NEW JUSRISPRUDENCE ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

CASE 1 Juanita Trinidad Ramos,et al. v.Danilo Pangilinanet al. G.R. No. 185920, 20 July 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.) There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Ramos, et. al

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners, vs. DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO ANTENOR, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint1 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. By Decision2 of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount ofP1,661,490.30 representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution3 which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name covered by TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property). Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.4 Respondents, however, averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact served as the companys business address as borne by the companys letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan property was indeed the family home, only the value equivalent to P300,000 was exempt from execution.

By Order5 of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Order. Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also filed before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a Manifestation questioning the Notice to Vacate issued by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that the Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family home straddled two (2) lots, including the lot covered by TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to vacate the house. The Labor Arbiter was later to deny, by Decision of May 7, 2009, the third-party claim, holding that Ramos death and petitioners substitution as his compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan property. And the NLRC6 would later affirm the Labor Arbiters ruling, noting that petitioners failed to exercise their right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one 1 year period or until January 16, 2009. The NLRC brushed aside petitioners content ion that they should have been given a fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the property, holding that to do so would give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos. As to petitioners claim that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos share can be levied upon, the NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase in the TCT indicating the registered owner as "Ernesto Ramos, married to Juanita Trinidad, Filipinos," did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having merely described Ramos civil status. Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in ruling that the market value of the property was P2,177,000 as assessed by the City Assessor of Manila and appearing in the documents submitted before the Labor Arbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan property was constituted as the family home in 1944, its value was way below P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code was applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution. In the assailed Decision7 of September 24, 2008, the appellate court, in denying petitioners appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution, for while "Article 153 8 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, [it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code." The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code, hence, there was still a need to either judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners family home before it can be exempted; and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, there was no error in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution. The only question raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the Court of Appeals Decision holding that the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid. The petition is devoid of merit. Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. 9 Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.10 lays down the rules relative to the levy on execution over the family home, viz:

No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas. Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied) For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code.11 Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 12 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 15413 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 15514 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. 1avvphi1 And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.15 In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos bank accounts16 were already closed while other properties in his or the companys name had already been transferred, 17 and the only property left was the Pandacan property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson WE CONCUR: ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD* Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Additional member per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010. NLRC records, Vol. I, p. 2. Id. at 78-86. Penned by Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria. Id. at 96-96-98. Id. at 99-100. Id. at 138-141.

NLRC records, pp. 278-286. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez and concurred in by Commissioners Gregorio O. Bilog, III and Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
6

Rollo, pp. 7-19. Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Sixto C. Marella, Jr.
7

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
8

resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
9

Josef v. Santos, G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 57, 63. G.R. No. 172263, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 499, 501-502.

10

Art. 225. The family home may be constituted by a verified petition to the Court of First Instance by the owner of the property, and by approval thereof by the court.
11

Art. 229. The petition shall contain the following particulars: (1) Description of the property; (2) An estimate of its actual value; (3) A statement that the petitioner is actually residing in the premises; (4) The encumbrances thereon; (5) The names and addresses of all the creditors of the petitioner and of all mortgagees and other persons who have an interest in the property; (6) The names of the other beneficiaries specified in Article 226. Art. 230. Creditors, mortgagees and all other persons who have an interest in the estate shall be notified of the petition, and given an opportunity to present their objections thereto. The petition shall, moreover, be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Art. 231. If the court finds that the actual value of the proposed family home does not exceed twenty thousand pesos, or thirty thousand pesos in chartered cities, and that no third person is prejudiced, the petition shall be approved. Should any creditor whose claim is unsecured, oppose the establishment of the family home, the court shall grant the petition if the debtor gives sufficient security for the debt. Art. 233. The order of the court approving the establishment of the family home shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. Art. 240. The family home may be extrajudicially constituted by recording in the Registry of Property a public instrument wherein a person declares that he thereby establishes a family home out of a dwelling place with the land on which it is situated.
12

Art. 241. The declaration setting up the family home shall be under oath and shall contain: (1) A statement that the claimant is the owner of, and is actually residing in the premises; (2) A description of the property; (3) An estimate of its actual value; and

(4) The names of the claimant's spouse and the other beneficiaries mentioned in Article 226. Art. 242. The recording in the Registry of Property of the declaration referred to in the two preceding articles is the operative act which creates the family home.
13

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.

14

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

15

Honrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166333, 25 November 2005, 476 SCRA, 280, 288.

See certification from Prudential Bank Assistant Manager Victorino B. Lazaro, Jr., dated October 3, 2005, NLRC records, Vol. I, p. 105.
16

See Deed of Donation of Antipolo lot executed by Ernesto Ramos in favor of Philippine Rehabilitation Foundation, id. at 196-198.
17

Case 2

Ben-Hur Nepomuceno v. Archbencel Ann Lopez, represented by hermother Araceli Lopez

G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)

The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner, vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner). Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount ofP1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999. Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority. Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army. 2

By Order of July 4, 2001,3 Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioners handwritten note which it treated as "contractual support" since the issue of Arhbencels filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencels prayer for support pendente lite in the amount of P3,000 a month. After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006,4 whereupon the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencels Certificate of Birth was not prima facie ev idence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioners signature; that petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note. On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007, 5 reversed the trial courts decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total of P8,000 a month. The appellate court found that from petitioners payment of Aracelis hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent commitment to provide monthly financial support, the only logical conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencels father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to provide financial support; and that the amount of P8,000 a month was reasonable for Arhbencels subsistence and not burdensome for petitioner in view of his income. His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008, 6 petitioner comes before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.7 Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is the father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support from the putative parent; that the supposed payment made by him of Aracelis hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial; and that Arhbencels claim of paternity and filiation was not established by clear and convincing evidence. Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions of fact which the appellate court had already addressed, along with the issues raised in the present petition.8 The petition is impressed with merit. The relevant provisions of the Family Code9 that treat of the right to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus: Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. 1awph!1 The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

1. The spouses; 2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants; 3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; 4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and 5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation. Herrera v. Alba10 summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows: Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows: ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. xxxx ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide: SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by

evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by suchconventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads: Manila, Aug. 7, 1999 I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income. The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, 11 has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 117-120. Id. at 29, 87. Id. at 86-90. Id. at 109-116.

Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa; id. at 53-65.
5 6

Id. at 50-51. Id. at 25-48. Id. at 127-130.

Executive Order No. 209 as amended. G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 197, 206-208. Rollo, p. 121.

10

11

CASE 3 Ma. Virginia V. Remo v.The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs G.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.) Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which i s c o n s i d e r e d s u p e r i o r t o a l l o t h e r o f f i c i a l d o c u m e n t c a n n o t b e countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 of the 27 May 2005 Decision2 and 2 August 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, which in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioners request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport. The Facts Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.

Petitioners request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request. On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating thus: This has reference to your letter dated 17 August 2000 regarding one Ms. Maria Virginia V. Remo who is applying for renewal of her passport using her maiden name. This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these conditions.4(Emphasis supplied) Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000.5 On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal 6 and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes." The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239. On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration. 7 Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the resolution dated July 27, 2004, and the order dated October 28, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.8 Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 2 August 2005. Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals Ruling The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code9 and Section 5(d) of RA 8239.10 The Court of Appeals held that for passport application and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner's marriage to Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree

has been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport after she had adopted her husbands surname in her old passport. Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, respondent was justified in refusing the request of petitioner to revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport.1avvphi1 The Issue The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage. The Ruling of the Court The petition lacks merit. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." We agree with petitioner that the use of the word "may" in the above provision indicates that the use of the husbands surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court.11 In Yasin,12 petitioner therein filed with the Sharia District Court a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" in view of the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. In ruling in favor of petitioner therein, the Court explained that: When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husbands name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husbands full name or by adding her husbands surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as use of her former husbands is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.13 She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.14

In the present case, petitioner, whose ma rriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husbands surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, petitioners marriage remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the dissolution of ones marriage. The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is Section 5(d), which states: Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the following requirements: x x x (d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied) The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 "limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport." These instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 provides: The passport can be amended only in the following cases: a) Amendment of womans name due to marriage; b) Amendment of womans name due to death of spouse, annulment of marriage o r divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage of his parents. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) o f RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.15 This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code. Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband's surname.16 In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.17

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law,18 thus: [I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.19 Moreover, petitioners theory of implied repeal must fail. Well -entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. T he apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective.20 For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.21 This petitioner failed to establish.1avvphi1 The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husbands surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioners present request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents,22 cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will. The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it23 as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid and the same may not be surrendered to any person or entity other than the government or its representative.24 As the OSG correctly pointed out: [T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and protection. x x x Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondents competence to regulate any amendments intended to be made therein, including the denial of unreasonable and whimsical requests for amendments such as in the instant case.25 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.

SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Rollo, pp. 37-44. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo Zenarosa concurring.
2 3

Id. at 35. Id. at 49. Id. at 50. Id. at 45-47.

Id. at 48. Id. at 44. Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

10Section

5(d) for RA 8239 provides: In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; 311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995). See also Bar Matter No. 1625, In re: Petition to Use Maiden Name in Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations, Josephine P. Uy-Timosa (En Banc Resolution dated 18 July 2006).
11 12

Supra.

Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1 (1990 edition), p. 675.
13 14

Id. Rollo, pp. 264-265. See http://dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/consular-services/passport. See http://dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/renewal-of-passport.

15

16

17

Sitchon v. Aquino, 98 Phil. 458, 465 (1956); Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil. 32, 35 (1952); De Joya v. Lantin, 126 Phil. 286, 290 (1967); Nepomuceno v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42, 47 (1960).
18

Lagman v. City of Manila, 123 Phil. 1439, 1447 (1966) citing Cassion v. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561 (1951).
19 20Valera

v. Tuason, Jr., 80 Phil. 823, 827 (1948); Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 211, 231, citing Gordon v. Veridiano II, No. L-55230, 8 November 1988, 167 SCRA 51, 58-59; People v. Antillon, 200 Phil. 144, 149 (1982).
21

U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208 (1916). Section 19, RA 8239.

22

23

See http://philippine-embassy.org.sg/index.cfm?GPID=9. Section 11, RA 8239. Rollo, p. 272.

24

25

Case 4 Alain M. Dio v. Caridad L. Dio G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.) In this case, Alains marriage to Caridad was declared void under Article36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149. The Antecedent Facts Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of

California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long -lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The Decision of the Trial Court The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and 2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.4 Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and 2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.5 Hence, the petition before this Court. The Issue The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The Ruling of this Court The petition has merit. Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. We agree with petitioner. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. Article 147 of the Family Code provides: Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9 All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are: Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10 The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled: x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11 Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. 12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 15 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upo n finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice ATTESTATION

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes
1Under 2Rollo, 3Id. 4Id. 5Id.

Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

pp. 28-34. Penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.

at 45-46. at 34. at 46. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective 15 March 2003. Phil. 1289 (1996). v. Bruno Fehr, 460 Phil. 445 (2003).

6A.M. 7328

8Mercado-Fehr 9Id. 10Article

43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:

(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
11Nicdao

Cario v. Yee Cario, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).

12Suntay 13Article 14Article 15Article

v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932 (1998). 88 of the Family Code. 105 of the Family Code.

36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
16Supra

note 7.

Case 5 Rosalino L. Marable v. Myrna F. Marable G.R. No. 178741, 17 January 2011, THIRD DIVISION, (Villarama, Jr., J.) It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011

ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner, vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioners prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioners other relationship and demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love, time and attention. On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children. As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.

Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition4 for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life. In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioners mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel so he would be noticed. Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family. In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report5 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that peti tioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs. SO ORDERED.6 The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioners psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully exp lain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision. Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latters findings: Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his claim for a much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external. Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse. The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological incapacity.7 According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags findings. Also, petitioner maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioners personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to live under a "non-existent marriage." The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment8 maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person. Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioners psychologist was insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be his general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities." These, however, do not constitute psychological incapacity. Respondent also filed her Comment9 and Memorandum10 stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

The appeal has no merit. The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases. Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.11 These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.12 Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.13 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of

Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,15 the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags evaluation which became the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. 16 For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles17 and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity. Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. 18 It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. 19 That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 21 All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes Rollo, pp. 21-31. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
1 2

Id. at 37-38. Id. at 32-35. Penned by Judge Ruth Cruz-Santos. Records, pp. 1-6. Id. at 9-17. Rollo, p. 31.

Records, pp. 16-17. Rollo, pp. 49-57. Id. at 68-71. Id. at 100-107. Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 711, 725. Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, p. 8. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121, 128. G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 209-213. G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154, 174. Id. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, supra note 13 at 129. Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572, 582. Id. G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 33.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Aspillaga v. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009, 604 SCRA 444, 449-450; Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 135, 142.
21

Case 6 Gerbert R. Corpuz v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Brion, J.) T h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h o f A r t i c l e 2 6 o f t h e F a m i l y Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive e v i d e n c e o f r i g h t i n f a v o r o f G e r b e r t , p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 4 8 , R u l e 3 9 o f t h e Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition). Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5 Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6 Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts

petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11 THE PETITION From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13 Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerberts position. Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. THE COURTS RULING The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18 Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22 As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26 Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the

Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states: SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27 The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33 In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides. Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere prese ntation of the decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35 A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name. xxxx Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons: (1) Birth and death register; (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages. (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1 Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial

proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

Footnotes Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
* 1

Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.

Id. at 3-20. Id. at 27. Marriage Certificate, id. at 37. Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38. Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states: It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

Supra note 1. Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987. Rollo, p. 31. G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114. Id. at 121.

10

11

Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
12 13

Supra note 2. Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

14

The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
15 16

The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code. Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.

17

Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
18 19

Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996. G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139. G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653. Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144. Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.

20

21

22

23

The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
24 25

See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code: Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. xxxx Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to remarry.
26 27

Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20. Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.

28

Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
29 30

Rollo, pp. 38-41.

The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of the courts judgment was not included.
31

Literally means "a thing adjudged," Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.
32

See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:
33

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.
34

Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
35 36

Rollo, pp. 47-50. Id. at 51. Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court. Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court. Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

37

38

39

40

When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.
41

CASE 7

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 174104 February 14, 2011

INSURANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VIDAL S. GREGORIO and JULITA GREGORIO, Respondents. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and nullification of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated June 14, 2006 and its Resolution2 dated August 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82303. The assailed CA Decision reversed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79, in Civil Case No. 748-M in favor of herein petitioner, while the questioned CA Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent antecedent facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: On January 10, 1968, the spouses Vidal Gregorio and Julita Gregorio [herein respondents] obtained a loan from the Insurance of the Philippine Islands Corporation [herein petitioner] (formerly known as Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc.) in the sum of P2,200.00, payable on or before January 10, 1969, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. By way of security for the said loan, [respondents] executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of [petitioner] over a parcel of land known as Lot 6186 of the Morong Cadastre, then covered by Tax Declaration No. 7899 issued by the Municipal Assessor's Office of Morong, Rizal. On February 14, 1968, [respondents] again obtained another loan from [petitioner] in the sum of P2,000.00, payable on or before February 14, 1969, with 12% interest per annum. Another Real Estate Mortgage, covering a parcel of land known as Lot No. 6190 of the Morong Cadastre under Tax Declaration No. 10518, was executed by [respondents] in favor of [petitioner]. On April 10, 1968, [respondents] obtained, for the third time, another loan from [petitioner] in the amount ofP4,500.00 payable on or before April 10, 1969 with 12% interest per annum. As a security for the loan, [respondents] again executed a Real Estate Mortgage, this time covering two parcels of land: Lot 3499 under Tax Declaration No. 10631-Rizal and a lot situated in Brgy. Kay Kuliat under Tax Declaration No. 3918. [Respondents] failed to pay their loans, as a result of which the [mortgaged] properties were extrajudicially foreclosed. The extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted on December 11, 1969 where [petitioner] was the highest bidder. Since [respondents] failed to redeem the property, [petitioner] consolidated its ownership over the properties. The corresponding Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of [petitioner]. 4 On February 20, 1996, petitioner filed a Complaint5 for damages against respondents alleging that in 1995, when it was in the process of gathering documents for the purpose of filing an application for the registration

and confirmation of its title over the foreclosed properties, it discovered that the said lots were already registered in the names of third persons and transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to them. Claiming that respondents acted in a fraudulent and malevolent manner in enticing it to grant their loan applications by misrepresenting ownership of the subject properties, petitioner prayed for the grant of actual and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In their Amended Answer,6 respondents contended that their obligations in favor of petitioner were all settled by the foreclosure of the properties given as security therefor. In the alternative, respondents argue that petitioner's cause of action and right of action are already barred by prescription and laches.1avvphi1 In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the RTC of Morong, Rizal, ruled in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and as against the defendants, directing the latter to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, as follows: a. Actual damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, representing the fair market value of the real properties subject matter of this suit; b. For defendants' deceit and bad faith, exemplary damage in the sum of P300,000.00; c. Attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P200,000.00; and d. Costs of suit. SO ORDERED.7 Aggrieved, respondents appealed the judgment of the trial court to the CA. On June 14, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC and dismissing the complaint of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner's action for damages is barred by prescription and laches. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution of August 10, 2006. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner's main contention is that the CA erred in ruling that petitioner's right to any relief under the law has already prescribed or is barred by laches. Petitioner argues that the prescriptive period of its action for damages should be counted from 1995, which it alleges to be the time that it discovered the fraud committed by respondents against it. On the other hand, the CA ruled that petitioner's right of action prescribed four years after the subject properties were registered with the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal and TCTs were subsequently issued in the names of third persons in the years 1970, 1973 and 1989. The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Petitioner filed an action for damages on the ground of fraud committed against it by respondents. Under the provisions of Article 1146 of the Civil Code, actions upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff or upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years from the time the cause of action accrued. 8 The Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause of action accrued at the time it discovered the alleged fraud committed by respondents. It is at this point that the four-year prescriptive period should be counted. However, the Court does not agree with the CA in its ruling that the discovery of the fraud should be reckoned from the time of registration of the titles covering the subject properties. The Court notes that what has been given by respondents to petitioner as evidence of their ownership of the subject properties at the time that they mortgaged the same are not certificates of title but tax declarations, in the guise that the said properties are unregistered. On the basis of the tax declarations alone and by reason of respondent's misrepresentations, petitioner could not have been reasonably expected to acquire knowledge of the fact that the said properties were already titled. As a consequence, petitioner may not be charged with any knowledge of any subsequent entry of an encumbrance which may have been annotated on the said titles, much less any change of ownership of the properties covered thereby. As such, the Court agrees with petitioner that the reckoning period for prescription of petitioner's action should be from the time of actual discovery of the fraud in 1995. Hence, petitioner's suit for damages, filed on February 20, 1996, is well within the four-year prescriptive period. Neither may the principle of laches apply in the present case. The essence of laches or "stale demands" is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.9 It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, being insufficient to constitute laches.10 In addition, it is a rule of equity and applied not to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation.11 There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.12 Ultimately, the question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.13 It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.14 It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.15 It is significant to point out at this juncture that the overriding consideration in the instant case is that petitioner was deprived of the subject properties which it should have rightly owned were it not for the fraud committed by respondents. Hence, it would be the height of injustice if respondents would be allowed to go scot-free simply because petitioner relied in good faith on the former's false representations. Besides, as earlier discussed, even in the exercise of due diligence, petitioner could not have been expected to immediately discover respondents' fraudulent scheme. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution, dated June 14, 2006 and August 10, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82303, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79, dated February 23, 2004 in Civil Case No. 748-M, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Second Division, Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

Mich/nj/ic