Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit G. R. No.

79956 January 29, 1990 Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Issue: Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional? HELD: YES. The creation of CAR is still under the executive power. The creation of the CAR is for the purpose of administrative coordination only and do not create a territorial and political subdivision. CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al, GR No. 80391, February 28, 1989 ARTICLE X Section 2: Local Autonomy Facts: On March 12, 1987 petitioner Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao. On November 2, 1987, members of Regional Legislative Assembly sans the petitioner Limbona convened in defiance to short recess called for by petitioner as the latter was to attend a congressional committee hearing for Muslim Affairs in Congress. During the convention, having acquired quorum, members thereof move to declare the Speakership of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant, thereby expelling petitioner from office. Petitioner Limbona filed petition for injunction praying that a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter and that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void. In view thereof, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear and decide matters over autonomous region was challenged by respondents. Issue: Whether or not autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? Ruling: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enabl es it to concentrate on national concerns. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central government authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991) ARTICLE X Section 2: Local Autonomy Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. The law says that the budget officer shall be appointed by the

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Department head upon the recommendation of the head of local government subject to civil service rules and regulations. If none of those recommended by the local government head meets the requirement of law. Issue: Whether or not the Department head may appoint anyone he chooses? Ruling: No. He must return the recommendations of the local government head explaining why the recommendees are not qualified and ask for new recommendations. In other words, the recommendation of the local government head is a conditio sine qua non (requirement) of the Departments appointing authority. This is the only way l ocal autonomy can be given the recognition the Constitution wants it to have. When in doubt, favor autonomy. MAGTAJAS V PRYCE GAS AND PAGCOR FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operation to Cagayan de Oro City due to its success in several cities. However there was instant opposition from religious element, different sectors, groups and youth when PAGCOR announced the opening of casino in said city. The Sangguniang Panlungsod issued ordinances which prohibits the use of building for casino operation and the operation of casino in the city. The City Government of Cagayan de Oro City contented that, under its authority to prohibit gambling, the city could prevent PAGCOR from operating in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances which prohibits the casino operation of PAGCOR in Cagayan de Oro City is valid. HELD: No, Casino gambling is authorized under PD 1869. This decree has a status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact said ordinance prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of casino and prohibiting its operation. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to pd 1869. LEYNES Vs. COA (GR NO. 143596, DEC. 11, 2003) FACTS: Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, presiding judge of RTC of Calapan City, Branch 40 Oriental Mindoro. His RATA is taken from the SC and in addition he received a monthly allowance from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan-being the sole presiding judge. On May 7, 1993, SB approved increasing petitioners monthly allowance. On Feb. 17, 1994 Provincial auditor issued a memorandum to stop the payment of allowance for he is already receiving RATA from the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan validly provided allowance in additionto that given by the SC. HELD: YES, RA 7160 is a special law which exclusively deals with LGUs outlining their own powers and functions in consonance with the constitutional mandated policy of the Local autonomy. Resolution No.101 is valid. Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of allowance to the judges BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY and BATANGASCITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004] FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject t o the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD

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regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. ISSUE: May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? HELD: No. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions - allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC. GARCIA V. COMELEC227 SCRA 100PUNO, October 5, 1993 GOVERNOR ENRIQUE GARCIA FACTS: May 11, 1992, Enrique Garcia was elected governor of Bataan. BUT in the early evening of July 1, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguinang Bayan of the 12 municipalities of Bataan met at the NPC Compound and the following day, they proceeded to constitute themselves into aPreparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall election of PETITIONER. Garcia contended that the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not. ISSUE: WON the preparatory recall assembly has the right to recall an election. HELD: The Court decided that the Constitution did not provide for any mode , let alone a single mode , of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recallelections. Article X Sec 3 of the constitution is for Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum by this constitutional mandate , the Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. Malonzo V. COMELEC 269 SCRA 380 FACTS: Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995, winning over former Mayor MacarioAsistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term, petitioner's office as Mayor was put to serious question when on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and SangguniangKabataan chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him. Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that the recall process was deficient in form and substance, and therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in order. On November 28, 1996, Mayor Malonzo came to us on a "Petition for Certiorari With Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction", assailing the COMELEC's resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Private respondents also, Ligangmga Barangay, allege that all the requirements for the holding of a recall election were duly complied with and that the petition is therefore without basis. ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of the propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC.

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HELD: , the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Moreover, to order the COMELEC to repeat the process of determining the notices' propriety would be sanctioning a recycling of administrative functions, entailing added cost and waste of effort. Petitioner likewise attacks the COMELEC's ruling on the validity of the proceedings held by the Preparatory Recall Assembly, in that it allegedly ruled that the LIGA ngmga Barangay is authorized to initiate the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Ligangmga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman."[7] The Ligangmga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the Ligangmga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground. Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271 FACTS: Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued a 600 day suspension against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. HELD: Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement i t cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension. Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279 Facts: Petitioner, Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija, assailed the validity of his suspension from office after he was given three extensions to answer the complaints filed against him by private respondents for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Petitioner contends that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the employees. On January 8, 1998, a resolution was issued suspending Petitioner from office for six months. Issue: Whether or not his suspension is valid. Held: No. The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition Page 4 of 27

Drilon v. Lim Facts: The Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice is not in excess of his supervisory power in rendering the Ordinance null and void? Held: The constitution provide the supervisory power of president over the Local Government Unit and authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. The Secretary of Justices acts still falls under th e power to supervise the LGU and the later did not exercise any controlling power.

Prov. Of Negros v. Commissioners G.R. No. 182574 Fact: On Dec. 21, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a Res. No. 720, allocating P4 million of its retained earnings for the hospital and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the Province. The Philam Care was awarded, and the local government entered into agreement and paid the total amount of 3,760,000.00. January 25, 1997 the Provincial Auditor issued notice of suspension no. 97-001-101, suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the office of the president. The petitioner complied with the directive and sent letter request dated Jan. 12, 1999, and on Jan. 26, 1999 the pres. directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount of 100,000.00 which was ignored by the provincial auditor instead issued notice of disallowances No. 99-005-101(96). The petitioner appealed the disallowance to COA and was denied, ruled under AO 103 in conformity with the policy of standardization of compensation laid done in RA 6758. And stated the persons liable: 1. The 1,949 officials and employees 2. The former governor 3. SP members and excluded the Provincial auditor on his stance for subject of disallowance. Issue: W/N the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760.000 for premium paid for hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees. Held: SC said, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 constitution, under Sec. 25 Art. II and Sec. 2 Art X and the local government code of 1991, we declare that the grant and release of the hospital and health care insurance benefits given to the officials and employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed. And COA then gravely abused its discretion in applying AO 103 to disallow the said benefits. Petition denied. LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805 Facts: Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles. The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration and license for driving tricycles has been devolved to LGU's. Issue:

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Whether under the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to local government units. HELD: The SC ruled that the registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB. Under the Local Government Code, LGUs have the power to regulate the operation of tricycle for hire and to grant franchise for the operation thereof.

LINA VS. PANO 364 SCRA 76 FACTS: Respondent Tony Calvento was appointed PSCO agent to in stall and operate a lotto terminal. Mayor of San Pedro Laguna denied his application for a business permit citing an ordinance (Kapasyahan Blg. 508, taong 1995) passed by the Provincial Board of Laguna, objecting/opposing any form of gambling including lotto in Laguna. Calvento arguing that KB508 is curtailment of State power since in this case the national legislature itself already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operation around the country, filed for declaratory relief before the RTC, to annul KB 508 and compel the local mayor to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet. Suit decided in Calventos favor. MR by Respondent denied. Petition wit h SC. Issue: Whether or not the provincial board can disallow by ordinance or resolution that would seek to prohibit permits. RULING: Game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress (RA1169), as amended by BP42, the law granting a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto is a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Provincial Board of Laguna, as a LGU, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. What the national legislature allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution

Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16, 2008 Facts: In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue Code or Ordinance 92-03, petitioner Petron Corporation was assessed a total tax of P6,259,087.62. Petron filed a letter protest arguing that it is exempt from paying local business taxes as provided by Article 232 (h) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code. The letter-protest was denied. A Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon. The RTC dismissed the Complaint and required Petron to pay the assessed tax. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was later denied by the court. Hence, the filing of this petition. Issues: Whether or not a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code (LGC) to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale of petroleum.

Held: No. The petition is granted. The Court defers to the other branches of government in the formulation of oil policy, but when the choices are made through legislation, the Court expects that the choices are deliberate, considering that the stakes are virtually all-in. Herein, respondents may be bolstered by the constitutional and statutory policy favoring local fiscal autonomy, but it would be utter indolence to reflexively affirm such policy when the inevitable effect is an increase in oil prices. Any prudent adjudication should fully ascertain the mandate of local government units to impose taxes on petroleum products, and such mandate should be cast in so specific terms as to leave no dispute as to the legislative intendment to extend such power in the name of local autonomy. What we have found instead, from the plain letter of the law is an explicit disinclination on the part of the legislature to impart that particular taxing power to local government units.

While Section 133(h) does not generally bar the imposition of business taxes on articles burdened by excise taxes under the NIRC, it specifically prohibits local government units from extending the levy of any kind of taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. Accordingly, the subject tax assessment is ultra vires and void.

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Yamane v BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation Facts: In 1998, BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation (Lepanto) received a tax assessment in the amount of P1.6 million from Luz Yamane, the City Treasurer of Makati, for business taxes. Lepanto protested the assessment as it averred that Lepanto, as a corporation, is not organized for profit; that it merely exists for the maintenance of the condominium. Yamane denied the protest. Lepanto then appealed the denial to the RTC of Makati. RTC Makati affirmed the decision of Yamane. Lepanto then filed a petition for review under Rule 42 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC. Yamane now filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. Yamane avers that a.) Lepanto is liable for local taxation because its act of maintaining the condominium is an activity for profit because the end result of such activity is the betterment of the market value of the condominium which makes it easier to sell it; that Lepanto is earning profit from fees collected from condominium unit owners; and that b.) Lepantos petition for review of the decision of the RTC to the CA is erroneous because when the RTC decided on the appeal brought to it by Lepanto, the RTC was exercising its original jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction; that as such, what Lepanto should have done is to file an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. ISSUE: Whether or not a RTC deciding an appeal from the decision of a city treasurer on tax protests is exercising original jurisdiction. Whether or not a condominium corporation organized solely for the maintenance of a condominium is liable for local taxation. HELD: 1. Yes. Although the LGC (Section 195) provides that the remedy of the taxpayer whose protest is denied by the local treasurer is to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction or in this case the RTC (considering the amount of tax liab ility is P1.6 million), such appeal when decided by the RTC is still in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction. This is because appellate jurisdiction is defined as the authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review. Here, the City Treasurer is not a lower court. The Supreme Court however clarifies that this ruling is only applicable to similar cases before the passage of Republic Act 9282 (effective April 2004). Under RA 9282, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), not CA, exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases whether originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. 2. No. Lepanto was not organized for profit. The fees it was collecting from the condominium unit owners redound to the owners themselves because the fees collected are being used for the maintenance of the condo. Further, it appears that the assessment issued by Yamane did not state the legal basis for the tax being imposed on Lepanto it merely states that Makati is authorized to collect business taxes under the Local Government Code (LGC) but no other reference specific reference to specific laws were cited. Part A: Local Taxation and Real Property TaxationI. Legal BasisSection 128-196Section 5, Art. X, 1987Constitution Phil Petroleum Corp vs Mun of Pililia 1991 Facts: Petitioner is a business enterprise engaged in themanufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleumproduct, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla,Rizal. PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya, Pililla,Rizal. Under Section 142 of the NIRC of 1939, manufacturedoils and other fuels are subject to specific tax.On June 28, 1973, PD 231 (Local Tax Code) was issuedenacted. Sections 19 and 19 (a) provide that the municipalitymay impose taxes on business, except on those for whichfixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers orproducers of any article of commerce of whatever kind ornature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, repackers,and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits and/or wines inaccordance with the schedule listed therein.The Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73(December 27, 1973) directed to all provincial, city andmunicipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local taximposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing inpetroleum products subject to the specific tax under theNIRC. Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73 (January 9, 1973)wasalso issued instructing all City Treasurers to refrain fromcollecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enactedbefore or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code, on thebusinesses of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, ordealing in, petroleum products subject to the specific taxunder the NIRC.Respondent enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, S-1974otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974" whichtook effect on July 1, 1974. Sections 9 and 10 of the saidordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those forwhich fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code onmanufacturers, importers, or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers,distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors,distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with theschedule found in the Local Tax Code, as well as mayor'spermit, sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee forflammable, combustible or explosive substances, whileSection 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surchargesand interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges n April 13, 1974, P.D. 436 was promulgated increasing thespecific tax on lubricating oils, gasoline, bunker fuel oil,diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum

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John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR No. 119775, October products leviedunder Sections 142, 144 and 145 of the NIRC, and grantingprovinces, cities and municipalities certain shares in thespecific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed onpetroleum products. The questioned Municipal TaxOrdinance No. 1 was reviewed and approved by theProvincial Treasurer of Rizal, but was not implementedand/or enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of itshaving been suspended up to now in view of ProvincialCircular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73.On June 3, 1977, P.D. 1158 otherwise known as the NationalInternal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, Section 153 of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined andmanufactured mineral oils and motor fuels.Enforcing the provisions of the ordinance, the respondent filed a complaint against PPC for the collection of thebusiness tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection feesfrom 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985. The RTC rendered a decisionagainst petitioner. Issue: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specifictax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay (a) tax on businessand (b) storage fees, considering Provincial Circular No. 6-77; and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto therespondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, based on MunicipalOrdinance No. 1 Held: YesRatio: PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. 2673declared as contrary to national economic policy theimposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleumproducts as they are already subject to specific tax under theNational Internal Revenue Code; (b) the above declarationcovers not only old tax ordinances but new ones, as well asthose which may be enacted in the future; (c) both ProvincialCirculars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective, hence,unless and until revoked, any effort on the part of therespondent to collect the suspended tax on business fromthe petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized; and (d)Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxeson petroleum products.PC No. 26-73 and PC No. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of local tax ordinances imposing a tax on business underSection 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code, with regard tomanufacturers, retailers, wholesalers or dealers in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under theNIRC, in view of Section 22 (b) of the Code regarding non-imposition by municipalities of taxes on articles, subject tospecific tax under the provisions of the NIRC.There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax OrdinanceNo. 1 imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is validespecially Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P.D. No. 426." It conforms with the mandate of said law.But P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed tohave repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19(a), were carried over into P.D. No. 426 and no exemptionswere given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, ordealers in petroleum products.Wellsettled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing ruleor regulation, the former prevails. Furthermore, whileSection 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxeson petroleum products, said decree did not amend Sections19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426, whereinthe municipality is granted the right to levy taxes onbusiness of manufacturers, importers, producers of anyarticle of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax onbusiness is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if theimposition of tax on business of manufacturers, etc. inpetroleum products contravenes a declared national policy,it should have been expressly stated in P.D. No. 436.The exercise by local governments of the power to tax isordained by the present Constitution. To allow thecontinuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No.26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power totax by mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5,Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines andlimitations that may be established by Congress can defineand limit such power of local governments.

24, 2003 FACTS:The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Moreover, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the Court declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the Constitution. However, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to the law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as in the case at bar, may stand and be enforced. ISSUE:WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition HELD:R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country. The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio,

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in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged. Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City.Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.

Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna Facts: MERALCO was granted franchise for the supply of electric light, heat and power by certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna including, Bian, Sta Rosa, San Pedro, Luisiana, Calauan and Cabuyao. On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a franchise by the National Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna. On 12 September 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, was enacted to take effect on 01 January 1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance providing for franchise tax at a rate of 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts. Provincial Treasurer, then sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment. Petitioner MERALCO paid the tax, which then amounted to P19,520,628.42, under protest. A formal claim for refund was thereafter sent by MERALCO to the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which provides Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current. Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative. On 28 August 1995, the claim for refund of petitioner was denied in a letter signed by Governor Jose D. Lina. In denying the claim, respondents relied on a more recent law, i.e., Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, than the old decree invoked by petitioner. On 14 February 1996, petitioner MERALCO filed with the RTC a complaint for refund against the Province of Laguna and also Benito R. Balazo in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. RTC dismissed the complaint holding that the power to tax exercised by the province of Laguna was valid. Issue: Whether of Not the power to tax was validly exercise. Held: Yes, as long the tax power imposed exist in accordance with the guidelines and limitations that was provided by the Congress. The basic rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that a. The taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; b. Each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; c. The resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and d. Local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.

Batangas Power v. Batangas City, GR No. 152675, April 28, 2004 FACTS In the early 1990s, the country suffered from a crippling power crisis. The government, through the National Power Corporati on (NPC), sought to attract investors in power plant operations by providing them with incentives, one of which was the NPCs assumption of their tax payments in the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) Agreement. On June 29, 1993, Enron Power Development Corporation (Enron) and NPC entered into a Fast Track BOT Project. Enron agreed to supply a power station to NPC & transfer its plant to the latter after 10 years of operation. The BOT Agreement provided that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes imposed on the power station except income & permit fees. Subsequently, Enron assigned its obligation under the BOT Agreement to Batangas Power Corporation (BPC). On September 23, 1992, the BOI issued a certificate of registration to BPC as a pioneer enterprise entitled to a tax holiday of 6

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years. On October 12, 1998, Batangas City sent a letter to BPC demanding payment of business taxes & penalties. BPC refused to pay citing its tax exemption as a pioneer enterprise for 6 years under Sec.133(g) of the LGC. The citys tax claim was modified and it demanded payment of business taxes for the years 1998-1999. BPC still refused to pay the tax, insisting that the 6-year tax holiday commenced from the date of its commercial operation on July 16, 1993, not from the date of its BOI registration in September 1992. In the alternative, BPC asserted that the city should collect the taxes from NPC since the latter assumed responsibility for their payment under the BOT Agreement. The NPC intervened that while it admitted assumption of the BPCs tax obligations under the BOT Agreement, it refused to pay BPCs business tax as it allegedly constitut ed an indirect tax on NPC which is a taxexempt corporation under its Charter. BPC filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Makati RTC against Batangas City & NPC alleging that under the BOT Agreement, NPC is responsible for the payment of such taxes but since it is exempt from such, both the BPC and NPC arent liable for its payment. ISSUES 1. Whether BPCs 6-year tax holiday commenced on the day of its registration or on the date of its actual commercial operation as certified by the BOI. 2. Whether NPCs tax exemption privileges under its Charter were withdrawn by Sec.193 of the LGC. HELD 1. Sec.133(g) of the LGC applies specifically to taxes imposed by the local government. The provision of the LGC should apply on the tax claim of Batangas City against the BPC. The 6-years tax claim should thus commence from the date of BPCs registration with the BOI on July 16, 1993 and end on July 15, 1999. 2. In the case of NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan, the removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities from local taxation is recognized as one of the most significant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Sec.193 of the LGC withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoined by the NPC under its Charter. The power to tax is no longer exclusively vested on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Art.X, Sec.5 of the 1987 Constitution. The LGC effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced by the LGUs. It widens the tax base of LGUs to include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws. When NPC assumed tax liabilities of the BPC under their 1992 BOT Agreement, the LGC which removed NPCs tax exemption privileges had already been in effect for 6 months. Thus, while the BPC remains to be the entity doing business in the city, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable to pay said taxes under the provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement & the 1991 LGC.

Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR No. 155491, September 16, 2008 FACTS: Smart filed a special civil action for declaratory relief for the ascertainment of its rights and obligations under the Tax Code of the City of Davao, which imposes a franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao. Smart avers that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to the City. RTC denied the petition. Smart filed an appeal before the SC but was denied. Hence, Smart filed a motion for reconsideration. Smart argues that the i n lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts franchise covers local taxes According to its franchise, Smart shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings. Moreover, it argues that the in in lieu of all taxes" clause is not rendered ineffective by the Expanded VAT Law. ISSUE: Whether Smart is liable to pay franchise tax to the City of Davao in view of the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in its franchise? HELD: YES. Tax exemptions are highly disfavored and that a tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the legislature to grant such exemption. And, even in the instances when it is granted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Jurisprudence suggests that aside from the national franchise tax, the franchisee is still liable to pay the local franchise tax, unless it is expressly and unequivocally exempted from the payment thereof under its legislative franchise. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in a legislative franchise should categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national taxes; otherwise, the exemption claimed should be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Moreover, the "Expanded VAT Law," did not remove or abolish the payment of local franchise tax. It merely replaced the national franchise tax that was previously paid by telecommunications franchise holders and in its stead imposed a ten percent (10%) VAT. VAT replaced the national franchise tax, but it did not prohibit nor abolish the imposition of local franchise tax by cities or municipalities. The imposition of local franchise tax is not inconsistent with the advent of the VAT, which renders

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functus officio the franchise tax paid to the national government. VAT inures to the benefit of the national government, while a local franchise tax is revenue of the local government unit. Pimentel v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000) FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. ISSUE: Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy. HELD: In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287[40] of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20 percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive power granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby permanently PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are concerned.

Batangas v Executive Secretary GR 152774, May 27, 2004 Facts: Dec. 1998, Pres. Estrada issued E.O. no. 48 ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMANT AND EQUALIZATION. To enhance capacity of LGU. Province of batangas represented by governor filed for petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the rules of court , to declare as unconstitutional and void curtained provisions contained in GAA in 1999, 2000, 2001 insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of 5 billion pesos IRA for local government service equalization fund and imposed condition for the released thereof. Issue: W/N certain provisions assailed in GAA of 1999, 2000, 2001 and OCD resolutions are constitutional. Held: No. they are declared unconstitutional and void. Art 10 sec 6 provides Local government shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes w/c shall be automatically released to them. Thus provision mandates that LGU shall have just share, just share determine by law, and automatically released to them. Under the assailed provision GAA of 1991, 2000, 2001 conditions were imposed for such amount be released to LGU. Subject to IRR prescribed by OCD. It makes the release not automatic which violate the constitutional mandate. Alternative Center v. Zamora G.R No.144256 June 8, 2005

FACTS: On August 22, 2000, a number of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and peoples organization, along with 3 brgy. Officials filed with this court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of Allocations to Local Government Units. ISSUE: Whether or Not the allocations are unconstitutional as it violate the autonomy of the LGUs by unlawfully reducing by 10B of its IRA due to the Local Governments and withholding the release of such amount by placing the same under UNPROGRAMED FUNDS.

HELD: Wherefore the petition is granted. XXXVII and LIV special provisions 1 and 4 of the year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the of 10B, as part of the Unprogramed Fund.

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League of Cities v. COMELEC August 24, 2010 Facts: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the 12th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001, amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million. Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100million income requirement of RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed into law without the Presidents signature. Said Cityhood Laws directed t he Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion. Issues: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. Held: Yes, the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. (1) Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers FACTS: Private respondent Jose Capcowas elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending June 1992.With the death of the incumbent mayor, Capcobecame the mayor by operation of law. In 1992, Capco ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years ending June 1995. In 1995, Capco was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 1998. In 1998,Capco filed his COC for mayor of Pateros but petitioner Benjamin Borja Jr.contested it on the ground that Capcohad already served as mayor for three-consecutive terms by June 1998, and therefore is ineligible to serve for another term after that. ISSUE: Whether or notCapco has already served three consecutive terms?

HELD: The Court held that the three term limit for local officials must be taken to the right to be electedas well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,he must also have been electedto the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. In this case, the first term of Capco cannot be included in the computation because he was not elected in that instance but rather only served the remaining term of the deceased mayor by virtue of operation of law.

Lozanida vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 135150,July 28.1999 Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification

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Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials. Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was el ected. The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. ADORMEO vs. COMELECG.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002 FACTS: Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City for the 2001 elections. Talaga, Jr. was then the incumbent mayor. He was elected mayor in 1992 andwas again re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost, however, in the recallelection of May 2000, he won and served the unexpired term. Adormeo filed a Petition to CancelCertificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter waselected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms. Talaga, Jr. responded that he wasnot elected City Mayor for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2 consecutive terms since he wasdefeated in the 1998 election, interrupting the consecutiveness of his years as mayor. COMELECFirst Division found Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor. He filed a motion for reconsideration and COMELEC en banc ruled in his favor and held that 1) respondent was notelected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the 1998 elections; 2) that hewas installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory inthe recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-termdisqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and hisloss in the 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. After canvassing, Talaga, Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE: Whether or not Talaga, Jr was disqualified to run for mayor of in the elections. RULING: It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not electedfor three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shallnot be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he waselected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computationof the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time shortof the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Socrates vs COMELEC 391 SCRA 457 (2002) GR No. 154512 ; GR No. 155083-84 Nov 12, 2002 FACTS : On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) to pass Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of confidence in Mayor Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days. On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution due to failure of information and communication. Hagedorn, who served for three consecutive terms as Mayor filed for candidacy in the recall election.

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ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution of Socrates and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa. 2) Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa withoutviolating Section 8 of Article X of the Philippine Constitution. HELD :1) No. The COMELEC didnt commit grave abuse of discretion in the Recall Resolution of Socrates as the Recall Assembly was properly published and disseminated to the public. 2) Hagedorn is qualified to run after his three consecutive full term as Mayor because the position being contested for election was merely to fill the vacancy after his term, which was the first term of the incumbent Mayor Socrates. Any subsequentelection, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service, as provided in Section 8 of Article X. Latasa vs. Comelec GR No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003 FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected Mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur to 3 three consecutive terms (1992, 1995, 1998). During his third term, a plebiscite was held to convert Digos into a component city (2000). The ratification of the Charter of the City of Digos ended the tenure of Latasa as Mayor. However, he was still mandated as hold-over mayor of the city until the next election. For the election of 2001, Latasa filed his COC for his first term as mayor of the city. He acknowledges that he served as mayor of Digos when it was still a municipality. Sunga, also a candidate for mayor, filed a petition to disqualify Latasa as he already had served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. Comelec issued a resolution in favor of Sunga and disqualified Latasa. Latasa submitted a motion for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Comelec until the end of the May 14 elections. As a result, Latasa was still able to continue his campaign and eventually won the election. Sunga now also sought to annul Latasas proclamation. Comelec only rendered its decision denying Latasas motion for reconsideration in 2002. Sunga claims that he should be procl aimed mayor as he holds the second most number of votes in 2001 ISSUE: WON Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. HELD: Latasa cannot serve as Mayor of the new city of Digos. Latasa having been elected as mayor in 1998, the conversion of Digos from a municipality to a city in 2000 falls within his term. As Digos acquired a new corporate existence, qualifications for its elective positions also change. As a result, the Office of the Municipal Mayor was abolished to make way for the creation of the Office of the City Mayor. However, under the Charter of the City of Digos, the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos shall have hold-over power until a new election and the duly elected officials have assumed their office. Latasa never ceased to discharge his duties as Mayor during the conversion of Digos. Also, although Digos was converted into a city, Digos never redefined its territory, the inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. Sungas cannot claim that he be proclaimed as mayor after the disqualification of Latasa, the SC already ruled that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the second highest vote earner the position of mayor. Vacancy be filled by succession. David vs Comelec Facts: This case involves two (2) consolidated petitions filed by David and Liga ng mga Barangay QC Chapter. David, brgy chairman from Kalookan and president of Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, sought to prohibit the holding of barangay elections scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. On the other hand, Liga ng mga Barangay QC Chapter sought judicial review to declare as unconstitutional certain laws including Sec 43 of the LGC, COMELEC resolutions, and budget appropriations for elections, which all essentially limited the term of barangay officials to three (3) years. Issue: How long is the term of office of barangay officials? Held: The petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit. Page 14 of 27

For the clear understanding of the issues, the SC gave a brief historical background of barangay elections, to wit: Concept antedated the Spanish conquest "Barangay" is derived from the Malay "balangay", a boat which transported them to the Philippines Originally, a barangay was ruled by a dato who has absolute powers of government Spaniards stripped the dato/rajah of his powers and power was centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and gobernadorcillo Dato/rajah was renamed cabeza de barangay, who was elected by local citizens possessing property After American colonization, barangays were known as "barrios" which were granted autonomy by the original Bario Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590 During the Martial Law regime, barrios were renamed "barangays" again Pursuant to BP 222, LGC of 1983, BP 881 Punong Barangay and six Kagawads were elected with a term of 6 years By virtue of RA 6653, the election scheduled by BP 881 on 2nd Monday of May 1988 was reset to 2nd Monday of November 1988 and every 5 years thereafter. Under this law, the Punong Barangay was to be chosen from among themselves by 7 kagawads. By virtue of RA 6679, election date set by RA 6653 was reset to March 1989 and the term of office was to begin May 1, 1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. Still, term was fixed at 5 years but the manner of election of punong barangay was changed: Only 7 kagawads will be voted for by the people and the one with the highest votes shall be the Punong Barangay

Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50 Facts: Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vicemayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. Issue: Whether or not the assumption of the vice-mayor office, by virtue of succession, can be considered as an effective disruption in his full service of his second term as councilor. Ruling: YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has FULLY served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.

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Ong v Alegre, GR No 163295, January 23, 2006 FACTS: The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for certiorari with petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the COMELEC en banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31, 2004of the COMELECs First Division. Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the term should be counted for purposes of the three term limit. Yes. The decision declaring him not elected is of no practical consequence because he has already served.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Dizzon v COMELEC FACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a residentand taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the LocalGovernment Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality. Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SCs ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections. Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc: affirmed. The three-term limit is not applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the duly-elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) Morales has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term. ISSUES: 1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term 2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term HELD:

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1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes. Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the LocalGovernment Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom." To this, we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC: The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is neither specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vicemayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)

Aldovinovs COMELEC, WilfredoAsilo GR No. 184836 December 23, 2009 FACTS :The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

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ISSUE :Whether or not respondent Asilo can qualify for the election after his three consecutive terms inspite of a preventive suspension during his preceding three years consecutive terms. HELD: No. Asilo's 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official's term.The COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.

David v COMELEC, GR No 127116, April 8, 1997 FACTS: David, brgy chairman from Kalookan and president of Ligangmga Barangay saPilipinas, sought to prohibit the holding of barangay elections scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. On the other hand, Ligangmga Barangay QC Chapter sought judicial review to declare as unconstitutional certain laws including Sec 43 of the LGC, COMELEC resolutions, and budget appropriations for elections, which all essentially limited the term of barangay officials to three (3) years. ISSUE: WON the law governs the terms of the barangay officials. HELD:Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. 39 To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. 40 The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver. There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years, except that of barangay officials which "shall be determined by law" Supangan Jr. v. Santos, GR No. 84662, August 24, 1990 Facts: Petitioner Johnny D. Supangan, Jr., is a member of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Mabini, Pangasinan. In 1985, he was elected KB Chairman of the said municipality. In that same year he was elected KB Provincial Federation President of the province of Pangasinan. On November 25, 1985, petitioner was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Pangasinan representing the youth sector. He accordingly assumed office, discharged his functions and paranticipated in the deliberations of the said body. However on August 8, 1988 at the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent Marissa Domantay presented to the Presiding Officer a letter dated August 3, 1988 written by respondent Secretary Luis T. Santos advising the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that respondent "Marissa Domantay has been named as member thereof to replace Johnny D. Supangan, Jr." (Annex "D", p. 15, Rollo). She took her oath of office on August 25, 1988 and began attending the sessions of the said body. Claiming that Sec. Santos has no legal authority to designate private respondent Marissa Domantay as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the youth sector because (a) respondent Marissa Domantay has never been elected as KB Provincial Federation President of Pangasinan, a basic qualification for appointment as member representing the youth sector, and (b) respondent Secretary has no legal authority in issuing his letter dated August 3, 1988 because the term of office of petitioner Johnny D. Supangan, Jr. has not yet expired nor his successor, if any, been elected/appointed and qualified, petitioner instituted the present quo warranto and injunction proceedings. Issue: Whether or not may the President make the appointments even before Congress has passed the law? Held: The phrase as may be provided by law is not prospective. Hence, it can refer to law already existing at the time t he Constitution was enacted or to future laws. TAN vs. COMELEC

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Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC. Issue: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Constitution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO. Held: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the League of Cities of the Philippines V COMELEC, GR 176951, Nov.29, 2008 FACTS: Petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines,assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the COMELEC and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws. Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution HELD: YES, The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700 FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1 st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because ofMMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).

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Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1 st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under theConstitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislativedistrict is not affected and so is its representation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Camid v. Office of the President, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005 ARTICLE X Section 10: Changes/Abolition Facts: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null andvoid due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as aprivate citizen andtaxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a fullblown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasksand services, it has its own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2) 17 barangays with chairman; (3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong. In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive order. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation Held: Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. The Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following reasons:(1) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment.(2) Andong did not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442 (d) regarding municipalities created by executive orders. It says: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.(3) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality.(4) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House of Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the1987 Constitution validates them. The fact that there existing organic statutes passed by the legislation recreating these municipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong.SC DISMISSED petition for lack of Merit. Note the following Sections with regards to juridical personality of corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a different treatment with Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. 8: Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence; Section 4.Corporations created by special laws or charters. Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating that are applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. 45 of the New Civil Code, those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions and Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. Page 20 of 27

G.R. No. 180050 : February 10, 2010 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA,Petitioners, v.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands,Respondents. FACTS: On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code. Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent appointments and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared null and void. They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the return of the former districts to the mother Province of Surigao del Norte. ISSUES: Whether R.A. No. 9355 complied with the requirements of Section 461 of the Local Government Code in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. HELD: The petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID. MMDA v BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC GR NO 135962 March 27, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent BelAir Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent is the registered owner of Neptune Street. On Dec. 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated Dec. 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting Jan. 2, 1996. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street and on Feb. 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed action. ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA is a local government unit that has power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. HELD: NO clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Sec.11, Arti.X of the Constitution. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005 ARTICLE X Section 11: Metropolitan Political Subdivisions FACTS: 1. Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally. 2. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be filed in Court.

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3. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. 4. The RTC ruled in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA can confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without any need of any other legislative enactment? RULING: The court ruled that Section 5(f) of R.A. 7924 did not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without the need of any other legislative enactment. Such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. RATIO: It is only where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated, like the local government units, that MMDA is not precluded and in fact duty bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as wel l as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs

Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City G.R. No. 177807 & G.R. No. 177933 October 11, 2011 Facts: Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located EDSA, Quezon City. A few years later, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. It required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade along EDSA. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. It bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. The City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request "subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands."The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs dec ision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. Issue Whether Ordinance No. 2094 is a valid exercise of police power? Held Yes, it is a valid delegation of Police Power. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital,

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the questioned provision is invalidated. It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. At the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction. ABELLA vs. COMELEC Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified. Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011 I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. II. THE ISSUES: 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? 3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.] 1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

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ABBAS V COMELEC. GR NO. 89651 FACTS: The Tripoli Agreement took effect on Dec.23, 1976, which provides for the establishment of autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and enumerated 13 provinces comprising the areas of autonomy. In 1987, a new constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for Regional Autonomy, pursuant to the constitutional mandate, RA 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989. Petitioner argues that RA 6734 unconstitutionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao. They contends that Art II , sec. 1 of RA 6734 makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6734 or parts thereof, violates the constitution. HELD: No, under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by the majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. Ordillos v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990) Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned. Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region. Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that: SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .

BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONGADMINISTRATION 194 SCRA 101GRIO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991

NATURE

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Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Maeng Tribal Court FACTS Quema mortgaged his 2 parcels of land to Dra.Valera. He was able to redeem the land 22 years later, long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption price to the mortgagees heir.- On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her Dra.Valera when she was still alive. However, she could not produce the deed of sale for it is allegedly in the possession of Vice-Gov. Benesa.- As Quema was revented by Rosa from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the dispute. Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe, which decided in favor of Quema. - The Baduas did not immediately vacate the land. They subsequently received a "warning order" from a zone commander of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The order stated that, "Non-compliance of the said decision of the Court and any attempt to bringth is case to another Court will force the CPLA to settle the matter, in which case, you will have no one to blame since the case has been settled."- Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. Later, his wife, Rosa, was arrested by the CPLA and detained for 2 days. - Spouses Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs"- Respondents alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians. The tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong Association or Administration whose military arm is the CPLA. The tribal court, or council of elders, is composed of prominent and respected residents in the locality. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes morespeedily than the regular courts, without theintervention of lawyers. The proceedings anddecisi ons of the tribal courts are respected andobeyed by the parties, the municipal and barangay officials, and the people in the locality, ostracism being the penalty for disobedience of, or non-compliance with, the decisions of the council of elders in the areas where tribal courts operate. They contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not a part of the judicial system. ISSUE: WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executor decision in a land dispute HELD: NO Ratio:An amicable settlement, compromise, andarbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if notseasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the L upon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul orrepudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, thedecisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, May been forced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today. Reasoning:- In "Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. COMELEC, the SC en banc, found that in the plebiscite pursuant to RA 6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the CAR did not come to be. Thus Resolution No. 2259 of the COMELEC, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the Feb. 14, 1990 memorandumof the Secretary of Justice, the Feb. 5, 1990memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Admin. Order No. 160, and RA 6861 were declared null and void while E.O. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended."- Thus, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under Sec 13 of E.O.220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, RA 6766), and the CPLA, as a regional police force or a regional command of the AFP (Sacs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist.- Since the CAR did not come into legal existence, the Maeng's Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766.Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.- Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law. They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No.1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.

G. R. No. 79956January 29, 1990Cordillera Broad Coalitionvs.Commission on Audit Facts: On September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed a ceasefire agreement. They also agreed to establish an autonomous region, the Cordillera Administrative Region which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and Baguio. Both representatives of the Cordillera and the government drafted EO 220 signed into law by President CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the p ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually replace Congress from its task of enacting an organic act.

ISSUE. WON the President , in the exercise of her legislative power replace the legislative power of the congress in enacting the said organic act. Page 25 of 27

HELD: The President in 1987 exercised legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened. Needed to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created.

541 On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director as Secretaryof the Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindananao issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. MamasaoSani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanaodel Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. On September 15, 1993, Lanaodel Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur Sani then, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. On October 29, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133 transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM. On November 6, 1993, Macacua, again in her capacity as DOH-ARMM Secretary-Designate, issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandis designation as Officer -in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanaodel Sur, as well as Sanis detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato City. ISSUE: Wheter or not petitioner is hereby declared as an appointing acying officer- in charged of then Integretaed provincial health Office. HELD: The Court of Appeals held that Saber is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanaodel Sur. The Court of Appeals ruled that Lanao del Sur Governor MahidMutilan has the power and authority to appoint the provincial health officer under Section 478i[10] of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160, the 1991 LGU Code for brevity). The Court of Appeals declared: Accordingly, health services including hospitals, which used to be under the central authority of the Department of Health were devolved to the local government units (Art. 25, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991; Sec. 17, RA 7160). Pertinently, Sec. 478 of RA No. 7160 makes mandatory for provincial governments the appointment of a health officer and under Article 115 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, it is specifically provided that the Provincial Health Officer is one of the mandatory appointive provincial officials. There is thus, no doubt in the mind of the Court Sema v COMELEC Facts: On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).

Issue: W/N Creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan by ARMM regional legislative assembly constitutional? Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID. Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units

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Province of North Cotabato v. Gov't of Phil Peace Panel, Gr No. 183591 Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the MOA-AD between the government and the MILF and sought to prohibit the signing and execution of said agreement. Issue: Whether or not MOA-AD is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the Government and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel.

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