Perez v Provincial Board 113 SCRA 187 G.R. No. L-35474 March 29, 1982 HONORATO C.

PEREZ, petitioner, vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, HON. EDUARDO L. JOSON, in his capacity as Governor of Nueva Ecija, and VALENTIN C. ESCUADRO, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Ecija, respondents. ESCOLIN, J.: This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul Resolution No. 228 of the respondent Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, dated August 21, 1972; to enjoin respondents from enforcing and implementing said Resolution; and to compel respondents to recognize petitioner Honorato Perez as acting provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija. The factual antecedents which gave rise to this petition are not disputed. When former provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija Celestino Juan was appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the Secretary of Justice, in Administrative Order No. 388, dated September 9, 1971, designated first assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of Nueva 1 Ecija as acting provincial fiscal. On May 10, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos nominated petitioner Honorato Perez for appointment to the 2 position of Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija. It appears, however, that the nomination which was submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation was by-passed upon adjournment sine die of Congress on May 18, 3 1972. On the following day, May 19, President Marcos designated petitioner as acting provincial fiscal. Reacting to the said designation, respondent Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 146 addressed to the Commission on Appointments, manifesting its opposition to the confirmation of petitioner's 4 appointment. Respondent Governor Joson also filed a formal protest with the Committee on Justice of the 5 Commission on Appointments, making known his strong and emphatic opposition to the confirmation. After submission of the evidence in support of the opposition, the said Committee resolved not to recommend the 6 confirmation of petitioner's appointment. On June 7, 1972, or during the sixth special session of Congress, petitioner was nominated anew for appointment 7 8 to the office in question; but the same was likewise by-passed upon adjournment of Congress on June 22, 1972. 9 On August 11, 1972, petitioner took his oath of office as acting provincial fiscal pursuant to the designation extended by the President on May 19, 1972; and on August 14, 1972, he formally assumed formally assumed 10 office. On August 21, 1972, respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 228, ordering respondent Provincial 11 Treasurer to stop payment of petitioner's salaries as acting provincial fiscal. The dispute came to a head on August 28, 1972, when respondent treasurer disapproved petitioner's requisition for various office supplies. His salary vouchers were likewise disapproved by the respondent Governor. Hence, the instant petition, petitioner raising the following legal questions: 1) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has the power to pass and enact a resolution not recognizing herein petitioner as acting provincial fiscal despite the fact that the latter has assumed such office pursuant to a designation lawfully extended to him by the President of the Philippines. 2) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has the power to defy and/or pass judgment on the validity of the said designation and assumption. We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, this petition having become moot and academic. We take cognizance of the fact that petitioner Perez filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor of Cabanatuan 12 City in the local elections of January 30, 1980. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture of his right to the controverted office under Section 29 of the Election Code of 1978 which provides: SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy . Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied).

A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive office is rendered moot and academic where his right to said office has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an elective office. ACCORDINGLY, this petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, De Castro and Ericta, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part. BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz : (1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and (2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308 Ruling: YES Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right. Facts: Petitioner, a senator, questioned the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. 308 which provided for the establishment of a national computerized identification reference system. Petitioner contends that the AO usurps legislative power. The government questioned his standing to file the case. Held: As a senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raisin the issue that the issuance of AO 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. (Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141) KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. (G. R. No. 118910) FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract ofLease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision

of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional lawbecause some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. G. R. No. 118910 FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSOs charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982) The issue in this case is whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, is unconstitutional, considering that in the time-honored principle protected and safeguarded by the constitution the judiciary is supposed to be independent from legislative will. Does the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution? HELD: Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.