security community towards 13 Central, EasternandSouthernEuropeancountriesatthemoment.Ithasplayedaverypositiverolein the adaptation of the Central and Eastern European countries from a communist order to democratic one. With its political, economic, social and financial assistance, it integrated them intothe socalled island of peace or amalgamated security community, where they developed democracy, human rights and freedoms, a market economy, social development
21 andsoon.

TheEUssecondroleistocontributetotheconstructionofthesecurityarchitectureby becominginvolvedintheresolutionofinternationalcrises,disputes,humantragediesetc.In theMaastrichtTreaty(theTreatyonEuropeanUnion)of1991,theEUcountriessetoutanew strategyinitiallycalledtheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP),anddesignatedthe WEUastheorganisationresponsibleforthisobjectiveandasalinkbetweentheEuropean UnionandNATO.Inotherwords,theimplementationoftheCFSPwastobecarriedoutby the WEU in cooperation with NATO principles and members. The WEU then defined its securityanddefencetasks,knownasthePetersbergtasks,attheWEUCouncilofMinisters meetinginPetersberginJune1992.TheyarenonArticle5taskssuchashumanitarianand rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of
22 crisismanagementsituationsincludingpeacemaking.

Theprocessaccelerated inthe1990s,especially duetothefactthattheEUandWEU werenotabletostopthewarand bloodshed inthe BosnianSerbianwarand inthe Kosovo war.Having seenthattheUSandothernonEU countriesdid notactdecisivelytostopthe war, the EU started to speed up the process and create an autonomous military force and security and defence policy in order to acquire the capacity/capability to implement the
21

See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogles, The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge, 1999),Chapter7.
22

ForthereasonsforthedevelopmentofaEUsecurityanddefencepolicy,seeLordGeorgeRobertson,Turkey andtheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceIdentity,InsightTurkey,Vol.3,No.1,JanuaryMarch2001.Thetextis an edited transcription of the speech the SecretaryGeneral gave at a conference organised by the Turkish EconomicandSocialStudiesFoundation(TESEV)on23November2000instanbul.

23 Petersbergtasks. IntheAmsterdamTreatyof1997,theEUnoteditsobjectivetointegrate

its European Security and Defence Identity into the EU body by a decision to include the PetersbergtaskswithintheEUstructure,totakestepstowardsaCommonDefencePolicyand tomergetheWEUwiththeEU(Article17).Thenin1998,whenBritainandFranceagreedin St.MalotoimplementthestepstowardsaEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP),a newprocessenteredontotheEuropeansecurityagenda. SoonaftertheEUCouncilmeetinginCologneinJune1999,theWEUmergedwiththe EU,thusseveringtheinstitutionalconnectionbetweentheWEUandNATOandcuttingthe nonEUNATO membersofthe WEUoutofthe Europeansecurity arrangements.Indeed, it wasastepthatalsooverlookedNATOsWashingtonSummitDeclarationthathadbeenmade just three months earlier in April 1999. Then, the EUs advance towards an independent security and defence mechanism was hastened at the EUs Helsinki Summit in December 1999.TheretheEUdecidedtodevelopaHeadlineGoaltocreateaEuropeanRapidReaction Force (the socalled European Army) with 60,000 troops by 2003. The WEUs role in the ESDP was formally terminated by the EU Council at Nice in December 2000, and the EU createdseparateorgansandmechanismsforthedecisionmakingandoperationsoftheESDP. Aresultofthat,theEUhassetanautonomouspathintheconstructionandoperationofthe securityarchitecturewithsomecomplicationsforallEuropeancountries. According to some observers and analysts, the ESDP could be a threat for ending
24 NATOs role in the region and an attempt that will not be able to achieve security.

AccordingtotheU.S.administrationandofficials,theESDPposesthepotentialproblemof creating the three Ds: duplication of the military forces, discrimination against the nonEU
25 NATOcountriesanddecouplingNATOfromtheESDP. Asaresult,itwasfearedthatthe

ESDP might create risks for building a security architecture under NATO. In other words, some worried that the division of labour could lead to the demise of NATOs role in the region.TheESDPcouldbeseenasarivaltoNATO.Butisitreallyso?

23

See Jonathan G. Clarke, Silver Lining: Renewed Interest in EuropeanRun Security Institutions, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), NATOs Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War (Washington D.C.: CATO Institute,2000).
24

Bill Cash, The European Security and Defence Policy: Threat to NATO, Perceptions, Vol.V, No.3, SeptemberNovember2000.
25

StanleyR.Sloan, TheUnitedStatesandEuropeanDefence (Paris:InstituteforSecurityStudies,Chaillot Papers29,April2000),pp.67.

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2.3.NATOEURelationswithintheSecurityArchitecture:RivalsorPartners? The above developments oblige us to askthe question of whether the EU is trying to becomeanalternativeorevenarivalforcetoNATO.Thiswouldbeagainstthespiritofall NATOdocumentsissuedinthepostColdWarera.Norwoulditbepracticablyachievablein the foreseeable future. In other words, the ESDP can hardly be a rival and alternative to NATOs position in the European security order due to legal, political, military and institutionalconstraints.

Fromalegalperspective,whenthedocumentsconcernedareassessed,itcanbeargued
thattheESDPissupposedtoactonlyforNATOsnonArticle5operations.NATOviewsthe ESDPasanattempttosharetheburdenofEuropeansecurityproblemsinsuchawaythat there should be a division of labour. Indeed, it was clearly stated, By assuming greater responsibility for their own security, the European member countries will help to create a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship that will strengthen the Alliance as a
26 whole.

Inthisrespect,inJanuary1994,NATOheadsofstateandgovernmentreaffirmedthat theAlliancewastheessentialforumforconsultationamongitsmembersandthevenuefor agreementonpolicies bearingonthesecurityanddefence commitmentsofthe Alliesunder


27 theWashingtonTreaty.

At their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, NATO foreign and defence ministers decided that the European Security and Defence Identity should be built within

NATO as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the alliance. This would enable all
European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activitiesofthealliance.28 From NATOs perspective, as declared in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brusselson1415December2000,theEUsrecentdecisionsconcerningtheconstructionof theESDPaspartoftheEUratherthantheWEUdidnotchangetheessenceofthedivision oflabour sprit for the construction of a new European security architecture as long as two points are taken into account. Firstly, The Alliance will remain the foundation for the collective defence of its members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis managementassetoutintheStrategicConcept.Secondly,[NATO]underlined,asitdidat

26 27 28

NATOWebpage: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm

Ibid. Ibid. Italicadded.

11

the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, the importance of finding solutionssatisfactorytoallAlliestotheissueofparticipation.Itnotedtheprovisionsagreed by the European Council at Nice for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with nonEU European Allies on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management as wellasthemodalitiesforparticipationinEUledmilitaryoperations...whichwillalsoenable nonEU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security interests
29 mightbeinvolved.

To sum up, the EUs role in the construction and operation of a broader European securityarchitectureinEuropecanbecategorisedintothefollowingpoints:First,actingasan organisation or model for boosting the economic, political and legal dimensions of the security architecture in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, and contributing to the developmentofdemocracy,marketeconomy,civilgovernmentandsocialeconomicreforms. Second, acting as a European pillar of NATO in the nonArticle 5 military operations if NATOisnotinvolved.

Fromamilitarypoliticalperspective,too,theESDPcanhardlybearivaloralternative
forNATOsroleinthesecurityarchitecture.Fourreasonscanbeshown:Firstly,theEUdoes nothaveenoughmilitarycapabilities,assetsorforcestolauncheffectiveoperationsthatmay be required for autonomous military operations. Indeed, it would take a long time and significantexpensetobuilduparobustEuropeanarmyandoperationfacilitiesandassetsfor
30 operations. AsAybetconcluded,TheWEUsmilitarycapabilityincarryingoutPetersberg

typeoperationsisdependingonNATO,andtheimplementationofthishasbeenworkedout inaNATOWEU framework.This meansthatfull NATO membersandexWEUAssociate membersarefullyandequallyparticipatinginthedevelopmentoftheESDI,andtheESDIis beingdevelopedwithinNATOassuggested intheBerlin ministerial decisionsofNATO in
31 1996.

Secondly, there is no overall consensus about the extent of the ESDPs role in the European security architecture. Some countries, the socalled Atlanticist countries, prefer NATOtocontinueastheprimaryorganisationandtransatlantic connectionessential forthe maintenanceofsecurityinEurope,whileothers,thesocalledEuropeanistcountries,prefera
29

Ministerial Meeting of The North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers Session, Final Communiqu, Brussels, 15 December 2000, points 28 and 32, NATO Communiqus and Statements 2000 (Brussels: NATO OfficeofInformationandPress,2001),p.81and83.
30

SeeAlistairJ.Shepherd,TopDownorBottomUp:IsSecurityandDefencePolicyintheEUaQuestionof PoliticalWillorMilitaryCapability, EuropeanSecurity,Vol.9,No.2,Summer2000,p.20.


31

GlnurAybet,NATOsDevelopingRoleinCollectiveSecurity,SAMpapers,No.4/99,(Ankara:Ministryof ForeignAffairs,CenterforStrategicResearch, 1999),p.52.

12

32 more independent European rapid deployment force and army. Because of these different

preferences,andbecauseoftheESDPSintergovernmentalstructurethatrequiresunanimity initsdecisionmakingprocess,thereneedstobeaconsensusbetweenproNATOandproEU countries.Otherwise,itcannotbeviableandeffective. Thirdly,thereare some institutional complexities inthearrangements betweenNATO and the EU: There are actually six nonEU European NATO members (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) and four nonNATO EU members (Austria,Finland,IrelandandSweden)andseveralcountriesthatarepartnersinNATObut notintheEU.Thesevaryingconnectionscancomplicatethedecisionmakingprocessinmost cases. Fourthly, the EUs potential operations area is not clearly defined. Because some EU countries, for example Germany, might have concerns and difficulties about outofarea operations,itshouldhaveclosecooperationwithallcountriesconcerned.ButiftheESDPis limited to EU members only, its operations in those regions can be very difficult. In particular,thepositionofthenonEUEuropeanNATOcountriesisverycritical,notonlyfor EU operations but also for NATOEU relations. EU operations in areas close to these countriesneedNATOassetsandcapabilitiesandNATOsaffirmativedecisionfortheiruse. One of these countries is Turkey with its critical geographical position, it lies at the heartofthenewsecurityarchitecture.

32

For an analysis of this division see Tom Lansford, The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security after the Cold War, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.22, No.1, March 1999,p.713.

13

3. TURKEYSDELICATEPOSITIONINTHENEWSECURITYARCHITECTURE

After the Cold War, Turkey found itself in an unstable and difficult international security environment stretching from the Balkans to Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. As the Cold War security order collapsedandanewandbroadersecurityorderhasbeenbuiltup,Turkeyssecurityposition has been deeply affected. Living in a difficult neighbourhood, Turkeys agenda has been dominated by inherently more serious and multiple security issues for the last 10 years. UnliketheColdWarsecuritychallenges,thenewsecurityenvironmentbroughtaboutarange ofopportunitiesandconstraintsandevenrisksforTurkishsecurityandforeignpolicy. NATOsourcesindicatedthatthereare16potentialcrisispointsaroundTurkey:Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, NagornoKarabagh in Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Abkhazia in Georgia, GeorgiaSouth Ossetia, Northern Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cyprus, Vojvodina,PrivlakaandBelarus.Moreover,ithas beenpointedoutthat13ofthemclosely
33 concernTurkey.

Someoftheseproblematicareaswereblownoutonagreatscaleduringthe1990s:the 19901991Gulf Warand its negativeconsequences inNorthernIraq,theBosniaSerbiawar of 19921995, the Kosovo problem, the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijani territory, the Abkhazian problem in Georgia, the Russian involvement in the Caucasus problems, the Chechnyauprising,theTurkishGreek crises inthe AegeanSeaand inCyprus,and (though notonthelist)theArabIsraeliconflict.Thus,Turkeyhasalreadycomeunderthepressureof thecrisesandwarsintheregion. As a result, at the end of the Cold War, Turkeys security position changed fundamentallyfrombeingatthesoutheasternflankofNATOtotheheartofthenewsecurity architectureduetothemultiplicationofTurkeyssecurityagendaandarena.UnliketheCold War position, Turkeys security concerns increased, its security burden became overloaded, and its foreign policy was heavily influenced by security issues, problems and targets. Turkeys foreign policy adopted a purely Realist perspective, i.e. the prime importance of securityoverallotherconcernsduetosecuritypressures.Whenallthosecrisesandwarsare viewedinretrospect,challengestoTurkeyssecuritycanbecategorisedintofourgroups.
33

Personal interview with Serdar Kl, Turkeys Deputy Permanent Representative in NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 05.06.2001 Hseyin Bac, Trkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endieler, in dris Bal (ed.), 21.Yzyln Eiinde Trk D Politikas (stanbul: Alfa, 2002), p.596. According to Turkish Foreign MinistryofficialsinAnkara,thenumberincreasedto23,21ofwhicharearoundTurkey.

14

First of all, challenges to Turkeys security and foreign policy have been multi

directional.DuringtheColdWaryears,Turkeysprimarysecurityconcernemanatedmainly
from the north, that is, the Soviet threat. Therefore, the collapse of the Sovietcommunist threatwasapositivedevelopmentduetotwofactors:firstlythedisappearanceoftheSoviet threat, and secondly the emergence of new opportunities in the postSoviet territories in Central Asia. In the new era Turkeys security perspective is influenced by developments from all directions: the Middle East and the Mediterranean in the south, the Caucasus and CentralAsiaintheeast,theBalkansinthewestandtheRussianfactorinthenorth. Secondly, Turkeys security agenda has been multifunctional. This means that Turkeys security is influenced more bythe softsecurity issues surroundingTurkeythan by theexistenceofadirectmilitaryattackbyanenemy.Inotherwords,thesoftsecurityissues suchasterrorism,ethnicnationalism,socialandeconomicinstabilities,refugees,weaponsof massdestructionetc.occupyTurkeyssecurityagendamorethaneverbefore. Thirdly, Turkeys security agenda has beenmultilevelled, which means that Turkeys security concerns come from various levels, such as the international system, interstate, domestic/national and individual levels. At the international system level, power politics relations among the US, the European Union, Russia, China and other powers closely influence Turkeys security. At the interstate level, Turkey has special bilateral security problems/relations with some regional countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Russia, GreeceandIsrael.Turkey is influenced bythe balanceofpowergame intheregion. Atthe domestic/national level, Turkey has faced critical challenges from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terror, radicalviolent religious fundamentalism such as Hezbollah, and from socialandeconomicproblems.Finally,attheindividuallevel,Turkeyhashadadeteriorating humanrightsrecordduetothegrowingnumberofapplicationsmadebyethnic,religiousand othercivilindividualstotheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinthe1990s. Finally, Turkeys security has been challenged by multiinstitutionalisation of the internationalsecurityarchitectureinEurope.DuringtheColdWaryears,NATOwastheonly security framework for protecting Turkeys security. In the new era, although it is still the mostimportantoneaswillbeanalysedbelow,thereemergedneworganisationswithsecurity agendas in additiontoNATO.Duetotheabovethreepoints,Turkeypaidcloseattentionto everyinternationalorganisationintheregion,beittheOSCE,theWEU,theEUoranyother. Turkeydoesnotwanttobeoutofany internationalorganisationwhoseactivities may have implicationsforTurkishsecurity,defenceandforeignpolicy.

15

These concerns and developments also brought Turkeys geopolitical and strategic position in world politics to a difficult point. As Turkey is involved heavily in European, AsianandMiddleEasternissues,TurkeyspositionintheEuropeansecurityarchitecturehas been very delicate. The main reason behind this delicate position is the factthat Turkeys connection with the European security architecture has been very multiplexed and multi varied in recent years. In other words, Turkeys connection with the developing European securityarchitecturehasthreechannelsanddimensions.Firstly,asafullmemberofNATO, TurkeyisatthecentreoftheEuropeansecurityarchitecturethroughNATO.But,secondly, as an Associated Member of the European Union and an Associate Member of the WEU, Turkeyisatthemidwayofthisarchitecture.Thirdly,theworsthashappenedrecently,and Turkey has been put at the margin of the architecture due to its marginal position in the European Security and Defence Policy. The following sections will examine these three channelsanddimensions.

3.1.Tur keyinNATO:TheCentralPosition
th Turkey hasalways beenadefactopartofEuropeansecurity sincethe19 century in

termsof internationalsecurityrelations.Turkeysplace improvedwithinconcrete, legaland organisational levels when it became a full member of NATO in 1952. This made Turkey automaticallyapartoftheWesternEuropeansecuritysystem.Sincethen,Turkeyssecurity anddefencepolicyhasbeendesignedmostlyinlinewithitsAlliancecommitments.Thiswas
34 thecaseduringtheColdWar,anditcontinuedaftertheColdWarduringthe1990s.

The connection between Turkey and NATO has improved in such a way that Turkey hasbecomeanintegral(central)memberofEuropeansecuritythroughNATO.Asastaunch memberoftheNorthAtlanticAlliance,Turkeyhasalwaysbeenanessentialandactiveactor oftheEuropean securityorder.Therewere indeedreciprocal interestsand benefits between TurkeyandNATOduringtheColdWar.WhileTurkeycontributedtoEuropeansecurityand defenceagainsttheSovietUnioninvariousways,theEuropeansaswellastheUnitedStates extended securityguaranteestoprotectTurkeysnationalandterritorial integrityagainstthe Soviets. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet threat,there were some argumentsthatasNATOhadlostitsraisondtre,Turkeysrole,importanceandpositionfor Europeansecuritywouldalsoinevitablycometoanend.However,thedevelopmentsshowed
34

NihatAlizcan,TheChangingThreatPerceptionsandtheTransformationoftheTurkishArmedForces, paperpresentedtoASAMInternationalConferenceonGlobalisation,SecurityandtheNationState,Sheraton Hotel,Ankara,1516June2002.

16

thatneitherNATOnorTurkeyhadlosttheirimportanceforEuropeansecurity.Asmentioned above,NATOadapteditselftothenewsecurityenvironmentintheregionstretchingfromthe AtlantictoAsia.Concurrently,Turkeysrole,importanceandpositionwerepromotedintothe heart of the European security architecture under NATO. As always, Turkey has cherished greatallegiancetoNATOinthenewera,justasNATOappreciatedTurkeyscontributionto the construction of the security order in Europe. It can be seen that there is a strong concurrenceandsimilaritybetweentheconstructionofthesecurityarchitectureunderNATO andTurkeyssecurityperspectiveinthepostColdWarera. As far as Turkey is concerned, NATO means several things for Turkeys security, defenceandforeignpolicy.ItsimportanceforTurkeycanbesummedupunderthefollowing points:Firstly,NATO has beenthe backboneof Turkeyssecurityanddefencepolicysince 1952.ThiswasthecaseduringtheColdWarandcontinuesinthenewera.Situatedinarather unstable and turbulent geopolitical location, Turkey views NATO as an international actor contributingtoitsstabilityandsecurity. Secondly,NATOisthestrongestlinchpinforTurkeysvocationintheWesternworld. As the most important, powerful and influential international organisation in the world, NATOprovidesapolitical/securityidentityforTurkeyininternationalpolitics.NATOisan international platform for Turkey to express its views and interests about international developments in a rather critical region. There, Turkey develops strong relations with European and transatlantic countries, manifests its interests about security issues in Europe and is now able to influence developments in the area from the Atlantic to Central Asia. Therefore,becauseof its institutional, military andpolitical power,Turkey viewsNATOas the primary organisation for the region surrounding Turkey. Most importantly, because of NATOs intergovernmental decisionmaking structure in which each member has a veto powerintheNorthAtlanticCouncilandotherorgans,Turkeyhasastrongvoiceonissuesof Europeansecurity. Thirdly, NATOs broadening security framework in the form of a quasisecurity communityisverymuchoverlappingandinlinewithTurkeyssecurity,defenceandforeign policy.ItcanbeseenthatNATOsconstructionofthenewsecurityarchitecturethroughthe establishmentofpartnershipanddialoguewithabout50countriescloselyconcernsTurkeys securityperspectiveandinterests.AscanbeseeninNATOsStrategicConcept1999andin

17

the Washington Summit Communiqu of 24 April 1999, NATOs security architecture is


35 centredonTurkeyssecurityenvironmentandviceversa.

Fourthly, NATO provides Turkey with a transatlantic connection. Development of TurkishAmericanrelationshasbeenbasedpartlyonTurkeysNATOmembershipandpartly on a bilateral level. It is a clear fact that in the postSoviet era the US remained the only hegemonicpowerintheMiddleEast,theBalkans,theCaucasusandCentralAsia.Thusitwas the leading country in the military operations in the Gulf War of 19901 and the Bosnian operation,andcontinuestobethereaswellas intheArabIsraelipeaceprocessandnow in Afghanistan.Ascanbeseen,TurkeyandtheUnitedStatessecurityagendaandareaoverlap in many respects. And in most of these issues Turkey supports the U.S. policy and vice
36 versa. Furthermore,TurkeyandtheUSsharesimilarperspectivesontheconstructionofthe

Europeansecurityarchitecture.BothpreferNATOasthe mainand leadingplatform forthe security arrangements within the security community both wish thatthe European Security andDefenceIdentity/PolicywouldactastheEuropeanpillaroftheAtlanticAlliance. Moreover,NATOcontinuestobeanimportantsecurityguaranteeforArticle5casesfor Turkishsecurity,thoughthepossibilityofanArticle5threatisverysmallinthisdayandage. Inthatregard,TurkeyscontinuingproblemswithRussiacloselyconcerntheNATOAlliesas well.Inparticular,thedevelopmentofcloserelationsbetweenNATOandRussiafinallydrew Russia into the security architecture within NATO. This rapprochement has had positive implicationsonTurkeyssecurityinterests,suchastheimplementationofCFE(Conventional ForcesinEurope)armsreductionintheCaucasus.BothTurkeyandNATOasawholewould like to see Russia withdraw its troops from the region. As stated in Article 36 of NATOs Strategic Concept 1999, A strong, stable, and enduring relationship between NATO and
37 RussiaisessentialtoachievelastingstabilityintheEuroAtlanticarea. Suchdevelopments

wouldhavepositiveeffectsonTurkishsecurity. From NATOs perspective, Turkey has been a very crucial asset for the organisation during and after the Cold War. As NATOs former secretarygeneral, Javier Solana, stated, Turkey,asanactiveand valued memberofthe Alliance, hascontributedtotheshapingof our common security. Its proximity tothe Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle

35

NATOs Strategic Concept 1999 and The Washington Summit Communiqu, in NATO Communiqus and

Statements1999(NATOOfficeofInformationandPress,Brussels,2000).
36

Forexample,seeNasuhUslu,TrkAmerikanlikileri(Ankara:21.YzylYaynevi,2000)andGeorgeS. Harris,ABDTrkiyelikileri,inAlanMakovskyveSabriSayar(eds.),TrkiyeninYeniDnyas:TrkD PolitikasnnDeienDinamikleri,translatedbyHrGld(stanbul:Alfa,2002).


37

AlsointheWashingtonSummitCommuniqu,Points27and33,op.cit.

18

EastandtheMediterraneanputsTurkey intheepicentreofchange.Itisthisnewroleof Turkey that makes this country a major asset in NATOs new cooperative approach to security.Asacountrywithuniquehistoricalandculturallinksandasapromoterofregional cooperation,TurkeyactivelycontributestoNATOscollectivedefenceaswellastoitsnew missions in crisis management and peace support. And, in contributing significantly to the Alliances outreach and cooperative activities with nonNATO countries, Turkey has a
38 particularimportanceindevelopingthenewcooperativesecurityarchitectureinEurope.

One of Turkeys major contributions to the construction of the European security architectureandtothedevelopment ofthesecuritycommunity istoactasamediatorand modelfortheadoptionoftheexSovietcountriesintheCaucasusandCentralAsiaintothe political, cultural, military and economic structure of the Western world. By these means, Turkeys contribution to the construction of the new European security architecture under NATO has taken various forms, including developing diplomatic and political dialogue and cooperation, military training and educational activities, economic and trade cooperation, and social and cultural exchanges with the newly independent Turkic states. Turkey has played a crucial role in guiding the exSoviet countries in Central Asia, the Balkans, the Caucasus,theMediterraneanandtheMiddleEasttoestablishcooperativerelationswiththe
39 Westernworld. MentioningjustafewsuchprojectswillillustrateTurkeysactiveandhard

workforthealignmentofthesecountriesintotheframeworkofthenewsecurityarchitecture underNATO. Firstofall,Turkey hasconcludedagreementsof cooperationon militarytrainingand technicalandscientificissuesaswellaswithinthedefenceindustrywithalmost60countries, including NATO and nonNATO countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Southern Mediterranean,SubSaharanAfrica,CentralAsia,theFarEastandevenSouthAmerica.All oftheseagreementsaimedatmilitary securitycooperationwitha viewtowardsdeveloping
40 interoperability. Bytheseagreements,Turkey hasbeenasecurity bridge betweenNATO

andnonNATOcountries. Moreover,Turkeydevelopedanumberofmultilateralsecurityprojectswithcountriesin the region. The main objective of these projects was to enhance Turkeys foreign security,

38 39

JavierSolana,NATOintheTwentyFirstCentury,Perceptions,Vol.IV,No.1,MarchMay1999,p.21.

For example, Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkeys New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to the WesternChina (Boulder:WestviewPress,RANDStudy,1993)IanO.Lesser,TurkeyinaChangingSecurity Environment, JournalofInternationalAffairs,Vol.54,No1,Fall 2000.
40

Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkeys Security and Its Relations with NATO, Web page:

http:\\www.mfa.gov.tr

19

defence and political relations as well as promote cooperation and dialogue in the region. Turkeys involvement in these projects serves the growth of the security community by developing intimate political, economic, military and institutional transactions. A brief mentionofsomeofthemwillproveTurkeyshighandactivecontribution. In the Balkans, Turkey initiated and/or was involved in a number of bilateral and multilateral political, economic, military and social projects such as the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force ( BLACKSEAFOR) in April 2001, the South East Europe CooperationProcess(SEECP)inFebruary2000,theMultinationalPeaceForceSouthEastern Europe (MPFSEE) and the SouthEastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) in September 1999, theSoutheastEuropeanCooperativeInitiative(SECI)in1996andtheBalkanfreetradezone initiative in October 1988. In the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey pioneered the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992, and allowed the enlargementoftheEconomicCooperationAgreementintotheCaucasianandCentralAsian countriesinthe1990s. In addition to these initiatives and efforts for the promotion of peace, security and stabilityintheregion,Turkeyplayedanactiveroleininternationalpeacekeepingoperations (Peace Support Operations) in several crises within the framework of the U.N. and NATO missions: intheU.N.IranIraqMilitaryObserverGroup(19881991),theU.N.IraqKuwait Observation Mission (1991present), Operation Provide Comfort/Northern Watch after the GulfWarof19901991(1991present),theU.N.OperationinSomalia(19921994),theU.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (1993present), the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (19931995), the Implementation Force and Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina(1996present),theCombinedPoliceForce inBosniaandHerzegovina(1995), theU.N.PreventiveDeploymentForceinMacedonia(1995present),theInternationalPolice TaskForceinBosniaandHerzegovina(1997present),OperationAlbainAlbania(1997),the Temporary International Presence in Hebron in IsraelPalestine (1997present), the Kosovo
41 Verification Force (19981999) and the Kosovo Force (2001present). Currently, the

TurkishArmedForcesparticipatesinandleadstheISAFforcesdeployedforthepurposeof Afghanistans reconstruction after the September 11 tragedy. All these peace support operationsinseveralareassurroundingTurkeyprovethattheTurkishmilitaryforceshadan active participation and role in nonArticle 5 operations under the mandates of the United

41

TurkishGeneralStaff,PfPTrainingCentreCourseGuide2000&2001,Ankara,Chapter1.Also,Webpage: http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/uluslararas.

20

NationsandNATO.TheyareTurkeysvaluablesupportinpeacekeeping,crisismanagement, searchandrescueandhumanitarianoperationsintheregion. Moreover,and moretothepointconcerningTurkeyscontributiontotheconstruction oftheEuropeansecurityarchitectureunderNATOisTurkeysinvolvementinthePartnership forPeace(PfP)andtheEuroAtlanticPartnershipCounciloperations.InlightofNATOsPfP initiative, as enshrined in the fifth paragraph of Point 25 of the Washington Summit Communiqu, Turkey established a PfP Training Centre in Ankara on 9 March 1998. Its principle objective is to provide qualitative education and training support to military and civilian personnel of Partner nations to reach Interoperability Objectives. All courses are open to all partners as well as to allies. PfP and nonPfPcountry personnel are trained and educatedatthecentreforadaptationtoNATOsdoctrine,principles,tactics,proceduresand
42 standards.

ThePfPTrainingCentreactivitiescomprisemilitaryvisits,militaryschool,collegeand academictrainingandeducationorfieldtrainingandeducationvariousshorttermcourseson a number of topics for interoperability job training at units, headquarters and institutions unit/personnel exchange cooperation in the field of military history, archives and
43 museologyandjointexercisesandsendingobserverstoexercises.

Since its establishment the Centre has hosted 1,200 participants from 14 NATO, 21
44 Partnerand2MediterraneanDialoguecountries, mostofwhomwereeducatedandtrained

indifferentplacesaroundTurkey.Thecourses/lecturesweregivenbyTurkishpersonnelwith NATOandPSOexperienceaswellasbyexpertsandspeakersfromNATOandthePfPand othernationalandinternationalinstitutions.Thus,therehasemergedasmallminiatureofthe newsecuritycommunity inwhich military,academic,technicalandpoliticalpersonnel have closecommunicationandexchangesleadingtonurturingcommonunderstandingandvalues, justlikeintheEAPCandPfPmeetingsattheministeriallevelwithintheNATOframework. Indeed,itisimportanttomentionthatineverycourse,importanceispaidtosocialcultural
45 activitiestohelptobridgethecrossculturaldifferences. Also,TurkeyandPfPcountries

holdjointmilitaryoperationseveryyear.Forinstance,from1995to1999TurkeyandthePfP countries held a number of joint military exercises in different countries such as Bulgaria,

42 43 44 45

Ibid.,p.119,22. Ibid.p.118. TurkishForeignMinistry,TurkeysSecurityandItsRelationswithNATO,op.cit. TurkishGeneralStaff,PfPTrainingCentreCourseGuide2000&2001I,op.cit.,p.126.

21

Romania, Italy, Albania, the Republic of Macedonia, the United States, Slovakia, Turkey,
46 Kazakhstan,Hungary,Canada,Georgia,Uzbekistan,KyrgyzstanandSlovenia. 47 Inaddition,TurkeyhasplacedgreatimportanceonNATOsMediterraneanDialogue.

BeingaMediterraneancountryandpartoftheMediterraneanDialogue,Turkeybelievesthat the Mediterranean dimension is one of the security components of the European security architecture.Inthatrespect,TurkeydevelopedgoodandfriendlyrelationswiththeDialogue countries, signing various technical cooperation agreements in the military field, assuming the task of Contact Point Embassy in Jordan for the period of 20012002, and training and
48 educating officers from Dialogue countries at the PfP Training Centre in Ankara. Indeed,

Turkey participates in the formation of NATOs decisionmaking processes regarding Mediterranean security. This is a great advantage and power for Turkish interests in the Mediterranean, unlike Turkeys sidelined position within the EUs European Mediterranean
49 Policy.

To sum up, Turkey and NATO members have been closely interdependent on each other in the construction of the new security architecture in a broader Europe. On the one hand, Turkey has further elevated its international position and increased its advantages by using its membership power in NATOs decisionmaking, strategy and operations. On the otherhand,NATOhas further increased its influenceoverthebroadersecurityenvironment intheBalkans,the Mediterranean,theCaucasus andCentral Asia by usingTurkeys strong geopolitical,historical,sociocultural,economicandevenmilitaryinfluenceovertheregion. If NATO were the only organisation for constructing the security architecture in Europe,Turkeyspositionwould have beenclearcutanddefinite,notdelicate.But,aswe havealreadystatedabove,theEUsquestforbuildingupasecurityanddefencecommunity inEuropecloselyconcernsTurkeyduetoitsimportantimplicationsforTurkeyspositionin Europe. It makes Turkeys position delicate due to Turkeys asymmetrically multiplexed connectionswiththeEuropeansecurity architecture.The followingsectionwill lookatthe midwaypositionsofTurkeyssecurityrelationswiththenewsecurityarchitectureinEurope.

3.2.Tur keyandtheEU/WEU:TheMidwayPositions
46 47

Ibid.,p.119.

ForNATOsMediterraneanInitiative,seeIanO.Lesseretal.,TheFutureofNATOsMediterraneanInitiative (WashingtonD.C.:Rand,2000)andIanO.Lesser,NATOLooksSouth:NewChallengesandNewStrategiesin theMediterranean (WashingtonD.C.:Rand,2000).


48 49

TurkishForeignMinistry,TurkeysSecurityandItsRelationswithNATO,op.cit.

M. Fatih Tayfur, Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, Perceptions, Vol.V, No.3, September November2000,p.138143.

22

Turkey pays close attention to developments in the European security order that are takingplacewithintheframeworkoftheEU.TurkeyssecurityperspectiveregardingtheEU ismadeupoftwodimensions:ThefirstoneisTurkeyswishtohavefullintegrationwiththe EUs economic, political, institutional and legal structures,thus becoming a full member of the EUs amalgamated security community, and, like the Central and Eastern European countries, being a member of the European familyorder in which democracy, market economy,humanrightsandfreedoms,civilsocietyandpluralismareprevalent. The second dimension is Turkeys wish to have full integration with the developing security,defenceandforeignpolicystructureoftheEU.Indeed,aswestatedabove,Turkeyis already an integral part of European security through NATO, where Turkey shares the securityanddefenceperspectiveoftheotherEuropeancountries,membersandnonmembers of the EU. However, since the EU countries have initiated development of a European securityanddefencepolicyasaEuropeanwingoftheAtlanticAllianceandasapillarofEU integration, not surprisingly Turkey wants to join such a formation at a respectable and convenient level and degree. This is a target for Turkey in order to match its associated partnership status in the first and third pillars of the EU with a similar status in the second pillar.Inotherwords,TurkeywantstobepartofthisaspectoftheEuropeanUnion,too.Just like itsobjectivetobepartoftheEUs economic,legal andpolitical structuresby fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey wants to be part of the EUs security and defence initiative/policy.JustasTurkeyhasacustomsunionintheeconomicandtradefieldswith theEU,Turkeywantstoestablish,sotospeak,asecurityanddefenceunioninsecurityand defencepolicy,butwithabetterdealthanthatinthecustomsunion,whereTurkeyhasnorole orparticipationinthedecisionmakingmechanisms.

3.2.1.SecurityDimensionofTur keysMembershipintheEuropeanUnion LikeNATO,theEuropeanUnionhasalsobeenadaptingitsinternalandexternalsystem to the new security environment since the end of the Cold War. Its admission of Finland, AustriaandSwedenin1995enlargedtheEuropeansecuritycommunityintermsofthesoft security approach, contributing to the growth of the security architecture in Europe. The EUs more important and substantial contribution to the development of European security came through its developing relations with the exSoviet Bloc countries in Eastern and Central Europe and its policy of admitting 13 Central, Eastern and Southeast European countries as candidates for full membership into the EU structure. It is expected that 10 of themwillhavebeenfullmembersbyMay2004. 23

In the light of the EUs guidance and encouragement, a number of radical and impressivereformswereimplementedbymostofthesecountriesinlinewiththeCopenhagen criteria of 1992. All these reforms resulted in the development of democracy, market economy,humanrights,pluralism,theruleoflawandfreedomofthoughtandexpressionin those European countries. In the end, all these contributed to the development of peace, stabilityandsecurity,notonlyinthosecountriesbutalsoinandaroundEuropeasawhole. Turkeys full integration into the European Union and adherence to the values of the Copenhagen criteria would also contribute to Turkeys development in the sense of soft security.JustastheCopenhagencriteriacontributedtothedevelopmentofsecurityconditions in Central and Eastern European countries, increasing their political, economic and social standardstothelevelofEUcountries,Turkeyalsoaimstobecomeanintegralmemberofthe EUs security community. These are the values atthe heartof the European Union that are
50 aimedatbyNATOaswell. So,Turkeysdriveforfullmembershipismotivatednotonlyby

the goal of entering the EU as an organisation, but also by the desire to improve Turkeys economicandpoliticalsecurity ingeneral.Thus Turkeys integration intotheEUshould be
51 regardedasoneofTurkeyssecurityandstrategicchoices. AsAmbassadorAlptunastated,

Sincethebeginning,membershipintheEUhasbeenastrategicobjectiveofTurkishforeign
52 policyandmustbeseenasanintegralpartofTurkeysmodernisationprocess Ifsecurity

meansfeelingsafeandsecureineveryaspectoflife,Turkeyssecuritycanbeimprovedby itsaccessiontotheEUthankstothefollowingadvantages:
53 *Psychological/Identity: FeelingandlivinginadevelopedEuropeanWesternworld.

If and when the Turkish people improve their condition in the way the EU countries have achieved, it will elevate the Turkish peoples feelings and identity from the category of underdevelopedcountrytothatofadevelopedsociety. * Political: Democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, civil society and pluralism are the values by which the Turkish people will improve their political condition andsolvetheirproblemsmorequicklyandmoresatisfactorily.
50

NATO is determined to contribute to building a stronger and broader EuroAtlantic community of democracies a community where human rights and fundamental freedoms are upheld, where borders are increasingly open to people, ideas and commerce where war becomes unthinkable. The Washington Declaration1999,Paragraph3,inNATOHandbook,Documentation,op.cit.
51 52

AliBula, AvrupaBirliiveTrkiye (stanbul:FezaGazetecilik,2001),p.34,3940.

Akn Alptuna (Ambassador, Deputy UnderSecretary, the Turkish Foreign Ministry), Turkeys European Perspective,InsightTurkey,Vol.3,No.2,AprilJune2001,p.65.
53

Forastudy ofTurkeyssearchforidentityintheEuropeanUnion,seeabanH.al,TrkiyeAvrupaBirlii

likileri:KimlikAray,PolitikAktrlerveDeiim (Ankara:Nobel,2001).

24

*Economic:OncetheitemsmentionedintheEUsMaastrichtcriteriasuchaslowlevel inflation,controlledbudgeddeficits,statespendingandsoonareachieved,Turkeyslevelof economicdevelopmentandprosperitywillbeincreasedtoEUstandards. *MilitaryStrategic:WhenTurkeyandtheEUcountriescomewithintheframeworkof thesamesecuritycommunity,oldenmitiesanddisputeswillbemoreeasilyeliminated.Inthe likelihoodofemergingproblems,forexample,betweenTurkeyandGreece,theywillhaveto usepeacefulmeansanddialoguetosolvetheseproblems. * Foreign Policy: Turkey will become an island of peace, security and stabilityin the midstofitsborderingregionsandwillfeelmoresecurefromtheproblemssurroundingit. AsapartneroftheEUsince1964andhavingenteredacustomsunionin1996,Turkey is getting closer to the European Union. At the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey was declaredoneofthe13candidatecountriesforfullmembershipintheEuropeanUnion.After that,TurkeyandtheEUtookimportantstepsinTurkeyspreparationforfullmembership:In reply to the EUs demands in the Accession Partnership Document of December 2000 to enact reforms in several areas, Turkey presented its National Program in 2001, in which TurkeyagreedtoimplementseveralreformsinordertofulfiltheCopenhagencriteria. Since then, Turkey has taken important steps in economic, political and legal areas in lightofitsNationalProgram.AlthoughthereisstillmoretimeforTurkeytocompletethese reforms, it is believed that with the realisation of Turkeys full membership in the EU there will be closer cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy. Along with other candidate countries, Turkey has already begun the process of integration into the consultationmechanismsestablishedtoenableitspoliciestoalignwiththoseoftheEUasfar aspossible.Inthisinstance,Turkeyhasparticipatedinmorethan80percentofEUstatements
54 onpolitical issuessinceHelsinki. ThusHelsinkimarksaqualitativenewbeginninganda

processofmutualstrategictransformationforbothTurkeyandtheEU. Yet,aswewillseebelow,theHelsinkiSummitalsostartedanawkwardprocessinthe fieldofsecurityanddefencepolicyregardingTurkeyandfiveothernonEUEuropeanNATO Allies.TurkeysconnectionwiththeESDIunderthe WEUwas halted.Sobeforeanalysing thisprocess,TurkeyssecurityanddefencerelationswiththeWEUwillbelookedat.

3.2.2.TurkeyandtheWesternEuropeanUnion TurkeyparticipatedintheconstructionoftheEUssecurityanddefenceidentitywithin theframeworkoftheWEUasthesecondpillarofEUintegrationasstatedintheMaastricht


54

Alptuna, op.cit.p.72.

25

Treaty.JustlikeitsapplicationforaccessiontotheEU,itappliedforfullmembershipinthe WEUin1991.But,justliketheresponsegiventoTurkeysapplicationforfullmembershipin the EU, Turkey was offered an associate membership, a position parallel to its EU membership level. The EU decided that full membership in the WEU would be contingent uponfullmembershipintheEU. When Turkey, along with Norway and Iceland, became an associate member of the
55 WEUon20November1992(becomingeffectivein1995), aparallelpositionwasinstituted 56 forTurkeysmembershipsintheEUandintheWEU. However,thatwasalsoaninevitable

outcomeofTurkeysintegralposition inNATO:Asthe WEUwastoactastheEuropean pillar of NATO in order to implement Petersberg tasks and develop the ESDI, the nonEU European NATO countries were given associate member status within the WEU
57 mechanism. Though not a perfect and fully desirable position for Turkey, it provided a

respectable connection for Turkey in the development of the ESDI by the WEU within NATO. The WEU associate membership provided Turkey with a place and some institutional rights in the WEUs decisionmaking processes as well as in the WEUs nonArticle 5 operations. Turkeys status in the WEU system granted Turkey the right to become closely involved in the European security architecture. Most importantly, Turkey had the right to participateinthemeetingsoftheWEUCouncilanditsworkinggroupsandsubsidiarybodies under certain conditions. During meetings, Turkey also had the right to speak and submit proposals,butnottherighttoblockadecisionthatwasthesubjectofconsensusamongthe full member states however, Turkey could adhere to such decisions later if it wanted. Furthermore, Turkey was associated with the WEU Planning Cell through special arrangementsandcould nominateofficerstotheCell. Moreover,Turkeycouldtakeparton thesamebasisasfullmembersinWEUoperations(aswellasinexercisesandplanning)to which it committed forces. Turkey could also nominate Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU)onthesamebasis.Therefore,byvirtueofitsNATOmembership,ithadasayin WEU operations, and it was directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in whichNATOassetsandcapabilitiesweretobeusedwithinthe frameworkof
55

Turkish Foreign Ministry, Document on Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the KingdomofNorway,andtheRepublicofTurkey,Webpage:http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/weu.html.
56 57

ForabriefhistoryoftheemergenceoftheWEUandTurkeysmembershipstory,seeAybet,op.cit.,PartFour.

Hseyin Bac, Turkey and the European security and defence identity a Turkish view, in Studien und Berichte Zur Sicherheitspolitik, GASP, 3 Oktober 2000, p. .35. For more about the disadvantages of the associate membership status, see Turkish Foreign Ministry, Document on Associate Membership of WEU of theRepublicofIceland,theKingdomofNorway,andtheRepublicofTurkey,op.cit.

26

the CJTF. This was an aspect of NATOWEU cooperation and the joint efforts for
58 strengtheningNATOsEuropeanpillarandtheESDIwithinNATO.

Allthesewere very importantforTurkey becausetheyensuredthatTurkeyssecurity interestsweretakenintoaccount.Thedecisionsreflectingtheabovementionedarrangements were well balanced and took into account the concerns of NATO members who were not
59 members of the EU. Indeed, Turkey actively participated in the work of this organisation

and contributed to its efforts aimed at establishing a system wherein Europeans could undertakePetersbergtypeconflictpreventionandcrisismanagementoperations. TherewereseveralreasonsforTurkeysinterestandwillingnesstobepartoftheWEU andtobeinvolvedintheESDI.Firstofall,TurkeywasalreadypartoftheEuropeansecurity orderbymeansofitsNATOmembership.AsmostEUcountriesarealsomembersofNATO, sharingthesameplatforms,policiesetc.,itis inevitablethatTurkeyandtheseEUcountries will have common security concerns in the European landscape. Secondly, Turkey, as a candidate for accession to the EU family, possesses the same values as the European countries: Turkey as well as the EU countries agree that there should be peace rather than war that states should have modern regimes and that differences should be resolved by peaceful meansandnotbyresortingtowar.Thirdly,TurkeyandtheEUcountriessharethe samegeography,i.e.theBalkans,SoutheastEurope,theMediterranean,andeventheMiddle East and the Caucasus. As stated above, any crisis or war in this geography concerns both Turkey and the EU. Fourthly, Turkey tried to improve its position in this field by being a memberoftheWEU.Fifth,theWEU,bymakingTurkeyanassociatememberandnotgiving security guarantees and defence commitments for disputes between member states of the
60 WEUandNATO,triedtostrikea balance betweenTurkeyandGreece. Thus,as statedin

theDocumentonAssociateMembership,theWEUtookintoconsiderationtheinterestsofthe associate members. Indeed, Greece tried to block Turkeys full participation in WEU decisionmaking when the WEU wanted an operation using NATOs operational assets to which the associate members would be contributing. The Greek block was removed by the FrenchgovernmentscompromiseproposalinApril1997,makingtheassociatememberspart
61 of the WEUs decisionmaking process. Finally, Turkey saw the WEU as an essential

58

Mnevver Cebeci, A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate MembersinDecisionMakingforEUledPetersbergOperations,withSpecialReferencetoTurkey,Occasional Papers,WesternEuropeanUnion,Brussels,1999,p.34.
59

Onurymen,TurkeyanditsroleinEuropeanSecurityandDefence,InsightTurkey,Vol.3,No.1,January March2001,p.5354.
60 61

Cebeci,op.cit. p.5Aybet,op.cit.,p.48. Cebeci,op.cit.,p.68.

27

dimensionofNATOsbroadersecurityarchitecture.ThusTurkeysmembershipintheWEU waspartofitsgeneralsecurityperceptioninNATO. An important NATO document that details Turkeys position as well as the relationshipsbetweenNATOandtheWEUonESDIistheWashingtonSummitdocumentof
th 1999.TheAlliesmeetinginWashingtontocelebratethe50 anniversaryofNATOreacheda

historic agreement/consensus on the evolution of the security and defence mechanisms in NATO. Some points of this agreement/consensus were very important in showing Turkeys position within the European security and defence system. Moreover, the Washington agreement/consensuslaiddownsomeimportantbasesofthesecuritycommunity. However, an awkward process has recently developed in TurkishEU relations in the militarydefenceaspectofsecuritysincetheSt.Maloaccordandtheensuingdevelopments: That is, Turkeys associate membership position in the WEU, though not perfectly satisfactory, was ended as a result of the EUs decision toterminate the WEUs role in the ESDI and the ensuing development of the ESDP since then. This development has the potential of marginalising Turkeys position in the European security system in an institutional sense, and, probably, in substance in the future. So the following section will focus on the process of Turkeys marginalisation from the institutional dimension of the Europeansecurityarchitecture.

3.3.Tur keyandtheESDP:TheMarginalPosition Turkeys position in the European security architecture became troublesome when Turkey was placed at the margin of the ESDP in the wake of two important developments alongwiththeirlegaldocumentsin1999:ThefirstonewastheWashingtonSummitandits legal documents of April 1999, which, as will be later analysed in detail, is actually a milestonenotonlyfortheAtlanticAllianceasawholeandtheEuropeansecurityarchitecture, butalsoforTurkeys(andothernonEUEuropeanNATOAllies)positionintheESDP.The second development was the Helsinki Summit and its legal documents of December 1999, whichstartedanewprocessnotonlyfortheEuropeanUnionbutalsoforTurkeyscandidacy process. At the Helsinki Summit, the EU Council accepted Turkey as one of 13 candidate countries for the EU, thus restoring TurkishEU relations, which had been worsening since the1997LuxembourgSummitwhereTurkeyhadalmostbeentakenoffthelistofthenextEU enlargement. The Helsinki Summit was a big step forward in Turkeys integration into the first and third pillars because it confirmed Turkeys integration process in the political, economic and legal fields in line with the Copenhagen criteria. As stated above, these had 28

positivesecurityimplicationsforTurkeyandtheEU.However,inaratherparadoxicalway, in the very same Helsinki Document, Turkey was interestingly distanced from the second pillar of the EU, the ESDP. Turkeys associate membership in the WEU, which had been underlined at the Washington Summit, became surprisingly worse than before, leading to increasing disagreements and tensions between Turkey and the EU on security and defence issues. After these two events, in a sequence of steps taken by the EU in the field of ESDP, TurkeysstandingwithintheEuropeansecurityarchitecturemovedfromthemidwaytothe margin,going frombadtoworseduetotheterminationofTurkeysparticipation inthe WEU decisionmaking mechanism and of its exclusion from the ESDPs decisionmaking
62 process. SointheperiodfromtheendoftheWashingtonSummitupuntilnow,TurkeyEU

relationshaveexperiencedratherstrangeupsanddownsasaresultofthedevelopmentofthe ESDP. While the ESDP process spilled over negatively into the economic/legal/political integrationefforts,TurkeyEUintegrationrelationsgaveapictureofcontrasts:rapprochement ontheonehandandalienationontheother,oraligningwith,whiledistancingfrom,theEU. Thuswecanarguethatanawkwardprocesshasdevelopedintwodimensions:Thefirstoneis withintheinstitutionaldimension,i.e.Turkeysexclusionfromtheinstitutionalisationofthe ESDPandthe secondone isonthesubstanceofpoliticalsecurityrelations, i.e.tensions in TurkishEUrelationsingeneral.Thetwodimensionalprocesscreatedsomecomplicationsin Turkeys domestic politics, foreign policy and in NATOEU dialogue and cooperation, whichwillbeanalysedlater. In order to see the development of Turkeys position in the second pillar, a brief summaryofthedevelopmentandstructureoftheESDPisgivenbelow.

3.3.1.DevelopmentoftheESDP TheEUCouncildeclarationsinCologne(June1999),Helsinki(December1999),Feira (June 2000), Nice (December 2000) and Laeken (December 2001) took important steps to develop the ESDP. All these decisions paved the way for an autonomous European Army, alongwithinstitutionalarrangementsandmechanisms.Withthat,theEUaimstocompleteits threepillar integration. They are First Pillar: European Communities/Economic and

62

ForbrieflookatthisprocessseeBac,TurkeyandtheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy,op.cit.,p.9 14andBac,TrkiyeAGSP:Beklentiler,Endieler, op.cit.

29

Monetary, Second Pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy and Third Pillar: Justice
63 andHomeAffairs.

Asaresultofthesedevelopments,theESDIhaschangeditscharacteristicsfrombeing anIdentitywithintheWEUtoaPolicywithintheEU.Thiswasmainlyduetothefactthat Article5oftheEUCologneDeclarationurgedthetakingofanewstepintheconstructionof the European Union towards a Common European Policy on Security and Defence, also named the European Security and Defence Policy. But that Policy was of course to be basedontheEuropeanIdentityintermsofpoliticsandsecurity. TheEUdeclaredthattheESDPwastobefunctionalonlyforPetersbergtasks,i.e.non Article5tasksofNATOandtheBrusselsTreaty.Tofulfilthesekindsofoperations,itstarted tobuildupanewinstitutional,political,andmilitarystructure,leadingtosomeproblemsin theexistingmechanismsconcerningNATO,theWEUandtheEU.Inotherwords,theEUs startofanewinstitutional,politicalandmilitaryprocessfortheconstructionoftheESDPhad implications for those countries that were not members of the EU, the socalled nonEU EuropeanNATOAllies(Turkey,Norway,Iceland,theCzechRepublic,PolandandHungary), particularlyforTurkey,forNATOspositionvisvistheEuropeansecurityarchitecture(in the view of the Washington Summit Document) and finally for the construction and developmentofthesecurityarchitectureunderNATOingeneral.Allthesedevelopmentscan be categorised into three groups: First, the decisionmaking mechanism second, military capabilities and operations as well as noncivilian military crisis management and third, modalities to include the nonEU European NATO Allies and the modalities to establish transparentdialogueandcooperationbetweentheEUandNATO.
64 3.3.1.1.ESDPDecisionMakingMechanism

As far as the decisionmaking mechanism and process is concerned, the EU, having mergedtheWEUintoitsSecondPillar,terminatedtheWEUsroleintheEuropeanSecurity andDefenceIdentity.TheWEUsdecisionmakingmechanismconcerningtheESDIwasput aside. Instead, the EU Council was designated as the supreme organ to take decisions to implementtheESDPforPetersbergtasks.AsstatedintheEUsCologneSummiton4June 1999,TheCounciloftheEuropeanUnionwillbeabletotakedecisionsonthewholerange of political, economic, and military instruments at its disposal when responding to crisis
63

For example, KlausDieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law (Brussels: European Commission DirectorateGeneralforEducationandCulture,2000).
64

All information in this part regarding the arrangements about decisionmaking was received from the EU CouncilDocumentsintheCologne,Helsinki,Feira,NiceandLaekenSummits.

30

situationsandhavetheabilitytotakedecisionsonthefullrangeofconflictpreventionand
65 crisismanagementtasksdefinedintheTreatyonEuropeanUnion,thePetersbergtasks.

WiththisdecisionattheCologneSummittomergetheWEUwiththeEU,notonlydid TurkeydefactoloseitsWEUassociatemembership,butalsotheNATOWEUcooperation anddialogueasstatedintheWashingtonSummitbecamevoid.Withthisabsorption,theEU tookover WEU functions and startedto set up a new organisational framework in orderto developtheESDP.
66 With this resolve to have an autonomous decisionmaking structure at the Helsinki

Summit,theEUoffered,asaconsolationprize,thenecessarydialogue,consultation,andco operation with NATO and its nonEU members, other countries that were candidates for accessiontotheEUaswellasotherprospectivepartnersinEUledcrisismanagement.Thus the EUs decisionmaking was limited to the EUs full members only, while all others, irrespective of their importance, acquisitions and connections with the European security architecture, were put at the margin of the ESDP decisionmaking mechanism. Meanwhile, thenonEUcountrieswerecategorisedintothreegroups:nonEUEuropeanNATOmembers candidate countries waiting for full membership in the EU and those countries that were related to the European security architecture such as the nonEU PfP countries. In other words,theESDPdecisionmakingmechanismcreatedastructurethatputEUmembersatthe centreandtheothersatthe margin,the latterservingonlyasa contributorstotheESDP. Mostimportantly,theEUemphasisedthatthoseatthe marginshould have fullrespect for the decisionmaking autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.67 The marginal countries were connected to the ESDP with a consultative function. During the Feira Summit, the EU defined a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countriesconcerned(sixnonEUEuropeanNATOmembersand13candidatesforaccession
68 totheEU) canenjoythenecessarydialogue,consultationandcooperationwiththeEU.At

the Nice Summit, the EU set up permanent consultation arrangements designed in

65

Cologne European Council, The European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European PolicyonSecurityandDefence,34June1999.
66

TheESDPsdecisionmakingorgansaretheGeneralAffairsCouncil,thePoliticalandSecurityCommitteein Brussels,theMilitaryCommittee,andtheMilitaryStaff,allcomingundertheEUCouncil.
67

Helsinki European Council, Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and DefenceandonNonMilitaryCrisisManagementoftheEuropeanUnion,1011December1999.
68

The 15 countries are nonEU European NATO members (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic) and the candidate countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic*, Estonia, Hungary*, Latvia,Lithuania,Malta,Poland*,Slovenia,Slovakia,Romania,Turkey*).*referstotheduplicatecountries.

31

consideration of noncrisis periods and crisis periods. Thus, the 15 countries will have varyingpositionswithintheEUdecisionmakingprocess. During noncrisis periods, the consultation on ESDP matters will be held at a minimum of two meetings in the EU+15 format during each Presidency, and also a minimum of two meetings in EU+6 format with six nonEU European NATO members. Furthermore, one ministerial meeting will be held with all of the 15 and the six together. SimilarconsultationarrangementswereconceivedattheMilitaryCommitteelevelaswellas exchangesatthemilitaryexpertlevel.ThosecountrieswishingtobeinvolvedinEUmilitary activitiesmayappointanofficeraccreditedtotheEUMilitaryStaff(EUMS)whowillserve asacontact.Aminimumof twoinformationmeetingswillbeheldduringeachPresidencyfor these officers from the 15 and the six countries, which could, for example, address the question of how the followup of crisis situations should be handled. But depending on the requirements, extra meetings may be organised for each case. But all of these meetings are seen as consultations and as a supplement for those meetings held as part of CFSP enhanced political dialogue. The only credit for the nonEU countries is their right to submitproposalsduringthemeetings,butwithnoguaranteeofconsideration. During periods of crisis, which are divided into preoperational phase and operationalphase,thesamepatternwasmaintainedmoreorless,withsomeexceptions.In thepreoperationalphase,asagreedatHelsinkiandFeira,intheeventofacrisis,dialogue and consultation will be intensified at all levels, including ministerial level, in the period leading up to the EU Council decision. When a crisis develops, these intensified consultationswillprovideanopportunityforexchangeofviewsonsituationassessmentand discussion of the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved. When the possibility of an EUled military crisis managementoperationisunderconsideration,theaimoftheseconsultations,whichcouldbe held at the politicomilitary expert level, will be to ensure that the countries potentially contributingtosuchanoperationareinformedoftheEUsintentions,particularlywithregard to the military options being envisaged. In this respect, once the EU begins to examine in depthanoptionrequiringtheuseofNATOassetsandcapabilities,particularattentionwillbe paidtoconsultationofthesixnonEUEuropeanNATOmembers. In the operational phase, once the EU Council has chosen the strategic military

option(s), the operational planning work will be presented to the nonEU European NATO
membersandtheothercandidatecountriesthathaveexpressedtheirintentioninprincipleof taking part in the operation to enable them to determine the nature and volume of the 32

contribution they could make to an EUled operation. Once the Council has approved the operationconcept,havingtakenintoconsiderationtheoutcomeoftheconsultationwiththird countrieslikelytotakepartintheoperation,thesecountrieswillbeformally invitedtotake partintheoperationaccordingtothearrangementsagreedtoinHelsinki.Thatmeansthatthe nonEU European NATO members will participate, if they wish so, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Where the EU does not use NATOassets,theywill,uponadecisionbytheCouncil,beinvitedtotakepartinoperations. Thus, the involvement in the operations of the nonEU European NATO members dependsfirstontheEUsuseofNATOassetsandsecondonaninvitationbytheEUCouncil. InoperationsrequiringrecoursetoNATOassetsandcapabilities,operationalplanningwillbe carried out by the Alliances planning bodies, and the nonEU European Allies will be involvedinplanningaccordingtotheprocedureslaiddownwithinNATO.InautonomousEU operations,operationalplanningwillbecarriedoutwithinoneof theEuropeanstrategiclevel headquarters.Inautonomousoperations inwhich theyare invitedtotakepart,thecandidate countries and nonEU European Allies may send liaison officers to the European Military Staff bodies atthe strategic level for exchanges of information on operational planning and the contributions envisaged. The states concerned will provide the EU with an initial indication of their contribution, which will then be further specified during exchanges with theOperationCommanderassistedbytheEUMS. The Committee of Contributors is composed of all the contributing countries. It will playakeyroleinthedaytodaymanagementoftheoperation.Itwillbethemainforumfor discussing all problems relating to the daytoday management of the operation. The deliberationsoftheCommitteeofContributorswillconstituteapositivecontributiontothose of the PSC. The PSC, which exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation,willtakeaccountoftheviewsexpressedbytheCommitteeofContributors.Allof theEUmemberstatesareentitledtobepresentatthecommitteesdiscussionsirrespectiveof whetherornottheyaretakingpartintheoperation,butonlycontributingstateswilltakepart in the daytoday management of the operation. NonEU European NATO Allies and candidatecountriesdeployingsignificantmilitaryforcesunderanEUledoperationwillhave the same rights and obligations in terms of daytoday management of the operation as EU memberstatestakingpartintheoperation.The workoftheCommitteeofContributorswill beconductedwithoutprejudicetoconsultationswithintheframeworkofthesinglestructure includingnonEUEuropeanNATOmembersandEUcandidatecountries.

33

To sum up, while the EU created an autonomous decisionmaking structure for the ESDP,thenonEUcountrieswereputatthemarginwheretheyareentitledonlytobecome involvedasconsultantcountries,andwhetherornottheirviews,interests,andparticipation aretakenintoconsiderationdependsonthedecisionoftheEUdecisionmakinginstitutions. InsomecasesitmightbeexpectedthatbecauseoftheintergovernmentalnatureoftheEUs decisionmakingregardingtheESDPpillar,theparticipationofnonEUcountrieseveninthe consultationprocesswillbecontingentuponaunanimousvoteintheEUCouncil.Thismay be a problem and concern for nonEU European NATO members in such operations where theEUdoesnotuseNATOassetsandcapabilities.Aswillbeshownbelow,thisisoneofthe pointsthatcausesTurkeyconcernregardingtheESDPprocess.

3.3.1.2.ESDPsMilitaryOperationalCapabilities The Cologne Summit stated that the EU Council should have the ability to take decisionsonthefullrangeofconflictpreventionandcrisismanagementtasksdefinedinthe Treaty on European Union, the Petersberg tasks. To this end, the Union must have the capacityforautonomousaction,backedupbycrediblemilitaryforces,themeanstodecideto usethemandareadinesstodosoinordertorespondtointernationalcriseswithoutprejudice toactionsbyNATO. In order to strengthen its military capability, the EU chose two ways: one by the member states efforts to improve their military capability and the other by using NATO assets and capabilities in their Petersbergtask operations. As regards military capabilities, member states need to develop further forces (including headquarters) that are also suitable for crisis management operations without any unnecessary duplication. The main characteristicsincludedeployability,sustainability,interoperability,flexibilityandmobility. In this respect, the member states have set themselves the Headline Goal from the Helsinki Summit: By the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deployrapidlyandthensustainforcescapableofthefullrangeofPetersbergtasksassetout intheAmsterdamTreaty,includingthemostdemanding,inoperationsuptocorpslevel(15 brigadesor50,00060,000persons).Theseforcesshouldbemilitarilyselfsustainingwiththe necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support servicesandadditionally,asappropriate,airandnavalelements. However,despitethememberstatesefforts,theEUwillneedNATOresourcesforthe following reasons. Firstly, most of the EU members assets and capabilities are assigned to NATO therefore, their assets and capabilities have to be doublehatted. Secondly, 34

construction of similar military capabilities creates duplication therefore,the duplication of military forces hastobeprevented inordertosave money andtime.Thirdly, inanycase it wouldtakealongtime,wouldbeverycostlyandwouldbedifficultfortheEUcountriesto achieve.Therefore,theEUwillhavetouseNATOassetsandcapabilitiesforitsautonomous EUledPetersbergtypeoperations. The Cologne European Council Declaration put forward two alternative ways with which the EU could implement Petersberg tasks: First, EUled operations with recourse to NATOassetsandcapabilities inaccordancewiththeBerlindecisionsof1996second,EU
69 led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. While in the first

alternativethedecisionsregardingtheoperationshavetobemadethroughtheinvolvementof theNATOmembersintheNorthAtlanticCouncil,inthesecondalternative,astherewould be no recourseto NATO assets,the decision to start, conduct and end an EUled operation would be made by the EU Council. That meant that the EU could undertake autonomous operationswithouttheparticipationoftheNATOmembers. In the EUled operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the EU could use national or multinational European means preidentified by member states. This would require either the use of national command structures providing multinational representation in headquarters or drawing on existing command structures within multinationalforces.FurtherarrangementstoenhancethecapacityofEuropeanmultinational andnationalforcestorespondtocrisessituationswillbeneeded. In EUled operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, including European command arrangements, the main focus should be on the following aspects: Implementation of the arrangements based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the WashingtonSummitdecisionsof1999.Inthosedecisions,NATOhadextendeditssupportto EUledoperationsundercertainconditionsasstatedabove.

3.3.1.3.TheEUNATOCooperation As the EU countries terminated the role of the WEU and the possibility of the previously decided NATOWEU cooperation, the EU asked NATO to develop a co operation between the two organisations and to replace the NATOWEU cooperation mechanisms.Inthisrespect,theEUapproachedNATOinordertobenefitfromtheAlliances assets and capabilities as well as from its force planning expertise at the military/technical level for the materialisation of the EUs Headline Goal. In addition, four ad hoc working
69

CologneEuropeanCouncil,op.cit.andAybet,op.cit.p.53.

35

groups were developed with the participation of representative of member states of both organisations. Themainissueatthosejointgatheringswastomakethenecessaryarrangementsforthe materialisation of the ESDP, for the modalities of EU access to NATOs assets and capabilitiesadoptedattheFeiraandNicesummits.DuringtheNiceSummit,theEUCouncil requestedpermanentarrangementsfromNATOinlightofEUNATOconsultationandco operationontheimplementationofParagraph10oftheWashingtonSummitCommuniquin
70 1999. The Nice Summit stated: On the basis of decisions adopted by the Alliance at the

Washington Summit on 24 April 1999, the European Union suggests that the arrangements betweenthetwoorganisationsfortheimplementationofBerlinPlusshouldbeasfollows[in headlines]:
71 1.TheEuropeanUnionwill haveguaranteedpermanentaccess toNATOsplanning

capabilities 2.Presumptionofavailabilityofpreidentifiedassetsandcapabilities
72 3.IdentificationofaseriesofcommandoptionsmadeavailabletotheEU

RightaftertheNiceSummitwheretheaforementionedregulationsweremade,theEU Council informed the North Atlantic Council of its Nice decisions and in December 2000 demanded the above three points for the realisation of the ESDP. The issue was then deliberatedintheNorthAtlanticCouncilmeetingsfromDecember2000onwardsandinthe joint meetingsoftheNorthAtlanticCouncilandtheEUsPoliticalandSecurityCommittee fromFebruary2001onwardsinBrussels. These institutionaldevelopmentsaside,the main issuewasthepositionofthenonEU EuropeanNATOAlliesinNATOEUcooperation.AlthoughtheEUdemandedfullrespect toitsautonomousorganisationasdifferentfromNATO,itwasseekingmilitaryassistance from NATO. In other words, the nonEU European NATO Allies were asked for military participationandcontributiontotheEUledoperationsbutdeniedpoliticalparticipationand contributiontothedecisionmakingsideoftheEUledoperations.Thatwasaratherunjust approachtothem.
70

Nice European Council, Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy, Appendix To Annex VII To Annex VI, Annex To The Permanent Arrangements On EU/NATO Consultation And Co operationOnTheImplementationofParagraph10ofTheWashingtonSummitCommuniqu,7,8,9December 2000.
71

In the Cologne European Council Declaration it was worded as assured EU access to NATO planning capabilitiesabletocontributetomilitaryplanningforEUledoperations, TheEuropeanCouncilDeclarationon StrengtheningtheCommonEuropeanPolicyonSecurityandDefence,34June1999.
72

NiceEuropeanCouncil, PresidencyConclusionsonEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy,AppendixTo AnnexVIIToAnnexVI,op.cit.

36

That is why the way that the EU constructed its institutional structure regarding the decisionmaking process and military capabilities in order to plan and implement the Petersbergtasks in viewof itsESDPwasopposedbythose countrieswhoseposition inthe ESDPandintheimplementationofthePetersbergtaskshadbeenmarginalised.Mostofthe nonEU European NATO members that had been part of the WEU were to be influenced negativelyby thesedevelopments.But,ofthesecountries,Turkeyisthemostaffectedfortwo reasons:1)UnlikeHungary,PolandandtheCzechRepublic,Turkeyisunlikelytobecomea memberoftheEUinthenearfuture.ThusunlikethemTurkeyisunabletoparticipatefullyin theaforementioneddecisionmakingprocessoftheESDPunderthesecircumstances.Onthe otherhand,giventhatTurkeyisalreadyanassociatememberoftheEU,whyshouldTurkey be put fully outof the second pillar of European integration? 2) In contrastto Norway and Iceland,Turkeyplaysaveryimportantroleintheheartofaveryunstableregioninsupportof Westerninterestsaswell.

3.3.2.TurkeysPolicyTowardstheESDP In general, Turkey gave a positive response tothe EUs attempts to have a security anddefenceidentity.TheTurkishMinistryofForeignAffairsstated,IftheEuropeannations require arrangements in security and defence matters, it is a choice that Turkey would only
73 respect. Turkey, as a European member of NATO, believes that Europeans should

shoulder their responsibility better in the Alliance for the security of the continent. Thus, Turkey from the outset has supportedthe ESDIdeveloping within the Alliance through the
74 WEU. And Turkey, as a candidate for EU membership, has also supported this

organisations ambitions and indeed historical goal of acquiring a security and defence
75 dimensionthrough itsESDP. Asa manifestationofthissupportTurkey has informedthe

EUofitsreadinesstoparticipateandextendmilitaryforcesintherealisationoftheHeadline

73

TurkishForeignMinistry,EuropeanSecurityandTurkey,Web:http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.html,

pointB1.
74

Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkeys Security and Its Relations with NATO, Web: http://mfa.gov.tr. Also, Uur Ziyal, Turkish Ambassador, UnderSecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey and European Security, speech made at EUNATO Cooperation and the Participation of Third Countries in the ESDP, VenusbergGroupAutumnSession,Ankara,2728November2001.
75

TurkishForeignMinistry,ibid.Ziyal, ibid.

37

Goal. Turkey pledged 6,000 troops, supported by necessary air and maritime support. This
76 contributionmadeTurkeythefifthlargestcontributortotheHeadlineGoal.

AsAmbassadorymenargued,TurkeyspolicyorapproachtowardstheESDIisbased onfourpoints:protectingTurkeysnationalinterests(national)respectingandhonouringthe legal documents in principle, i.e. the documents adopted by NATO in the 1990s but in particular the Washington Summit documents (principle) preserving NATOs position and integrity in the European security architecture (institutional) and strengthening European
77 security(substantial).

In other words, Turkey believes that the ESDP should take into consideration the following points: Firstly, Turkeys integral position in the European security architecture as wellasTurkeysnationalsecurity,defenceandforeignpolicyconcernsshouldnotbeharmed in any way. Here the most important issues are the socalled participation issue, Turkeys multidimensionalsecurityproblemsandTurkeysrelationswithGreece.Secondly, itshould takeintoconsiderationthe futureofNATOand itsimportantrole intheconstructionofthe European security architecture and its acquis. Thirdly, it should ensure that the European securityarchitecture isconstructedwholeand free.In lightofthesepreferences,Turkeys perspectiveoftheESDPisbasedonsomereservations.

NATO First: As a staunch and dedicated member of NATO, Turkey believes that
NATOsrole,effectiveness,coherenceandsolidarityshouldneverbeputatriskbytheEUor any other institution, and that NATO should remain the effective alliance for European securitywithatransatlanticconnection.Indeed,theindivisibilityofthesecurityoftheEuro Atlanticareastillcallsforastrongtransatlanticlink.[The]leadingroleofNATOasacore organisation in EuroAtlantic security should be preserved. In any emerging crisis situation
78 NATOhastohaveadeterminingandprominentrole.

In the words of Ambassador ymen, NATO will continue to be the primary organisationofEuropeandthewiderEuroAtlanticarea.Intheeventofafuturecrisisonour continent,NATOshouldalwaysbethefirstoption.Thatistosay,theEUcaninterveneand take leadership of a peacekeeping operation in Europeonly when NATO chooses notto do

76

Turkish National Defence Ministry, Turkeys viewpoints on NATO, the Western European Union and the European Security and Defence Identity, Web: http://www.msb.gov.tr/genpp/white/p2c1.pdf and Lale Sariibrahimolu,CrucialESDPtalkstostartinAnkaratoday,TurkishDailyNews,25October2001.
77 78

ymen,op.cit.,2001,p.57. ymen,op.cit.,2001.p57.

38

79 so. ThisisnotasurprisingviewbecauseTurkey,asanintegralmemberofNATO,wishes

ittomaintainitsinfluenceandactivities. Nevertheless, Turkey is concerned that the way the ESDP is being constructed, especially as regards the arrangements concerning the position of the nonEU European NATO members within the ESDP, has the potential to put aside the guiding principle of inclusivenessthatexistedintheconstructionofthesecurityarchitecturewithinNATO. Turkey is concerned that if the EUs autonomous decisionmaking mechanisms and operations create a division leading to a decline in NATOs role in the region, this would bring not only the demise of NATO but also of Turkeys position in the region. As stated above, because NATO membership provides several advantages for Turkish foreign and security policy, NATOs declining position would create a kind of uncertainty and vacuum fortheTurkishsecurityperspective.GiventhatTurkeyisnotafullmemberoftheEUandnot anactorwithintheESDP,TurkeysconnectionwiththeEuropeansecurityarchitecturecould bedamagedtoagreatextent.ThatiswhyTurkeylooksattheESDPprocessfromwhereitis, thatis,fromitsNATOmembershipandadvantages.

The Washington Summit Consensus: In line with the NATO First attitude, Turkey
believesthatthealliesshouldrespecttheNATOacquisadoptedduringtheconstructionofthe European security architecture in the 1990s. This demand is based mainly on the legal foundationoftheWashingtonSummitconsensus,theaspectsofwhichwerereflectedinthe documents adopted at the Summit (the Communiqu, the Declaration and the Strategic

Concept). The important aspects of this consensus included all of the aforementioned three
points: i.e. Turkeys position, NATOWEU cooperation and the characteristics of the Europeansecuritystructure. On the eve of the Washington Summit Turkey was afraid of being excluded from the developmentsinEuropeansecurityanddefencematters,whichhademergedparticularlyafter theconclusionoftheAmsterdamTreatyin1997.ItanticipatedthattheEUwasabouttoset up an autonomous institution for EU members only and that such a formation could and would marginalise Turkeys position. In addition, before the Washington Summit, Turkey knew that the EU would demand from the Allies guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilitiesandthattheUnitedStateswouldacceptitforthesakeofthemaintenanceofthe divisionoflabourandburdensharing.

79

Onur ymen, The Future of European Security and NATO, paper delivered to the Twelfth International AntalyaConferenceonSecurityandCooperation,1115April2002.

39

Fearing that such a possibility would have a negative outcome for Turkeys position within the European security architecture, Turkey waged a hard diplomatic struggle to convince the Allies at the Washington Summit to take Turkeys (and the other nonEU European NATO Allies) position into consideration. Turkeys tough diplomacy played an important role in persuading the Allies to reach a consensus. As a result, they used careful wording in the documents so that Turkeys interests as well as NATOs role in the future
80 couldbeupheld. Asymennoted,Thismutuallysatisfactoryresultcouldonlybeattained 81 becauseoftheflexibilityshownbyTurkeyintheSummit.

AttheendoftheSummit,Turkeywassatisfiedwiththedocumentsandgaveconsentto thecollectivedecisionsmadebytheAllies.Turkeystoughdiplomaticstruggleproducedan acceptable consensus among the Allies. From the Turkish perspective, the Washington consensusprovided importantsupportandabasistoTurkeysclaimsconcerningtheESDP: TurkeyspositionwithintheEuropeansecurityarchitecturewasconfirmedbytheAllies.Asa memberof bothorganisations(NATOandthe WEU)TurkeysconnectiontotheESDIwas alsorecognised.Participationofthe Allies inEUledoperations wasunderlined. AsTurkey alsohadanassociatemembershipintheWEU,evenifnotasstrongasfullmembers,Turkey could participate in the strategic planning, operations and command of EUled Petersberg type operations in the areas surrounding Turkey. Turkey had the right: 1) to take part in a WEUledoperationwithNATOsupport,includingitspreparationandplanningwithfulland equalrights2)toparticipateinanautonomousWEUoperationwithequalrightsifitdeclared its readiness to take part by making available a significant troop contribution and 3) to participate, as a member of both NATO and the WEU, in the organs the EU would set up, sinceNATOEUmechanismswouldbebuiltonexistingNATOWEUmechanisms.Inshort, theWashingtonSummitconsensusrecognisedtheWEUacquisasthebasisoffutureworkfor
82 theEuropeansecurityarchitecture. ItacceptedthatthedevelopmentoftheESDIwouldbe

constructedontheexistingmechanismsofNATOWEUcooperation. AstheEUstartedtobuilduptheESDPinthemannerstatedabove,mostofthepoints oftheWashingtonSummitwerenottakenintoconsideration.Inotherwords,wecansaythat theEUandTurkeydisagreeonthewaytheWashingtonSummitconsensusshouldbeputinto practice.ThemaindisagreementemergesfromdifferencesbetweenTurkishandEUofficials interpretation of the Washington Summit documents. They have different approaches tothe
80 81 82

Hrriyet (Turkishdailynewspaper),27April1999.
Formoreseeymen,op.cit.,2001,p.5455.

TurkishGeneralStaff,TheTurkishGeneralStaffView onESDI,InsightTurkey,Vol.3,No.2,AprilJune 2001,p.878.

40

Washington documents: The EU Council concentrated on Paragraph 10 of the Washington SummitCommuniquwherethe Alliesdeclaredthatthey stand forreadyaccess bythe European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in whichtheAllianceasawholeisnotengagedmilitarilyandsoon.However,Turkeyargues thatthatarticle should beread in viewofParagraph9(subparagraphd.)ofthe Washington Summit Communiqu and Article 30 of NATOs Strategic Concept 1999, where the full participationofallEuropeanAlliesandtheuseofNATOassetsandcapabilitiesbytheEU onacasebycasebasisandbyconsensuswereformulated.TheEUsarrangementsforthe participationofthenonEUEuropeanAlliesinitscrisismanagementprocessdidnotcomply withthesearticles. Thus,TurkeyviewstheprocessfromtheCologneSummitonwardsintheconstruction of the ESDP as a divergence from the spirit of the Washington Summit agreements. Moreover,theEUsapproachtotheWashingtonSummitdocumentswasseen byaTurkish official as a violation of principle in terms of respecting and honouring the agreements
83 reached at the level of heads of state and government. In this way, the EU made a one

sidedinterpretationoftheWashingtondocuments,tryingtosecureassuredaccesstoNATO planning capabilities without fulfilling the EUs own responsibility to make the relevant arrangements for participation. Therefore, the crisisbased participation model, covering
84 onlyconsultationasforeseenbytheNiceSummit,isnotsuitableforTurkey.

Indeed, the Washington Summit documents should be taken as an important agreement or consensus among the Allies to continue the division of labour and the arrangementstobefollowedbytheAlliesforthemanagementofsecurityaffairsinEurope.It is possible to draw conclusions about Turkeys position in and relations with the WEU in particular and the security architecture in general from the points in the Washington documents. Turkeys claims were based on the following points in the Washington Summit documents: *NATOwillcontinuetobetheessentialforumforconsultationamongtheAlliesand theforumforagreementonpoliciesbearingonthesecurityanddefencecommitmentsofits membersundertheWashingtonTreaty(NATOsStrategicConcept1999,Article25).Thus thedecisionsconcerningEuropeansecurityshouldbedecidedbytheNATOCouncilbecause underArticle41,thesecurityofallAlliesisindivisible.
83 84

ymen,op.cit.,2001,p.57. TurkishGeneralStaff,op.cit.,2001,p.88.

41

Therefore, the EUs plan to have autonomous decisionmaking institutions and processesandEUoperationsexcludinganyoftheNATOAlliesisnotinlinewiththeabove. Creating such nonNATO institutions will start a divergent path in the construction of the Europeansecurityarchitecture.Thiswouldcreatedivisionsonbothinstitutionalandpractical levels. *NATO welcomesand supportsthedevelopmentoftheESDIwithinthe Allianceon thebasisofthedecisions bythe Allies in Berlin in1996and subsequently, TheESDIwill continuetobedevelopedwithinNATO(NATOsStrategicConcept1999,Article30).The development of a CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) by the EU includes a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, will be compatiblewiththecommonsecurityanddefencepolicyestablishedwithintheframework of the Washington Treaty (NATOs Strategic Concept 1999, Article 17). NATO acknowledgestheresolveoftheEuropeanUniontohavethecapacityforautonomousaction sothatitcantakedecisionsandapprovemilitaryactionwheretheAllianceasawholeisnot engaged (The Washington Summit Communiqu of 1999, Paragraph 9, a.). The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. Both organisations make decisivecontributiontopeaceandstabilityontheEuropeancontinent.Cooperationbetween thetwoorganisationsontopicsofcommonconcern,tobedecidedonacasebycasebasis, couldbedevelopedwhenitenhancestheeffectivenessofactionbyNATOandtheEU(The WashingtonSummitCommuniqu,Paragraph40). According to the above paragraph, the EUs demand for guaranteed access to pre identified assets is not in line with the condition of a casebycase basis. Thus Turkey believes that NATO can extend such assets and capabilities for EUled operations on the casebycasebasis,i.e.dependingonthetype,magnitudeandlocationofthecrisisandon Turkeysowninterests. * The ESDI will be built in such a way as to develop cooperative arrangements and mechanisms between NATO and the WEU and the EU if necessary (NATOs Strategic Concept1999,Article30).Asthisprocessgoesforward,NATOandtheEUshouldensure the development of effective consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the mechanismsexistingbetweenNATOandtheWEU(TheWashingtonSummitCommuniqu, Paragraph9,b.). Thus the NATO Summit documents acknowledged that the EU might at some point take over the role of the WEU within the existing NATOWEU framework planning

42

85 capabilities. Butsuch aneventualityshould be builtonthe mechanisms existing between

NATOandtheWEU.Accordingly,theESDPissupposedtoaccepttheWEUacquisintoits EUstructure.ButasseenintheaboveanalysisoftheWEUandtheESDP,thisisnotthecase. * NATOs support for the development of the ESDI will be in the form of making available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed (NATOs Strategic Concept 1999, Article45).ItwillenableallEuropeanAlliestomakeacoherentandeffectivecontribution to missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities (NATOsStrategicConcept1999, Article30). Thus,whiletheESDIshouldbedevelopedasaEuropeanpillaroftheAtlanticAlliance, all European Allies should be included into such a formation for the sake of division of labour,providedthatalltheEuropeanAlliesareobligedtocontributetoEUoperationswith orwithoutrecoursetoNATOassetsandcapabilities. *EventheprovisionofassetsandcapabilitiestotheESDIprocessisconditionalupon thefollowingpoints: They will be made available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarilyundertheWEU(NATOsStrategicConcept1999,Article30).If,andonce,the Alliance takes up an issue on its agenda, then the EU will have to leave the matter for NATOsdecisionmakingprocess. Because the EUs development of security and defence dimension will have implicationsfortheentireAlliance,allEuropeanalliesshouldbeinvolvedin it,buildingon arrangementsdeveloped by NATOandthe WEU(NATOsStrategic Concept,Article17). Asstatedabove,theESDPshouldtakeintoconsiderationthatanyEUledoperationwillhave implicationsfortheentireAlliance. * [T]aking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were to choose (NATOs Strategic Concept, Article 30), We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of nonEU European Allies in EUled crisis responseoperations(TheWashingtonSummitCommuniqu,Paragraph9,d.). ThisisthemostimportantpointforTurkeyandothernonEUEuropeanAlliesbecause itclearlystatesthattheyshouldbeentitledtofullparticipation.Asaresult,theEUsnew arrangementsproposedbytheNiceSummitaretotallyincontradictionwiththispoint.

85

Aybet,op.cit.,p.53.

43

*Theprovisionofsuchsupportwillbemadeonthebasisofseparablebutnotseparate NATO assets and capabilities (NATOs Strategic Concept, Article 49 The Washington SummitCommuniqu,Paragraph9,e.). * It will reinforce the transatlantic partnership (NATOs Strategic Concept, Article 30). * The assistance and contribution to the European allies will be made on a caseby casebasisandbyconsensus(NATOsStrategicConcept,Article30)withinNATO.This isthearticlethatlegitimatesTurkeysvetointheNorthAtlanticCouncil.Turkeyarguesthat theguaranteedaccesstopreidentifiedassetscan be madeonlyona casebycase basis byaconsensusintheNAC. * NATO was prepared to adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union tothe collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for [the WEUled] operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily, and the Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements (The Washington Summit Communiqu,Paragraph10). Thus,thedecisionconcerningaccessbytheEUtoAllianceassetsandcapabilitieswill bemadebyNATOspoliticaldecisionmakingorgan.Thisisincompliancewiththeprimacy ofNATOandwiththespiritofthedivisionoflabour.However,thereappearstobeaparadox betweentheconceptofacasebycasebasisandtheconceptofreadyaccess.Theparadox isthatwhereastheformertiestheuseoffacilitiestoindividualdecisionstobemadeineach case,thusdependingontherequirementsofthecase,the latterreferstotheuseof facilities automaticallyirrespectiveofthesituation. TheparadoxcanberesolvedonlyinsuchawaythattheNATOCouncilandtheWEU Councildeterminetherangeofarrangementsandmechanismsfordecidingabouttheuseby theEUofNATOsassetsandcapabilities becausetheentirecampaignwill be basedonthe cooperation between NATO and the WEU. Since the WEU Council was merged with the EU,sucharrangementsandmechanismsaresupposedtobedecidedjointlybyNATOandthe EUin theviewoftheWEUacquis. * Finally, the Allies agreed that The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliances security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture the Alliance will also continue to help build an undivided continent by promotingandfosteringthevisionofaEuropewholeandfree(NATOsStrategicConcept 1999,Article65).

44

In conclusion, the Washington Summit documents reflect the spirit of division of labour in nonArticle 5 operations in and around Europe. Therefore, their arrangements confirmtheagreementsanddecisionsmadebytheAlliessincetheendoftheColdWar.Most of the points in the Washington Summit documents rely on and build up over the previous
st documents. However, the adoption of a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance for the 21

centurycanberegardedasamilestoneforthefutureoftheAlliance.Secondly,thedocuments also reiterate the fact that NATO is interested in building up a security architecture in and aroundEurope,includingtheMediterranean,theBalkans,theCaucasus,CentralAsiaandthe MiddleEast.Thirdly,allthedocumentsshouldberegardedassourcesofinternationallaw throughwhichthesignatoriescommittedthemselvestoanewNATOStrategicConcept.

Europe,WholeandFree: OneofTurkeysobjectivesasregardstheESDPisconcerned
with the nature of the European security architecture. As was also mentioned in the WashingtonSummitdocuments,Turkeyisinfavourofawhole,undividedandfreeEurope. There should not be groupings, blocks or fragmentation between the Allies. Thus, as Ambassador Orhun stated, Our conceptof security should be an allembracing one, taking intoaccountthesecurity needsofallcountries,andtakingcare nottocreatenewdivisions,
86 zonesofinfluenceorgreyareas. Turkeybelievesthatthiscanbeachievedonlybybroad

security conception and overarching institutions such as NATO. According to Ambassador ymen, it isa vital instrument foraneffective, strongtransatlantic linkthatwillenablethe indivisibilityofsecurityintheEuroAtlanticarea.Weshouldpreservethelink.ThusNATO
87 shouldplayaleadingroleasacoreorganisationintheareainanyemergingcrisis.

From this perspective, Turkey supported, though having some reservations, the
88 expansion of NATO towards Central and Eastern Europe and now towards the Balkans, 89 (Romania andBulgaria). Inthatspirit,Turkey has improved itsdialogue andcooperation

withCentralandEasternEuropeancountriesovertheyearssincetheendoftheColdWar.At theendofaconferenceinAnkaraparticipatedbyofficialrepresentativesofthesecountries,a remarkbymadeAmbassadorYiitbaolureflectsTurkeysbroadsecurityperspectivevery well: This seminar pointed out that we share common economic, political and security
86

mrOrhun,TheUncertaintiesandChallengesAhead:ASouthernPerspective,Perceptions,Vol.IV,No.1, MarchMay1999,p.24.
87 88

ymen,op.cit.,2001,p.5657. Ali L. Karasomanolu, NATO Enlargement: Does it Enhance Security?, in Foreign Policy Institute (ed.), ymen,op.cit.,2002,p.2.

TurkeyandtheEuropeanUnion:ANebulousNatureofRelations (Ankara:ForeignPolicyInstitute,1996).
89

45

intereststhatactuallyuniteusinoursearchforprosperity,peace,securityandstability....We dontwantnewdivisions,newinfluencezonesandsecondclasscitizenshipintheemerging
90 new Europe. To achieve this objective, there should be a congruence between the

enlargementsofNATO[and]theEuropeanUnionsincetheseorganisationshavemanythings incommon.Nocountryshouldbeexcludedfromtheseorganisations.Turkeyobjects[to]the understanding that it should remain an integral member of NATO, but only an associate
91 memberoftheEU.

ParticipationIssue: TurkeysmainpolicyobjectivevisvistheESDPistoparticipate
in its formation and decisionmaking process. Turkey should not be put aside or excluded fromthecentralmechanismsoftheESDPprocessforthreereasons:ThelegacyoftheWEU, i.e. the WEU acquis being an integral part of NATO, i.e. the NATO acquis and Turkeys
92 geostrategicimportanceintheregion.

Due to its marginalisation from the construction of the ESDP process and decision making institutions, Turkey is not satisfied with the EUs permanent arrangements for consultationanddialoguewiththenonEUEuropeanNATO Allies,whichweredeveloped inCologne,HelsinkiandFeiraandfinalisedinNice,forthefollowingreasons: Firstly,themodelisnotsatisfactorybecauseTurkeyisnotgiventherighttoparticipate in the main decisionmaking units such as the General Affairs Council (at the ministerial level),thePoliticalandSecurityCommittee,the Military CommitteeandtheMilitaryStaff, wheretheEUwilldecidewhere,whenand howitwill conductoperations.Instead,Turkey andothernonEUEuropeanAlliesareofferedtwoconsultationsperpresidencyinpeacetime anddeepconsultationsintimesofcrisis.Thatisnotasatisfactoryformulabecause,asone Turkishgeneralargued,Actually,wedonthaveanyrestrictionsonconsultationswithanyof
93 ourEuropeanallies.SoitisnotaprivilegeforTurkey.

Secondly, the EUs consideration of Turkeys participation in Petersbergtask operations is important and positive. But it will be only within the framework of the Committee of Contributors, which does not bear any responsibility for the strategic control and political direction of the operations, which in turn are decided by the Political and
90

ErhanYiitbaolu, MinutesofSeminaronIntegrationProcesswithinaChangingEuropeanStructure,12 June1997,Antalya,SAMPapers,No.5/97,(Ankara:MinistryofForeignAffairs,CenterforStrategicResearch, 1997),p.125.


91 92

Onurymen,MinutesofSeminaronIntegrationProcesswithinaChangingEuropeanStructure, ibid.,p.9.

Ali Yldz, Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Anatomy of a Problematic Relationship,unpublishedMScthesis,MiddleEastTechnicalUniversity,Ankara,2002.
93

TurkishGeneralStaff,op.cit.,2001,p.88.

46

Security Committee and the EU Council, in which Turkey is not a full participant. Furthermore,thenonEUAllieswereofferedonlyadaytodayconductofoperationsthrough the ad hoc Committee of Contributors. This is not a substantial involvement, and such a position gives Turkey only a subcontractor role for the ESDP, which is totally
94 unacceptable.

Thirdly,andinterestingly,suchdecisionswillbemadebytheEUCouncil,inwhichthe nonNATOEUmembers(Ireland,Austria,FinlandandSweden)will havearoleandasay. Indeed,thatmightcreatesomecomplicationswithinthe Allianceand forEUledoperations becauseoftheir neutralpositions,noninvolvementand lackofexperience in securityand defenceissuesduringtheColdWarandafter. Fourthly,evenwhenaEUledoperationusesNATOassetsandcapabilities(inTurkey), the EU does not provide Turkey with the right to participate in the strategic control and
95 politicaldirectionoftheoperations. TheFeiramodelofEU+6andEU+15(atthePSCand

ministerial level, later improved by the Nice model) negates the inclusiveness principle for European security and the indivisibility of the security of all Allies on the basis of NATO WEU arrangements as decided at the Washington Summit. It offers regular and permanent participation for nonEU countries however, their participation is limited to a few
96 occasions.

Turkey would like the EU to develop this model in such a way that the EU6 should cover daily consultations on a more frequent, permanent and regular basis. This would provide Turkey with a role in decisions taken by the 15 full members of the EU, which is consistent with what Turkey had within the WEU. Indeed, participating without a right of
97 vetointhedecisionstakenbytheEUdoesnotupsettheEUslegality.

Finally,theEUdoesnotofferanyroleforthenonEUAlliesinthenonmilitaryaspects of crisis management. Indeed, Turkey is very active and keen in this field as was seen in Turkeys contribution to the Bosnia and Kosovo crises and in the reconstruction of AfghanistanafterSeptember11.Indeed,asstatedabove,Turkeywouldliketocontributeto conflictpreventionandcrisismanagementinpolitical,militaryandnonmilitaryterms.Soit isnotsatisfiedwiththeEUarrangementsfordialogue,consultationandcooperationwiththe

94

mrOrhun,EuropeanSecurityandDefenceIdentity CommonEuropeanSecurityandDefence:ATurkish Perspective,Perceptions,Vol.V,No.3,SeptemberNovember2000.


95 96 97

TurkishGeneralStaff,op.cit.,2001. ForadetailedanalysisoftheFeiradecisions,seeOrhun,op.cit.,2000. TurkishGeneralStaff,op.cit.,2001.

47

nonEUEuropeanNATOmembers.Itwouldliketohaveparticipationindecisionmakingas
98 wellasinthepreparationandplanningofEUledoperations.

Turkeys Near Abroad: Turkey is highly sensitive and interested in the EUs
PetersbergtasktypeoperationsinTurkeysnearabroad,withorwithoutrecoursetoNATO assets and capabilities. As stated above, in the postCold War era, Turkeys own security faced a number of challenges in multiple ways. Turkey is located at the centre of unstable regions:the MiddleEast,theMediterranean,theBalkans,theCaucasus andCentral Asia.It hashistorical,sociocultural,politicalstrategicandmilitaryconnectionswithallthesetrouble spots.Becauseofthat,anycrisisinthenearabroadinfluencesTurkeyssecurity. Turkeysroleandpowerintheregioniswellknown:Nooperationintheregionwould bepossible withoutTurkey. AmbassadorBalanzinounderlinedTurkeysposition verywell: IcannotimagineascenarioforEUledcrisis managementoperationsthatdoesnotinvolve Turkey in one way or another. Simply put: If the crisis is very serious, NATO will be involvedincludingTurkey[inwhichtheESDPwillnothavearole].Ifthecrisisislessprone toescalation,butstillrequiresasignificantamountofforce,thentheEUmaylead,butonly withthehelpofNATOagainTurkeywillbeinvolved.Ifthecrisisisatthelowerendofthe spectrum,theEUmayactautonomously,butifitisanoperationthataffectsTurkeyssecurity orTurkeys vital security interests, it will obviously be in the interest of the EU to at least solicit Turkeys views and most importantly to seek its active contribution in resolving the
99 crisis.

NowletslookatthepossibilitiesregardingTurkeyspositioninEUledoperations:In the first alternative where NATO will have both strategic and political control of the operation, like those in the Kosovo and Bosnia cases, Turkeys participation in both dimensionsisnotquestionable.Thatis,Turkeywillbeinvolvedinbothdecisionmakingand operationsduetoitsNATOmembershipandvotingrightsintheNorthAtlanticCouncil. ButtheremaybeproblemsintwootherscenariosinwhichtheEUwillhavestrategic andpoliticalcontroloftheoperationbecauseNATOasawholeisnotdirectlyinvolved.The heartoftheproblemlies,fromTurkeysperspective,inthemanagementofsuchoperations.

98 99

Orhun,op.cit.,2000,p.120.

th SergioBalanzino,TheStateoftheAlliance AGoodNewsStory,speechdeliveredatthe11 International AntalyaConferenceonSecurityandCooperation,Antalya,Turkey,29March2April2001,(Ankara:Turkish GrandNationalAssemblypublication,2001),p.51.ThesameargumentwasstatedbyLordGeorgeRobertson, TurkeyandtheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceIdentity,op.cit.,p.4950.

48

In the second scenario wherein the EU has a Petersbergtype operation using NATO assets and capabilities, thus requiring Turkeys NATO assets and capabilities, what will Turkeyspositionbe?AccordingtotheEUdocuments,ifTurkeywishes,itcanparticipatein such an operation, assign its forces to the operation and have consultation with the other contributorsduringtheoperation,butitcannotparticipateintheEUdecisionmakingprocess concerningtheconductoftheoperation,includingthedecisiontoterminatetheoperation.So Turkey will not be in the kitchen where the food is cooked.This is what makes Turkeys positionratherdelicate.Therefore,iftheEUistouseTurkeysNATOfacilitiesandtohave cooperation with Turkey, Turkey should be involved notonly in the operations but also in the military and political decisionmaking process. That wasthe position that Turkey partly
100 enjoyedintheWEUandthatwasconfirmedattheWashingtonSummit.

ThispositionresemblesTurkeysposition inthe customsunionwiththeEU,opposed by many Turkish experts because of Turkeys lack of participation in the determination of customs union rules, regulations and decisions and because of its negative implications on
101 Turkeys economic and political interests. Here Turkey is on the implementation side of

EU Commission decisions concerning the customs union such as the Common External Tariffs, the Common Commercial Policy and preferential trade concessions towards third countries, etc. All these policies, regulations and laws regarding the customs union were originally devised bytheEUsdecisionmaking institutionssuchastheEUCommission, in whichTurkeyisnotinvolved.Turkeyisentitledtoexpressitsopinionsontheseissuesinthe CommonAssociationCouncilandtheCustomsUnionCommonCommittee,whichconvenes everysixmonths.However,TurkeyisnotoneoftheEUsfullmembersthatmakesdecisions oroffersmodificationstotheEUscustomsunionsystem.NordoesTurkeyhavearoleinthe
102 determinationofthecommonexternaltariffratestowardsthirdcountries.

Moreover,theEUCouncilmeetinginNicedecidedthatTurkey,asoneofthesixnon EU European Allies, should provide guaranteed (assured) access to Turkeys NATO planning capabilities for EU use during an operation. The issue of guaranteed access to Turkishfacilitiesissomethinglikegivingablankchequetoyoursupplierforunpredictable
100

PersonalinterviewwithSerdarKl,DeputyofTurkeysPermanentRepresentativetoNATO,05June2001, NATOHeadquarters,Brussels.
101

Forexample,seeErolManisal, GmrikBirliininSiyasalveEkonomikBedeli (Ankara:1996).

102

FormoreabouttheTurkeyEUcustomsunionsee,forexample,NevzatSayglolu,AvrupaBirliiYolunda Gmrkdaresi, YeniTrkiye,SpecialIssueontheEuropeanUnionVol.II,NovemberDecember2000,Year6, No.36,pp.11181125narzen,1/95SaylOrtaklkKonseyiKararerevesindeTrkiyenin YkmllklerizerinebirDeerlendirme,YeniTrkiye,SpecialIssueontheEuropeanUnionVol.II, NovemberDecember2000,Year6,No.36,pp.11431155.

49

and uncertain deals in the future. In particular, if you dont know what the supplier will deliver to you in return forthe cheque, it would be a very risky payment. So it is betterto makethepaymentsbycheque,purchasebypurchase,sothatyoudontlosemoneyorlose yourrelationswiththesupplier.ThisanalogyresemblesTurkeysargumentforprovidingthe EU with Turkeys NATO assets on a casebycase basis, as stated in NATOs Strategic Concept 1999. In the words of smail Cem, former Turkish Foreign Minister, it would put
103 Turkeyintoanobserverposition.

Furthermore,inanyoperationaroundTurkey,theEUwillneedtouseTurkeysassets and capabilities such as air bases, airspace, military infrastructure and, last but not least, intelligence facilities.These facilitiesareassignedtotheNATOcommandstructureandare useable by Allies under NATO Treaty regulations. But all of these operations must always takeTurkeysownnationalinterestsintoconsideration.Becauseofthisprecondition,Turkey should be part of the decisionmaking regarding EU operations around Turkey. Turkey can allowtheuseoftheseassetsonly if it issuitable for itsown national interests.That iswhy Turkeywouldgivesuchpermissiononacasebycasebasisandbyconsensusasstatedin Article30ofNATOsStrategicConcept1999. Turkey would not give permission for use by the EU or any other organisation of its assetsandcapabilitiesinsuchoperationsthatwouldharmTurkeyssecurityinterests.Inorder for Turkey to give such permission to the EU, it is essential and vital that Turkey should participate in the preparation, conduct and control of the operations. That is the principal reasonbehindTurkeysinsistenceonparticipatinginthedecisionmakingmechanismandthe military capability of the Headline Goal. Indeed, Turkey would not like to make such a commitmentthatmightcreateproblemsinthefuture. In the third scenario of EUled operations, the EU launches the operation with the contribution of the EU member states and by using the Headline Goal forces. In such operations, which will be led by a Framework Nation, the EU will lead the operation at all levels butwill invitetheotherstocontributetotheEUledoperation by providing facilities and forces. The invitation to the operation will be made by a unanimous vote of the EU Council. This has the possibility that if one of the members of the EU Council vetoes the participationofany nonEUcountry,thatcountrycannotparticipateeven intheoperational sideoftheESDP.

103

smailCem,interviewedbyMuratAkgnofNTVTelevision,15May2001.

50

TheGreekandCyprusFactor: WhenandiftheEUhasautonomousoperationswithout
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey might be totally excluded from such operationsbecausetheEUCouncilmayfailtoinviteanonEUcountry.Moreclearly,thereis always the possibility that Turkeys participation in such operations might be vetoed by GreeceorevenbytheGreekCypriotgovernmentafteritbecomesafullEUmemberinMay 2004.SuchoperationsmightbedirectlyrelatedtoTurkishGreekproblemsortoothercrisis situations intheregion.Ineachcase,there isthepossibilitythatTurkey mightbe excluded fromanEUledPetersbergtypeoperationinoraroundTurkeyssecurityenvironment,evenif Turkeywishestoparticipate.Indeed,thisworriesTurkeyduetothefactthatGreeceandeven the Greek Cypriot government may attempt to veto Turkeys participation in EUled autonomousoperationsandthatGreecemightwishtousetheESDPtoincreaseitsinfluence over Turkey. That is why Turkey uses its veto in the North Atlantic Council now, before GreeceortheGreekCypriotgovernmentusestheirvetointheEUCouncilinthefuture. There is evidence supporting such a Greek attitude towards Turkey: Greece blocked
104 TurkeysmembershipintheWEUuntil1997. Aswillbeseenbelow,Greecehasreiterated

itspolicytoblockTurkeyssecuringofaplaceintheESDP.Asaresult,thecurrentproblem canbeseenasareplayofthetraditionalTurkishGreekcompetitiontohaveacounterbalance towardseachotherwithininternationalinstitutionsandplatforms. IthasevenbeenarguedthatGreecemighttrytopresstheEUtoconductaPetersberg type operation on TurkishGreek problems in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. It can use the ESDPasleverageonTurkey.GreecedoesntwanttoseeTurkeyaspartoftheESDPprocess ineitherdimensionbutmaywishtouseitagainstTurkeyinordertoprotectGreeceagainst Turkey.Inthisrespect,GreecewishedtouseTurkeysESDPparticipationissueasacard fortheresolutionoftheCyprusprobleminitsfavour. Sofarwehave lookedatthe issue fromtheTurkishperspective.Nowweshouldalso lookatitfromtheEUsside.ThiswillbehelpfulinunderstandingwhytheEUdevisedsuch an institutional structure that excluded Turkey and other nonEU European NATO Allies fromtheprocess.

3.3.3.EUsResponsetoTurkeysPolicytowardstheESDP TheEUsargumentsaboutthepositionofthenonEUEuropeanNATOmembers, Turkeyinparticular,werebasedonthefollowingpoints:

104

Cebeci,op.cit.

51

EUOnlyInstitutionalisation: Firstofall,theEU developedtheESDPasapartofthe


EUintegrationprocess,thusitbelievesthatonlyEUmemberscanhavefullparticipationin decisionmaking institutions and process. The same problem is valid fortheother five non EUNATOAlliesaswellasforothergroupsofcountries.Butasstatedabove,Turkeyscase isdifferentfromtheothers.NorwayandIcelanddonotwanttobefullmembersoftheEU, while Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic will be part of the Union and the ESDP decisionmakingprocessinthenearfuture.Unlikethem,Turkeywantstobepartofallpillars oftheEUintegrationprocessbutisnotreadyyet. The heart of the problem here is whether European security can be limited by institutional arrangements. Can European security be confined to EUonly members? As statedabove,itisnoteasytorealiseaEUonlysecurityanddefenceprojectbecausethereis an interdependence of security between the arenas and agendas in the broader European securityarchitecture.TheBalkanwarsclearlyshowedthattheEUcountriesandTurkeywere all affected by the Bosnian tragedy. Although Turkey and some of the EU countries had differencesanddifferentinterestsintheBalkanwars,bothTurkeyandtheEUcountrieswere interdependent on each other for the resolution of the war. Thus they got involved in the peacekeeping forces of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR and in the regional schemes to establish peaceintheregion.ThesameistrueforotherproblemssurroundingTurkey. Inotherwords,TurkeyandtheEUareboundtocometogether,particularlyfordealing with those crises or problems in the regions surrounding Turkey. As mentioned above, Turkeysnearabroad is fullofcrisisspotswithsecurity implications for boththeEUand Turkey.

EuropeanIdentity: TheESDPisnotsimplyasecurityanddefenceprojectbutrathera
plannedconstructionoftheEuropeanidentity.So,EUofficialsargue,theprimarylegitimacy
105 for being a member of the ESDP is to have the required European identity. Turkeys

failures in the Copenhagen criteria and Helsinki Summit decisions delayed Turkeys attainmentoftheEuropeanidentity.TheEUcountriescriticiseTurkeyfornotimplementing reformsindomesticpoliticsandfornotresolvingitsproblemswithGreeceintheAegeanSea andCyprus.AccordingtotheEU,ifTurkeyfailstofulfiltheCopenhagencriteriainorderto resolve its domestic political, economic and legal problems, Turkey cannot become a full member of the EUled security community. Moreover, Turkey does not try to create a

105

AliL.Karaosmanolu,AvrupaGvenlikveSavunmaKimliiAsndanTrkiyeAvrupaBirliilikileri,

DouBat,No.14,FebruaryMarchApril2001,p.162165.

52

peaceful,stableandsecureenvironmentintheregionandtoeliminateEUfearsaboutthesoft security threats in and around Turkey. In short, Turkey is not ready to enter the EUs Europeansecurityidentity.InsteaditisaburdenfortheESDP.

Security Consumer: Thus, Turkey is seen not only as unsuitable for the European
106 identity but also as a security burden or consumer country. By security consumer is

meantthatTurkey isoverburdened bya numberofhardsecurityproblems inandaround it. And this creates, rather than solves, problems for the EUs security community. Turkeys overemphasis on military security (hard security) and underemphasis on the social economicculturalpoliticalaspectsofsecurity(softsecurity)couldhavenegativeimplications fortheconstructionandrealisationoftheESDP.ThatiswhyTurkeyisnotyetreadytofully participate in ESDP deliberations, at least until it is part of the other pillars of the EU integration. In that respect, one of the EUs soft security concerns is the migration issue and its negative impactonEUsocieties.TheEUsprosperity isattractingotherpeople intotheEU market in various ways, be it as legal workers, refugees, asylumseekers, illegal smugglers,
107 and so on. In the wake of growing migration into EU markets from Eastern and Central

Europe,theBalkans,theMediterraneanandtheMiddleEast,EUsocietieshavebeenfacinga socialsecuritysyndrome. SotheEUfearsthatTurkeysowndemocraticdeficit,humanrightsproblems,problems withtheexpressionoftheIslamicidentityanduncontrollablemigrationareproblemsthatcan


108 spilloverinto,andthreaten,theEUssocialstructure.

Another EU concern is thus about Turkeys geopolitical location. Some argue that becausetheEUviewsTurkeyasaMiddleEasterncountry,Turkeywillneverbeacceptedasa
109 full memberoftheEU. Therefore,itisargued,Turkeyseasternbordershouldnotbethe

EUseasternborderaswell.TheyarguethatTurkeysparticipationinESDPdecisionmaking

106

SeeAliL.Karaosmanolu,EuropesSecurityParameters,paperdeliveredattheConferenceonTurkeyand CentralandEasternEuropeanCountriesinTransition:AComparativeStudywithaViewtoFutureMembership toEU,BilkentUniversity,Ankara,9March1996.


107

For ananalysis of this kind of threat see Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre,

Identity,MigrationandtheNewSecurityinEurope (London:Pinter,1993).
108

These were the problems that were discussed in a conference on Turkey at the Gates: Possibilities and Problems of the EU Entry, Potsdam Spring Dialogues, organised jointly by the Development of Peace FoundationandWeltTrends,11April2001.
109

Forexample,IanO.Lesser,TrkiyeninBatylaGelienGvenliklikileriinAlanMakovskyandSabri Sayar (eds.) Trkiyenin Yeni Dnyas: Trk D Politikasnn Deien Dinamikleri, trans. By Hr Gld (stanbul:Alfa,2002).

53

could dilute the decisionmaking process and overextend the EUs security borders and concernsuptotheGulfregionandAsiaasawhole. All these arguments imply, among other things, that Turkeys approach to security issuesisnotfullyconsistentwiththeEUsapproachtocreatingasecuritycommunityonthe European continent based on a soft security understanding. They also imply that unless Turkey completes its reforms and pursues a soft security approach to the problems surroundingit,itcanneitherbeapartoftheESDPnorenjoyparticipationinthedecision makingprocessofautonomousEUledoperations.

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4. COMPLICATIONSOFTHEDELICATEPOSITION

Turkeys delicate position, particularly in the wake of the ESDP process and the marginalisation of the nonEU European NATO Allies, produced, not surprisingly, some complications. They can be categorised into three different points: Firstly, NATOEU co operation was disrupted secondly, TurkeyEU relations were paralysed and thirdly, the ESDPcouldnotbeputintooperation.

4.1.NATOEUCooperationDisrupted The most important aspect of the ESDP is establishing cooperation, dialogue and transparency between NATO and the EU. However, this could not be achieved because of divisionsandproblemsamongtheNATO membersregardingthe operationalisationofthe ESDP. The main reason is the differences of opinion among the member countries about NATOEUcooperation. Turkey believes that such cooperation should be based on respect towards national interests and views of the member countries. So Turkeys demands for NATOEU co operationaremainlytomakenecessarymodificationsconcerningtheformationandoperation of the ESDP, in particular aboutthe participation of the nonEU NATO Allies visvis the EU request to have guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilities. Indeed, because NATO was established for the protection and promotion of the national interests of its membercountries,which isreflected intheworkingprocedureofNATOsdecisionmaking system,itisquiteobviousthateveryNATOmemberwillraiseitsnationalsecurityconcerns in the NATO platforms. In this respect, Turkey fears that its national security might be harmedifitismarginalisedfromtheformationandoperationprocessoftheESDP,asstated above. NATO is the only important international platform in which Turkey can express its demands and objectives on the ESDP issue. Thus Turkey became assertive in order to preserve its place in the European security architecture. Turkeys assertiveness came to the pointthatit blockedtheNATOdecisionmaking processsoastoobtainadecision meeting TurkeysdemandsoftheEU. Turkeyhasbeenthemostassertiveallyinputtingforwardsomeconditionsconcerning EUNATOcooperation fortherealisationoftheESDPproject however,Turkey is notthe onlycountryseekingareviewoftheESDParrangements.Theyaredividedintotwogroups similar to the way the ESDP should be constructed and operationalised. On the one hand, 55

therearethosecountries,calledAtlanticists,thatarguethatNATOshouldpreserveitspriority forEuropeansecurityovertheESDP.They areledbytheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom, NorwayandTurkey.Ontheotherhandarethosecountries,calledEuropeanists,thatbelieve that the ESDP should be more independent from NATOs decisionmaking, operations and strategiccontrol.TheyareledbyFranceandGermany. Thus, Turkeys position was mainly supported by U.S. and U.K. officials. The U.S. officials have expressed their support for Turkeys views and position. For instance, U.S. SecretaryofDefenceDonaldRumsfeldopposedtheexclusionofthenonEUEuropeanAllies fromtheESDP,fearingthat itwoulddestabiliseNATOsexistingpositionand stabilityand
110 riskAlliancesolidarity. FormerU.S.SecretaryofDefenceWilliamCohenarguedthatthe

nonEUEuropeanNATOAlliesshouldhavefullparticipationintheplanningofthoseESDP operations that involved their national security interests. Another Atlanticist, U.K. Chief of DefenceStaffGen.SirCharlesGuthrie,arguedthatFrenchinsistenceonthefullautonomyof theEuropeanRapidForcefromNATOscommandandcontrolwouldbringrisksthatwould create divisions within the Alliance and would start the process of U.S. withdrawal from NATO.Healsowarnedthatin suchacasetheUKcouldpossiblywithdraw itstroopsfrom
111 theEuropeanRapidForce. Andneedlesstosay,thenonEUEuropeanNATOAllieshave

similaropinionsabouttheESDPprocess.Nevertheless,amongthesecountriesonlyNorway
112 hasthesameopinionasTurkey.

On other hand, the Europeanists, particularly France, argued that the European Army would maintain its autonomous identity with its own command and planning capacities. France is the most ardent supporter of the ESDPs autonomy from NATO, and thus the exclusion of the nonEU European NATO Allies from the ESDP. That is why Turkey and France went headtohead in the NATOEU cooperation meetings throughout the year 2001. ButitmustbestressedthatTurkeyalsocameunderU.S.pressurenottoprocrastinate withitsvetoovertheNATOEUcooperation.ItwasreportedthatU.S.PresidentBillClinton asked Turkish Prime Minister Blent Ecevit to avoid using the veto on NATOEU co operation.TheUS fearsthat iftheproblem isprolongedanda formulacannotbe found for theoperationalisationoftheESDP,thentheEUcountrieswillbreakawayandtrytobuild
110 111 112

http://www.haber.superonline.com/CDA/Haber/haber_search/1,2342,35762.html. http://www.nethaber.com/haber/haberler/0,1082,33629_6,00.html.

http://www.haber.superonline.com/CDA/Haber/haber_search/1,2342,3390,00.html and Frederick Bull Hansen, NonEU members of NATO withinEuropean Security: Role and Expectations of Norway, Foreign Policy,Vol.XXI,No.12,1997.

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uptheirown militarycapabilities,resulting inthemuchfeared duplication,decouplingand


113 discrimination. TheTurkishprimeministerdidnotaccedetosuchademandbecausethe

participationissuehasaspectsotherthantheNATOEUcooperationperse: Oneofthemis Turkeys concern that it would have greater risks if it were to be totally excluded from the ESDPdecisionmakingprocess. OneoftheserisksisrelatedtotheTurkishGreekdisputeswithitsnegativeimpactona divisionwithinNATO.DuetotheirlonglastingandunresolveddisagreementsintheAegean Sea and Cyprus, etc., Turkey and Greece try to gain superiority over each other by using NATOandtheEUplatformsrespectively.InthecaseofTurkeyESDPrelations,Greeceuses the EU as an instrument to improve its interests over Turkey by exercising its veto advantages in the EU. On the other hand, Turkey uses NATO as a counterinstrument to protect its interests in the ESDP process against Greece by utilising its veto advantage in NATO.Inotherwords,one,ifnottheonly,ofthecriticalreasonsbehindthelackofNATO EUcooperationontheESDPissueistheclassicalTurkishGreekpoliticalrift. Such divisions and disruptions, if unresolved, could have negative effects on the constructionoftheEuropeansecurityarchitecture,ontheefficientuseofmilitaryassetsand capabilities, and on the implementation of EUled operations in the area around Turkey. Furthermore, in such a case, the Turkish General Staff pointed out, [T]he EU cannot use
114 NATOassetsandcapabilitiesinanautomaticandunlimitedfashion. Onesuchdisruption

occurredinApril2002,whentheEUwantedtodeployEUforceswithintheframeworkofan EUled operation in Macedonia, codenamed Amber Fox, to take over the task of NATO forces by using NATO assets and capabilities. This was the first attempt by the EU to operationalisetheESDP.Turkeyrefusedtoallowthistohappenunlessanduntil a solution
115 wasfoundandTurkeysconcernswereeliminated.

Moreover,adivisionwithinthe Alliancealongthese lines, i.e.theAtlanticistsandthe Europeanists,wouldinflictseriousdamagetothetransatlanticconnectionandsolidaritywith itseconomic,politicalandstrategiccosts.Intheextremepossibility,ifNATOscohesionand solidarityduringtheColdWaryearshaddisappearedandturnedouttobeacompetitionand rivalryamongtheAllies,thatwouldhavebeentheworstscenario,notonlyfortheAlliance and the Allies themselves but also for world politics and security in general. To think the unthinkable, the possibility of an emerging rivalry between the United States and the EU
113 114 115

Hrriyet,16December2000.
TurkishGeneralStaff,op.cit.,2001,p.94.

Radikal (Turkishdailynewspaper),6April2002.

57

wouldpushinternationalsocietytowardsthebalanceofpowerpoliticsoftheColdWaryears and even back to the 19th century. Of course, however unlikely, all this would mean increasingarmamentsandpolarisationbetweenthenationstates,resultingineconomic,social andhumancosts.

4.2.Tur keyEUIntegrationProcessParalysed There are more reasons and issues other than technical/institutional ones in the developmentandformationofTurkeysviewsabouttheESDPandtheuseofitsvetointhe NorthAtlanticCouncil,and intheEUsputtingTurkeyatthe marginoftheESDPprocess. ThesearerelatedtothesubstanceofTurkeyssecurity,defenceandforeignpolicyaswellas tothatofEUsperceptionofTurkeyinparticular. Since the start of an awkward process after the end of the Helsinki and Washington summits, the TurkeyEU integration process seemed to have drifted away from its main course, even causing damage to the achievements made over the last 40 years. TurkishEU relationshavebeenfacinganumberofdifficultiesandtensions.Turkeysintegrationprocess hasbeenparalysed,ifnotblockedaltogether,byintersubjectiveperceptions,understandings, prioritiesandinterests.Theintersubjectivemisperceptionswentsofarthatbothsidesstarted toengageinnegativethinkingtowardseachother. On these points, Turkeys understanding of security differed from that of the EU. Turkeylookedattheissuesmorefromthehardsecurityperspective,whiletheEUlookedat them froma softsecurityperspective, insistingontheprimacyand validityofthe valuesof the EUs security community. Turkish public opinion referred to its special conditions and problemsaftertheendoftheColdWar. Some Turkish observers in official positions perceived that Turkeys marginalisation fromtheESDPmeantthattheEUneverwantedtoseeTurkeyaspartofEUintegration.In response, some EU officials perceived that Turkey didnt want to reform itself towards EU standards but only used excuses to avoid the reform process as indicated in the National Program and that Turkey was not serious and willing to be part of the EU security community and its values. The following paragraphs will take a brief glance at the most important items of growing intersubjective misperceptions of Turkish public opinion in recent years: the Cyprus problem, the terror/PKK problem, the Armenian problem and TurkeysdomesticreformsforfullEUmembership. OntheCyprusproblem,theEUisdeterminedtoacceptCyprusasafullmemberunder theleadershipoftheGreekCypriotgovernmentevenbeforetheCyprusproblemisresolved. 58

Onthecontrary,anoverwhelmingmajorityoftheTurkishpublicviewssuchamembershipas aviolationof international lawaswellasdisrespecttoTurkeysnational interestsregarding the Cyprus problem. The EU and Turkish views on the Cyprus problem differ so radically, that while the EU views the Greek Cypriot governments EU membership as part of the expansion of its security community into the Mediterranean region, Turkey views it as an attempt to unite the island with Greece, the longstanding Greek dream of enosis. This is mostlytruebecauseGreeceinsiststhatunlesstheislandisacceptedintotheEU,itwillblock themembershipofothercountries.Thus,asstatedabove,GreeceisusingtheESDPissueand
116 TurkeyspositionasleverageonboththeEUandTurkey.

On the PKK/terrorism problem, some EU countries gave indirect supporttothe PKK terrorists in various ways, in the form of providing shelter to PKK militants even to Abdullahcalan,the leaderofthe PKK, in1999byItalyand criticisingthewayTurkey foughtagainstthePKKterroristsduringthe1990s.Moreover,theEUCouncilhesitatedfora longtimetoincludethePKKontheEUslistofterroristorganisations.AlltheseEUactions createdillfeelinginTurkishpublicasrespectstheEUandsomeoppositiontoTurkeysfull membershipintheEU.SomepeopleeventhinktheEUisplayingadirtygametodivideand ruletheTurkishstate,justasinthecaseoftheTreatyofSvresafterWorldWarI. On the Armenian issue, the European Parliament adopted resolutions recognising the alleged Turkish genocide of the Armenians in 1915, thus condemning Turkeys past. Similarly, this was also negatively reacted to by Turkish public opinion, similar to the reactionshowntotheEUsapproachtothePKK/terrorismproblem. Finally, on the Turkish reforms for full membership, the EU increased its pressure on Turkey to complete fundamental reforms in its political, economic and legal systems. Here again, someofthereformsare concernedwiththeterror/PKKproblem. Atthe heartofthis problemareissuesofabolishingcapitalpunishment,whichwouldincludecalan,allowing educationandpublicationrightsinnativelanguages,inKurdishinparticular,andabolishing martiallawinsoutheasternTurkey. Indeed, all these are very sensitive issues for the Turkish people at both the state and societal levels because most of these demands clash with Turkeys Realist perception of internationalpoliticsandnationalinterests.Firstofall,eachoftheaboveissueshashistorical and negative connotations. The Turkish people are disturbed by the EUs or any other countrys interference in these sensitive domestic issues because such interference would

116

Gndz Aktan, Sorun Yunanistan m?, Radikal, 14 May 2002, p.8 and A. Papayiannidis, Atinay Anlamak,ToVima,12May2002,excerptedinRadikal,15May2002,p.8.

59

bringbacktheTurksnegativememoriesfromWorldWarIandafter.Secondly,theTurkish peoplehavesufferedgreatlossesbecauseofterrorism.Turkishfamilieslosttheirownortheir relatives sons and daughters during the 1980s and 1990s in the fight against terrorism. Turkish public opinion, mainly due to both these historical and recent problems, views the EUs assertive policy behaviour towards these sensitive issues as attempts to interfere in Turkish domestic politics, to weaken Turkey from within, and to eventually divide Turkey intopartsandcreateindependentstatesintheregion. As a result of these intersubjective misconceptions, the development of the awkward process between Turkey and the EU due to the ESDP and the ensuing problems produced negative outcomes that have undermined the longongoing integration process between TurkeyandtheEU.Asaresult,antiWesternviewsandreactionsappearedinTurkey. InthemidstofthegrowingoppositiontowardsTurkeysmembershipintheEU,there emergedradicalviewssuchasarguingthattheEUposesathreattoTurkeysownsecurity.A retired general argued that Turkeys integration with the EU was against, and contrary to Turkish history and to the Turkish Revolution formed by Kemalist thought. If full independenceandsovereigntyareseparated fromRepublicanism,therewillremain acorps,
117 and this is not Kemalism. Some accused the European countries of clearly supporting 118 PKKterrorismandArmenianallegationsagainstTurkey. SomeaccusedtheEUofexerting

pressureonTurkeyandtheTurkishRepublicofNorthernCyprustogiveconcessionsforthe full integration of all of Cyprus under the leadership of the Greek Cypriots even before the dispute isresolved.ThegreatmajorityoftheTurkishpublic isagainstsuchahappening.In replytotheseandothercrisispointsbetweenTurkeyandtheEUduringtheawkwardprocess, some argued that Turkey should look for alternative foreign policy orientations in the East, includingevenIran,Russiaandsoon. Thiskindofovertureshows howTurkishEUrelations becametense.Ifthesewereto go to further extremes, it would indeed cause a worse crisis for Turkey and for the EU countries.Moreover,iftheseradicalreactionsweretospreadtostatetostaterelations,then thewholestructureofTurkeyEUrelationswouldcometoaverydangerouspoint. Then,oneshouldask,ifTurkeyEUrelationsarestrainedandtheawkwardprocessgets worse,canEuropeansecurityanddefenceeverbeattainedandachieved?

117 118

RetiredGeneralSuatlhan,speakingataconference,Yeniafak,(Turkishdailynewspaper),25March2002.

General Yaar Bykant, Genelkurmay kinci Bakan, speech at a conference on Developments after September11andTurkey, Radikal,29May2002,p.8.

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4.3.EuropeanSecurityandDefencewithoutTur key? Turkeys marginalisation from the ESDP process in particular and from the European/WesternworldingeneralcreatesserioussetbacksinthemaintenanceofEuropean securityanddefence for variousreasons.Giventheaforementionedproblems in NATOEU cooperation and the estrangement in TurkeyEU relations, Turkeys radical turn in foreign policy would create larger problems, not only for NATOs construction of a security architectureinabroaderEuropebutalsofortheproperoperationalisationoftheESDP. Theabovequestioncanbeansweredintwoways.Politicallyspeaking,Turkeycouldbe reluctant to cooperate with the allies in a future crisis in the areas surrounding Turkey. Militarilyspeaking,TurkeywouldbehesitanttoallowtheuseofTurkishmilitaryassetsand capabilities by the European allies in such crises. Turkish officials have declared their determinationinthisrespect:AsTurkishDefenceMinisterakmakolubluntlystated,those who plan to have European security without Turkey should take into account the risk that TurkeywouldnotpermittheuseofNATOassetsandcapabilitiesandwouldcontinuetouse its veto in NATO to prevent such an occurrence. Moreover, former Foreign Minister Cem statedthatTurkeyscontributiontotheESDPwouldbeproportionaltoitsparticipationinthe
119 decisionmakingoftheESDP.

Therefore,giventhe factthatTurkey isa very influentialactorplaying apoliticaland military role in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia,Turkeysstandinginanycrisisisessential.IntheseregionstheEUcouldhaveserious problems in launching even nonArticle 5 military operations without using Turkeys planningandintelligenceassets.NorcantheEuropeanalliesbeverysuccessfulwhenandif Turkey plays a resisting role in crisis management operations and peacekeeping and peacemakingoperations. Furthermore,Europeansecurityanddefenceare notlimitedto nonArticle5problems only but also include Article 5 problems. Turkeys marginalisation from nonArticle 5 operationswould have negative effectsonTurkeyscontributiontoArticle5operations. As statedabove,thereisnotmuchpossibilityofanArticle5threat(i.e.acolossaldirectmilitary threat) today, but any of the 16 crisis hot points could escalate in such manner that NATO might have to use the collective defence mechanism, requesting Turkeys contribution. In thosesituations,TurkeycouldbereluctanttoacttogetherwiththeEuropeanallies. Turkeysresistanceandnegativepositionmightevenpreventaresolutionofthecrisis. It is appropriateto mention that if Turkey had not actedtogether with the allies againstthe
119

Hrriyet,07December2000.

61

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf coalition could hardly have functioned. Turkeys suspension of very vital TurkishIraqi oil pipelines and the use by the allies of Turkish air
120 basesplayedagreatroleinIraqsdefeatandthecoalitionsvictoryin19901991crisis.

Finally, Turkeys multilateral approach to international security and defence problems canbechangedintoaunilateralapproach.ThatwouldmeantherenationalisationofTurkish militaryforcesandpolicyandaunilateralapproachtoitsownsecurityanddefenceproblems intheregion. Alloftheaboveactualandpotentialcomplicationsreflectthedarksideoftheawkward process.Theactualisationofthesecomplicationswould,ofcourse,notbegoodforTurkeyor for the European Union or for the Atlantic Alliance because it would definitely be to the detriment of the European security architecture in particular and to the broader Euroasian securityingeneral. Presumably this point was taken into consideration by officials in Turkey and in the AtlanticAlliance,convincingthemtofindasolutiontoendtheawkwardprocess.Therefore in2001therewereseriousattemptstowardsthisend,andquiteimportantdevelopmentsand stepsinitiatedbyTurkeyandtheAllieshavetakenplaceinthisrespect.Thefollowingsection willdealwithalternativewaysofresolvingtheawkwardprocessinparticularandbringingan endtoTurkeysdelicatepositionintheEuropeansecurityarchitecture.

120

See Ramazan Gzen, Amerikan Kskacnda D Politika: Krfez Sava ve Turgut zal (Ankara: Liberte Yaynlar,2000).

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5.TOWARDSTHESOLUTIONAFTERSEPTEMBER11

The September 11 affair has shifted the cards in the broader European security architecture in such a way that Turkeys delicate position should be done away with and a viable solution should be found for Turkey to have a more secure position in the broader Europeansecurityarchitecture.TheSeptember11tragedycreatedsuchanewsituation,that whiletheinternationalsecurityenvironmentwaschallengedbyterrorism,theAlliesrealised the importance of cooperation and collective defence against terrorism in the world. In particular,anewkindofinternationaloperationcameintobeinginsuchareasasAfghanistan, where international terrorism enjoyed shelter and support. Hence, while the concept of a broader security arena and agenda reemphasised its validity and continuity, the allied co operation, in particular the NATOEU cooperation on security and defence, had to be completed sooner rather than later. At that point, the Allies, in an unprecedented uniting againstthethreatcomingfromterrorism,showedtheirsupportandsolemnsolidarityforthe United States under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The U.S.led military operation wasthen launched in AfghanistantofightagainsttheTalibanregime andtocatchalQaeda terrorists.Afterthemilitaryoperationended,theUnitedStatesandmostoftheNATOAllies includingTurkey,Germany,theUKandFrance,collectivelyactedtorebuildAfghanistanand bringordertothecountry.Thus,althoughitwasanotaformalandinstitutionalNATOEU cooperation,itcan beseenasdefactocooperationamongNATOandEUmembers. In the midst of all these developments, Turkey came to the forefront of international
121 security due to its special position. Both the US and the EU members realised Turkeys

critical importance and position in the fight against terrorism in an area where Turkey has influence and involvement due to its geostrategic, geopolitical and geocultural connections. Turkey,alongwithEUalliessuchasGermany,theUKandFrance,gavequicksupporttothe U.S.militaryoperationinAfghanistan.LikesomeEUcountries,Turkeyprovidedlogistical, politicalandintelligencesupportduringthemilitaryoperationbyallowingtheuseofTurkish assets and capabilities by U.S., German and British aircraft. Furthermore, Turkey got involved in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan by dispatching forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as by extending assistance to the social, cultural, and technical reconstruction of Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that

121

Foracriticalanalysis,seeabanKarda,ThestrategicimportanceofTurkeyafterSept11,TurkishDaily

News,2425May2002.

63

Turkey acted at all times in cooperation with boththe EU countries and the United States. That was similar to NATO solidarity in Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite some differences of opinionandthelackofafullconsensusonthedefinitionofterrorismandaboutthewayto solvethesecurityproblems,theAllieshaveanoverallagreementonthefightagainstterror. In the wake of this new situation in which the Allies needed Turkeys support and contribution for fightingagainstterrorintheregion,itwas inevitablethatTurkeysdelicate position hadtobeeliminatedandturnedtowardsa morepositive andproperpath.Thusthe attempts that had started prior to September 11 were speeded up so as to satisfy Turkeys expectationsandremoveitsvetoontheEUsdemandforguaranteedaccesstopreidentified NATO assets and capabilities. This would consequently help the Allies realise NATOEU cooperation for a successful implementation of the ESDP process. Before going into the detailsofthisattemptandotheralternativesolutions inordertoeliminateTurkeysdelicate position,letsreiterateTurkeysexpectationsfromtheESDP: *HavingtheWEUacquisbackagain * The EU+6 should have daily consultations on a permanent and regular basis and provideTurkeywitharoleindecisionstakenbytheEU *FullparticipationinthedecisionmakingprocessofoperationswithNATOassetsand capabilities * Respect for Turkeys national interests and security concerns in such operations
122 withoutNATOassets

*TherighttoraiseTurkeysconcernsinthedecisionmakingmechanismsofEUonly operationsinTurkeysgeographicproximityandareasofnationalinterestsuchastheAegean Sea,Cyprus,etc.and *InsurancethattheESDPwill notbeinvolvedindisputesamongtheAllies. There were a number of proposals, suggestions and models put forward by different writers,politiciansandstrategists inthisrespect,suchas transferringthe WEUacquis into the EU, concluding a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the EU, occasional full participation when concerning Turkeys national interests, concluding a Schengentype
123 securityagreementbetweenTurkeyandtheEU andacomprehensiveproposalcalledthe 124 EuropeanSecurityandDefencePlanningSystem.

122 123 124

ForeignMinistersmailCemsstatement, Hrriyet 25May2000. Yldz,op.cit.,Chapter5. ThiswasproposedbyUSSecretaryofDefenseWilliamCohen,on10October2000,citedinHalilimek,

TrkiyeninUlusalGvenlikStratejisi (stanbul:IQKltrSanatYaynclk,2002),p.179.

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Only one of these attempts produced a concrete formula, that is the socalled Ankara Agreement,whichwasacceptedattheendofthediplomaticnegotiationsamongTurkey,the United States and the United Kingdom in 2001 and finalised in 2002. Then, due to Greek opposition,theAnkaraAgreementwasslightlysoftenedintheensuingnegotiationsthattook placeontwofronts:oneamongTurkey,theUK andtheUSontheone hand,andtheother amongGreeceandotherEUcountriesontheother.Throughthenegotiationsthattookplace in the NATO Summit in Prague on 21 November 2002 and in the EU Council meeting in Brussels on 2425 October 2002, the parties finally reached a compromise to end the deadlock. According to the compromise that was expressed in the EU Brussels European Council Document dated 2425 October 2002, Greece and the EU accepted Turkeys reservationsontheuseofNATOassetsandcapabilitiesinEUledoperations.Inturn,Turkey withdrewitsvetoontheoperationalisationoftheESDP.ItseemsthattheAnkaraAgreement andtheBrusselsDocument finally and formally settledTurkeysdelicatepositionregrading theESDPprocessandopenedthewaytotheconclusionofEUNATOcooperationregarding the use of NATO assets and capabilities in EUled operations. Both the Ankara Agreement andtheBrusselsDocumentwillbeexplainedbelow.However,becausetheycanhardlybethe ultimate solutions for Turkeys longterm interests, we will suggest three more formulas as ouropinionforafullresolutionoftheproblem.

5.1.MinimalSolution:TheAnkaraAgreement ThediplomaticnegotiationsamongtheUS,theUKandTurkeyduringtheperiod2001
125 2002 produced the Ankara Agreement for finding a solution to Turkeys veto on EU

NATOcooperation.TheAnkaraAgreementwasanimportantformulaforfindingasolution totheproblem. Accordingtothisagreement,apartfrompreviouslygivenrights intheNice Declaration,TurkeywasprovidedwithadditionalassurancesandrightsinreturnforTurkey removing its veto on EUNATO cooperation, i.e. the EUs guaranteed access to pre identifiedNATOassetsunderthefollowingconditions: Firstly,inEUledoperationsforPetersbergtaskswithoutNATOassetsandcapabilities, the Nice formula was maintained. Thus the nonEU European NATO members could participateinsuchoperationsonlyafteraninvitationbytheEUCouncilforconsultations.But in any case, according to the Ankara Agreement, the EU assured Turkey that it wanted to eliminate Turkeys aforementioned fears by giving security guarantees on the following points:
125

Analysedbyymen,op.cit.,2002.

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* The EU will pay due attention to Turkeys serious concerns and supreme national interests primarily in areas of proximity to Turkey: the Balkans, the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean,theMiddleEast,theCaucasusandCentralAsia.Turkeywillbeinvitedtothe preparation stage of EUled operations in these regions, and the EU Council will take Turkeysviewsandconcernsintoconsiderationduringthedecisionmakingprocess *Petersbergtypeoperationswillnotbelaunchedfortheresolutionofdisputesbetween the Allies, nor will the ESDP be involved in such cases where a NATO country has vital interests.ThatmeanstheESDPwillnotinterfereinthedisputesbetweenTurkeyandGreece in the Aegean Sea, Cyprus etc. In other words, Greece will be unable to use the ESDP as leverageonTurkeyintheirrelationsandproblems. Secondly,inEUledoperationswithNATOassetsandcapabilities,theoperationswill beabletouseNATOassetsandcapabilitiesdependingontwocategories,strategicandnon strategic. * If, in an EUled operation, nonstrategic assets are to be used, the EU will have guaranteed/automatic access to NATO assets and capabilities. In this case, as stated in the Niceformula,Turkey,asoneoftheEU+6countriesandaspartoftheEU+15,willbeentitled toparticipateintheoperationsaswellasinthemeetingsoftheCommitteeofContributors. *Butif,inaEUledoperation,strategicassetsaretobeused,EUdemandsfortheuse oftheseassetswillbedecidedbytheNATOCouncilonacasebycasebasis.Thus,asafull member of the NATO Council, Turkey will be directly involved in the making of final decisionsonEUledoperations. *Furthermore,insuchcases,theAnkaraAgreementprovidedTurkeywiththerightto haveenhancedconsultationsinpeacetimeandactiveparticipationintheoperationalphasein operationswhereNATOassetsareused.ThissupportstheWashingtonSummitdecisions.
126 TheAnkaraAgreementwasgivensupportbytheNATOandEUmembers exceptfor

Greece. Greece vetoed the document at the EUs Laeken Summit and at NATO Council
127 meetings held in December 2001. During the Seville Summit of June 2002, Greece 128 continued its veto over the EUNATO cooperation. Greece explicitly stated that the EU

should not give guarantees for nonEU countries and that nonEU countries should never participateintheESDPdecisionmakingprocess,fearingthatTurkeymightbeallowedrights
126

In a joint press conference by George Robertson on behalf of NATO and Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel,JavierSolanaandChrisPattenonbehalfoftheEUexpressedtheirsupportoftheAnkaraAgreement. Yeniafak,7December2001.
127 128

Forexample, Radikal, issues47December2001.

TurkishNews(TurkishdailynewspaperinEnglish),212223June2002.

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thatwouldgiveitinfluenceinESDPdecisionmaking.Greeceinsistedinsteadthatitshould begivensecurityguaranteesbyNATO.Thus,NATOEUcooperationwaslockedintothe TurkishGreek competition, and this in turn prevented the operationalisation of the ESDP. Hence, because the Ankara Agreement could not be fully put into practice, it was slightly changedandformallyputintooperationonlyafteracompromisewasreachedintheBrussels processinthesecondhalfof2002.

5.2.TheFor malSolution:The BrusselsDocument InthewakeofthedeadlockcreatedbytheGreekoppositiontotheAnkaraAgreement, theEUcountriesandtheUnitedStatescontinuednegotiationswithGreeceandTurkeyfrom aboutthe middle tothe end of 2002. In the NATO Summit in Prague, the Allies conceded TurkeyssecurityconcernsasstatedintheAnkaraAgreementinreturnforTurkeysremoval ofitsvetoontheEUNATOcooperationfortheuseofNATOassetsandcapabilities.Atthe EU Council meeting in Brussels, on the other hand, the EU countries finally persuaded GreecetoremoveitsobjectiontotheAnkaraAgreementinreturnforsomemodificationsto the agreement. Hence came the socalled Brussels Document, which formally ended the deadlock,notonlyintherelationsbetween theEUandTurkey,butalsointheimplementation ofEUNATOcooperation. TheBrusselsDocument,whichwasacceptedbytheEUCouncilmeetinginBrusselson 2425 October, was endorsed by the Copenhagen European Council meeting on 1213 December 2002 and by the NATO Council on 13 December 2002. The Brussels Document declared...undernocircumstances,norinanycrisis,willESDPbeusedagainstanAlly,on theunderstanding,reciprocally,thatNATOmilitarycrisismanagementwillnotundertakeany
129 action against the EU or its members. Furthermore,the EU accepted Turkeys policy in

thefollowingdecision:InthecaseofanyEUledoperationnotrequiringrecoursetoNATO assetsandcapabilities,nonEUEuropeanAllieswillbeinvited,uponadecisionofthe[EU] Council,toparticipate.Intakingdecisionsonparticipation,theCouncilwilltakeaccountof thesecurityconcernsofthenonEUEuropeanAllies.Inaspecificcasewhenanyofthenon EUEuropeanAlliesraisesitsconcernsthatanyenvisagedautonomousEUoperationwillbe conductedinthegeographicproximityofanonEUEuropeanAllyormayaffectitsnational interests,theCouncilwillconsultwiththatAllyand,takingintoconsiderationtheoutcomeof

129

Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy, Annex II: ESDP:ImplementationoftheNiceProvisionsontheInvolvementoftheNonEUEuropeanAllies,Point2,2425 October2002.

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130 theseconsultations,decideontheparticipationofthatAlly. Inaddition,theCopenhagen

EuropeanCouncildecidedthattheBerlinPlusarrangementsandtheimplementationthereof wouldapplyonlytothoseEUmemberstateswhicharealsoeitherNATOmembersorparties to the Partnership for Peace, and which has consequently concluded bilateral security
131 agreements with NATO. Thus, Cyprus and Malta will not take part in EU military 132 operations conducted using NATO assets once they have become members of the EU...

But this will not affect the right of their representatives to participate and vote in the EU institution and bodies. As regards the other arrangements agreed to in the Nice European Council on the preparation and operation of the ESDP, the EU maintained its position as
133 statedintheabovediscussions.

The Ankara Agreement, the Brussels Document and the ensuing EU decisions in the Copenhagen European Council have had a positive impact on the elimination of the complicationsofTurkeysdelicateposition.Althoughitistooearlytoseetheoptimalresults, it is possible to say that the agreements opened a new era in the resolution of complicated issues, namely the future of TurkishEU relations, EUNATO cooperation and the implementationoftheESDP. Firstly,theCopenhagenEuropeanCouncilmeetingon1213DecembergaveTurkeyan encouraging,ifnotfullysatisfying,responsetothefutureofTurkeysfullmembershipinthe EU.InTurkeys long journeytowardsbecoming a fullEU memberthatbegan in 1964,the EUforthefirsttimementionedadate:December2004.Althoughitwasnotassatisfyingas whattheTurkishpeopleandthenewgovernmentledbyAbdullahGlhadexpected,itputa concretetargetbeforeTurkeytospeedupitspreparations.Ashasbeenpopularlystated,itcan be considered a date for dateto formally startthe accession negotiations between Turkey andtheEU.Indeed,theGlgovernmenthasalreadytakenimportantstepstogetadefinite date to start the formal negotiations. It is expected that at the conclusion of the implementationofreformsinthedomesticandforeignpolicyrealmsthathavebeenongoing overthelastfewyears,andifthingsgoasplanned,Turkeywillbeafullmemberofboththe EUaswellastheESDP. Secondly, both the Ankara Agreement and the Brussels Document were big and important steps forward towards the fulfilment of EUNATO cooperation. They finally
130 131

Ibid.,Point12.

CopenhagenEuropeanCouncil,PresidencyConclusionsonEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy,1213 December2002.
132 133

Ibid.
See,ibid.,Points3,5,8,9andsoon.

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opened the way for EUNATO cooperation on the use of NATO assets and capabilities in EUled operations. Soon after the NATO Council accepted the Brussels Agreement on 13 December 2002, the EU and NATO leaders, Javier Solana and Lord Robertson, issued a declarationon16December2002tostartclosermilitaryandpolitical cooperation between the two organisations in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. The declaration outlined the political principles for EUNATO cooperation and gave the EU
134 assuredaccesstoNATOsplanningandlogisticcapabilitiesforitsownmilitaryoperations.

The declaration also noted that EUNATO cooperation would have respect for the interests of the member states of the European Union and NATO and ensure the fullest possible involvement of nonEU European Members of NATO within the ESDP by implementingtherelevantNicearrangements.Moreover,NATOssupporttotheESDPwill
135 bemadeinaccordancewiththerelevantWashingtonSummitdecisions.

Thirdly, with the elimination of Turkish and Greek vetoes and the conclusion of the NATOEUagreement,theEUwasabletoputtheESDPintopracticein2003.Firstly,theEU tookovercommandoftheU.N.PoliceForceinBosniaandHerzegovinaafterthecessationof theU.N.ledInternationalPoliceTaskForceattheendof2002,thefirstESDPoperationthat willlastuntil2005.TheEUPoliceForce,whichismadeupof900staffmembersfrom15EU countries as well as from nonEU countries including Turkey, will train the Bosnian police
136 forces. Inaddition,theEUtookovertheNATOled Amber Foxpeacekeeping mission in

Macedonia on 31 March 2003 by using NATO assets and capabilities. Moreover, the EU Council statedthe EUs willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR
137 (nowrunbyNATO).

As a result, as Turkey achieved most of its objectives in the Ankara Agreement it should be seen as a positive outcome for Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. In the end, Turkey managed to make some important modifications in EU arrangements on the ESDP thathadbeendecidedattheCologne,HelsinkiandNicecouncils.Withthesemodifications, Turkey seemed to ensure its security interests until it becomes a full member of the ESDP through full EU membership. It also provided important progress in meeting Turkeys fundamentalconcernsrelatingtoTurkeysnationalinterestsinthebroaderEuropeansecurity

134 135 136 137

NATOEUDeclarationontheESDP ,www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/12december/e1216a.htm. www.nato.int/docu)pr/2002/p02142e.htm. www.euobserver.com/index.phtml Radikal,28.12.2002and02.01.2003. hhtp://euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=8885.

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region. This can be considered an important achievement because of Turkeys increasing securityburdenaftertheendoftheColdWar,asstatedabove. However,inouropinion,theFormalSolutioncannotbeconsideredthefinalsolution to end Turkeys delicate position between NATO and the ESDP in the long term. Some evidencecanbeshownforthispessimism.Firstofall,despiteassurancesgiventoTurkey,it does not make Turkey and the other nonEU European Allies an actual part of the ESDP process.ItisstillfarfromTurkeysstatusasassociatememberintheWEU.Inotherwords,it canbeseenasapoliticalandcompromisesolutionbutwithoutinstitutionalarrangements. Although it made promises and assurances to Turkey, it cannot be seen as concrete solutionsforthefutureunlessinstitutionalconnectionsareestablishedandunlessTurkeyis made an institutional part of the ESDP process. The most critical problem Turkeys participation in the ESDP decisionmaking process remains unresolved. Turkey is not allowedtoparticipateintheESDPdecisionmakingprocessinoperationswithNATOassets and capabilities, nor is Turkey guaranteed that it will be invited to EUled operations withoutNATOassetsand capabilities.Soitcan only beatransitional solution fortheshort termtoassureTurkeythatEUledoperationsusingNATOsstrategicassetswillbedecided bytheNATOCouncilonacasebycasebasisandthatTurkeywillberaisingitsdemandsfor thiskindofoperation. Therefore, Turkeys delicate position will continue in the foreseeable future, until a more concrete and durable solution is found. In the following pages, we will suggest three morealternativesolutionsinthisrespect.

5.3.SatisfyingSolution:MakingTurkeyanAssociateMemberoftheESDP That is to simply establish a kind of parallelism between Turkeys associated membership in the first and third pillars of EU integration and the second pillar. In other words, Turkeys acquisitions in economic and legal issues can be transferred to the ESDP decisionmaking structure. This has many advantages. First of all, this would end Turkeys marginal position that developed starting in 1999. Turkeys integration with the EU would proceed at all levels, and that would encourage Turkey to speed up its work towards full membership in the EU. At least it would end the complications that, as stated above, have emergedsincetheHelsinkiSummit. Secondly,TurkeywouldfullycontributetoEUNATOcooperation,thusallowingthe EU guaranteed access to preidentified NATO sources in a much easier manner than what Turkey accepted in the Formal Solution. In other words, unlike the case of the Ankara and 70

Brussels agreements in which Turkeys permission for EU access to NATO assets and capabilitiesisonlyconditionalonsomedetails,intheeventofitsassociatemembershipinthe ESDP Turkey would be more willing to coact with the EU. As a result, Turkey would be involvedinthedecisionmakingprocessattheassociatemembershiplevel.Thoughunableto block any EU decisions oroperations, it would be able to express its opinions and table its proposalssoastocontributetotheformationofthedecisions. Thirdly, itwould bringthe WashingtonSummitarrangementsandperspective backto life.The Allieswould havedialogue,cooperationandtransparencyunderthecommonand mutual frameworks of the EU and NATO. This would not do any harm to the EUs autonomousinstitutionalcharacterbecauseitwouldcontinuetomaintainitsautonomyinthe ESDPdecisionmakingprocess. Fourthly,thedivisionoflaboursystemwithinNATO,i.e.theEUasthesubcontractor for the European security architecture under NATO, would work more efficiently. The aforementionedinstitutionalcomplexitiesoftheEuropeanmemberspositions,includingsuch divisionsasthenonEUEuropeanNATOAllies(Turkey,Norway,Iceland,Poland,Hungary andtheCzechRepublic),nonEUNATOAllies(+theUSandCanada),thenonNATOEU countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland), the EU+15 arrangement and the EU+6 arrangement, would end to a great extent. If the two institutions can establish common platforms where they can promote dialogue, cooperation and transparent relations, there wouldemergewhattheU.S.secretaryofdefencecalledtheEuropeanSecurityandDefence
138 System,leadingtoawholeandcompactEuropewithatransatlanticconnection.

When one mentions that Turkey should be made a part of the ESDPs institutional dimension, even at the associate membership level, there is a view that Turkey is trying to entertheEUfromthebackdoorthroughtheESDPmechanism.So,theargumentcontinues, TurkeyisusingitsvetopowerinNATOinordertoachievethisobjective. Thisisanunjustifiedaccusationforseveralreasons:Firstofall,Turkeywasalreadya partoftheEUinstitutionthroughitsWEUassociatemembershipbeforetheawkwardprocess started after the Helsinki and Washington summits in 1999, and now asks no more than a continuationofthatposition.Inotherwords,thesatisfyingsolutionisonlytosatisfyTurkey that it is still part of the European security and defence policy and not excluded from the system. With that, Turkey is neither asking for full membership in the EU nor trying to

138

TheTurkishGeneralStaffagreesandcallsitaunitarysystemforcrisismanagement.Itwouldpreventthe creation of dividing lines withinthe EU and NATO. Turkish General Staff, op.cit.also by Foreign Ministry, Orhun, op.cit.2000,p.121.

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secure vetopowerintheEUCounciltoblocktheESDPprocess.Turkeyonlyasksthatthe EUtakeTurkeyssecurityconcernsandpoliciesintoconsiderationasstatedabove. Ofcourse,TurkeywoulddefinitelyliketobeafullmemberoftheEUssecondpillaras wellastheothertwopillars.Butitisclearthatitcannotbeapartofitunlessitcompletesits reformsineconomic,politicalandlegalissues.OnlythencanTurkeybeafullmemberofthe ESDP. That would be the optimal solution for Turkeys delicate position between NATO andtheESDPingeneral.

5.4.OptimalSolution:FullIntegrationintotheESDP ThisistheultimatesolutionforendingbothTurkeysdelicatepositionandtheawkward processthatstartedin1999.ThiswouldopenthewayforTurkeytobeapartofthesecurity communitythathasbeenunderdevelopmentbytheEUforsomany years.However,thisis indeeda mediumtermprojectthatiscontingentuponTurkeys full integrationintotheEU. Soitisneitheradreamnorautopia.OnceTurkeyspeedsupitsreformprocessinlightofthe Copenhagen criteria, having genuine integration in the economic, political and legal fields, TurkeywillupgradeitssoftsecurityagendaandarenatotheleveloftheEUcountries. Such an eventuality could have positive security implications for Turkeys foreign, defence and security policy. Turkeys improvement of its standards in line with modern/contemporary values and policies would spill over into the region in proximity to Turkey: the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkeys export of softsecurity values such as democracy, human rights, market economy, pluralism,freedomsetc.wouldimprovetheconditionsintheregionssurroundingEurope. Indeed,Turkeyhassuchpotential.Asabridgebetweencivilisationsandcommunities, Turkeys attainment of EU values would increase the level of securitisation not only for TurkeyitselfbutalsofortheEuropeanUnionasawhole.Animportantpieceofevidencefor that was the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)EU Joint Forum on 1213 February 2002 in Istanbul after the September 11 incident. The forum, codenamed Civilisation and Harmony:ThePoliticalDimension,wasorganisedbytheTurkishForeignMinistry.Atotal
139 of 89 countries from EU and OIC institutions participated. During the forum, being the

broadest international gathering after the U.N. General Assembly meetings, the EU and the OICcountriessoughttocreateaharmoniousconnectionandunderstandingbetweenthetwo
140 worldsfollowingSeptember11.ItwasdepictedastheIstanbulSpirit. TheIstanbulSpirit

139 140

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/OICEUForum.htm.
MuratYetkin,columnist,in Radikal,14December2002.

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reiterated the fact that Turkey has the potential to act as a melting and meeting point, or bridge, between two geographies, political systems and cultures, and to contribute to international security by reducing the level of conflicts and misperceptions between the EuropeanworldandtheIslamicworld.Thus,thateventcanbeseenasevidencethatTurkey canplayasecurityproviderroleintheregionandcontributetotheexpansionoftheEUs security community into the Islamic world in general and to the Euroasian region in particular. According to Ambassador Bozkr, no other country could manage to bring these two worlds within the same framework. Turkey sent an interesting message to both the European countries and the Islamic world: Turkey, as a democratic, secular and market economycountry,could bea model fortheMuslimworldand bringbothworldswithinthe
141 sameframework.

Similarly, Turkey, the EU allies and the United States have been involved in the reconstructionofAfghanistansinceSeptember11.Turkeydisplayedapositivereactiontothe Bonn Agreement in which the EU and the NATO Allies agreed to eradicate the sources of terrorism bygettingridoftheremnantsoftheTalibanregimeandalQaeda.Inthisrespect, TurkeyshoweditsreadinesstocooperatewiththeEU/NATOAlliesinbuildingupmodern socialandtechnical institutionssuch as schools,televisionstations, hospitals, infrastructure, policeandmilitaryservicesystems.Inaddition,asstatedabove,TurkeyparticipatedinISAF andeventookovercommandofthe forcefromtheUK forsix months from midJune2000 onwards. All those should be seen as indications of how Turkey could act as a security providerfortheEuropeanUnionssecuritycommunityinthebroaderEuropeanarchitecture. True,theEUhasdifferenceswithTurkeyontheapproachtointernationalpoliticsand foreign policy. But that does not mean that the EU harbours enmity, secret agendas or conspiracy towards Turkey. One should realise that the EUs perception of security is differentfromthatofTurkey.KaraosmanoluhasrightlyarguedthatwhereastheEUturned

inwards, trying to build up a security community in Europe per se, Turkey has turned
142 outwards, trying to improve its security in Euroasia. But this does not mean that the

TurkishandEUsecurityperceptionscannotbereconciled: WhileTurkey becomesapartof the European security community by fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and completing

141

InterviewwithVolkanBozkr,DeputySecretaryGeneralofTurkishEuropeanUnionGeneralSecretariat,3 May2002,Ankara.
142

AliL.Karaosmanoglu,TurkeysSecurityPolicyinConnectionwiththeUSAandtheEU,inHasanCelal Gzeletal.,(eds.),TheTurks,Vol.5,(Ankara:YeniTrkiyePublications,2002)AliKaraosmanolu,Trkiye AsndanAvrupaGvenlikKimlii:JeopolitikveDemokratikUfukinabanal,hsanDave Ramazan Gzen(eds.),TrkiyeninDPolitikaGndemi:Kimlik,Demokrasi,Gvenlik(Ankara:Liberte,2001).

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integrationwiththeEUinallfields,theEUandTurkeycollectivelyextendthebordersofthe
143 securitycommunitytoabroaderEuropewhereTurkeyandtheEUhavemutualinterests.

5.5.Per fectSolution:Tur keyasMultidimensionalSecurityProvider The perfect solution for Turkey is to act as a European actor in the region, endowed withbothhardsecurityandsoftsecuritycapabilitiesandpolicies.Inotherwords,likemany oftheEuropeanUnioncountriesthatareintegralmembersofbothNATOandtheEU,Turkey can develop its own militarysecurity power as well as its economicpoliticaltechnical cultural power. Turkey, having NATO and the EUs support and advantages, could be the rising star of the region, acting as a source of stability in all aspects. Such an eventuality would bring manyadvantages. Firstofall,theTurkish nationwould improve itspowerand security in all dimensions. Turkeys attainment of the EUs political,

economic/financial/commercial,legalandtechnicalstandardswouldimprovethesoftsecurity aspectoftheTurkishnation.Secondly,aneconomicallydevelopedTurkeywouldenhanceits militarystrategic capabilities, positively contributing to burdensharing in the Atlantic Alliance. Turkey could sustain its own military spending much more easily and efficiently than when Turkey receives foreign aid from the Allies all the time. Thirdly, Turkeys attainmentofsoftand hard militarysecuritycapabilitieswould make ita morecredibleand influential power in the region. Turkey could get involved in, and contribute to, not only militarystrategic operations but also the economicpoliticallegal operations in all these places.Asaresult,Turkeycouldincreaseitspotentialtochangetheregiontowardsamodern, stableandpeacefulenvironment.

143

See Rosemary Hollis,TurkeyandtheGeopoliticalConsequences ofEUEnlargement,inChristianPeter Honelti et al. (ed.), Future Prospects for EuropeanGulf Relations (Munich: Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research,2000).

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6.

CONCLUSION:

THE

FUTURE

OF

THE

EUROPEAN

SECURITY

ARCHITECTUREANDTURKEY

Attheendofthiswork,wecanput forwardtwoconclusions, firstaboutthe futureof the European security architecture and second about Turkeys position in future developments. Weliveinaworldinwhichsecuritycanbeachievedonlythroughthecooperationof countriesbecausesecurityproblemsarecommonandinterdependentallovertheworld.The September11tragedyhasshownthisveryclearly.TheeventssincetheendoftheColdWar aswellasSeptember11havealsoshownthatthebordersofsecurityagendasandarenashave beenbroadenedinalldimensions.ThatposesachallengefortheEuropeancountriesandtheir organisations such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. All these organisations have roles to play for the management of security relations. As stated at the beginning,eachhasitsownpeculiarfunctionandroleinthedivisionoflabourspirit. This study has argued thatthe EUs attemptto break up this division of labour and a narrowapproachtothemanagementofthesecurityproblemsinabroaderEuropehascreated and might create more complications in the Atlantic Alliance in general and in Turkeys relationswiththeEUinparticular. Therefore, the European security architecture should not be based on a narrow perspective but rather on a broad perspective, simply because the realities on the ground cannotbeunderstoodbyanddealtwiththroughnarrowsecurityarrangements,butonlywith broad security arrangements. To put it more clearly since we are living in the age of globalisationwhere bordersaremuchweaker,problemsaffectmostoftheworldpopulation and countries and peoples are thus more interdependent on each other the conception of security should also be globalised. As a result, all countries, regardless of their level of development, prosperity and status, are facing the impact of the security implications of globalisation. Due to such a broad concept of security in the age of globalisation, arrangementsandsolutionsintheregionsthatwerethemoststronglyaffectedbytheendof thepostColdWarperiod,i.e.abroaderEurope,shouldbebasedonbroadperspectives.Thus, thebordersoftheEuropeansecurityarchitecturedonotendatthebordersoftheEUcountries perse,butdefinitelyencompassthesurroundingregions.Asaresult,boththeEUandNATO shouldworknotonlyforthesecurityandstabilityoftheirownregionsbutalsoforthatofthe surrounding regions. And both organisations should act in cooperation within the spirit of 75

division of labour and work to find viable, longterm and durable solutions for both hard securityandlowsecurityproblems. Intheconstructionprocessofthenewsecurityorder,somecountrieshavekeypositions due to their multidimensional, namely broad, security connections with the regions in their proximity.Theyareakindofoverarchingregionalpowerhavingaconsiderableamountof influence and involvement in the region. Russia and Turkey constitute this sort of country. Turkeys importantposition in itsownregion is wellknown.Butthisworkhasarguedthat Turkey is a country whose contribution to European security should be multidimensional, rangingfrommilitarypoliticaldiplomatictoeconomic,socialculturalandtechnical.Turkey issituatedatadelicatepointthatcanbebothanassetandalsoaburdenfortheEuropean securityarchitectureinparticular.ItcanbeanassetonlyifTurkeyisfullyandsubstantially integrated, not only into the military and strategic structure but also into the political, economic and social structure of the Western/European security community. Then, Turkey can be a more influential country within its geography in such a way as to project durable stability,peaceandprosperity.Turkeycouldactasa modelcountry forthecountries inthe region. As a country having the characteristics of both worlds, Turkey could play a more fundamentalandeffectiverolethanjustactingasamilitaryforce. Achieving such a role necessitates hard work by both Turkey itself and the Western allies. First of all, Turkey should complete its reforms to become a full member of the EuropeanUnionandthusdevelopitseconomic,commercialandtechnicalcapacity.Andthen, Turkeyshouldapproachandbecomeinvolvedintheregioninordertoexpandthebordersof the security community by employing soft security policies for the resolution of social, politicalandeconomicproblemsinandaroundTurkey.Thatwouldcreateamorepeaceful, secure, and stable region around the EU. So it is advantageous and beneficial not only for Turkeyandtheregionitself,butalsofortheEUandtheNATOAlliesaswell. Thus,secondly,the Westernallies,particularlytheEU,shouldtake intoconsideration Turkeyspositivecontributiontothecreationofapeaceful,stableandsecureenvironmentin itsownregion.Inthatrespect,theEUshouldclearthewayforTurkeysfullintegrationinto thesecuritycommunity,givepositiveandconstructiveresponsetoTurkeysgenuineattempts to complete its reforms in light of the Copenhagen criteria and, of course, find a viable solutionforTurkeysdelicateposition.IftheEUwantstobecomeaglobalactorandinvolved insecurityanddefenceissues,itshouldhavecloseinstitutionallinkswithTurkeyaswellas with other nonEU European NATO countries. This is necessary for its operational capabilities.Inanycase,theEUwillneedTurkeyscontributionandassistance,especiallyin 76

theEuroasianregion.AsBrethertonandVoglesconcludeTheEUsdismalfailureofpolicy towards Turkey represents the nadir of EU actorness. Inability to address this issue may
144 ultimatelyunderminetheEUsbroaderstrategyofcloseassociationwithitsnearabroad.

As for NATO, the Allies should understand Turkeys delicate position and display sympathy towards Turkeys insistence and use of its veto for achieving its objective to becomepartoftheESDPprocess.ThisisindeedforthebenefitofalltheWesternallies. Finally, the future of the broader European security architecture closely depends on whereTurkeyis,andviceversa.ThecloserTurkeyistotheEUsecuritycommunity,themore secureandpeacefulTurkey,aswellastheEU,NATOandtheEuroasianregion,willbe.

144

BrethertonandVogles,TheEuropeanUnionasaGlobalActor ,op.cit.EUactornesscanbedescribedasthe EUsabilityandpolicytoactasasingleentityininternationalrelationsonbehalfofthemembercountries.

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