[G.R. No. 148864. August 21, 2003] SPOUSES EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA and EPIFANIA C. EVANGELISTA, petitioners, vs.

MERCATOR FINANCE CORP., LYDIA P. SALAZAR, LAMECS ** REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: Petitioners, Spouses Evangelista (Petitioners), are before this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing their petition. Petitioners filed a complaint[1] for annulment of titles against respondents, Mercator Finance Corporation, Lydia P. Salazar, Lamecs Realty and Development Corporation, and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioners claimed being the registered owners of five (5) parcels of land [2] contained in the Real Estate Mortgage[3] executed by them and Embassy Farms, Inc. (Embassy Farms). They alleged that they executed the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Mercator Financing Corporation (Mercator) only as officers of Embassy Farms. They did not receive the proceeds of the loan evidenced by a promissory note, as all of it went to Embassy Farms. Thus, they contended that the mortgage was without any consideration as to them since they did not personally obtain any loan or credit accommodations. There being no principal obligation on which the mortgage rests, the real estate mortgage is void. [4] With the void mortgage, they assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceedings conducted by Mercator, the sale to it as the highest bidder in the public auction, the issuance of the transfer certificates of title to it, the subsequent sale of the same parcels of land to respondent Lydia P. Salazar (Salazar), and the transfer of the titles to her name, and lastly, the sale and transfer of the properties to respondent Lamecs Realty & Development Corporation (Lamecs). Mercator admitted that petitioners were the owners of the subject parcels of land. It, however, contended that on February 16, 1982, plaintiffs executed a Mortgage in favor of defendant Mercator Finance Corporation for and in consideration of certain loans, and/or other forms of credit accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee (defendant Mercator Finance Corporation) amounting to EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE & 78/100 (P844,625.78) PESOS, Philippine Currency and to secure the payment of the same and those others that the MORTGAGEE may extend to the MORTGAGOR (plaintiffs) x x x. [5] It contended that since petitioners and Embassy Farms signed the promissory note[6] as co-makers, aside from the Continuing Suretyship Agreement [7] subsequently executed to guarantee the indebtedness of Embassy Farms, and the succeeding promissory notes [8] restructuring the loan, then petitioners are jointly and severally liable with Embassy Farms. Due to their failure to pay the obligation, the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgaged properties are valid. Respondents Salazar and Lamecs asserted that they are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, relying on the validity of the title of Mercator. Lamecs admitted the prior ownership of petitioners of the subject parcels of land, but alleged that they are the present registered owner. Both respondents likewise assailed the long silence and inaction by petitioners as it was only after a lapse of almost ten (10) years from the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent sales that they made their claim. Thus, Salazar and Lamecs averred that petitioners are in estoppel and guilty of laches.[9] During pre-trial, the parties agreed on the following issues: a. Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage executed by the plaintiffs in favor of defendant Mercator Finance Corp. is null and void; Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings undertaken on subject parcels of land to satisfy the indebtedness of Embassy Farms, Inc. is ( sic) null and void; Whether or not the sale made by defendant Mercator Finance Corp. in favor of Lydia Salazar and that executed by the latter in favor of defendant Lamecs Realty and Development Corp. are null and void; Whether or not the parties are entitled to damages.[10]

b.

c.

d.

After pre-trial, Mercator moved for summary judgment on the ground that except as to the amount of damages, there is no factual issue to be litigated. Mercator argued that petitioners had admitted in their pre-trial brief the existence of the promissory note, the continuing suretyship agreement and the subsequent promissory notes restructuring the loan, hence, there is no genuine issue regarding their liability. The mortgage, foreclosure proceedings and the subsequent sales are valid and the complaint must be dismissed. [11] Petitioners opposed the motion for summary judgment claiming that because their personal liability to Mercator is at issue, there is a need for a full-blown trial. [12] The RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. It held: A reading of the promissory notes show (sic) that the liability of the signatories thereto are solidary in view of the phrase jointly and severally. On the promissory note appears ( sic) the signatures of Eduardo B. Evangelista, Epifania C. Evangelista and another signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below the words Embassy Farms, Inc. It is crystal clear then that the plaintiffs-spouses signed the promissory note not only as officers of Embassy Farms, Inc. but in their personal capacity as well(.) Plaintiffs(,) by affixing their signatures thereon in a dual capacity have bound themselves as solidary debtor(s) with Embassy Farms, Inc. to pay defendant Mercator Finance Corporation the amount of indebtedness. That the principal contract of loan is void for lack of consideration, in the light of the foregoing is untenable.[13] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. [14] Thus, petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals, but again were unsuccessful. The appellate court held:

The appellants insistence that the loans secured by the mortgage they executed were not personally theirs but those of Embassy Farms, Inc. is clearly self-serving and misplaced. The fact that they signed the subject promissory notes in the(ir) personal capacities and as officers of the said debtor corporation is manifest on the very face of the said documents of indebtedness (pp. 118, 128-131, Orig. Rec.). Even assuming arguendo that they did not, the appellants lose sight of the fact that third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property (Lustan vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663, 675). x x x. In constituting a mortgage over their own property in order to secure the purported corporate debt of Embassy Farms, Inc., the appellants undeniably assumed the personality of persons interested in the fulfillment of the principal obligation who, to save the subject realities from foreclosure and with a view towards being subrogated to the rights of the creditor, were free to discharge the same by payment (Articles 1302 [3] and 1303, Civil Code of the Philippines ).[15](emphases in the original) The appellate court also observed that if the appellants really felt aggrieved by the foreclosure of the subject mortgage and the subsequent sales of the realties to other parties, why then did they commence the suit only on August 12, 1997 (when the certificate of sale was issued on January 12, 1987, and the certificates of title in the name of Mercator on September 27, 1988)? Petitioners procrastination for about nine (9) years is difficult to understand. On so flimsy a ground as lack of consideration, (w)e may even venture to say that the complaint was not worth the time of the courts.[16] A motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied for lack of merit. [17] Thus, this petition where they allege that: THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE MAY 4, 1998 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND ITS NON-ENTITLEMENT TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT. [18] We affirm. Summary judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation.[19] The crucial question in a motion for summary judgment is whether the issues raised in the pleadings are genuine or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. [20] To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which a reasonable finding of fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party. The proper inquiry would therefore be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issue of fact requiring a full-blown trial. [21] In the case at bar, there are no genuine issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not deny that they obtained a loan from Mercator. They merely claim that they got the loan as officers of Embassy Farms without intending to personally bind themselves or their property. However, a simple perusal of the promissory note and the continuing suretyship agreement shows otherwise. These documentary evidence prove that petitioners are solidary obligors with Embassy Farms. The promissory note[22] states: For value received, I/We jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of MERCATOR FINANCE CORPORATION at its office, the principal sum of EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS & 78/100 (P 844,625.78), Philippine currency, x x x, in installments as follows: September 16, 1982 October 16, 1982 November 16, 1982 December 16, 1982 January 16, 1983 February 16, 1983 xxx P154,267.87 P154,267.87 P154,267.87 P154,267.87 P154,267.87 P154,267.87 xxx x x x.

The note was signed at the bottom by petitioners Eduardo B. Evangelista and Epifania C. Evangelista, and Embassy Farms, Inc. with the signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below it. The Continuing Suretyship Agreement[23] also proves the solidary obligation of petitioners, viz: (Embassy Farms, Inc.) Principal (Eduardo B. Evangelista) Surety (Epifania C. Evangelista) Surety (Mercator Finance Corporation) Creditor To: MERCATOR FINANCE COPORATION (1) For valuable and/or other consideration, EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA and EPIFANIA C. EVANGELISTA (hereinafter called Surety), jointly and severally unconditionally guarantees (sic) to MERCATOR FINANCE COPORATION (hereinafter called Creditor), the full, faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness of EMBASSY FARMS, INC. (hereinafter called Principal) to the Creditor.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) The obligations hereunder are joint and several and independent of the obligations of the Principal. A separate action or actions may be brought and prosecuted against the Surety whether or not the action is also brought and prosecuted against the Principal and whether or not the Principal be joined in any such action or actions. xxx xxx x x x.

The agreement was signed by petitioners on February 16, 1982. The promissory notes [24] subsequently executed by petitioners and Embassy Farms, restructuring their loan, likewise prove that petitioners are solidarily liable with Embassy Farms. Petitioners further allege that there is an ambiguity in the wording of the promissory note and claim that since it was Mercator who provided the form, then the ambiguity should be resolved against it. Courts can interpret a contract only if there is doubt in its letter. [25] But, an examination of the promissory note shows no such ambiguity. Besides, assuming arguendo that there is an ambiguity, Section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Law states, viz: SECTION 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: xxx xxx xxx

(g) Where an instrument containing the word I promise to pay is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. Petitioners also insist that the promissory note does not convey their true intent in executing the document. The defense is unavailing. Even if petitioners intended to sign the note merely as officers of Embassy Farms, still this does not erase the fact that they subsequently executed a continuing suretyship agreement. A surety is one who is solidarily liable with the principal. [26] Petitioners cannot claim that they did not personally receive any consideration for the contract for well-entrenched is the rule that the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not pass directly to the surety, a consideration moving to the principal alone being sufficient. A surety is bound by the same consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties thereto. [27] Having executed the suretyship agreement, there can be no dispute on the personal liability of petitioners. Lastly, the parol evidence rule does not apply in this case. [28] We held in Tarnate v. Court of Appeals ,[29] that where the parties admitted the existence of the loans and the mortgage deeds and the fact of default on the due repayments but raised the contention that they were misled by respondent bank to believe that the loans were longterm accommodations, then the parties could not be allowed to introduce evidence of conditions allegedly agreed upon by them other than those stipulated in the loan documents because when they reduced their agreement in writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. Treble costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 138400. July 11, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO CAETE, accused-appellant. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The brothers Sergio, Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad together with their 67-year old father, Sotero, all surnamed Caete, were temporarily detained at the municipal jail in Liloan, Cebu in relation to a murder case filed against them for the slaying of one Edith Tumayao. Upon learning that they would be salvaged, they refused to leave their cell and started a riot when the police came to transfer them to the Cebu Provincial Jail. For allegedly bashing the head of his 67-year old father, Sotero Caete, with the wooden leg of a prison bunk during the ensuing melee, which resulted in the latters death, Sergio Caete was charged with Parricide in Criminal Case No. DU-6233 in an Information [1] which alleges: That on the 1st day of June 1997, at about 9:30 oclock in the morning, at Liloan Police Station Jail, Municipality of Liloan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike the head of Sotero Caete, his own father, with the use of a piece of wood, which caused the death of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded Not Guilty to the charge. [2] After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused guilty as charged, thus:
[3]

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused Sergio Caete guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide, the said accused is hereby sentenced to undergo the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. Accused being a detention prisoner shall be credited in the service of his sentence [the] full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. SO ORDERED.[4]

On appeal to this Court, accused-appellant faults the trial court with the lone assigned error that THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE. Culled from the testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecutions version of what transpired is summed thus by the Solicitor General in the Peoples brief: Accused-appellant Sergio Caete, his three (3) brothers Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad, and their father Sotero Caete, were detained at the municipal jail of Liloan, Cebu, in connection with the murder of a certain Edith Tumayao of which they were being accused. On June 1, 1997 at about 9:30 a.m., they staged a riot inside the municipal jail to prevent their transfer to the provincial jail. They threw stones at the policemen outside the jail. The police had to use tear gas and water cannons to flush them out. Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad were forced to come out of the detention cell, while Sergio and Sotero Caete remained inside. PO3 Ricardo Cabalda Enriquez then entered the jail followed by SPO2 Eleazar Salomon and SPO1 Danilo Latoza. Enriquez was struck by accused-appellant with a piece of concrete on the right side of his face. After he was hit, his companions Salomon and Latoza dragged him out of the detention cell and brought him to a clinic.[5] Thereafter, accused-appellant went amuck and started throwing broken pieces of concrete from inside the jail. This compelled the firemen outside to fire their water cannon at him to immobilize him. The policemen were then able to handcuff accused-appellant and pull him out of his cell. The police then loaded the Caetes aboard the municipal service vehicle and brought Sotero to the hospital while delivering the rest to the provincial jail. Upon arrival at the hospital, Sotero Caete was still conscious, but he later expired. [6] Dr. Jose Dacudao of the Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center in Cebu City conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim. He testified that the victim suffered severe head injury due to a skull fracture. He also testified that the victims chances of survival even with medical intervention was practically nil and that he would have died owing to the severity of the injury sustained. [7] Accused-appellant had a different version of the incident. In a nutshell, he claims that it was actually PO3 Ricardo Eking Enriquez who bludgeoned his father to death. He narrates that he, his victim-father and his brothers were the only prisoners remaining in detention at the time because the others had already been transferred. [9] They were ordered to come out of their cell preparatory for transfer but they refused to leave because they overheard Enriquez saying at the time they were incarcerated that they would be salvaged.[10] They pleaded with their captors not to transfer them to the provincial jail because it was a Sunday but their entreaties fell on deaf ears. [11] Thus, they refused to come out of their cell, prompting the police and firemen to fire tear gas and water cannons at them. [12] Accused-appellant and his father covered their faces to protect themselves from the tear gas and lay on the floor when the water cannon was fired at them. As accused-appellant and his father lay prostrate side by side on the ground, the police entered. It was at that time that PO3 Enriquez clubbed the deceased. [13] Accused-appellant pleaded with Enriquez to stop, but he was punched by another policeman named Toto.[14]
[8]

Accused-appellants account was corroborated by his sister-in-law, Charito Caete, who was there at that time. She testified that shortly after, tear gas and water cannons were fired into the cell, Alfredo, Ruben and Trinidad called that they be let out. Sotero and Sergio, however, remained defiant and refused to leave. She overheard Sotero say, Which of my children will come with me to the end? and it was Sergio who replied, Pa, I will be with you. Water hoses were then fired at the two (2) remaining prisoners. A commotion ensued and she saw someone with a club enter the cell. She did not know what happened after that because they were taken to a vehicle and padlocked inside for about thirty (30) minutes. After that, the vehicle was opened and Sergio, who had several wounds on his face, was thrown inside. She then stepped out of the vehicle and proceeded to the cell where she saw an unconscious Sotero with broken wrists being carried by the police. [15] Accused-appellants mother and widow of the victim, Florentina Caete, confirmed Charitos account of what happened. She testified that she was at the plaza on June 1, 1998 when she noticed that people were converging towards the municipal hall. She went there to find out what the commotion was all about and saw her husband and her sons being fired upon with tear gas. She saw Charito waving at the police to open the door of the prison cell because the inmates wanted to get out. Shortly thereafter, three of her sons emerge from the cell but her husband and Sergio remained.[16] She was able to enter the municipal hall but was prevented from going any further, was dragged out and locked inside a truck.[17] Later, she saw her husband and accused-appellant being brought out. Accused-appellant, who was badly injured and unconscious, was thrown inside the vehicle. She went with accused-appellant when the latter was brought to the Southern Islands Hospital where her husband was also admitted for treatment. On the 21 st, they went to the hospital to secure a copy of the medical records but they were not able to. [18] Generally, findings of the trial court are entitled to respect, considering that it was in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial.[19] Nonetheless, this rule is circumscribed by well-established exceptions. [20] Thus, the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed if by the evidence or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred. [21] In other words, a trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances of substance that, if taken into account, could have materially affected the outcome of the case.[22] In the case at bar, we find several material circumstances which were overlooked by the court a quo, to wit: First, PO3 Ricardo Eking Enriquez claimed he was pounced upon and assaulted by accused-appellant who hit him on right side of the head when he entered the cell. The severity of the alleged attack which purportedly drew blood from the wound,[23] coming as it does from a supposedly desperate assailant, was such that he had to be brought to a clinic for treatment by his co-policemen. However, no medical certificate to prove the alleged attack on his person was presented. Neither was the supposed weapon used in the assault produced to substantiate this claim. Indeed, other than the prosecution witnesses bare avowals on this point, the wooden post of the bunk or the piece of cement allegedly used in fatally bludgeoning the victim was never presented in court. On the contrary, there is evidence on record which shows that it was one of the responding policemen who entered the cell where accusedappellant and his victim-father held out who carried a club.[24]

Second, the alleged assault imputed on the accused-appellant and his father becomes even more questionable considering that they both were forced to lay flat on the ground at the time Enriquez, Salomon and Latoza entered because of the tear gas and water cannon fired into their cell. In fact, the physical evidence tends to support the claim of the defense that it was accused-appellant and his victim-father who were actually assaulted and beaten up by the police. The record discloses that a severely injured accused-appellant who sustained many wounds on his face [25] was taken out of the cell and thrown into the truck. [26] He was unconscious with broken wrists.[27] Needless to state, such physical condition renders impossible the prosecutions claim that he attacked the policemen who came to take them out. Third, the prosecution witnesses, all of them police officers who claim to have been at the scene of the incident, were one in declaring that accused-appellant assaulted PO3 Enriquez. [28] Curiously for all their supposedly eyewitness declarations of what transpired inside the cell, they were totally silent on the injuries sustained by accused-appellant, notably his broken wrists and the wounds on his face. Interestingly too, the medical certificate [29] issued by examining physician Dr. Dacudao but signed by Dr. Lemuel Lecciones [30] detailed only the head injuries of the victim but made no mention of the other wounds he sustained and described by Charito Caete when he and accused-appellant were both thrown unconscious into the truck. Fourth, even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant and his father were dangerous inmates with a predisposition for violence, as the prosecution pictured them to be, they practically had no opportunity to perpetrate the acts imputed on them on account of the extreme measures adopted by the police to subdue them. It appears that tear gas was first fired at them causing them to cover their faces to protect their eyes thus effectively limiting their movements. They were next blasted with water cannon forcing them to lie prone on the floor effectively immobilizing them. It was at this juncture, as they lay helpless and vulnerable on the ground, blinded by tear gas and dazed from the pounding they sustained from a high pressure water cannon, that PO3 Enriquez, SPO2 Salomon and SPO1 Latoza entered the cell. Fifth, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them police officers belonging to the Liloan police unit, with regard to the alleged assault on their co-officer SPO3 Enriquez and the victim engenders doubt as to their credibility. Identical features in the testimony of witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought-out and prefabricated story. [31] It was in fact held in one case that because of the close camaraderie that developed between the witnesses-members of the same police force to which an accused belonged, they could not be expected to testify truthfully. [32] Furthermore, a circumspect scrutiny of their testimonies shows that having testified uniformly only to material facts, they have been forgetful or non-committal with particulars and details having relation with the principal facts. Worth remembering in this regard is People v. Alviar,[33] where we said that: . . . [i]t often happens with fabricated stories that minute particulars have not been thought of. [34] It has also been said that an honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case incomplete, but throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a witness may be honest, but his testimony is not reliable. [35] Sixth, the deportment of SPO2 Salomon on the witness stand as he testified on the particulars of a serious crime which claimed the life of the victim only deepens the suspicion of the prosecution witnesses claims on the alleged culpability of the accused-appellant. He was smilingeven as he recounted the details of the supposed deadly assault by accused-appellant on SPO3 Enriquez. [36] It has been pointedly stated inPeople v. Ganan, Jr. [37] citing the old case of U.S. v. Burns[38] that: The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message. Seventh, going by the account of the prosecution witnesses that the accused-appellant and his father were desperate and dangerous men with a propensity for violence, it stands to reason that they should have properly armed and protected themselves against a possible assault before entering the cell where the accused-appellant and his father defiantly held out. SPO1 Latoza, however, declared they went inside barehanded: Q So that when you and your companions allegedly got inside the cell you were already aware that there might be some untoward incidents that may happen and you may sustain injuries and you were risking your lives and limbs? Yes. Being aware with that what precaution[s] have you made in order to avoid any untoward incident that would happen to your lives? First the door was sprayed with water and that is why we were able to have chance to go inside. What do you want to impress [to] this Honorable Court is that while you were in a single file going inside there were hoses which were directed to that area? Yes. xxx Q. A. Q. A. xxx xxx

A. Q. A. Q. A.

By the way, being aware of the risk that you faced at that time, of course you did get inside the cell with some arms? No sir. Do you mean to say you entered with bare hands? Yes.

Q. A. Q. A.

Do you want to impress [upon] this Honorable Court that you wanted to save people who were very brave at that time and who threw stones at you as you said with only your bare hands? Yes. Because at that time there were only few stones left with them because (sic) the others were already thrown outside. While you cannot see how many few stones left? That is the work of the policeman and we are all indispensable. [39]

Eighth, the Court notes that the measures the police adopted to get the inmates out of their cell were far too excessive and unwarranted by the occasion. Tear gas was fired at accused-appellant and his father. They were later sprayed with water cannon purportedly to immobilize them. The excessiveness of the means employed by the police in fact conforms to the theory of the defense that it was accused-appellant and his father who were mauled by the police to punish them for their recalcitrance. In the process, the victim was fatally injured on account of the severe beating they were subjected to. Ninth, accused-appellant, his victim-father and his brothers could hardly be faulted for their fears that they would be rubbed out because, aside from the declaration of SPO3 Enriquez that they would be salvaged,[40] the record discloses that they were the only prisoners left in the jail [41] and there has been no satisfactory reason given why they should be left behind instead of being transferred together along with the other prisoners . The foregoing circumstances, seemingly trivial when taken singly but decisive when considered together, were glossed over by the trial court with the presumption that the prosecution witnesses were in the regular performance of their bounden duties at the time of the incident. However, it should be stressed that [W]hile the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent [42] and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [43] The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellants conviction because First, the presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption.[44] Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. [45] The presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. [46] In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.[47] The attendant circumstances enumerated above, negate the presumption accorded to the prosecution witnesses. Where inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, while the others may be compatible with a finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for conviction. [48] Viewed vis-vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, it is worth repeating what we previously stated in People v. Ratunil[49] that courts are mandated to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing and that the presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused. [50] It is a well-entrenched rule in criminal law that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight [51] and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[52] In view of the foregoing considerations, the evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of accused-appellant. What is required is that there be proof of beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused-appellant committed the crime. [53] It is only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial that the judgment be for conviction.[54] All told, we are not satisfied that the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded accused-appellant has been overcome. Corollarily, we find it unnecessary to examine the other corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution. Where the principal and basic evidence upon which the prosecution rests its case fails, all evidence intended to corroborate or support it must likewise fail. [55] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. DU-6233, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sergio Caete is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED unless held for other lawful causes . SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 105455 August 23, 1995 EXCELSA INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ASIAN ALCOHOL CORPORATION, SPOUSES RODOLFO V. ZULUETA and GERMAINE R. ZULUETA and BRIQUETTED DIAMOND CORPORATION, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28825 dated 11 March 1992 and its resolution dated 14 May 1992 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts are not disputed.

On 19 March 1985, private respondent Asian Alcohol Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AAC) entered into an agreement, 1 with petitioner for the purchase of a coal briquetting machine for P1,500,000.00 with P450,000.00 as downpayment and the balance of P1,050,000.00 to be paid in eight (8) equal quarterly installments at 24% interest per annum. On 18 May 1987, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against respondent AAC. Petitioner alleged that despite its numerous demands, respondent AAC refused and failed to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price. In its answer filed on 19 June 1987, respondent AAC contended that it was constrained to withhold payment of the balance of the purchase price in view of the controversy over the ownership of the machinery it bought from petitioner which arose from the case instituted by spouses Rodolfo and Germaine Zulueta before the Securities & Exchange Commission (docketed as SEC Case No. 2883) against Lorenzo Elago, respondent Briquetted Diamond Corporation (hereinafter referred to as BDC), petitioner Excelsa Industries Corporation and AAC itself. The Zulueta spouses claimed that the true owner of the subject machinery was respondent BDC and not petitioner Excelsa Industries, Inc. On 27 July 1987, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment anchored on the alleged admission of respondent AAC of its accountability 2 which respondent AAC opposed on 17 August 1987. On 26 August 1987, respondent AAC filed a Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint against respondents BDC and Rodolfo and Germaine Zulueta. On 27 August 1987, respondent AAC deposited in trust the remaining balance of the purchase price (P1,050,000.00) with the Far East Bank & Trust Co., Ramada Branch, Manila. On 25 September 1987, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment and admitted respondent ACC's third party complaint. Petitioner questioned the above-mentioned order in a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. On 12 July 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and ruled that the "ownership of the machinery sold is a genuine issue as to a material fact which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial." 3 On 17 October 1989, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court for the annulment of the Court of Appeals' decision dated 12 July 1989. On 23 October 1987, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular 1-88. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated 6 December 1989. Meanwhile, on 5 February 1990, respondent BDC filed its answer to the third party complaint and averred that: 2. Paragraph 4 is denied. Third-party defendant BDC does not claim, and has never claimed ownership over the coal briquetting machineries purchased by third-party plaintiff. Third-party defendant likewise does not seek, nor has ever sought nullification and invalidation of the Agreement of Sale entered into by and between plaintiff Excelsa Industries Corporation and third-party plaintiff. Third-party defendant BDC fully recognizes the genuineness, due execution, validity and efficacy of the Agreement of Sale. 4 On 16 February 1990, petitioner filed a second motion for summary judgment on the ground that the question of ownership has been finally settled when respondent BDC categorically stated, as aforequoted, that it has no claim of ownership over the subject machinery and does not dispute the sale agreement between petitioner and respondent ACC. 5 On 8 May 1990, the trial court granted petitioner's motion and ruled that respondent BDC's answer to the third party complaint "put to rest the issue of ownership which was the main reason why defendant (respondent) ACC refused to pay the balance of P1,050,000.00 to Excelsa Industries Inc. . . ." 6 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads: PREMISES ABOVE-CONSIDERED, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Asian Alcohol Corporation ordering the latter to pay to the former the sum of P1,050,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price of a coal briquetting machinery. Plaintiff is hereby allowed to withdraw the amount above-indicated which was deposited by the defendant in trust for the plaintiff with the Far East & Trust Co., Ramada Branch as full payment of the purchase price. No pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs. The third party complaint is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED.
7

On 31 May 1990, petitioner's motion for execution was granted and subsequently petitioner withdrew the P1,050,000.00 from Far East Bank & Trust Co., Ramada Branch.

On 11 June 1990, the Zulueta spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals. Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, petitioner likewise appealed to the Court of Appeals on 19 June 1990 for the sole purpose of recovering interest, attorney's fees, exemplary damages and costs of suit. On 11 March 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. The dispositive portion reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby annulled and set aside. The writ of execution issued pursuant to the invalid decision is likewise declared to be legally flawed. Plaintiff-appellant is hereby directed to cause restitution of the sum of P1,142,036.51, representing the amount withdrawn from the Far East Bank, Ramada Branch upon a proper motion therefor. Also, the case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. SO ORDERED. 8 In the instant petition for review, petitioner made the following contentions: I THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL FACT IN THE CASE. THIS JUSTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT. II RESPONDENT ASIAN'S THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT WAS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER AND CLEARLY REPUGNANT TO THE IDEA OF A. THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AS DEFINED BY THE RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE. THE RESPONDENT COURT FAILED/REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS. III THE RESPONDENT COURT ORDERED THE REMAND OF THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT YET IT CANNOT GIVE ANY EXPLANATION ON WHY IT SHOULD BE SO REMANDED, AS IT COULD NOT EVEN SAY WHAT THE PARTIES WILL CONDUCT TRIAL FOR, DESPITE PETITIONER'S DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THIS EFFECT. IV THE RESPONDENT COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. 9 The petition has no merit. The issue boils down to whether or not it was proper for the trial court to render summary judgment in the case at bench. We rule that it was not. Summary judgment under Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Court is a procedural technique which is proper only if there is no "genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of flaw." 10 It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record. 11 Summary judgment or accelerated judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. The very object is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial. 12 The term "genuine issue" has been defined as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. 13 Well-settled also is the rule that the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact. 14 Upon the plaintiff is the burden to prove the cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the plaintiffs burden has been discharged, defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend. 15 Although determination of the efficacy of a motion for summary judgment depends on the particular circumstances of the case, the general test is whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers as to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is clearly meritorious. 16

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that there exists a genuine and vital factual issue, namely, who is the rightful owner of the subject machinery. It is quite apparent that the trial court based its decision on petitioner's second motion for summary judgment solely on the answer filed by respondent BDC. It failed to consider or appreciate the answer of the other third party defendants, now respondents Zulueta spouses, minority stockholders of respondent BDC, who have unwaveringly and persistently asserted that the coal briquetting machine, subject of the sale agreement between petitioner and respondent AAC, belong to or are among the properties of respondent BDC. 17 As readily observed by the Court of Appeals: . . . In addition, the other third-party defendants (Rodolfo and Germaine Zulueta) did not simply fold their arms and keep their voices of protest to themselves since they also externalized their indignation as early as October 30, 1987 (page 83, Record) or three years prior to the decision rendered on May 8, 1990. Hence, thiscaveat definitely posed a serious question on the issue of ownership which was asserted by Rodolfo Zulueta as Treasurer of Briquetted Diamond Corporation premised on the theory that the alienation of the machinery from Briquetted Diamond Corporation to Excelsa is ultra vires due to absence of stockholders' approval but,regrettably, only the other answer submitted by Briquetted Diamond Corporation to the third party complaint was considered by the lower court. 18 (Emphasis ours.) Moreover, we note with some perturbation the ownership structure of petitioner Excelsa Industries, Inc. and respondent BDC. Lorenzo Elago, the current president of petitioner Excelsa Industries, Inc. is, likewise, one of the majority stockholders of respondent BDC. 19 The effect that this kind of set-up may have on the issue of ownership over the subject machinery in the instant case should have been considered by and should have cautioned the trial court. At the very least, it clothed the aforequoted answer of respondent BDC with some suspicion. The question of ownership thus raised by respondent AAC is a substantial issue. It was not merely contrived to delay payment of the purchase price. As the records show, respondent AAC had already deposited the amount of P1,050,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price in trust. Hence, it cannot be accused of bad faith. Petitioner cannot rely on the dismissal of the case filed with the Security & Exchange Commission by respondent Zulueta spouses against petitioner and the other respondents, including Lorenzo Elago. The SEC and this Court dismissed the case not on the merits but on grounds of lack of jurisdiction precisely because the issue involved ownership of machineries and equipment (including the subject machinery) and not an intra-corporate dispute: From a perusal of the allegation of the petition, we find and so hold that there already existed in the petition itself a controversy as to the ownership of the machineries and equipment involved in this case. For this reason, we hold that we have no jurisdiction over the instant case. . . . (Rodolfo Zulueta, et al. v. Lorenzo D. Elago, et al., SEC Case No. SEC-AC No. 167, Order pages 1 and 2). 20 From the foregoing, we therefore hold that a trial on the merits is necessary. "Courts should not render summary judgment hastily . . . . considering that this remedy is in disparagement of a party's right to due process. . . ." 21 It is well to remember that: In case there is doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment, the doubt shall be resolved against the moving party. The court should take that view of evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences. The trial courts have but limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only in cases where there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. The rule does not invest the court with jurisdiction summarily to try the factual issue on affidavits, but authorizes summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 22 ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners. Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila. According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her fourmonth old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance. Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. 1 She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. 2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. 3 For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. 4 She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989. On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. 5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The trial court decreed: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof. Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez. SO ORDERED.6 Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal. 7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing. 8 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person, 9 and disposed of the case, thus: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein. SO ORDERED.10 Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition alleging: I THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN. II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS" AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.11 In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following: (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy? (2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of petitioners? We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. 12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. 13 It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person. In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. 14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor. True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. 15 But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted. Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring. Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. 18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child. A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test 19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has

now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. 20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. 21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.