G.R. No. L-11439 October 28, 1916 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO ELICANAL, defendant-appellant.

Francisco Villanueva, Sr., and Francisco Villanueva, Jr., for appellant. Attorney-General Avancea for appellee. MORELAND, J.: Related Topic: Exempting Circumstance: UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR Requisites: 1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater than or at least equal to, that which he is required to commit 2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it **************************************************************************************** Ruling: Trial Court- Defendant-Appellant & others guilty BRD of the crime of murder (sentenced to death) Ratio: Trial court refused to accept his defense holding that Guiloresa did not exercise such influence over him that amounted to an uncontrollable fear or a deprivation of his volition SC- There being neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances, judgment appealed from is REVERSED and the accused is hereby sentenced to cadena perpetua Facts: -11 December 1914, Accused (Elicanal) was on board the Iorcha Cataluna as a crew with Guillermo Guiloresa as the Chiefmate & Juan Nomo as the Captain; Accused is 22 years old, w/out education & physically weak. -The ship barely leaving the mouth of Iloilo River, Guiloresa approached the accused & told him that he would kill the captain which the accused thought as a joke since per his knowledge, no member of the crew has any resentment towards the captain -Following morning, Guiloresa assaulted the captain inside his cabin, attempting to seize and hold the hands of the captain, at the same time calling the rest of the crew to come forward and help him -At the request of Guiloresa, the crew except Elicanal got hold of the captain and tied his hands with a rope -At this instance, Guiloresa struck the captain in the back of the neck with an iron bar and immediately handed the iron bar to Elicanal & ordered him to come forward and help in disposing of the captain. -While the captain still struggling, he seized the iron bar and struck the captain on the head which caused his death Issue: WON, there was a threat directed to the accused that would deprive him of his own volition and make him a mere instrument of the person who threatened him. Held: No. Ratio: - Evidence fails to establish that the threat directed to the accused by the chief mate, if any, was of such a character as to deprive him of all volition and to make him a mere instrument without will of his own but one moved exclusively by him who threatened. Nor does the threat appear to have been such, or to have been made under such circumstances, that the accused could reasonably have expected that he would suffer material injury if he refused to comply. In other words, the fear was not insuperable. Indeed, it is doubtful if any threat at all in the true sense was made; certainly none of such serious nature as would justify an illegal act on the part of the accused

Issue: WON, the court erred in ruling that the crime committed was murder instead of homicide & the qualifying circumstance of Treachery was proven. Held: No. Ratio: Court cannot agree with counsel fro the appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, or alevosia, has not been proved. It appears undisputed that, at the time the accused struck the deceased with the iron bar and thereby caused his death, the latter was bound hand and foot and was helpless and defenseless. While it is quite true that there was no treachery at the beginning of the struggle terminating in the death of the captain, that is, the initial attack was open and fair, the struggle being man to man between the chief mate and the captain, both unarmed, this does not necessarily dispose of the question of treachery. This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself. While the writer of this opinion holds the view that, where there is not treachery in the attack which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, but, the court having held so frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established. TRENT, J., concurring: I concur in the disposition of this case, but desire to observe that I find nothing in the briefs of counsel to the effect that the doctrine laid down in the case of the United States vs. Balagtas (19 Phil. Rep., 164) "is quite different from, if not directly opposed to, that already stated as, theretofore, the uniform holding of this court." In fact, counsel for the defendant cite three cases of this court in support of the same proposition as that in support of which United States vs. Balagtas was cited. The rule laid down in this case is not in conflict with the other cases cited in the majority opinion. I also desire to observe that if the court, in saying that "the personal qualities and characteristics of the accused are matters particularly cognizable by the trial court; and the application of this section is peculiarly within the discretion of that court," intends to holds that this court has no power or authority to apply article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, as an extenuating circumstance, if the trial court has declined to do so, or vice versa, I cannot consent to such holding ARAULLO, J., concurring: Although, as a general rule, the trial judge has better opportunity than this court to determine whether the provision of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature, should be taken into account for the purpose of increasing or diminishing the penalty that should be imposed upon the defendant; yet, as one of the assignments of error is based on the trial judge's failure to apply this article in one or the other of the senses mentioned, it is my own opinion that this court, after reviewing all the evidence of record and taking into account the said legal provisions, should decide whether the trial judge did or did not incur the error attributed to him With this observation, and being of the belief that the said article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by the Act above cited should not be applied in the present case to increase or diminish the penalty fixed for the crime committed by the defendant and which should be imposed upon him, I concur in the preceding decision.