1) Minutes of September 9-10, 2003 Meeting

2) Second Interim Report

3) Biography and Joint Inquiry Testimony

of General Brent Scowcroft

4) September 19 Letter to Judge Gonzales

5) Proposed October 14 Hearing Agenda

6) Family Steering Committee Report Card

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

Minutes of the September 9-10, 2003 Meeting

The Vice Chair called the Commission to order at 6:35 p.m. on September 9, 2003. Vice
Chair Hamilton, and Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Fielding, Gorton, Lehman, and Roemer
were present. Hamilton chaired until Chairman Kean arrived.

Minutes. The minutes of the August 14,2003 meeting were approved.

Press Guidelines. The Vice Chair indicated that recent public statements regarding the Air
Threat Conference Call had created problems with the White House. He added that the
Commission was able to work through those problems, but the incident raised the question
of how to deal with the media. The Vice Chair stated that although he was reluctant to give
strict guidelines, they way the Commission deals with the press has an important impact on
its relationship with the White House. He offered a few suggestions:

1) Do not disclose the Commission's internal deliberations.

2) Do not discuss the details of White House documents.
3) Do not disclose the character of intelligence information, especially with respect to
foreign governments or detainees.
4) Do not disclose the status of negotiations with the White House or conditions of access
unless the Commission decides to make such information public.
5) When in doubt, call the Chair or Vice Chair to work it out.

Commissioner Roemer stated that it was important for Commissioners to be able to speak
to the press without censorship or approval, and that the Commissioners should use
common sense when speaking to the media. The Vice Chair pointed out that the guidelines
only ask that Commissioners consult the Chair or Vice Chair when they are in doubt, and
therefore, most of what Commissioner Roemer said would still be permissible.
Commissioner Roemer said he would try to live by the guidelines, but added that the media
was a source of the Commission's leverage.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste underscored the importance of the Air Threat Conference Call.
The call's significance, combined with the minor redactions, made the four-month delay in
receiving the transcript inexplicable. He stated that he had not leaked, but as a trial lawyer
and former prosecutor with significant government experience, he will not be quiet if he
believes the Commission is getting the run-around. The issue with the conference call was
not one of disclosing national security information, as doing so would aid those who do not
wish the Commission well.

Commissioner Gorton noted that the while each Commissioner has the right to his or her
own views, the Commission will ultimately derive its authority from preserving unanimity
in the delivery of its major recommendations. If commissioners separate themselves now

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for reasons that may seem worthy at the moment, the later ability of the Commission to
succeed might be threatened. He added that it doesn't help for a single member to make
statements and splinter off.

Commissioner Lehman expressed his support for the press guidelines and his concern that
the Commission is losing the public relations battle. He added that the public perceives the
Commission to be focusing on access and not generating substantive outcomes. He
recommended that the Commission focus on media backgrounding and foregrounding on
substantive issues, and refrain from obsessing about access, hi reference to Commissioner
Lehman's comments on substance, the Vice Chair stated that he and the Chair still needed
to solicit ideas from the Commission on the content of the September 23 interim report.

Concurring with Commissioners Gorton and Ben-Veniste, Commissioner Fielding

reiterated that leaks would destroy the Commission. He added that the media would seize
upon the perception of anarchy within the Commission, whether it was true or not.

The Vice Chair added that if the White House sees discussion of negotiations in the press,
an adversarial treatment of the Commission is more likely and the Commission will get less
information. Fundamentally, he argued, in order to have successful negotiations with the
White House they have to remain private. He observed that the guidelines will protect the
integrity of the Commission down the road. He distributed the guidelines, and asked that
Commissioners let the Chair or Vice Chair know if there were any concerns or objections.

Access. The Vice Chair announced that there was good news to report, and asked the
General Counsel to describe recent developments to the Commission.

The General Counsel stated that the first interim report had a big impact on document
production, and that the letters to agency heads with the prospect of a second interim report
also had a significant impact. He observed that, overall, the picture was pretty good. The
administration had produced roughly 2 million pages of documents. The agencies that were
behind—FBI, Justice, and Defense—had improved substantially. He added that the FBI had
been very helpful, although there was one serious problem that he would address later.

The remaining gaps in document production, he noted, were high-level policy documents.
They have received assurances from Dan Levin that the Commission would receive the vast
majority of remaining documents within the next two weeks.

Commissioner Roemer asked why the Commission had not sent an August 19 letter to the
EOP/NSC, and further inquired about the production status of EOF Document Request No.
3. In regard to the first question, the General Counsel responded that the Commission's
relationship with the White House was on a separate track and that they had already had
worked out a production schedule, hi regard to the latter question, the General Counsel
reported that the White House had begun to produce EOF #3 documents in the beginning of
September and that much more would be ready by the third week of September.

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The General Counsel then distributed and introduced a discussion of an August 15, 2003,
letter from Judge Gonzales. The General Counsel noted that the letter had presented some
issues. He reported that he and the Executive Director met with David Leitch that same
week to raise the Commission's concerns regarding the letter. As a result of this discussion,
they reached several understandings which were reflected in a Memorandum for the Record
that was made available to commissioners.

Commission Ben-Veniste recommended that the Commission memorialize these

understandings in a letter responding to the Judge's letter of August 15. The Vice Chair
concurred.

The General Counsel reported that the Commission had made progress regarding notes and
believed it was likely that the White House would allow the Commission to take notes on
final PDDs and NSPDs. He added that the Executive Director had made a strong case for
the Commission's need to take notes on most of these documents, and that they would
continue to press for the lifting of restrictions. The Executive Director observed that the
White House lawyers are marinated in executive privilege law and that their positions
follow the vocabulary and approach of that body of law. The General Counsel stressed that
the Commission has to demonstrate a case of particularized need in order to get past the
executive privilege presumption. The Chair added that in a conversation with the White
House Counsel, the Judge indicated that when the Commission makes a case, he is willing
to help.

Commissioners Roemer and Ben-Veniste expressed their concern that the Commission was
being put into a position in which it can't take notes, can't discuss the material to which it
has access, and can't put the material in the final report. They added that the current note-
taking arrangements are a waste of their time. The Executive Director acknowledged that
the restrictions could be annoying and stressed that the staff would try to resolve these
issues before Commissioners visited the NEOB to review documents. In addition, he
observed that they would soon reach the point where the number of pages on which the
Commission cannot take notes would be very small. The key, he added, is if the
Commission gets the documents it needs and is able to use them in the report.

PDBs. The Executive Director noted that the White House has assembled all materials
responsive to the Commission's request, and that there are hundreds of such items. He
reported that the White House first wants to provide a briefing to the Commission on the
PDB items. The concern they articulate is not just legal. In a way, the PDBs also reveal
"the best the intelligence community can do," and both the White House and the CIA are
particularly sensitive about this. The Vice Chair noted that the briefing would cover
questions such as: What kind of warnings did the President receive and when? How was
the al Qaeda threat depicted? How were the relationships between al Qaeda and other
states—Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—depicted?

Commissioner Roemer noted that the PDBs are also given to the DCI, and suggested that
this would make the executive privilege argument more difficult to make. The Executive

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Director stated the Commission was unlikely to win on such a legal argument, as the "state
secrets" privilege is nearly absolute. Commissioner Roetner then suggested that the
Commission not request to see all| |PDBs, but perhaps! IThe Executive Director
concurred that the Commission should not attempt to obtain hundreds of PDBs.

Commissioner Lehman observed that the SEIBs [Senior Executive Intelligence Briefings]
contain nearly all of the information provided in the PDBs. He suggested that the
Commission ask for the difference between then SEIBs and PDBs. He went on to
recommend that the Commission reframe the PDB debate over what the President knew to
what information the intelligence community did (or did not) provide him.

The Vice Chair advised that the Commission move ahead and accept a briefing. He added
that although they should not be satisfied with a briefing and that the next steps may be
unclear, the Commission needed to take this first step.

Interviews. The General Counsel then turned to the issue of interviews with NSC and
high-level officials. He reported that the White House had suggested a set of guidelines
which would prohibit the Commission from recreating "blow-by-blow" descriptions of
conversations and determining specific positions taken by officials. The Commission
countered with a set of "need-to-know" principles. The Commission has also agreed to
meeting with the agency representative before these interviews to give them notice about
the topics the Commission would cover, so that the interviewees are prepared to be
responsive and so key legal issues can be addressed before the interview occurs.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked if there was a point at which the Commission could
conclude whether or not if had enough information to do its job. Speaking on behalf of
Commissioner Gorelick (who was unable to attend the meeting but provided written
comments), the Chair asked if the Commission was at a point where they could judge
whether they can produce the final report on time? The Executive Director stated that, as
best he knew, the answer was yes. He had met with all of the team leaders that morning,
and that, in general, they were on track.

FBI Access. One problem of particular concern, though, was Team 1 A's need for access to
the FBI's Automated Case File System (ACS). The Executive Director reported that Team
1A had determined that the PENTTBOM file is incomplete, and that they will need direct
access to the FBI database in order to conduct searches in a complete and timely manner.
Below the level of Mueller, he stated, no one at the FBI has agreed to this level of access
thus far. The Bureau is concerned that, with such an arrangement, they would not be able to
redact confidential sources and Rule 6E material. In addition, after negative experiences
with the Joint Inquiry, some at the FBI had resolved to not let staff "roam around" ACS.
The General Counsel explained that the FBI concedes that the Commission should see
these materials, but the current production mechanisms are too slow. He added that the
issue was going to be brought to the Director's attention that week.

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The Executive Director reported that the agency minders have had no visible impact on
candor in interviews thus far.

The meeting adjourned and continued at 9:10 a.m. on September 10 with Commissioner
Cleland joining.

Budget. The Deputy Director reported on the status of the Commission's budget. As of
August 31, the Commission had used approximately a third of its funds, and he stated that
he was reasonably confident that the Commission would remain on track financially.

The Chair asked if there were any funds reserved for implementation. The Deputy Director
responded that $200,000 was reserved for such activities. Commissioner Roemer asked if
there were funds reserved for consulting services from a public relations firm. The Deputy
Director replied that there were not, but that the Commission could do so if it chooses. The
Vice Chair noted that PR services can be rather expensive, and that the Commission should
try to seek pro bono support. The Executive Director added that the Commission had been
approached by a couple of firms offering pro bono services.

Hearings. The Executive Director presented an outline for hearings in 2004. Commissioner
Roemer asked if the Commission would have time to interview the witnesses prior to the
public hearings. The Executive Director responded that it was the staffs intention to do so.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked when the topics of NORAD/FAA and intelligence

failures would be addressed. The Executive Director responded that the topics would be
addressed at the April and February hearings, respectively. Commissioner Ben-Veniste
stated that the 2004 hearing plan divided the various witnesses in such a way that it would
be difficult to tell the story of what happened. The public, he added, expects the
Commission to tell the story. The Executive Director replied that it might be challenging to
tell the story with a large number of witnesses in the style of a trial, but that staff statements
might be a way to set the scene for each hearing. Commissioner Ben-Veniste agreed that
staff statements could be useful, but reiterated that it was important to tell the story with the
witnesses as well.

The Vice Chair observed that the purpose of the public hearings was to get the facts the
Commission needs. On the role of Congressional oversight, he expressed his view that the
best way to get the information is to have private conversations with selected members. He
suggested that they begin by meeting with Senators Roberts and Rockefeller and
Representatives Goss and Harman. Governor Kean expressed his belief that Congressional
oversight was not very interesting as a public topic.

Commissioner Lehman noted that Congressional oversight goes beyond intelligence—in

the cases of immigration and aviation, the role of Congress is more important than that of
the President. Commissioner Fielding noted that the Commission could address the role
Congressional oversight at each of the 2004 hearings instead of scheduling a separate
hearing on the subject.

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Commissioners Roemer and Lehman expressed their support for hearings on "hot topics"
such as DNI, MI-5, and Congressional oversight. The Executive Director noted that the
October hearing could be reshaped to focus more on the DNI issue, and that the December
hearing could focus more on MI-5. The Deputy Director described plans for the November
hearing at Drew University on emergency preparedness.

Commissioner Roemer suggested that the Commission add a fourth hearing on

Congressional oversight in October. The Chair expressed his reluctance over adding
another fall hearing, and recalled the staffs preference to refrain from fall hearings
altogether. Commissioner Gorton stated that although he finds the hearings very useful and
believes every suggested topic has merit, he was concerned that the Commission would not
have enough time to complete its work. The Vice Chair concurred with Commissioner
Gorton, and observed that it was not possible to write the definitive account on each topic.
He suggested that the Commission should come up with one or two recommendations in
each area.

Commissioner Roemer asked if there were any topics in which the families were
particularly interested. The Executive Director stated that their interests were all over the
map; the Commission needs to convince them that it is seriously addressing their concerns.
Commissioner Roemer recounted a call from Stephen Push during which he expressed his
concerns that the Commission wasn't doing more.

Commissioners Lehman, Ben-Veniste, Cleland, and Roemer agreed that the Commission
needs to remain in the public eye. Commissioner Cleland added that the Commission needs
to bring the public along as the investigation progresses. Commissioner Ben-Veniste noted
that the family groups expect the Commission to develop the facts, and that the
Commission needs to have a narrative with individuals telling the story.

Commissioner Roemer restated his proposal to hold a fourth hearing on Congressional

oversight in October. He suggested that he and Commissioner Lehman would take the lead
on it. The Vice Chair amended the proposal, suggesting that Commissioners Roemer and
Lehman talk to Congressional leaders before scheduling the hearing and come back to the
next meeting with a proposal. The Commission agreed to the amended proposal by
consensus.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste proposed to hold an additional day of hearings on December 9

to explore the NORAD/FAA story. The General Counsel suggested holding this hearing in
January to give the staff more time. The Commission agreed to hold an earlier
NORAD/FAA hearing.

Foreign Travel. The Executive Director presented a plan to the Commission for foreign
travel. He stated that he and the Deputy Director would each lead a staff delegation to
various countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe central to the investigation.
Keeping a low profile, they expect to meet with country teams and working level officials.

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The Vice Chair said that it was important for the staff to go and commended them for
taking it on. Commissioner Roemer asked if the Commissioners might have the opportunity
travel as well. The Vice Chair suggested that they make a judgment at a later date.

Team Leader Presentations. Team Leaders begin presentations at 11 a.m., in reverse

numerical order.

Team 8 Leader John Farmer explained the merger of former Teams 8 and 9, and why it was
appropriate and instructive to look at immediate response issues at both the national and the
local levels within the same team. He mentioned that Team 8 would begin interviewing
Air Traffic Controllers shortly, and walk them through the events of the day. One of the
important purposes of the interviews will be to understand their situational awareness. The
controllers tried to understand what was happening as events unfolded—and never quite got
there. The Team will also explore the changing Rules of Engagement for the shoot-down
of commercial aircraft, the EPA's work on air quality immediately after 9/11, and the
response of the financial markets.

One key question for NYC is also situational awareness, especially what was learned after
the 1993 WTC bombing. Team 8 will also take a close look at the tenants of the WTC
buildings. The Commission needs to identify best practices, and will want to look closely
at the work of the New York Safety Council.

A theme running throughout the work of the Team is "bureaucracies struggling to adapt."
The Team will begin interviewing first responders in October.

The Chair asked Team Leader Farmer about obstacles. He responded that his chief
obstacles are time, logistics and the volume of people whom he needs to interview. In
response to questions about document access, Farmer said access was "good." There do
not appear to be certain documents from Cheyenne Mountain, but DOD is checking again.
Also, NORAD does not appear to have done after-action reports. NYC documents are
coming in; we do not know yet whether NYC is fully responsive, and the Port Authority
has exceeded expectations.

The Vice Chair asked when the Team will be in a position to write a narrative; Farmer said
that his team is writing an open source narrative, and then will add to it when information
from documents becomes available.

Farmer stated that it is premature to commit to a hearing in early December, but stated his
belief that his team "has the people to get the job done," and is confident that the job will
get done. The Team can leverage DOD's historical effort, the work of the National
Institute of Standards, and John Farmer's own law students.

Team 7 Leader Sam Brinkley stated that his team has already drafted the first of 3 parts of
its own narrative, on the status of the civil aviation security system prior to 9/11. The first
15 interviews are intended to support this narrative; the interviews will be concluded by

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9/30 and the target date for completion of internal review of the draft is October 3. The
next 15 interviews are scheduled for the purpose of telling the 9/11 story. The Team has
conducted interviews and visits to Portland and Boston's Logan airports; Dulles is
scheduled for 9/29 and Newark soon thereafter.

Team 7 met with the Transportation Security Administration's Red Team, and is working
with TSA on a re-enactment, including pre-screening through the CAPPS system in place at
that time. The team will walk through the screening process using the same type of
weapons the hijackers purchased.

On document requests, Brinkley noted that the team is in good shape. The air carriers have
been responsive, and TSA very responsive. Additional document requests have been sent
out, including to the Air Transport Association. The Chair asked about obstacles: Team
Leader Brinkley said "time," but that the team right now is in good shape, though that could
change.

Team 6 Leader Barbara Grewe stated her team's mission is to understand how intelligence
about terrorism inside the United States is collected, analyzed, and disseminated, including
to state and local authorities. The central question is whether the FBI should have the job
or not, and this question requires a factual answer, not an emotional answer. Team 6 is
looking into this very question through a series of Field Office interviews at the
Washington Field Office, New York City, Miami, Phoenix, and San Diego. Document
requests pertain to five additional field offices. Eighty-five interviews have been conducted
already; 14 more are scheduled in NYC in the following week.

Key observations so far: the FBI is very worried about losing its job. Current policy is to
follow every single anti-terrorism lead, despite the huge drain on manpower, because the
FBI is worried that the one lead they don't follow will cause them to lose their job.

Managers have been candid in interviews: "we are not there yet" in terms of where the FBI
needs to be. They have taken a thoughtful approach, and understand that the Commission
is important in terms of the FBI's future, and therefore are taking the Commission
seriously.

The NY Field Office bears considerable resentment at how it has been treated in the war
against terrorism. They believe their role in the war on terrorism is to indict people, and
they indicted bin Laden in June 1998, before the East Africa bombings and before the
DCFs "declaration of war" on terrorism. They state they were doing prevention before
9/11 and have devoted their lives and mission to counterterrorism.

hi response to a question on minders, Team Leader Grewe notes they were not
obstructionist, and did not get in the way of candor.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked about the role of analysts. Team Leader Grewe noted
that Maureen Baginski's vision of analysis within the FBI is still a long way from being

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achieved. In Field Offices, it seems that they do not yet understand how to do all-source
analysis the way it is done at CIA. So far, FBI analysts are glorified paralegals, supporting
case work. Right now, agents are doing the real analytic work.

hi response to a question about FBI cooperation with local law enforcement, Team Leader
Grewe says cooperation has been very good at the squad and local level, but there have
been complaints about cooperation at the top level of organizations.

She observed further that there has been excellent cooperation with her team from the
Justice Department's Inspector General, and close cooperation with Team 1A on the Saudi
issue. She did not have a firm update on FBI document production simply because her
team has been on the road so long that it has not caught up with the document inflow.

Team 5 Leader Betty Swope noted that the focus of her team's work is on intelligence
watchlist development, visas, and border inspections. The team has just received 4 major
boxes of documents from the State Department, and is now unable to keep up. The team is
still waiting on some CIA documents, and still lacks documents on senior-level policy
decisions pre 9-11.

The team is working on the question of how the 19 hijackers got their documents, and its
policy themes have not changed: watchlists; identity security; redesign of the US visa and
screening process (which began immediately post 9/11), student tracking, and efforts with
Canada and Mexico. The Vice Chair asked about documents. Team Leader Swope stated
that the question is how to get former INS leadership documents. DHS is looking for them,
and has found few.

Team 4 Leader John Roth noted that he has 3 main goals: first, al-Qaeda's funding of the
plot. Are there gaps in the FBI's work, how do we address them, and what are the lessons
for the future; second, the team is looking at 5 domestic charities alleged to be involved in
terrorist financing, and how the USG pursued these 5 organizations before and after 9/11;
and third, where are we now in terms of efforts to disrupt terrorist financing operations, and
where are we going? As a subsidiary of the third issue, the team will be looking into Saudi
cooperation: how has it changed over time? What was the level of cooperation pre 9-11, up
through the Riyadh bombings on May 12, and cooperation now?

On document production, Team Leader Roth states "we have turned the corner." Agencies
have been inefficient in production, not because they are ill-willed, but because they just
lack the capability to produce. Deadlines were set for early July, and documents did not
come through until late August. The Team has enough documents to do its job and has the
people; the challenge will be to keep its focus. The Chair asked about the costs associated
with compliance with the PATRIOT Act; Team Leader Roth said his team will look into it.

Team 3 Leader Mike Hurley stated that the team's goal is to produce the most authoritative
account of the key policy decisions, in detail and in clear prose. The team is creating a
detailed timeline (now 35 pages), and is working on a chronological outline that will be the

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spine of the narrative. The team is still getting feedback from the Front Office and its goal
is to tell the story fairly and fully. The staff is looking at the following division of labor:
(1) the Clinton adminstration; (2) the transition; (3) Bush administration pre- 9/11; the
Bush adminstration post 9/11 and the immediate aftermath; and analysis, conclusions and
policy recommendations. Two eminent outside experts are handling the pre-1998 period.

A recurring theme in the team's work is the belief in the Department of Defense that
counter-terrorism is not fundamentally a military problem: this was true post-Khobar
Towers, and post-Cole bombing. The Team has developed a good sense of Dick Clarke's
2001 policy review, and of Bush options as outlined in NSA Rice's 9/15 briefing book.

The Team has an ambitious schedule seeking to interview a number of very high-level
officials. Also, there are some 80 to 100 potential interviews with individuals of
considerable interest to other teams as well. The Chair asked about obstacles; Team Leader
Hurley replied that the team has a complex, big task, with a large volume of work and a
limited time to do it. So far the team is managing it.

Team 2 Leader Kevin Scheid mentioned a number of questions pending before his team.
Was there an intelligence failure? Who performs the warning function in the Intelligence
Community—many have a piece of it but who is in charge? Do we have "Kentucky Fried
Analysis" in the Community, short-term analysis that falls short on its strategic component?
How is the intelligence system working, not only as a community at home, but also as a
transnational system? What exactly happened when the DCI declared war? The team is
also looking at resources and congressional oversight.

The Vice Chair asked whether the Team was also looking at the question of dissemination;
Team Leader Scheid answered yes. He noted that the team had received approximately
70% of the documents it had requested, and had conducted about 20 interviews so far, with
senior former officials. The purpose of these interviews is to prepare for interviews with
current officials. He would like, similar to Team 6, to focus on some 5 or 6 case studies, in
this case country teams instead of field offices. He would like to investigate Ottawa,
London, Berlin, Riyadh, Islamabad, and Kuala Lumpur, to get a snapshot of how we
interact with foreign liaison. He noted that his challenges are (1) the new Department of
Homeland Security assignment; (2) resources; and (3) coordinating with other teams.

Team 1A Leader Dieter Snell described the primary mission of his team as telling the
definitive story of the conspiracy. His team needs to figure out who was involved, without
worrying about whether that involvement meets the legal test of "conspiracy." The team is
looking at detainee debriefings, from CIA, FBI and a little bit from DOD; the Joint Inquiry
did not have the benefit of any of these debriefings. It is looking to get additional
information about the detainee interviews.

Snell noted that the CIA has been in good in its timely response to document requests. But
he has questions as to whether the disseminated intelligence meets his team's needs, and
they may need to get more information. He also reviewed the FBI issues that had been

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discussed earlier with the Commission, making the case for direct access to the FBI's
automated case files.

Team 1 Leader Doug MacEachin stated his mission as follows: We want to know
everything we can about what we knew—and know—about what happened when. The
team has received a mountain of documents from CIA and DOJ, and documents from
terrorist seizures and arrests. He then commented on his evaluation of some of the
evidence, noting the importance of an earlier defector. He then summarized the emerging
depiction of Al Qa'ida as an organization.

The chief problem Team 1 faces, MacEachin notes, is that its work made analysts who had
committed themselves to earlier positions feel defensive. Commissioner Ben-Veniste
asked what our response has been; MacEachin notes that it is one of persistence, going back
to people and pursuing questions. Over time, this has produced the needed information.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked further about link-ups between narcotics trafficking and
terrorist networks; MacEachin replied. Both he and Team 5 noted that this is a question
that they, as well as State and CIA, are following closely.

The Chair noted that Team Leader reports have been very valuable; he stated that the
Commission should receive such updates monthly. The Chair adjourned the meeting at 1:15
PM.

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