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UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Fire Command Station (PCS) Systems & Protocol

Type of event: Memo; based on interviews with Alan Reiss (former Director of the Port
Authority World Trade Department) and Michael Hurley (former WTD Life Safety
Director)

Date: July 1, 2004

Special Access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: N/A

Participants - Non Commission: N/A

Participants - Commission staff: N/A

The following systems / methods existed for transfer of information to and form
the fire command stations ("PCS") in the lobbies of WTC 1 and WTC 2, which were
managed by the buildings' deputy fire safety directors ("DFSD's").

1) The public address system*: The p.a. system was used to make voice
announcements to tenants in the buildings. The DFSD could select to make an
announcement to specified floors, to the entire tower, or to one or more of the
stairwells (selected by pushing appropriate buttons; separate buttons existed to
transmit to each of the 3 stairwells). Announcements were generally made to
"affected" areas, as indicated by automatically-generated computerized alarms
(see below) or by actual reports from tenants. Public address announcements
were regularly preceded by a tone; 'advisory' announcements were preceded by
"chimes" and "emergency" announcements were preceded by the warble
evacuation alarm signal; the tone would be overridden (unless sounding
automatically in default mode) when the DFSD pressed the push-to-talk button.

• Protocol regarding instructions to building tenants:


Each PCS contained manuals with pre-scripted announcements pertaining to a number of
specified emergencies. Instructions existed for standard fire emergencies, as well as for
bomb threats and other non-fire events. If an incident arose for which no script was
provided, it was standard procedures for the DFSD to consult with the FSD before
making an announcement, to determine instructions and wording. If the DFSD could not
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contact the FSD, it was acceptable for him to act on his own. DFSD's, though called
"deputies," were all NYC-certified fire safety directors and many were retired members
of the FDNY. In all cases, once the FDNY arrived on the scene, it had jurisdiction over
any decisions concerning evacuation and/or other emergency procedures. FSD's could
make recommendations and/or object but the decision was ultimately the FDNY's. There
was no pre-written script specifying how to advise tenants in one tower if there was a
major event or explosion in the other. (See WTC Protocols & the South Tower, dated
Jul. 24, 2004). In general, announcements were either "advisory" or "emergency."
Advisory announcements generally informed tenants of an event which either did not
affect them or did not require immediate action (e.g., an incident which was occurring in
another location but perceptible to tenants, or a non-emergency situation such a power
dip). The purpose was reduce anxiety. Emergency announcements advised tenants how
to proceed in situations which did require immediate attention (e.g., evacuation). (See
also Michael Hurley interviews, dated July 8, July 22, & July 23, 2004) & Memo re WTC
Protocols & South Tower, dated July 24, 2004)

2) Emergency intercom "floor warden" phones: Floor warden intercom phones were
located on each floor of the towers to enable the designated floor "fire warden" (a
civilian tenant) to communicate with the FCS when an emergency event occurred
(as fire drill training instructed). Lifting the handset at the floor location would
automatically connect the fire warden (or anyone using the phone) to the FCS.
The FCS was alerted by a sound alarm and a red LED alert.

3) Computerized alarms*: The FCS was equipped with a computer monitor by


means of which the DFSD could monitor conditions throughout the building.
When an alarm condition occurred (i.e., smoke, heat) it would automatically
trigger a coded message to appear on the screen at the fire command desk,
indicating the type and location of the alarm.

4) Hardlines: The FCS contained regular landline phones which tenants could reach
by dialing standard 7-digit numbers. Phone numbers were provided liberally;
they were given to all fire safety team members and many others who might need
to the contact the FCS.

5) Evacuation Tone*: Under normal circumstances, the evacuation tone could be


activated 1) manually; 2) by the water flow detection alarm, or 3) by the smoke
detector alarm. The tone would also sound automatically in default mode if the
transponder received an alarm input triggered by an actual alarm condition but
was unable to "communicate" with the FCS. Transponders generally covered 3-
floor areas and would receive input from and generate tones to those areas in the
manners indicated. The tone would be broadcast through the public address
speakers.

* Indicated items were components and/or features of the class "E" fire alarm system,
installed by the Port Authority in response to the 1993 bombing ($70 million); (See also
Alan Reiss interview dated Jun. 16, 2004). It was comprised of six separate systems, in
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different physical locations, and covered all areas owned and operated by the PA. (WTC
1,2,4, 5, sub grade areas, concourse). The system contained redundant electronics and
control panels in physically dispersed locations, in case pertinent areas (i.e., lobby PCS)
had to be evacuated.

Functionality of Systems on Sept. 11thAfter Impact of Planes: This issue of which and to
what extent building systems functioned on September 11 after the towers were hit by the
planes is being thoroughly investigated by NIST. Because we lack the resources and
expertise to conduct this type of investigation, we have refrained from attempting to draw
broad conclusions. However, our research has yielded the following, non-technical,
information:

* Public-Address System: nV^^ a


1) From 911 tapes: The p.a. system was generally not heard in the background of X ^ f\/ M
any 911 tapes that we have listened to. Staff recalls hearing an announcement in \) ^ V
the background one call that did not appear to correspond to the events taking ""~J • pj\ tf
place at the time. In a separate call, people from the 97th floor of the South Tower , 0 I flO^
make repeated references to having heard an announcement to "go down the rC i \^/
stairs." 0 ^
2) Interviews: No civilian evacuees whom we interviewed from either tower recalls V>M
hearing p.a. announcements after their respective buildings were struck. No
family members/ co-workers of victims, who spoke with victims on the phone
while in the towers, recall hearing announcements in the background. The DFSD
stationed in the North Tower recalls receiving confirmation from some tenants,
who called down to the FCS for direction after the building was hit, that they had
heard his p.a. announcements. He does not recall which floors the
acknowledgments came from but does not remember receiving any
communications from people at or above the impact. An employee of American
Building Maintenance told us that he recalled hearing an automatic, pre-recorded
message on some lower floors in the North Tower. However, as noted, p.a.
announcements were made "live." (See Michael Hurley interview June 21, 2004).
A Port Authority employee, who was on the 35th floor of the South Tower when it
was hit, recalls hearing what sounded like a p.a. announcement emanating from
the floors while he was evacuating down a stairwell, but he did not enter the floor
to check.

* Floor Warden Phones: No evacuees we spoke with attempted to use the floor warden
phones. The DFSD in the North Tower has told us that he received calls via those phones
after the NT was hit; the former fire safety director (PA), who reported to the North
Tower lobby that morning, recalls seeing that calls were coming through by that method
(the former FSD was not responsible for actually answering the calls). The NT DFSD
does not remember which floors he received these calls from, but does not recall being in
communication with anyone at or above the impact by any method. An ABM employee,
who remained in the stairwells and on floors in the 20's and 30's of the NT, recalls
observing people attempting to use the floor warden phones, but does not believe that
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they could get through. In the Port Authority transcripts of recorded calls to the PA
police desk, a fire warden from the 106th floor reports that the "fire phones are out."

* Hardlines: The DFSD in the north tower remembers receiving calls from tenants in
that tower via landline phones. There is other evidence of successful use of landline
phones to make calls from within the towers, including to 911

* Evacuation Tone: the tone was heard in some locations below the impact zone in the
NT, and in some locations both above and below the impact zone in the ST. (911 calls
and interviews). We have not determined whether the evacuation tone had been activated
manually or was operating in default mode. This may be determined by NIST.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Evacuation Tone

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence

Date: June 2 - 4 , 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By telephone / email

Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Staff was reminded during a meeting with Michael Hurley, the former PA fire
safety director for the WTC, that the WTC fire alarm evacuation tone was programmed to
sound automatically in default mode in a particular area if the transponder controlling
that area was unable to "communicate" with the PCS (this would alert the transponder, in
lay terms, that there was problem). Staff asked whether it could be concluded that, in
areas where the alarm tone was triggered in default mode, other components of the
system (e.g., the public address system) were not functional. Staff followed up with Alan
Reiss.

Mr. Reiss recalled that the evacuation tone could be activated in two ways. First,
the deputy fire safety director could manually activate the tone to sound on individual or
multiple floors, as the situation required, from the lobby FCS. This would send a signal
to the transponder to pump out the evacuation tone and flash the strobe lights. When the
push-to-talk button was pressed, the tone would be overriden for voice announcements.
This was the method used to initiate fire drills.

The system was also programmed so that, if a transponder received an alarm input
(e.g., smoke from a smoke detector), it would send a signal to the FCS and receive an
acknowledgment. If this acknowledgement was not received (i.e., the transponder could
not 'communicate' with the FCS), the transponder would generate an evacuation tone on
the floors it covered (typically a 3-floor area). The purpose of programming the system
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to generate the evacuation tone in default mode was to ensure that tenants were alerted to
the existence of alarms conditions on their floors, if regular system signals failed.

If, during the evacuation on September 11, the evacuation tone was heard on all
floors throughout the building, it could be surmised that the console signal was able to get
through, i.e., that the transponder was able to communicate with the PCS, since actual
smoke and/or other alarm conditions may not have existed immediately on all floors to
trigger the tone to sound in default mode. On the other hand, if evacuees did not report
hearing the tone right away—but it was heard in various locations as the morning
progressed—it could be surmsied that it was triggered in those areas in default mode, as
alarm conditions arose, rather than manually.

Mr. Reiss was not certain whether the fact that an evacuation tone sounded in
default mode in a particular location could be taken to mean that other systems in that
location were unable to function. He explained that there were many pairs of wires in the
dual risers serving to the system (rather than, e.g., 2 in the case of a telephone system)
and there were also various failure modes (e.g., open, short, cut). Therefore, there could
be many permutations as to what did and did not get damaged. Mr. Reiss referred the
question to PA engineering and the manufacturer of the fire alarm system. The
manufacturer's technical response was beyond the scope of staff s investigation.
However, Mr. Reiss explained, in summary, that it was possible for, e.g., the floor
warden phones to have worked in a location where, e.g., the public address system did
not (if those wires were shorted). (See also MFR Int NIST, dated Jun. 7, 2004)

Staff does not have the resources or expertise to pursue a technical investigation
of this topic. The issue in being thoroughly investigated by NIST. For purposes of our
research, we will state facts learned from interviews or our analysis of other materials and
refrain from drawing conclusions.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Public Address System in stairwells

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence with Alan Reiss

Date: June 22, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: Madeleine Blot

Participants - Commission: Alan Reiss, Former Director of Port Authority World Trade
Department

In response to a question from staff, Alan Reiss confirmed that the fire alarm
public address system did have speakers in the fire stairwells. Because the stairwells
were part of a different circuit/zone from the floors, announcements were activated by a
separate switch at the fire command desk (there was a switch for each of the A, B and C
stairwells). (Staff member Madeleine Blot had previously been informed either by
interviewees or other staff members that the p.a. system could not be broadcast into the
stairwells).
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Chimes

Type of event:

Date: July 25, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

In response to a question from staff, Alan Reiss explained that "chimes" were a
tone which could be generated by the fire alarm system in addition to the warble
evacuation tone. Chimes were regularly used to precede "advisory" announcements over
the public-address system, whereas the warble siren was used to precede emergency
announcements. Chimes were used for advisory announcements in order to avoid
inspiring panic in a non-emergency situation.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: PCS systems; Evacuation tone

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence

Date: June 4, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: J. Randall Lawson, National Institute of Research and


Technology (NIST)

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Staff contacted Randy Lawson of NIST to inquire whether NIST had made any
determinations about the functionality of building systems at the WTC on Sept 11,
specifically in light of recent testimony by Lloyd Thompson at their joint interview.

NIST told staff that some evidence suggests that the floor warden phones were
not working. They confirmed that the evacuation tone could be activated manually or in
default mode, and that it could also be activated automatically by the system (under
regular conditions).

In follow up, NIST confirmed that under the normal course of events, the
evacuation tone could be activated in the following three ways: 1) manually, 2) by the
water flow detection alarm, or 3) the smoke detector alarm. It would also be generated in
default mode if the block of floors corresponding to the transponder, or "slave unit," was
severed from the overall building alarm control system. When the alarms were activated
from the transponder or block mode, it was difficult to turn the alarms off. A whooping
sound was initiated, and there was no capability for verbal announcements. However,
verbal announcements could be made via other audio systems in the building.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Public address announcements

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence

Date: June 21,2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety
director of WTC

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

In response to a question from staff, Michael Hurley confirmed that all public
address announcement were made "live." There were no pre-recorded or automated
messages.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: PCS systems backup, landline numbers & scripts

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence

Date: June 4, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety
director of WTC

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

In follow up to the June 2nd meeting, staff asked Michael Hurley several questions
related to PCS systems and protocol.

Mr. Hurley confirmed that each PCS contained a pre-scripted announcements


corresponding to a number of specified situations and/or emergencies, including
evacuation for fire emergencies, fire or smoke conditions not requiring evacuation,
smoke outside the complex, electrical power outages, elevator service interruptions,
disruptions to water or HVAC service, bomb threats. (Staff later obtained copies of WTC
scripts). The purpose was to enable specific and consistent messages to be broadcast by
deputy fire safety directors (vs. their making it up on the spot).

Mr. Hurley also confirmed that since each tower's PCS could be operated
remotely, it was possible for announcements to one tower from the lobby of the other.
Control of all systems regularly controlled from the tower lobby FCS's could be also be
transferred to the OCC, which served as an additional backup.

The landline telephone numbers for the FCS's were distributed widely to those
who might need to contact the PCS. They were given to the tenant fire safety teams
(wardens, deputy wardens & searchers) during fire drills. They were also given others,
including construction crews, fire alarm system contractors, electricians, welders,
sprinkler contractors, the FDNY, and probably many others. The numbers were liberally
distributed because there was a 24-hour presence at the tower FCS's.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: WTC systems follow up

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence

Date: June 17, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety
director of WTC

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Michael Hurley confirmed staffs understanding of the various methods of


information flow to and form the FCS, as set forth in an email corresponding to staffs
memo on FCS Systems & Protocol. Mr. Hurley pointed out that the tones which
regularly preceded announcements were set to sound automatically (as opposed to being
manually activated at the time) when the system was set to broadcast a message, as pre-
programmed. The tone could be overridden by voice announcements if the push-to-talk
button was pressed. Mr. Hurley also confirmed that tones were broadcast through the
public address speakers.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Repeater System

Type of event: Conference call

Date: July 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: Ray Simmonnetti, Port Authority; James Begley,


Deputy General Counsel, Port Authority.

Participants - Commission staff: Sam Caspersen; Madeleine Blot

Commission staff spoke with Ray Simmonnetti about various aspects of the
towers' repeater system, in order to elaborate on questions posed by the FDNY
concerning this matter. See MFR prepared by Sam Capsersen.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Public-address announcements in the South Tower

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence

Date: April 15, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location. By email

Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, Former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Alan Reiss contacted staff to relay information relevant to staff member


Madeleine Blot's research. A PA employee, who was on the 35th floor of the South
Tower on the morning of September 11, told Mr. Reiss that he did not recall hearing any
public address announcements after the building was hit. The PA employee did recall
hearing announcements before the building was hit1 and also remembered hearing the
evacuation tone after the building was hit.

1 Content of announcements not specified

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