WORKING PAPER - ANNO 3, NUMERO 4 - OTTOBRE 2012

WORKING PAPER - anno 1, numero 2 - luglio 2010

- History of the treaties between the riparian states By Federico Formentini Tommaso Milani

The legal status of the Caspian Sea

ABSTRACT The Caspian Sea represents a vital source of wealth for all littoral states. The control over the hydrocarbons contained below its seabed (as well as their economic exploitation) is a fact of key strategic importance, especially for those states e.g. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan to which Caspian oil and gas exports constitutes the most part of GDP. No wonder that the legal determination of the ownership of the Caspian Seas territorial waters and seabed remains a topic of great importance for the worlds energy market and for the littoral states directly involved in the dispute. This paper will describe the history of the Caspian Sea from a legal perspective and will analyse the many different treaties and international agreements signed in the course of the last three centuries by the states that succeeded one another on the shores of the Central-Asian lake. Moreover, it will focus on current international law issues and their implications on the arrangements in place in the region.

INTRODuction
By and large, the Caspian Sea represents a vital source of wealth for all littoral states. The control over the hydrocarbons contained deep below its seabed (as well as their economic exploitation) is a fact of key strategic importance, especially for those states e.g. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan to which Caspian oil and gas exports constitutes the most part of GDP. No wonder that the legal determination of the ownership of the Caspian Seas territorial waters and seabed remains a topic of great importance for the worlds energy market and for the littoral states directly involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, before focusing on current international law issues and their implications, it is necessary to describe the history of the Caspian Sea from a legal perspective and to go back to the many different treaties and international agreements signed in the course of the last three centuries by the states that succeeded one another on the shores of the Central-Asian lake.

Figure 1 Map of the Caspian Sea region, present day

1. The Imperial Russian Period

(1732-1917)

The first ever international treaty regarding the Caspian Sea was signed between Russia and Persia in 1732. This treaty, known as the treaty of Rasht from the Persian city in which it was signed, was indeed the first to contain some references on freedom of navigation and commerce on the waters of the enclosed sea1. Far from containing any clear definition of the reciprocal territorial waters (let alone of sea resources exploitation), the treaty of Rasht was principally a trade and cooperation treaty between two regional powers interested in solving some minor disputes in the Caspian area in order to concentrate their efforts against the Ottoman Empire, their common enemy at the time2. The treaty of Rasht, whose dispositions were confirmed in the treaty of Gandzha (or Ganja as the city is also known) of 1735, was followed by other similar agreements which gradually established a framework of international treaties between the Russian Empire and Persia. Following the Russian colonization of all the northern and eastern shore of the Caspian Sea (culminated with the annexation of Turkestan in the late 19th century), Russia and Persia became the sole and only riparian states facing the sea. They would remain as such until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Treaty of Gulistan, signed in 1813 after the third Russo-Persian War (1804-1813), granted Russia the control of all the Caspian Western shore, from Daghestan to modern day Azerbaijan, by forcing the Shah of Persia to renounce his claims of sovereignty over Georgia, Mingrelia, Abkhazia, Ganja, Qarabag, Qobba, Darband, Baku, Dagestan and Sakki3. Besides the huge territorial transfer, the Treaty also included some trade disposition through which Persia expressly renounced all rights to navigate the Caspian Sea and also gave Imperial Russia the exclusive right to deploy a military navy on the enclosed sea4. This situation was later confirmed by the Treaty of Turkmanchai (following the fourth Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828), through which Persia renounced again to sail any kind of vessel (military or commercial alike) on the waters of the Caspian Sea and allowed Russian commercial ships full access to its ports. Due to this treaty, therefore, Imperial Russia found itself as the sole and only ruler of the vast Central-Asian body of water, whose only other riparian state, Persia, did not even have the right to set sail on it, nor tried for the rest of the century to regain its lost sovereignty. Mamedov gives a possible explanation for the peace-oriented Caspian foreign policy adopted by Persia for the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th by stating that Tehran, having agreed with unofficial Russian control over the Caspian Sea, has got a phantom right and guarantee of stable peace with Russia and assistance in case of third countries aggressions against Iran. As the matter of fact, Iran consented to loose territory, possession and sphere of influence in return for a warranty of existence within the borders and shape in which it continued to exist throughout the 20th century5 . Hence the period between 1828 to 1917 was one of relative peace in the region, at least from the point of view of international law.

2. The Soviet Period

(1918-1991)

The Russian Revolution of 1917 represented a major geopolitical change for the Caspian region and undermined the legal framework at its core. The new Bolshevik state in fact refused to succeed to any of the international treaties signed by imperial Russia, including those with Persia. During the civil war that followed the collapse of Tsarist Russia chaos spread in the area, for both factions occupied and abandoned their positions in the region. External actors also tried to take advantage of the situation: British forces were sent to defend the independence of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan for a while6, and the Turkish rogue forces of Enver Pasha marauded the region for several years in the vain attempt of establishing a Great Turkestan7. Once the Red Army succeeded in restoring order in the region, the overall political geography of the Caspian region did not present any change worth of notice: Russia was still in control of three out of four shores of the sea and the Russian Empire itself, albeit under different colours, appeared to be even stronger than before. Keen to establish solid diplomatic relations and recognizing the need to rebuild a new international treaty basis for the Caspian region, Persia and the U.S.S.R. negotiated what became known as the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship, signed in Moscow on February 26 1921. The treaty, by refusing to recognise the previous Treaty of Turkmenchai, inaugurated a completely new era of international relations for the two countries and the development of International law in the area8. Formal equality between the two countries was recognized as a founding principle of the relationship between the contracting parties. As a result, equal right of navigation was granted to Persia. Russia renounced all previous colonial privileges granted by Turkmenchai (such as, for example, the exclusivity on the concession of fishery licenses to Russian consuls in Persian coastal cities) and obtained in return recognition for the new regime in Moscow as well as the neutrality of the Shah9.

1. ZONN et al (2010), 464. 2. Ibidem. Worth remembering that the first exploration of the shores of the Caspian Sea was order by Peter the Great only a generation before, in 1701. Before that date there were very few contacts between the two very distant Empires and both considered the Caspian Sea region as a distant frontier . Although the Russian always knew of the giant lake since the times of the expedition of Gran Duke Igor in the region in 913, the first map showing considerable detail of the entire Caspian Sea was not drawn until 1730. 3. Article 3 of the Treaty of Gulistan as reported in DANIEL (2001). 4. Article 5 of the same treaty as reported in DANIEL (2001). 5. MAMEDOV (2000), 117 6. The small nation knew a short-lived period of independence in 1918 before being reoccupied by Russian forces, this time under the banner of the Communist Revolution. 7. See MIRBABAYEV (2010). 8. MAMEDOV (2000), 122 9. The treaty included a number of clauses (clauses 6 and 7 in particular) forbidding Persia to host foreign troops on its territory which caused many problems during the decades following the end of the Russian civil war.

Furthermore the principle of equality granted Persia the right to practice fishery (clause 14) and, in clause 11, the ...equal right of free floating in the Caspian Sea under their own flags or, in other words, the right to deploy a military fleet10. Both countries also agreed on sharing the responsibility for the security of the sea and established the principle of the exclusive use of the sea by the two littoral countries (clause 7). Although constituting in theory a good starting point for future treaties that would have further expanded the application of International law in the region, the 1921 Treaty contained a flaw that impeded its reconfirmation and conditioned the evolution of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. At the beginning of the treaty in fact (clause 3) the two countries had indeed declared their respect towards the old Russian-Persian border as set by the Conciliatory Commission of 188111, neither delimiting the actual maritime borders of the Caspian Basin nor clearly opting for the condominium solution. The matter was left to future dealings and in 1927 the Agreement on Development of the Fishing Resources of the Southern Coast of the Caspian Sea12 referred to the Astara-Gasan Kuli line as the limit of efficacy of the agreement itself. This straight line between the two most southern points of Russian territory on both sides of the sea, which Asriyan does not hesitate to call mere gentleman demarcation13, was not in any way intended to have a permanent status nor to become the officially sanctioned maritime border between the two countries. The objective of the 1927 agreement (valid for 25 years) was in fact only that of establishing a joint Soviet-Persian fishing company in order to improve the fishing industry on the Iranian coast (and there alone) in application of clause 14 of the Treaty of Friendship. After the prescribed 25 years of duration, in 1953, Persia did not extend the validity of the agreement thus rendering the joint fishery agreement legally invalid together with any possible claim on the validity Astara-Gasan Kuli line as official maritime border between the two countries14. While, on the one hand, the Treaty of Friendship and the following agreement of 1927 legalized the international status of the Caspian Sea and freed it from the old Russian policy of colonial occupation, on the other hand the long-term contribution of these two treaties to the overall development of a new Caspian international-legal framework was greatly reduced by the limited scope and view of the two signatory states15. None of the treaties in fact had as main objective the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. A coherent view of the latter started to come into existence many years later and only through a (highly debated) process of deduction made by International law scholars on the existing treaties and on littoral states behaviour. The Treaty of Friendship was followed by the Treaty of Establishment Commerce and Navigation of 1935, which confirmed the dispositions of the previous treaty of 1921 and reaffirmed the principle of exclusivity in the use of the sea in favour of the two littoral countries: not only foreign flags were forbidden to sail on the Caspian Sea but also foreign crewmen were not to be allowed on board any vessel, commercial and military alike of the two riparian states. The treaty also reaffirmed the equal right of the two signatories to jointly exploit sea resources anywhere on the Sea, with the exception of a ten nautical-miles-wide strip from the coast in which fishery would have remained a national prerogative16. Far from actually dividing the Sea into exclusive economic zones, the treaty seems to state the principle of condominium of the two riparian states over the enclosed sea, leaving only a 10 mile wide area to exclusive national exploitation17. All these dispositions were substantially confirmed and reinforced by the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 194018. This treaty, as well as all previous ones, regulated only fishery, navigation and commerce, omitting any reference to seabed resources or maritime border demarcation. Surprisingly enough, not even after the discovery of oil off the coast of Azerbaijan in the 1940s the two states began to discuss on a delimitation treaty of some sort to address the question of seabed resources. n the 1956 agreement, named Treaty on Settlement of Frontier and Financial Questions, no reference to seabed resources or to maritime border demarcation was made. To be sure the 1956 treaty defined an administrative frontier on the old Astara-Gasan Kuli line, but only on the lands on both sides of the Caspian, and not through the Sea itself19. This apparent incoherence in the development of international law in the Caspian region can be explained by taking into account the history of International relations in the area, as well as in the whole world, during the period. In fact, from the first Treaty of Friendship of 1921 to the 1950s diplomatic relations between the two countries have frequently changed from moments of neutrality to moments of open hostility. So, when the Shah inaugurated his pro-German policy in the 1930s by refusing to renew the Treaty of Establishment Commerce and Navigation signed only a few years earlier, he paved the way to a period of diplomatic confrontation during which the share of the U.S.S.R. in the Iranian foreign trade turnover dropped to only 0.5% in 194020. Later on, the German invasion of the Soviet Union led to a joint occupation of Iran by Russian and British troops in the summer of 1941. With the destitution of Reza Shah in September 1941, Iran lost part of its sovereignty and after the war, under the rule of Reza Pahlavi, finally entered in the Anglo-American political sphere of influence. Soviet-Iranian diplomatic relations remained more or less tense during the entire Cold War. Moreover, the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Iranian Islamic Republic in 1979 certainly did not help to improve the relations between the two countries21. During all this period the Caspian Sea remained divided only by the pragmatical demarcation of the Astara-Gasan Kuli line which granted the Soviet Union the control of over 86% of the seas surface22. Until 1991 no treaty was signed on the subject of seabed resources exploitation or maritime border demarcation.

10. MAMEDOV (2000), 123. 11. MAMEDOV (2000), 123. 12. A possibility already envisaged by clause 14 of the Treaty of Friendship of 1921. 13. See ASRIYAN (2003). 14. See MAMEDOV (2000). The line remained in use until the collapse of the Soviet Union as an informal geographical reference for jurisdiction and flight paths determination. On the point see KARBUZ (2010). 15. See MAMEDOV (2000). 16. See KARBUZ (2010); MAMEDOV (2000). 17. See KARBUZ (2010). 18. The treaty of 1935 was expired due to the Persian unwillingness to renew it. See MAMEDOVA (2009). 19. See HAGHAYEGHI (2003). 20. In the 1920s and the early 30s the Soviet Union, by buying 100% of all Iranian fish and ambary exports, 97% of rice and cattle, 90% of cotton, 86% of wool, 68% of silkworm cocoons and 47% of leather and hides, was the main export partner of Iran.See MAMEDOVA (2009). 21. See MAMEDOVA (2009) 22. See ASRIYAN (2003)

The only act in this direction of which there is notice, is an administrative decision taken by the U.S.S.R. Ministry for Oil and Gas Industry. In the early 1970s this institution divided the Soviet part of the Caspian Sea into four regional sectors, one for each of the littoral Socialist republics (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). In order to do that, the Ministry simply utilized the median line principle by extending an equal distance between opposite coastlines up to the point in which the two areas meet in the middle of the Sea. This subdivision had a purely administrative character and was not intended to give any exclusive right of exploitation to any of the different republics, at that time all members of the Union. According to the law of the U.S.S.R., indeed, all natural resources (hydrocarbons included) were of exclusive competence of the Union and its centralized institutions, which might then have established regional administrative divisions and subdivisions, as this was the case23. All in all, the loose legal framework created by the several treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Persia (later Iran) did not provide a solid legal foundation for the division of Caspian Sea resources between the riparian states nor it gave an agreed upon definition on whether or not the landlocked body of water was considered lake, sea or enclosed sea by the parties. Rather, the pre-1991 series of treaties focused on establishing the principle of the seas exclusivity and on regulating fishery, navigation and trade on its waters24. As noticed by Di Placido, the two countries (U.S.S.R. and Iran) appeared to have created an unofficial and unsanctioned condominium over the resources of the Caspian Sea25. Yet it must be stressed that not all scholars (let alone governments) agree on this interpretation of the legal basis created by Soviet-Iranian international relations during the 20th century. Regardless of the many possible interpretations, there is no doubt that the Soviet-Iranian international legal framework for the joint management of the common body of water was largely non-formalised and incomplete. Furthermore the very same constitutional structure of the Soviet Union, due to its centralised control on natural resources and the scarce autonomy enjoyed by its member states, prevented the development of a true body of international law. By the same token, until the geopolitical order of the area remained stable, as it happened during the Cold War, all possible dispute arising from this absence of regulation had been silently (or, for better saying, administratively) solved inside the Soviet bloc. It was the sudden collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 which left a legal void still negatively affecting the region today.

3. The Downfall of the U.S.S.R. and the

Emergence of a New Regional System
(1991 - toda y)
The long peace that characterized the area for the most part of the 20th century came to end with the collapse of the U.S.S.R.. Largely unexpected, this geopolitical shock had a long-lasting impact on the Caspian area as much as the Bolshevik Revolution. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union four new subjects of international law have appeared on the shores of the Caspian Sea: the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. These new actors immediately started to compete (together with Iran) for the hydrocarbon resources contained in the Caspian basin by unilaterally claiming possession over arbitrarily defined national maritime borders. As a consequence international relations in the region after the end of the Soviet Union became rather unstable, for new overlapping multilateral interests contributed to dismantle the old, fragile international legal framework26. One by one, all riparian states, except for the Russian Federation, declared their intention not to recognise the binding nature of the Soviet-Iranian contractual basis with regard to the Caspian Sea. Apparently, this act went against what Soviet Unions successor states had just declared in the Alma-Ata Protocols (December 1991) in which they substantially reaffirmed the validity of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978 for what regarded their participation to the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.S.I.) and their consequent succession in all the treaties signed by the U.S.S.R.27. every issue regarding the landlocked body of water they were to share: from fishery and environmental protection to partition and border delimitation, every government appeared to have a different view and to propose a different solution. As Mamedov pointed out, in the early nineties all Caspian states accepted that an internationally accepted legal status of the Caspian Sea was not properly developed during the Soviet period, and to assume that it was developing was a wrong assumption28. Nevertheless, the urge to find a diplomatic solution to the contested legal status of the sea was strongly felt by all littoral states, especially by the ones, like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, that had huge hydrocarbons reserves near their coast and desperately needed foreign investments to develop them. So, from 1992 onwards, a complex web of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the future definition of the legal status of the Caspian Sea started to take place among the five littoral states, with the occasional involvement of other external actors, notably the U.S., the E.U. and China. As a matter of clarity, in summing up all the events, conferences, round tables and negotiations that took place over the last twenty years we will hereby refer to the historic classification made by Mamedov who clustered them into phases29. In the next paragraphs, we will focus on two out of three of them: the first one (1995-1999), characterized by investigation, acquaintance and search after reasonable solutions, as Mamedov put it; and the second one (1995-1999) in which littoral states eventually matured their own national claims and preferences over particular interpretations of the international law applicable to the Caspian Sea.

23. See KARBUZ (2010) 24. See HAGHAYEGHI (2003) 25. DI PLACIDO (2010), 49. 26. MAMEDOV (2002), 218 27. See DI PLACIDO (2010). 28. MAMEDOV (2002), 219 29. MAMEDOV (2002), 220

a.The First Phase of Multilateral Negotiations

(1991-1994)

After the initial chaos and uncertainty generated by the Soviet withdrawal from the region, littoral states and other external actors started to realize the geopolitical importance that Caspians hydrocarbon reserves would have in the new world order. The Islamic Republic of Iran was the first one to seek to take advantage from the regional power void and to redraw the Caspian Sea legal framework in line with its national interest. Making the most of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) conference30, held in Tehran in February 1992, Iran proposed the constitution of an Organisation of the Caspian Sea in order to foster regional cooperation aimed at exploiting natural resources. In Irans utterances, by joining the ECO, former Soviet republics of the Caspian should have also become part of this newly founded organisation and Tehran was more than willing to host the newly founded organizations headquarters within its territory. Despite Iranians efforts to bring forward the idea of a Caspian States Cooperation Organization (OCSC), its proposal was turned down by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan who decided to work together in other directions31. This, however, did not prevent the two states from joining the ECO the following fall together with Turkmenistan, and to meet again in Tehran during the same year to discuss the establishment of a common legal framework for the Caspian Sea. The numerous issues on the table at this first Caspian Sea conference spanned from environmental protection and border delimitation, to security cooperation and legal status definition. By and large, due to the chaos fuelled by the events of 1989-1991, there were very few aspects already regulated. It was the actual implementation of a common solution to this wide spectrum of issues, rather than the issues themselves, that formed the main object of discussion at the conference: Tehran continued to push for the creation of the OCSC while Azerbaijan proposed, for the first time, to agree about a common definition on the legal status of the Caspian Sea32. Both proposals were turned down by other participant to the conference and, from that moment on, comprehensive approaches to the problems affecting the region were all set aside. This setback notwithstanding, the issue by issue negotiations that followed allowed the parties at least to find consensus on a series of joint action programs regarding natural resources protection, implementation of ecological standards and determination of sea routes. In addition to that, all states agreed to organise six specialized committees in order to address the issues of legal status, economic development, navigation, scientific research, environmental protection and hydrocarbons exploitation. On the other hand, only the hydrocarbons committee (euphemistically called committee on the protection of biological resources) ever actually came into function, mostly thanks to Russias renewed interest towards the Caspian Sea and its riches. After the end of the conference, the committee officially invited all riparian states to meet again as soon as possible on the grounds that the protection of biological resources of the Caspian Sea was so important that it made necessary further discussion and resolution of the issue on a contractual legal basis33. Henceforth, all participants to the second Tehran conference met again in 1993 at the intergovernmental forum on the use and protection of biological resources of the Caspian Sea held in the Iranian city of Rasht. This conference proved a pivotal moment for international relations in the region since the irreconcilable nature of the diverging national interests of the littoral states, appeared then very clear to all participants to the conference. The conference had started under the best auspices with the presentation of the plan previously elaborated by the Committee on the protection of biological resources but the discussion of the draft agreement suddenly came to an halt when Azerbaijans proposal to define the status of the Caspian Sea as a boundary lake (and divide it accordingly) was utterly rejected by Russia and Iran. The proposal also received a cold welcome from Kazakhstan that agreed on the principles behind it but refused to discuss the issue any further; the same did Turkmenistan whose delegation did not reveal its official position on the matter. A second Azerbaijani proposal to introduce in the draft Convention the principle of national division of the natural resources of the Caspian Sea was rejected as well, leaving no further room for reconciliation34. At Rasht, therefore, participants not only failed to reach an agreement on the legal status of the sea, but clashed also over the general principles to agree and thus dumped the draft. Despite the stalemate at Rasht, riparian states did not give up the idea of seeking a common diplomatic solution to the problem of the Caspian Sea. Two other meetings were put in place in Astrakhan and Ashkabad, in 1993. Both meetings however ended up unsuccessfully. Each meeting appeared to have made the situation worse by widening the gap between the different positions. The growing divergence of opinions was made clear during the Moscow summit of the Special representatives of the Caspian states in the fall of 1994, where three different drafts on the legal status of the Caspian Sea were submitted to discussion by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia35. The Kazakhstans plan would categorize the Caspian Sea as a closed sea and therefore regulated by the norms of positive international law and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Plainly enough, had this option been adopted, it would have rendered any special delimitation agreement pointless since borders on the enclosed sea would have been determined automatically by the application of the UNCLOS. In addition the draft also contained provisions that definitely declared all the old Soviet-Iranian treaties obsolete and inactive. Azerbaijan submitted again its plan for the definition of the Caspian Sea as a boundary lake and therefore to be entirely divided among littoral states into territorial water areas. These national sectors were defined by Baku as part of water area, bottom and bosom, adjoining to the coastal state and being an integral part of the Caspian state territory that was limited by territorial water boundaries36. Therefore the different national sectors of the Caspian Sea would have constituted by all means an integral part of each littoral states territory. Differently from the UNCLOS solution, this arrangement would have left the delimitation of the national portions of the Sea to the free determination of the littoral states by bilateral and multilateral agreements37. Russia, jointly with Iran, immediately rejected the two other drafts, refused to discuss them, and presented a draft of its own containing no definition whatsoever of the status of the Caspian Sea. Article 2 of the Russian draft in fact left the determination of the legal status of the Sea to a special Convention to be held in the future38. According to Moscow, as long as littoral states would not agree on a common legal definition within the special Convention, the previous legal regime (Soviet-Iranian treaties) was to be applied. This accommodation, welcomed by Iran, was utterly rejected by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, fearing that, by de facto refusing to apply any particular international law regime, Russia and Iran would split the region into less rigid spheres of influence. Secondly, making reference to the previous legal regime of the Soviet-Iranian treaties would imply the recognition of the principle of condominium over the resources of the Caspian Sea. As the Russian plan was rejected the meeting came to an end, and so did the first efforts to find a common legal definition of the status of the Caspian Sea.

30. ECO is an intergovernmental created by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in 1985 with the aim of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the Member States. For further information, see the official organization website http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ as retrieved on April the 10th 2012. 31. From the Final Communiqu of the Teheran ECO Conference of February 1992, as quoted in MAMEDOV (2002), 222. 32. MAMEDOV (2002), 222. 33. MAMEDOV (2002), 222. 34. MAMEDOV (2002), 223. 35. MAMEDOV (2002), 224. 36. MAMEDOV (2002), 226. 37. Article 4 of the Azerbaijani proposal, as reported in MAMEDOV (2002), 226 38. MAMEDOV (2002), 227.

B.The Second Phase of Multilateral Negotiation

(1995-1999)

The failure of the Moscow meeting coincided with the first arrival of foreign investors in the region. In September 1994 the so called contract of the century was signed in Azerbaijan, inaugurating a new era for the Caspian region. From that moment on, the legal disputes on the status of the Caspian Sea and the ownership of its resources became a matter of great interest for many powerful external actors39. Since the negotiations had been fostered by several external pressures (both direct and indirect) coming from countries such as the U.S., Britain, Turkey and France. All of them shared an interest in prompting a clear definition for the legal status of the Caspian sea, and therefore eventually took the side of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan within the dispute40. This involvement inevitably heated the diplomatic situation and provoked in turn angered reactions, especially on behalf of Russia. On December 5, 1994, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent an official note to the UN General Assembly expressing discontent for many violations of international law committed by some littoral states (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan), charging them of unilateral appropriation of the Caspian Sea for their own use. Despite this note of complaint to the General Assembly, negotiations proceeded in the following year through a great number of official meetings and conferences. Nevertheless, the divide among different coastal states points of view remained unchanged and, in certain cases, mutual relationships even appeared to be worsening. During the conference held in Almaata in the Spring of 1995, whose main object was defining the international legal status of the Caspian, different interests clashed with a yet unseen hostility. While the Azerbaijani were insisting on their view of the Caspian as a lake, and the Kazakhstani delegation was still sustaining the application of the UNCLOS to an enclosed sea, Russian deputy foreign minister, Andrei Chernishev declared: Russia is against rough division of the Caspian Sea, when everyone hogs what he wants. We are against plunder of mineral resources of the Caspian Sea. The interests on the Caspian Sea are our interests. We are open to cooperation but on our terms. We are pitted against each other. Opportunities for achievement of compromise do persist, but we are against unilateral production on the Caspian Sea until the agreement of five states is reached. We have already felt a fear of imperial ambitions; we want to solve the problem fairly and according to conscience. If unilateral actions are accepted Russia will have an opportunity to take due measures should business go beyond the mark. Although the threats made by Russia at the conference had no concrete consequence, they confirmed once and for all Moscows contrariety not only towards any national zones delimitation but also towards the alleged unilateral production in the Caspian Sea itself41. Moscow, supported by Tehran, in fact continued to insist on the condominium solution which would give all riparian states an equal share of the Sea resources regardless from their proximity to the coast of ones state. No wonder Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan refused to abandon their own positions in favour of Moscows and the conference ended up as another fiasco. The only small step forward made in Almaata was the formation of a permanent negotiating mechanism on determination of the international legal status of the Caspian in the form of working groups composed by high officials of the respective riparian state government42. Nevertheless even this small result soon failed to bring positive diplomatic outcomes: during its first meeting the group entered into serious conflict since nobody appeared was prone to make any concession on the legal status issue. The parties could agree on only one thing: the consensus of all riparian states was needed in order to approve any multilateral agreement on the status of the Caspian Sea. The second meeting of the group took place in Almaata a few months later, without the presence of the Russian delegation which refused to participate out of disappointment for the outcome of the previous meeting. Without a key participant and still suffering from reciprocal disagreements the states involved concluded only that a final agreement defining the legal status of the Caspian Sea would have been contained in a single uniformed document elaborated by the group in a future meeting. Nevertheless, in the following months the meagre results of the September meeting were not implemented and the whole permanent working group initiative was unofficially suspended sine die. Russias intransigent position at the Almaata conference and its subsequent refusal to participate to other meetings certainly played a major part in bringing multilateral negotiations to a dead end. On the other hand in the summer of 1995 all riparian states had already realized that, with or without Russia, an agreement among them would have been impossible to reach anyway. Such a stalemate was sanctioned by Azerbaijan that having arrived at a conclusion of futility of its efforts to determine a new international legal status for the Caspian Sea proceeded unilaterally in the determination of its own exclusive national sector of the Sea according to the boundary lake principle43. Bakus radical move initially provoked negative reactions from all riparian states but in the following two years Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan took a similar stand and appropriated themselves of their own exclusive zones44. It is hardly surprising that, after all the events that took place in the course of 1995, diplomacy languished and, for some time, was unable to do anything but acknowledging the quick deterioration of the situation. In the winter of 1996, Iran tried once again to put forward the idea of an organisation of the Caspian Sea states to solve all economic and political problems of the region under one common legal framework. According to Teheran, in fact, this intergovernmental organisation would take control over all the hydrocarbons contained in the Caspian basin and administered them for the advantage of all riparian states. Needless to say, this proposal for the constitution of an institutionalised condominium of resources and jurisdiction over the Caspian Sea was strongly opposed by the other riparian states up to the point of refusing even to discuss its possible implementation. After this last (rather desperate) attempt to find a common regional solution to the problem of the Caspian Sea, riparian states divided into two main group of interest: one formed by those states which supported the division of the body of water into national sectors (either trough the boundary lake or the enclosed sea solution) and another formed by those countries namely Russia and Iran that sustained the idea of a condominium (either de facto or institutionalised). The two groups hardly communicated between each other and only the Republic of Turkmenistan appeared to be swinging between the two extremes.

39. As it was already during the 19th and the early 20th century when the British Empire tried to increase its influence over the region. 40. China and the E.U. will start to exert their influence only some few years later. 41. MAMEDOV (2002), 231. 42. MAMEDOV (2002), 232. 43. MAMEDOV (2002), 233. 44. MAMEDOV (2002), 243.

In addition, it must be stressed that the problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea had already become a key global geopolitical issue and, in the second half of the decade, non-Caspian powers started to get actively involved. As suggested by the team led by Coby Van der Lynde in the report Study on Energy Security and Geopolitics45 as well as by Soligo and Myers Jaffe46, the presence of huge hydrocarbons reserves within the national territory of three former Soviet Republics outside of Moscows political orbit (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) inevitably aroused the attention of the U.S. and other European countries as well as of private oil companies. The gradual stabilization of the region after the chaos of the early nineties, together with a partial reduction of both Persian and Russian influence over the Caspian Sea due to the legal status dispute, provided the West a good opportunity to intervene in the area. A resolution of the EU Parliamentary Assembly of 1997 acknowledged the vast amount of investments made by Western oil companies in the Caspian Sea during the previous few years and stressed out the need for more coordination between private companies, the E.U. and local state actors. The E.U. therefore, after having sent a number of experts in the region within the framework Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS), implemented the Interstate Oil and Gas to Europe (INOGATE) programme in the Caspian area47. The latter consists of a programme designed to support and facilitate the development of the energy sector in the targeted countries by providing technical support and attracting investments towards projects of common regional interest such as pipelines, refineries and renewed electricity grids. Operating in close connection with the U.S. and Turkey, the European diplomatic effort aimed at establishing a safe energy supply corridor between the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean. This was partially achieved by the Union and its partners a decade later with the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipelines. The construction of the two pipelines, however, was the result of a long and complex multilateral diplomatic process which involved many different international actors ranging from the European Commission to the U.S., OECD and Turkey plus all the Caspian littoral states with the exception of Russia and Iran. This process is still ongoing and its broader aims have been described in a declaration of the Council of Europe as to overcome the remaining obstacles to cooperation and to reach an overall agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, as well as on the division of the Caspian seabed and the rights of exploitation of energy resources; to improve legal and regulatory regimes and to ensure transparent state administrations in order to encourage investment, enhanced competition and energy efficiency; to reduce political tensions between them (the countries in the Caspian Sea Region) that delay the construction of transportation routes for oil and gas to international markets48. Besides its geopolitical implications, the arrival on the scene of external actors had the effect of bolstering diplomatic activity on the definition of the sea legal status: having languished for two years after the failure of direct multilateral talks in 1995, negotiations speeded up on a bilateral basis. After the unilateral delimitation of a national sector by Azerbaijan however, it was only a matter of time before all other states recognized the de facto subdivision of the sea into exclusive zones and proceeded accordingly. On July 6, 1998, Russia and Kazakhstan concluded a bilateral agreement that sanctioned the division of the northern Caspian basin (and its huge reserves of hydrocarbons) into two distinct national sectors. This agreement was not welcomed by Tehran, who interpreted it has an implicit abandonment by Moscow of the principle of condominium over the Caspian Sea. In a conference of the Caspian states held in Moscow in December 1998 (three years after the previous one), the disagreement between Iran and Russia surfaced and, at the end, Tehran found itself isolated in defending the idea of condominium, when Moscow agreed on signing the final declaration of the conference in which all littoral states (except for Iran) recognized the necessity of a division of the Caspian Sea. Russias sudden change of plans was a direct consequence of both the Azerbaijan unilateral delimitation of 1995 and interference by third parties. As Mamedov put it, having realized that Russia was left behind in opportunities of oil transportation, as some Caspian states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) began to realise projects bypassing Russia, Russia was compelled to refuse the concept of condominium and recognize what it did not wish: sectional division of the Caspian Sea49. The earthquake provoked by Russias (apparent) shift forced Iran to change its position in order not to remain completely isolated as happened at the previous Moscow summit. The new Iranian position was officially presented at the International Conference on the Caspian Sea held in Teheran in June 1999. According to the Islamic Republic, the Caspian Sea was to be considered neither sea nor lake but to be divided into five identical parts (so that each state would possess 20% of the sea surface). The proposal was obviously rejected at the conference but other riparian states sustained that, by making it, even Iran implicitly recognized the partition de facto of the Caspian Sea. On that regard, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that On the issue of the Caspian Sea regime, Iran considers that new legal status of the Caspian sea should be made out and accepted unanimously with all coastal countries. While there is no new legal regime, the old one should stand in force (i.e. the Soviet-Iranian regime). Any unilateral and unreasonable exploitation of the Caspian Sea, considering its uniqueness will not be recognised by us before acceptance of the new legal status, as all resources of this sea, before definition of a new legal regime, belong to all coastal states50. All in all, even the 1999 Tehran conference failed in bringing riparian states reciprocal position closer. Delegations left the Iranian capital without having changed their minds regarding the definition of the Caspian Sea and without having reached any other minor agreement that could have brought the process forward. After this conference the multilateral negotiations come to another halt, thereby ending the second phase of negotiations (1995-1999).

45. See AA. VV. (2004). 46. See SOLIGO, JAFFE (1998). 47. At the moment of writing (2012) INOGATE includes all Caspian riparian states except for Russia and Iran. Together with INOGATE, the E.U. Implemented other non-energy related programmes in the area like the TRACECA. 48. COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2002). The Van Der Lynde Report gives also an interpretation of the U.S. policy goals vis--vis this diplomatic process: ...the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey (AGT) pipeline system has been the most likely project as the US aims to get Central Asian countries away from Russian influence and isolate Iran. At the same time the AGT would bring to the Eastern Me 49. MAMEDOV (2002), 243. 50. Declaration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, K. Kharrazi, as reported in MAMEDOV (2002), 245. diterrranean a supply of oil that is non-OPEC, non-Arab, and from secularised Muslim. In AA.VV (2004), 175.

C.The Last Decade of Negotiations

(1999-PRESENT)

The Caspian region during the 1990s still lacked a coherent international legal framework. The failure to reach a multilateral agreement between the five riparian states paved the way to bilateral treaties and unilateral moves. Yet, in this apparently chaotic situation, some progresses have been made. The decade started with the rise to power of Vladimir Putin who renewed Russias effort to solve the Caspian Sea issue through a multilateral agreement51. This effort, soon abandoned due to other riparian states disagreements, signalled the important change of view (or, better to say, of strategy) which had been taking place in Moscow since the 1998 agreement with Kazakhstan, dubbed On differentiation of the Northern Part of the Caspian Sea with the Purposes of Realisation of the Sovereign Rights to the Bosom. Moscows new position was a sort of pragmatic compromise between the condominium idea and the partition of the seas natural resources. In its agreement proposal to the other states in 2000, Russia argued that the Caspian Sea should be divided into national sectors, which are fixed to the appropriate coastal states. The surface of the Caspian Sea remains in the common usage, only the bottom is divided into national sectors52. To this proposal however, which acknowledged the principle of partition into national sectors, Russia added another point thereby suggesting that disputable oil and gas deposits should be shared on a 50/50 basis among the contestants. Considering the number and the importance of disputed hydrocarbon deposits at that time, little wonder that the Russian proposal was not welcomed by other riparian states. Curiously enough, the pragmatic compromise proposed by Moscow eventually upset the supporters of condominium no less than those who championed a complete partition of the sea. Indeed Iran continued to sustain the idea of a total condominium over the Caspian Sea with renewed strength and refused to discuss any subdivision of the sea as such53. Turkmenistan insisted that, until a summit of all riparian states would decide for a legal definition of the Sea, Ashgabat would not agree on any partition of sort, and Kazakhstan advanced its proposal on the partition of the Caspian into different exclusive economic zones equidistant from the coast. Despite the failure to revive multilateral talks, Moscows efforts brought to the signature of an important bilateral agreement with Azerbaijan in 2001. In the line of that signed with Kazakhstan three years before, the agreement of 2001 aimed at dividing the seabed between the two countries according to the median line principle moderated by the application of the principle of equity54. The seabed delimitation agreement between Russia and Azerbaijan marked a major turning point: with its signature the northern Caspian Sea finally had a (quasi) coherent legal framework of bilateral agreements regulating resource exploitation and partition of the seabed. In combination with the 1998 agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan and another similar partition agreement signed between the latter and Azerbaijan, the 2001 agreement effectively sanctioned the partition of 66% of the Caspian seabed among three littoral states55. However, being the result of a series of bilateral agreements, such a partition lacked the strength of a comprehensive multilateral agreement, especially considering that only three out of five riparian states agreed to it. Secondly, the three separate agreements provided only a division of the seabed but were silent on all the rest. In particular, none of the agreements outlined a definition of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. In other words, they represented a pragmatic solution to practical problems (ownership of hydrocarbons fields) but avoided any long-term settlement of the entire Caspian Sea issue. During a visit to Moscow in 2004, Azerbaijans President declared that the current legal framework covering the northern half of the sea must form the basis of a comprehensive treaty on the Caspian56. In reality no comprehensive treaty was ever to follow these bilateral agreements. In the same year, riparian states clashed again on the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the right of riparian states to build pipelines through their national sections. This event was triggered by the projected attempt of a private consortium (backed by the U.S. and the E.U.) of constructing a gas pipeline through the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan57. Russia and Iran, both strongly opposing the idea of trans-Caspian pipelines for obvious geopolitical reasons, raised the issue during multilateral negotiations on a Caspian Sea Convention in March 200458. More specifically, Russia pointed out that, due to serious environmental concerns and the particular seismology of the area, no pipeline should have been built without the consensus of all coastal states and before the issue of the legal status of the Caspian had been solved once and for all59. All other riparian states (Turkmenistan included) disagreed with this view, but they failed to reach a compromise with Moscow and Tehran on the point, leaving another important obstacle on the path to a multilateral agreement60. Subsequent negotiations on a draft to a convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea languished in a myriad of conferences and inter-governmental meetings that made even plainer the differences among riparian states positions. So, at the 15th meeting of the foreign ministers of the Caspian states held in Moscow on October 26th and 27th 2004, negotiations came to a stalemate once again, this time due to the Azeri-Turkmen dispute over their respective portions of the sea61. The clash between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan was caused by the latters official support to the Iranian proposal of dividing the Caspian Sea into equal parts (20% of the bottom to each coastal state). This would have extended the Iranian controlled zone some eighty kilometres beyond the historical AstaraGasan Kuli line to include the Alov, Araz and Sharg oil deposits, at that time exploited by an international consortium under a production sharing agreement (PSA) with the Azeri government. Furthermore, under the Iranian proposal, Turkmenistan too would have extended its own part of the sea to cover part of the Sharg (named Altyn-Asyr deposit in Turkmen documents) as well as the immense Chirag and Azeri field (named Osman and Khazar deposits in Turkmen documents) currently under Bakus influence. This proposal was indeed unacceptable for Azerbaijan62 and substantially brought an end to the negotiations that after this diplomatic failure remained virtually suspended for more than three years63.

51. MAMEDOV (2002) 52. As reported by Mamedov in MAMEDOV (2002), 247. 53. This even if Teheran had previously advanced a proposal for a partition on an equal basis of the Caspian Sea (20% of its surface to each riparian state). 54. See RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004a). 55. As of today, Kazakhstan owns 29% of the seas bottom, Azerbaijan 19% and Russia 18%. See RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004a). 56. See RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004a). 57. For the geopolitical implications of the projected trans-Caspian pipeline see FISHELSON (2007). 58. See RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004b). 59. In 2004 Viktor Kalyuzhny, Russia Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs declared The Caspian is a unique reservoir, and whatever man-caused accident there may bring a huge disaster. Russia has always been stressing the point. Meanwhile, none of the Caspian countries has sufficient technical opportunities to cope with whatever emergency single-handed. RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004 March). See also RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004c). 60. RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004b). 61. RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004d) 62. Nor it was welcomed in Kazakhstan and Russia. Turkmenistan however later stopped to support the Iranian proposal when it was released that, according to the same principle, Iran could have advanced claims over Turkmen offshore gas deposits. 63. See RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004d)

During that period the legal status of the Caspian Sea, though always an important issue in the international agenda of the region, was temporarily left aside in the event of other crisis like the intensification of the Afghan war, the death of Turkmenistans dictator Turkmenbashi and, of course, Irans renewed nuclear ambitions. Riparian states started to discuss the legal status issue again at the Caspian states conference of October 2007, only to find out that nothing had changed and that the conditions to reach an agreement were not in place. During the summit, Vladimir Putin declared that the (loosed) legal framework of the Northern part of the sea shall be extended to the south since to reach an agreement on delimiting the seabed for mineral use, there is no need to wait for a convention to be drawn upon its legal status. In further explaining Russian position he asserted that the more of the Caspian Sea was to be left to the common use of the five littoral states the better and that, in general terms, the sea should not be covered by numerous borders, sectors and exclusive zones65. This apparently incoherent declaration can be explained only if we consider, as Moscow actually does, the delimitation agreements of the Northern part of the sea as relating only to mineral resources and not to borders or proper economic zones per se. In other words, according to Russia, existing national sectors should delimit offshore hydrocarbon fields ownership and nothing more, in a similar way to the administrative partition of the sea actuated by the Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry of the U.S.S.R. in the early 1970s65. In the end, the conference of October 2007 failed at reviving negotiations over the Caspian sea legal status and riparian states could agree only on a common declaration to repel all aggressors, in which the five countries confirmed that they would not have allowed other countries to use their territories for acts of aggression (or other military operations) against the other riparian states66. After this further setback in multilateral talks, real negotiations remained confined to the bilateral dimension for some more years, which saw intense talks (though insofar unsuccessful) between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for the delimitation of the respective national zones and the construction of the trans-Caspian pipeline67. In 2010 Russian President Medvedev called for a renewed effort by all riparian states to reach a definitive agreement over the common body of water that, starting from the legal status, could define all issues, from environmental protection to maritime border delimitation . From that moment on negotiations appeared to have proceeded at an increased pace but, since then, many public declarations notwithstanding, no concrete result has been achieved and the Caspian Sea legal status still remains undefined.

CONCLUSIONS
The third phase of negotiations (from 2000 to the present) has been generally characterized by the same degree of antagonism among littoral states seen since the early nineties and, insofar, has failed to bring the perspective of a multilateral agreement any closer. The legal framework that has been slowly emerging since the 1990s is a complex patchwork of bilateral agreements, unilateral declarations and tacit understandings. Interestingly enough, while the previous legal framework generated by the Soviet-Iranian treaties (1921-1940) may have appeared as a condominium de facto, what emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union is a tacit partition of the Caspian Sea. From 1991 to present day, littoral states have failed in giving the body of water an organized legal framework with a common set of rules. Instead, divisions among them grew and consolidated during this period, thus deepening one of the most relevant international law dispute of our time.

64. See RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2007) 65. See KARBUZ (2010). 66. This one may well have been the real objective of the summit. RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (October 2007). 67. See FISHELSON (2007). 68. See RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2010).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
AA.VV, (2004), Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, Institute for International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, available from: http://www.nog.se/files/EU_energy_strategy_2004.pdf ASRIYAN, V. (2003), The Caspian: A Sea of Cooperation or an Apple of Discord?, RIA Novosti, July 23. COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2002), Europe and the Development of Energy Resources in the Caspian Sea Region, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc 9635, 12 December, available from: http://assembly.coe.int/documents/workingdocs/doc02/edoc9635.htm DANIEL, E. L. (2001), Golestan Treaty, in Enciclopoedia Iranica, London, available from: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/golestan-treaty DI PLACIDO, L. (2010), Il Bacino del Mar Caspio, Situazioni Tendenze e Criticit nel cuore energetico dellEurasia in Rivista Marittima, March 2010, available from: http://www.marina.difesa.it/documentazione/editoria/marivista/Documents/2010/03_mar/DiPlacido.pdf FISHELSON, J. (2007), From the Silk Road to Chevron: The Geopolitics of Oil Pipelines in Central Asia, The Journal of Russian and Asian Studies, available from: http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia HAGHAYEGHI, M. (2003), The Coming of Conflict to the Caspian Sea in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 50, no. 3, May/June 2003, 32-41. KARBUZ, S. (2010), The Caspian Unsettled Legal Framework: Energy Security Implications in Journal of Energy Security, May 2010, available from: http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=244:the-caspians-unsettled-legal-frameworkenergy-security-implications&catid=106:energysecuritycontent0510&Itemid=361 MAMEDOV, R. F. (2000), International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in its Historical Development in The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, vol. XXX, Ankara, available from: http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/670/8530.pdf MAMEDOV, R. F. (2002), International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Issues of Theory and Practice in The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. XXXII, Ankara, available from: http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/672/8561.pdf MAMEDOVA, N. M (2009), Iranian-Soviet Relations (1917-1991) in Enciclopedia Iranica, available from: http://www.iranicaonline.org/ articles/russia-ii-iranian-soviet-relations-1917-1991 MIRBABAYEV, M. (2010), Concise History of Azerbaijani Oil, SOCAR, Baku. RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004a), Azerbaijan President Backs Idea to Divide Caspian into Sectors, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 05 February, available from: http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040205/39906918.html RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004b), Ad Hoc Team Fails to Settle Caspian Pipeline Differences, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 17 March, available from: http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040317/39911164.html RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004c), Russia Objects to Pipelines Being Built Across Caspian Seabed, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 05 April, available from: http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040405/39913104.html RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEW AGENCY (2004d), Tehran Tries to Gain Bakus Support on Caspian Sea, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 24 May, available from: http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20040524/39916892.html RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2004e), Finalizing the Caspian Seas Legal Status, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 26 October, available from: http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20041026/39771990.html RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2007), Putin Calls for Shared Use of Most of the Caspian Sea, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 16 October, available from: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071016/84133969.html RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY (2010), Medvedev Calls for Quick Agreement on Caspian Sea Legal Status, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 18 November, available from: http://en.rian.ru/world/20101118/161394961.html SOLIGO, R., JAFFE, A.M. (1998), The Economics of Pipeline Routes: The Conundrum of Oil Exports from the Caspian Basin, Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, available from: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/the-economics-of-pipeline-routes-theconundrum-of-oil-exports-from-the-caspian-basin ZONN, A., KOSTIANOY, KOSAREV, A., GLANTZ, M. (2010), The Caspian Sea Encyclopedia, Springer Verlag, Berlin.

CREDiTS
COSE` ECESA? La disponibilit di forniture energetiche rappresenta una condizione sine-qua-non per ogni tipo di societ complessa e la loro sicurezza da sempre una delle priorit di governi e istituzioni politiche. Negli ultimi anni, la crescente dipendenza dei tradizionali consumatori occidentali da forniture esterne e lintegrazione nel sistema produttivo globale di economie emergenti assetate di benessere e risorse hanno creato forti pressioni sul sistema di produzione, distribuzione e consumo di energia a livello globale. Tali pressioni rappresentano una delle questioni decisive del ventunesimo secolo: nellattuale contesto di espansione economica e demografica sar infatti estremamente complesso garantire approvvigionamenti sicuri e competitivi senza scatenare conflitti per il controllo di risorse scarse o danneggiare irrimediabilmente gli equilibri ambientali del pianeta. Ci ha portato le questioni energetiche al centro delle relazioni internazionali contemporanee e la loro comprensione divenuta fondamentale per una corretta interpretazione delle dinamiche politiche globali. Da questa idea nasce lo European Center for Energy Security Analysis (ECESA). Fondato nel febbraio 2010 come parte di Equilibri.net, think tank dedito allo studio e all'analisi degli eventi e delle dinamiche internazionali, ECESA un osservatorio indipendente che pu fare affidamento su un'estesa rete di studiosi, analisti e professionisti nel campo delle relazioni internazionali e che si avvale della collaborazione del mondo dell'universit, della ricerca e dellindustria. Cercando di superare schemi predefiniti e paradigmi disciplinari, ECESA si propone di promuovere e divulgare analisi libere da pregiudizi ideologici o logiche partigiane che favoriscano la diffusione di una consapevolezza circa le dimensioni politiche ed economiche delle questioni energetiche contemporanee. Il lavoro di ECESA si articola attorno a quattro direttici principali, la cui comprensione e integrazione necessaria ad una corretta interpretazione degli affari energetici e per la formulazione di politiche adeguate. Paesi produttori. Linevitabile dipendenza da importazioni rende lo studio delle complesse dinamiche interne ai paesi produttori, spesso instabili o apertamente ostili, un fattore fondamentale che vani sogni dindipendenza energetica non potranno eliminare. Industria. Pur rappresentando una componente decisiva nel funzionamento delle societ, il settore energetico dominato da grandi attori industriali, il cui know-how tecnico e finanziario rappresenta un'insostituibile risorsa per soddisfare i fabbisogni energetici a livelli globale. Processi di decision-making. Dalle normative a livello locale alle pletoriche conferenze dellUNFCC, passando per le autorit nazionali e le direttive della Commissione Europea, lenergia un settore in cui regole e leggi svolgono un ruolo decisivo. Sviluppi tecnologici. Spesso ignorati da analisti e decisori per poca lungimiranza e oggettiva complessit, essi hanno pi volte rivoluzionato le questioni energetiche e il loro ruolo sar sicuramente decisivo nellaffrontare le sfide del futuro.

Matteo Monti - Coordinatore ECESA

Laurea Triennale in Relazioni Internazionali presso lUniversit di Pavia, ha studiato allIEP de Bordeaux e si sta specializzando alla School of International Studies di Trento. Ha collaborato con lItalian Center for Turkish Studies, con Equilibri. net e con Geopolitica.info, nonch con lAmbascita Italiana in Marocco.

Federico Formentini - Gruppo dAnalisi ECESA

Laureato in Scienze Giuridiche allUniversit Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano e specializzando in Studi Europei ed Internazionali presso la School of International Studies di Trento, ha frequentato corsi di specializzazione sull'industria degli idrocarburi presso l'Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy ed ha collaborato con le trading companies VartegEnergy e Trans-Oil S.A. entrambe con sede a Ginevra. Per ECESA si occupa di geopolitica energetica dellAsia Centrale.

Tommaso Milani - Gruppo dAnalisi ECESA

Laurea in Scienze Politiche presso la LUISS Guido Carli di Roma, attualmente specializzando in Studi Europei e Internazionali presso la School of International Studies di Trento. Ha frequentato corsi presso lIstituto di Studi di Politica Internazionale (I.S.P.I.), area European Affairs, e lAlta Scuola di Economia e Relazioni Internazionali (A.S.E.R.I) di Milano.

Antonio G. Luzzi - Gruppo dAnalisi ECESA

Laureato in Scienze Politiche e Relazioni Internazionali allUniversit Roma Tre, con esperienze allUniversit di Liegi in Belgio. In seguito, ha conseguito il Master in Studi Europei presso il Collegio dEuropa di Bruges, promozione Marco Aurelio, con una tesi sulla Politica Energetica dellUe nel Mediterraneo. Esperto di politica estera dellUnione europea e delle politiche di vicinato, tra le sue aree dinteresse figurano le questioni mediorientali contemporanee, la sicurezza internazionale e le dinamiche della diplomazia multilaterale. Dopo aver lavorato al Parlamento europeo, collabora attualmente presso il Segretariato Generale dellInterpol a Lione, dove si occupa di terrorismo internazionale. Collabora con ECESA-Equilibri dallottobre 2010.

Nicol Rossett o- Gruppo dAnalisi ECESA

Dottorando in Economia, Diritto e Istituzioni presso lo Iuss di Pavia, si occupa di aspetti economici e di regolazione dei mercati energetici. In precedenza si laureato prima in Scienze Politiche e poi in Economia, Politica e Istituzioni Internazionali presso lUniversit di Pavia. Ha svolto uno scambio Erasmus presso lUniversit di Warwick (UK). Alunno del Collegio Borromeo, i suoi campi dinteresse si estendono alla politica europea e alla teoria economica. A livello non accademico ha avuto esperienze lavorative presso il Ministero dellEconomia e la Rappresentanza a Bruxelles della regione Veneto.

Equilibri Onlus - Sede legale: Via Turati 5/a, 20077 Melegnano - Mi Tel. +39 028360642 Fax. +39 0258109661 Email info@equilibri.net ECESA Occasional Paper n.2 Inserto online del quotidiano Equilibri.net Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Firenze del 19 Gennaio 2004 numero 5320 Tutti i diritti riservati: permesso luso personale dei contenuti pubblicati da Equilibri.net solo a fini non commerciali. Lutilizzo commerciale, la riproduzione, la pubblicazione e la distribuzione pu avvenire solo accordo con Equilibri Onlus SERVER LOCATION: C/O Telnet S.r.l., Via Buozzi, 5 27100 Pavia Equilibri S.r.l. una societ del gruppo Bridge That Gap. Bridge That Gap Group: Via Vigevano 39, 20144 Milano Tel. +39 028360642 Fax. +39 0258109661

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