From League of Nations to United Nations Author(s): Leland M. Goodrich Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 1, No.

1 (Feb., 1947), pp. 3-21 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703515 . Accessed: 09/05/2012 23:09
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FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS

byLELANDM. GOODRICH* I. On April18, 1946,the League Assembly after adjourned takingthe ofthe League of Nationsand necessary the existence stepsto terminate transfer its properties and assetsto the UnitedNations.On August1, thistransfer tookplace at a simpleceremony in Geneva.Thus, an imin international portant and,at onetime, promising experiment cooperationcameformally ofGeneva, was to an end.Outside no important notice was takenofthisfact.Within the counsels ofthe UnitedNations, there and to reas a failure, an apparent to write theold League off readiness a fresh gard the new organization as something unique,representing of peace and security. approachto the worldproblems Quite clearly there was a hesitancy in manyquarters to call attention to theessential continuity of the old League and the new UnitedNationsforfearof arousinglatent hostilities or creatingdoubts which mightseriously and earlysuccessoftheneworganization. jeopardize thebirth at a time This silence regarding the League couldwellbe understood when theestablishment ofa general world organization to taketheplace ofthe discredited League was in doubt,whenit was uncertain whether theUnited StatesSenatewouldagree to American participation, andwhen thefuture course oftheSovietUnionwas in thebalance.Though careful consideration had beengivenwithin the Department ofStateto League in theformulation ofAmerican it was quiteunderexperience proposals, that officers standable of the Department, in the addresses whichthey and reports delivered whichtheymade on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, should havefor themost partomitted all references to theLeague except where it seemed possible to pointto thegreatimprovements that had been incorporated in the new Proposals.Nor was it surprising, in view of the past relation of the UnitedStates to the League and the known antipathy oftheSovietUnionto thatorganization, thatSecretary in hisaddress ofStateStettinius to thelUnited Nations Conference inSan Francisco on April 26, 1945, failed onceto refer to theLeagueofNations,
* LHLAND M. GOODRICH, Professor of Political Science at Brown University and Professor ofInternational Organization at the FletcherSchool of Law and Diplomacy,was Secretary of theCommittee on the PacificSettlement of DisputesofCommission III at the UnitedNations of the Documents Conference at San Francisco.He is co-editor on American Reations Foreign series,co-author, with Edvard Hambro, of Charter of the UnitedNations: Commerdary and Documents, and a former Directorof the World Peace Foundation.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

or thepartofan American President in theestablishment ofit.' In fact, from the addresses and debatesat the San FranciscoConference, the theConference personnel assembled for Secretariat, and theorganization and procedure ofthe Conference, it wouldhave been quitepossible for an outside observer to drawtheconclusion thatthiswas a pioneer effort in worldorganization.2 Sincethe UnitedNationscame intobeingas a functioning organization therehas been a similar disinclination on the partofthoseparticipating in itswork to callattention to itstruerelation to theLeagueofNations. Whilethe circumstances make it necessary forthoseofficially which withthe UnitedNationsto be so circumspect connected in theirreferencesto the LeagueofNationscan be appreciated, thestudent ofinterin factis dutybound, is free, national organization to take a moreindeand objective If viewofthe relations ofthetwo organizations. pendent hisstudies lead himto theconclusion thattheUnitedNationsis in large ofa continuous measure the result evolutionary development extending of beingthe product wellintothe past,iinstead ofnewideas conceived oftherecent under notbe theoccasion pressure war,thatshould fordethe past that those social institutions spair,as we knowfrom which in achieving havebeenmostsuccessful their purposes are thosewhich are ofgradual ingeneral theproduct evolutionary development, thosewhich habits ofthought butwhich to established conform nevertheless havethe to newconditions foradaptation and newneeds. inner capacity and application of Whileprogress largely depends uponthediscovery it has alwaysbeenconsidered thetestofpracnewideasand techniques, to be able to buildon the past,adapting whathas tical statesmanship in pastexperience to theneedsand requirements to be useful beenproven ofthe American Thus the framners world. ofthe changing Constitution, to drawheavily while muchthatwas new,did nothesitate theycreated and principles werea partoftheir common which uponthe institutions and in England.At thetimeofthe in America ofexperience background of the League of Nations,the view was commonly establishment held, than today in relation to the United withmorejustification certainly we thatsomething Nations, reallyuniquewas beingcreated. However, was primarily a that even the have cometo recognize League system withsome innovations ideas and practices, of pre-war systematization Sir Alfred Zimmern has expressed added in the lightof warexperience. thisfactverywellin thesewords: to be, noris it, . . . The League of Nationswas neverintended it acceptstheworld On thecontrary, a revolutionary organization.
I United Nations Conference on International Organization, Document 15, P/3, April27, 1945. 2 For an authoritativedescription of the

see GraysonKirk and Lawrence Conference, H. Chamberlain,"The Organizationof the in Political SciSan Francisco Conference," LX (1945), p. 321. enceQuarterly,

FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS

ofstates as it finds it and merely seeks to providea moresatisfactory means forcarrying on some of the businesswhichthesestates transact between one another. It is not even revolutionary in the more limitedsense of revolutionizing the methodsfor carrying on interstate busihess. It does not supersede the older methods. It merely supplementsthem.3 We have come to recognizethe various strandsof experience-the European Concert of Powers, the practiceof arbitrationin the settlement of disputes, internationaladministrativecooperation,to mention only a few-which enteredinto the fabricof the League. Should we be surprised to findthat what was true of the League of N, ations is even more true of the United Nations? Those who have thusfarattempteda comparison ofthe United Nations with the League of Nations have, generallyspeaking, been concerned with pointingout the differences.4 Furthermore, comparisonhas been made of the textual provisionsof the Covenant and the provisionsof the Charter,not taking into account actual practice under the Covenant. Such a basis of comparisonnaturallyleads to an exaggeratedidea of the extentof the gap which separates the two systems.If in similarfashion the Constitutionof the United States as it existed on paper at the time it became effective in 1789 were comparedwiththe Constitutionas it is applied today, the conclusionundoubtedlywould be that a revolution had occurredin the intervening period.Obviously,any usefulcomparison ofthe League and the UnitedNations mustbe based on the League system as it developedunderthe Covenant. If that is done, it becomes clear that the gap separatingthe League of Nations and the United Nations is not large, that many provisionsof the United Nations system have been taken directly from the Covenant,thoughusually with changesof names and rearrangements of words,that otherprovisionsare little more than codifications, so to speak, of League practice as it developed under the Covenant,and that stillotherprovisions represent the logicaldevelopment of ideas whichwerein processof evolutionwhen the League was actively Of course there are many exceptions,some of them imporfunctioning. tant. But the point upon which attention needs to be focused for the serious student of internationalaffairsis that the United Nations does not represent a break withthe past, but ratherthe continuedapplication of old ideas and methods with some changes deemed necessary in the lightof past experience.If people would only recognizethis simpletruth, theymightbe moreintelligent in theirevaluation of past efforts and more tolerantin theirappraisal of presentefforts.
B AlfredZimmern,The League of Nations and theRule ofLaw, London, 1936,p. 4. 4 See, for example,Clyde Eagleton," Covenant ofthe League ofNations and Charterof

the United Nations: Points of Difference," in Department of State, Bulletin,XIII, p. 263.

ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL

IL Space does not permit a detailed analysiswitha viewto establishing of the the exact extent to whichthe UnitedNationsis a continuation themore imporLeaguesystem. Allthatis attempted hereis to consider particularly thosewithretantfeatures of the UnitedNationssystem, made, with a viewto despectto which claims to uniqueness have been can be said to exist. termining to whatextent in general thiscontinuity tothe Relation PeaceSettlement thathasbeenmadeinfavor Onepoint oftheUnited Nations as a special claimto uniqueness is thatitsCharter instrument, unis an independent connected with ofbeing madefor settling thetreaties which arein process it is the politicaland economic issuesof WorldWar IL'* In contrast, wasmade argued thattheLeague,by virtue ofthefactthatitsCovenant in each of the peace at the Paris Peace Conference, and incorporated in the issuesof the peace treaties, was from the beginning so involved that it was neverable to overcome the initialhandicapof settlement It is true,of course, that beinga League to enforce the peace treaties. of the peace treaties, underthe Covenantand underotherprovisions in connection the League had placed upon it certainresponsibilities was not, This connection with thecarrying out ofthepeace settlement.6 as an unmixed evil. One disin the earlyyearsofthe League,regarded of the function tinguished observer, whilerecognizing that a principal on the basis of concluded League was "to executethe peace treaties," on balance serveda the first yearsof experience that this connection thatthe criticism thatlater world useful purpose.7 It might be suggested to thepeace ofitsrelation cameto be madeoftheLeagueon theground and would themselves treaties was primarily an attackuponthetreaties which organization proved have beendirected againstany international ofrevising thispoint, however, incapable them. Without further arguing ofthe can be raisedas to howdifferent willbe therelation the question War World II? UnitedNationsto thepeace settlement following is a separateinstrument and was made at a conWhilethe Charter Nations willinevitably calledspecially for theUnited ference thepurpose, once and directly becomeintimately associatedwiththe peace treaties Nations theoriginal oftheUnited aremade.For onething they Members werethosestatesthatwereat warwithone or moreofthe Axispowers theinterpreat thetimeofthe San Francisco Furthermore, Conference.
I See, forexample,Clyde Eagleton,"Covenantofthe League of Nationsand Charterof in the United Nations: PointsofDifference," XIII, p. 264. Departmentof State, Bulletin, 6 See, for example, the provision of the Treaty of Versaillesrelatingto the administrationof the Saar Basin and the protection

of Danzig. Treatyof Peace with Germany, Part III, sectionIV, Annex,chapterII, and sectionXI. 7 W. E. Rappard, International Relation. ViewedfromGeneva,New Haven, 1925, p.

14-16.

FROM LEAGUEOF NATIONSTO UNITED NATIONS

makesit clear 4 oftheCharter ofArticle to date oftheprovisions tation the waris an important stateduring ofa non-member thatthe conduct to memberthat stateshall be admitted whether in determining factor theUnitedNationsas a peace organi107dissociates ship.WhileArticle to enemystates,once the peace actiontaken in relation zationfrom economic have beenmadetheywillbecomepartoftheexisting treaties the UnitedNationswillseekto on thebasis ofwhich order and political to see how an international It is difficult peace and security. maintain such as the United peace and security, formaintaining organization in connection Nationsis, can do so on any otherbasis. Furthermore, see theUnitedNations we already ofthepeacetreaties, themaking with or of administration functions important beingcalledupon to exercise Thus theLeaguewas askedto perform. to thosewhich similar guarantee forTriesteparallels ofthe specialregime the UnitedNationsguarantee of Danzig in its basic conception, verycloselythe League guarantee with"terriand the proposed roleofthe UnitedNationsin connection withthe SecondWorld statesin connection enemy from detached tories to "colonies to thatofthe Leaguein relation War" 8 is almostidentical War I] of the late war [World and territories whichas a consequence of the States whichformerly have ceasedto be underthe sovereignty 9 them." governed and powers therespective we shouldconsider In thissameconnection ofthe to the revision in regard ofthe two organizations responsibilities madeofthe League of Nacriticism One serious twopeace settlements. ofthose for therevision as an instrumentality tionswasitsineffectiveness as unfair had cometo be recognized which ofthepeacetreaties provisions was emand unjust.Underthe Covenantof the League the Assembly of treatieswhichhad become "inappoweredto advise the revision continuwhose conditions " andtheconsideration ofinternational plicable remained a dead Thisprovision affect ationmight thepeaceoftheworld.'0 ofdecision lackofpower from due to theAssembly's thebeginning, letter is theUnitedNaeffective How muchmore and meansofenforcement." the 14 of theCharter Article to to in this According tions respect? likely be for the measures adjustment peaceful General mayrecommend Assembly to impair whichis likely friendly of origin, of any situation, regardless made ofthe mention is no Whilethere specific amongnations. relations this authorized under is clearly Assembly oftreaties, theGeneral revision in its treaty having origin unsatisfactory Article to discuss any situation Thereis, however, thereon.'2 and to makerecommendations provisions
New York, 1937, p. 106-11. 12 See discussion in Leland M. Goodrich of the United and Edvard Hambro, Charter 12, paragraph1. Boston and Documents, 10Ibid., Article19. Nations:Commentary 11Frederick S. Dunn, Peaceful Change, 1946, p. 104-06.
8

9 Cotenant oftheLeague ofNations,Article

of the UnitedNations,Article77. Charter

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

no obligation on the part of Members to accept any recommendation that may be made. Thus the powerconferred underthis Articledoes not go substantiallybeyond that of the Assembly under Article 19 of the that the United Covenant and thereis the same chance, ifnot likelihood, as an instrument Nations will be ineffective fortreatyrevision.Furthermore, whilethe SecurityCouncil is given broad powersto take necessary action to maintain peace and security,the powers which the Council has to bind Members are limited to those falling within the general action and do not extendto the powerto impose categoryof enforcement in a particularsituationany upon partiesto a disputeor states interested particulartermsof settlement or adjustment.That was made clear in the discussionsat San Francisco.'3

Basic Character ofTwoOrganizations

The statementhas been made that the United Nations is "potentially and actually much stronger" than the League of Nations.'4 That statementmightlend itselfto some misunderstanding, in view of particularly the fact that it is only one of many statementsthat have been made is a more powerfulorsuggestingthat the United Nations inherently ganization and therefore more likelyto achieve its purpose by virtue of the specific provisionsof its Charterthan was the League of Nations. We can start,I think,withthefundamental thatthe United proposition Nations, as was the League of Nations, is primarily a cooperativeenterpriseand fallsgenerally within the categoryof leagues and confederations instead of withinthat of federalunions. Except in one situation,neither the United Nations nor its principalpolitical organs have the authority to take decisions binding on Members without their express consent. Withoutthis power,it is impossibleto regardthe organs of the United a government Nations as constituting in the sense of the federalgovernmentofthe United States. The essentialcharacterof the United Nations is specifically affirmed in the firstof the principleslaid down in Article 2 of the Charterwhereit is stated that "the organizationis based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members."This principlewas not expresslystated in the Covenant of the League of Nations,but was, nevertheless, implicitin its provisions. Since both the United Nations and the League of Nations are based primarilyupon the principleof voluntary cooperation,the point that needs special consideration is whether, moreor less as an exceptionto the general principle, the Charter contains provisionswhich give to the organs ofthe UnitedNations greater than was vested in the correauthority
13 See Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit., p. 152-53, 155-59. 14Louis Dolivet, The United Nations: A

Handbook on the New World Organization, New York, 1946, p. 16.

FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS

a greatdeal ofemphasis spondingorgansofthe League. In thisconnection has been placed upon the provisionsof the Charterregulatingvoting in the General Assemblyand the SecurityCouncil. It is, of course,true that underArticle18 of the Charterdecisionsof the General Assemblycan be majorityof the memberspresentand voting,intaken by a two-thirds for stead of by unanimousvote of those present,as was the requirement the League Assembly.It must be bornein mind,however,that on quesand that contions of policythe General Assemblycan only recommend, sequently any decision taken is a decision to make a recommendation. Also, it is quite unfairto compare these provisionswithouttaking into account the practice of the League Assembly under the Covenant. In so several importantrespectsthe rule of the Covenant was interpreted ofthe Charcloseto theprovisions as to bringactual League practicefairly For one thing,it was providedin the rules of the Assemblythat a ter.15 with state whichabstained fromvotingwas not to be countedas present, the result that abstentionwas a means by which certain of the consehowquences of the unanimityrule could be avoided. More important, session of the League ever,was the rule whichwas establishedin the first Assembly,that a resolutionexpressinga wish, technicallyknown as a "voeu," might be adopted by a majorityvote. This had the effectof making possible a whole range of Assemblydecisions by majorityvote in any importantrespectfromdecisionswhichmay whichdid not differ be taken by the General Assemblyby majorityor two-thirdsvotes.18 it should be noted that the League Assemblyearly came Furthermore, an amendmentto the to the conclusionthat the decision to recommend Covenant underArticle26 mightbe taken by a majorityvote,17withthe result that the power of the Assemblyto initiateamendmentsactually could be exercised more easily than under the Charter of the United Nations. Thus it would seem erroneousto view the provisionsof the Charter with respect to the power of the General Assembly to make different approach fromor any fundamentally decisionsas representing any great advance over the comparable provisionsof the Covenant of in practice. the League of Nations as interpreted When we turnour attentionto the SecurityCouncil we findadmittedly that an importantchange has been made. Under the League Covenant the Council was governed by the unanimityrule except in procedural whenthe Counand this proveda serioushandicap, particularly matters, 11 of Covenant. It was Article the under possible for a cil was acting or of the peace, accused disturbing of the threatening Council, member this Article the under effective action interposition by to prevent any
15See Margaret E. Burton, The Assembly nationalOrganization, Baltimore,1940,p. 24. 17 League of Nations,Records oftheSecond of the League of Nations, Chicago, 1941, p. Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 733-35. See 175-205. 16 See C. A. Riches,Majority Rule in Inter- also, Burton,op. cit.,p. 187.

10

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

in Manchuria in thecase ofJapanese aggression ofits veto,as happened ofItalianaggression in Ethiopiain 1935.Under in 1931and the threat Members of to be takenbinding the Charter it is possible fora decision this theirexpressconsent.Furthermore, the United Nations without acts uponthe partof the Members of the decision mayrequire specific as a simple recommendation as UnitedNationsand is notto be regarded takenby the League CouncilunderArticles was the case withdecisions 10 and 16. to be keptin mindbefore there are important we points Nevertheless, place, that a revolutionary step has been taken. In the first conclude of a recomCouncilcan onlyhave the effect a decision by the Security of mendation whenthe Security Councilis engaged in the performance itsfunctions under VI, i.e. whenit is seeking to achievethepaChapter of a disputeor situation. Furthermore, cific settlement or adjustment of the Security to enforcement Councilwithrespect whilethe decision VII is binding upon Members of the UnitedNaactionunderChapter on the SecurityCouncil,such tions,including those not represented ofall thepermanent cannotbe takenwithout the concurrence decisions oftheSecurity in a situation comparamembers Council.Consequently, in 1931 ble to that ofJapanese againstChinain Manchuria aggression ofItalianaggression the againstEthiopiain 1935,where and thethreat failed on accountoftheunanimity principle, LeagueCouncil admittedly Council would be prevented fromtakingany decision. the Security the Security whichthe League Underthe Charter Councilhas power, but the Councildid not have,to take actionagainstthe smallpowers, of the past wouldseem to showthat it is not the smaller experience the peace. When powers, actingalone,who are mostlikelyto disturb withthreats powers actingalonethe League Council dealing by smaller had thebackit failed was reasonably onlywhensmallpowers effective; In spiteofimportant provichanges in thetechnical ingofgreat powers. one is forced to the conclusion that so faras the sionsof the Charter, ofpower actualpossession is concerned, the UnitedNationshas not adsituatheLeagueofNations andthatincomparable vancedmuch beyond tionsmuch under thesameresult is to be anticipated. In thelastanalysis success orfailure is dependent either ofthemore upontheability system to cooperate forcommon members effectively ends. powerful Finally,the provisions of the Charterwith regardto amendments oftheCoveand withdrawal in all essential follow respects theprovisions and nant and the practices thereunder. Underboth Charter developed Covenantno amendment can become recommended by the Assembly untilratified effective The Covenantwas a little by the greatpowers. ratification more restrictive thantheCharter by in onerespect, requiring ofthe Leaguewhoserepresentatives all members the Council, composed

FROM LEAGUEOF NATIONSTO UNITED NATIONS

11

member members, thereby giving anyCouncil plusa majority ofall other the "veto" to whilelimiting a "veto." On the other hand,the Charter, approvalby two-thirds of the Members permanent members, requires are not likely the charter provisions ofthe UnitedNations.In practice, results. to have substantially different to withdrawal, the League and the UnitedNaLikewise, withrespect in any important respect. The Covenantof tionssystems do not differ withdrawal under certainconditions the League expressly permitted says nothenforced in practice.'8 The Charter which werenot,however, on the basis of a declaration ing aboutwithdrawal but it is understood ofwithdrawal can be exercised.'9 adoptedat San Francisco thattheright to it,it was and conforming No doubtinfluenced by theLeaguepractice ofthis decided be attached to theexercise thatno legalconditions should a shouldbe made to force a stateto remain right and thatno attempt to continue it was madeclearthata moral obligation Member, although be exeras a Member and thattheright ofwithdrawal shouldonly exists cisedforverygoodreasons. ofMembers Basic Obligations 2 oftheCharter of are certain in Article basic obligations Enumerated the obligation to settle Members of the UnitedNations.These include thatinternational peaceand insucha manner disputes bypeaceful means to refrain from the threat or the obligation security arenotendangered, orpolitical independence integrity the use offorce against theterritorial ofanystate,and theobligation to theUnitedNations to giveassistance in anyaction Similar commitments oftheCharter. takenunder theterms different languageand withsomewhat different phrasedin somewhat ofthe Covenant.20 From wereto be found in variousArticles meanings ofviewofform theCharter a somewhat different doesrepresent thepoint aregrouped inthatthesebasiccommitments as Princitogether approach oftheCharter in certain The phraseology plesbinding uponall Members. Forinstance, theprovision improvement. respects undoubtedly represents "from the of Article are to refrain 2, paragraph 4, by whichMembers oruseofforce orpolitical threat independtheterritorial integrity against an advanceoverthe corresponding enceofany state" represents provito takerefuge which madeit possible formembers sionsoftheCovenant sensewas no thatan undeclared warin the material in the technicality did not constitute a "re force warand thattherefore suchuse ofarmed the basic sortto war." On the otherhand,in one important respect,
18 Article 1, paragraph2. 19For text,see UNCIO, Verbatim Minutes of theNinthPlenarySession, June 25, 1945, Document 1210, P/20, p. 5-6; for text and comment, see Goodrichand Hambro,op. cit.,

p. 86-89. 20 Articles10; 12, paragraph 1; 13, paragraphs1 and 4; 15, paragraphs1 and 6; 16, paragraphs1 and 3; and 17.

12

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

obligationsof the Members of the United Nations may prove to be less action, the obligationof satisfactory since, in the matterof enforcement the Members of the United Nations is to accept and carryout decisions of the Security Council and to give assistance to the United Nations in any actiontaken underthe Charter,whileunderArticle16 ofthe Covenant, the obligationof membersextendedto the taking of specificmeasures againstany state resorting to war in violationofits obligationsunder the Covenant. While thisobligationwas weakenedby resolutions adopted proved capable of providingthe by the Assemblyin 1921, it nevertheless legal basis forimportant action against Italy in 1935. III. The elementof continuity in the progressionfromLeague of Nations to United Nations is perhaps most obvious when we examine the structure of the two organizations.The General Assemblyis the League Asof its composition, sembly,fromthe point of view of the basic principles powers and procedures.We have already seen froman examinationof between the League provotingproceduresthat the practical difference visions and theiractual application and the Charterprovisionshas been greatlyexaggerated. The powers of the General Assembly,as compared it is withthose of the League Assembly,have been somewhatrestricted, true. The General Assembly's powers of discussionunder Article 10 of the Charterand succeedingarticlesare fullyas broad and comprehensive as the League Assembly's powers under Article 3, paragraph 3 of the has the Covenant. Only in respect to the making of recommendations power of the General Assemblybeen limited,and this,it can be argued, is in line withthe practicewhichdevelopedunderthe Covenant according to which the Council, and not the Assembly,ordinarily dealt with disputes and situationswhich endangeredpeace and good understanding.2' The significant is that under the Chartera party to a dispute difference cannot by its act alone transferthe dispute fromthe Council to the Assembly, as was possibleunderArticle15, paragraph9, ofthe Covenant. is the old The SecurityCouncil, from the point of view of composition, League Council. One importantchange, however,has been introduced and into the Charter. The League Council had general responsibilities whereas the Security Council is a highly specialized organ. functions, Instead of having one council with broad powers as did the League, the United Nations has three,among whichthe various functions and powers of the League Council are divided. To a certainextent this new set-up was anticipated in League practice. At the time when the League's prestige as a peace and security organizationwas low, the Assembly created a special committeeknown as the Bruce Committeeto inquire
21

See Burton,op. cit.,p. 284-374.

FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS

13

and reporton the possibilitiesof givingthe economicand social workof the estabthe League greaterautonomy.This Committeerecommended of a new organ to be knownas the Central CommitteeforEcolishment and the direction nomicand Social Questionsto whichwould be entrusted This supervisionof the work of the League committeesin this field.22 the foreproposed Committee,while it never was set up, was in effect runnerof the presentEconomic and Social Council. So far as the TrusteeshipCouncil is concerned,there is a somewhat similar backgroundof development.While the Council was responsible ofmandates, ofthe-administration underthe Covenant forthe supervision in actual practicethe Council came to relyveryheavilyon the Mandates Commissionwhich,under the Charter,has come to be elevated to the rank of a principalorgan,responsiblenot to the Council but to the Genof the TrusteeshipCouncil to the eral Assembly.This veryresponsibility General Assemblywas to some extent anticipated in the practice of the .theLeague Assemblyearly League. Over the protestof some members, assertedand exercisedthe rightto discussand expressits opinionon mandates questions. While the Council was technicallyresponsiblefor the of the provisionsof the Covenant, therecan be little doubt enforcement both on Council action but what the Assemblyexerciseda real influence and upon the mandatorypowers.23 The Secretariatof the United Nations is clearlya continuationof the not onlyin name, but also largelyin substance.While League Secretariat, the Charterprovisionswould permitits organizationon somewhatdifferforthe principalorgans of the United Naent lines, with separate staffs tions,it seems clear that the conceptionof a unifiedSecretariathas preof the as the administrator vailed.24"The role of the Secretary-General United Nations derives fromthat of his counterpartin the League of Nations," 25 but has clearlyassumed greaterimportanceand scope under the provisionsof the Charter. Due to political circumstancesand the of the the Secretary-General holder of the office, personalityof the first League never came to exercisea strongguidinghand in the directionof the League's work. The Charter of the United Nations, however,both greaterpower expresslyand by implication,gives the Secretary-General leadershipfromhim. More parand seems to expect more constructive will be called upon to play ticularly, the role whichthe Secretary-General in connection ofthe workofthe specializedagencies withthe coordination will requirethe exerciseof initiativeand strongleadership.26
22 League of Nations, MonthlySummary, August 1939,Special Supplement. 23 See Quincy Wright, Mandates underthe League of Nations,Chicago, 1930,p. 133-35. 24 See Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, 23 De-

cember1945, p. 84-94; Walter H. C. Laves and Donald Stone, "The United Nations October Policy Reports, Secretariat,"Foreign 15, 1946. 25 Laves and Stone,op. cit.,p. 183, 26 Ibid., p. 186 et seq.

14

ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL

Withrespect to the Court,it is clearly recognized that,whileit was a newname, it willbe essentially the decided to setup a newCourt under Justice.27 The factthat same as the Permanent Courtof International organs oftheUnited Nations thisCourt is regarded as oneoftheprincipal it from thePermanent Court.For purdoesnotin substance distinguish it seemedadvisableto maintain the fiction thatthe posesofexpediency was independent oftheLeague Permanent CourtofInternational Justice but a careful of the actual organization and work system, examination oftheCourt as fully within willleaveno doubtthattheCourtfunctioned the framework Courtof Justice of the League as willthe International within theframework oftheUnitedNations. IV. internaLiketheLeagueofNations, theUnitedNationsis a "general " in the sensethat its functions tional organization and actionscover thewholerangeofmatters concern. Both thePreamble ofinternational andthestatement in Article I oftheCharter make ofPurposes contained this clear.In factthis generality is moreexof purposeand function in the though plicitly statedin theCharter thanit was in the Covenant, recognized. The Charter ofthe practice oftheLeagueit cameto be fully and substantive provisions, UnitedNations,in its general arrangement into threecategories: dividesthe majoractivities of the Organization peace and security, by the pacific (1) the maintenance of international ofenforcement measures; (2) the settlement of disputes and the taking and (3) the and socialcooperation; promotion ofinternational economic ofnon-self-governing territories. protection oftheinterests ofthepeoples
The Pacific Settlement of Disputes

of disputes,28 while The Chartersystemfor the pacificsettlement fromthat of the League in many details of substanceand differing twobasic principles: (1) thatparties phraseology, follows it in accepting a settlement a to seek to dispute areinthefirst instance peaceful bymeans of international the oftheir ownchoice;and (2) thatthepolitical organs a threat has become organization are to intervene onlywhenthedispute or conciliatory to thepeace,and thenonlyin a mediatory capacity. The obligation of the UnitedNationsaccept under whichMembers international Article their disputes bypeaceful 2, paragraph 3 is to " settle insucha manner thatinternational andjustice, means peaceand security, Article Under are notendangered." 34, paragraph 1, the partiesto any
27 UNCIO, Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/1, Document 913, IV/1/74 (1). See also Manley 0. Hudson, "The Year of the World Court," Twenty-Fourth in AmericanJournal of Internatinal Lawf

LX (1946), p. 1-52. 28 For detailed analysis, see Leland M. of Disputes," Goodrich,"Pacific Settlement XXXIX PoliticalScienceReview, in American (1945), p. 956-970.

FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS

15

dispute "the continuanceof whichis likelyto endangerthe maintenance of international of all seek a solution" by peace and security, shall, first peacefulmeans of theirown choice. Furthermore, by the termsof Article 36 ofthe Statute ofthe Court,Membersmay by declarationaccept under of the Court. Declarations certainconditionsthe compulsory jurisdiction made by Membersof the United Nations acceptingthe compulsory jurisdictionof the PermanentCourt of InternationalJusticeand still in force are declared to be acceptances under this Article. The legal obligationswhichMembers of the United Nations have thus assumed are substantially the same as the obligationsof League members underthe Covenant and supplementary agreements. The Covenant itself did not place upon membersof the League the obligation to settle all theirdisputesby peacefulmeans. However, forty-six states accepted the compulsory jurisdictionof the PermanentCourt by makingdeclarations underArticle36 of the Statute.29 By Article2 of the General Pact forthe Renunciation of War of 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact), the signatories agreed that "the settlementor solution of all disputes or conflictsof whatevernature or of whateveroriginthey may be . . shall never be sought except by pacificmeans." of The powersof the United Nations organsforthe pacificsettlement disputesare substantially the same as those of the principalorgansof the League. Under the Charter, as under the Covenant, the functionsof political organs in this connection are limited to discussion, inquiry, mediationand conciliation.It is clear fromthe wordsof the Charterand fromthe discussionsat San Francisco, that the SecurityCouncil has no power of finaldecision in connectionwith its functionsof pacificsettlement.30 The Charter does, however, seek to differentiate between the functions and powers of the General Assemblyand the SecurityCouncil it makes the in a way that the Covenant did not do. More specifically SecurityCouncil primarily responsibleforthe maintenanceof peace and security, does not permita party to a dispute to have the mattertransferred at its request to the General Assembly,and limitsthe powerof the General Assemblyin principleto that of discussion.This constitutesan importantdeparturefromthe textual provisionsof the League Covenant whichgave the Council and Assemblythe same generalcompetenceand allowed a party,actingunderArticle15, paragraph9, to have a expressly howat its request to the Assembly.It is significant, dispute transferred ever,that out ofsome 66 disputesthat came beforethe League, onlythree wereactually broughtbeforethe Assemblyunderthisprovision.It would thus appear, and this is the conclusionof a carefulstudentof the Assem29 See Manley 0. Hudson, "The TwentyFourth Year of the World Court," op. cit., p. 33.

30 See UNCIO, Report of the Rapporteur of Committee III/2, Document 1027 III/2/31(1), p. 4.

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

thatactualpractice under theCovenant in a differentiation resulted bly,31 offunction. Thisthe Charter seeksto makeobligatory. In certain other respects the Charter system departs from the League pattern, but the importance of these differences can be greatly exagin voting gerated. The elimination oftherequirement ofunanimity theoftheSecurity oretically increases thepower Council, as compared with the League Council,in dealingwithdisputesand situations, but considering Councilcan only recommend, and that in that the Security Leaguepractice, agreement ofthegreat in the powers was likely to result necessary agreement amongall members of the Council,the practical is notlikely importance ofthisdifference to be great. under Furthermore, the Charterprovision is made forthe consideration by the Security Council and General ofsituations Assembly as well as disputes, but this does notmeanany increase in the powers ofthe United Nationsorgans, particularly the Security Council,as compared withthoseof the corresponding organs ofthe League.In fact,it can be arguedthattheprovisionsof the Chartersuffer somewhat in flexibility and capacityfor growth, as compared with thecorresponding provisions oftheCovenant, because of the greater detail and consequent of certainof its rigidity A comparison terms. ofexperience under theCharter to dateinthepeacefulsettlement or adjustment ofdisputes and situations withthatofthe Leaguegives little basisfor a confident conclusion thattheCharter system is inherently better than,or forthatmatter, significantly different from, thatwhich operated under theterms ofthe Covenant.32
Enforcement Action

It is in respect to enforcement thattheprovisions oftheCharter action oftheCovenant,33 seem marked contrast totheprovisions to offer themost with theCharter thewayin but hereagainwhenwe compare provisions which the Covenant provisions wereactuallyappliedthe differences do not appear so great.The League system, as originally was conceived, had resorted based on theprinciple thatoncea member to warin violawereimmeditionofits obligations under theCovenant, other members atelyobligated to applyeconomic and financial sanctions ofwidescope to recommend againstthe offending state.The Councilwas empowered
31 See MargaretE. Burton,TheAssembly of theLeague ofNations,p. 284 et seq. 32 On the operationof the League system, see WilliamE. Rappard, TheQuestforPeace, Cambridge,1940,p. 134-207; Burton,op. cit., p. 284-374; and T. P. Conwell-Evans, The League Councilin Action,London, 1929. On the workof the SecurityCouncil to date, see of the Clyde Eagleton, "The Jurisdiction SecurityCounciloverDisputes," in American

Journal of InternationalLaw, XI (July, 1946), p. 513-33; and UnitedNations,Report oftheSecurity CounciltotheGeneral A8emmbly, A/93,October3, 1946. 38 For analysis of the United Nations sysof peace and secutem forthe enforcement of rity, see GraysonKirk,"The Enforcement Security,"in Yale Law Journal,LV (August 1946), p. 1081-1196.

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notreofthe Leagueweretechnically which members measures military theprovioffact, in the one case where to carry out.As a matter quired of likea realtest,theapplication anything 16 weregiven sionsofArticle oftheresoluunderthe influence againstItaly in 1936,acting sanctions of the League in 1921,34 the members tionsadoptedby the Assembly individual oftheir acts,and for thecoordination a mechanism established No recommeasures. and financial economic to applyselected proceeded of military was made by the Councilfor the application mendation what fordeciding responsible Council makestheSecurity The Charter thepeace. Obligations are to be used to maintain measures enforcement have ofthe UnitedNationsonlywhensuchdecisions ariseforMembers in oftheprinciple recognized development beentaken.This is a further against and in theapplication ofsanctions resolutions the 1921Assembly the taking agencyis neededto insure coordinating Italy,thata central and the miniwiththe maximum ofeffectiveness measures ofnecessary Howand danger members. to the participating mumof inconvenience thandidtheCovenant oftheCharter further go much theprovisions ever, and advancecommitments measures forobligatory military in providing Council.Even at the disposalof the Security forces to place specific of the League,notablyFrance,wereinsistent members certain though little was donein League commitments, military upontheneedofspecific of1924was onenotable to meetthisneed.The GenevaProtocol practice whichin certainrespects to meet this demand,by methods attempt ofthe butit nevercameintoforce. The framers theCharter, anticipated thisas a defect intheLeaguesystem, sought nodoubt recognizing Charter, in somedetailformilitary agreethe deficiency by providing to remedy oftheUnited and theSecurity Council, Nations members between ments to assisttheSecurity in drawcommittee staff Council and fora military measures. military ingup advancedplansand in applying the Charter willbe more be queried whether system It can,however, inviewoftherequirement ofunanimity thantheLeaguesystem, effective of the Security its members Council.If we imagine of the permanent and Sino-Japanese suchas theItalian-Ethiopian in situations application to see howthe UnitedNationswouldachieveany it is difficult affairs, results than did the League. Like the League,but forsomewhat better in so faras its enforcethe UnitedNations, different technical reasons, of forthe enforcement is an organization are concerned, mentactivities oftheSecurity members thesmaller states.Ifthepermanent peaceamong to takeeffective actionunder it willbe possible arein agreement, Council
84 League of Nations,Records oftheSecond PlenaryMeetings,p. 803. Assembly, 35For summary of this experience, see

measures.35

International Sanctions(A Reportby a Group of Membersof the Royal Instituteof International Affairs), London, 1938, p. 204-213.

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the Charter.It is not likelythat such agreementwill be reached to take measuresagainst one of these greatpowersor against a prot6geof such a enforcement action by great power. Consequentlythe sphereof effective in advance, even moreperhapsthan was the United Nations is restricted that of the League. Within the area of possible operation, the actual of the United Nations system will depend upon political effectiveness conditions which,iftheyhad existed,would have also assured the success of the League of Nations.3"

Administration Territories ofNon-Self-Governing

Here we encounternew names and phraseologyin the United Nations Charter,but the substance is very much the substance of the League For one mandates system. There are, of course, importantdifferences. Territhing,Chapter XI, "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing an addition.The idea, however,is not new, as it has tories,"is definitely in recent years, and been accepted by various colonial administrations has found expressionboth in officialstatements and in authoritative writingson the subject.37However, it is new to have embodied in an instrument a definite statementof principlesbindingupon international of non-self-governing all states engaged in the administration territories and to place upon such states the additional obligationto make reports to an international authority. So far as the trusteeshipsystem, strictlyspeaking, is concerned,it The threecategories followsin generalthe lines ofthe mandatessystem.38 allowed of A, B, and C mandates do not appear, but due to the freedom in the drafting of trusteeship there can be the same, if not agreements, greater,variety of provisions. Like the League mandates system,the institutionof the trusteeshipsystem is not made obligatoryfor any it is simplydeclaredapplicable to certainterritories particularterritories; to the extentthat they are placed under it by agreement.Followingthe accordagreements, practiceunderthe mandates system,the trusteeship ing to the Charter,are to be made by the states "directly concerned." They must in additionhave the approval ofthe General Assemblyor the SecurityCouncil, dependingupon whetheror not they apply to strategic a to draftand put into effect areas, but neitherorgan has any authority withoutthe specificapproval at trusteeship agreementforany territory least of the state in actual possessionof it. and the linesof responsibility have been The machinery forsupervision changed in that fortrusteeshipareas other than strategicareas the adSee Kirk,op. cit.;p. 1082. 37See, for example, Baron Lugard, The Dual Mandatein BritishTropicalAfrica, 2nd ed., London, 1923. 38 For detailed analysis of the United
"

Nations trusteeshipsystem, see Ralph J. Bunche, "Trusteeshipand Non-Self-Governin the Charterof the United ing Territories the UnitedNation8, Nations," in Organizing Departmentof State Publication2573.

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ministrative authorities are responsible to theGeneral Assembly and its agent, As has beenpointed theTrusteeship Council. out above,however, thischange as compared with theLeaguemandates was to some system, extent anticipated in League practice which by the right the Assembly asserted andexercised and makerecommendations to discuss with respect to the administration ofmandated territories. in the Thereis, however, Charterone important powervested in the United Nations organs, thoughin somewhat qualified form, whichthe Counciland Mandates Commission of the League did not have and the lack of which was regarded as a serious weakness oftheLeaguesystem. I refer to theprovision forperiodical visitsto the trusteeship territories whichshouldmake it possible for theOrganization to getinformation on thespotand thereby check uponand supplement thereports oftheadministrative authorities. International Economic and Social Cooperation Perhaps themost important advanceoftheCharter overtheCovenant of the League is to be foundin its provisions defining the objectives, policies, machinery and procedure of international economic and social cooperation. In thisrespect, the Charter offers a wide contrast to the Covenant, whichhad only threearticlesdealingspecifically withthe subject. In fact, thePreamble oftheCovenant, containing thestatement of purposes of the League,made no specific in mention of cooperation economic and socialmatters, though thevery "in order general phrase to promote international order and cooperation"y was relied uponto justify numerous activities forwhich no express authority was to be found. It is,nevertheless, thattheLeaguein practice true was a quitedifferent matter.39 It hasbeengenerally observed worththatthemost permanently while activities oftheLeagueofNations were in thefield ofinternational and socialcooperation. economic Therewas in thecourse oftheLeague's existence a tremendous proliferation of organization and an impressive record ofsubstantial achievement in making availablenecessary information, in promoting administrative and legislative action by member states,and in dealingdirectly withinternational economic and social evilsby administrative action. We haveseenhowin 1939therecognition ofthescopeandimportance ofthiswork ledtotheproposal thata Central forEconomicand Social Questions Committee shouldbe set up to coordinate Leagueactivities in thisfield. Apartfrom the provision fora separateeconomic and social council is one important there organizational difference theLeagueand between UnitedNationssystems, a difference whichmay proveto be of great
39 See, for example,Denys P. Myers,Handbookof theLeague of Nations,Boston, 1935, forevidenceof the relativeimportance on a

quantitative basis, at least, of the League's the first economicand social activitiesduring fifteen years of the League's existence.

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and financial weredevelopedwithin the health,economic cooperation direction and framework ofthe League and operated underthe general ofthe principal the approachof the UnitedNacontrol League organs, on the astionshas been a different one. This timewe have proceeded thatspecialneedsas theyariseshouldbe metby the creation sumption autonomous and that subsequently, these of appropriate organizations with andwith should be brought eachother organizations intorelationship by the organs empowered the UnitedNationsby agreements negotiated is thatinsteadofhavinga number of to act in suchmatters. The result the general international ortechnical organizations functioning within and subjectto the generaldirection and supervision of its ganization we nowhave a number of principal organs, as under theLeaguesystem, a defined within specialized inter-governmental agencies, each operating area and moreor lessindependently oftheothers. andtypeofaction has possibilities as to therange Sucha system clearly that may be takenwhichweredeniedto the League system operating On the considerations. morecompletely underthe influence of political in having someeffecother advantages hand,there are obviously certain will as there tivecoordination ofthe operation ofthesevariousagencies will overlap.40 and activities be manypointsat whichtheirinterests concerns Under theCharter theproposal is to take careofthesecommon by thespecialagreements referred to above. It is too earlyto be certain willproveto be. as to whatthe practical consequences ofthisapproach
V.

ofthe Charterare applied importance, depending upon how the provisions in practice. Whereas the League technical organizationsdealing with

To the studentof international it shouldbe a cause organization, thatthe UnitedNationsis for neither ofsurprise norof concern to find all practical a continuation it purposes oftheLeagueofNations.Rather organization had completely would be disturbing ifthearchitects ofworld orlargely thrown and materials ofthepast.One cannot asidethedesigns buildsoundly on thebasisofpuretheory. Man being whathe is, and the and attitudes dominant forces relations beingwhatthey ofinternational and foolhardy theperfect system of are; it is idleto expect, to construct the lessonsofpast experiworld government in our day. Profiting from toward theattainment ence,we can at mosthopeto makesomeprogress ofa goalwhich a longtimeremain beyond ourreach. The United mayfor Nationsis not worldgovernment and it was not intended to be such. Ratherit represents a muchmoreconservative and cautiousapproach
40 See Herman Finer, The UnitedNations Economicand Social Council,Boston, 1945, 121 p.; also Reportof the Preparatory Com-

Nations,PC/20, DecemmissionoftheUnited ber 23, 1945,p. 40-48.

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fallsintothestream As such,it inevitably order. ofworld to theproblem by the League of Nationsand represented development ofinstitutional things, and namesmay be used forsimilar Different its predecessors. similar ideas. to express maybe devised ofwords combinations different substantive and in factimportant Theremay be changesof emphasis, orthought necesofpastexperience desirable inthelight deemed changes, is no realbreakin the But there to meetchanged conditions. saryin order oforganizational development. stream the United mustrecognize organization of international The student improved League,nodoubt is,a revised for what it quiteproperly Nations a League, but nonetheless weakerin others, possibly in somerespects, in the League on largely of nations,carrying a voluntary association changes have occurred Important and by the Leaguemethods. tradition and political economic in the world's in theworld ofpower, distribution These changescreate atmosphere. structure, in the world'sideological in meeting the chancesof successor failure and modify new problems to remainmuchthe same. Anyonedesiring them,but the mechanics ofits success, howit operates, theconditions understand themachinery, to therichand ofthepast,and particularly mustlookto theexperience organizainternational at a general attempt varied ofthatfirst experience tion,theLeagueofNations.