Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXV No.

2, September 2007 2007 International Phenomenological Society

Spinozas Arguments for the Existence of God*

martin lin Rutgers University

It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and distinctive conception of God (the unique substance, or Natura Naturans, in which all else inheres and which possesses innitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments that he oers which purport to prove Gods existence contribute nothing new to natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just another participant in the seventeenth century revival of the ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by Malebranche and Leibniz among others. That this is the case is both puzzling and unfortunate. It is puzzling because although Spinoza does oer an ontological proof for the existence of God, he also oers three other non-ontological proofs. It is unfortunate because these other non-ontological proofs are both more convincing and more interesting than his ontological proof. In this paper, I oer reconstructions and assessments of all of Spinozas arguments and argue that Spinozas metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something like a Principle of Sucient Reason are the driving force behind Spinozas non-ontological arguments.

Spinoza holds a number of highly controversial theses concerning God. According to him, God is the unique substance, or Natura naturans, in which all else inheres, who possesses innitely many attributes, including extension, and who is an impersonal being who does not order his creation according to any providential plan. Perhaps none of these views of God is entirely without precedent, but Spinozas treatment of them is remarkable in its systematicity and force. Yet, despite the widely acknowledged boldness of Spinozas thinking concerning the nature of God, it is often thought that the arguments that he oers for the existence of God merely recapitulate the ontological argument

I would like to thank Michael Della Rocca, Donald Ainslie, Marleen Rozemond, and Charlie Huenemann for their detailed comments on drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to Ed Curley, Phil Kremer, Imogen Dickie, and Eric Watkins for helpful discussion of the ideas contained in this paper.
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given by Descartes in the fth Meditation and hence contribute nothing new to natural theology.1 What does it mean to classify an argument as ontological? There are more or less ne-grained conceptions of ontological arguments. According to the most coarse-grained conception, an argument for the existence of God is ontological just in case its premises are known a priori.2 But if a philosophers arguments are ontological only in this sense, then it is unfair to criticize their originality on that basis. Commentators who describe Spinoza as an ontological arguer, however, typically have something more specic in mind, taking Descartes ontological argument as their paradigm. Descartes ontological argument works by analyzing the concept of God and purporting to show that the very nature of that concept entails that it must be satised. That is, it purports to show that the existence of God is a conceptual truth. In what follows, I shall accordingly understand by ontological argument an argument of that form. It is puzzling that so many commentators see Spinoza as primarily offering an ontological argument. Spinoza does indeed offer something like an ontological argument, but that argument is only one of four, the rest of which are not ontological. Commentators, nevertheless, typically either ignore all but the ontological argument,3 or, even more commonly, argue that, appearances to the contrary, all four of Spinozas arguments are, at bottom, ontological.4 This is an unfortunate state of affairs because Spinozas ontological argument is the least interesting, the least original, and the least convincing of the four arguments that he gives. The other three proceed, I shall argue, on a basis entirely different from that of the ontological argument. They do not proceed exclusively on the basis of an analysis of the concept of God. Rather, they all rely, either explicitly or implicitly, on a version of the Principle of Sufcient Reason (PSR hereafter). In
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For example, Jonathan Bennett characterizes Spinozas argument for the existence of God as essentially the same sterile and boring argument as Descartes in his Learning From Six Philosophers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 1, p. 122. See also, Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. I, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 158-213; William A. Earl, The Ontological Argument in Spinoza, and The Ontological Argument in Spinoza: Twenty Years Later, in Marjorie Green ed., Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), and Harold H. Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1902), pp. 51-52. Kant, who helped introduce the term ontological argument into the philosophical vocabulary, understands the term in this way. Cf. Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers. This is the position of Joachim and Earl. Wolfson thinks that all but the third argument are ontological.
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this respect my interpretation is similar and indebted to Don Garretts.5 There is, however, an important dierence between our respective interpretations. Garrett claims that Spinoza holds that something exists necessarily just in case it is self-caused. Spinozas strategy in each of his arguments, according to Garrett, is to show that God is self-caused and then conclude from this and the equivalence of necessary existence and self-causation that God exists. This, however, cannot be right, for such an equivalence would conict with Spinozas necessitarianism. No being, other than God, is self-caused, according to Spinoza. Yet many (and arguably all) beings other than God exist necessarily.6 Necessary existence and self-causation thus cannot be equivalent for Spinoza. Perhaps Garrett could amend his interpretation by replacing the equivalence of self-causation and necessary existence with an equivalence between self-causation and necessary existence in virtue of ones own nature. This would preserve the validity of Garretts reconstructions without the unwanted consequence of rampant self-causation. Moreover, Spinoza clearly believes such an equivalence. He distinguishes between things whose existence is necessary in virtue of their own nature and those whose existence is virtue of the nature of another. The only thing whose existence is necessary in virtue of its essence is God.7 God is also the only being who is self-caused.8 So it is indeed true for Spinoza that a being is self-caused just in case it exists necessarily in virtue of its own nature. But the possibility of such an emendation is of little
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Spinozas Ontological Arguments, Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 198-223. There is a good deal of controversy as to how Spinozas commitment to necessitarianism should be interpreted. Adherents of a moderate interpretation hold that only Gods existence and facts about the laws of nature are really necessary (see, for example, E.M. Curley, Spinozas Metaphysics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), chap. 3. and Edwin Curley and Greg Walski, Spinozas Necessitarianism Reconsidered in Gennaro and Huenemann eds., New Essays on the Rationalists, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)). Those who favor a strong interpretation think that, for Spinoza, all things are necessary (see, for example, Don Garrett, Spinozas Necessitarianism, in Yovel ed., God and Nature (Leiden: J. Brill, 1991). What is relevant here is that however Spinozas necessitarianism is interpreted, he thinks that some non-self-caused beings exist necessarily. Spinoza says that if the existence of a thing follows necessarily from its cause, then given that cause, that thing necessarily exists (1p33s). For Spinoza all eects follow necessarily from their causes (1a3). Thus, relative to their external causes, all individuals necessarily exist. That is, a thing exists in very possible world in which its cause exists. Now, if the external cause itself exists necessarily, it follows that the thing itself necessarily exists, i.e., exists in every possible world. What is uncontroversial is that, for Spinoza, at least some things are caused immediately by God and only by God and thus their existence is necessary too. The immediate innite modes are an example of such things. So, although immediate innite modes exist necessarily, they are not self-caused. They are, rather, caused by God. 1p33s1. 1p14.
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moment. Whether or not Garretts equivalence can be patched so as to avoid a conict with Spinozas necessitarianism, none of Spinozas arguments for the existence of God relies upon any such equivalence. Once we fully appreciate the strength of the PSR and how adeptly Spinoza exploits that strength in his arguments, we shall see that there is no need to add the powerful equivalence of self-causation and necessary existence (in virtue of ones own nature or otherwise) in order to derive the existence of God from Spinozas premises. Moreover, correctly appreciating the role of the PSR in Spinozas arguments allows us to see how Spinoza can appeal to the PSR in supporting some of his other central metaphysical claims. Or so I shall argue. Spinozas reliance on the PSR might be surprising to some since the PSR is usually associated with Leibniz, and its role in Spinozas thinking sometimes fails to receive the proper emphasis.9 In fact, it constitutes one of the most important of the commitments that shape Spinozas metaphysics. By neglecting Spinozas non-ontological arguments, commentators have contributed to this failure to fully appreciate the importance of the PSR to Spinozas system. By showing how Spinozas arguments rely on the PSR, I hope to demonstrate its centrality to Spinozas thinking with respect to the important case of Gods existence and, by extension, to all aspects of his system that presuppose the existence of God. I shall conclude by considering a well-known problem that Spinozas argument for monism presents for his arguments for the existence of God. Garrett has pointed out that Spinozas arguments of the existence of God can be easily adapted to prove the existence of any other substance, say a substance with only one attribute. Spinoza tries to rule out such alternative substances with his argument for monism. But Spinoza can legitimately conclude from that argument no more than that at most one substance with any particular attribute exists. Only on the assumption that a substance with all the attributes exists does that argument lead to the monism conclusion. Thus the variant on Spinozas arguments which proves the existence of a single attribute substance together with Spinozas argument for the claim that only one substance of a particular attribute exists would prove the nonexistence of God. Building upon the work of Michael Della Rocca, I shall argue that, here too, understanding how the PSR gures into Spinozas
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I do not mean to suggest that commentators have not noticed Spinozas commitment to the PSR. Rather, my claim is that they have not made it out to be the driving force behind his metaphysics, as I believe it is. Notable exceptions to this are Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinozas Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), pp. 24; Garrett, Spinozas Ontological Arguments; and Michael Della Rocca, A Rationalist Manifesto, Philosophical Topics, 31.
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thinking on the subject shows how such an argument for the nonexistence of God can be blocked. 1. The First Argument The rst argument is the only one of Spinozas four arguments which might be accurately characterized as an ontological argument. Spinoza begins by inviting us to conceive, if we can, that God does not exist. If the nonexistence of God is conceivable, then his essence does not involve existence (1a7). The essences of substances involve their existence (1p7). God is a substance (1d6). Therefore, Gods essence both does and does not involve his existence, which is absurd. Q.E.D. Obviously, the claim that the essence of a substance involves existence (1p7) provides a crucial premise for the rst argument. The demonstration of 1p7 proceeds as follows: 1. A substance cannot be produced by anything else. (1p6) 2. A substance is self-caused. (by 1) 3. Therefore, the essence of a substance necessarily involves existence. (by 2 and 1d1) The conclusion of 1p7d, it is important to note, is not unambiguously the claim that substances necessarily exist. What the conclusion states is merely that substances have essences that involve their existence, whatever that might mean. And while one possible interpretation of what it means for an essence to involve existence is that such things exist necessarily, the use to which 1p7 is put in the rst argument does not require such an interpretation. Let us now look at the reasoning by means of which Spinoza reaches his conclusion in 1p7. He seems to think that (2) follows directly from (1), which, of course, it does not. It does, however, follow from (1) and certain consequences derivable from 1a1, which says that everything is either in itself or in anther. That is, modes inhere in substances and substances inhere in themselves. For Spinoza, inherence implies causation.10 Hence:
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The use of 1d3, 1d5, and 1a1 in 1p4d establish that inherence implies conception. Since, as discussed above, conception implies causation, inherence must also imply causation. See Don Garrett, Conatus Argument, in Koistinen and Biro eds., Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 136-137 for a useful discussion of these texts and the relationship between causation and inherence.
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1.1. Everything is either caused by itself or by another Substances then must be self-caused because they are not caused by another. Let us now return to a fuller discussion of the rst argument. What follows is a reconstruction that lls in a number of suppressed premises: 4. God does not necessarily exist. (assumption for reductio) 5. If God does not necessarily exist, then it is conceivable that God does not exist.

6. It is conceivable that God does not exist. (by 4 and 5) 7. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, then its essence does not involve existence. (1a7) 8. Gods essence does not involve existence. (by 6 and 7) 9. God is a substance. (1d6) 10. If anything is a substance, then its existence involves essence. (1p7) 11. Gods essence involves existence. (by 9 and 10) 12. God necessarily exists. (by 8 and 11) An obvious potential problem with this argument is (9). In order to assess the truth of (9), we need rst to understand its meaning. This in turn depends upon the correct semantics for an apparent singular term like God. This is, unfortunately, an issue fraught with controversy. There are two main options. The most popular is to assign an individual as the semantic value of a singular term like God. But if we understand the semantics of (9) in this way, the argument begs the question of Gods existence since the sentence contained in (9) does not otherwise express a proposition. If the semantic value of God is an individual, then it is semantically defective if there is no such individual. Sentences containing semantically defective names do not express propositions. Alternatively, we could treat God as a quantier expression. The argument, however, fares no better if God is construed in this way.11 The most natural way to construe God as a quantier expression in the context of this argument is as a universal quantier expression:
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I am indebted on this point to Charlie Huenemann.

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13. If anything is God, then it does not exist necessarily. 14. If (if anything is God, then it does not exist necessarily), then (if anything is God, then its nonexistence is conceivable). 15. If anything is God, then its nonexistence is conceivable. 16. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, then its essence does not involve existence. 17. If anything is God, then its essence does not involve existence. 18. If anything is God, then it is a substance. 19. If anything is a substance, then its essence involves existence. 20. If anything is God, then its essence involves existence. 21. God necessarily exists. This argument is invalid because (17) and (20) are not contradictory. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that not only does the contradictory of (17) not follow from Spinozas premises, but it begs the question of the existence of God: there is something that is God and its essence involves existence. So, the rst argument is either invalid (when God is construed as a quantier expression) or question begging (when God is construed as a singular term). My discussion of Spinozas rst argument for the existence of God has assumed that either God is a singular term the semantic value of which (if it has any value at all) is an object or God is a disguised quantier expression. Spinozas argument may not be vulnerable to the criticisms I have lodged if this assumption is incorrect. There are, however, no obvious alternative construals of God, certainly none, of which I am aware, that are plausible in themselves and would save Spinozas argument.12 In the absence of such an alternative, we must provisionally conclude that Spinozas rst argument fails.

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Perhaps Spinozas reasoning could be saved by adopting a Meinongian semantics for non-referring names. God, then, could take a nonexistent object as its semantic value and (9) would beg no important questions. This move, however, quickly leads to existentially quantifying over nonexistent objects. But if this possible, then I have no idea what the existential quantier means. For this reason, I reject Meinongian semantics.
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2. The Second Argument The second argument appeals to the PSR. The basic idea is that a cause or reason for the nonexistence of God is impossible and so he must exist. The rst premise of the second argument is the PSR: 22. If something exists, there must be a cause of its existing and if something does not exist, there must be a cause of its nonexistence. This is the rst explicit statement of the PSR in the Ethics, although it is plausible to think that it is foreshadowed by 1a3,13 which says that:
From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow.

To derive the psr from 1a3, it is necessary to interpret effect as meaning any event, and not just that which is produced by some cause. But such an interpretation is reasonable since otherwise 1d3 is so trivial as to make one wonder why Spinoza would bother to state it. It is also necessary to interpret effect as including events which involve absences, e.g., the cars having no gas. But given the fact that Spinoza clearly believes that absence involving events require causes, it seems plausible to think that 1a3 is meant to apply to such events as well. Spinoza next claims that: 23. The cause or reason for the nonexistence of anything is either internal (its nature involves a contradiction) or external (some external cause prevents its existence). Spinoza here assumes that if anything has an internal cause of its nonexistence, then its nature involves a contradiction. What does this mean and is it true? Spinoza does not say explicitly what he means, but he does provide an instructive example: the nature of a square circle. In what sense does the nature of a square circle involve a contradiction? Square circles are contradictory in that they possess the properties of being closed gures every point on which is equidistant from its center and of not being a closed gure every point of which is equidistant

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My discussion of 1a3 and its relation to the PSR is indebted to Garretts Arguments, p. 202.
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from its center. The nature of a square circle, however, possess no such contradictory properties. (The nature of a circle is not a circle.) Nevertheless, if it were exemplied, then its exemplication would entail a contradiction. This then is what it is for a nature to be contradictory. The assumption that the only possible internal cause of nonexistence is a contradictory nature might appear tendentious. Why cannot there be a nature that cannot be externally produced and yet does not contain the internal causal resources to produce itself? Such a nature would seem to be an internal cause of the non-exemplication of itself. If there could be such a nature, then Spinoza would rst need to show that Gods nature is not like that. Recall the above characterization of contradictory natures: a nature is contradictory just in case if it were exemplied, its exemplication would entail a contradiction. Substances are ontologically independent. Thus they cannot have external causes for their existence or for anything else. So, being a substance and lacking self-causal power jointly entail nonexistence. But if such a nature were exemplied it would exist. It would thus both exist and not exist. That is, such a nature is self-contradictory. Given then that no internally coherent nature can prevent itself from being exemplied,14 the PSR together with premise (23) dictates that every nature is: a. internally coherent, exemplied, and has an external cause or b. internally coherent, unexemplied and has an external cause or c. internally incoherent and unexemplied or d. internally coherent, exemplied, and has an internal cause. The PSR rules out the possibility that a nature is: e. internally coherent, unexemplied, and does not have external cause.

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I here treat existence as a second-order property, viz., as that property that properties have if and only if they are exemplied. I do so because no part of Spinozas argument requires that we treat existence as a rst-order property (for example, his argument does not rely on the idea that existence is a perfection and so is contained in our concept of a perfect being) and since such a conception of existence is vulnerable to well known objections, I see no reason to saddle Spinoza with that problematic view.
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(1) rules out alternative (a) with respect to substances. Since Spinozas argument concerns the existence of God, a substance, (a) is ruled out. From (13) it follows that: 24. If a cause or reason for the nonexistence of God is impossible, then Gods existence is necessary. Since, given the psr, the nonexistence of God is possible only if there is a cause or reason for his nonexistence, if such a cause or reason is impossible, then his nonexistence is impossible, i.e., his existence is necessary. In order to establish Gods necessary existence, all Spinoza needs to do is to rule out alternatives (b) and (c). That is, all he needs to do is establish the impossibility of a cause or reason for Gods nonexistence. He argues as follows: 25. If God didnt exist, there would be either an internal or external cause or reason. 26. If it were internal then the nature of God would be incoherent. 27. The nature of God is not incoherent. The only support for premise (27) that Spinoza offers is the assertion that it would be absurd if the nature of a supremely perfect being were incoherent. This is not obviously so. But as we shall see presently, the third and fourth arguments provide some reason for Spinoza to claim that an absolutely innite being is coherent. In the meantime, let us assume that Gods nature is internally coherent, and so Spinoza can rule out alternative (c). He turns next toward ruling out (b) with the following line of argument: 28. If God didnt exist, then there would be an external cause. 29. No external cause can prevent or take away Gods existence. Premise (29) is supported by the following considerations. Spinoza believes that causation and conception are equivalent: i. x causes y if and only if y is conceived through x.

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He also believes that: ii. If y is conceived through x, then y and x are conceived through the same attribute. Now Spinoza believes that no two substances can be conceived through the same attribute.15 Therefore, no two substances can causally interact. On the assumption that an external cause of a substance must involve another substance, we can thus conclude that no external cause can prevent Gods existence.16,17 Premise (27) rules out alternative (c) and premise (29) rules out alternative (b). We have thus ruled out every possible cause or reason for Gods nonexistencei.e., a cause or reason for Gods nonexistence is impossible. Therefore: 30. God necessarily exists. (by 25, 26, 27, and 29)

3. The Third Argument The third argument begins with the assumption that to be able to exist is a power, and conversely, to be able to not exist is a lack of power. Spinoza then goes on to argue that given that some nite things exist (e.g., we exist), an innite being must exist. His argument can be summarized as follows: 31. To be able to exist is to have power and being able to not exist is to lack power. 32. If a nite being exists, and an innite being does not, then a nite being is more powerful than an innite being. (by 31)
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1p5. That only causes involving substances can causally inuence substances is a consequence of a number of Spinozas metaphysical principles. First, every thing is either a substance or a mode of a substance (1a1). Second, if one thing causes another, then the latter can be conceived through the former (1a4). Modes are conceived through substances (1d5). Substances are not conceived through modes (1p1). Modes cannot, therefore, causally inuence substances. So, only a substance can causally inuence a substance. The argument that I have given above accurately paraphrases 11pd, but Michael Della Rocca has pointed out to me that Spinoza actually has available to him a much more direct route to (29). If an external cause can prevent Gods existence, then, if God exists, his existence would be dependent on something. But substances are, by denition, conceptually and causally self-contained. Thus, the existence of God (or any other substance) cannot depend upon something else.
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This claim is problematic. A nonexistent thing cannot stand in any relation to anything. Im taller than Goliath because Goliath, not existing, has no height! Perhaps the following is a more felicitous way of putting Spinozas point: 32.* If the nature of a nite being is exemplied and the nature of an absolutely innite being is unexemplied then a nite being possesses more power than the nature of an absolutely innite being. That Spinoza would have found this an acceptable paraphrase can be seen by the scholium to this argument. There he offers another argument which he claims has the same basis as the third. But in that text he speaks of the power to exist of natures of things and not of things themselves. The argument continues: 33. It is impossible that a nite being possesses more power than the nature of an absolutely innite being. 34. Nothing exists or the nature of an absolutely innite being is exemplied. (by 32, and 33) 35. We exist. 36. Therefore, an absolutely innite being, i.e., God, necessarily exists. (by 34 and 35) A number of things about this argument seem problematic. First, the meanings of the curious notions being able to exist and being able to not exist and their identication with having and lacking power respectively are obscure. Second, it is not obvious that a nite thing cannot be more powerful than the nature of an innite thing, because Spinoza hasnt yet established any connection between innity and power. Moreover, even granting Spinozas assumptions, it does not follow that God exists necessarily since that nothing exists is still possible, although contingently false, from the point of view of this argument. Taken on their own these difculties with the third argument are intractable; but, we shall see when we consider the fourth argument, it is possible to ll in the gap between the notions of innity and power by connecting them both to Spinozas notion of reality and applying the PSR, thus rendering the third argument much stronger in retrospect.

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4. The Fourth Argument Spinoza claims that the basis of the fourth argument is the same as the third. It differs from it, however, in that it is a priori and includes a premise which refers to the notion of reality. It can be summarized as follows: 37. To be able to exist is a power. 38. The more reality the nature of a thing has, the more power to exist it has. 39. The nature of an absolutely innite being has an absolutely innite power of existing. 40. Therefore, the nature of an absolutely innite being is exemplied, i.e., an absolutely innite being exists. This argument, as it stands, is obviously invalid. We can, however, make it valid by supplying the additional premise: 39.1. If a nature has an absolutely innite power of existing, then it is exemplied. In order to nd a use for (38) we must assume that (39) is supposed to follow from (38) together with the following suppressed premise: 38.1. The nature of an absolutely innite being has innite reality. Although the argument thus supplemented is valid, it remains mysterious. In particular, why should anyone believe premises (38)-(39.1)? What is needed is some further explication of the relationship between reality and power on the one hand, and reality and innity on the other. The rst question is how we should understand Spinozas notion of reality. Premise (38) implies that reality is a variable quantity. It might seem more natural to think that reality is either on or off. Existent things are real and nonexistent things are not. Spinoza, however, clearly thinks that reality is something that admits of degrees. Such a notion of reality will be familiar to readers of Descartes from his argument for the existence of God from our idea of an innite being, which appears in the third Meditation and Principles of Philosophy I, 17-18. This is an argument which Spinoza knows well and comments on in his

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geometrical exposition of Descartes Principles.18 Commentators such as Curley and Normore have argued that the notion of reality at work in Descartes argument can be explained in terms of relative ontological dependence.19 On this interpretation of reality, x is more real than y just in case the existence of y depends on the existence of x. God is the most real being because his existence does not depend upon anything else. Minds and bodies are less real than God because they depend on God. Modes of thought and extension are less real than minds and bodies because they depend on minds and bodies. I believe that if we take Spinoza to be relying upon this notion of reality in the fourth argument, we can better understand why he believes (38.1). But to see how, we need to turn rst to Spinozas conception of nitude and innitude. In 1d2, Spinoza says that something is called nite if it can be limited by another of the same naturean extended thing by an extended thing, a thinking thing by a thinking thing. What kind of limitation does Spinoza have in mind here? I think a number of considerations suggest that the limitation in question is causal. First of all, the requirement that the limited thing have something in common with the limiting thing is the same requirement which Spinoza uses to rule out causal interaction between substances of different attributes. It is further suggested by the fact that later on Spinoza describes being nite as the result of a partial negation of the existence of some nature.20 The PSR requires that the negation of the existence of some nature requires a cause. If a total negation requires a cause, then it is natural to think that there must be a cause for a partial negation as well. Something is thus nite if it is limited by an external cause. Substances cannot be limited by external causes and thus are innite. Hence the innitude of a substance follows from its utter causal independence. Having identied reality with independence, we can conclude that anything innite is real to the highest degree, i.e., absolutely real. Next, we need to establish a connection between power and reality. Once again the PSR provides us with the key. Something is absolutely real, as we have seen, if it is independent of external causes. If something is independent of external causes, then nothing external can exert any causal inuence on it. Preventing existence, it seems obvious, is a form of causal inuence. Therefore, nothing can prevent a possible nature with innite reality from being exemplied. So if an absolutely real
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DPP, G I 159-160. E.M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 130. Calvin Normore, Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes lie Oksenberg Rorty and His Sources, in Essays on Descartes Meditations, Ame ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 226-227. 1p8s.
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being did not exist, its nonexistence would have to be a brute fact and hence violate the PSR. Therefore, there are no possible circumstances in which an absolutely real nature is unexemplied. In other words, an absolutely real being necessarily exists. If there are no possible circumstances in which a thing does not exist, then it would be natural to describe that thing as possessing an absolutely innite power of existing. To see this, let us represent the power of something as a function from possible contexts to effects. Some x has the power to bring about an eect e just in case there is a possible context which maps x onto e. For instance, I have the power to lift one hundred pounds because there are possible circumstances in which I lift one hundred pounds. The greater the power to bring about e the greater the number of possible contexts which map onto e. For example, if there are only relatively few possible circumstances in which I lift one hundred pounds (perhaps I can do so only if I am well rested or have had a good breakfast) then I have less power to lift one hundred pounds than if there are relatively many possible circumstances in which I lift one hundred pounds. Gods nature has an absolutely innite power of existing because every possible circumstance maps onto its exemplication. For this very reason, God also exists necessarily. If there is no possible circumstance compatible with a things nonexistence, then that thing exists necessarily. In other words, if a nature has an absolutely innite power of existing, then it is exemplied. We now have a justication of (39.1) above. Before continuing, a word on the notion of a possible circumstance or a possible context is in order. Given Spinozas necessitarianism, the only possible circumstances are the actual circumstances, and thus my characterization of power might seem to imply that a thing only has the power to do what it actually does. But there are, according to Spinoza, two sources of necessity: the essence of a thing and its causes.21 Things from whose essences alone existence doesnt follow still exist necessarily but not in virtue of their own natures. Rather, they necessarily exist in virtue of their causes. So while no non-actual situation is possiblesince any non-actual situation will be incompatible with the ordo naturae, which is itself entailed by the divine naturewe can still ask whether or not two or more essences are compatible with each other. Doing so can inform us about the natures of things. For example, while a counterfactual situation in which I took a lethal dose of cyanide yet lived is made impossible by the ordo naturae, it is also impossible given my nature and the nature of cyanide. A counterfactual situation in which I ate an apple and lived is also made impossible by the ordo
21

1p33s.
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naturae, but it is not made impossible by my nature and the nature of apples. In this sense, then, we can speak of a counterfactual situation that is possible per sei.e., not made impossible by the natures of the involved individualswithout implying that such situations are possible tout court. Moreover, claims about what is possible per se, may be perspicuous ways of making claims about essences. For example, that the circumstance in which I ate an apple and lived is not impossible per se tells us something about my nature and the nature of apples. So when I speak of representing power of existing by a function from a nature and a possible circumstance to the exemplication of that nature, I am speaking a circumstances which, while perhaps made impossible by the ordo naturae, are not made impossible by the essences of the individuals that they involve.22 I claimed in the last section that a proper understanding of the fourth proof would clarify ceratin puzzles concerning the third proof. Here is how. We can take what we have learned about Spinozas understanding of power, reality, and innity and show why Spinoza believes premise (33) of the third argument: It is impossible that a nite being possess more power than an innite being. To get there, we must rst note that Spinoza thinks that for any given nite thing there is some external cause capable of preventing its existence. As he writes in 4a1:
There is no singular thing [i.e. nite thing] in nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another more powerful by which the rst can be destroyed.

One might reasonably wonder about the axiomatic status of this claim, as it does not appear to be self-evident.23 But if we grant this assumption, then it follows that there is at least one situation incompatible with the existence of any nite thing. We are now is a position to say why a nite thing cannot have more power of existing than an innite thing, as was asserted in premise (33) of my reconstruction of the third argument. If a nite thing had more

22

C.f., Don Garrett, Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Philosophy, in Gennaro and Huenemann, eds., New Essays on the Rationalists, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 316. While Spinoza does not attempt to demonstrate in the Ethics any of the axioms he presents in that work, there is reason to believe that Spinoza believes that at least some of the Ethics axioms can be demonstrated. Henry Oldenburg complained to Spinoza (in Ep. 3) that some of Spinozas axioms arent indemonstrable principles, known by the light of Nature, and requiring no proof. Spinoza responds (in Ep. 4) that he doesnt hold the axioms to be indemonstrable, and then proceeds to try to give a proof of some of them. Spinoza never, however, attempts a proof of 4a1.
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power of existing than an innite thing, then, by denition, there would be fewer possible circumstances compatible with the nonexistence of a nite thing than an innite thing. But whereas no possible circumstances are compatible with the nonexistence of an innite being, there is at least one incompatible with the nonexistence with any nite being. Therefore, it is impossible for a nite being to have a greater power of acting than an innite one. We can also dispense with the worry that the nature of a nite being which actually exists may involve a greater power of existing than the nature of an innite being that is unexemplied. There can be no circumstances in which the nature of an innite being is unexemplied. But this line of reasoning does not depend in any way upon the a posteriori premise that some nite being exists. Thus we see that force behind Spinozas third argument comes from an entirely a priori source, which is just what we should expect given that Spinoza describes the fourth argument as an a priori argument that has the same basis as the third. 5. The PSR and 1p16d I claimed above that my interpretation distinguishes itself from Garretts by, among other things, the light it sheds on aspects of Spinozas metaphysics not directly connected to his arguments for the existence of God. In this section, I intend to substantiate this claim by showing how the reasoning contained in Spinozas arguments for the existence of God as I have interpreted them can also provide support for Spinozas claim that God creates every possible mode. This is an important result because, although this claim is very important to Spinozas system, Spinozas argument for it is vulnerable to a powerful objection that stems from a widespread view of Gods creative power. I conjecture that this objection did not worry Spinoza, because he was aware that the reasoning that he uses to establish the existence of God can be adapted to respond to this objection as well. In any event, that my interpretation of Spinozas arguments for the existence of God coheres well with other important aspects of Spinozas metaphysics is evidence, although hardly decisive, in favor of it. In 1p16 and 1p16d, Spinoza writes:
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow [sequi] innitely many things in innitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall under an innite intellect.) Dem.: This proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends to the fact that the intellect infers from the given denition of anything a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it

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(i.e., from the very essence of the thing); and that it infers more properties the more the denition of the thing expresses reality, i.e., the more reality the essence of the dened thing involves. Bust since the divine nature has absolutely innite attributes (by d6), each of which also expresses an essence innite in its own kind, from its necessity there must follow innitely many things in innite modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an innite intellect), q.e.d.

1p16d tries to establish that an omnipotent God exercises all of his power. This claim amounts to something like a principle of plentitude: God creates every possible thing. This is not at rst obvious because Spinoza discusses the issue in terms of what follows from Gods nature and it is not obvious what kind of relation following from is. Is it causal, logical, explanatory, or something else? If I am right and this text concerns what God creates, then following from must have a causal dimension. We can see that it does have a causal dimension from the three corollaries that Spinoza alleges follow from 1p16, all of which pertain to causal relations. A further difculty for the plenitude interpretation is that 1p16d concerns the question of what properties follow from the denition of God. And that seems to pertain to the ways that God is, not what he does. But, for Spinoza, everything other than God is a mode of God and hence has an adjectival relation to God. So, if there is no limit to the modes that follow causally from God, then there is no limit to Gods power. And if every mode that can follow from Gods nature does follow, then God exercises all of his power. Here then is how I understand 1p16d: P1. If something is unconstrained by external causes (i.e., has innite reality), then it causes every conceivable thing. P2. God is unconstrained by external causes. C. So, God causes every conceivable thing. There are many things here with which a philosopher might want to take issue. I shall conne myself here to considering one objection that stems from a widespread view of God that I shall call the standard view. The standard view holds that while God has innite power and hence cannot be bound by external causes, that power need not be exercised. This would entail a denial of premise (P1). How can Spinoza defend (P1) against the standard view? I propose that Spinoza can respond with an argument that is, in many respects, parallel to his argument for the existence of God.
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Suppose that God didnt exercise all of his power. Then there would be a possible mode that God doesnt create. There must be a cause or reason for its nonexistence. This cause is either internal to the mode, external to God, or God himself. It cant be something external to God, because then something external to a substance would causally inuence a substance, which is impossible. It cant be internal to the mode, because, ex hypothesi, it is a possible mode and only selfcontradictory things have internal causes for their nonexistence.24 So the only candidate for causing the mode to not exist is God. In virtue of what might God be the cause of the nonexistence of a possible mode? It might be that, while the mode is possible per se, it is not possible relative to Gods nature. That is, Gods nature doesnt contain the possibility of creating such a mode. But then God would not be omnipotent, which the adherent of the standard view cannot accept. So perhaps God chooses not the create the mode. This is how the standard view typically characterizes Gods power. There is no possible mode that he cannot create, but, for any possible mode, God may choose not to create it. That God contingently chooses not to create some possible mode, however, conicts with the PSR. Here is a proof. First, a few preliminaries are in order. Let choice be the putative truth that God contingently chooses not to create some possible mode. For each truth p let d(p) be the sucient explanation of p. (Note that every truth has exactly one sucient explanation. It has at least one by the PSR. It has at most one by the principle of explanatory exclusion.)25 A class Y of truths is the explanatory class of some truth p just in case Y is the smallest class that contains p, and is closed under conjunction, and is closed under the function d. Let W be the explanatory class of choice. Let q be the conjunction of every truth in W. The sufcient explanation of every contingent truth is a contingent truth. P2. No contingent truth is self-explanatory. P3. If p 2 W, then d(p) p (because no contingent truth is self-explanatory) and d (p) 2 W (because W is by denition closed under d). (P1, P2) P4. q 2 W. C1. So, d (q) q and d (q) 2 W. (P3, P4)
24 25

P1.

1p11d. Did Spinoza accept the principle of explanatory exclusion? I suspect he did, but for present purposes, the answer to this question doesnt matter. The assumption that he did is not essential to the proof; it merely simplies it. So, for the sake of exposition, I shall here assume it.
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P5.

For any contingent conjunction p, the sucient explanation of p is not a conjunct of p. C2. d(q) is not a conjunct of q. (P5) P6. Every member of W is a conjunct of q. C3. So, d(q) is a conjunct of q. (C1 and P6) This contradicts C2. q.e.d.

We have now ruled out every candidate explanation of the nonexistence of a possible mode: it cannot be explained by anything external to God nor anything internal to God or the mode itself. Since these alternatives are exhaustive, if there were a possible mode that did not exist, then its nonexistence would be inexplicable. Hence, according to the psr, the nonexistence of a possible mode is impossible. We are now in a position to see the advantages of my interpretation over Garretts. Recall that Garretts reconstruction of Spinozas arguments include an equivalence between necessary existence and selfcausation. According to him, Spinoza uses the PSR to establish that God is self-caused. That together with the equivalence of self-causation and necessary existence allows Spinoza to conclude that God necessarily exists. As I argued above, this equivalence is either inconsistent with Spinozas necessitarianism or it must be patched up. The most obvious patch would be to replace the equivalence between self-causation and necessary existence with an equivalence between self-causation and existence that is necessary in virtue of its own nature. But then the style of reasoning that Spinoza employs in his arguments for the existence of God would have no application in cases of existence that is necessary in virtue of the nature of another. The existence of every possible mode is necessary in virtue of the nature of another (viz., God), so the reasoning that supports the claim that God necessarily exists can have no bearing on the necessary existence of the modes and Spinoza has no defence against the standard view. Garretts mistake lies in underestimating the power of Spinozas PSR and its centrality to his metaphysics. There is no need for Spinoza to appeal to Garretts equivalence. The psr together with Spinozas assumptions about substances and causation sufce. Moreover, the very same style of reasoning allows Spinoza to handle otherwise telling objections to some of his other main metaphysical theses. 6. The Monism Argument Adapted to Prove the Nonexistence of God There is a well-known problem with Spinozas arguments. Having attempted to prove the existence of God, Spinoza goes on to try to

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prove, using the no-shared attribute theorem introduced in 1p5, that there is no substance other than God. God has all the attributes. If there were some substance other than God, then it would share an attribute with God. But no two substances can share an attribute. Therefore, there are no other substances. It would seem, however, that some of Spinozas arguments for the existence of God would equally well serve to prove the existence of some substance other than God. Take for example the second argument. Replace every mention of God in that argument with an expression referring to a substance other than God, e.g., a merely extended substance (in other words, a substance with exactly one attribute, extension). For everything there is a cause or reason, as much for its nonexistence as for its existence. If a merely extended substance did not exist, it would be because it was internally incoherent or externally prevented. No external cause can inuence a substance. A merely extended substance isnt incoherent. Therefore, a merely extended substance exists. The argument thus transformed seems to work just as well as the argument for the existence of God. The problem is not just that this result contradicts the claim that there is no other substance than God (1p14), but, along with the no-shared attribute theorem, a merely extended substance would preclude the existence of God. In this way, at least some of the arguments presented for 1p11 would equally well serve as arguments for the nonexistence of God. Garrett has argued that Spinoza recognizes these difculties and designs the third and fourth arguments with an eye toward blocking such alternative arguments.26 First of all, in the third argument he denes power of existing so that if x exists and y does not, then, ipso facto, x has a greater power of existing than y. Second, in the fourth argument he claims that an absolutely innite being, i.e., a being with innitely many attributes, has an absolutely innite power of existing. From these two premises it follows that it is not possible for a less than absolutely innite attribute to exist because that would imply, together with the no-shared attribute theorem, that a substance with a greater power of existing did not exist. But what it is for x to have a greater power of acting than y is to be such that y cannot exist if x does not exist. Della Rocca has argued that this response begs the question against someone, e.g., an orthodox Cartesian, who believes that substances have one and only one attribute. He writes:

26

Garrett Ontological Argument, p. 211.

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A Cartesian would deny (and, in Ep 8, de Vries does deny) that a substance could have more than one attribute. For this reason, we can see that a Cartesian would hold that a certain dierence between God (as Spinoza denes God) and [a merely thinking substance] gives [a merely thinking substance] more power to exist than God. Although [a merely thinking substance] and God both have thought, they dier in that God has other attributes besides thought, and [a merely thinking substance] does not. This dierence, a Cartesian would say, is clearly to the detriment of God (as Spinoza denes God) since the notion of a substance having more than one attribute is simply incoherent, whereas the notion of a substance having just one attribute is perfectly legitimate. Thus, the Cartesian would say, God would be precluded from existing by Gods very concept, but [a merely thinking substance] would not be precluded by [a merely thinking substances] concept.27

Della Roccas worry harks back to the concern I expressed earlier in connection with premise (27) of the second argument: The nature of God is not incoherent. Spinoza offers no explicit argument for this and given his denition of God as a substance with innitely many attributes, any philosopher who, like Descartes, denies that a substance can have more than one attribute would challenge it. So in addition to meeting the challenge that single attribute substances pose for the existence of God, part of the pay off of this section will be to offer some support for (27). Della Rocca has suggested a Spinozistic argument that might establish the correlation of attributes and power. The argument begins with the claim that for every attribute A there is some substance that has A, i.e., every attribute exists. This follows from the fact that, for Spinoza, each attribute is conceptually self-contained. And we have already seen from the second argument that Spinoza has reasons to believe that anything conceptually self-contained necessarily exists.28 From Spinozas belief that no two substances share an attribute and the claim that every attribute exists, Della Rocca concludes that if A is an attribute then one and only one substance has A. The important question is how are these uniquely possessed attributes distributed among substances? Here Della Rocca invokes the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: if x is not identical to y, then there is some dierence between x and y that explains their nonidentity. Thus, if the extended substance is not identical to the thinking substance, then there is some dierence between them that explains their nonidentity. Perhaps we can explain
27 28

Della Rocca, Spinozas Monism, p. 26. Della Rocca thinks that Spinoza would here rely on 1p7 not the second argument. But, as was shown previously, 1p7 does not contain any claim about necessary existence.
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their nonidentity by appealing to their diverse attributes. So, for example, the extended substance is not identical to the thinking substance because it has extension and the thinking substance does not. That is, the distinguishing feature is the attribute of extension only if the thinking substance lacks extension. But the PSR demands that for every fact there is cause or reason which explains that fact. What fact could explain the fact that the thinking substance lacks extension? Della Rocca claims that nothing could account for this lack. To show this he considers two unsuccessful attempts to explain it, and concludes that all attempted explanations will share their aws. The rst attempted explanation begins with the assumption that the thinking substance is distinct from the extended substance. Distinct substances cannot share an attribute (1p5). Therefore, the thinking substance does not share the attribute of extension with the extended substance. But this begs the question since the nonidentity of the thinking and the extended substances is the very thing we are trying to establish, and the assumption on which this putative explanation is based presumes that nonidentity. Della Rocca next considers an attempted explanation which begins with the assumption that thought and extension are mutually exclusive. Thus, the fact that the thinking substance possesses thought explains why it does not also possess extension. But this explains a fact involving extensionthe fact that a certain substance does not have itby a fact involving thought. This would violate 1p10d, which says that attributes are conceptually self-contained and hence no fact involving one attribute can be explained by a fact involving another attribute. Clearly this attempted explanation violates this explanatory barrier between the attributes, by explaining an extension involving fact (that this substance does not posses extension) by reference to a thought involving fact (that this thinking substance possesses thought). I believe that Della Roccas argument provides a genuinely Spinozistic basis for the claim that a substance with fewer than all the attributes is impossible. There is, however, a closely related argument that also supports that claiman argument which more perspicuously displays the connection between that claim and Spinozas metaphysical rationalism. Whereas the main premises of Della Roccas argument are the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and the explanatory barrier between attributes, my variation proceeds from the PSR and the causal barrier between the attributes. That our two arguments are very closely related can be seen from the fact that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is entailed by the PSR and the fact that, for Spinoza, explanation and causation are coextensive. But since I take adherence to the PSR to be the dening feature of Spinozas metaphysical
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rationalism, I think my version of the argument has the benet of highlighting the signicance of the PSR to both Spinozas theism and monism. In order to work our way up to the conclusion that any substance must possess all the attributes, let us begin with a case where we are trying to determine whether or not some substance possesses some attribute, say attribute E. For every substance x, x either possesses attribute E or not. Suppose that x, a substance with only one attribute, does not posses E. There must be, according to the PSR, a cause for substance xs non-possession of E. Causes, for Spinoza must be conceived through the same attribute as are their eects. That is: iii. If x causes y, then (there is some attribute A such that x is conceived through attribute A if and only if y is conceived through attribute A). Moreover, Spinoza believes that if something can be conceived through an attribute, then that attribute is sufcient for conceiving of that thing. That is: iv. If x is conceived through attribute A, then A is sucient for conceiving of x.29 This rules out the possibility that some x is conceived through A and B together but not through A alone. Because the psr requires xs non-possession of E is possible only if it is the eect of some cause, and because causes and eects must be conceived through the same attribute, we must now ask, through what attribute is xs non-possession of E conceived? The fact of xs non-possession of E cannot be conceived through some attribute other than E, because in order to conceive of xs not possessing E it is necessary to conceive of E. And yet this fact cannot be conceived through E because substance x cannot be conceived through E. This is because, for Spinoza, things are conceived through their essences,30 and attributes are what an intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.31 Thus, if x could be conceived through E, then x would possess E. But x does not possess E and so cannot be conceived through it. Perhaps, then, xs non-possession of E is conceivable through a combination of attributes E and some other attribute that x does possess,
29 30 31

1p10s. 2d2. 1d4.

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T. Then we would conceive of x through T, which x does possess, and not-possessing-E would be conceived through E. But such a solution would violate (iv), because neither E nor T would suce for conceiving of xs non-possession of E. It seems, then, that substance xs non-possession of E is not conceivable through any attribute. But then, according to (iii), there can be no cause of xs non-possession of E. And so, by the PSR, this non-possession is impossible. That is, for any substance x and for any attribute E it is not the case that x does not possess E. Consequently, a substance with fewer than all possible attributes is impossible, and the threat that single attribute substances would pose to the existence of God is defeated. We can also make some sense of Spinozas claim that the more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has.32 As we have seen, reality, for Spinoza, is equivalent to causal and conceptual independence. Because a substance is absolutely causally and conceptually independent, nothing could aect such a substance so as to bring about its non-possession of an attribute. So any substance with innite reality possesses every possible attribute. Any substance with fewer than every possible attribute would violate the PSR and so is impossible. Even so, each fact of nonpossession of an attribute which is true of some less than innite substance would be the result of a causal limitation. Each such limitation reduces its degree of reality. That is, if some substance didnt possess, per impossibile, some one attribute, it would have to be because there was something capable of preventing it from doing so, which would compromise that substances causal and conceptual independence.33 Every attribute lacked would introduce another limitation and further reduce its causal and conceptual independence. Thus some impossible substances are even less real than others.
32 33

1p9. It is often thought that counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents (i.e., counterpossible conditionals) are vacuously true. Thus the claim that if some substance didnt possess, per impossibile, some one attribute, it would not have to be because there was something capable of preventing it from doing so would also be true. But the truth of that proposition would undercut Spinozas claim that the more attributes a substance has, the more real it is. I think, however, that there is good reason to reject the idea that conditionals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true. As Daniel Nolan points out (Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 4, Fall 1997, p. 504) the historian of philosophy has especially good reason to reject such a principle. Presumably some philosophers believe that both Platos metaphysics and Leibnizs metaphysics are false. And not because Forms and monads happen not to exist. If they are false, they are necessarily so. But it would be absurd for the historian of philosophy to conclude from this that Platos and Leibnizs metaphysics are equivalent and that dierent things dont follow from them.
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7. Assessment I shall now turn briey to assessing the persuasiveness of Spinozas arguments. I believe that the second and fourth arguments, as I have reconstructed them, are valid. The third is invalid because from its premises the most that can be legitimately concluded is that God exists, not that God necessarily exists. The rst argument is problematic because, on plausible assumptions about the semantic value of God, it either begs the question or is invalid, depending upon whether God is construed as a singular term or as a disguised quantier expression. Nevertheless, all of Spinozas arguments clearly avoid a number of the most powerful criticisms lodged against more traditional ontological and cosmological arguments. Unlike many traditional ontological arguments, they do not suppose that existence is a property or a constituent of the concept of any being. Unlike many traditional cosmological arguments, they do not falsely assume that a necessary being must be perfect. To this extent, at least, they are stronger than many traditional arguments for the existence of God. Spinozas arguments are not, nevertheless, unobjectionable. Aside from various quibbles, I think there are two very serious problems with them, both of which are pillars of nearly all rationalistic metaphysics and relate in interesting ways to Spinozas necessitarianism. First is Spinozas equivalence between conception and causation. The icy conditions caused the car wreck, but the concept of the car wreck does not involve the concept of the icy conditions. Smoking causes cancer, but the concept of the latter does not involve the concept of the former. The equivalence of conception and causation is, however, crucially important in Spinozas arguments because it secures the inference from a substance being conceptually self-contained to its being independent of external causes, particularly in premise (29) of my reconstruction of the second argument and in establishing the connection between reality and innity for the purposes of the fourth argument. Perhaps Spinoza could argue that the equivalence of conception and causation is required by the PSR. It cannot be simply a brute fact that a causal relation obtains between two things. There must be something in virtue of which it obtains, which explains why it obtains. And this explanatory factor must either be itself self-explanatory or be part of an explanatory chain that eventually terminates in something self-explanatory. Bennett and Della Rocca have argued that by claiming that causation is equivalent to conception, Spinozas account of causality satises the PSR.34 The explanation of why one thing is causally related to another is that it is part of the concept of the former that it is so related
34

Bennett, Study, pp. 31-31 and Michael Della Rocca, A Rationalist Manifesto.
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to the later. Conceptual relations are self-explanatory in the sense that there can be no further question why bachelors, for example, are unmarried men, once we have analyzed the concept BACHELOR into the constituents UNMARRIED and MAN. Similarly there can be no further question about why one thing causes another after it has been established that the concept of the former implies that it causes the latter. This response puts Spinoza in the awkward position of having to maintain that the concept of the car wreck does indeed contain the concept of the icy conditions. This awkwardness, however, is mitigated by the fact that Spinoza thinks that we never have adequate ideas of external particulars like car wrecks or icy conditions.35 Thus if we fail to discern the conceptual connection between the two, it is open to Spinoza to claim that this is only because our grasp of these concepts is incomplete or inadequate. This response is not entirely implausible. As Tyler Burge has pointed out, most, if not all, people possess concepts that they incompletely grasp.36 For example, one might possess the concept of a mortgage without knowing exactly what distinguishes one from any other kind of debt, or one might possess the concept of a contract without recognizing that some verbal agreements are contracts. On Burges account, possession of incompletely grasped concepts depends upon the complete grasp of experts and a disposition on the part the one who incompletely grasps them to defer to expert judgment. On Spinozas account of concepts, however, no nite mind completely grasps the concept, and so it is beyond nite minds to discover causal connections between particulars by conceptual analysis. There is, however, a more serious objection to Spinozas claim that a things causal prole is contained in its concept: whether or not various causal connections obtain is never, on this view, a contingent matter. If it is part of the concept of Caesar that Brutus murdered him, then it is necessary truth that Brutus murdered Caesar. It is thus impossible, on Spinozas view, that Caesar died of old age or in battle. Spinoza, of course, would not be bothered by the consequence that all causal relations are necessary since he is arguably committed to the view that all truths are necessary. Philosophers who do not share Spinozas conviction that there are no contingent facts concerning causation, however, will do well to reject the equivalence of conception and causation. This brings us to the second problem, the PSR itself. This principle expresses Spinozas basic rationalist orientation. No element or feature
35

The only things we can have adequate ideas of are common notions, the eternal and innite essence of God, and the formal essences of singular things (which are eternal truths). See 2p40s. Tyler Burge, Individualism and the Mental, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV (1979).
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of the world is inaccessible to rational understanding. Whether or not a given individual exists, and if it exists, whether or not it exemplies a given property or stands in a given relationship has a complete explanation. All but the rst of Spinozas arguments presuppose that the PSR is, and is known to be, true. Moreover, it cannot simply be a brute fact that the PSR is true. If it were, then the PSR would violate itself. Hence, the truth of the PSR must be self-explanatory. How could the truth of such a principle be self-explanatory? It would be reasonable to regard it as such if it were true logically or analytically. It seems, however, quite clear that it is not a theorem of logic. Perhaps Spinoza would claim that it is analytically true. For example, Spinoza might claim that the concept of a thing is a complex concept consisting of the concept of the most general category of being such that if something is not a thing, then it does not exist, and the concept of something with a cause or reason. If such an analysis of the concept of a thing were correct, then the PSR would be a conceptual truth. It would also be, unfortunately for the adherent of the PSR, a triviality. For the opponent of the PSR could characterize a different concept, THING*, such that something is a thing* just in case it exists. Then the anti-rationalist is in a position to ask whether of not there are any things* that arent thingsi.e. dont have complete causes or reasonswithout denying the PSR is true as concerns things. Any attempt to claim that the PSR is an analytic truth will be subject to such evasions. Since such evasions deprive the PSR of the force that its rationalist adherents ascribe to it, the PSR must not be an analytic truth. Some philosophers have thought that the PSR is presupposed by all rational inquiry, and thus its truth can never be rationally challenged. But, as Russell points out, if rational inquiry presupposes the PSR, it is only in the sense that prospecting presupposes the existence of gold. That is, rational inquiry hopes to nd causes and reasons, but should not assume that such things can be found everywhere. If there is no explanation of the truth of the PSR, then the PSR is incoherent. I can think of nothing that would explain the truth of the PSR, but I know of no argument to show that such an explanation is impossible. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that the burden of proof rests with the rationalist. Until an explanation of the truth of PSR is given, the threat of incoherence looms. If the PSR is not known to be true, is it known to be false? The PSR entails that all truths are necessary.37 This can be demonstrated by

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This has been shown by William Rowe in his Cosmological Arguments, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), Peter van Inwagen in his Metaphysics, pp.119122, and Jonathan Bennett in his Study, p. 115.
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the following argument. If there are contingent truths, then there is the set of all contingent truths. If the PSR is true, then there must be an answer to the question, what is the cause or reason why this set is the set of contingent truths and not some other set? It cannot be a contingent truth not contained in the set, because it is, ex hypothesi, the set of all contingent truths. It cannot be a necessary truth. Any necessary truth is compatible with every possibility, and so cannot answer the question, why is this set of possibilities actual and not some other? That is, the necessary truths are the same in all possible worlds so none of them can explain why one of those possible worlds is the actual world. It cannot, moreover, be a subset of the set. If it were, then some subset of contingent truths could determine the entire set of contingent truths. But this is impossible. To see why, take a seemingly plausible candidate for being such an explanatory subset, for example, a complete specication of the state of aairs that obtained just after the big bang and the laws of nature. If the universe were deterministic, this would suce to explain why any other contingent fact obtains. It would not, however, explain itself. Contingent truths are not selfexplanatory. There would be then, at least one brute fact, which violates the PSR. In sum, the explanation of the entire set of contingent facts cannot be a necessary truth, nor can it be a contingent truth. All truths, however, are either contingent or necessary. Hence, if there were contingent truths, the set of them would have no explanation. And by the PSR, we can conclude that contingent truths are impossible. In other words, all truths are necessary truths. So, the following statements are inconsistent and no one may rationally believe both: There is a cause or reason for everything. That Bush won the election is a contingent truth. For my own part, I have more condence in Bushs victory being contingent than I have in the PSR. Thus I must, on pain of irrationality, reject the PSR. Such a rejection cuts to the heart of Spinozas metaphysics. As we have seen, at nearly every turn in arguing for the existence of an absolutely innite substance, i.e., God, Spinoza appeals to the PSR. Without God, the metaphysical foundations of nearly all of his philosophythe parallelism, the conatus doctrine, necessitarianism, his accounts of virtue and political legitimacyare undercut. That is, however important God is to Spinozas system, so too is the PSR.

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