JARILLIO V. PEOPLE G.R. No.

164435, [June 29, 2010] DOCTRINE: He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. FACTS: On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in 1999. On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000. For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of thecelebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor. On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of suff icient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. ISSUE: W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void. HELD: No. Jarillos conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Orlando Villanueva vs Court of Appeals and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva Article 45 In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly free ly cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her. ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar. HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

REPUBLIC VS IYOY (G.R. NO. 152577) Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation. March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA. Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity? Held: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity o r inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained. In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

LOLITA ENRICO v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI G.R. No. 173614, 28 SEPT. 2007, Chico-Nazario, J. (Third Division) Under Article 34 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment to marry are exempt from securing a marriage license. A Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The heirs of the deceased spouse can question the validity of the latter's marriage, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased filed in the regular courts. Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli were married on June 14, 196 2. They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner, Lolita Enrico and on February 10, 2005 or six months later, Eulogio passed away. Respondents, as heirs of Eulogio Medinaceli, filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds: that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and the lack of marriage

ceremony due to Eulogio's serious illness which made its performance impossible. Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from getting a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 0 2-11-10-SC which provides in Section 2, par. (a) that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage maybe filed solely by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal v. Bayadog holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing a marriage license 2) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of Eulogio

HELD: Petition DISMISSED. Under Article 34 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment to marry are exempt from securing a marriage license. The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely three months after his first

wife, Trinidad, died. Moreover, the respondent heirs have NO standing to assail the validity of the second marriage even after the death of their father, Eulogio. While it is true that Ninal v. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father's second marriage after the death of their father, the Court held that the same rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts of this case, Enrico's marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. Thus, AM 0 2-1110-SC governs the instant case. A.M. No. 0 2-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope. Section 1 states that "this Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily." Section 2, par. (a) categorically states that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased father filed in the regular courts.

Republic vs Quintos Case Digest Republic vs CA and QUintos: GR 159594

Facts: State appeals the decision which affirmed the declaration of marriage between Eduardo Quintos and Catalina Quintos based on the latters psychological incapacity. Eduardo and Catalina were married. They were not blessed with a child because Catalina had a hysterectomy. Eduardo filed for annulment on the grounds of

psychological incapacity due to Catalinas inability to perform her marital obligation. Catalina did not interpose but prayed to be given a share in the conjugal house and lot. Eduardo testified that catalina refused to give in to his sexual needs and gossiped with neighbors instead of performing her marital obligations. She also lived with her paramour. Neuro psychiatric evaluation was done and showed that Catalina has Borderline Personality disorder that is not treatable. RTC and CA granted the nullity, however State appealed due to the fact that catalinas traits are not constitutive of psychological incapacity; her marital unfaithfulness is not psychological incapacity, abandonment is only a ground for legal separation, gambling is not psychological incapacity and the test failed to establish the cause of the incapacity.

Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of nullity of catalinas marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity Under Article 36 of the Family Code

Ruling: No, there has not been sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of nullity of Catalinas marriage to Eduardo. The decision of the RTC and CA has been set aside for the following reasons: 1. The lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. Catalinas behavior was not established. Lower courts have relied heavily on the results of neuro-psychological evaluation, yet the report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. Dr Reyes had only interviewed Catalina and did not personally seek out with other persons. This is not a thorough and in dept assessment of the parties. There is no proof of natal or supervening factor that incapacitated the spouse from performing the basic marital obligations; the only fact that was established was the abandonment of marital home which is not a ground for psychological incapacity.

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It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.