Professional Documents
Culture Documents
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Type of event: Memo; based on interviews with Alan Reiss (former Director of the Port
Authority World Trade Department) and Michael Hurley (former WTD Life Safety
Director)
Team: 8b
Location: N/A
The following systems / methods existed for transfer of information to and form
the fire command stations ("PCS") in the lobbies of WTC 1 and WTC 2, which were
managed by the buildings' deputy fire safety directors ("DFSD's").
1) The public address system*: The p.a. system was used to make voice
announcements to tenants in the buildings. The DFSD could select to make an
announcement to specified floors, to the entire tower, or to one or more of the
stairwells (selected by pushing appropriate buttons; separate buttons existed to
transmit to each of the 3 stairwells). Announcements were generally made to
"affected" areas, as indicated by automatically-generated computerized alarms
(see below) or by actual reports from tenants. Public address announcements
were regularly preceded by a tone; 'advisory' announcements were preceded by
"chimes" and "emergency" announcements were preceded by the warble
evacuation alarm signal; the tone would be overridden (unless sounding
automatically in default mode) when the DFSD pressed the push-to-talk button.
2) Emergency intercom "floor warden" phones: Floor warden intercom phones were
located on each floor of the towers to enable the designated floor "fire warden" (a
civilian tenant) to communicate with the FCS when an emergency event occurred
(as fire drill training instructed). Lifting the handset at the floor location would
automatically connect the fire warden (or anyone using the phone) to the FCS.
The FCS was alerted by a sound alarm and a red LED alert.
4) Hardlines: The FCS contained regular landline phones which tenants could reach
by dialing standard 7-digit numbers. Phone numbers were provided liberally;
they were given to all fire safety team members and many others who might need
to the contact the FCS.
* Indicated items were components and/or features of the class "E" fire alarm system,
installed by the Port Authority in response to the 1993 bombing ($70 million); (See also
Alan Reiss interview dated Jun. 16, 2004). It was comprised of six separate systems, in
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
different physical locations, and covered all areas owned and operated by the PA. (WTC
1,2,4, 5, sub grade areas, concourse). The system contained redundant electronics and
control panels in physically dispersed locations, in case pertinent areas (i.e., lobby PCS)
had to be evacuated.
Functionality of Systems on Sept. 11thAfter Impact of Planes: This issue of which and to
what extent building systems functioned on September 11 after the towers were hit by the
planes is being thoroughly investigated by NIST. Because we lack the resources and
expertise to conduct this type of investigation, we have refrained from attempting to draw
broad conclusions. However, our research has yielded the following, non-technical,
information:
* Floor Warden Phones: No evacuees we spoke with attempted to use the floor warden
phones. The DFSD in the North Tower has told us that he received calls via those phones
after the NT was hit; the former fire safety director (PA), who reported to the North
Tower lobby that morning, recalls seeing that calls were coming through by that method
(the former FSD was not responsible for actually answering the calls). The NT DFSD
does not remember which floors he received these calls from, but does not recall being in
communication with anyone at or above the impact by any method. An ABM employee,
who remained in the stairwells and on floors in the 20's and 30's of the NT, recalls
observing people attempting to use the floor warden phones, but does not believe that
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
they could get through. In the Port Authority transcripts of recorded calls to the PA
police desk, a fire warden from the 106th floor reports that the "fire phones are out."
* Hardlines: The DFSD in the north tower remembers receiving calls from tenants in
that tower via landline phones. There is other evidence of successful use of landline
phones to make calls from within the towers, including to 911
* Evacuation Tone: the tone was heard in some locations below the impact zone in the
NT, and in some locations both above and below the impact zone in the ST. (911 calls
and interviews). We have not determined whether the evacuation tone had been activated
manually or was operating in default mode. This may be determined by NIST.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
Team: 8b
Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department
Staff was reminded during a meeting with Michael Hurley, the former PA fire
safety director for the WTC, that the WTC fire alarm evacuation tone was programmed to
sound automatically in default mode in a particular area if the transponder controlling
that area was unable to "communicate" with the PCS (this would alert the transponder, in
lay terms, that there was problem). Staff asked whether it could be concluded that, in
areas where the alarm tone was triggered in default mode, other components of the
system (e.g., the public address system) were not functional. Staff followed up with Alan
Reiss.
Mr. Reiss recalled that the evacuation tone could be activated in two ways. First,
the deputy fire safety director could manually activate the tone to sound on individual or
multiple floors, as the situation required, from the lobby FCS. This would send a signal
to the transponder to pump out the evacuation tone and flash the strobe lights. When the
push-to-talk button was pressed, the tone would be overriden for voice announcements.
This was the method used to initiate fire drills.
The system was also programmed so that, if a transponder received an alarm input
(e.g., smoke from a smoke detector), it would send a signal to the FCS and receive an
acknowledgment. If this acknowledgement was not received (i.e., the transponder could
not 'communicate' with the FCS), the transponder would generate an evacuation tone on
the floors it covered (typically a 3-floor area). The purpose of programming the system
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
to generate the evacuation tone in default mode was to ensure that tenants were alerted to
the existence of alarms conditions on their floors, if regular system signals failed.
If, during the evacuation on September 11, the evacuation tone was heard on all
floors throughout the building, it could be surmised that the console signal was able to get
through, i.e., that the transponder was able to communicate with the PCS, since actual
smoke and/or other alarm conditions may not have existed immediately on all floors to
trigger the tone to sound in default mode. On the other hand, if evacuees did not report
hearing the tone right away—but it was heard in various locations as the morning
progressed—it could be surmsied that it was triggered in those areas in default mode, as
alarm conditions arose, rather than manually.
Mr. Reiss was not certain whether the fact that an evacuation tone sounded in
default mode in a particular location could be taken to mean that other systems in that
location were unable to function. He explained that there were many pairs of wires in the
dual risers serving to the system (rather than, e.g., 2 in the case of a telephone system)
and there were also various failure modes (e.g., open, short, cut). Therefore, there could
be many permutations as to what did and did not get damaged. Mr. Reiss referred the
question to PA engineering and the manufacturer of the fire alarm system. The
manufacturer's technical response was beyond the scope of staff s investigation.
However, Mr. Reiss explained, in summary, that it was possible for, e.g., the floor
warden phones to have worked in a location where, e.g., the public address system did
not (if those wires were shorted). (See also MFR Int NIST, dated Jun. 7, 2004)
Staff does not have the resources or expertise to pursue a technical investigation
of this topic. The issue in being thoroughly investigated by NIST. For purposes of our
research, we will state facts learned from interviews or our analysis of other materials and
refrain from drawing conclusions.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Team: 8b
Location: By email
Participants - Commission: Alan Reiss, Former Director of Port Authority World Trade
Department
In response to a question from staff, Alan Reiss confirmed that the fire alarm
public address system did have speakers in the fire stairwells. Because the stairwells
were part of a different circuit/zone from the floors, announcements were activated by a
separate switch at the fire command desk (there was a switch for each of the A, B and C
stairwells). (Staff member Madeleine Blot had previously been informed either by
interviewees or other staff members that the p.a. system could not be broadcast into the
stairwells).
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
Re: Chimes
Type of event:
Team: 8b
Location: By email
Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department
In response to a question from staff, Alan Reiss explained that "chimes" were a
tone which could be generated by the fire alarm system in addition to the warble
evacuation tone. Chimes were regularly used to precede "advisory" announcements over
the public-address system, whereas the warble siren was used to precede emergency
announcements. Chimes were used for advisory announcements in order to avoid
inspiring panic in a non-emergency situation.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
Team: 8b
Location: By email
Staff contacted Randy Lawson of NIST to inquire whether NIST had made any
determinations about the functionality of building systems at the WTC on Sept 11,
specifically in light of recent testimony by Lloyd Thompson at their joint interview.
NIST told staff that some evidence suggests that the floor warden phones were
not working. They confirmed that the evacuation tone could be activated manually or in
default mode, and that it could also be activated automatically by the system (under
regular conditions).
In follow up, NIST confirmed that under the normal course of events, the
evacuation tone could be activated in the following three ways: 1) manually, 2) by the
water flow detection alarm, or 3) the smoke detector alarm. It would also be generated in
default mode if the block of floors corresponding to the transponder, or "slave unit," was
severed from the overall building alarm control system. When the alarms were activated
from the transponder or block mode, it was difficult to turn the alarms off. A whooping
sound was initiated, and there was no capability for verbal announcements. However,
verbal announcements could be made via other audio systems in the building.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
Team: 8b
Location: By email
Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety
director of WTC
In response to a question from staff, Michael Hurley confirmed that all public
address announcement were made "live." There were no pre-recorded or automated
messages.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
Team: 8b
Location: By email
Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety
director of WTC
In follow up to the June 2nd meeting, staff asked Michael Hurley several questions
related to PCS systems and protocol.
Mr. Hurley also confirmed that since each tower's PCS could be operated
remotely, it was possible for announcements to one tower from the lobby of the other.
Control of all systems regularly controlled from the tower lobby FCS's could be also be
transferred to the OCC, which served as an additional backup.
The landline telephone numbers for the FCS's were distributed widely to those
who might need to contact the PCS. They were given to the tenant fire safety teams
(wardens, deputy wardens & searchers) during fire drills. They were also given others,
including construction crews, fire alarm system contractors, electricians, welders,
sprinkler contractors, the FDNY, and probably many others. The numbers were liberally
distributed because there was a 24-hour presence at the tower FCS's.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
Team: 8b
Location: By email
Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety
director of WTC
Team: 8b
Location: By email
Commission staff spoke with Ray Simmonnetti about various aspects of the
towers' repeater system, in order to elaborate on questions posed by the FDNY
concerning this matter. See MFR prepared by Sam Capsersen.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Team: 8b
Location. By email
Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, Former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department