1. LAMPESA VS. DE VERA FACTS: On December 28, 1988, De Vera, Jr.

boarded a passenger jeepney[3] bound for Baguio City driven by respondent Modesto Tollas. Upon reaching the Km. 4 marker of the national highway, the jeepney came to a complete stop to allow a truck,[4] then being driven by Dario Copsiyat, to cross the path of the jeepney in order to park at a private parking lot on the right side of the road. As Tollas began to maneuver the jeepney slowly along its path, the truck, which had just left the pavement, suddenly started to slide back towards the jeepney until its rear left portion hit the right side of the jeepney. De Vera, Jr., who was seated in the front passenger seat, noticed his left middle finger was cut off as he was holding on to the handle of the right side of the jeepney. He asked Tollas to bring him immediately to the hospital. After delivering a load of vegetables, truck owner Lampesa instructed his driver, Copsiyat, to park the truck in the parking lot across the highway. While the rear of the truck was still on the pavement of the highway, an approaching passenger jeepney sideswiped the rear portion of the truck. This resulted in the dismemberment of De Vera, Jr.s left middle finger, according to the defense. Lampesa offered P5,000 to De Vera, Jr. as a gesture of humanitarian support, but the latter demanded P1 million although this amount was later lowered to P75,000. The parties failed to settle amicably; thus, De Vera, Jr. filed an action for damages[8] against Lampesa, Copsiyat, Ramos and Tollas, as the truck owner, truck driver, jeepney owner/operator and jeepney driver, respectively. The trial court found driver Copsiyat negligent in the operation of his truck and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by De Vera, Jr. Upon review, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts findings of negligence on the part of Copsiyat and Lampesa. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: w o n that petitioners are liable for the injury sustained by De Vera, Jr. HELD: In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found Copsiyat negligent in maneuvering the truck and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by De Vera, Jr. Lampesa was also held accountable by both courts because he failed to exercise due diligence in the supervision of his driver. This Court is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the parties, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter of petitioners negligence coincide. The resolution of factual issues is a function of the trial court, whose findings on these matters are, as a general rule, binding on this Court more so where these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On a final note, petitioners liability for moral damages and attorneys fees cannot now be questioned for failure of petitioners to raise it before the Court of Appeals. It is a well-entrenched rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.[20] Moreover, the award of moral damages in this case is justifiable under Article 2219 (2) [21] of the Civil Code, which provides for said damages in cases of quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.[22] The award for attorneys fees is also proper under Article 2208 (2)[23] of the Civil Code, considering that De Vera, Jr. was compelled to litigate when petitioners ignored his demand for an amicable settlement of his claim.[24] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. [16] Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee.[18] To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.

2. DY TEBAN VS. CHING FACTS: On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City. They were delivering commercial ice to nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.[3] The night before, at around 10:00 p.m., the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire blowout. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. The prime mover was not equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.[5] To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became inoperable as a result of the incident. On October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages [8] against private respondents prime mover owner and driver with the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint. On August 7, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle Private respondents appealed to the CA. On August 28, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC decision. the CA held that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus. The appellate court accepted the claim of private respondent that Limbaga placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer may act as substitute early warning device. Hence, petition to court. ISSUE: whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages suffered by the Nissan van. HELD: We agree with the RTC that private respondent Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition. We thus agree with the RTC that Limbaga did not place lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the prime mover. We give more credence to the traffic incident report and the testimony of SPO4 Pame that only banana leaves were placed on the vehicle. Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] thus finds no application to the case at bar. Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all damages that resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other motorist in trying to avoid collision with the parked prime mover. We cannot rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the passenger bus, if any, because it was not a party to the case; joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC decision dated August 7, 2001 is REINSTATED IN FULL. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff.[16] NEGLIGENCE is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[17] The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. PROXIMATE CAUSE is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.[27] There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[28] The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from the collision. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

3. BPI VS, LIFETIME MARKETING CORPORATION FACTS: On October 22, 1981, Lifetime Marketing Corporation (LMC, for brevity), opened a current account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI, for brevity), Greenhills-Edsa branch, denominated as Account No. 3101-0680-63. In this account, the sales agents of LMC would have to deposit their collections or payments to the latter. Sometime in 1986, LMC availed of the BPIs inter-branch banking network services in Metro Manila, whereby the formers agents could make [a] deposit to any BPI branch in Metro Manila under the same account. Under this system, BPIs bank tellers were no longer obliged to retain the extra copy of the deposit slips instead, they will rely on the machine-validated deposit slip, to be submitted by LMCs agents. For its part, BPI would send to LMC a monthly bank statement relating to the subject account. This practice was observed and complied with by the parties. As a business practice, the registered sales agents or the Lifetime Educational Consultants of LMC, can get the books from the latter on consignment basis, then they would go directly to their clients to sell. Since LMC have several agents around the Philippines, it required to remit their payments through BPI, where LMC maintained its current account. It has been LMCs practice to require its agents to present a validated deposit slip and, on that basis, LMC would issue to the latter an acknowledgement receipt. Alice Laurel, is one of LMCs Educational Consultants or agents. On various dates covering the period from May, [sic] 1991 up to August, 1992, Alice Laurel deposited checks to LMCs subject account at different branches of BPI, Each check thus deposited were retrieved by Alice Laurel after the deposit slips were machinevalidated, except thirteen (13) checks. A verification with BPI by LMC showed that Alice Laurel made check deposits with the named BPI branches and, after the check deposit slips were machine-validated, requested the teller to reverse the transactions. fraudulent transactions of Alice Laurel and her husband was made possible through BPI tellers failure to retrieve the duplicate original copies of the deposit slips from the former, every time they ask for cancellation or reversal of the deposit or payment transaction. Upon discovery of this fraud in early August 1992, LMC made queries from the BPI branches involved. In reply to said queries, BPI branch managers formally admitted that they cancelled, without the permission of or due notice to LMC, the deposit transactions made by Alice and her husband, and based only upon the latters verbal request or representation. Thereafter, LMC immediately instituted a criminal action for Estafa against Alice Laurel and her husband Thomas Limoanco, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, This case for estafa, however, was archived because summons could not be served upon the spouses as they have absconded. Thus, the BPIs apparent reluctance to admit liability and settle LMCs claim for damages, and a hopeless case of recovery from Alice Laurel and her husband, has left LMC, with no option but to recover damages from BPI. On July 24, 1995, LMC, through its representative, Miss Consolacion C. Rogacion, the President of the company, filed a Complaint for Damages against BPI, and was raffled to Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 141. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a Decision in favor of LMC. Only BPI filed an appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but increased the award of actual damages to P2,075,695.50 and deleted the award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.[3] Citing public interest, the appellate court denied reconsideration in a Resolution[4] dated 30 January 2007. In this Petition for Review[5] dated 19 March 2007, ISSUE: whether or not BPI observed the highest degree of care in handling LMCs account is the subject of the inquiry in this case. HELD: Negligence in this case lies in the tellers disregard of the validation procedures in place and BPIs utter failure to supervise its employees. Notably, BPIs managers admitted in several correspondences with LMC

that the deposit transactions were cancelled without LMCs knowledge and consent and based only upon the request of Alice Laurel and her husband.[12] BPI cannot escape liability because of LMCs failure to scrutinize the monthly statements se nt to it by the bank. This omission does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of BPIs tellers in failing to require the surrender of the machine-validated deposit slips before reversing the deposit transactions, the loss would not have occurred. BPIs negligence is undoubtedly the proximate cause of the loss. It is also true, however, that LMC should have been more vigilant in managing and overseeing its own financial affairs. The damages awarded to it were correctly reduced on account of its own contributory negligence in accordance with Article 1172 of the Civil Code. Be that as it may, we find the appellate courts decision increasing the award of actual damages in favor of LMC improper since the latter did not appeal from the decision of the trial court. It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court whose decision is brought up on appeal. The exceptions to this rule, such as where there are (1) errors affecting the lower courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) cler ical errors, do not apply in this case.[17] WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62769 dated 31 July 2006 and its Resolution dated January 30, 2007 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Bank of the Philippine Islands is ordered to pay actual damages to Lifetime Marketing Corporation in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). No pronouncement as to costs.

4. NGO SIN SING vs. LI SENG GIAP & SONS, INC., FACTS: Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot at 745 Caballero St., Binondo. In 1978, they decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this project, they contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent, through its general manager, John T. Lee, received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart .[2] An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. As a gesture of goodwill to their neighbors, the petitioners assured the respondent that repairs would be undertaken by their contractor. In December 1979, Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the LSG Building. Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors, cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the building. In 1981, the respondent was constrained to consult engineers, E.S. de Castro Ph.D. and Associates, through Control Builders Corporation, to investigate the cause of the damages in the LSG Building and to determine its present structural integrity. the consultants concluded that the structural failure of the LSG Building resulted from the differential settlement caused by the excavation during the construction of the NSS Building. Since the building had undergone large differential settlements beyond safe tolerable limits, the consultants recommended the complete demolition of the LSG Building. The demolition and reconstruction of the building was estimated to cost the respondents about P8,021,687.00.[4] The respondents demanded that the petitioners rebuild the LSG Building or pay the cost of the same, which the petitioners refused. Thus, a complaint for sum of money was filed against Ngo Sin Sing, Ticia Dy Ngo and Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that the petitioners and Contech be ordered to, jointly and severally. In their Answer,[6] spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1) the respondents building had been structurally unstable and deficient since incipiency, having been constructed in 1966 without the appropriate provision to vouchsafe its structural integrity including differential settlements during its economic life; and (2) the structural defects and failure were traceable not necessarily due to soil erosion but to a number of external forces constantly working upon the building including earthquakes and improper maintenance. Petitioners filed a cross-claim against Contech averring that pursuant to their construction contract, all claims of third parties should be answered by said corporation. [7] After due hearing, the trial court ruled that the defendants were negligent. the trial court rendered judgment rendered ordering defendants Ngo Sin Sing, Ticia Dy Ngo and [Contech] Construction Technology Development Corp. jointly and severally, liable to pay plaintiff Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. the sum of P4,010,843.50. The claim for other damages cannot be awarded for lack of sufficient basis. Defendant Contech Technology & Development Corp. shall reimburse defendants Spouses Ngo Sin Sing & Ticia Dy Ngo for whatever amount the latter will pay to plaintiff. The counterclaims of defendants are DISMISSED.[9] Dissatisfied with the trial courts ruling, Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. and the spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo filed their respective appeals. Contech no longer appealed. On May 11, 2005, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. The appellate court ruled that the respondent had a proven cause of action against the petitioners; that respondents right to property was invaded or disturbed when excavation was done without sufficient lateral or subjacent support. As such, the petitioners liability as project owner should be shared with the contractor, applying the provisions of Article 2194 of the Civil Code which states that the responsibility of two or more persons for a quasi -delict is solidary.[10] The CA refuted the findings of the trial court imputing contributory negligence to the respondents Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., and ruled that the spouses

Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo together with Contech, were solidarily liable for the whole amount. Aggrieved, the spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo now come to this Court. ISSUE: w o n respondent LSGs own negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to its building, or at least, amounted to contributory negligence warranting reduction of the award. HELD: This only goes to show that the additional two floors put up on the LSG Building could have overburdened the foundations load-bearing capacity and contributed to the sagging of the building. The possibility of settlement due to weak foundation cannot, therefore, be discounted. As the trial court correctly ruled: adding more floors without touching or reinforcing the buildings bottom line or foundation are already manifestive of some negligence or ignorance on the part of said building owner. x x x Had plaintiff stuck to his original building 2-storey with its kind of foundation, the excavation by its adjacent neighbor would not matter much or affect the building in question at the outset.[20] In this case, considering that respondents negligence must have necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is warranted. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that respondent should likewise share in the cost of the restructuring of its building. This is more in keeping with justice and equity. The negligence of Contech caused the damages sustained by the building, which did not discharge its duty of excavating eight (8) inches away from the boundary line from the lot of plaintiff with insufficient lateral and subjacent support. Indeed, the facts show that Contech's negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. Construction is a field requiring technical expertise. The petitioners, as ordinary laymen, would understandably have no knowledge at all about the technical aspect of constructing a building. This was precisely the reason why they contracted the services of a reputable construction firm to undertake the project. Petitioners had every right to rely on the warranties and representations of their contractor. Moreover, the trial court pointed out that Contech fell short of its responsibility as contractor in this valuable project. It failed to insure its work against possible risks. As to the award for attorney's fees in the CA decision, the same should be deleted, as the appellate court did not provide any basis whatsoever to justify the award. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the modification that Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation, alone, is ORDERED to pay respondent Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., the sum of P4,010,843.50.

Under the doctrine of supervening negligence which states that where both parties are negligent but the negligence of one is appreciably later in time than of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of or bar a defense against the liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.[21]

5. BALIWAG VS CA FACTS: on July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver. At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, the shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo Escala, were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned by respondent A & J Trading. Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago's passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted "Babangga tayo!". Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck. It caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala, and injury to several others. Leticia and Allan Garcia were among the injured passengers. Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.[5] Leticia sued as an injured passenger of Baliwag and as mother of Allan. Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the mishap. Baliwag alleged that the accident was caused solely by the fault and negligence of A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique. Baliwag charged that Recontigue failed to place an early warning device at the corner of the disabled cargo truck to warn oncoming vehicles.[6] On the other hand, A & J Trading and Recontique alleged that the accident was the result of the negligence and reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver of Baliwag After hearing, the trial court found all the defendants liable, the defendant A & J and Julio Recontique for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. "[8] The trial court ordered Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique to pay jointly and severally the Garcia spouses On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by absolving A & J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of attorney's fees to P10,000.00 and loss of earnings to P300,000.00, respectively.[10]Baliwag filed the present petition for review. ISSUE: w o n absolving A & J Trading from liability and holding Baliwag solely liable for the injuries suffered by Leticia and Allan Garcia in the accident HELD: The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its driver's recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The passengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored.[13] Leticia also revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor.[14] She could smell him as she was seated right behind the driver. Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-employee.[15] All these prove the bus driver's wanton disregard for the physical safety of his passengers, which makes Baliwag as a common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code. Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially comply with the law is untenable. The law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates.[18] No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV-31246 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION reducing the actual damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74.

A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances.[11] In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.[12]

6. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION VS. LIM SIO WAN FACTS: On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) at its Quintin Paredes Branch in Manila a money market placement of PhP 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days to mature on December 15, 1983,3 as evidenced by Provisional Receipt No. 1356 dated November 14, 1983.4 On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans money market placement, to issue a managers check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the check.5 Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos so that So could easily identify her.6 Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a managers check to be issued .7 The bank issued Managers Check No. 035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee.8 The check was cross-checked "For Payees Account Only" and given to Santos.9 Thereafter, the managers check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank),10 with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser.11 the Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Banks payment of its obligation to FCC. To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations, Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads: "All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."18 The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported indorsement. Thus, the amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC.19 On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market placement to mature on January 9, 1984.20 On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it.21 She was then informed that the placement had been pre-terminated upon her instructions. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the proceeds thereof. She desisted from further complaints when she was assured by the banks manager that her money would be recovered.22 When Lim Sio Wans second placement matured on January 9, 1984, So called Lim Sio Wan to ask for the latters instructions on the second placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll -over the placement for another 30 days.23On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan, realizing that the promise that her money would be recovered would not materialize, sent a demand letter to Allied asking for the payment of the first placement. 24 Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan, claiming that the latter had authorized the pre-termination of the placement and its subsequent release to Santos.25 Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a Complaint dated February 13, 198426 docketed as Civil Case No. 6757 against Allied to recover the proceeds of her first money market placement. Sometime in February 1984, she withdrew her second placement from Allied. Allied filed a third party complaint27 against Metrobank and Santos. In turn, Metrobank filed a fourth party complaint28 against FCC. FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint29 against Producers Bank. Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no longer connected with Producers Bank.30 On May 15, 1984, or more than six (6) months after funding the check, Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the check was forged.31 Thus, Metrobank withheld the amount represented by the check from FCC. Later on,

Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the latter executed an Undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse the amount.32 Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank as a party-defendant, along with Allied.33 The RTC admitted the amended complaint despite the opposition of Metrobank.34 Consequently, Allieds third party complaint against Metrobank was converted into a cross-claim and the latters fourth party complaint against FCC was converted into a third party complaint.35 After trial, the RTC issued its Decision, holding as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid; 2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages; 3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P173,792.20 by way of attorneys fees; and, 4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit. Defendant Allied Banks cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is DISMISSED. Likewise defendant Metrobanks third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is DISMISSED. Filipinas Cement Corporations fourth-party complaint against Producers Bank is also DISMISSED.

Allied appealed to the CA, which in turn issued the assailed Decision on March 18, 1998, modifying the RTC Decision, Hence, Allied filed the instant petition. Issue: whether or not Allied was not authorized to release the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans money market placement to Santos. Held: This Court has held that the matter of negligence is also a factual question.41 Thus, the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that the respective parties were negligent in the exercise of their obligations is also conclusive upon this Court. The Liability of the Parties We find that Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan. Fundamental and familiar is the doctrine that the relationship between a bank and a client is one of debtor-creditor. Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wans money market placement, the bank still has an obligation to pay her at six percent (6%) interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment thereof. We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.

Allied avers that even if it had not issued the check payment, the money represented by the check would still be lost because of Metrobanks negligence in indorsing the check without verifying the genuineness of the indorsement thereon. The trial court correctly found Allied negligent in issuing the managers check and in transmitting it to Santos without even a written authorization.54 In fact, Allied did not even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions. Both actions could have prevented the whole fraudulent transaction from unfolding. Allieds negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the resulting loss.
As to the claim that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank, the same is correct. Allied correctly claims in its petition that Producers Bank should reimburse Allied for whatever judgment that may be rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him."

It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be considered as having been unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that FCCs money market placement with Producers Bank was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Banks payment thereof was justified. FCC was entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the indorsement on the check was forged cannot be raised against FCC which was not a part in any stage of the negotiation of the check. FCC was not unjustly enriched. We see that Santos could be the architect of the entire controversy. Unfortunately, since summons had not been served on Santos, the courts have not acquired jurisdiction over her.60 We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her liability in the instant case. Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 18, 1998 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 and the November 15, 1993 RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 6757 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. [A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with each other but through a middle man or dealer in open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer.

7. CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. TANJANGCO. FACTS: Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454 and 2829615 respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots. Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.6 Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square meters. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.7 Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8 against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction. On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos perimeter wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it constructed the house. It, thus, ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action. The Tanjangcos filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 of the said RTC Decision which the RTC, however, denied in its Order10 dated June 28, 1993. Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed to the CA. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989. The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in performing their respective duties and so they were ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a total of fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay under the decision, also with interest of six percent (6%) per annum. Only Corinthian filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the CA Decision within the 15-day reglementary period. No motion for reconsideration was filed by the Cuasos, C.B. Paraz and/or Engr. De Dios. In its Resolution13 dated November 14, 2003, the CA denied Corinthians Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, Corinthian filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution, and impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents being the third-party plaintiffs in the RTC.

ISSUE: whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. HELD: after a meticulous review of the evidence on record, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error when it deviated from the findings of fact of the RTC. The CA's findings and conclusions are substantiated by the evidence on record and are more in accord with law and reason. Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and Regulations, thereby resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos property. By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. 41 It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that "no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid." Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a "table inspection" and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a "table inspection" and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order. In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. In the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA. All told, the CA committed no reversible error. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

8. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. FACTS: a Mitsubishi Lancer car with Plate Number PHD-206 owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was traversing the Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, Lipa City. The car was insured with plantiff-appellee [UCPB General Insurance Inc.], then driven by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo, the Asst. Manager of said bank, was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck with Plate No. PJE-737 and Trailer Plate No. NVM-133, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga. The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued on its [sic] way to its [sic] destination and did not bother to bring his victims to the hospital. Plaintiff-appellee paid the assured UCPB the amount of P244,500.00 representing the insurance coverage of the damaged car. As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were made by plaintiff-appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made. Thus, plaintiff-appellee filed the instant case on March 13, 1991.3 PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that it could not be held liable for the collision, since the driver of the truck, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of its co-defendant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO).4 In fact, it was SUGECO, and not petitioner, that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and SUGECO.5 Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question.6 After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 15, 1999, in favor of plaintiff UCPB General Insurance [respondent], ordering the defendants PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., [petitioner] and Renato Gonzaga, to pay jointly and severally the former. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, petitioner appealed to the CA.In its Decision dated December 12, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision, with certain modifications, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated February 18, 2004. Hence, herein Petition for Review. ISSUE: whether or not petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasi-delict may be held liable, jointly and severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties. HELD: we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiffappellant. The rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents , for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership.30 A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties.31 Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.

This ruling may appear too severe and unpalatable to leasing and financing companies, but the Court believes that petitioner and other companies so situated are not entirely left without recourse. They may resort to third-party complaints against their lessees or whoever are the actual operators of their vehicles. In the case at bar, there is, in fact, a provision in the lease contract between petitioner and SUGECO to the effect that the latter shall indemnify and hold the former free and harmless from any "liabilities, damages, suits, claims or judgments" arising from the latter's use of the motor vehicle.32 Whether petitioner would act against SUGECO based on this provision is its own option. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 12, 2003 and Resolution dated February 18, 2004 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, the registered owner may be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either 1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a delictor crime under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or 2) solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief based on a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. It is the option of the plaintiff whether to waive completely the filing of the civil action, or institute it with the criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a criminal action;15 his only limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.16

9. MANLICLIC vs. CALAUNAN FACTS: At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos. On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13 In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: whether or not Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision even if exonerating in the criminal case. HELD: if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. 36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.43 For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners. A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35 As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. 38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.39 In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that: Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.

10. REAL vs. BELO FACTS: Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the Philippine Women's University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU. Around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at petitioner's Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area, including respondent's stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondent's demand. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila (MeTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 152822.3 Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the selection and supervision of her employees; that petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. 4 In her Answer dated September 23, 1996, petitioner denied liability on the grounds that the fire was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees.5 After trial, the MeTC rendered its Decision6 dated April 5, 1999 in favor of the respondent. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 9994606, insisting that the fire was a fortuitous event. On November 26, 1999, the RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC but increased the amount of temperate damages awarded to the respondent fromP50,000.00 to P80,000.00.8 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the increase in the award of temperate damages is unreasonable since she also incurred losses from the fire. In its Order dated April 12, 2000, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration holding that it cannot disregard evidence showing that the fire originated from petitioner's fastfood stall; that the increased amount of temperate damages awarded to respondent is not a full compensation but only a fair approximate of what he lost due to the negligence of petitioner's workers.9 Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58799.10 On June 16, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for being "procedurally flawed/deficient." 11 The CA held that the attached RTC Decision was not certified as a true copy by the Clerk of Court; that a certified true copy of the MeTC Decision was not attached; that material portions of the record, such as the position papers of the parties and affidavits of witnesses, as would support the material allegations of the petition were also not attached.12 On July 14, 2000, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,13 attaching photocopies of the Decisions of the RTC and MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court.14 On November 27, 2000, the CA issued its Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.15 Hence, the present petition ISSUES: Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result of the fire that razed not only her own food kiosk but also the adjacent foodstalls at the Food Center premises of the Philippine Women's University, including that of the respondent. HELD: In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent.36

It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including respondent's fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support petitioner's theory of fortuitous event. As to the award of temperate damages, the increase in the amount thereof by the RTC is improper. The RTC could no longer examine the amounts awarded by the MeTC since respondent did not appeal from the Decision of the MeTC.37 It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.38 While there are exceptions to this rule, such as if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors,39 none apply here. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated June 16, 2000 and November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the temperate damages awarded is reduced from P80,000.00 to P50,000.00 as awarded by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila in its Decision dated April 5, 1999. Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. 30 Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.31 Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumptionjuris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.34 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.35

11. AGUILA vs. BALDOVIZO FACTS: On April 19, 1993, at about 11:30 a.m., Marlun Lisbos was driving, along the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) inCaloocan City, a van with Plate No. TER-883, registered under the name of petitioner Danilo D. Reyes. The van sideswiped Fausto who was walking along the pedestrian lane in front of the Monumento Market in Caloocan City. He was crossing EDSA. Fausto fell on the pavement and suffered injuries , and was brought to the Manila Central University Hospital for treatment. Subsequently, Fausto died on July 6, 1993. On May 20, 1994, Marlun Lisbos was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide at the Metropolitan Trial Courtof Caloocan City, Branch 52. On September 24, 1994, Faustos wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children, Edgar and Carmelo, filed before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225, a separate complaint for damages against Marlun Lisbos, Danilo D. Reyes, petitioner Emerlito F. Aguila, the actual operator and possessor of the van, and Times Surety and Insurance Company, the insurer of the van under a third-party liability insurance contract. Summons were served on the defendants except Marlun Lisbos whose whereabouts were unknown according to the Sheriffs Report. In his Answer, Aguila claimed that Fausto disregarded traffic rules when he crossed EDSA; that Aguila exercised due diligence in the selection of Lisbos as driver; and that Aguila provided assistance and support during the hospitalization of Fausto. On the other hand, Reyes denied ownership of the van. Although the van was registered in his name, Reyes claimed that Aguila was its actual possessor and operator. Hence, Reyes claimed he could not be liable for damages. Meanwhile, Times Surety and Insurance Company was declared in default for failure to file an Answer. After the parties failed to arrive at a settlement, trial ensued. Petitioners were considered to have waived their right to present their evidence due to their failure to appear on the December 1, 1999 hearing. On March 7, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs Carmen, Edgar and Carmelo R. Baldovizo. On May 4, 2000, petitioners Aguila and Reyes filed a petition for relief from judgment before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225. The trial court denied the petition in a Resolution dated November 20, 2000.The trial court denied the second motion for reconsideration as well as the reconsideration of the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Petitioners Aguila and Reyes appealed the Amended Decision before the Court of Appeals. In denying the appeal for being improper, the appellate court ruled that Aguila and Reyes had lost their right to appeal. Since no appeal of the March 7, 2000 Decision was made within the reglementary period, the decision became final and executory. The Amended Decision did not give the parties a fresh period within which to file an appeal. The appellate court also held that petitioners attempt to revive their rights in the case failed after their petition for relief from judgment was denied for lack of merit. In any event, the appellate court sustained the Amended Decision which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos among the parties held liable. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended decision after the original decision had become final and executor. HELD: Under Section 2,[9] Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order becomes final and executory if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed within the period provided by the Rules. Before a judgment becomes final and executory, that judgment may be amended. Upon finality of the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.[10] Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tuncentries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory.[11] This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject only to a few exceptions.[12] None of the exceptions are present in this case.

In view of the foregoing, there is no basis for petitioners to appeal the Amended Decision which is void. As for petitioners plea for substantial justice, time and again, we have reminded the litigants that the Rules of Court are not mere tools that they can readily use or discard to serve their own purpose, but they are purposively devised for the proper administration of justice. Litigants should not, after resorting to a wrong remedy, then cry for liberal construction of these rules. For utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by merely harking on the policy of liberal construction.[18] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. However, the Amended Decision dated August 13, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225, is declared void for lack of jurisdiction, and its original Decision dated March 7, 2000 is hereby reinstated. The total amount adjudged therein shall earn an interest rate of 6% per annum from the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this Decision. Thereafter, the total amount adjudged shall earn an interest rate of 12% per annum until it is fully paid.

12. LAPANDAY vs. ANGALA FACTS: On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-903 driven by Apolonio Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) and driven byBernulfo Borres (Borres). Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez (Mendez). Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running alongRafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged. Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorneys Fees against LADECO, its administrative officer HenryBerenguel[4] (Berenguel) and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer when the accident took place Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the speedometer. Respondent sent a demand letter to LADECO for the payment of the damages he incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo. Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were both running at about 40 kph. The pickup was running along the outer lane. The pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the left. Deocampo testified that he did not see any signal from the pick-up.[6] Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-up but he was unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated that he did not apply the brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision. In its 3 March 1995 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 (trial court) ordering the defendants LADECO and Apolonio Deocampo to solidarily pay the plaintiffs. The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while following the pick-up and that the crewcabs speed was the proximate cause of the accident. The trial court observed that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the point of impact despiteDeocampos claim that he stepped on the brakes moments after the collision. The trial court ruled that Deocampo had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and Deocampo (petitioners)[9] filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied petitioners motion in its 13 June 1995 Order.[10] Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Sustained the finding of the trial court that Deocampo was negligent. The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of last clear chance and ruled that Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding the pick-up. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 March 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the petition before this Court. ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to the damages awarded. HELD: We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b) of RA 4136, Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the U-turn. Deocamposhould have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20 meters away from him.[13] Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road.[14] Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We sustain this finding since factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court.[15] Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. It would not

have happened if Deocampo was not driving very fast. Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. LADECO failed to substantiate its allegation that it exercised due diligence in the supervision and selection of its employees. Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable with Deocampo. We sustain the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action.[20] WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 25 July 2001 Decision and 11 March 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51134 with MODIFICATION by deleting the award of attorneys fees. The DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.[16] Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.[17] Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.[18] A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead.[19] Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pickup. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pickup. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.

13. UNIVERSAL AQUARIUS, INC vs. Q.C. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION FACTS: