UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT RETURN DATE: August 1, 2013 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------x IN THE MATTER

OF: ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess Debtor. CHAPTER 7 --------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Plaintiff/Creditor, v. ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01229-ess Defendant/debtor, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC., Defendants/Creditors, THIRD AMENDED VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS COMPLAINT KOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered), Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR, Cross-Claimants, v. MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Cross-Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------x Michael Krichevsky, Plaintiff, Pro Se, sues defendants and under penalty of perjury respectfully alleges upon his firsthand knowledge, except where it stated upon information and belief, or where it stated that he verily believes it to be true: INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT This is an action where plaintiff, with clean hands, collaterally attacks NULL and VOID documents, orders, contracts and liens. This is the action were plaintiff exercises his Constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Said grievances aroused when the defendants in contracting with plaintiff acted as predators, and some as vultures, to

obtain their goal of enrichment by unjust and unlawful means. Individual defendants in this case did not want to work hard and play by the rules as millions of Americans do. No, these defendants are smarter than other Americans are, and deserve more or so they think. Defendant Svenson was the plaintiffs girlfriend and business partner who never wanted work a day in her life. After breakup with plaintiff, she wanted to continue her parasitic lifestyle. She did not want to work and did not want to support her son. To achieve this goal, defendant Svenson attempted to blackmail plaintiff by threatening to report him and his employer to IRS and FBI, thereby making his life miserable by being subjected to their investigation and attorneys expenses. When her attempt failed, she, using money stolen from plaintiff, started a legal war against him by unleashing against him four lawyer-bullies along with police, sheriffs and family court. Defendant Svenson, through fraud, misrepresentations, defamation and violations of Penal Code of the State of New York, obtained a void order of child support, which allows her not to work and not to support her son. She and her attorneys committed and conspired to commit numerous criminal acts in violation of Penal Code of the State of New York. Defendants Svenson, Edelstein, Kotlyar and their attorneys conspired to extort money from plaintiff and force him into the short sale of his condominium to Edelstein and Kotlyar. Watching defendants Svenson, Edelstein and Kotlyar hurting plaintiff and hurting his condominium interests by not paying common charges, Homeowners Association, its board, agents and other individual corporate defendants, having fiduciary duty to intervene on behalf of plaintiff and other homeowners, refused to do so when plaintiff requested help. This is the case where these officers decided that they do not serve homeowners, but instead homeowners serve them.

All of the defendants decided that Plaintiff is weak and too busy defending himself so they can walk all over him, empty his pockets while he is laying unconscious and bleeding, loot and plunder plaintiffs hard earned assets. Lana Kaplun, under pretext of acting in the best interest of homeowners association ordered Farid Badalov and Boris Meydid to create artificial controversy with plaintiff. In the process, she, using corrupt attorneys and vexatious litigation, turned about $5000 of alleged debt created by her into about $50,000. Then she added post factum additional litigation fees and expenses to common charges, filed unlawful liens, started foreclosure of plaintiffs unit and made homeowners fit her bills by raising monthly common charges each homeowner must pay. Her behavior is akin to corporate raider like squeezing out of minority shareholders. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges the constitutionality of Oceanas Condominium. bylaws, policy and procedures. Defendants have filed two liens on Plaintiffs property without his knowledge while he challenged alleged debt in court. This is also an action that seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges Oceanas Condominium practice of deactivating magnetic keys from the amenities, building entrance and gates. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants failure to provide proper notice violated the due process clause of the 5th and14th amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 6 of the New York State Constitution JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. The plaintiff, Michael Krichevsky, at all times herein mentioned was and still is a resident of the County of Kings and the State of New York. 2. The defendant, Elena Svenson, at all times herein mentioned was and still is a resident of

the County of Kings and the State of New York. 3. All defendants did and are doing business and committed herein torts and crimes against plaintiff and his property in the County of Kings and the State of New York. 4. Venue lies in this District pursuant to Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code. 5. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 1334 of Title 28 of the United Stated Code in that this proceeding arises in and is related to the abovecaptioned Chapter 7 case under Title 11 and concerns alleged property of the Debtor, validity of liens and certain debts in this case. 6. This Court has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Section 1334 of Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 157(b)(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code, 7. This Court has the Federal Question Jurisdiction to hear cases in Law and Equity arising under violations of Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to Constitution of The United States - depravation of due process rights by state and federal actors. 8. This Court has the Federal Question Jurisdiction to hear cases under 18 U.S.C. 241: Conspiracy against rights as opposed to New York, which does not recognize cause of action for conspiracy. 9. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under 15 U.S.C. 1692k(d) as an action under the FDCPA, 28 U.S.C. 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction for the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. Declaratory relief is available pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202.

10. 11.

This Court has the Federal Question Jurisdiction to hear cases under 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). This matter is primarily a core proceeding and therefore the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to enter a final order.

12.

This court consolidated, in addition to chapter 7 bankruptcy case, 3 more cases from 3 different State Courts and created judicial economy to save taxpayers money. This, in turn, will benefit all interested parties because it will secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding as per Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.

13.

The amount in controversy exceeds $75.000, exclusive of interest and costs. PARTIES

14.

Plaintiff, MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY (KRICHEVSKY), self-governed law-abiding natural person. He was gainfully employed from 1988 until 2010. He lost his federally protected job due to the torts committed by defendant SVENSON.

15.

Defendant, ELENA SVENSON (SVENSON), was never gainfully employed since 1986.

16.

SVENSON became KRICHEVSKYs business partner and fiduciary when they in 1991 entered into confidential relationship, and later in 2000 into contracts to borrow money from a bank and to buy a condominium unit (UNIT), which is subject of controversy in this action. Since SVENSON was in confidential and partnership relationship with KRICHEVSKY, she owed KRICHEVSKY a fiduciary duty of care, duty to disclose; and a duty of good faith and fair dealings. During that whole length of relationship with SVENSON, KRICHEVSKY justifiably relied and depended on performance of these

duties. However, she individually committed and conspired with EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to commit several torts against KRICHEVSKY, UNIT and OCEANA. 17. BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANACONDOMINIUM NO TWO (OCEANA) is homeowners association and must represent ownership interests of: 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. KRICHEVSKY in the unit and common areas; and other owners individually and as a whole. OCEANA must act on behalf of unit owners as: fiduciary; or an agent; or both. OCEANA, by individual officers and board members as whole, has duties, inter alia, of care, good faith and fair dealings on behalf of unit owners and caries vicarious liability for its unlawful or negligent operation; actions or inactions of its officers, members or employees resulting in damages to both the units and unit owners due to negligence or other misconduct. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. LANA KAPLUN (KAPLUN) is unelected, de facto president of OCEANA since 2006. KAPLUN is in privity with KRICHEVSKY, and has a duty of care, duty of loyalty; duty to account; duty of confidentiality; duty of full disclosure;

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

duty to act fairly; and duty of good faith and fair dealing. KAPLUN must act on behalf of UNIT and/or unit owners and KRICHEVSKY as: fiduciary; or an agent; or both. From about 2006 and through 2008 KAPLUN, as an accountant and president of OCEANA, or through agency relationship with real estate management company, was in control of:

39. 40.

OCEANAs mail box where checks for common charges were mailed by owners; and/or bank account where owners, as an alternative method of payment, electronically transferred money using ONLINE BILL PAY service; and/or

41.

the bank account checkbook of OCEANA from which she wrote checks to lawyers, accountants and other contractors.

42.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC, (IRS), unlawfully placed a void lien against KRICHEVSYs UNIT.

43.

VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS is former tenant of SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY, who individually committed and conspired with SVENSON and KOTLYAR to commit several torts against KRICHEVSKY, UNIT and OCEANA.

44.

BORIS KOTLYAR is civil husband or a boyfriend of EDELSTEIN, who individually committed and conspired with SVENSON and EDELSTEIN to commit several torts against KRICHEVSKY, UNIT and OCEANA.

45.

COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC (COOPER) is a real estate management corporation, which by its officers and employees, has duties, inter alia, of care, good faith and fair dealings, and must act on behalf of KRICHEVSKY and unit owners as:

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

a fiduciary; or an agent; or both. Alternatively, COOPER must act on behalf of OCEANA and unit owners as: fiduciary; or an agent; or both. COOPER, by its officers and employees caries vicarious liability for its unlawful or negligent operation; actions or inactions of its officers and employees resulting in damages to both the units and unit owners due to negligence or other misconduct.

54.

FARID BADALOV (BADALOV) is licensed real estate agent and officer or employee of COOPER.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

BADALOV must act on behalf of the UNIT, unit owners and KRICHEVSKY as: fiduciary; or an agent; or both. BORIS MEYDID (MEYDID) is licensed real estate agent and officer or employee of COOPER.

60.

MEYDID must act on behalf of the UNIT, unit owners and KRICHEVSKY as:

61. 62. 63. 64.

fiduciary; or an agent; or both. LANA KAPLUN, FARID BADALOV and BORIS MEYDID are natural persons who are employed by COOPER or OCEANA. They claim to be the "authorized and designated custodians of records" for all or nearly all of the accounts on which they file liens and lawsuits against the unit owners. COOPER and individual defendants regularly collect consumer debts alleged to be due to another. Defendants are "debt collector" as defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6).

65.

Under New York law, a fiduciary relationship exists from the assumption of control and responsibility, and is founded upon trust reposed by one party in the integrity and fidelity of another. KRICHEVSKY is in privity with KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID, and sues KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID personally for breach of fiduciary duty, trust and other misconducts as officers and fiduciaries of OCEANA and COOPER.

66.

John Doe and Jane Johns are unidentified or unknown to KRICHEVSKY unlawful actors of OCEANA or COOPER, or both who harmed him. They are persons associated with OCEANA and/or COOPER who were involved in the violations of laws alleged in this Complaint.

67.

Also, KRICHEVSKY sues individual defendants personally because they each committed torts:

68. 69.

on their own; and against interests of homeowners they work for; or

70. 71. 72.

intentionally and knowingly acted upon unlawful policy or order of superior, and/or superiors themselves; and/or conspired with other defendants to harm KRICHEVSKY and the UNIT. Their actions or inactions were against public policy.

73.

Alternatively or in addition, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID sued by KRICHEVSKY personally because they each committed torts:

74. 75.

on their own; negligently, maliciously and recklessly acted against interests of KRICHEVSKY and homeowners they work for; or

76. 77.

negligently and recklessly acted upon unlawful policy or order of superior, and/or superiors themselves. Their actions or inactions were against public policy. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

78.

KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON, unmarried individuals, jointly entered into a written contract with developer, Brighton Two LLC, to buy the UNIT, known as and located at 120 Oceans, Drive West, Apt. 5D, Brooklyn, NY 11235 as partners.

79. 80. 81.

The purchase price for the UNIT was $420,000.00. KRICHEVSKY owns in fee no less than an undivided one-half interest in said UNIT. Said premises were conveyed by deed dated November 26, 2001 and recorded on February 27, 2002, Reel 5494, Page 2289.

82.

On or about December 2005, both SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY moved out of the UNIT and entered into a one-year lease agreement with EDELSTEIN at a monthly rent of $2,500. The lease contained an option to renew for an additional three years at 3% annual

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increases. 83. 84. At the beginning of 2008, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY decided to break up as couple. However, they continued to be in fiduciary relationship because they had son and jointly owned property. 85. At all relevant times, SVENSON starts using a legal advice of her attorneys to commit series of torts against her son, KRICHEVSKY and the UNIT. 86. On or about April 2009, KRICHEVSKY notifies EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR through their attorney, Nicholas Ratush, that SVENSON refused to pay KRICHEVSKY or OCEANA common charges out of rent money she received from EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR. 87. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR violated, inter alia, New York Real Estate Law by refusing to pay common charges to OCEANA out of rent money they paid to SVENSON. 88. KRICHEVSKY is informed by EDELSTEINs attorneys and verily believes that since August 2008 until November 2009, SVENSON has collected and retained all rent monies received from EDELSTEIN, which is at least $35,000. 89. SVENSON never paid any income tax from the above amount of money.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON - Life Long Fraud/Fraud upon US Government and Immigration Court 90. 91. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. On or about December of 1991 KRICHEVSKYs friends, Galina and Fred, tell him that they have mutual friend who is divorced and looking to start a family. 92. Averments stated below, were discovered by KRICHEVSKY on or about November

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2008 going forward to 2010 2012. KRICHEVSKY discovered and believes that SVENSON (maiden name Gaber) in 1988 fictitiously married Sam Svenson (SAM) in order to emigrate from Germany through marriage with him as US citizen. 93. Galina and Fred introduce SVENSON to KRICHEV SKY and she, acting as a marriage con artist with false identity, tells him that she is divorced and looking to start a family. She tells KRICHEVSKY that she is full time attending Long Island University medical school to become a nurse. These representations were materially false representations of facts, which will be explained in details below. These representations were intentionally and foreseeably designed by SVENSON to persuade KRICHEVSKY to meet SVENSON on a date for the first time. She knew that KRICHEVSKY is paralegal, has a good paying job and planning to go to law school. SVENSON was not working or had any business at that time and needed an image of herself that she is worthy marriage candidate hence full time medical school student. If she carried an image of a lazy non-working gold digger, would anybody marry or have a child with her? But-for these representations, KRICHEVSKY would never decide to meet SVENSON. 94. In reality SVENSON (real name Gaber), at age about 35, was single none-working illegal immigrant attempting to evade US immigration laws through marriage with fictitious US citizen Sam Svenson. She had no profession or college degree. In order to look more respectable for her age, she changed her identity to ELENA SVENSON US citizen, divorcee and full time medical school student. 95. KRICHEVSKY trusts SVENSON, justifiably relies on above representations and enters into confidential relationship with her.

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96.

Upon information derived from immigration documents discovered by KRICHEVSKY in 2008 and belief, on October 10, 1991 SVENSON signs application for naturalization in USA, Exhibit A. (same as in amended complaint and incorporated by reference herein)

97.

It is fraud and deceit to start dating KRICHEVSKY as divorcee on or about December 1991,

98. 99. 100. 101.

move in KRICHEVSKYs apartment in about spring-summer of 1992; and, while living with him in his apartment for more than a year, on or about April 15, 1993 secretly from US government and KRICHEVSKY meet with her fictitious husband, SAM;

102. 103.

and both go to tax preparer Rima Rubinstein; and both sign under penalty of perjury joint Income Tax return as husband and wife living together at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt 2M in Brooklyn for the year of 1992 in order to submit this document to immigration authority and IRS.

104.

It is fraud and deceit, secretly from immigration authority, IRS and KRICHEVSKY, a few month later to file for divorce

105. 106. 107. 108.

on the grounds that SAM in 1992 left marital residence, which they claimed to be at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt 2M in Brooklyn, and constructively abandoned SVENSON. Their divorce papers state that SAM constructively abandoned SVENSON on or about August of 1992.

109.

In spring of 1992, SVENSON introduces KRICHEVSKY to her parents who live at 2580

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Ocean Pkwy, Apt. 2M, Brooklyn New York. KRICHEVSKY presumes, SVENSON and SAM never lived at said address together at alleged times. 110. These fraudulent and deceptive acts defrauded government, KRICHEVSKY personally and as a taxpayer, and constitute fraudulent concealment of her sham marital status. 111. Upon information derived from discovered immigration documents and belief, the person named SAM SVENSON is fiction created by the SVENSON is for sham marriage of defendant SVENSON, maiden name Gaber. 112. Upon information and belief, the person named SAM SVENSON does not exist because the Social Security number of fictitious SAM SVENSON belongs to the person named ANISIM ZVIDRIN, likely a Gabers family friend. 113. SVENSON knew or should have known that there was a presumption by immigration authorities that their marriage is sham and made for SVENSON to evade immigration laws and obtain residency in USA. 114. To rebut this presumption SVENSON and SAM required production of real and/or documentary evidence such as they live together as husband and wife at the same address as family, have joint bank account, jointly purchased real estate or have a child together. 115. Alternatively, SVENSON and ANISIM ZVIDRIN signed immigration documents and IRS documents where ANISIM ZVIDRIN forged signature of SAM in presence of SVENSON and appeared as SAM in front of immigration officers with fake ID. 116. Also alternatively, instead of ANISIM ZVIDRIN impersonating SAM some other person using ANISIM ZVIDRINs Social Security number impersonated SAM. 117. Accordingly, SVENSON created a false identity for herself, which is illegal. Her

14

citizenship, passport and whatever document with name ELENA SVENSON are null and void. 118. KRICHEVSKY presumes, to accomplish the fraud she or they produced 1992 income tax return and submitted it to immigration authorities and IRS. 119. KRICHEVSKY presumes, by this trick SVENSON fraudulently conceals from immigration authorities and IRS that she actually lives with KRICHEVSKY in his apartment on Bedford Avenue in Brooklyn, and not at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt 2M in Brooklyn with SAM as family. 120. Additionally, the fact that SVENSON lived with KRICHEVSKY while married to SAM constitutes adultery. That fact would make her a person of bad moral character by immigration authorities and make her not eligible to obtain a legal status in USA. 121. SVENSON knew that she was not divorced, because she was married from 1988 until 1994 to SAM. KRICHEVSKY presumes, it was misrepresentations of material facts, known to be false when made in order to induce KRICHEVSKYs justifiable reliance on misrepresented facts. KRICHEVSKY justifiably relied on misrepresentations that she is US citizen, divorced, going to medical school full time, and looking to start a family with him. These fraudulent concealments and misrepresentations later on detrimentally resulted in his injury and damages. 122. Immigration authority and IRS justifiably relied on SVENSONs misrepresentations of material facts and wrongfully approved her immigration status, citizenship and allowed her to remain in USA legally. While everybody believed that SVENSON is legally in USA, she obtained an opportunity to act as a gold digger and later on to defraud

15

KRICHEVSKY out of his life and property. 123. KRICHEVSKY at all material times justifiably relied on SVENSONs US passport erroneously given to SVENSON by government and believed that her immigration status is legal. As a direct and foreseeable by SVENSON result, KRICHEVSKY relied on US government passport and treated SVENSON as US citizen and honest person. 124. On May 24, 2013, KRICHEVSKY discovered that about one year before SVENSON met him in 1991, she lived with Michael Gordin in his apartment for a year, and not with SAM as family further proof of immigration fraud by SVENSON. 125. 126. In 1994 the parties child, David, was born. In 1994, SVENSON breached KRICHEVSKYs trust and used KRICHEVSKY to further commit marriage and immigration fraud by inducing KRICHEVSKY to name his newborn son David Svenson instead of David Krichevsky. 127. At all relevant times, she lied to KRICHEVSKY that she went to Astrologist and he told her that she has to change her name to SVENSON from Gaber and her children should have the name SVENSON as well. KRICHEVSKY was in love with SVENSON and trusted her misrepresentations of these material facts. 128. Even though her marriage with SAM is sham and fictitious, she knowingly submits her paperwork for US Citizenship and Naturalization in USA as real evidence that David Svenson, Elena Svenson and Sam Svenson are real family. This by itself is another reason why SVENSONs Citizenship, passport and other documents with the name SVENSON are NULL and VOID, and this type of fraud upon the government has no statute of limitation to prosecute.

16

129.

The fact that SVENSON comes from GERMANY to USA, gets married to SAM as US citizen, and at the same time tells the world and KRICHEVSKY that she is divorced and looking to form a family,

130. 131.

does not live together with SAM as husband and wife having a romance, but, instead, lives with KRICHEVSKY is an evidence of immigration fraud and sham marriage with SAM as fictitious person.

132.

On or about 1996 1997, SVENSON tells KRICHEVSKY that she learned about new trend developing in Long Island University medical school. She tells him that many students from her class are transferring from nursing study to psychology study. She tells that doctors psychologists are in great demand and she would like to become one. She is asking KRICHEVSKY to bear with her many years of study and continue financially supporting her a little longer, and in return, she will be able to open up private practice and make more money than nurse.

133.

At all relevant times, while SVENSON lived with KRICHEVSKY, she complained to him about how hard it is to study full time in medical school. She would leave home early morning and comeback late afternoon. In order to care for the partys son, KRICHEVSKY paid for housekeeper, private preschool that allowed the child to be there until 6 pm for SVENSON to pick him up after her school, did shopping while his motherin-law was mostly doing cooking.

134.

Above-mentioned facts about medical school and study were false and SVENSON knew they were false at the time she made these representations. The truth was that she went to school only for 3 hours a day, and not every day. That fact will hardly qualify for the full

17

time study in school. Additionally, school records show she never studied in nursing school, but from 1991 studied psychology. 135. KRICHEVSKY justifiably relied on her representations and agreed to continue supporting her financially and otherwise. 136. At all relevant times, by contrast, KRICHEVSKY was working 60 80 hours per week, including sometimes weekends and holidays in order to support what he thought was real family. He would come home late after SVENSON allegedly finished her schools homework and watches TV. 137. In the year of 2000, SVENSON tells KRICHEVSKY and his friends that she would graduate from her medical school in 2001. 138. SVENSON, by the above false representation, on or about August 2000, fraudulently induced KRICHEVSKY into joint purchase of UNIT by intentionally misrepresenting to KRICHEVSKY that in 2001 she would graduate from her medical school, will become a doctor psychologist and will financially contribute to expenses associated with purchase of the UNIT, as well as to future expenses. 139. SVENSON fraudulently induced KRICHEVSKY into joint purchase of UNIT by knowingly and intentionally withholding the fact that from 1998 until 2001 she did not attend her medical school at all. She would live home early and comeback late afternoon as she always did, complaining about being tired from study and watching TV to rest and relax. 140. SVENSON fraudulently induced KRICHEVSKY to lend the money for her startup medical billing and management business.

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141.

When this business started to generate a cash flow, SVENSON, instead of contributing and repaying money to KRICHEVSKY, fraudulently concealed embezzlement, conversion and fraudulent transfer of more than $100,000 from joint business account to her secret personal account via friends and relatives in Germany, Exhibit B.(same as in amended complaint and incorporated by reference herein).

142.

Even though SVENSON, at that time, had several secret personal bank accounts in Astoria Federal Savings in Brooklyn and in Europe, she intentionally wrote several checks out of partys joint business account to her family members and friends in Germany. KRICHEVSKY infers and presumes that this done without KRICHEVSKYs knowledge and consent in order to conceal her fraudulent money transfers from KRICHEVSKY, which he accidentally discovered in 2010. It is unknown what other fraudulent transfers made by SVENSON because the documents that discovered are not complete bank records.

143.

After the sale of her cooperative apartment, she told KRICHEVSKY that she deposited the check from the sale into partys joint business account in order to reduce amount of mortgage and pay for her business expenses. However, KRICHEVSKY discovered that she never did this.

144.

This fact discovered by KRICHEVSKY in 2010 when SVENSONs attorney produced some records from this business account during litigation in Kings County Supreme Court. Moreover, SVENSON fraudulently concealed from the court and KRICHEVSKY said fraudulent transfers of money to Germany, and instead, blamed KRICHEVSKY for stealing this money from her. In that action she perjuriously claimed that she was not in

19

control of joint business account, wrote no checks and that KRICHEVSKY had control over the account. She also stated in her affidavit of merit that she had no idea where money went and that KRICHEVSKY defrauded her out of her check for the sale of cooperative unit. 145. In her motion to dismiss KRICHEVSKYs 2nd amended complaint in instant action she changes her story and 146. 147. 148. 149. admits to being in control of the joint business account. She admits to writing several checks to her family and friends in Germany, but now her story is that everything in this account is hers, she had a right to transfer her money out and did not have a duty to inform or ask KRICHEVSKY for permission. 150. KRICHEVSKY is at loss as to which version of her story regarding joint bank account he has to believe. KRICHEVSKY must know, was SVENSON lying then, to Judge Bunyan, or is she lying now to Judge Stong? Without this information, KRICHEVSKY is unable to reply to her motion to dismiss. 151. In conclusion and presumptively, KRICHEVSKYs contract with SVENSON to buy the UNIT is void due to illegality, fraud at the inducement; and her title to the UNIT is null and void due to illegality of her false identity as well. 152. 153. Additionally, every document and signature signed by SVENSON is nullity and forgery. KRICHEVSKY justifiably relied on her citizenship status, passport given her by US government and as consequence justifiably relied on SVENSONs misrepresentations about her immigration status, divorcee status, full time student status; and was not aware

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of her fraudulent concealment of these material facts to his detriment, injury and loss. 154. If immigration authorities immediately discovered the true facts stated above, SVENSON would never receive a legal status in USA and would be jailed. 155. If KRICHEVSKY immediately discovered the fraud, he would have acted differently and
would not even meet SVENSON, least deal with her in any way. Accordingly, SVENSON

intentionally and fraudulently induced KRICHEVSKYs consent to enter into confidential and business relationship with her. 156.
As a direct and foreseeable by SVENSON result of fraudulent concealment of material facts, deceit and misrepresentation of material facts and reality, SVENSON intentionally induced KRICHEVSKY into relationship allowing her to illegally exploit this relationship to her

benefit and unjustly enrich herself for more than 15 years. 157. Her false identity, misrepresentations, fraudulent concealment of material facts and deceit continued from 1991 until present and KRICHEVSKY invokes doctrines of continuous violation and equitable tolling to deny SVENSONs affirmative defense of statute of limitation for equitable relief. 158. SVENSON acted illegally, unlawfully, maliciously and oppressively. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial; declaratory judgment that SVENSONs citizenship is void due to forgery and fraud upon the US government and immigration court; alternatively, that this court refers this matter to the Department of Homeland

21

Security or other appropriate authority for adjudication; declaratory judgment that SVENSONs and KRICHEVSKYs joint contract to buy the UNIT from developer is void for illegality, forgery and fraud; declaratory judgment that SVENSONs title to the UNIT is void for illegality, forgery and fraud. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON - Breach of Contract/Constructive Fraud 159. 160. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. Before entering into contract to buy the UNIT from developer, SVENSON in 2000 represented to KRICHEVSKY that she would graduate from her medical school in 2001. KRICHEVSKY became glad and welcomed this news. SVENSON then represented to him that she, subsequently, will start work or business and will contribute toward purchase and future expenses associated with purchase of the UNIT. Later on, KRICHEVSKY discovered that said representations were misrepresentations of material facts by SVENSON, because at that time she did not go to school at all and knew she will not graduate in 2001. 161. KRICHEVSKY reasonably relied on these misrepresentations, as he reasonably believed that studying full time from 1991 until 2001 is enough time to graduate and become a psychologist. Consequently, KRICHEVSKY agreed to enter into contract with SVENSON to buy the UNIT from the developer. 162. SVENSON knew or should have known that bank would not lend money to any person without any kind of income. 163. To accomplish the above requirement, in 2000 or beginning of 2001 SVENSON, as a

22

sham, enters into medical billing and office management business. This would allow her to claim that she is a businessperson on banks loan application, which she claimed. 164. The business required her to graduate from her medical school in 2001 and obtain a driver license in order to devote her full time for business and to be mobile. 165. Within all relevant times, she borrows $120,000 from KRICHEVSKY to start and run this business. 166. SVENSON promises to repay the loan when business starts paying back. In 2010 KRICHEVSKY discovered from SVENSONs financial statements produced by her in Kings County Supreme Court action and believes that this business did bring some profit before closing of the UNIT, but SVENSON fraudulently transferred proceeds from joint bank account via her friends and relatives into Germany (exhibit Incorporated from prior complaint)?. 167. Before the closing, KRICHEVSKY requests that SVENSON takes over from him all tasks associated with bookkeeping and banking of their affairs because he does not have time to do it due to long hours of his work and renovation he plans to start on the UNIT. 168. 169. SVENSON agrees and takes over these tasks. Thereafter, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY jointly applied for a loan from the bank in order to buy that UNIT. 170. The doctrine of implied contract states that when parties jointly enter into contract with third party, and there is no express contract between entering parties themselves as to contracts special terms and conditions between them, this fact gives an inference and presumption that each party mutually intended to pay on their own for goods or services

23

delivered. Accordingly, by jointly entering into contract to buy the UNIT from the developer, and by jointly entering and applying for the loan from the bank to buy said UNIT, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY bilaterally entered into contract with each other to be duty bound to jointly pay, own, share and care for the unit. 171. The joint contract to buy the UNIT and joint loan application constitutes contract between SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY for each partys duty to contribute financially toward paying off the loan. 172. Because this contract did not specify percentage of financial contribution by each party, it implied and parties had orally agreed to own equal shares and equally share all costs and expenses associated with the purchase. 173. At that time, SVENSON owned a cooperative unit located at 2580 Ocean Parkway, Apt. 2M, Brooklyn, NY 11235. SVENSON represented to KRICHEVSKY that she would obtain a home equity line of credit ("HELOC") against her cooperative unit in order to liquidate funds necessary for her to contribute her share toward down payment of the purchase price of the unit, closing costs and future renovation. 174. SVENSON's HELOC application was denied right before the closing and closing took place without her contributing any funds. 175. Because SVENSON's HELOC application was denied, she represented to KRICHEVSKY that she would sell her cooperative apartment and contribute funds later, after the sale of it. 176. Due to denial of HELOC, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY had to reapply for new, bigger loan in order to perform by contract with developer.

24

177.

The closing, which was delayed for that reason, took place on or about November 26, 2001 instead of September 26, 2001.

178.

For the reason of delaying the closing, the seller charged buyers additional fees, which were paid by KRICHEVSKY at closing.

179.

KRICHEVSKY solely and completely contributed funds to buy the UNIT, which sums exceeded 55,000.00 including the down payment and closing costs.

180.

On or about November 26, 2001, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY became the owners in fee of real property known as and located at 120 Oceana Drive West, Apt 5D, Brooklyn, NY by purchasing the property from Brighton Two LLC.

181.

On or about November 26, 2001, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY each executed a first mortgage on the subject property for $378,000.00 held by JP Morgan Chase Bank.

182.

SVENSON, by applying for the 30-year loan, enters into contract with KRICHEVSKY and the bank that she will keep paying for up to 30 years for the unit until it paid off.

183.

That required her to have a job or business and to generate income in order to be able to fill in loan application.

184.

KRICHEVSKY reasonably relies on SVENSONs misrepresentations that she would graduate in 2001, will run business, perform bookkeeping and banking as he believes that after graduation she would want to succeed and make money from her business and profession. It was reasonable reliance to lend SVENSON money for her business, as many banks make student loans, and students are promising to repay them back when they start a job or business. With that in mind, KRICHEVSKY lends her money to start the business and enters into contracts to buy the UNIT.

25

185.

SVENSON intentionally defaulted and breached her contracts and oral agreements with KRICHEVSKY by failing to graduate in 2001 and obtain a driver license to be mobile.

186.

When final exams are over, SVENSON tells KRICHEVSKY that she failed some subjects because it is too difficult and hard to study the subjects of psychology with her English as second language. She asks KRICHEVSKY to bear with her just a little longer until she passes her failed subjects and finally graduates. Feeling sorry for her believed hard work, KRICHEVSKY agrees to wait. SVENSON continues to leave home early and come back late afternoon until 2002. By that time, partys son is going to private school in order for SVENSON to pick him up at 6:00 PM from her medical school. Again, KRICHEVSKY pays $600 plus $150 for the transportation per month in order for SVENSON to study hard full time and finally graduate.

187.

In 2003, KRICHEVSKY tells SVENSON to quit her medical school and just go to find any job and help him financially.

188.

SVENSON begs KRICHEVSKY to wait one more year and she swears she will graduate and his patience will pay back handsomely.

189.

SVENSON knew that her representations are false because from 1998 until 2001 she did not attend her medical school at all and used her study excuse in order not to work.

190.

When she finally graduates in 2004 as psychologist, she intentionally fails to find any meaningful job, while her business went under and closed with remaining Accounts Receivables, which she refuses to manage.

191.

At all relevant times, KRICHEVSKY substantially performs on said contracts by paying all costs associated with purchase and carrying expenses of UNIT.

26

192.

On or about October of 2002, SVENSONSs cooperative unit sells for approximately $180,000.

193.

However, SVENSON fails to contribute any funds toward the purchase of the UNIT. SVENSON's failure to equally contribute to purchase of this UNIT and pay any carrying costs and expenses associated with the UNIT constitute a breach of the parties' contract to equally share all costs and expenses associated with purchase of the UNIT.

194.

Despite the parties' prior agreement to share costs and expenses, all monthly carrying expenses including mortgage payments, utility charges, taxes and maintenance fees were solely and completely contributed by KRICHEVSKY. Said monthly carrying expenses were approximately $3,500.00.

195.

In addition, on or about December 2001, KRICHEVSKY commences major renovations in the UNIT, which includes a rehabilitation of the bathrooms, closets, kitchen, ceilings throughout, plumbing throughout, and tiling throughout.

196.

Additionally, KRICHEVSKY earns no less than $300,000 in sweat equity in the UNIT. Sweat equity included - architectural design, decoration, research, supplying materials and labor.

197.

All costs and expenses associated with the renovations, totaling over $75,000 (without mortgage and common charges) were paid solely and completely by KRICHEVSKY.

198.

On or about July 2005, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON try to refinance their mortgage in order to get a lower monthly payment.

199.

Because SVENSON fails to find any job and does not pay her credit card bills on time, her FICA score is low.

27

200.

That fact makes KRICHEVSKYs score lower as well, which prevents him from refinancing.

201.

As the partys relationship begins to deteriorate and at the advice of mortgage broker, SVENSON enters into an agreement with KRICHEVSKY, whereby she agrees to transfer her one-half interest in the subject property back to KRICHEVSKY in order for him to be the sole borrower and owner, which would qualify him for a higher FICA score.

202.

Thereafter, on or about August 11, 2005, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON refinance their mortgage and enter into a loan consolidation, extension and modification agreement whereby Washington Mutual Bank, N.A. becomes the holder of a consolidated note in the amount of $565,000 and KRICHEVSKY becomes the sole borrower.

203.

All monthly carrying expenses under the refinance agreement, including mortgage payments, utility charges, taxes and maintenance fees, were solely and completely contributed by KRICHEVSKY.

204.

Said monthly carrying expenses were approximately $2,500 (ARM with negative amortization).

205.

Even though the bank approved SVENSON for a loan in 2001, her intentional failure to subsequently maintain an income stream forced KRICHEVSKY to pay her share of the loan and carrying costs and expenses associated with the UNIT, causing KRICHEVSKY to lose money and other business opportunities.

206.

SVENSON has not worked or paid her share of the expenses, though demands have repeatedly been made.

28

207.

About a week after refinancing, closing agent told Krichevsky that transfer of SVENSONs share of the UNIT would cost KRICHEVSKY approximately $50,000.00.

208.

About a week after closing, KRICHEVSKY learned from SVENSON of an approximately $100,000 federal tax lien on the UNIT based on SVENSON's failure to pay her personal income taxes for the 2002 fiscal year. These 2 events prevented KRICHEVSKY from finalizing transfer of SVENSONs share of the UNIT to him.

209.

SVENSONs unwillingness to work, constant excuses and promises that never kept plays major role in break up with KRICHEVSKY in 2008.

210.

During partys discussion of division of assets in 2008, SVENSON admits to KRICHEVSKY that she was lying to him all this time. However, she says to KRICHEVSKY vagina does not give money back (straight translation of Russian slang) and

211. 212.

demands equal distribution of assets. This is when SVENSON starts blackmailing KRICHEVSKY and writes him the blackmailing note and verbally threatens him to drive him into bankruptcy.

213.

In 2008, SVENSON secretly from KRICHEVSKY offers and negotiates a one-year lease to EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR.

214.

SVENSON does not tell KRICHEVSKY or ask him whether he would agree with that in breach of her partnership duties and agreement to do everything jointly.

215.

From 2001 until 2008, KRICHEVSKY did not do anything with the UNIT without first discussing it with SVENSON.

216.

SVENSON's offer of a lease agreement to EDELSTEIN during the pendency of a

29

summary holdover proceeding commenced by KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON constitutes an intentional breach of the parties' agreement and duties to recover possession of the UNIT, which sabotaged parties ability to sell it. 217. KRICHEVSKY is informed by SVENSONs former partner Gregory Belenkiy and verily believes that in 2010-2011 she finally received some share of the profits from the Account Receivable, but intentionally concealed disclosure of this fact to family court, bankruptcy court and KRICHEVSKY. 218. SVENSON refused to repay KRICHEVSKY the business loan that she received in 20002001 even though she had the money. 219. In 2011 KRICHEVSKY learned from SVENSONs school record that from 1998 1999 until 2001 SVENSON did not attend her medical school at all. If KRICHEVSKY knew about this fact then, he would never enter with her into contract to buy the UNIT and would never lend the money for medical business. 220. Because SVENSON in all these years did have money to contribute, her failure to contribute was fraudulent, unjustifiable, willful and intentional. 221. SVENSON's actions have substantially damaged and continue to damage KRICHEVSKY in an exact amount to be determined at trial, but no less than $600,000. 222. In addition, SVENSON acted illegally using false identity, unlawfully, maliciously and oppressively. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial.

30

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Waste 223. 224. 225. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. SVENSON had a duty of care for the UNIT and its value. She knew or should have known that numerous liens on the property together with foreclosure action diminish the value of the property. 226. 227. 228. She knew or should have known that foreclosure action leads to total loss of the UNIT. She breached her duty and is liable. From 2008 until present SVENSON engages herself in self-destructing behavior against the UNIT and KRICHEVSY. 229. SVENSON commits waste and injury upon the UNIT, by neglecting and failing to pay her personal income taxes for the 2002 fiscal year; thus 230. 231. causing a federal lien to be placed on the property; and by neglecting and failing to pay the loan and common charges out of rent received from EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR for the UNIT. 232. 233. 234. SVENSON commits waste and injury upon the UNIT by neglecting and failing to: contact IRS and workout a payment plan; or contact her accountant to work out a payment plan with IRS after KRICHEVSKY hires an accountant for SVENSON; and 235. 236. avoid placement of the IRS lien on the unit. In spring of 2009, KRICHEVSKYs attorney Daniel Singer, Esq. by OSC notifies SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR that KRICHEVSKY is unable without rent to pay and stopped all payments for the UNIT.

31

237.

He warns them of imminent foreclosure and asks the court to order defendants to turn rent to his escrow account in order to save the UNIT from foreclosure.

238.

In reply, SVENSON, while collecting about $2850 in rent, refuses to give any money to save the UNIT, and instead, knowingly and intentionally commits waste and injury upon the unit by:

239. 240. 241.

hiring and paying cash to numerous attorneys to obstruct and delay justice; and conspiring with EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to delay eviction action KRICHEVSKY starts in 2008 in Kings County Supreme Court and Kings County Landlord & Tenant Court; and

242.

becoming in contempt of court when she settles for $7000 OSC Hon. Bert Bunyan worked out with her toward paying expenses for UNIT, but

243. 244.

she fails to obey that order; and becomes in contempt, but continues to pay her attorney, BIANCINELLO, to argue her contempt with KRICHEVSKY and judge.

245.

SVENSON knowingly commits waste and injury upon the UNIT by neglecting and failing to:

246.

appear in Civil Court to defend this UNIT when OCENA on or about October 2009 starts action against SVENSON, EDELSTEIN, KOTLYAR and KRICHEVSKY; and

247. 248. 249. 250.

fails to pay common charges out of rent when OCEANA demands payment in court; and defaults in that action while KRICHEVSKY appears to defend the UNIT; and gives OCEANA an opportunity to add legal fees and expenses, late fees; and gives them opportunity to place a lien on the unit due to her default.

32

251.

SVENSON knowingly commits waste and injury upon the UNIT by defaming KRICHEVSKY in family court; and by

252. 253.

defaming and harassing his employer in family court; and personally demanding and causing employer to fire KRICHEVSKY, which in turn made KRICHEVSKY unemployed and unable to care for the UNIT without an income.

254.

KRICHEVSKY believes that her attorney Mr. Biancanello latter on dropped her representation after realizing that he is aiding and abetting her commission of torts.

255.

As a direct result or proximate cause of her deliberate self-destructive acts above, on or about August of 2009 Bank of America started foreclosure action against the UNIT.

256. 257.

Above acts constitute an abandonment of her interest in the UNIT. SVENSON's actions have caused KRICHEVSKY damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but no less than $500,000.

258.

In addition, the defendant acted unlawfully, maliciously and oppressively. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest and attorneys fees.

259.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial; declaratory judgment that her waste actions against the UNIT constitute abandonment of interest in it; declaratory judgment awarding full title of the unit to KRICHEVSKY. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON Promissory Estoppel

260. 261.

KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. SVENSON should be held liable under the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. She on or

33

about August 2000 made a clear and definite promise to graduate from medical school and contribute to down payment of the UNIT at the time of signing contract with developer to buy the UNIT. Closing was scheduled to occur a year later. 262. Even though SVENSON did not contribute any money at closing, when in 2002 SVENSON sold her cooperative apartment for $180,000 she did not contribute anything to the purchase of the UNIT. 263. KRICHEVSKY refrained himself from other investment opportunities on his own and reasonably and foreseeably relied on SVENSONs promise to his detriment. He was injured by having to pay virtually all expenses when SVENSON did not keep her promise. 264. In addition, SVENSON acted illegally, unlawfully, maliciously and willfully. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Constructive Trust/Unjust Enrichment 265. 266. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. SVENSON has received the benefit of the financing and payments made by KRICHEVSKY to purchase the UNIT, start her business and acquired a half of the interest in it without paying her half of price and expenses. 267. During all material times, SVENSON had money available to contribute and pay, but

34

refused and fraudulently concealed this material fact from KRICHEVSKY. If KRICHEVSKY knew that SVENSON had money available, but concealed this material fact from him, he would have acted differently and would not deal with SVENSON in any way. 268. SVENSON was contractually and equitably obligated to KRICHEVSKY, but failed to pay her share to purchase said premises thought promised to do so. 269. As fiduciary and business partner, SVENSON owned KRICHEVSKY a duty of disclosure that she had money available. 270. As a consequence of concealment of money availability, which is material fact, SVENSON has received the benefit of the payments made from 2000 and continued to be made by KRICHEVSKY until 2008 to cover all costs and expenses associated with the UNIT and her business. 271. Contractually, in equity and in good conscience, SVENSON should be ordered to pay her share of the acquiring and carrying costs and expenses, and should be ordered to transfer all rent monies collected from the UNIT to KRICHEVSKY. 272. Svenson has been unjustly enriched at the expense of KRICHEVSKY in an amount to be determined at trial, but no less than $600,000. 273. In addition, the defendant acted illegally, unlawfully, maliciously and willfully. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial.

35

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Conversion 274. 275. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. SVENSON, without authority, has refused to provide KRICHEVSKY with his share of profits derived from the rental of the UNIT. She completely pocketed about $35,000 she received from EDELSTEIN. 276. Between 2000 and 2004, SVENSON, without authority, knowledge and consent from KRICHEVSKY, fraudulently transferred from parties joint business bank account at least $100,000 to her personal bank accounts via friends and relatives into Germany. 277. KRICHEVSKY specifically refers to 140 149 and incorporates them here by reference. 278. As such, SVENSON has unlawfully excluded KRICHEVSKY and has wrongfully converted KRICHEVSKYs property to her own. 279. After the discovery of fraudulent transfers in 2010, KRICHEVSKY demanded numerous times that SVENSON returned his property, but she refused. 280. By reason of the foregoing, KRICHEVSKY has sustained money damages together with interest, expenses and attorneys fees in the sum to be determined at trial, but no less than $175,000. 281. In addition, the defendant acted unlawfully, maliciously and oppressively. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial.

36

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Accounting 282. 283. KRICHEVSKY adopts every allegation above by reference herein From about 2000 until 2004, SVENSON fraudulently transferred money from joint business account to her own in Germany by writing checks to her relatives and friends; did not deposit $180,000 check from the sale of her COOP. 284. From October 2001 until November 2008, the parties had agreed to pay the joint obligations for the UNIT including but not limited to: down payment, bank loan, utilities, maintenance, improvements, repairs and other expenses. KRICHEVSKY believes, SVENSON has failed to pay any noteworthy portion of these expenses. It is unknown what amounts, if any, have been contributed by SVENSON. 285. In addition, SVENSON has rented the premises without any notice to KRICHEVSKY and has not accounted for the rents she has presumably received. Additionally, upon information from her partner Gregory Belenkiy and personal belief, she received hundreds of thousands of dollars from her Accounts Receivable, which she never accounted for. 286. Upon information derived from KRICHEVSKYs investigation, SVENSON wired money to Germany or Luxemburg using account #554 from company RIA. 287. KRICHEVSKY lacks sufficient knowledge of the exact amounts embezzled and of rents and profits due and owing to him. 288. 289. KRICHEVSKY lacks an adequate remedy at law, as such, an accounting is required, WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands order directing SVENSON and EDELSTEIN to produce all books and records.

37

EIGHT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON-Partition 290. 291. KRICHEVSKY adopts every allegation above by reference herein. By SVENSONs breach of the contract, waste and intentional pushing the UNIT into foreclosure, she abandoned her interest and waved her right to this UNIT. 292. SVENSON intentionally defaulted in every legal action involving her interest and right to this UNIT. 293. She deliberately wasted and injured this UNIT and any equity in it she could have disappeared. 294. 295. She has no stake in it now and uses it as toll to harm KRICHEVSKY and unit owners. KRICHEVSKY no longer able and desires to hold and use the property in common with SVENSON and is entitled to an order partitioning the premises. 296. Now, the sale of the UNIT for a reasonable price is impossible due to loss of equity in it, and it is "under water." If the UNIT is sold today, KRICHEVSKY will lose his interest and money invested in this UNIT. 297. Actions of SVENSON brought about the following negativities that affect the price and ability to sell the unit, which is: slander of title, clouded title, numerous liens, difficulty for prospective buyers to obtain a mortgage, and OCEANA initiated additional foreclosure of the unit. 298. Because SVENSON is literally acting as a "monkey on the back" of KRICHEVSKY, he is unable to care for or save this UNIT from the future imminent foreclosure by the banks or OCEANA. 299. SVENSON, having an income and funds is not planning to settle her debts with

38

OCEANA and KRICHEVSKY. SVENSON's actions have made partition appropriate and necessary. 300. No settlement between the parties has ever been discussed and the property remains titled in the names of KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands declaratory judgment awarding KRICHEVSKY the whole title to the UNIT. NINETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON - Fraud upon the Family Court 301. 302. 303. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. In New York, statute of limitation for fraud is six years and this claim is timely. The Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction and the power to void and set aside any State judgment or order obtained through fraud upon the court and deprivation of KRICHEVSKYs constitutionally well established right to defend him within due process of law. 304. The final order of the Family Court for child support is VOID due to fraud upon the court by SVENSON and SVENSONs attorney, Yonatan Levoritzs misconducts. During the child support proceedings in Family Court the following KRICHEVSKYs constitutional rights to due process of law were violated and denied: 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. the right to face his accuser and examine her during proceeding, the right to bring a witness in his defense, the right to impeach a witness against him, the right to discovery, the right to and meaningful opportunity to be heard, and

39

310. 311.

the right to a competent and unbiased tribunal. As the direct and proximate result of the above deprivation of constitutional rights, KRICHEVSKY was deprived and continue to be deprived of Liberty, Property and the Pursuit of Happiness by the State and SVENSON.

312.

Before the child support proceeding started in November 2008, SVENSON spoiled the evidence and filed false family offense petition in Family Court. Then she asked the court for an order of protection from KRICHEVSKY. During the order of protection hearing, KRICHEVSKY testified that immediately after evidence spoliation and false reporting of family offense incident SVENSON with son, David Svenson, went to KRICHEVSKYs place of employment and both harassed his employer demanding termination of KRICHEVSKYs employment. After KRICHEVSKYs attorney argued that they, contrary to affidavit for order of protection, were not afraid to meet KRICHEVSKY there. Instead, they came in to harass him and his employer and to provoke the violence on KRICHEVSKYs part, SVENSON withdrew her petition for order of protection before the court had opportunity to rule.

313.

During the child support proceeding in August 2009, SVENSON, under oath in court, and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, both testified that she is looking for a job and that in two months she will start work in order to support her son. Based on these representations, the court adjourned proceeding in order to wait and see if she found any job and how much she will make. These representations were misrepresentations of material facts to the court, which will be explained further below.

314.

When one of the parents is going to school full-time, the child support hearing officer

40

may order working parent to support the non-working while in school full time. The theory behind this is that after school is completed, the none-working parent will earn more money, which will benefit the child. 315. Upon circumstantial evidence and belief, SVENSONs attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, prior to the next hearing date (October November of 2009), coached SVENSON to lie and change her prior testimony that she is looking for work and instead testify that she is already going to medical school full-time and was not going to look for a job. The goal of new testimony was to receive bigger amount of child support than if she would otherwise get if she would work and study. At that time the child was 14 years old and did not require mother to babysit the child, which made her able to work and study as millions of mothers do. Because SVENSON already had diploma of bachelor in psychology, she did not require further education and could find a job as psychologist or social worker. 316. During a child support hearing in October November of 2009, she under oath in court and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, both testified that she is going to medical school full time to become a nurse and she was not looking for a job. 317. SVENSON should have been judicially estopped from such drastic change in her testimony. KRICHEVSKYs attorney was shocked and surprised by this change of testimony and was not ready to contradict or impeach it. 318. When hearing officer of family court, Mr. Fasone, asked her when she would graduate, she told him that in 2012. 319. SVENSON knew that her statements to the court were false because she was looking for a job and did not go to the school full time. She worked her old trick, which she used on

41

KRICHEVSKY for 15 years, and testified to the court that she needed education in order to make more money as a nurse. But now she told the court that nurses make more money than psychologists do, that psychologists are not in demand and she cannot find a job as psychologist. The court justified and relied on her misrepresentations and did not order her to get a job. 320. Because of the above, the courts decision resulted in void order for fraud upon the court and miscalculation of the amount of child support that KRICHEVSKY was ordered to pay as explained in 314 of this complaint. KRICHEVSKY did not know the truth and could not impeach her testimony. 321. KRICHEVSKY discovered from SVENSONs bankruptcy court file that on or about March of 2010, few weeks after the final order of support was issued, SVENSON dropped out of school and for the first time in her life went to work full time as home attendant. 322. Alternatively, SVENSON knew that her statement about full-time study is false because she did not attend her school at all or dropped out of school during the child support proceedings in 2009-2010. 323. Alternatively, SVENSON willfully dropped out of nursing school right after the final order of support was issued and did not intend to study. 324. Upon researched information from media and personal knowledge, in order to start working at health care agency, prospective employee must study and obtain a certificate/license and pass a heath examination. 325. Upon information derived from bankruptcy courts file and belief, she started preparation

42

for that work while testifying that she is not looking for work and before the child support proceeding was over, thereby perjured herself. 326. In the same court proceeding, SVENSON caused her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, to commit Fraud upon The Court by preparing 2 perjurious financial disclosure affidavits, which he filled in court. 327. Alternatively, her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, committed Fraud upon The Court by preparing 2 perjurious financial disclosure affidavits without SVENSON verifying information in them, which he filled in court. 328. Alternatively, SVENSON and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, knew or should have known that the statements on these affidavits are false and misleading the court because during the court hearing these affidavits and her testimony were impeached by KRICHEVSKY. 329. SVENSON testified in Family Court that she does not have any jewelry. However, at the beginning of the child support proceedings, she admitted in her financial disclosure affidavit that KRICHEVSKY was buying her jewelry for many years on the regular basis. Exhibit C 330. Her lawyer, Yonatan Levoritz, knew or should have known that after impeachments of these affidavits and statements of SVENSON, he had fiduciary and disciplinary duty as officer of the court toward the court and KRICHEVSKY to correct the record by correcting affidavits and filing them in court. He failed and refused to do so. 331. These fraudulent statements and affidavits were used by Mr. Fasone to create an unjust and unlawful order of child support.

43

332.

SVENSON destroyed and/or withheld important for KRICHEVSKYs defense his financial and tax records. Then her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, during evidentiary hearing selectively entered into evidence in 2009 child support proceedings KRICHEVSKYs 2003 high earner income tax return as the only available document and evidence of KRICHEVSKYs income. He admitted on the record to evidence spoliation by SVENSON and that this 2003 income tax return was stolen from KRICHEVSKY. When KRICHEVSKY objected to this evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree, he replied to KRICHEVSKY saying that he does not care about this and that KRICHEVSKY can go and complain to police.

333.

However, KRICHEVSKY restored destroyed records and when he attempted to admit them into evidence, Mr. Levoritz objected, saying that they are created using Photoshop. Mr. Fasone sustained his objection instead of sanctioning SVENSON for evidence spoliation, contrary to law and common sense. KRICHEVSKY objected to this ruling and hinted to Mr. Fasone that KRICHEVSKY plans to appeal this decision before final hearing. However, Mr. Fasone never issued the written decision, which was necessary for interlocutory appeal.

334.

SVENSON fraudulently concealed material fact from the Family Court that she operates an apparel smuggling business in her apartment together with her sister from Germany, and how much they make. Instead, she claimed that her income is zero. The court, without knowing the truth, had to presume that she is telling the truth and relied on her misrepresentations when issuing the void order of child support.

335.

Alternatively, Mr. Fasone did not want to know the truth and conveniently presumed that

44

she is telling the truth and relied on her misrepresentations when issuing the order of child support. 336. At all relevant times, the amount of child support order was bigger than KRICHEVSKY was earning or had available in cash. 337. While KRICHEVSKY was waiting for written decision from evidentiary hearing to appeal and thereafter conduct discovery, Mr. Fasone scheduled final hearing without notifying KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON, and held it in parties absence. This act shocks conscience of KRICHEVSKY and constitutes denial of KRICHEVSKYs constitutional right to defend him within due process of law. What Mr. Fasone did was Spanish Inquisition Star Chamber style trial, and therefore his order is VOID. 338. Additionally, the child support order is VOID according to Maxims of Law nobody can give what he does not have and nobody is bound to impossibility. Therefore, this order should be set aside and new trial ordered in accordance with Constitution and New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules. 339. In addition, this order is void because it is unconstitutional. Constitution prohibits peonage and slavery, and this order turned KRICHEVSKY into a debtor-prisoner because this debt is unlawful and cannot be extinguished through Bankruptcy. In fact, supervising judge of family court Paula Hepner, set the child support order aside and ordered the new trial. She, also, ordered Mr. Fasone, as condition precedent, to read and reply in writing to KRICHEVSKYs post trial numerous motions that KRICHEVSKY filed in court prior to her order for new trial. However, Mr. Fasone in contempt of her order did not comply with any and all condition precedents to start the new trial; it did not start and the void

45

order stands. 340. In October 2012, KRICHEVSKY discovered from Bankruptcy Court file that from August 2009 until present, SVENSON fraudulently concealed from the Family Court and KRICHEVSKY material fact. This fact was that during Child Support, Modification and Contempt proceeding against KRICHEVSKY she was and is working as home attendant from April 2009 until present, while claiming that her income is zero, that she is going to medical school full time and that she does not have enough money to feed the child. 341. In 2010, after KRICHEVSKY was fired from his job, SVENSON filed petition to hold KRICHEVSKY in contempt of court and pretended to be a victim of KRICHEVSKYs contemptuous behavior. She demanded imprisonment of KRICHEVSKY for being unable to pay this void child support order. 342. By law, she had an obligation to tell the court and KRICHEVSKY that she is working as home attendant from April 2009. If the court and KRICHEVSKY knew the truth, the proceedings would have been different and outcome would have been different as well. 343. Additionally, SVENSON fraudulently concealed from the court and KRICHEVSKY that she received some money from her medical accounts payable. 344. If SVENSON told the truth to the court during child support and modification of child support proceeding, the courts calculations of the amount of child support order would have been different. In fact, it would have amounted to no more than $298 per month as opposed to $2045, which is illegally and unlawfully ordered now. 345. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was fired from his job due to SVENSONs and her attorneys Yonatan Levoritz harassment of his employer,

46

suffered a stroke during contempt proceedings, became disabled and unemployable, lost 70% of his unemployment benefits, could not sell his UNIT, lost his credit rating and equity in the UNIT ($100,000). All of the above, in turn, had the falling dominos effect on his health, finances and business plans. KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict with the exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of trial, including interest, expenses, and attorney fees. 346. At present time, KRICHEVSKY overpaid SVENSON and demands refund and restitution. 347. In addition, defendant acted unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. 348. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment declaring the child support order is void; judgment awarding damages, punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial, including interest, expenses, and attorney fees. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON - Fraud upon the Bankruptcy Court 349. 350. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. SVENSONs discharge in bankruptcy court is VOID. SVENSONs educational loans made for the sole wrong purpose to pretend and tell the Family Court that she is going to school full time, therefore busy and does not have to work to support her son. Instead, KRICHEVSKY has to support her while she is in school. 351. She intentionally did not pay $625 monthly common charges to COOPER out of $2825

47

monthly rent payments from EDELSTEIN, although was obligated. Debts that obtained by fraud or for wrongful purposes are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 352. In 2008, KRICHEVSKY asked SVENSON to follow up with collection attorneys regarding her medical business Accounts Payable and she replied that she did not get any money yet. 353. In 2010-2011, her business partner Gregory Belenkiy told KRICHEVSKY that SVENSON recently received her share of money from her medical business Accounts Payable. He hinted that more is coming, but declined to tell KRICHEVSKY how much and directed inquiry to SVENSON. In her Bankruptcy Petition and until today, SVENSON never mentioned her Accounts Payable in Bankruptcy Court, which is fraud upon the court, deceit and misrepresentation. 354. SVENSON intentionally did not report on her Bankruptcy petition any money she collected from Accounts Payable, which is perjury. 355. KRICHEVSKY, as Creditor, has an interest in this Accounts Payable because he lent SVENSON money for it and performed some work in her business. 356. 357. This Accounts Payable is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Alternatively, if she did not receive this money, which is not admitted, she has a claim for hundreds of thousands of dollars against the Accounts Payable, which she intentionally did not report as claim on the Bankruptcy petition. This is perjury and fraud upon the bankruptcy court. KRICHEVSKY requests the court to reopen her chapter 7 case. 358. 359. Out of this Accounts Payable, every creditor can get a relief, including KRICHEVSKY. Alternatively, in fairness and equity, if she did not get any money from her partners,

48

KRICHEVSKY will ask the court and/or trustee to assign this claim to him for collection as liquidated damages and/or quantum merit claim. 360. SVENSON fraudulently concealed from the Bankruptcy Court and trustee that she has about $50,000 in jewelry. During the child support proceedings, she admitted in her affidavit that KRICHEVSKY was buying her jewelry on the regular basis. Exhibit C 361. SVENSON concealed from the Bankruptcy Court and trustee that she operates an apparel smuggling business with her sister from Germany, and how much they make. KRICHEVSKY will introduce witnesses in court to prove existence of this business. 362. Then she transfers money to Germany using money transfer company RIA with office located on Brighton Beach Avenue in Brooklyn through account #554 363. SVENSONs bankruptcy petition is fraud, perjury and must be dismissed. She fraudulently concealed from the court that she owns a car and in her petition this material fact is not disclosed. From this undisclosed fact flows other undisclosed facts, like car insurance expense, 364. 365. 366. gasoline expense, repairs and maintenance. During creditors meeting and examination of SVENSON by KRICHEVSKY, Svenson testified under oath that she recently sold her car to her friend. 367. When KRICHEVSKY asked her why her car is used by her on a daily basis, she replied that her friend lets her use it. 368. 369. She admitted then that she is paying for the car insurance and other expenses. Her testimony sounded as fraudulent transfer before filing for bankruptcy petition and an

49

attempt to mislead the court, trustee and creditors through voodoo accounting and conceal that her real expenses are higher than her income, which presumptively will raise courts question about her hidden assets. 370. Upon information derived from New York Motor Vehicle Registration Report on May 30, 2013 KRICHEVSKY discovered that SVENSON did not sell her car to her friend and still owns it. This car registered to her from March 2, 2012 until 2014. 371. After impeachments of her bankruptcy petition by KRICHEVSKY, SVENSONs attorney, Miss LaMotte, as officer of the court had a fiduciary and disciplinary obligation toward the court and KRICHEVSKY to notify the court and correct the bankruptcy petition by adding car expenses and filing amended bankruptcy petition in court. She failed to do so and Svensons bankruptcy petition is void for perjury and fraud upon the court. 372. The bankruptcy court was not aware of above said perjury and fraud, thought that SVENSON has clean hands and considered SVENSONs testimony that she is a poor person credible, calculations and accounting truthful, and as a result, discharged her debts, including her debts owed to KRICHEVSKY and OCEANA for the UNIT. 373. KRICHEVSKY timely objected to bankruptcy discharge by filing instant adversary proceedings, he continues to object and requests reopening of SVENSONs chapter 7 case. 374. If the court knew about SVENSONs hidden assets, unclean hands, fraud and perjury upon the bankruptcy court and other courts, her bankruptcy petition would have been dismissed.

50

375.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, the court discharged SVENSON debts owed to KRICHEVSKY and he is damaged and at loss.

376.

In addition, defendant acted unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial.

377.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment declaring SVENSONs bankruptcy petition and discharged order is void; judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial, including interest, expenses, and attorney fees.

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR Fraud upon the Landlord & Tenant Court 378. 379. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. During the pendency of the holdover proceeding in 2008, EDELSTEIN alleged in open court and in her affidavit filed in court that prior to holdover preceding started, she and KOTLYAR, as tenants, had entered into a one year lease agreement with SVENSON, as landlord, commencing in October 1 2008 at a monthly rent of approximately $2,825.00 per month. 380. Said allegations were materially misleading the court, because said lease was fraudulently entered into without KRICHEVSKY's knowledge, consent and with the sole goal to hinder and delay eviction. Additionally, said lease was used by defendants to extort money from KRICHEVSKY. 381. KRICHEVSKYs consent was required since he owes undivided 50% interest in the UNIT.

51

382.

KRICHEVSKY in the possession of documentary evidence that shows said lease was backdated by SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in order to deceive the court and KRICHEVSKY to justifiably rely on that lease in that action.

383.

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR argued that before summary proceeding started by KRICHEVSKY, they entered into a one-year lease with SVENSON. This statement was materially misleading and false statement and court relied on it when granted them adjournments of trial.

384.

Upon information and belief derived from litigation and filings in Kings County Supreme Court in 2010, said lease was backdated and signed on November 7, 2008, and not on September 20, 2008 as the lease signing date shows.

385. 386.

Upon information and belief, said lease was entered into the court record. When one attorney represents multiple clients with adverse and diverging interests, he must advise them of potential conflict of interest, get informed consents in writing and file consents in court (New York Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and Restatement of the Law Third, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS.)

387.

When KRICHEVSKY in the beginning of 2009 discovered conflict of interest between defendants attorney Yoram Nachimovsky law firm and all of the defendants, he reported this violation to his attorney Mr. Rosenblatt. It was clear to KRICHEVSKY that Mr. Nachimovsky is advising all of the Defendants how to act in concert; personally aiding and abetting defendants commission of conversion and other torts against KRICHEVSKY because they were not sophisticated in law to figure out this scam.

388.

KRICHEVSKYs attorney Mr. Rosenblatt later informed KRICHEVSKY that after

52

discussion with Mr. Nachimovsky, his law firm dropped representation of all of the Defendants in February 2009. 389. On May 7 2013, KRICHEVSKY discovered from landlord and tenant courts file that the law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky and Mr. Ratush particularly secretly from KRICHEVSKY and the court continued representing SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR against KRICHEVSKY until about August 24, 2009 by filing motion to dismiss holdover proceeding; signing affidavit, affirmation and stipulations to adjourn the trial. KRICHEVSKY did not discover this fact in time because he did not personally appear in that court to see Mr. Nachimovsky or Mr. Ratush continued to appear on behalf of all defendants and could not alert the court to this attorneys misconduct. 390. The court did not know that the law firm of Nachimovsky officially dropped representation of all defendants by sending fax confirmation by Mr. Ratush to Mr. Rosenblatt. Accordingly, these attorneys committed fraud upon the court by officers of the court by secret unauthorized appearances in court. 391. Their conduct and defendants conduct constitutes conspiracy to commit perjury and fraud upon the court because lease and unauthorized attorney appearances were created with knowledge of false intent; and in order to produce this lease to the court and enter it into the court record. 392. 393. These facts are material for the purpose of fraud upon the court cause of action. Using this fake and perjurious lease in conjunction with unauthorized attorneys representation, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR initiated blackmail of KRICHEVSKY and extortion of the UNIT under the threat of foreclosure.

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394.

In March 23, 2009, Mr. Nachimovsky together with Mr. Ratush filed motion to dismiss holdover proceedings based on this fraudulent lease, EDELSTEINs perjurious affidavit and SVENSONs unauthorized stipulation to discontinue holdover proceedings.

395.

Starting from the October - November of 2008 through November of 2009 they requested the court to grant them several adjournments of trial for the purpose of settlement out of the court, which were granted.

396. 397.

Within all this dilatory time, SVENSON was receiving rent totaling about $35,000. Then she would turn some or all rent over to Yoram Nachimovskys law firm, which in return and in spite of conflict of interest, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court represented SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR acting in concert against KRICHEVSKY in family court litigation, landlord and tenant court litigation, civil court litigation and Supreme Court litigation.

398.

At the same time, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR attempted extortion of the UNIT from KRICHEVSKY through short sale. Their attorney Yoram Nachimovsky or Nicholas Ratush contacted KRICHEVSKYs attorney Robert Rosenblatt and started negotiating with him the sale of the UNIT to EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR.

399.

They knew or should have known that KRICHEVSKY does not have money to pay for UNITs expenses and that UNIT eventually will enter foreclosure.

400.

When UNITs extortion failed, they attempted to extort $23,000 from KRICHEVSKY by Nicholas Ratushs offer to buy them out of this fraudulent lease.

401.

From 2008 until 2010 KRICHEVSKY did not know that said lease was backdated and could not alert the court to this misleading material fact. The court and KRICHEVSKY

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presumed that the issue in controversy is conversion of his 50% undivided interest in the UNIT. The court presumed that Mr. Nachimovsky and Mr. Ratush were authorized to represent EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in court. The court presumed that the lease was signed on September 20, 2009 and based its decision on these false presumptions. 402. If the court knew that this lease was backdated and forgery, that these attorneys are not authorized to appear before the court and that SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR have unclean hands, the court would not have granted them adjournments of trial, and instead, have granted eviction of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR immediately. Consequently, KRICHEVSKY would have timely sold the UNIT to prospective cash buyer who was unable to enter and inspect the UNIT due to EDELSTEINs denial of access to the buyer. 403. This action terminated in SVENSONs, EDELSTEINs and KOTLYARs favor due to perjury and fraud. They succeeded in delaying eviction for more than a year harming KRICHEVSKY. But-for this fraudulent lease and unauthorized attorney appearances, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR would have been evicted from the UNIT in 2008. SVENSON benefited from this fraudulent lease and unauthorized appearances by paying low rent and delaying eviction and collecting $35,000 from EDELSTIN. 404. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR benefited from this fraudulent lease and unauthorized appearances by delaying their eviction for more than a year and getting a yearlong opportunity for extortion of the UNIT and money from KRICHEVSKY, even though extortion failed. 405. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY could not sell his UNIT,

55

lost his credit rating and equity in the UNIT ($100,000). This, in turn, had the falling dominos effect on his finances and business plans. He was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 406. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. 407. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. TWELVETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR Fraud upon the Supreme Court 408. 409. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. At all material times, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR conspired and committed fraud upon the court and obstruction of Justice. 410. KRICHEVSKY specifically refers to 386 388 for chronology of the events of this complaint. 411. Starting from this paragraph, KRICHEVSKY did not know all the facts that he avers below. They discovered by KRICHEVSKY only in 2011, just before he filed his motion to disqualify Mr. Nikolas Ratush (employee of Nachimovskys law firm) in Kings County Supreme Court. Mr. Ratush in 2008 at the beginning of controversy between defendants in eviction proceedings represented all of them against KRICHEVSKY.

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412.

Upon information derived from Mr. Rosenblatt, he demanded that Mr. Nachimovsky resigns from the case due to conflict of interest. Mr. Ratush sent him a confirmation fax stating that this firm no longer represents SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR, Exhibit D. (same as in 2nd amended complaint and incorporated by reference herein)

413.

Mr. Ratush, Russian-speaking attorney of the Nachimovskys firm, informed or should have informed in Russian SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR that KRICHEVSKY objects to their representation of all defendants because of conflict of interest that exists between them.

414.

Mr. Ratush told or should have told SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR that officially, law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky will have to drop their representation, but in reality will continue it. He proposed to pretend that SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR left the firm as clients and EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR hired the attorney Herbert Marek. He proposed that this way KRICHEVSKY would believe that Nachimovsky no longer advises and represents all of the Defendants, and defendants no longer act in concert. He proposed to make KRICHEVSKY believe that Nickolas Ratush never worked for Nachimovsky, and instead to believe that he works for attorney Herbert Marek. Later on KRICHEVSKY discovered that Herbert Marek is Nachimovskys friend and acts as a front to cover up this scam.

415.

KRICHEVSKY presumes and believes, Mr. Ratush proposed that because KRICHEVSKY saw only Mr. Nachimovsky, and never saw Mr. Ratush before, KRICHEVSKY would believe that Ratush works for Herbert Marek.

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416. 417.

SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR agreed. Accordingly, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR together with Nachimovsky, Ratush and Marek conspired to hide from the court and KRICHEVSKY the fact that SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR still represented by law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky, where Nicholas Ratush continues to represent all of the Defendants still acting in concert.

418. 419.

KRICHEVSKY specifically refers to 389 395 of this complaint. Due to the above, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew or should have known that they conspired to participate in fraud upon the court by intentionally concealing from the court and KRICHEVSKY the fact that they still represented by law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky and acting in concert.

420.

Defendants knew or should have known that by acting in concert to conceal the truth, they deceive the court and KRICHEVSKY by taking advantage of lack of knowledge. Indeed, from 2009 until 2011 KRICHEVSKY did not discover their scam. Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (1977).

421.

They knew or should have known that Nickolas Ratush is lying to the court and KRICHEVSKY by signing pleadings, motions, affirmations, affidavits and addressing envelopes stating that he works for Herbert Marek from his Long Island office.

422.

KRICHEVSKY reasonably believed that Nachimovsky is no longer on the case and did not object to Ratushs representation of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in Kings County

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Supreme Court, mistakenly thinking that Ratush works for Herbert Marek. 423. Mr. Ratush committed fraud upon the court by not filing written waivers of conflict of interest from all three of the Defendants, which allowed him and all defendants not to be discovered by KRICHEVSKY and/or the court. This scheme allowed the law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky to continue aid and abet all three of the Defendants in commission of conversion and other torts in landlord and tenant court and Supreme Court. 424. In addition to this fraud, SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR were supposed to sign release or termination agreements with law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky, and 425. EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR were supposed to sign retainer agreement with Herbert Marek. 426. The fact of signing the sham retainer agreements with Herbert Marek for the court is perjury, 427. when SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR knew that these retainer agreements are sham. 428. The fact of signing the sham retainer termination agreements with law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky for the court is perjury, 429. when Defendants knew that they are still represented and advised by the firm of Nachimovsky. 430. When KRICHEVSKY first time met Nicholas Ratush in Kings County civil court, he did not know that Ratush is actually working for Nachimovsky, and Herbert Marek is just a front for Nachimovsky. 431. KRICHEVSKY thought that new attorney, Mr. Ratush, would advise EDELSTEIN and

59

KOTLYAR that the advice of Nachimovsky law firm was unlawful and harmful to them; that what they did was wrong, they are losing money to senseless litigation and they will attempt to settle and vacate the UNIT. 432. However, KRICHEVSKY later noticed that Nickolas Ratush is acting against interests of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR, and instead helping SVENSON. For example, KRICHEVSKY and SVENSON simultaneously filed motions to amend pleadings. Mr. Ratush filed opposition against KRICHEVSKYs amended complaint arguing that amendments will prejudice, delay and make proceedings more expensive. However, he did not object to SVENSONs proposed amended answer to add counterclaims against KRICHEVSKY, as if this will not similarly prejudice, delay and make proceedings more expensive as well. 433. In another example, KRICHEVSKY filed an order to show cause to compel EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to deposit rent money into escrow account instead of giving it to SVENSON. Mr. Ratush opposed this motion (e.g., was paid by EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR) as if he or EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR should care that SVENSON will be cut off from the money supply. Circumstantial evidence does show that Mr. Ratush cared that SVENSON would be cut off from money supply, because then she would not pay Nachimovsky firm for fraudulent services. In fact, KRICHEVSKY informed Mr. Ratush that he might be committing legal malpractice by failing to inform EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR that in their best interest would be to withhold rent money from SVENSON, and deposit it into escrow account until the court decides what to do with it. KRICHEVSKY informed Ratush that it is likely that the court will rule against

60

his clients. In such a case, they will have money available for KRICHEVSKYs compensation. Mr. Ratush replied that KRICHEVSKY is wrong, because he discussed the issue about escrow account and EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR directed (e.g. paid Mr. Ratush) him to oppose this motion. 434. Shortly thereafter, Honorable Bert Bunyan of Kings County Supreme Court stipulated with SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR that they in a month would jointly pay $8000 to KRICHEVSKYs attorney escrow account to save the UNIT from foreclosure that was started by the bank. 435. Stipulation in court is a contract, which SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR in concert breached by not paying what promised. 436. SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR knew their statements to Judge Bunyan were false and that they did not intend to honor this contract. That is fraud upon the court and contempt of court. 437. 438. The court relied on their negotiation and promises when issued its order. SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR entered into this contract to frustrate KRICHEVSKY and to delay proceedings. In fact, they delayed this proceeding for 4 years without any relief to KRICHEVSKY until SVENSON filed for bankruptcy, staying this proceeding. 439. In conclusion, attorneys of Nachimovskys law firm, acting behind the curtain coached SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR to lie in concert, produced frivolous pleadings delaying resolution of controversy and legally attacking KRICHEVSKY. They even advised defendants to become in contempt of court. Needless to say that all of the

61

defendants conspired and willingly followed attorneys advice. 440. Alternatively, SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR did not use their attorneys advice, but conspired to act in concert and to lie in concert, which produced unnecessary pleadings and motions, delaying relief and legally attacking KRICHEVSKY. SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR conspired to become in contempt of court and in concert did not pay $8000 as stipulated by the parties in front of the judge. 441. Timing of SVENSONs bankruptcy petition was not accidental or random, but rather done by Nachimovskys firm. The reason behind KRICHEVSKYs belief is that he was waiting for the end of four-month stay in Supreme Courts action due to the disqualification of Mr. Ratush. Krichevsky was waiting to enter disqualification order to serve on defendants pursuant to New York CPLR. Thereafter, KRICHEVSKY planned to serve a notice of appeal on defendants due to courts denial of his motion to replead the fraud causes of action without instructing him how to repair his complaint. At the same time, KRICHEVSKY started motion to renew based on new evidence and disqualification of Mr. Ratush by the court. The arguments that KRICHEVSKY was going to make would have been similar to the ones that he is making in instant cause of action for fraud upon the Supreme Court. 442. Precisely after expiration of four-month stay, SVENSON filed for bankruptcy effectively destroying KRICHEVSKYs plans by yet another stay of bankruptcy court. KRICHEVSKY believes that this was another dilatory move to frustrate KRICHEVSKYs efforts. In fact, Judge Bunyan in his last decision hinted to KRICHEVSKY that SVENSON is in default and that KRICHEVSKY should file motion

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for default judgment, which KRICHEVSKY was planning to do. 443. KRICHEVSKY presumes that from about 2010, the IRS started collection proceedings against SVENSON and she could have filed her bankruptcy petition much earlier but did not know the outcome in Supreme Court proceedings. KRICHEVSKY believes that when her attorneys realized she almost lost the case, they advised her to immediately file for bankruptcy. 444. As a direct or proximate result of this fraud and obstruction of Justice, KRICHEVSKY spent almost 4 years and about $20,000 in attorneys fees to litigate without any relief. 445. When Honorable Bert Bunyan of Kings County Supreme Court ordered SVENSON, but EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR particularly, to sign written waivers of conflict of interest, all defendants declined. 446. 447. As a result of the above, Mr. Ratush was disqualified. SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR or just EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR knew from the beginning of that litigation that they will not sign any waivers of conflict of interest. 448. Notwithstanding the above, they continued signing affidavits and paying Mr. Ratush to oppose his disqualification for more than a year in a hope that Mr. Ratush survives disqualification and will continue to obstruct Justice for KRICHEVSKY. 449. If the court knew the truth from the beginning of the proceedings and that the defendants have unclean hands, the courts decision would have been different because KRICHEVSKYs averments of fraud upon the court, creation of fraudulent lease and other misrepresentations of material facts would have made much more sense. There would have been much better chance that KRICHEVSKYs motion to amend would have

63

been granted and KRICHEVSKY could have been granted timely relief. Maxim of law justice delayed is justice denied proves that KRICHEVSKY was damaged for 4 years with all consequences arising out of justice denied. Particular damages described in other paragraphs on damages above and incorporated by reference herein. 450. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial. 451. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST EDELSTEIN - Breach of Contract/Constructive Fraud 452. KRICHEVSKY adopts FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION above by reference herein. 453. At the termination of EDELSTEINs one-year term lease, EDELSTEIN requested that SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY short-sell the UNIT to her for $650,000. 454. Because SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY declined this offer, EDELSTEIN declined to exercise the option to renew this lease for another three years until 2009, and

64

455.

requested that she remains as a month-to-month tenant while she explores options to purchase her own residence, and while KRICHEVSKY tries to sell the UNIT for a higher price.

456.

She told KRICHEVSKY that a month-to-month tenancy would be mutually convenient because it would allow either party to withdraw from tenancy on a short notice without any future liability to each other. SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY believed her representations, agreed to this tenancy and listed the UNIT for sale.

457.

At all relevant times before May-July 2008, EDELSTEIN allowed KRICHEVSKY, real estate persons and potential purchasers to see the UNIT.

458.

On or about May-July of 2008, EDELSTEIN informed KRICHEVSKY that she found some property to buy,

459. 460. 461. 462.

applied for a loan; and is going to vacate KRICHEVSKYs UNIT in one month; and will not send KRICHEVSKY a rent check, but will not ask for refund of rent deposit. About a month later, EDELSTEIN informed KRICHEVSKY that bank denied her request for a loan.

463.

At that time, EDELSTEIN told KRICHEVSKY that she would like to stay and renew her month-to-month tenancy on prior terms.

464.

EDELSTEIN told KRICHEVSKY that she would send him a rent check for prior month, and

465. 466.

when requested, will vacate the UNIT. KRICHEVSKY reasonably relied on her representations, agreed to new tenancy and

65

accepted EDELSTEINs check without the rent increase, even though a market rent was higher. 467. About a month later, KRICHEVSKY had an interested purchaser for the UNIT, but EDELSTEIN refused to allow potential purchaser access to the UNIT. 468. She told KRICHEVSKY that her attorney advised her that because KRICHEVSKY continued accepting her rent from 2006, she may deem her option to renew her lease for 3 years automatically exercised, and 469. 470. 471. will live in the UNIT until December 2009 against KRICHEVSKYs will, and will not show the UNIT to anybody. KRICHEVSKY informed EDELSTEIN that he terminated her tenancy, would not renew her month-to-month lease and will initiate eviction. 472. 473. Nonetheless, EDELSTEIN refused to vacate the UNIT. In New York, a month-to-month tenancy considered a valid contract, which requires renewal every month. 474. Because EDELSTEIN would have to move out on the short notice, if requested by KRICHEVSKY, she negotiated a lower-rent than the market price. This evidenced by contrast between $2650 month-to-month rent that EDELSTEIN paid to KRICHEVSKY and $2825 that EDELSTEIN willingly started paying SVENSON in addition to paying attorneys fees to litigate fraudulent and unlawful lease issues against KRICHEVSKY. 475. 476. 477. EDELSTEIN was duty-bound to deal with KRICHEVSKY in good faith and fairly. EDELSTEIN was duty-bound to allow purchaser to see the UNIT, and was duty-bound to vacate the UNIT if and when KRICHEVSKY requested.

66

478.

Even if, which is not admitted, EDELSTEIN did think that she has a valid long-term lease, she was duty-bound to show the UNIT to prospective purchaser who may buy that UNIT with a tenant and gladly continue her tenancy.

479.

EDELSTEIN failed to perform by contract and breached her duties by preventing access to the UNIT by prospective purchaser, and by

480. 481. 482.

refusal to vacate the UNIT when KRICHEVSKY requested, despite the fact that KRICHEVSKY substantially performed by the contract. Due to EDELSTEINs refusal to show the UNIT and later refusal to vacate the UNIT, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY started holdover proceeding in Kings County Landlord & Tenant Court Index number 95633/2008 to protect their interests and show said UNIT to above-mentioned buyer.

483.

At the beginning of said Litigation, attorney for SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR, Yoram Nachimovsky made a settlement proposal by which EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR would buy the UNIT through short sale and assume KRICHEVSKYs loan.

484.

EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew or should have known that they could not obtain a loan to buy their own residence due to their low FICA score and/or financial meltdown of 2008 amongst the banks.

485.

KRICHEVSKY believes that the real reason why EDELSTEIN did not allow access to the UNIT is to force KRICHEVSKY to short-sell the UNIT to her and KOTLYAR for a much lower price and assume KRICHEVSKYs loan under the threat of foreclosure. Banks often allow assumption of loan when a property is in foreclosure and sold short.

67

486.

KRICHEVSKY believes that after EDELSTEIN failed to obtain a loan in May July 2008, she decided to misrepresent and conceal from KRICHEVSKY her abovementioned short sale plan in order to induce KRICHEVSKY to enter into a new monthto-month lease and wait for KRICHEVSKYs financial collapse. She would live in the UNIT paying below-market rate and wait for KRICHEVSKYs financial condition to deteriorate to the point that he will agree to the short sale of the UNIT.

487.

After failed short sale attempt of the UNIT, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR offered KRICHEVSKY to buy out their unlawful lease for $23,000 in exchange for them moving out. KRICHEVSKY treated this offer as extortion and declined.

488.

Alternatively, EDELSTEIN decided to breach her contract after she entered into the new month-to-month lease to extort money from KRICHEVSKY, abusing tenancy rights and threat of foreclosure to her advantage.

489.

Between June of 2008 and November of 2009, there were at least three (3) potential purchasers interested in the UNIT, all of whom EDELSTEIN denied access to view the UNIT. All or some of said purchasers purchased different units in the same condominium complex without an opportunity to see the UNIT.

490.

From 2008, during the course of whole litigation, KRICHEVSKY hired three attorneys and incurred litigation expenses to protect his rights and interests. When he run out of money, he continued litigation pro se and incurred additional litigation expenses.

491.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY could not sell his UNIT, lost his credit rating and equity in the UNIT ($100,000). This, in turn, had the falling dominos effect on his finances and business plans. KRICHEVSKY was damaged,

68

continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict with the exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 492. In addition, EDELSTEIN was acting unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands determination of punitive and treble damages at the time of the trial. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR- Fraudulent Conveyance 493. 494. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. Since SVENSON never paid her share for purchase of said property, as well as any expenses, she was indebted to KRICHEVSKY as to creditor. 495. 496. During refinance with WAMU, she released her interest back to KRICHEVSKY. The rent money that she received was even less than KRICHEVSKY had to pay as total monthly expenses and less than market price. 497. The said lease agreement entered into between SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR during the pendency of a holdover proceeding, without the knowledge or consent of KRICHEVSKY constitutes a fraudulent conveyance because: 498. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR conspired with each other to intentionally commit series of torts against KRICHEVSKY, thereby entering into close relationship of partners in crime,

69

499.

the rent amount $2825 that SVENSON received from EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR was inadequate because the adequate amount should have been around $3400,

500. 501.

all of the defendants knew that KRICHEVSKY will claim his property back and he did, said lease was intentionally and fraudulently entered into court by Yoram Nachimovsky law firm on behalf of SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in order to hinder and delay eviction of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR and prevent the sale of the UNIT.

502. 503.

As such, the lease agreement should be declared null and void. In addition, Defendants' actions were willful, wanton and malicious, and as such, KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages in the sum to be determined at trial.

504.

KRICHEVSKY should be entitled to a judgment for damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but no less than $500,000.

505.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees.

506.

In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment declaring this lease is void and awarding damages, punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

70

KOTLYAR Torturous Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. 507. 508. KRICHEVSKY adopts averments above by reference herein. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR knew that SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY are selling their UNIT for $825,000. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR knew that KRICHEVSKYs expenses are more than the rent payments and he needed to reduce his mortgage obligation in order to borrow money for his Seagate project (renovation of the house). KRICHEVSKY introduced EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to Seagate project and offered them participation in it, instead of short sale of the UNIT during the meeting with them in 2006. They knew that if KRICHEVSKY sold the UNIT, he would be able to borrow money and use equity left after the sale of UNIT for Seagate project. 509. They knew that KRICHEVSKY has business relationship with real estate brokers who are trying to sell the UNIT. In fact, a few times potential purchasers, brokers and KRICHEVSKY, did come to see the UNIT, which fact was admitted by EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in State courts proceedings. 510. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR knew that KRICHEVSKY through brokers found interested purchaser and that on or about July 2008, KRICHEVSKY called EDELSTEIN to schedule an appointment with her in order to show the UNIT to the purchaser. 511. 512. KRICHEVSKY incorporates 467 472 by reference herein. Thereafter SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR started interference with his business relationships by entering among themselves into unlawful and fraudulent lease effectively denying the purchaser, brokers and KRICHEVSKY an opportunity to inspect

71

the UNIT. Without inspection, that purchaser was reasonably afraid to buy the UNIT. After EDELSTEIN refused access to the unit, relationship with brokers terminated and brokers stopped selling the UNIT. Thereafter, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR engaged KRICHEVSKY in never ending litigation, which is subject of instant action. But for the acts of these defendants conspired and acted in concert, that potential purchaser would have purchased the UNIT. In fact, after that person became tired from waiting the outcome of this litigation in order to enter the UNIT, that person purchased another unit in OCEANA, which act terminated relationship with KRICHEVSKY. 513. If KRICHEVSKY sold the unit, he would have completed his Seagate project and would not be harmed. 514. Accordingly, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR acted in concert with the sole purpose of harming KRICHEVSKY and used dishonest, unfair and improper means to prevent KRICHEVSKY from selling the UNIT. 515. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY could not sell this UNIT, lost his credit rating and equity in the UNIT ($100,000). This, in turn, had the falling dominos effect on his finances and business plans. In fact, the Seagate project is not complete and failed due to this and other torts committed by defendants flowing from each other 516. KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees.

72

517.

In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously,

oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. 518. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and

treble damages to be determined at trial. SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR Aid and Abet Commission of Conversion 519. 520. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew that leasing of the UNIT was done without KRICHEVSKYs knowledge and consent. 521. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew, or under the circumstances should have known, that SVENSON committed fraudulent conversion of KRICHEVSKYs share of the UNIT into her own and leasing it to them. They knew or should have known that no one tenant, but them would be willing to pay $2825 per month rent to SVENSON in addition to litigation expenses they paid their attorneys to defend eviction. 522. EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew that by entering into unlawful one-year lease with SVENSON, the copy of it would be brought into landlord and tenant court to stop the eviction of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR. Moreover, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR for more than a year continued paying the rent to SVENSON, while litigating against KRICHEVSKY 523. . EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR knew that they are substantially aiding and abetting the commission of conversion, because without their financial support in form of rent to

73

SVENSON, her conversion would fail. 524. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 525. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR- Tortuous Interference with Prospective Economic Relationships 526. 527. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. Defendants knew that SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY are selling their UNIT for $825,000. They knew that KRICHEVSKYs expenses are more than their rent payments and he needed to reduce his mortgage obligation in order to borrow money for his Seagate project. They knew that if he will sell the UNIT, he would be able to borrow money for Seagate project. They knew that KRICHEVSKY has business relationship with real estate brokers who are trying to find a buyer of UNIT. 528. On June 2008, defendants have intentionally and knowingly started interference with KRICHEVSKY's prospective economic relations with brokers and purchasers by means of preventing potential purchasers access to the UNIT; and

74

529.

by entering into fraudulent and unlawful lease agreement without KRICHEVSKYs knowledge and consent during the pendency of a holdover proceeding to recover possession of the UNIT in order to enter the UNIT.

530. 531. 532.

Defendants were aware of KRICHEVSKY's intent to sell the UNIT. Defendants have intentionally and knowingly interfered with OCEANAs and/or COOPERs duties to collect common charges by conspiring not to pay KRICHEVSKY rent, or by conspiring not to pay common charges to OCEANA and/or COOPER directly, although had the duty to do so.

533.

SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR acted with the sole purpose of harming KRICHEVSKY and used the following dishonest, unfair and improper means to prevent potential purchasers and brokers from entering the UNIT:

534.

willfully and maliciously deny prospective purchaser and broker access to inspect the UNIT;

535.

committing fraud upon the court by filing into the court record backdated lease, which allowed them to deny purchasers access to the UNIT by remaining in control of the UNIT for more than a year;

536.

conducting frivolous and vexatious litigation allowing them to drug the resolution of eviction until KRICHEVSKY lost his prospective purchaser and brokers terminated relationship with KRICHEVSKY.

537.

As a direct and proximate result of the forgoing, KRICHEVSKY defaulted on his mortgage and common charges obligations;

538.

the UNIT is in foreclosure by the bank and OCEANA;

75

539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544.

KRICHEVSKYs credit rating has been destroyed; KRICHEVSKYs existing credit lines were cut off; new credit was denied, KRICHEVSKY was prevented from renting out his UNIT. All his business plans failed. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial.

545.

In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA, COOPER, LANA KAPLUN, FARID BADALOV AND BORIS MEYDID Fiduciary Breaching Duty to Principal

546. 547.

KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. There was/is a principal - agent and/or entrustor - trustee relationship between KRICHEVSKY toward OCEANA and COOPER.

548. 549.

There was/is an agent-principal relationship between COOPER and KRICHEVSKY. KRICHEVSKY gave OCEANA authority to act in the best interest of KRICHEVSKY in

76

the day-to-day activities of homeowners association. 550. KRICHEVSKY entrusted his UNIT, undivided share and interest in common areas to COOPER to maintain, care and protect it on his behalf. 551. The major reason for the existence of these entities is to benefit, serve and protect interests and safety of the owners of condominium units and units themselves. 552. There is/are the written; and/or implied contracts and/or policies between OCEANA and COOPER spelling out all the duties owed to KRICHEVSKY, as principal, entrustor and beneficiary. KRICHEVSKY demanded these contracts or policies from COOPERs management people numerous times, but they refused to disclose and provide them. 553. There was contractual and/or fiduciary relationships between KRICHEVSKY and KAPLUN when KRICHEVSKY voted for her in 2001 and/or 2002 elections of the board members, when she promised to volunteer on his behalf and others. 554. 555. 556. There was fiduciary relationships between KRICHEVSKY and BADALOV, and later MEYDID. One of their duties as property managers were to investigate and report to him creditworthiness of potential tenant, and 557. 558. if KRICHEVSKY signs a lease, process tenancy by issuing magnetic keys and instructing tenant about OCEANAs policy. 559. The other duties were to collect common charges checks and provide accounting for same. 560. The authority to act OCEANA and COOPER derive from individual unit owners

77

directives and their consent. 561. Those duties were breached on or about October-November of 2008 and continue to be breached until present. KAPLUNs, BADALOVs and MEYDIDs duties of care for welfare of KRICHEVSKY entered into the conflict of personal interests and self-dealing. They each on their own and in concert went against his interests and of unit owners by rejection of KRICHEVSKYs tender of checks and the lease (TENDER) to satisfy the alleged debt. 562. After KRICHEVSKY told them about controversy with SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR and requested assistance, they became and continue to be disloyal, belligerent and hostile toward him. 563. Upon information and belief derived from OCEANAs bylaws, the law firm BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP created condominium bylaws and/or amendments to it, which permits OCEANAs or COOPERs employees to break the locks and enter into an abandoned by an owner UNIT. Thereafter, OCEANA or COOPER can lease out this unit and even foreclose on it. KRICHEVSKY believes that this condominium bylaw was abused or planned to be abused by corporate defendants against him and the UNIT by preventing KRICHEVSKY from leasing out his UNIT in order to keep the UNIT unoccupied. 564. On or about January 15, 2010 KAPLUN breached her fiduciary duty by failure to seek legal advice from BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP, a law firm that gets paid for business legal advice to board of managers, when she on her own decided to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER.

78

565.

Alternatively, she did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP, but went against such advice when she on her own decided to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER.

566.

Alternatively, she did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP and advice was to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER.

567.

KAPLUN did not have an authority to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER without meeting and approval of all board members.

568.

Rejection of KRICHEVSKYs TENDER went against his interest, welfare and interests of all unit owners as well. Rejection of KRICHEVSKYs TENDER shows disloyalty to him and all unit owners, because it hurts welfare of each unit owner by forcing unit owners to pay more for monthly common charges.

569.

New York Law requires that KRICHEVSKY, OCEANA and COOPER use available means to mitigate damages.

570.

KRICHEVSKY informed corporate defendants that on or about October of 2008, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR entered into FRAUDULENT lease with SVENSON without COOPERs and KRICHEVSYs knowledge and consent, and that SVENSON and EDELSTEIN do not intend to pay the monthly common charges. BADALOV wrote EDELSTEINs last name on the piece of paper and promised to be mindful of this matter.

571.

KAPLUN on the phone promised KRICHEVSKY to take care of this. KAPLUN had authority and/or duty to:

572. 573.

call or write SVENSON and demand monthly common charges, or call or write EDELSTEIN and convince her to pay monthly common charges, or

79

574.

direct BADALOV or somebody else to attempt to collect common charges from SVENSON and EDELSTEIN, or

575.

start inexpensive legal action in Small Claims Court to compel payments of common charges on or about December 2008, noticing that common charges did not come in two month indeed.

576. 577. 578. 579. 580.

BADALOV had authority and/or duty to: call or write SVENSON and demand monthly common charges, or call or write EDELSTEIN and demand monthly common charges. KAPLUN and/or BADALOV did not do some or all of the above. On or about June of 2009, KRICHEVSKY demanded that KAPLUN start legal action against SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to collect money for common charges.

581.

On or about August 2009, KRICHEVSKY demanded second time that KAPLUN start legal action against SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to collect money for common charges.

582. 583.

KAPLUN promised KRICHEVSKY to follow up on his demand. It was a part of BADALOVs duty to make sure that COOPER gets common charges every month from every unit.

584.

On or about October-November of 2009 BADALOV breached his fiduciary duty by failure to seek legal advice from BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP, a law firm that gives business legal advice to COOPER, when he on his own decided to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER.

585.

Alternatively, he did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN,

80

LLP, but went against such advice when he on his own decided to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER. 586. Alternatively, he did seek legal advice of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP and advice was to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER. 587. Alternatively, BADALOV acted pursuant to order or directive from KAPLUN or other person to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER. 588. KRICHEVSKY claims that KAPLUN and BADALOV each acting separately and in concert, or after mutual discussion, conspired to rejected KRICHEVSKYs possible TENDER. 589. As a direct or proximate result of this breach of fiduciary duty, KRICHEVSKY had to hire an attorney, pay him personally to protect his interests, as well as interests of other unit owners because they would have to make up the difference in OCEANAs budget. 590. To evict EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR cost KRICHEVSKY about $20,000 in attorney fees. 591. As the direct and proximate result of breach of fiduciary duty, KRICHEVSKY did not receive from the UNIT approximately $7476 in common charges, thereby unable to pay the same to OCEANA for 2009. 592. Upon information and belief derived from COOPERs and OCEANAs mailings to unit owners that money, was paid collectively by other unit owners to make up the difference in budget. 593. As the direct and proximate result of breach of fiduciary duty, eviction of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR was delayed for more than a year resulting in KRICHEVSKYs lost

81

opportunities and money damages. 594. As the direct and proximate result of fiduciaries failure to mitigate damages through delay to act for more than a year, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR were not evicted until about October-November of 2009. 595. Upon information and belief, after OCEANA or COOPER in October-November of 2009 disconnected EDELSTEIN access to health club and gym, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR vacated KRICHEVSKY UNIT. 596. Alternatively, after OCEANAs legal action started, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR vacated the UNIT. 597. Because these fiduciaries had another fiduciaries-attorneys BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP, who advise them about business decisions and other legal matters, they knew or should have known that lease and conduct, which SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR commit, constitutes CONVERSION. 598. They knew or should have known that conversion is unlawful act and they had fiduciary duty, resources and authority to stop it. 599. It was not until November-December of 2009 that KAPLUN started legal action against SVENSON, EDELSTEIN, KOTLYAR and KRICHEVSKY in Brooklyns civil court. 600. Inclusion of KRICHEVSKY in this action was frivolous and done in retaliation for KRICHEVSKYs critique of KAPLUNs failure to work on this problem. 601. These fiduciaries had fiduciary duty, resources and authority to order BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP to start collection action for unpaid common charges against SVENSON, EDELSTIN and KOTLYAR in the beginning of 2009.

82

602. 603. 604.

These fiduciaries intentionally, or negligently waited for aggravation and/or escalation of wrong conditions, and despite known conflict of interest between KRICHEVSKY and BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP,

605.

ordered BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP to start foreclosure against KRICHEVSKY in 2012.

606.

As a direct and proximate result of the forgoing KRICHEVSKY did not collect any rent from his UNIT, which made him unable to pay his mortgage.

607.

As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing KRICHEVSKY was not able to collect a rent in the sum of about $35,000 per year.

608.

As a direct and proximate result of the forgoing KRICHEVSKY UNIT entered into foreclosure by the bank.

609.

On or about January 15, 2010 KRICHEVSKY signed the lease with new tenant, Vladimir Traynin.

610. 611.

On or about January 15, 2010, Vladimir brought this lease to BADALOV for processing. On or about January 15, 2010 Vladimir called KRICHEVSKY and told him that BADALOV said to Vladimir that until KRICHEVSKY pays his debt to COOPER, he would not process Vladimirs application for tenancy.

612.

Without processing, security at the OCEANAs gate would not let tenants truck with belongings in.

613.

On or about January 15, 2010 KRICHEVSKY brought in COOPER's office and tendered to BADALOV:

83

614. 615. 616.

two checks for $2900 each from new tenant, Vladimir Traynin, and the lease agreement. BADALOV should have welcomed tender and new tenant as that would remedy the situation, mitigate damages and stabilize financial condition of KRICHEVSKY and other unit owners.

617.

KAPLUN should have welcomed a new tenant as that would prevent foreclosure of the unit, which in turn should stabilize equity and price of each individual unit as well.

618.

KAPLUN and BADALOV should have welcomed a new tenant, as that would make KRICHEVSKY to be able to pay common charges in the future,

619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625.

thereby solving and crossing out this problem from their problem solving to do list. BADALOV in bad faith rejected the TENDER, and in bad faith refused to process the application for tenancy. This rejection of TENDER was done in bad faith because it was: against business judgment rule, and against any joint interest of unit owners and/or KRICHEVSKY. Alternatively, even if, which is not admitted, KRICHEVSKY did not tender these two checks, but only tendered lease, it would be financially beneficial for all unit owners to forbear the debt as damages mitigation duty and process tenancy than litigate, or

626. 627.

let KRICHEVSKY pay the debt over time than litigate. Accordingly, KRICHEVSKY avers that they intentionally and without any justification rejected this TENDER and tenancy in order to keep the UNIT unoccupied, drive KRICHEVSKY's UNIT further into the debt and foreclosure, because

84

628.

they knew or should have known that their actions or inaction will foreseeably bring about foreclosure of the UNIT.

629.

OCEANA instituted self-serving policy incorporated into By-Laws, were board have a right of first refusal to arbitrary buy any condominium unit on sale using peoples money.

630.

Accordingly, if KRICHEVSKYs UNIT goes into foreclosure and sold at auction they will be the first to buy it on the cheap to be able to resell for a profit.

631.

This is the reason, KRICHEVSKY believes, KAPLUN and BADALOV conspired to drive KRICHEVSKY's UNIT into foreclosure.

632.

This is the reason, KRICHEVSKY believes, KAPLUN and BADALOV created controversy; did not mitigate damages; and filed a lien on KRICHEVSKY's UNIT.

633.

Foreclosure scenario was foreseeable by Defendants. OCEANA, in fact, filed foreclosure action against KRICHEVSKYs UNIT, but proceeding was stayed due to the bankruptcy proceedings in this court.

634.

Alternatively, KAPLUN and BADALOV attempted larceny and extortion of bribery from KRICHEVSKY after which the tender would have been accepted.
New York Penal Law 155.05 Larceny; defined 1. A person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof. 2. Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property, with the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section, committed in any of the following ways: (e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third

85

person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (ii) Cause damage to property; or (iii) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (viii) Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or (ix) Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

635.

After KRICHEVSKY told BADALOV that his rejection of TENDER and refusal to process tenancy leaves KRICHEVSKY no choice, but to sue him personally for damages, he laughed and told KRICHEVSKY to do what he has to do.

636.

KRICHEVSKY immediately called KAPLUN and complained about BADALOVs rejection of tender.

637.

KRICHEVSKY requested that she speak to BADALOV and intervene on KRICHEVSKYs behalf.

638.

KAPLUN replied that BADALOV has absolute right to reject the TENDER and refused to speak with BADALOV.

639.

Accordingly, KAPLUN and BADALOV attempted larceny by extortion through calculated effort to compel or induce KRICHEVSKY to pay BADALOV or KAPLUN to do their public servant duties to accept KRICHEVSKYs TENDER and process tenancy.

640.

They instilled the fear in KRICHEVSKY of losing his UNIT and harmed his business and fanatical condition.

641.

BADALOV and KAPLUN did not have the authority to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER.

86

642.

For BADALOV to reject the TENDER, which would trigger confrontation and embark KRICHEVSKY, OCEANA and COOPER on litigation, he needed higher authority from KAPLUN and/or the board of managers.

643. 644.

KAPLUN did not have such authority without boards meeting and decision. KRICHEVSKY presumes, there was no boards meeting about KRICHEVSKYs TENDER, because BADALOV rejected the tender without second thought right on the spot.

645.

When KRICHEVSKY called KAPLUN to complain that BADALOV rejected TENDER, she refused to intervene without second thought right on the spot.

646.

Alternatively, if there was such a meeting authorizing KAPLUN and BADALOV to reject KRICHEVSKYs TENDER, the board members were misinformed by KAPLUN and/or BADALOV about true reason for controversy because KRICHEVSKY was not present.

647.

Because OCEANA or COOPER never notified KRICHEVSKY of their intention to file a lien,

648.

they violated KRICHEVSKY constitutional right of notice and opportunity to be heard, and

649.

New York State Lien law, which proscribes service by certified mail of notice of lien on the property owner.

650.

As the direct or proximate result of the TENDER rejection, KRICHEVSKY was unable to collect $2900.00 per month in rent for the first year and $3000 for the second.

651.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue

87

to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally, vicariously and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial. 652. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID harassment, private nuisance and constructive eviction 653. 654. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. BADALOV, who created private nuisance in 2009 to harass and constructively evict EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR by deactivating magnetic entrance keys, was removed from managing OCEANA by COOPER, and due to complaints of other unit owners for his other misconducts. 655. MEYDID substituted BADALOV after he was removed from the management of OCEANA. 656. 657. 658. MEYDID, following the order of KAPLUN or other person, or COOPERs supervisor, or on his own continued private nuisance and begun harassment of KRICHEVSKY and his guests by deactivating magnetic keys ( keys) to buildings entrance, in addition to

88

already deactivated health club and spa, meeting house and numerous gates including gate to the beach (amenities). These actions continued numerous times within the past two years. 659. Liability for a private nuisance arises, inter alia, from conduct, which invades another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is intentional or negligent. KRICHEVSKY, as a UNIT owner, and his guests have the right to access amenities since they are undivided common areas in which KRICHEVSKY has a rightful ownership interest. 660. Deactivation of the keys as private nuisance and harassment by KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID resulted in dimunition of value of the UNIT to any would be renter. 661. When KRICHEVSKY with his guests would come to COOPERs office to complain that buildings entrance keys deactivated, MEYDID would torturously tell KRICHEVSKY that some kind of computer virus constantly attacks their computer disabling entrance keys. 662. KRICHEVSKY interviewed other residents of the building and concluded that their keys were working properly on the days that KRICHEVSKYs did not. These acts were done in retaliation for KRICHEVSKYs self-defense in court, and constitute private nuisance and/or harassment, and/or constructive eviction by officers or employees of COOPER and OCEANA. 663. MEYDID knew or should have known that his acts constitutes intentional interference with the use and 664. enjoyment of the UNIT in lawful possession of KRICHEVSKY, which

89

665. 666.

would prevent KRICHEVSKY and his guests from entering the amenities that he owes. After KRICHEVSKYs order to show cause to compel activation of the keys was settled by OCEANA, MEYDID, in contempt of court, activated only buildings entrance keys. The settlement order between KRICHEVSKY, OCEANA and COOPER presumed activation of all amenities.

667.

Alternatively, MEYDID activated all keys, but in a few days deactivated them again, in contempt of court.

668.

These unlawful and unreasonable acts substantially interfered with KRICHEVSKYs use and enjoyment of the UNIT.

669.

As a direct and proximate result of numerous deactivations of the keys, lawsuits and harassment, KRICHEVSKY was unable to receive services of COOPER. He was prevented and deprived from the use of amenities, and could not rent out his UNIT.

670.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that KAPLUN and MEYDID personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial.

671.

In addition, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial, including interest and attorneys fees. TWENTY FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN,

90

KOTLYAR, KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID - torturous interference with the contract 672. 673. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. At the time of the unlawful acts of the defendants, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY, as partners, were parties to a valid contract with OCEANA and/or COOPER which provided that COOPER and/or OCEANA perform several services to the UNIT, SVENSON and KRICHEVSKY in exchange for their payment for such services to COOPER and/or OCEANA, which payment called common charges. 674. All of the defendants either knew of the existence or, under the circumstances, should have known of the existence, of that contract. 675. At the time of the commission of the earlier-mentioned tort, conversion, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR unlawfully excluded KRICHEVSKY from rent money due to him from the UNIT. This, in turn, torturously and directly interfered with KRICHEVSKYs ability to pay common charges, as well as gain and profit from the rent. As a direct and proximate result, KRICHEVSKY was induced to breach his contract performance with COOPER and/or OCEANA. 676. KRICHEVSKY was informed by OCEANA and verily believes that neither SVENSON, nor EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR ever contributed any money towards common charges of the UNIT. 677. As such, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR intentionally induced breach of KRICHEVSKYs contract performance by refusing to pay common charges either to KRICHEVSKY, or themselves to COOPER and/or OCEANA, even though they had the

91

ability and duty to pay under 339-kk of the New York State Real Property Law. 678. KRICHEVSKY filed an order to show cause in Kings County Supreme Court to compel defendants SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to turn over rent money to KRICHEVSKY in order for him to pay common charges. 679. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR maliciously opposed and became in contempt of court by not following courts order to jointly pay $8000 into an escrow account. 680. KRICHEVSKY timely notified all of the defendants that he is unable to pay common charges to COOPER because he was excluded from KRICHEVSKYs share of rent. 681. SVENSON as partner and fiduciary of KRICHEVSKY, intentionally and maliciously breached partners contract with COOPER and/or OCEANA by not paying common charges even though she had an ability and duty to pay. The debt that SVENSON intentionally and maliciously created by the breach of the contract with COOPER and/or OCEANA, including damages to them, is not dischargeable in bankruptcy court. Therefore, her bankruptcy discharge is VOID and she should indemnify KRICHEVSKY and pay the COOPER and/or OCEANA compensation, including damages to them. 682. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR are jointly and severally liable to KRICHEVSKY in addition to COOPER and/or OCEANA and should contribute and recover KRICHEVSKY by paying the COOPER and/or OCEANA compensation, including damages to them. 683. At the time of the unlawful acts of the defendants KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID, KRICHEVSKY was a party to the contract with COOPER and/or OCEANA mentioned above. Additionally, he was a party to a second valid contract with new tenant Vladimir

92

Traynin, which provided that he will pay KRICHEVSKY $2900 per month in rent for one year with an option to renew for another year at a monthly rent of $3000. 684. At that time, the keys to amenities were still deactivated by BADALOV from his prior attempt to harass and constructively evict EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR from the UNIT. 685. Deactivation of the keys as private nuisance and harassment by KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID resulted in dimunition of services provided by COOPER or lack thereof. 686. Deactivation of the keys as private nuisance and harassment by KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID resulted in dimunition of value of the UNIT to any would be renter. 687. Deactivation of the keys resulted in dimunition of the value of the services as per contract between KRICHEVSKY and COOPER, while COOPER kept billing KRICHEVSKY for the value of services not performed. In New York, billing a customer for the services not performed calls fraud. Nonetheless, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID caused 2 liens of questionable legality and amounts to be recorded against the UNIT without the approval of the court. 688. Nonetheless, KRICHEVSKY for the 2nd time attempted to gain control over situation and start performing by the contract with COOPER through tender of 2 checks for sum of $5800 and the lease with new tenant (TENDER), Vladimir Traynin. On or about January 15, 2010, KRICHEVSKY brought TENDER in the office of COOPER and presented to BADALOV for processing. BADALOV refused to perform his duties by rejecting TENDER. 689. As such, BADALOV induced KRICHEVSKY to continue non-performance of contract with COOPER and/or OCEANA by rejecting TENDER and preventing him from renting

93

out his UNIT. 690. By refusal to process said lease, BADALOV induced new tenant to breach contract with KRICHEVSKY and caused this tenant to void said 2 checks and enter into another lease with another unit owner in the same building. 691. Upon information derived from COOPER, Vladimir Traynin and other sources, said new lease BADALOV immediately approved, which now causes KRICHEVSKY to question BADALOVs legitimate reason for rejection of TENDER. 692. KAPLUN ratified and approved rejection of TENDER by refusing to intervene and speak with BADALOV on behalf of KRICHEVSKY. 693. After BADALOV was removed from the management of OCEANA, MEYDID continued to carry on private nuisance and harassment of KRICHEVSKY and his guests, with ratification and approval of such torts by KAPLUN and/or other unidentified defendants. For the past 2 years MEYDID kept disconnecting several times entrance keys to the building of the UNIT. 694. Said conducts resulted in KAPLUNs, BADALOVs and MEYDIDs torturous interference with contracts between KRICHEVSKY and COOPER and/or OCEANA, as well as contract between KRICHEVSKY and Vladimir Traynin. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID acted outside their duties, in bad faith and failed to collect common charges; wrongfully filed liens against the UNIT; failed to mitigate damages;

94

700. 701. 702.

failed to correct conditions of breach of contract, and interfered with contracts themselves in violation of business judgment rule. According to business judgment rule, they were supposed to act in good faith and in furtherance of legitimate purpose to create a profit. In this case the profit was actually a loss, and they knew or should have known what the outcome would be.

703.

KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID together with SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR are jointly and severally liable to KRICHEVSKY in addition to COOPER and/or OCEANA and should indemnify KRICHEVSKY by paying the COOPER and/or OCEANA compensation, including damages to them.

704.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial.

705.

In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY is entitled to punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. TWENTY SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST KAPLUN AND BADALOV torturous interference with the contract

706.

KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein.

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707.

At the time of the unlawful acts of the defendants KAPLUN and BADALOV, KRICHEVSKY was a party to a valid contract with new tenant Vladimir Traynin, which provided that he will pay KRICHEVSKY $2900 per month in rent for one year with an option to renew for another year at a monthly rent of $3000.

708.

KAPLUN and BADALOV in concert refused to accept KRICHEVSKYs TENDER; refused to process new tenancy and activate the keys to amenities. By refusal to process said tenancy, BADALOV induced new tenant to breach contract with KRICHEVSKY and caused this tenant to void said 2 checks and enter into another lease with another unit owner in the same building.

709.

As the direct and proximate result, KRICHEVSKY did not collect $2900 per month for the first year and $3000 per month for the second year.

710.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest and attorneys fees.

711.

In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. TWENTY THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID Abuse of Process

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712. 713.

KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. In 2009 and 2010 KAPLUN, BADALOV, and MEYDID regularly issued two legal processes against SVENSON, KRICHEVSKY, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR in Kings County Civil Court, which were terminated in favor of KRICHEVSKY.

714. 715.

OCEANA did not appeal these decisions. In these two processes, OCEANA petitioned the court to issue money judgments against KRICHEVSKY and others for nonpayment of common charges, to compel performance of payments and award attorney fees.

716.

Since KRICHEVSKY notified defendants that he is unable to pay common charges due to above-mentioned conversion against him, defendants knew that they in good faith could not compel KRICHEVSKYs performance due to excusable defense of impossibility.

717.

However, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR, as a tortfeasors with ability and duty to pay, could be in good faith compelled to perform. Though SVENSON defaulted in these two processes and OCEANA could ask the court for a default judgment with award of attorney fees against her, it failed to do so and abandoned these actions.

718.

It is well settled in New York that a prevailing party may not recover attorneys' fees from the losing party except where authorized by statute, agreement or court rule (see Chapel v

Mitchell, 84 NY2d 345, 349 [1994], quoting Hooper Assoc., Ltd. v AGS Computers, Inc., 74 NY2d 487, 491 [1989]; Mighty Midgets, Inc. v Centennial Ins. Co., 47 NY2d 12, 2122 [1979]). Yet, OCEANA, as a losing party, rewarded itself with attorneys fees, filed two liens and in 2012 started foreclosure of UNIT in Kings County Supreme Court.

97

719.

However, when KRICHEVSKY in 2010 obtained money and tendered payment of common charges, BADALOV rejected it contrary to their demands in these 2 processes.

720.

In addition to these processes, OCEANA administratively interfered with KRICHEVSKYs UNIT by disconnecting keys to amenities, thereby preventing him, inter alia, to rent out his UNIT. This interference, too, terminated in KRICHEVSKYs favor as OCEANA and COOPER settled this issue in court, admitting wrongdoing by signing stipulation of settlement and activating the keys.

721. 722. 723.

In 2009 OCEANA demanded from KRICHEVSKY approximately $4900. In 2011 OCEANA claimed that KRICHEVSKY owed already about $50,000. In October 2012, in Bankruptcy Court OCEANA issued yet another regular judicial process motion to lift the bankruptcy stay. The stay was lifted and OCEANA claimed yet another $2000 in attorney fees. It told the court that lifting the stay is necessary to proceed with foreclosure action in state court. As of today, there is no movement in the action of State court, because KRICHEVSKYs challenge of validity of debt and liens in 2010 Civil Court action is not resolved in their favor and OCEANAs right to foreclose on the UNIT is still in question in any court of the United States of America.

724.

The bankruptcy court should be the perfect forum to resolve validity of debt and liens for OCEANA, if defendants believed that they are right.

725.

Moreover, OCEANA filed yet another judicially issued regular processes motion to dismiss KRICHEVSKYs case against it. This motion was frivolous, untimely and designed to harass KRICHEVSKY.

726.

These regularly issued judicial processes continued one after another from 2009 until

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present and this claim is timely. 727. Accordingly, Defendants used these processes in perverted manner to wit: harass KRICHEVSKY and torturously interfere with his contracts, 728. to obtain collateral objective of generating and adding attorneys fees, expenses and late fees to account of KRICHEVSKY,
729. 730. 731. for filing two liens on the UNIT yet another two regularly issued processes; and instituting foreclosure to generate even more fees and expenses. These corporate defendants planned and attempted to fraudulently obtain KRICHEVSKYs UNIT through foreclosure and unjustly enrich themselves.

732.

As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees.

733.

In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. TWENTY FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BADALOV and MEYDID Professional Malpractice

734.

KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein.

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735. 736.

BADALOV and MEYDID are real estate salespersons licensed by New York State. To have the position of the property manager, COOPER requires by law that property managers have real estate license.

737.

As such, BADALOV and MEYDID owed KRICHEVSKY a duty of care, good faith and fair dealings, which they breached by negligent actions against KRICHEVSKYs and OCEANAs interests.

738.

BADALOV rejected KRICHEVSKYs TENDER of $5800 and refused to process the lease between KRICHEVSKY and Vladimir Traynin.

739.

MEYDID created nuisance to KRICHEVSKY and his guests by disconnecting magnetic entrance keys numerous times.

740.

BADALOV and MEYDID, acting in gross disregard to KRICHEVSKYs interests, followed unethical and unlawful orders of KAPLUN and/or other member of OCEANA and/or COOPER. They engaged themselves in the conduct contrary to professional ethics and responsibility of licensed real estate person. They embarked in a negligent departure from the accepted standards of ethics and practice, which harmed KRICHEVSKY.

741.

As the direct and proximate result of this departure, KRICHEVSKY was injured, continue to be injured and will be injured in the future.

742.

In addition to that, their conduct was willful and wanton and KRICHEVSKY demands punitive damages. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages and punitive damages to be determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees.

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TWENTY FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA AND COOPER-Accounting 743. 744. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. From about 2001 until 2009, OCEANA and/or COOPER did not credit all payments and interest they received from KRICHEVSKY and/or EDELSTEIN. 745. Additionally, they added unlawful attorneys fees, late fees and expenses to KRICHEVSKY account of common charges 746. KRICHEVSKY needs to verify amount of debt and liens they claim to be correct and lawful. KRICHEVSKY believes that amount of debt is fraudulently overstated. 747. KRICHEVSKY lacks an adequate remedy at law, as such, an accounting is required. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands order directing OCEANA and COOPER to produce all books and records.
TWENTY SIXTH

CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST COOPER, BADALOV AND MEYDID Aid and Abate Breach of Fiduciary Duty

748. 749.

KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. This is an alternative cause of action in case all of the defendants will deny breach of the fiduciary duty to KRICHEVSKY. There is/was principal-agent relationship between OCEANA and COOPER.

750.

BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that there is a fiduciary relationship between KRICHEVSKY and KAPLUN. They knew or should have known that KAPLUN owes a duty of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY.

751.

BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that by following KAPLUNs order to create nuisance and to harass KRICHEVSKY and his guests, she is breaching

101

her duty of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY. 752. BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that by torturously interfering with KRICHEVSKYs contracts with OCEANA and COOPER, KAPLUN is breaching her duty of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY. 753. BADALOV and MEYDID knew or should have known that if they refused to follow KAPLUNs orders, she would be unable to breach her duty of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY and KRICHEVSKY will not be harmed. 754. If BADALOV and MEYDID did not disable magnetic keys, but instead accepted KRICHEVSKYs TENDER and timely contacted EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR to collect common charges, KRICHEVSKY would not be harmed, or would be harmed substantially less otherwise. Accordingly, BADALOV and MEYDID substantially aided and abetted KAPLUNs breach of her fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to KRICHEVSKY. 755. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 756. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and

102

treble damages to be determined at trial. TWENTY SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA, COOPER, KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID Declaratory Judgments 757. 758. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants failure to provide proper notice before filing the lien against the UNIT violated the due process clause of the 5th and14th amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 6 of the New York State Constitution 759. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges the constitutionality of OCEANAs bylaws, policies and procedures. 760. Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) to stop "the use of abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors," 15 U.S.C. 1692(a). 761. This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that challenges OCEANAs policy and practice of disconnecting keys from the amenities and gates; and filing harassing lawsuits. 762. A debt collector may not "use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt," 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Such a prohibition includes the false representation of "the character, amount, or legal status of any debt," 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(A). KRICHEVSKY seeks declaratory relief that challenges OCEANAs validity and the amount of liens on the UNIT. 763. A debt collector may not "use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to

103

collect any debt," 15 U.S.C. 1692f. 764. Nor may a debt collector "engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt," 15 U.S.C. 1692d. 765. Corporate defendants conspired and acted in concert, have filed three harassing lawsuits using notoriously known sewer service, and two liens on KRICHEVSKYs UNIT without his knowledge and consent while he challenged alleged debt in courts. 766. If, which is not admitted, defendants believed that they can lawfully add a late fee together with attorneys fees to the amount of the lien without court approval, they did not need to file lawsuits against KRICHEVSKY. All they needed to do, is to simplify file the lien without notifying KRICHEVSKY. 767. Accordingly, filing of 2 lawsuits using sewer service, failure to later cure defect in service and continue litigation to obtain a judgment against KRICHEVSKY or SVENSON is an evidence of abuse of judicial proceedings intended to harass KRICHEVSKY and generate litigation fees and expenses for debt collector. Additionally, KRICHEVSKY avers that defendants attempted fraudulently obtain default judgment against him by the use of sewer service, add fees and expenses to the amount of the liens. Thereafter, corporate defendants planned and attempted fraudulently obtain KRICHEVSKYs UNIT through foreclosure. When KRICHEVSKY discovered their plot, they abandoned these proceedings to avoid adjudication against them. 768. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants failure to provide proper notice before filing the lien on the UNIT violated the due process clause of the 5th and14th amendment of

104

the United States Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 6 of the New York State Constitution. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief: a declaratory judgment that Defendants failure to provide proper notice before filing the lien on the UNIT violated the due process clause of the 5th and14th amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 6 of the New York State Constitution; declaratory judgment that OCEANAs bylaws and policy of debt collection are unconstitutional; declaratory judgment that Defendants violated the FDCPA; declaratory judgment that debt and liens on the UNIT are void; issuing an Order enjoining Defendants from committing similar violations in the future; statutory damages, actual damages, attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action and defending Plaintiffs rights in other actions; any other relief that the Court deems just and proper. TWENTY EIGHT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS Trespass on Land 661. 662. 663. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. KRICHEVSKY is the rightful owner of the UNIT and amenities. At all relevant times, each defendant personally and all in concert, knowingly, intentionally and maliciously interfered with KRICHEVSKYs right to possess the UNIT by preventing him to enter it, inspect or conduct business using it. 664. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR conspired and unlawfully prevented KRICHEVSKY from entry, inspection and from selling the UNIT. 665. Alternatively, SVENSON, EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR conspired and unlawfully

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prevented KRICHEVSKY from entry, inspection and leasing the UNIT and collecting rent. 666. At other relevant times, KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID conspired and unlawfully prevented KRICHEVSKY and his guests from entering amenities and apartment building itself where UNIT is located. By disconnecting entrance keys and refusing to process the lease application, they prevented KRICHEVSKY from leasing the unit and collecting rent. 667. Disconnection of magnetic entrance keys to amenities had the effect of building a wall on KRICHEVSKYs land, thereby preventing his entrance to land. 668. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 669. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously, oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages; punitive and treble damages to be determined at trial. TWENTY NINETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR Conspiracy to commit Fraud upon the Court and Obstruction of Justice 769. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein.

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770.

KRICHEVSKY specifically adopts every averment in NINETH and TWELVETH causes

of action by reference herein. 771. SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR acting in agreement between themselves

and in concert, created common scheme to participate and commit the following illegal and unlawful acts, or a lawful acts in an unlawful manner: 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. fraud upon the landlord and tenant court fraud upon the Supreme Court fraudulent conveyance conversion torturous interference with the contract torturous interference with prospective economic advantage torturous interference with business relationship breach of contract. To further their goal, they created illegal and unlawful lease, put the wrong date on it, and hired the law firm of Yoram Nachimovsky to aid and abet them and file this lease in

court. 783. 784. Alternatively, attorneys of the firm advised, aided and abated in creation of said lease. Thereafter, this firm started frivolous and vexatious litigation against KRICHEVSKY

despite conflict of interest and conspiracy. 785. When KRICHEVSKY timely objected to that representation, defendants and attorneys of

the firm conspired with each other to deceive the courts and KRICHEVSKY by

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misrepresenting the fact that the firm dropped representation of defendants. Attorneys of the firm told KRICHEVSKYs attorney Mr. Rosenblatt that they no longer represent all of the defendants. However, they continued to represent defendants undercover acting as wizard behind the curtain in order not to be discovered by the courts and KRICHEVSKY. 786. As the direct and proximate result of this conspiracy, defendants and their attorneys

embarked KRICHEVSKY on almost 4 years of frivolous and vexatious litigation in State courts. 787. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above from all causes of action regarding

damages by reference herein. 788. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 789. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously,

oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. 790. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and

treble damages to be determined at trial. THIRTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA, COOPER, KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID Conspiracy to commit Fraud upon the Court and Obstruction of Justice 791. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein.

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792.

KRICHEVSKY specifically adopts every averment in NINETIENTH, TWENTIETH,

TWENTY SECOND, TWENTY THIRD, TWENTY FOURTH, TWENTY SIXTH and TWENTY EIGHTH causes of action by reference herein. 793. KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID acting in agreement between themselves and in

concert, created common scheme to participate and commit the following illegal and unlawful acts, or a lawful acts in an unlawful manner: 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. fraud upon the court breach of fiduciary duties harassment private nuisance constructive eviction torturous interference with the contract abuse of process professional malpractice aid and abate breach of fiduciary duty violation of FDCPA malicious persecution To further their goal, they conspired to create and created illegal and unlawful liens

against the UNIT, 806. 807. 808. put intentionally incorrect amounts of debt on them, and hired two law firms to aid and abet them and file this liens in county recorder. At all relevant times, these 2 law firms started frivolous and vexatious litigation in civil

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court using sewer service. 809. Even though said lawsuits terminated in KRICHEVSKYs favor, defendants hired

attorney Joshua Losardo and his firm to start foreclosure of UNIT in Supreme Court based on those illegal and unlawful fraudulent liens using sewer service. 810. After SVENSON filed for bankruptcy, defendants conspired to start and started frivolous

and vexatious litigation against KRICHEVSKY and the UNIT in bankruptcy court lasting almost a year. 811. As the direct and proximate result of this conspiracy, defendants and their attorneys

embarked KRICHEVSKY on almost 3 years of frivolous and vexatious litigation in State courts and the bankruptcy court. 812. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above from all causes of action regarding

damages by reference herein. 813. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 814. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously,

oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial. 815. WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and

treble damages to be determined at trial. THIRTY FIRSTCAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST OCEANA, COOPER, KAPLUN,

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BADALOV AND MEYDID malicious persecution 816. 817. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above by reference herein. KRICHEVSKY specifically adopts every averment in THIRTIETH cause of action by

reference herein. 818. KAPLUN, BADALOV AND MEYDID maliciously commenced and continued above

mentioned legal actions against KRICHEVSKY and the UNIT. 819. Two of the collection proceedings commenced by the defendants and their attorneys in

2009 and 2010 in civil court terminated in KRICHEVSKYs favor. 820. The foreclosure proceedings against the UNIT in Supreme Court is terminated under such

circumstances indicating lack of probable cause and prosecutorial attorneys misconduct. 821. By above mentioned proceedings defendants interfered with the UNIT and

KRICHEVSKYs constitutional right to do commerce and enjoy his property. Defendants and Board of managers of Oceana arbitrarily and capriciously ordered COOPER to disconnect entrance to amenities of the UNIT, thereby creating wall on KRICHEVSKYs land and preventing entrance into it. 822. KRICHEVSKY adopts every averment above from all causes of action regarding

damages by reference herein. 823. As the direct and proximate result of the above, KRICHEVSKY was damaged, continue to be damaged, will be damaged in the future and demands verdict that all of the defendants jointly, severally and personally liable to him with exact amount of damages to be determined at the time of the trial, including interest, expenses and attorneys fees. 824. In addition, all of the defendants conspired and acted in concert, unlawfully, maliciously,

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oppressively and against public policy. KRICHEVSKY demands punitive and treble damages determined at the time of the trial.
825.

WHEREFORE, KRICHEVSKY demands judgment awarding damages, punitive and

treble damages to be determined at trial.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY Please take notice that Plaintiff demands trial by jury in this action.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York June 5, 2013 _______________________________________________ MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, All rights reserved 4221 Atlantic Ave Brooklyn, New York 11224 (718) 687-2300 tokrichevsky1@yahoo.com

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