1.

General Introducton 2
2. Criteria 5
3. Microstates in Internatonal Relatons 25
4. Microstates and Internatonal Security 34
5. Conclusion and Recommendatons 40
Atachments 42
1
Index
In 2005 the BBC broadcasted a series with the ttle: How to start your own country. In the documentary, the
Britsh writer/comedian Danny Wallace tried to start his own country, ruled by himself. This kingdom, called
The Kingdom of Lovely consisted of a fat as sovereign territory, family, friends and fans as ambassadors
and bedrooms, closets and hallways as embassies. During the series he gets help from various academics
and in the end he travels to New York to apply for UN membership. It will be no surprise, but a country which
exists in only an apartment in East London, did not qualify as independent country, hence the UN declined
his membership applicaton. Nevertheless this series showed a litle bit about the fundamental questons
that surround statehood, like: how big should the territory of a state be, or how many people do you need to
qualify as a state? Do you need to be recognized by other states in order to obtain a sovereign status? And, on
behalf of the physical territory, do you need one, or can a state also be solely virtual?
1
In the world of today
one could argue that online societes like Second life or World of Warcraf can be seen as virtual states,
including members (citzen), an own currency and (virtual) property. As today, The Kingdom of Lovely stll
exists and is qualifed as a micro naton
2
, not to be confused with a microstate. The interestng part, and the
reason why I menton it here, is that in the series it turns out that actually it is very unclear what is needed
to qualify as a state. And of course, the queston of what is needed to qualify as an independent state, is a
very serious one as the case of Kosovo shows us. The queston of statehood qualifcaton can even turn
into a (civil) war. Ofcially all you have to do to be recognized as independent is to meet with the standard
as agreed upon during the Montevideo Conventon.
3
According to the Montevideo Conventon of 1933 the
following criteria should be met:
A permanent populaton
A defned territory
A government
Capacity to enter into relatons with other states
Long before the Montevideo Conventon took place these four points where already a kind of unwriten law.
Maybe the most important point of the four above mentoned was the possibility to defend the territory.
There was a tme that every tribe in Europe represented some kind of naton, united in clans.
4
Also known
are the huntng grounds of the several Natve American tribes and of course there are a lot more examples to
menton. Afer the collapse of the Roman Empire, Europe witnessed a sharp increase in urbanizaton. Think
of the German Kleinstaaterei
5
, the Italian city states during the tme of Machiavelli and the frst republic in
the world: The United Dutch Provinces.
1 Sounds ridiculous? Currently the people of Tuvalu are threatened to loose their territory due to climate change, they
consider contnuing their naton online. This will bring new challenges to the qualifcatons of statehood.
2 An entty that resembles a naton or a state that for the most part exists only on paper, on the internet, or in the mind of
its creator. htp://en.wiktonary.org/wiki/micronaton on 13.7.2010.
3 Montevideo Conventon on the rights and dutes of states, 1933 codifying the declaratve theory of statehood.
4 Hungary was formed by seven clans in the old days.
5 Germany existed of no less than 314 so called kleinstaate or small states in the second half of the 18th century. See Zwaan
2001 for further details.
2
1. General Introducton
The number and power of these city states and small natons reached its peak at the start of the 14th century.
Tiny Venice had the same governmental budget as the Kingdom of Spain and only 20% less than the Kingdom
of France! This period of wealth was accompanied with a relatve high standard of democracy. Microstates
where known for their small open type of governments. General sufrage didnt exist, but ofen the trading
elite were very infuental. This era ended abrupt in 1494 when the Italian peninsula was invaded by Charles
VIII of France. With this the Great Italian Wars had started and the curtain for the microstates in Southern
Europe had fallen. Noteworthy is that the French invasion was encouraged by Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan
(at that tme also a city state) who sought an ally against the Republic of Venice
6
. Meanwhile the German
Kingdom dispersed and the world was colonized by Europe. This all accumulated untl in 1900 when the
world consisted of just a few powers: the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, the Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden, the Russian Empire, the German Empire, Austria-Hungaria,
the Otoman Empire, the French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy. Note that many invasions of the former
microstates were driven by the greed for their wealth. At the start of the 20th century there where almost
no microstates lef.
What followed was a century perceived by many historians as the bloodiest century ever
7
; two world wars
tore the world apart and caused the death and birth of many natons. Other countries were ruled by brutal
dictators who killed many of their own people.
8
Afer that a cold war followed, which wasnt really that cold
by proxy. Around three third of the century there was a wave of decolonizaton, accompanied with in many
cases violent wars. At the end of the 20st century we witnessed the frst two high tech wars ever fought: the
First Gulf War and the Kosovo War.
Where there almost no microstates lef at the start of the 20th century, at the end of last century they where
back and here to stay! So, the 21st century is about ten years young, what guarantees the microstates that
they will survive this century? Afer all history has proven that the internatonal arena can be whimsical.
In this research I would like to explore the phenomena of the microstate. In order to do this in an ordered and
focused way I formulated a working ttle and a research queston. The working ttle is:
The existence of microstates in a large world
The research queston is:
What defnes a state as a microstate?
Are the current defnitons used to determine whether a state is a microstate sufcient and workable, or are
they insufcient and arbitrary?
6 Milan was, like Venice, a microstate.
7 See Niall Fergusons War of the World, 2006
8 Josef Stalin, Pol Pot, Mao Zedong e.g.
3
In the frst chapter I want to put forward a set of criteria of which I believe to be useful in defning micro-
states. Maybe the used criteria (Montevideo Conventon and UN criteria) are too limited, focusing on only
some aspects of a state like populaton, territory or military or economic power. In the second chapter I will
focus on microstates in Internatonal Relatons Theory and praxis. How does the theory perceive microstates
and how is the presence of microstates known in the world? In the third chapter I want to take a closer look
at security issues. By their nature, microstates are more vulnerable than most other states, making them an
easy prey in an anarchistc world. I will review their military strength and role in power politcs. I will also
discuss a case study to illustrate microstate security. In this case study I will discuss the strategic value of Oce-
ania in the PRC/ Taiwan dispute. I will conclude my research with a conclusion and some recommendatons.
In this essay I will use the terms state, naton and country interchangeable. I know that there are dif-
ferences in the defnitons of these words, but for my research those diferences are irrelevant. When I talk
about territory I either describe the total area of a naton or I talk about non independent areas (like over-
seas territories or disputed territories). Which one will allude from the context.
Concluding this general introducton I would like to note that I do realize that to a certain extend defning
microstates is a mater of interpretaton and for that reason rather artfcial. In creatng an outline there
will always be some grey areas. However, if we use the criteria I forward in this writng we will have a more
cohesive group of states that have more in common and are more complete than the current group of micro-
states.
Aart-Jan van der Vlies
4
Defning the term microstate is not as easy as it seems. How do we quantfy the term micro and how
strict, or loose, do we use the term state? To recognize a microstate we are in the need to research both
words: micro and state. The defniton of being a state is given in the previously mentoned Montevideo Con-
venton. The micro part is defned by the UN as a state with one million inhabitants or less. This defniton
seems to me to be rather artfcial and theoretcal with litle use in the real world. For example, according to
this defniton, Singapore with its 687 square kilometres and 4,657,542 inhabitants is not a microstate. Qatar
with 11,586 square kilometres but a populaton of only 833,285 is.
9
In my preliminary reading I noted that
among academics, as well as state and organizaton ofcials, the defniton of a microstate is at best inconclu-
sive. Below Ive listed some of the criteria used to defne the micro part in the term microstate:
The UN defniton
10
1,5 Million inhabitants
11
A territory of maximum 1,000 square kilometres (habitable, most archipelagos for example
contain more water than landmass)
12
Number of individuals per square kilometre (>100 per square kilometre)
13
The politcal power of a state (weak states being microstates)
14
No parameters at all, as reference to small states
15
As you can see above, the parameters vary quite dramatcally; people use numbers of inhabitants, surface,
power and mixed forms of this to determine microstates. Key element in all these defnitons is that its
looked upon from a large state perspectve. What is the statstcal accountability of the number one million
or one and a half million? Or, if its not a mater of math, what other explanaton is there for the numbers?
I found it hard to believe that a country with one million citzens is very diferent from a country that has
one and a half, or even two million citzens. The landmass criterion is understandable to a certain extend,
however, it would be more correct to use it in defning island microstates. A totally diferent way in defning
micro is the measurement of politcal power. If you use politcs as criteria, you can easily abandon smallness
as a research criterion as compared to the strongest states all others are weak. Another consequence would
be that massive countries like Canada can be qualifed as microstates, using the politcal power criterion. For
sure this doesnt create a realistc portrait of the reality.
9 htp://www.photus.com/rankings/geography/land_area_sq_km_2010_0.html and htp://www.photus.com/rankings/
populaton/populaton_2010_0.html on 14.5.2010
10 www.un.org
11 Mohammed 2002, p1
12 Sidiropoulos 2009, p46
13 Ibid., p48
14 Thomas 2010, p97
15 Andriamananjara & Schif 1998, p2
5
2. Criteria
2.1 Introducton
The second part of the term microstate is the state part. Territories like the Cayman Islands, Netherlands
Antlles and Hong Kong are ofen referred to as microstates. Although they might be micro in landmass and/
or populaton, they are not states according to the criteria of the Montevideo Conventon of 1933. They are
not independent, and as they do not have the capacity (which is in this case the possibility) to maintain rela-
tons with other states. Spoken of the last criteria, relatons with other states; many microstates barely have,
or dont have the capacity at all, to maintain relatons with other states thanks to their remoteness, small and
untrained populaton or lack of fnancial resources.
16
If a microstate fails in maintaining relatons with other
states on an individual level, is it stll a state? With how many states does a microstate have to maintain rela-
tons, and in what form? Via embassies or is UN membership sufcient? The state part is a difcult one, and
quite possible even harder to defne than the micro part of microstate. To defne the frst part we can look
to statstcs, characteristcs and trends. The later one has been determined by history and traditon. As we
saw in the general introducton, the current defniton of state, as set out in the Montevideo Conventon, is
about to face serious challenges.
The last queston linked to defning microstates is what criteria does microstates bundle as a group, other
then populaton and territory size? What has Luxembourg in common with The Maldives other than having
a relatvely small populaton and a small territory? Isnt the whole idea of grouping states based on their
populaton and/or landmass futle? Even if you take two seemingly equal countries in size, populaton and
sort there might not be much in common. Take for example the Caribbean and Oceania. Both are island
groups, both globally have the same populaton and landmass. However the Caribbean are mostly ex Britain
colonies located ofshore the Americas in the Atlantc Ocean while Oceania was occupied by various powers
(USA, France, Australia and New Zealand) and stretches from ofshore Australia to the remote vastness of the
Pacifc Ocean. Even if we dont take culture into account, the diferences between, and the (economic) pos-
sibilites for, both areas are very diferent.
17
This research aims to fnd the link that group microstates, other
then on the level of populaton or territory size. We will see that next to size, microstates have other things
in common.
So taken all this into account, how does one accurately defne the term microstate in a way that this def-
niton can be applied to reality rather than just paper? In this chapter I will review what defnes a state as
a microstate. I will review the four criteria of statehood as defned in the Montevideo conventon. I will also
add an extra parameter, based on trends in the available literature: Economy. In chapter three I will review
microstate military. The frst four are:
The state as a person of internatonal law should possess the following qualifcatons:
a) a permanent populaton;
b) a defned territory;
c) a permanent government; and
d) capacity to enter into relatons with the other states. (Art 1., Montevideo 1933)
16 Mohammed 2002, p6-14
17 Connel 1991, p260/ Van Fossen 2008, p5
6
The frst two criteria are useable for statstc research, namely how big is the permanent populaton and how
vast is the defned territory. In this research we will see a trend including a modus. In an incremental scale,
everything lef from the modus is smaller and everything right from the modus is larger than the modus. The
third criterion is kind of tricky. What government is meant here? Its important to defne this, as all territories,
depended and overseas territory have a government, whether or not independent. In my research I will cre-
ate statstcs for both groups, i.e. internatonally recognized independent natons (all UN members plus the
Vatcan City and Kosovo) and all territories including states and oversees territories. The motvaton for also
taking oversees territories into account is that they sometmes play an important role in various internatonal
afairs. One can think of tax havens (Cayman Islands, Isle of Man), economic importance (Hong Kong), and
military issues (Taiwan, Falkland Islands). The last criterion is the capacity to enter into relatons with other
states. I will analyse this criterion more in depth in the next chapter, as it is a rather specifc challenge for
some microstates.
Next to the parameters described in the Montevideo Conventon and the known UN criterion I will put
forward two other parameters that can be used for statstc research; GDP and GDP percentage spend on
military. However not to distllate a modus but to recognize trends. These cant be criteria as else the image
would be incorrect, some large states (Nigeria, Zimbabwe) have a rather small GDP. The same applies for the
percentages of the GDP spend on military. The USA spends a lower percentage of their GDP on military than
Yemen, however the USA GDP is umpteen tmes bigger than Yemens GDP so the military strength of the USA
is much greater. In analysing both criteria I aim to reveal a trend, characteristc for microstates as defned by
criteria one, two and four.
At the end of this chapter we will have a set of criteria that defne a group of states that have more in com-
mon than just their populaton size. It will then be possible to use this group to predict behavior of this group
(based on statstcs) and to analyse the importance of group members in diverse situatons based on similar
cases other microstates had to deal with in the past. I do realize that the defniton will have a limited use. It
stll stands that for example Luxembourg has very litle in common with The Maldives except its populaton
size. Nevertheless will the complete picture be more clear.
7
The frst criterion I want to use to defne microstates is the size of its populaton.
Table 1
18 19
Value A B C D E F G H I J K L
Total 14 18 14 24 12 44 33 35 22 12 9 2
UN 0 7 7 16 11 40 32 34 22 12 9 2
Non UN 14 11 7 8 1 4 1 1 0 0 0 0
A < 10,000 G 5,000,001 - 10,000,000
B 10,001 - 50,000 H 10,000,001 - 25,000,000
C 50,001 - 100,000 I 25,000,001 - 50,000,000
D 100,001 - 500,000 J 50,000,001 - 100,000,000
E 500,001 - 1,000,000 K 100,000,001 - 500,000,000
F 1,000,001 - 5,000,000 L > 500,000,001
18 www.photus.com and htps://www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/ on 10.6.2010
19 In the category Non UN all territories, disputed territories and non UN members are included. Not included are the Arctc
Region and Islands without a permanent populaton.
8
2.2 Populaton
In Figure 1 we can see that most natons in the world have a populaton between the one and fve million
inhabitants. Obviously there are more countries that have more than fve million inhabitants, but to create a
balanced and just overview we have to separate them in diferent categories. This means that they are not
comparable. In my frst atempt to create populaton groups I grouped categories H and I together, forming a
group that stretched from 10 to 50 million inhabitants. However, it turned out that this group was too large
to derive any trend from it. For example Belgium (10,414,336) and Spain (40,525,002) would be in the same
group. Populaton wise, both dont have much, or even nothing, in common. A remarkable discovery is that
there are no countries with a populaton between 500 million and one billion.
The UN defnes a microstate as any state having one million inhabitants or less. Everything else is normal,
culminatng in a few real recognized large states. I dont agree with this because this criterion is from the
paradigm of being a large state. The startng point of the UN criterion are in fact states like the USA, China
and Russia.
20
But compared to those states almost every other state is small. That makes the grouping un-
clear and meaningless. For this reason I prefer to make an other division, because how can we compare e.g.
Belgium (10,4 million) and Botswana (1,5 million)? And furthermore we should make a separaton between
small states and microstates.
Because a populaton of one to fve million is the most occurring category, this will be the modus. From this
startng point one can conclude that countries with less than one million inhabitants are smaller than the
modus and countries with more than fve million inhabitants are larger than the modus. So how do we defne
micro in this case? Most countries with less than one million inhabitants have a populaton between 100,000
and one million inhabitants (categories D and E). There are 27 UN Members with a populaton between
100,000 and one million and 9 non UN Members, a total of 36. From this fact we can conclude that micro,
being smaller than the typical small, contains the categories A,B and C.
There are 14 UN Members with less than 100,000 inhabitants and 33 non UN members, a total of 47. Seen
what I concluded earlier, this argumentaton seems contradictng, as less than 100,000 is modus here. How-
ever one must take into account that were not talking about two diferent categories but fve. As we can see,
the biggest group here is A, countries having less than 10,000 inhabitants. However non of those countries
are UN members and only one of them is internatonally recognized as independent; the Vatcan City (826
inhabitants). All others are, according to the Montevideo Conventon, in fact no states, as they are not inde-
pendent but having a status aparte in the UN which labels them related territories. Besides this, there are
some disputed areas like for example Gaza and Dhekalia. If we take this into account, suddenly the categories
A, B and C contain only 15 countries (including the Vatcan City). We can thus conclude that, populaton wise,
a microstate is a state with 100,000 inhabitants or less. A state having a populaton between the 100,000
and one million inhabitants can be seen as a small state. Most states fall in the category of one to fve million
inhabitants. In Table 2 we have an overview of all states and territories that are a microstate according to
their populaton.
20 Baehr 1975, Small States- A Tool for Analyses? in World Politcs 27(3) p. 456 and further states that it is meaningless to
divide countries in categories because there are only a few states with real infuence on the world stage.
9
Table 2, microstates by populaton size.
UN Members Non UN Members
Andorra Akrotri Vatcan City
Antgua and Barbuda American Samoa Isle of Man
Dominica Anguilla Jersey
Grenada Bermuda Montserrat
Liechtenstein Britsh Indian Ocean Ter-
ritory
Niue
Luxembourg Britsh Virgin Islands Norfolk Island
Marshall Islands Cayman Islands Northern Mariana Is-
lands
Monaco Christmas Island Pitcairn Islands
Nauru Cocos (Keeling) Islands Saint Barthelemy
Palau Cook Islands Saint Helena, Ascension,
and Tristan da Cunha
Saint Kits and Nevis Dhekalia Saint Martn
San Marino Falkland Islands (Islas
Malvinas)
Saint Pierre and Mique-
lon
Seychelles Faroe Islands Svalbard
Tuvalu Gibraltar Tokelau
Greenland Turks and Caicos Islands
Guernsey Wallis and Futuna
The second criterion I want to use to defne microstates is the one of territory size. This criterion is in my
opinion rather under appreciated, but nevertheless from a vital importance. For example, Monaco has far
less inhabitants than Singapore. But if we look at their size of territory they might have much in common on
an administratve level (obviously Singapore on a larger scale). Furthermore both can be qualifed as city
states meetng the same challenges and advantages typical for these kind of states. In the following fgure,
the used data is in square kilometres and contains the landmass only. This to create a reliable overview. If
you would use the Exclusive Economic Zone (later on EEZ
21
) in creatng datasets, the overview would be false
as many small island are microstates and ofen have large EEZs. For example, Kiribats habitable area is 811
square kilometre, while its EEZ is an astonishing 3.55 million square kilometres!
22

21 The EEZ is mostly regarded to as exclusive natonal sea rights
22 htp://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacifc/Kiribat.php on 14.6.2010
10
2.3 Territory size and geography
2.3.1 Territory size
Figure 2
Table 3
23
Value A B C D E F G H I J
Total 58 8 6 38 23 55 23 22 5 1
UN 24 5 4 34 22 54 22 21 5 1
Non UN 34 3 2 4 1 1 1 1 0 0
A < 1,000 F 100,001 - 500,000
B 1,001 - 5,000 G 500,001 - 1,000,000
C 5,001 - 10,000 H 1,000,001 - 5,000,000
D 10,001 - 50,000 I 5,000,001 - 10,000,000
E 50,001 - 100,000 J > 10,000,000
As we can see here, in Figure 2, there are two groups scoring signifcantly higher than the others; territories
with less then 1,000 square kilometre and the group of territories between 100,000 and 500,000 square kilo-
metre. If we would take the Total graph as reference, the group of 1,000 square kilometre and less would
23 In the category Non UN all territories, disputed territories and non UN members are included. Not included is the Arctc
Region and the Islands without a permanent populaton.
11
be narrowly the modus (58 versus 55). However this would create a false image of the reality because in this
group are a lot of territories not regarded as independent. From this group actually not less than 33 territo-
ries are not independent countries but, for example so called overseas territories
24
etcetera. The Vatcan
City is the only state being independent without being member of the UN
25
. So if we take the UN graph as a
startng point, adding Vatcan City to group A, we get a far more just concepton of reality as group F is the
modus. So every state or territory larger then 500,000 square kilometre can be seen as large, all states and
territories smaller than 100,000 square kilometre can be seen as small. All countries that have 10,000 square
kilometre habitable territory or less, can be seen as microstates. In concluding this, I reject the criterion set
by some authors like Sidiropoulos (2009), who argues that 1,000 square kilometre or less is the criterion for
microstates. It is evident to see why he argues that, because of the great number of territories in this catego-
ry. But again, most of them are not recognized as independent by the UN. Afer correctng the numbers with
the not independent territories, 25 recognized states fall in group A. But taking A as the point of departure,
this would for example exclude Luxembourg and Samoa of being a microstate. Taking the UN graph as refer-
ence we can see that group D (10,000-50,000 Km2) is the modus for small countries. In conclusion, territory
size wise, states with a 10,000 square kilometre or less are microstates. In Table 4 an overview of all states
and territories that are a microstate according to their territory size.
Table 4, microstates by territory size.
UN Members Non UN Members
Andorra Monaco American Samoa Jersey
Antgua and Barbuda Nauru Anguilla Macau
Bahamas, The Palau Aruba Mayote
Barbados Saint Kits and Nevis Bermuda Montserrat
Brunei Saint Lucia Britsh Indian Ocean Ter-
ritory
Netherlands Antlles
Cape Verde Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Britsh Virgin Islands Niue
Comoros Samoa Cayman Islands Norfolk Island
Cyprus San Marino Christmas Island Northern Mariana Is-
lands
Dominica Sao Tome and Principe Cocos (Keeling) Islands Pitcairn Islands
Gambia, The Seychelles Cook Islands Puerto Rico
Grenada Singapore Faroe Islands Saint Barthelemy
Kiribat Tonga Frech Polynesia Saint Helena, Ascension,
and Tristan da Cunha
Liechtenstein Trinidad and Tobago Gaza Strip Saint Martn
Luxembourg Tuvalu Gibraltar Saint Pierre and Mique-
lon
Maldives Guernsey Tokelau
Malta Vatcan City Turks and Caicos Islands
Marshall Islands Hong Kong Virgin Islands
24 E.g. the Dutch Antlles and Aruba or the Falkland Islands.
25 The Holy See is the authority of the Vatcan but no state, The Vatcan has a state with no authority.
12
UN Members Non UN Members
Mauritus Isle of Man Wallis and Futuna
Micronesia, Federal
States of
Jan Mayen West Bank
Another important factor is the geography of Microstates. With the geography I not only mean to talk about
width, length and size of the state but, maybe even more important, about the situaton. Both territory size
and locaton are closely related to (the size of) populaton, economic growth and strategic value. The site of
a naton is how its geographical positon is. The situaton of a naton is how the site is cultvated. The site
determines to a certain extend the cultvaton of a naton or territory. Sidiropoulos distnguishes fve types
of sites, namely:
Territories with no exit to the sea (e.g. Andorra)
Territories with exit to sea (e.g. Brunei)
Peninsular territories (e.g. Qatar)
Islands (e.g. Nauru)
Island complexes (e.g. Maldives)
In defning situatons Sidiropoulos defnes three categories:
City (Monaco)
Agglomeraton (Singapore)
Region (Hong Kong)
If we look only at the territory size as criteria in determining microstates we can conclude that most micro-
states are either islands or island complexes and are situated as a region. Obviously site and situaton cant
be criteria, but we can use it in subdividing microstate to create a beter cohesion of the group microstates if
we can classify microstates according to their site and situaton. Thus it will be possible to use one microstate
as an example in order to, for example, predict the future for another microstate. Regarding these specifc
characteristcs, I tend to conclude that these are historical determined. Of course it is more logical to stay
independent for a small island in the midst of the pacifc (e.g. Nauru) than for small countries surrounded by
stronger states (e.g. the German Kleinstaaterei ). You might be able to conclude that for being a microstate
it is necessary to be a litle bit isolated in order to stay independent. Of course there are some exceptons like
e.g. Monaco or Vatcan City, but they stayed independent by the grace of their neighbours.
13
2.3.2 Geography
Weve seen in the past sectons how big the populaton of a typical microstate is and how vast the territory
of a typical microstate is. So what does the government of a typical microstate look like? We already noted in
the introducton of this paper that theres a difculty when it comes to the interpretaton of the term state.
Many of the perceived microstates in todays literature are an abundant mix of independent states, overseas
territories, related territories and disputed territories. In order to keep things clear I will give an overview per
microstate variant on behalf of its governmental form.
There are 34 independent microstates at the moment. In Table 5 an overview of the independent states,
their government form, and rankings concerning politcal and civil freedom.
Table 5
26

27

28

29
State Government Style Specifed PR CR FR
Andorra* Parliamentary Democracy MC 1 1 1
Antgua and Barbuda* Parliamentary Democracy M 2 2 2
Bahamas, The* Parliamentary Democracy M 1 1 1
Barbados* Parliamentary Democracy M 1 1 1
Brunei Islamic Absolute Monarchy - 6 5 5.5
Cape Verde* Republic M 1 1 1
Comoros* Federal Republic MC 3 4 3.5
Cyprus* Presidental Republic C 1 1 1
Dominica* Parliamentary Republic M 1 1 1
Gambia, The Republic - 5 4 4.5
Grenada* Parliamentary Democracy M 1 2 1.5
Kiribat* Republic MC 1 1 1
Liechtenstein* Parliamentary Democracy MC 1 1 1
Luxembourg* Parliamentary Democracy MC 1 1 1
Maldives Presidental Republic - 4 4 4
Malta* Parliamentary Republic M 1 1 1
Marshall Islands* Democratc Presidental
Republic
M 1 1 1
Mauritus* Parliamentary Republic MC 1 2 2
Micronesia, Federal States of* Democratc Federated Presi-
dental Republic
C 1 1 1
Monaco* Consttutonal Monarchy MC 2 1 1.5
Nauru* Parliamentary Republic M 1 1 1
Palau (Belau)* Democratc Presidental
Republic
C 1 1 1
26 States are according to the Populaton and Territory Size criteria. See chapter 2.2 and 2.3
27 Government Style according to www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/ on 15.6.2010
28 Government Style Specifed according to Anckar 2008, p72. In Italic own observaton.
29 PR, CR and FR according to www.freedomhouse.org on 15.6.2010
14
2.4 Goverment Style
2.4.1 Independent microstates
State Government Style Specifed PR CR FR
Saint Kits and Nevis* Parliamentary Democracy M 1 1 1
Saint Lucia* Parliamentary Democracy M 1 1 1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines* Parliamentary Democracy M 2 1 1.5
Samoa* Parliamentary Republic M 2 2 2
San Marino* Parliamentary Republic M 1 1 1
Sao Tome and Principe* Democratc Semi Presiden-
tal Republic
MC 2 2 2
Seychelles* Republic C 3 3 3
Singapore Parliamentary Republic - 5 4 4.5
Tonga Consttutonal Monarchy - 5 3 4
Trinidad and Tobago* Parliamentary Republic M 2 2 2
Tuvalu* Parliamentary Democracy M 1 1 1
Vatcan City Ecclesiastcal Sacerdotal
Monarchy
NA NA NA NA
Explanaton of abbreviatons in Table 5:
Abbreviaton Explanaton
* Electve Democracy
M Majority Rule
C Consensus Rule
PR Politcal Rights
CR Civil Rights
FR Freedom Rate
Value explanaton Table 5:
The values for PR, CR and FR are based on an incremental scale. A value of 1 representng the most free and
a value of 7 being the least free ratng.
Table 5 shows us that by far most microstates are well executed democratc states. They score, with four
exceptons all higher than a 3 in the freedom rate category and are thus listed as free countries according to
Freedom House
30
. In most cases, six exceptons here, politcal and civil rights are well insttuted and guaran-
teed. We can conclude from this that a typical microstate is an electve democracy in which politcal and civil
rights are of high standard.
When we take a closer look at the governmental form of the electve democratc microstates we can see two
trends;
Most democracies are Parliamentary Democracies (11) and,
Most democracies are majority ruled. (16)
How come most microstates are parliamentary democracies, and how come most of them are majority
30 Freedom House is an internatonal non-governmental organizaton based in Washington, D.C. that conducts research and
advocacy on its conceptons of democracy, politcal freedom and human rights.
15
ruled? Several studies indicate that microstates are more eager to maintain democracy than large countries.
Ot, Clague, Gleason, Knack, Diamond and Tsalik
31
all conclude in various studies over more than 20 years
tme that size is positvely related to democracy. Anckar therefore concludes that small countries are more
prone than larger countries to hold democracy in high esteem. (Anckar 2008). Alesina and Spolaore give an
economic reason why small countries have fewer dictatorships than large countries. A dictator, or to use a
Hobbesian term, a Leviathan
32
seeks maximum rent for his or her own beneft instead of natonal beneft. A
larger country gives more interest than a small country, therefore by their nature smaller countries are less
atractve to become a dictatorship as they will be more difcult, if not impossible, to be self sustaining, let
alone create proft for the Leviathan.
33
The explanaton given by Alesina and Spolare is, although plausible,
not totally feasible as it does not take the personality of a Leviathan into account. Afer all, any country, big
or small, can originate a potental dictator. So, best you can say is that a totalitarian system based in a small
country has very litle chance of survival.
A reason why the populaton of microstates are more cohesive is also found in economics. Maybe the micro-
states are more cohesive as they are less multform in their populaton structure. For example, in Monaco
almost every citzen is rich and politcally right orientated. And (not by chance) its almost impossible to
become a citzen of Monaco if you are not very rich. On the other hand we see the opposite happening in
poor microstates: nobody wants to become a citzen as theres nothing to get. This is also supported by sta-
tstcs, specially the Pacifc microstates have to deal with an increasing part of the populaton living abroad.
Having explained why smaller countries are more likely to be a democracy we can take a look at the form of
democracy.
One can argue that in small communites its more likely that there is more consensus on issues and therefore
a majority rule. However, on the contrary one could argue that in small communites difuse points of view
are more likely to polarize. Anckar concludes in his artcle Microstate Democracy: Majority or Consensus:
Difusion or Problem-Solving that majority democracies in most cases have a Britsh Colonial past. There-
fore they simply succeed the Britsh majoritarian model, based on the Westminster model.
34
This indicates
that majority democracy is not so much the result of the size of microstates as well as their past. Indeed,
when we take a look at the democratc microstates (Cyprus, Micronesia, Palau, Seychelles) that are not ma-
jority ruled, we can see that non of them where a Britsh Colony in the past.
Most of the microstates that have a mix of majority and consensus are the traditonal European microstates;
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Monaco. The combinaton is explained as most of them stll have a
traditonal dynasty that has politcal powers, combined with a government formed by a mult party system.
In my point of view, this is all explained by history.
31 Anckar 2008 p67 and further
32 Hobbes 1655, Leviathan
33 Alesina & Spolaore 2005, Chapter 5
34 Anckar 2008, p76
16
The most difcult Montevideo Conventon criteria to fulfl are the criteria of sovereign government and the
ability to maintain relatons with fellow states. Remarkable is that, if we only use populaton and territory
size as criteria and leave out the other criteria most overseas, related and disputed territories can be seen
as microstates. Up to an astonishing 43 microstates are not independent states. In categorizing those states
we can derive two groups; Non-Self-Governing territories that are totally governed by their administering
country, the other group is indicated by the Freedom House as Related Territories. Those territories are not
independent but they do have some level of self governance. I must note here that Freedom House only
notes Hong Kong and Puerto Rico as related territories. However, the UN has removed them, and other ter-
ritories from the list of Non-Self-Governing territories. But the removal has other reasons then independence
as they are not really independent (e.g. Hong Kong, Puerto Rico etc.). Therefore we can conclude that those
territories that did not gain independence, or merged with other dependent or independent territories can
be listed as related territories (for example, Macau has the same status as Hong Kong within the PRC).
Table 6 shows all the microstates who arent independent, but who are neither Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries (later on NSG Territories). In imitaton of the Freedom House I will call those microstates Related Territo-
ries. In Table 7 I give an overview of all those microstates that are Non-Self-Governing. This means that they
have no form of self governance, with excepton of some local politcs, ofen in tribal form. Table 8 lists the
microstates that are marked as disputed territories.
Table 6
35
, Related Territories
Territory Status
Aruba Consttuent country of The Netherlands
Cook Islands Sovereign State in free associaton with New Zealand
French Establishments in Oceania* Overseas Collectvity of France
Greenland Home Rule in community with Denmark
Hong Kong Special Administratve Region of the PRC
Macau Special Administratve Region of the PRC
Netherlands Antlles Consttuent country of The Netherlands
Niue Sovereign State in free associaton with New Zealand
Puerto Rico Unincorporated organized commonwealth of the USA
Saint Pierre and Miquelon Overseas Collectvity of France
Cocos (Keeling) Islands Federal Consttutonal Monarchy
Northern Mariana Islands Commonwealth in politcal union with the USA
Faroe Islands Parliamentary Democracy within the Kingdom of Denmark
Guernsey Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom
Isle of Man Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom
Jersey Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom
Norfolk Islands Self-governing territory with Australia
Saint Barthelemy Overseas Collectvity of France
35 htp://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonizaton/trust2.htm on 17.6.2010
17
2.4.2 Overseas, related and disputed territories
Territory Status
Saint Martn Overseas Collectvity of France
* French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna
Table 7
36
, Non-Self-Governing Territories
Territory Administraton
American Samoa United States of America
Anguilla United Kingdom
Bermuda United Kingdom
Britsh Virgin Islands United Kingdom
Cayman Islands United Kingdom
Falkland Islands United Kingdom
Gibraltar United Kingdom
Guam United States of America
Montserrat United Kingdom
New Caledonia France
Pitcairn Islands United Kingdom
Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha United Kingdom
Tokelau New Zealand
Turks and Caicos Islands United Kingdom
Virgin Islands United States of America
Britsh Indian Ocean Territory United Kingdom
Christmas Island Australia
Akrotori United Kingdom
Dhekalia United Kingdom
Mayote France
Svalbard Norway
Table 8
37
, Disputed Territories
Territory Status
Gaza Strip Occupied or disputed territory
Westbank Occupied or disputed territory
A narrow majority of non independent microstates are internatonally seen as Non-Self-Governing-Territo-
ries (21), 19 non independent microstates are Related Territories as they enjoy a great form of independ-
ence. Two microstates are disputed territory, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Depending on who you ask
they are either occupied by Israel or disputed land. The author feels that it is not necessary to go into detail
regarding this mater as it does not add to this essay. Note worthy is though, that some of the NSG Territories
are also disputed, the Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas, being famous. Of course its not necessary for a
dispute to be ofcially registered as a dispute.
36 htp://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonizaton/trust3.htm on 17.6.2010
37 htps://www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/felds/2070.html on 17.6.2010
18
In conclusion, regarding microstate governance, we can say that a majority of microstates are fully, or to a
large extend, independent states. Most of those states are electoral majority democracies with a Britsh Colo-
nial past. The microstates that are not fully independent are in most cases NSG Territories, administrated by
their home country. A remarkable outcome of the tables is that most NSG Territories are under Britsh Rule,
underlining the great imperial past of Britain and its former world power.
There is a lot to do about microstate economy. How do such small sized countries, with virtually no natural
resources, ofen situated in deserted parts of the worlds survive? Besides this there is ofen (but for sure not
always) a small natve populaton with an arreage in knowledge. I will frst take a look at the GDP per capita
PPP of microstates. Following I will describe the economical compositon of microstates in which I will also
address the phenomena of the illustrious tax havens.
The frst thing we immediately note from Table 9 is that from the top 10 richest countries in the world, an
astonishing six countries can be classifed as microstates. Observing this, we can already conclude that appar-
ently being small in territory and populaton is not necessarily, unlike one might expect, a disadvantage when
aiming at the biggest wealth for the populaton.
38
Neither is the lack of natural resources.
Table 9
39
Rank Country GDP - per capita (PPP) (USD)
1 Liechtenstein 118,000
2 Qatar 85,600
3 Luxembourg 79,600
4 Bermuda 69,900
5 Jersey 57,000
6 Norway 54,900
7 Brunei 54,400
8 Kuwait 54,300
9 Singapore 48,500
10 United States of America 46,300
When we take a look at Table 10 and 11 we can observe that there are more non independent microstates
that have a GDP of >$10,000 per capita then independent states. However the highest GDP per Capita in
the Non UN Members group (Bermuda, $69,900) is only a litle higher than half of the GDP of the highest
GDP per capita in the UN Members group (Liechtenstein $118,000). What we can further notce, is the vast
diferences in between microstate GDPs, among UN Members as well as Non UN Members, in total ranging
from $118,000 (Liechtenstein) to a poor $1000 (Tokelau), a gap of an astonishing 118 tmes! So, although
smallness is not necessarily a hiccup in making a naton wealthy, its not an advantage either.
40
There must
38 Armstrong, Kervenoael, Li & Read 1998, p655
39 htp://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=10&v=67&l=en on 21.6.2010
40 Milner & Westaway 1993, in Armstrong, Kervenoael & Li 1998, p642
19
2.5 Economy
be another explanaton for it.
Table 10
41
UN Members GDP per capita (PPP) in USD
Andorra 38,800
Antgua and Barbuda 18,100
Bahamas, The 29,600
Barbados 18,500
Brunei 54,400
Cape Verde 3,400
Comoros 1,100
Cyprus 21,200
Dominica 9,600
Gambia, The 1,200
Grenada 12,300
Kiribat 5,300
Liechtenstein 118,000
Luxembourg 79,600
Maldives 4,400
Malta 23,300
Marshall Islands 2,900
Mauritus 11,100
Micronesia, Federal States of 2,300
Monaco 30,000
Nauru 5,000
Palau (Belau) 7,600
Saint Kits and Nevis 18,600
Saint Lucia 10,900
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 9,400
Samoa 4,700
San Marino 41,900
Sao Tome and Principe 1,300
Seychelles 18,900
Singapore 48,500
Tonga 4,700
Trinidad and Tobago 21,500
Tuvalu 1,600
41 htp://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=xx&v=67 and htps://www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2004rank.html on 21.6.2010
20
Table 11
42
Non UN Members GDP per capita (PPP) in USD
Akrotri NA
American Samoa 5,800
Anguilla 8,800
Aruba 21,800
Bermuda 69,900
Britsh Indian Ocean Territory NA
Britsh Virgin Islands 38,500
Cayman Islands 43,800
Christmas Island NA
Cocos (Keeling) Islands NA
Cook Islands 9,100
Dhekalia NA
Falkland Islands 35,400
Faroe Islands 31,000
Frech Polynesia 17,500
Gaza Strip 1,100
Gibraltar 27,900
Greenland 20,000
Guernsey 44,600
Hong Kong 40,500
Isle of Man 35,000
Jersey 57,000
Macau 28,400
Mayote 4,900
Montserrat 3,400
Netherlands Antlles 16,000
Niue 5,800
Norfolk Island NA
Northern Mariana Islands 12,500
Pitcairn Islands NA
Puerto Rico 18,700
Saint Barthelemy NA
Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha 2,500
Saint Martn NA
Saint Pierre and Miquelon 7,000
Svalbard NA
Tokelau 1,000
Turks and Caicos Islands 11,500
Vatcan City NA
Virgin Islands 14,500
42 htp://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=xx&v=67 and htps://www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2004rank.html on 21.6.2010
21
Non UN Members GDP per capita (PPP) in USD
Wallis and Futuna 3,800
West Bank 2,900
It is here in analysing microstate economics we see the second chasm in defning microstates (the frst
chasm being situaton and site, see 2.3). Roughly one can divide microstates, based on GDP, in four groups
falling along geographic lines: American (Caribbean), European, African and Pacifc/ Asian microstates. It is
no coincidence that these groups follow a geographical patern. In his artcle Island Microstates: The Mi-
rage of Development (The Contemporary Pacifc, volume 3, number 2 1991), John Connel investgates why
development in microstates in the Pacifc (and Africa) underperform in comparison with European, and to
a greater extend (because of similar geographic conditons) American microstates. He describes the various
economic actvites a microstate can deploy in order to gain economic growth. When microstates became
independent, in the tme of decolonizaton, afer the Second World War, help and economic aid was aimed
at classical economic principles; If you wish for industrializaton, prepare to develop agriculture. (Lipton
1977, p24)
43
. This principle had been applicable for Europe during the 18th and 19th century and later on
for the newly independent states in Africa. However this principle did not work out quite as well for the new
independent microstates, who were with almost no excepton islands or even worse (spoken from a develop-
mental perspectve); island groups. The reason why promotng agriculture and industrializaton failed to suc-
ceed in island microstates are numerous. To name a few, remoteness, isolaton, small surface, lack of natural
resources, and an unskilled labour force. As the leaders of the new born natons and the aid givers (ofen in
form of a former colonial power) discovered the great problems in developing agriculture and industries, the
focus shifed to specialized producton (for example phosphate (Nauru) or woolen garments (Mauritus and
Tonga) however this lead to what is called The Dutch Disease; the economical monoculture resulted in an
unstable economy depending heavily on world demand. In case the global demand for this single product or
service collapses, the economy is almost immediately in great problems. In other cases of industrializaton,
raw materials needed to be imported. In exploring mining, the resources driving the economy are limited.
Next to agriculture, mining and industry we have fshery as an opton for microstate islands to develop their
economy. A problem with fshery is that most microstate islands have an autarkic traditon in which fshery
was solely a mean to provide food for the people, not for export or to be processed in other products. There-
fore, many microstate islands have an underdeveloped fshery despite their large Exclusive Economic Zone.
44

Another problem with being dependent on fshery is that there are only two ways to sell this product: either
fresh (with problems as distance etc.) or processed (with problems as the need for factories, skilled workers
etc.) The most successful branches in developing economy and creatng a sustainable and reliable economy
are in the servicing sector. Proved are partcularly tourism and fnancial services. In order to develop those
economic actvites a stable and well organized government is essental.
Prior to their independence in most Caribbean microstates the tourism industry was already well established.
However, in the Pacifc, tourism was seen as a bail out opton in case other means to set up a stable economy
would fail. It was feared that tourism would have negatve cultural implicatons threatening the traditonal
43 Connel 1991, p253
44 Fairbairn 1985, p82
22
way of life. (Lea 1980)
45
. The most successful business actvity employed in microstates is ofering fnancial
services, functoning as an Ofshore Financial Centre (later on OFC) or tax haven. This kind of fnancial service
is solely seen in Microstates on this very scale. Van Fossen notces in Small economies and Global econom-
ics that tax havens are enhancing sovereignty in small states while it erodes it in metropolitan states (Van
Fossen 2008, p4). This can happen because of the inerta
46
, or extantsm
47
of the internatonal system.
Once a small state or territory gained autonomy and independent powers, its uterly impossible to recall
these or take them away.
48
The impact of tax havens world wide is considerable large; Kashner published
in March 2007 in the Quarterly Bulletn of The Bank for Internatonal Setlements a report concerning the
external currency assets of banks in reportng ofshore fnancial centres. In September 2006, of all reported
external currency assets, OFCs accounted for about 26% ($6,9 trillion). Were talking here about 12 states,
whether independent or not, from whom 10 are microstates. The reason why these OFCs are especially so
successful in microstates is thanks to the micro in microstate. Thanks to their small populaton it is possible
to pass laws that favour rich multnatonals quite easy. On top of that the infuence of lobby groups, consist-
ing of large companies and wealthy individuals in a microstate are very powerful. Not seldom are politcal
leaders also the CEO or board member of OFCs. Despite internatonal critque on tax havens, the OECD ant-
tax haven campaign, was of litle success and in some cases the besieged microstates succeeded in reversing
measurements taken to stop multnatonals of what large states see as tax evasion.
49
Obviously the tax haven
business has a negatve infuence on the democratc system within microstates because of intertwining in-
terests. However, the people do not easily complain about this as it brings wealth and success to their state.
For example, for Guernsey it is known that about one-third of all graduates end up working for the leading
OFCs on the island.
50
Again, a crucial factor in setng up an efectve OFC seems to be, next to of course a
certain level of common development, geographic locaton. Oceania knows very litle successful OFCs and
partly this is caused by its remote locaton. This might change in the (near) future, as doing business and
transferring money online becomes more custom and the internet speeds are increasing rapidly, distance in
kilometres becomes less problematc.
The diferences between economic performances among microstates are huge, from super rich (Liechten-
stein) to uterly poor (Comoros). In conclusion we can see that the microstate economy is not very diverse.
Most employed economic actvites are special producton in mining or industry, fshing, tourism and fnan-
cial services. However, despite their limited economic possibilites, a rather large number of microstates
developed themselves to be the richest countries in the world, or in case of the Principality of Liechtenstein,
the richest of the world. Some problems caused by microstate economic actvites is that large states face
tax evasion by big companies with help of OFCs based in small countries. Thanks to the current internatonal
system it is not possible to take acton, or sufcient acton. As Armstrong, Kervenoael, Li & Read conclude,
the advantage of being small is impossible to quantfy as it would eradicate the advantage itself.
51

45 Connel 1991, p254
46 Baldacchino 2005, p40
47 Bartmann 2002, p371-372
48 Van Fossen 2008, p12
49 Sharman 2006
50 Van Fossen 2008, p12
51 Armstrong, Kervenoael, Li & Read 1998, p641
23
In this chapter I have opposed the UN criterion used to defne microstates and analysed the Montevideo
Conventon to determine the independence of a state. By statstc evidence Ive shown that a populaton of
1,000,000 people is neither accurate nor correct to determine whether a state is a microstate. First of all, a
state is not only defned by its people, the richest states of the world have a surprisingly small populaton.
And the most powerful state is not the state with the most people, the same applies for the state with the
largest territory. From these facts it becomes clear that populaton alone can never be the sole criterion in
determining whether a state is a microstate. Therefore more criteria need to be added. Secondly, micro im-
plies excepton. If it was not exceptonal it would not have been called micro, but normal or common. Using
populaton, statstcs show us that states with a populaton of 100,000 or less can be seen as a microstate.
Next to populaton we have territory size, as this heavily infuences the administratve character of a country
as well as its economic perspectve and security. Statstcs show us that we can conclude that states with a
habitable (as landmass) territory size of 10,000 square kilometre or less can be seen as microstates. Those
two criteria are the basic criteria one can use in defning a microstate. We then analysed governmental form
and economics. For the frst one we can conclude that microstates most likely are to be an electve, majority
ruled, democracy with a Western colonial past. This favours the statement that states with a small populaton
will tend to be more democratc as they have a more convergent opinion on the diverse issues that are im-
portant within their naton. Regarding economy we can conclude that microstates generally have limited op-
tons when it comes to developing their economy. Tourism and the fnancial service sector proved to be the
most successful and reliable way in creatng wealth. However, smallness in populaton and/or territory size
is not necessarily a drawback in reaching great economic wealth. The top 10 richest countries in the world,
measured by GDP per capita, contains six microstates. The service sector has lead to an illustrious phenom-
enon opposing large states: tax havens. The system of Internatonal law that should be able to fght those tax
havens is also the system that prevents tax havens from being shut down, as microstates are sovereign. Also
from our research we can conclude that the most dominant obstacles for a wealthy naton are to be found in
either a dysfunctonal government, a remote locaton or a lack of knowledge. These are the reason why some
microstates fail in reaching the average GDP per capita.
24
2.6 Conclusion
In the past chapter weve set up an outline in how to defne microstates. In this chapter we want to look at
how this works out in the real world. Afer all, microstates are dwarfs in a world full of giants. If we look at it
from a Realist perspectve, microstates are the ones to be eaten as they are small and therefore ofen very
weak. However they stll exist, and surprisingly, they have a rather large infuence within various internaton-
al organizatons. So, can we conclude that microstates are an omen of the dawn of the Realist era and prel-
ude a (more) Liberalist era? In the frst paragraph I will refect microstates against the (Neo)Realist and (Neo)
Liberalist perspectve in Internatonal Relatons Theory, using cornerstone literature. In the second paragraph
I will take a look at the foreign afairs of microstates. How do they shape their policy and maintain relatons
with other states, and what about internatonal organizatons? In doing so I will review the last criterion of
the Montevideo Conventon.
The Realist perspectve on Internatonal Relatons has been the most dominant theory since the Second
World War. Even though this theory didnt predict, or foresee, the end of the Cold War, many countries
contnue to form their foreign policy based on Realism, or one of its forms. Key characteristc of this theory
is that the sovereign state is the highest authority in the world, shaping an anarchistc world order in which
no state is bound by rules or laws other then the rule and laws it sets it self. The best way to summarize the
realist perspectve on internatonal relatons is with the words of Minos: Right, as the world goes, is only in
queston between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak sufer what they must.
52

In this quote it immediately becomes clear that internatonal relatons is nothing more but a global state of
anarchy in which survival of the ftest is the only regulaton. Taking this into account it is only natural that
Realist academics have spend most of their tme on studying powerful states, as they are the key players in an
anarchistc world society. There is litle literature available specifc on the role of small states or small states
as phenomena seen from a Realist perspectve. Annete Baker Fox was the frst to write on small states in
Internatonal Relatons. She wrote an artcle ttled: The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II. In
her artcle she examines the diplomatc eforts of small European states such as Sweden and Switzerland
in their eforts to remain neutral. Remarkable is that the size of a state is not as much defned here by popu-
laton or territory or economic power, but politcal power. In other words, a small state is a politcally weak
state. This startng point is characteristc for Realist literature on small states and microstates. Not the size
of any touchable fact counts, but the politcal strength is the measurement tool. Not surprisingly almost all
Realist literature on small states and microstates is writen from a large state perspectve, using large state
criteria to measure politcs. This is obviously biased and portrays in no way a just picture of microstates in
internatonal relatons. A Good example is found in the bundled paper Small States in Internatonal Rela-
tons. Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gsthl describe microstates in the introducton of this bundled paper
as those states whose claim to maintain efectve sovereignty on a territory is in some degree questoned
by other states, and [they] cannot maintain what larger states at any one given tme defne as the minimum
required presence in the internatonal society of states (...) for a perceived lack of resources. (Ingebritsen,
52 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War.
25
3. Microstates in Internatonal Relatons
3.1 Internatonal Relatons Theory and microstates
3.1.1 Realism and Neorealism
Neumann, Gsthl & Beyer (editors) 2006, p6). As an example they take the rejecton of Liechtensteins mem-
bership request of the League of Natons in 1920. According to the League of Natons (later on LoN), Liech-
tenstein was rejected because it had chosen to depute to others some of the atributes of sovereignty nor
did Liechtenstein had an army.
53
This way of thinking about microstates and the example of Liechtensteins
denied membership of the LoN perfectly illustrates the dominant Realist perspectve on Internatonal Rela-
tons (later on IR).
First of all when we take a look at the defniton of microstates we note that there must be some kind of terri-
tory dispute, and there must be a lack of minimum presence within the internatonal society as lined out by
large states, caused by a lack of resources. Specially note here that according to this defniton, it are the large
state that provide the guidelines. Further; the territory dispute is clearly not a conditon but rather a charac-
teristc. It is indeed true that microstates do not necessarily have more or less disputes then non microstates.
What we can see from the available data is that most of the disputes are about island microstates and either
involve fshing rights or an island or archipelago.
54
The second argument is defnitely a criteria as it touches
the very being of a microstate questoning the sovereignty of a microstate, taken the Montevideo Conventon
into account. However it is very vague what that minimum presence in IR is and who the larger states are. In
fact this is somewhat strange. If we see microstates as politcal weak states, are they then those states that
lack a minimum presence in IR set out by larger states? Are large states then states that are over-represented
in IR, and middle states the states that have the ideal presence in IR? Besides, is it in any way possible to
measure presence in IR in a quanttatve way in order to determine whether a state is sufcient present in
IR (the term minimum suggests that it is), as diferent states have diferent needs regarding Internatonal
Relatons. Lets say for the sake of argument, that membership of the UN is the minimum required presence
in IR, then it would be possible that the UN is able to prevent states from growing from micro to small. This
is illustrated with the same case mentoned above. By denying Liechtensteins membership of the League
of Natons, Liechtenstein stays micro, and therefore weak. This is a circular reasoning, as the microstate
cannot totally determine its own eforts to gain a beter presence in IR. More important in this case are the
reasons why Liechtenstein was denied. The main reason seems to be that Liechtenstein is not seen as totally
sovereign because it didnt have an own army and outsources several sovereign actvites. This brings us to
the Realist perspectve on the state. Webers conclusion best summarizes the classical realist percepton
of the phenomena state as he describes a state as a successful monopolist of the legitmate use of force
within a given territory. (Weber 1958).
55
This defniton explains why Liechtenstein was denied by the LoN.
It also becomes clear that states are perceived as sovereign powers having a monopoly on the use of force.
In being so, they together form an anarchistc world order in which they dont have to answer to any higher
authority (I dont regard the people (democracy) or a god (religion) as higher powers here). Ingebritsen, Neu-
mann, Gsthl & Beyer describe small (micro) states from a large state perspectve, elaboratng on the 19th
century view that small states are all those states who are not great powers.
56
If we elaborate on the Realist
perspectve on states, how come that anno 2010 there are stll microstates? Afer all, microstates will thanks
53 Gsthl 2001, p106
54 htps://www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/felds/2070.html on 23.8.2010
55 Weber in Alesina & Spolare 2005, p176
56 Ingebritsen, Neumann, Gsthl & Beyer 2006, p5
26
to their lack of resources and politcal power not be very successful in self preservaton (the principle of Self
Help, Waltz), let alone to endeavour world hegemony (Mearsheimer)
57
. It seems that realism doesnt really
have an answer to this, except for describing small (micro) states as weak states, which is prety much every
state except for the few on the top.
In number 3 of World Politcs volume 27 (April 1975, Small States: Tool for Analyses?) Peter R. Baehr wrote
an artcle in which he reviewed the book Probe for Peace: Small-State Hostlites by Edward E. Azar (1973)
and Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of Internatonal Relatonships. By Marshall R. Singer
(1972). In his artcle he disagrees with both reviewed authors and he fnally reaches the conclusion that
grouping countries based on size is futle. To make it even more complex, Baehr does see small states as pos-
sible disturbing forces within Internatonal Relatons if they succeed in obtaining Nuclear Weapons. So, while
he rejects the idea of classifying states to size, he does see small states as potental disruptve forces within
IR. The reason why Baehr rejects Small States as analytcal tools lay within his view on IR. In his conclusion he
writes: If all cars were black, as Henry Ford wanted, there would be litle purpose in studying the colors of
automobiles. If all states, with the possible excepton of two, are small, one might as well abandon smallness
as a focus of study. (Baehr 1975). Again we see that small states, microstates included, are looked upon from
a large state perspectve, resultng in small states being equal to weak states.
In a Realist world microstates are doomed to be conquered by their fellow bigger states. The microstates self
have too litle power and are not capable of defending themselves. The world allows the larger powers to
conquer the smaller powers as anarchy is the norm and a framework of internatonal law and treates does
not exist, or has no power. As microstates stll exist and are rather well protected by internatonal law and
treates we must conclude that the realistc view is at least not the truth. Even so, I would like to point out
that microstates are in line with Hobbes view on the principle of liberty, namely the absence of restraint
58
. As
Dag Anckar already argued, microstates are thanks to their small populaton bound to be more democratc
then other states. The fgures in chapter 2.4 proves this right. Here we see that microstates demonstrate a
realist principle.
The most important counter theory to Realism and Neorealism is the theory of Liberalism and Neoliberalism.
In this theory theres an important shif cognizable when it comes to approaching small states in research
and study. For the frst tme, small states are looked upon from their own perspectve, not from a large state
perspectve. Robert O. Keohane, together with Joseph Nye founders of the Neoliberal theory, leaves it to the
head of states themselves whether they reckon themselves to be a small state or not. In his artcle Lillipu-
tans Dilemmas, Small States in Internatonal Politcs he defnes a small state as a state whose leaders
consider that it can never, actng alone or in a small group, make a signifcant impact on the system. (Ingeb-
ritsen, Neumann, Gsthl & Beyer 2006, p60)
59
Key factor in this defniton is making an impact on the system.
Queston is; what system. From the artcle it becomes clear that Keohane allude to the politcal system. This
57 Mearsheimer 2001, p21
58 Waltz 1954, p85
59 Ingebritsen, Neumann, Gsthl & Beyer 2006, p60
27
3.1.2 Liberalism and Neoliberalism
is also second by a simple example from reality. Take for example Vatcan City; a true microstate in all facets.
It has a small territory, a small populaton and its recognized as an independent state. Indeed, Vatcan City
has litle weight when it comes to Internatonal Politcs, most countries couldnt care less if the Vatcan City
threatens to declare war on them. However, if we look at an economical level Vatcan City makes a huge
impact on the Internatonal System. Van Fossen describes how The Vatcan Bank (Insttuto per le Opere di
Religione or IOR) has been linked to massive frauds, tax evasion, politcal bribery, illegal arms dealing as well
as money laundering for the Mafa and a powerful neo-Fascist secret society. (Van Fossen 2008 p12 and fur-
ther). They also contributed to some of the biggest bank collapses since the Second World War. Vatcan City
has no direct power to infuence the (politcal) system on their own, however economically spoken they can
be of great importance within internatonal relatons and even internatonal politcs (during the WW II the
IOR supported the Nazi Croatan regime). Despite all the eforts to force Vatcan City to take responsibility for
the actons of the IOR, the IOR stll contnues their clientle as they are protected by the sovereign status of
Vatcan City.
Liberalism seems to do more right to the situaton of microstates then Realism and its variants. Whereas by
Realism the state is the main character, Liberalism also considers other factors that play in important role in
IR. This gives us the opportunity to explain why microstates can live without the fear of being over run by any
Leviathan that put its eye on it. It also explains why tax havens can exist and why Vatcan City is untouched
despite internatonal pressure. Liberalism seems to have adopted the new order of things within interna-
tonal relatons. Although, in the ultmate, a sovereign state is its own highest authority and restrain (see the
Second Gulf War), in daily life the relatons and actons of states are well orchestrated and governed by the
framework of internatonal law and order. It is in this framework that microstates can exist (see chapter 4)
and prosper. Therefore, liberalism has a more logical explanaton when it comes to microstates and is able to
incorporate microstates beter in Internatonal Relatons Theory.
This queston is rather hard to answer. Microstates today have proven that its not all about power politcs
and that the internatonal community are not that anarchistc as Waltz or Morgenthau thought. Large and
small states do obey the rules, set out in a framework of internatonal law. As Joseph Stglitz argued in the
Guardian
60
, war is bad for the economy, and today the economy is our world religion. Of course I do not ig-
nore or neglect the aspect of arbitrariness in the Realist theory. If a state is set on waging war, it will do so
if it can. With or without the consent of the Internatonal Community. Look at the USA in Iraq or at Russia
in Chechnya, to take a less used example. However, rather then seeing this as a proof of the internatonal
society being anarchic, I found it to be simply a given. When has domestc law ever stopped a murderer from
murdering? Therefore the reasoning of the Athens in the Penelopisian
61
war was not as much a descripton of
inter state politcs as well as a fnding of the fact that there are strong people and weak people in the world.
Yes, microstates are more prone to military atacks, some of them dont even have a standing army. No they
do not have to fear for their existence as thanks to advanced internatonal law and treates todays moto is
pacta sunt servanda.
60 Stglitz in the UK Guardian on January 22, 2003
61 Nye 1993, p8 and further
28
3.1.3 Does the theory mater?
What ever perspectve you take on microstates, realist or liberalist, microstates have to practce interna-
tonal relatons, and they therefore need ways to communicate their foreign afairs. Roughly this can be done
in three ways; via internatonal organizatons, embassies, and via communicaton channels (press releases,
state communiqu).

As we have noted several tmes in the past chapter all independent microstates with excepton of Vatcan City
are UN members and have at least through the UN the possibility to maintain relatons with the other states.
As the UN gives them an opportunity to lobby for their own interests and make their own needs known in
the world.
62
Next to the UN there are a number of what I shall name special interest groups for microstates.
Note here that these groups are not exclusively formed by microstates, but they represent a group that exists
of mostly or substantally microstates. Below a brief overview of the best known microstate special interest
group.
ACP, Africa-Caribbean-Pacifc Group of States. The ACPs main goal is to reduce poverty, create sustainable
development and beter integraton of the economies of the member states in the world economy. In prin-
ciple, the ACP is not a group exclusively for microstates. However, a considerable percentage (+/-30%) of the
members is a microstate.
63
AOSIS, Alliance of Small Island States. The AOSIS is a coaliton of small islands and low lying coastal states
that face the same environmental challenges. Its main actvity is ad hoc lobbying within the UN for small
island developing states.
64
The infuence of the AOSIS within the UN is debatable. Although they did book
successes, its the queston if they owe the success to their own eforts or to the circumstances.
65
CARICOM, Caribbean Community. The CARICOM is a platorm for the Caribbean countries, with an economic
eye mark. The Community aims to improve the economic conditons and relatons within the Caribbean
archipelago by creatng a free-trade zone and a mutual stand point on economic issues outside the Carib-
bean.
66
The organizaton could be seen as a Caribbean interpretaton of the European Union. The CARICOM
operates according to their own insights, taking the USA into account but not being controlled by them. This
is shown in for example advanced negotatons with Cuba about membership and increased cooperaton
with Venezuela.
PIF, Pacifc Island Forum. The PIF came to existence in 1999 and is basically the South Pacifc Forum now
allowing north Pacifc states to become members of the organizaton. The PIF is a politcal group aiming to
support and work with the member governments. They represent and advocate for the interests within the
62 Mohamed 2002, p26
63 htp://www.acpsec.org/ on 17.8.2010
64 htp://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/ on 17.8.2010
65 Betzold 2010, p11
66 htp://www.caricom.org/ on 17.8.2010
29
3.2 Microstates within Internatonal Organizatons
internatonal community.
67
SPC, Secretariat of the Pacifc Community. The SPC is an intergovernmental organizaton providing its mem-
ber states technical and policy advice. It aims to develop the Pacifc Community to a secure and prosperous
place and to positon the Pacifc Community with the internatonal community.
68
The SPC is seen as the major
intergovernmental body for the Pacifc states and has the same kind of authority and infuence as the CARI-
COM and to a lesser extend the EU.
69

Next to these organizaton there are all kinds of organizatons and cooperatve programs in which microstates
partcipate. The above mentoned organizatons are all of considerable importance within the internatonal
community. It is very hard, if not impossible to measure the exact weight and infuence of these organiza-
ton, and it would require another study to map their infuence. Most important lesson we can draw from
this observaton is that microstates understand the internatonal order, and use it as good as they can, to
their own advantage. Surprisingly, or rather naturally, the European and Asian microstates are not organized
within any kind of special interest group by and for microstates. For the Asian microstates, this is caused
by the issue of statehood. Brunei and Singapore are the only two independent Asian microstates and the
economic diferences (and government style) are rather large. Besides this both of them are (at least partly)
ruled by a totalitarian regime. As for the European microstates, the EU makes another special group otose.
Except for Cyprus and Malta none of the European microstates are a full EU member, although they do co-
operate and partcipate in selected areas of the EU policy. That microstates can be of great infuence within
the organizatons they partcipate in is shown by the case of Malta within the CSCE/OSCE. Although Malta
was at that tme the smallest and most southern member of the partcipatng states, it refused to agree on
the Helsinki Final Act of 1972. It insisted on staying outside a military alliance and wanted to add a Mediter-
ranean Chapter to ensure Maltas positon of EU (at that tme stll the EC) border land. Afer long and not
seldom heated negotatons (at the tme the deadline for the agreement was approaching, Malta threatened
to withhold consensus, triggering a furious reacton from the Soviet delegaton) the Mediterranean Chapter
was added and Malta agreed with the Helsinki Final Act.
70
We have seen that internatonal organizatons
are an important mean for microstates to maintain relatons with the outside world. Why will become clear
from the next paragraph. The advantages of internatonal organizatons are big, combined power and votng,
shared experience and costs and a sense of unity among each other.
67 htp://www.forumsec.org.f/ on 17.8.2010
68 htp://www.spc.int/ on 17.8.2010
69 AusAID, No 27, October 2001
70 Mosser 1999, p58-59
30
Except for being represented in an internatonal organizaton, or within a regional organizaton, a microstate
must maintain relatons with its fellow states on an individual level. As we already saw in the second chap-
ter, this might be rather problematc for numeral reasons. Just to name a few: lack of money, lack of skilled
personal and remoteness form serious barriers in maintaining efectve embassies. That embassies play an
important role in the sovereignty of natons is not only demonstrated by the Montevideo Conventon; Mor-
genthau sees the embassy as a central element in a natons natonal power, as the embassy represents this
power.
71
Ali Nasseer Mohamed, Assistant Director at the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of the Republic of the
Maldives published a research on this subject for The Netherlands Insttute of Internatonal Relatons Cling-
endael. His frst conclusion is that most microstates have some kind of shared past with one of the European
countries as former colonizer. This bond is especially strong among the former Britsh Island colonies in the
Caribbean.
72
The sense of unity among the Caribbean natons is rather strong as well, as some of them, de-
spite the USA embargo, established diplomatc relatons with Cuba in 1972.
73

The main problem in making an efectve foreign policy and maintaining embassies abroad seems to be
mostly insufcient knowledge and the high average costs per capita to maintain an embassy, as a microstate
has less citzens to share the costs with. Regarding the lack of knowledge, we see for example that most
microstates do not have an own Internatonal Relatons Insttuton of some kind. This means that the govern-
ment is dependent on overseas IR schools. In some cases this might not be much of a problem (the European
microstates have excellent access to the European universites), but in case of the Pacifc microstates this
might be a serious challenge. On top of this, the states that lack easy access to foreign insttutes to train their
foreign afairs staf are also those microstates that are rather poor compared to their conspecifcs in Europe,
Asia or the Caribbean. Therefore Mohamed concludes that the foreign policy in most microstates is more
based on the personal knowledge of a leader then on academic skills.
74
This development comes with some
serious weaknesses and can lead to serious problems. First of all the diplomats are less skilled, having less
knowledge and are therefore less powerful than their colleagues of other countries (only taken the training
into account, obviously the size of a naton and its internatonal reputaton play an important role too). This
creates imbalance when it comes to forming a policy or standpoint of the sending naton on a certain issue
or problem in the receiving naton or region. The fact that foreign afairs depend heavily on the personal skills
of the leader, or leaders, can be dangerous to democracy and lead to reckless risk taking as the policymakers
only reference is his or her own knowledge. These problems, or as you wish challenges, are translated into
the number and sort of representatons of microstates world wide. The Caribbean microstates maintain rela-
tons with their former colonial power (EU), the USA and Canada and, because some of them have large eth-
nic minorites (Indian and African descendents) with their descendent countries. For the Pacifc states we can
see a diferent patern; tes with the former colonial power, the large countries next door (Australia and New
Zealand) and the United Natons are the most important internatonal relatons. Remarkable is the strong
military presence of the USA in the South Pacifc that stll exists afer the Cold War. The USA grants large
71 Morgenthau 1993, p361
72 Mohamed 2002, p7
73 Sanders 1989, p420
74 Mohamed 2002, p10
31
3.3 Microstate Foreign Afairs
sums of money for development projects in exchange for (assumed) control over the defense and security
policy of the state (Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau). This relatonship is known as Compact of Free
Associaton
75
The foreign relatons of the African microstates are more complex. In the past theyve strug-
gled a lot with governmental form, and poverty reducton remains the most important issue in Internatonal
Afairs. In the past they maintained relatons with the former Soviet Union, Soviet allies and neighbouring
countries. Today its more of a mix and the USA has taken the place of the Soviet Union. Another shif is the
vast increase in populaton which caused that some countries are not longer seen as microstates (according
to the UN defniton, for example Botswana).
Having ascertained the difcultes microstates face when it comes to maintaining an efectve Foreign Afairs
policy and executng this policy through embassies we can see an apparent paradox in the study of Moham-
ed. On the one hand he acknowledges the lack of skills, money and the danger of personal infuences when
it comes to Foreign Afairs, on the other hand he also concludes that a microstate does not necessarily main-
tain less internatonal relatons compared to a larger country. As example he takes (naturally) The Maldives
which maintain relatons with 132 (!) countries. Though this might seem paradoxical at frst, it really is not.
Take The Maldives as example again, they only maintain 11 permanent embassies abroad (Australia, India,
South Africa, Canada, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, The Netherlands and the USA)
76
. The countries
represented in The Maldives are Austria, Bangladesh, China, Finland, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
and Sweden.
77
The average number of embassies a microstate maintain is about seven. This is extremely low
if we compare it to other countries in the world. No surprise that the United Kingdom (145) or Australia (85)
have more permanent missions abroad, but even the poorer countries in the world like Ethiopia (33) and
Sierra Leone (15) have more permanent missions abroad than the average microstate.
78
So where does this leaves us when it comes to IR theory and representaton abroad? If we combine Mor-
genthaus vision on embassies with Keohanes defniton of small states (see 2.1.2) we are tempted to con-
clude that microstates are indeed in most cases equal to politcally weak states. However, this would be a Re-
alist conclusion, from a large state perspectve. What is missing here is the desire to make a signifcant impact
on the internatonal system alone or in a group. Why would Palau, The Bahamas or Monaco want to make
a diference in the internatonal system? Not just a diference, but a signifcant diference? Isnt their nature
and with that their focus not totally diferent from countries like the USA or UK? Instead of the struggle for
being the most powerful, or most infuental, microstates are more focused on maintaining themselves and
creatng wealth for their own good. So where is the need to employ more embassies than they already have
at the moment? Smaller also means less concerns. A big advantage for foreign policy makers in microstates
is that they can permit themselves to be very specifc. They dont have to take a stand point on all issues in
internatonal relatons. Nobody cares what Nauru thinks of the Iranian nuclear power plant. For this reason
the goal of foreign afairs in microstates will have a very diferent, more specifc focus. The big advantage
75 htp://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/, htp://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/special/cofa_special.htm and
htp://dumpdc.wordpress.com/2010/03/17/the-compact-of-free-associaton-how-seceding-states-might-band-together/ on
13.7.2010
76 htp://maldives.embassyhomepage.com/ on 13.7.2010
77 htp://www.embassiesabroad.com/embassies-in/Maldives on 13.7.2010
78 Mohamed 2002, p15
32
here is that microstate diplomats dont have to go into every issue they come across, only the issue directly
infuencing them, or the region have to be addressed. Thanks to a smaller and more cohesive populaton,
microstates can aford it to be less nuanced and specifc in their foreign afairs policy.
Having said that, we must also conclude that in representng their own country in a receiving country, micro-
states do have a disadvantage because of their lack of skills and money. Even if it would be a given that all
states have the desire to make a signifcant diference on the internatonal system (which sounds surprisingly
Mearsheimer like), the best we can conclude will be that microstates are ofen politcally weak states, not
that politcally weak states are automatcally equal to micro- or small states.
Whether or not a microstate desires to maintain relatons with the other countries in the world depends a
lot on the size of economy and populaton. Mohamed shows in his study that economy and populaton is
positvely related to the number of permanent missions abroad. This is also supported by Plischke, East and
Watson.
79
We have to note here that Mohamed only researched the poorer microstates, which are virtually
all islands. If we take the European microstates in consideraton as well we see that despite their wealth
they do not necessarily have more embassies than their fellow microstates who are maybe less wealthy.
An exact study on the correlaton between the increase in GDP per capita and the number of permanent
missions lacks. Another conclusion we can draw from the fact that economy and populaton determine the
foreign policy of microstates is that the internal conditons determines the external behaviour, according to
the 19th century liberal view on Internatonal Relatons.
80
Obviously one can argue that the size of territory
and in some cases the site and situaton of microstates can be considered external factors, determining the
economic and populaton possibilites and therefore the states internatonal aspiratons. However, when
Ranke argued that external conditons determine the domestc conditons he was referring to diplomacy, not
geographical maters.
81
Once again we can see here that its merely the microstate itself, determining their
presence within the internatonal community. Not the larger states should be dictatng the minimum pres-
ence or how the foreign policy should be.
In the end, diplomacy is one of the strongest tools of statecraf that a microstate has to maintain itself and
to let the world know it exists. The foreign afairs of microstates aims on sustaining and profling itself rather
then to make a signifcant diference on the internatonal system. Therefore we can conclude that the foreign
policy of microstates is reactve, whereas the foreign policy of most states in the world will be for an exten-
sive part proactve. In some cases economy in the form of tax havens or tourism might prove to be more pow-
erful instruments than a specifc foreign policy. The foreign afairs policy of microstates is characterized by, in
general, a lack of skilled people and money, resultng in (from a large state perspectve) under-representaton
of the microstate in the internatonal system.
79 Mohamed 2002, p18-21
80 Waltz 1954, p85
81 Ibid., p225
33
Internatonal security is a mater of great importance, and its importance has only increased in the past dec-
ade. In the early tmes courage and conditon where mostly enough to stay independent as tribe or people.
In this way the Franks succeeded to remain independent despite the superior Roman army. In later centu-
ries we fnd other examples of small populaton groups that remained independent despite their larger and
stronger opponents. Today a naton can either develop a high tech army, according to the latest techniques,
or become an underdog, adaptng guerilla warfare. Only the mighty and rich countries have access to tech-
nique and modern weaponry. We see a good example of this in the 90s of last century. An allied force, under
command of the USA and UK was able to defeat the complete Iraq army, including the infamous Natonal
Garde within hours. And how about Afghanistan? The USA/NATO accomplished in a few weeks what the
former Soviet Union could not do in many years. The queston that arises, seen the developments in military
techniques and the examples, is whether staying independent can stll be guaranteed by own strength. Or
has it become a mater of the internatonal community, deciding what microstate stays independent? In this
chapter we will see that the military expenditures and eforts of microstates are virtual to nothing compared
to the other states. They do not guarantee independence in any case. Other factors, playing an important
role are internatonal law and treates that guarantee and determine the independence of a country. An
example we will analyse closer is the Kosovo case compared to the Osseta/ South Abkhazia case, in both
cases it were not the leaders of the regions in queston deciding on independence, but the internatonal com-
munity. We will also discuss the strategic signifcance of microstates. A case we will take a closer look at to
demonstrate the strategic potental of microstates will be the PRC/ Taiwan dispute and the changing strategic
signifcance of Oceania regarding this dispute. That the Pacifc states can be of crucial importance during an
armed confict has been demonstrated during the Second World War. I will conclude this chapter with some
general remarks on microstates and internatonal security.
When analysing microstate security it is inescapable to review microstate military as a sovereigns military
has been traditonally the power pre-eminently to defend and expand borders and interests. As we have
seen earlier microstates encounter a number of difcultes when it comes to foreign afairs and economi-
cal development. Both areas are obviously related to microstates military. The frst to determine whether a
microstate maintains an army and the use of it, the later determines the investments a microstate can make
in the army. To analyse microstate military I looked to the military expenditures percentage of the GDP PPP.
Obviously it will have litle use to look at numbers as microstates in any case have less soldiers (as they have
less populaton) than other states.
We can see a clear chasm here between the independent states and the other territories. Only some of the
independent microstates maintain an army. Except the state of Bermuda, no other form of dependent micro-
state maintains an army. Remarkable is that not even all independent microstates maintain an army. Some
have even forbidden the army by consttutonal law (Kiribat and Liechtenstein)! Other microstates have no
army but instead a police force taking care of the enforcing the law and defense of the country. For example
34
4. Microstates and Internatonal Security
4.1 Introducton
4.2 Microstate military expenditures
the Cocos or Keeling Islands have a police force of fve men. In general, in the case of non independent
microstates, the administratng country is responsible for the defence of the naton.
Another, unique, phenomena we witness in microstates military is the advanced cooperaton between a
group of Caribbean microstates, who maintain a joint army. This so called Regional Security System (or RSS)
is formed by the following countries: Antgua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kits and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Throughout its history the RSS has been deployed at
various occasions, as diverse as assistng afer a hurricane to restoring a government and the eradicatons of
drug related criminal networks.
82
The microstates who maintain their own, independent army, have a diverse patern when it comes to military
expenditures; as litle as 0.11% of the GDP (Bermuda) to as much as 5.50% of the GDP (Maldives). The aver-
age military expenditure percentage of GDP is 1.74%. This is 0.26 percent less then the world average (which
is 2%), which is as expected (even although some microstates are considerable wealthy, they have less ter-
ritory and people to defend and thus in any case less expenditures) . If we divide the total by all microstates
we get a totally diferent view, as most of the microstates do not maintain their own army. The percentage is
then a poor 0.42% of the GDP. This is for all, independent, overseas and disputed microstates in the world.
If we only look at the independent microstates we get a diferent picture. If we divide the total by only the
microstates that spend a given percentage of their GDP on military we have an average of 1.85%. If we divide
the total for independent microstates over all independent microstates we get an average of 0.87% of GDP
on military expenditures. From the 34 independent microstates only 16 have an outlined defense budget.
The others either rely on the military forces of their neighbours (this can be formal; Monaco and France, or
informal; Nauru and Australia). Other states either partcipate in the RSS or in other programs like the Free
Associaton Pact (USA in Oceania) and the OSCE (Liechtenstein). Only one non independent microstate (Ber-
muda) has an outlined budget for their own military.
We can conclude that microstates in general reserve a smaller percentage of the gross domestc product
for military expenditures. This is in line with expectatons as microstates have a smaller populaton and are
smaller in territory size and require therefore less personnel and material. Another important aspect is that
litle more then half of the independent microstates have no own army but outsource, or cooperate in their,
military aspiratons. From the non independent microstates only Bermuda has an own budget for military
expenditures. For an overview of the data, see II Used Data in Atachments.
As we saw in the past paragraphs, microstates in general barely have the means to defend themselves as
they lack an army. So, how do they maintain their independence if they lack the only thing that can guaran-
tee this sovereignty? At the end of the day, microstates exist by the grace of the internatonal community.
Today, no naton exists on its self, with maybe an excepton in the form of North Korea and Iran (although
even these internatonal outcasts stay in constant dialogue with the rest of the world, be it more in terms
of war rhetoric). Afer the second world war we witnessed a sharp decrease in colonial powers, and with it
82 htp://www.rss.org.bb/ on 19.8.2010
35
4.3 Existng by the grace of the internatonal community?
a sharp increase of the number of independent states. One could argue that the southern hemisphere was
reorganized in new born states. No surprise that amongst the newbies were many microstates. Those new
states did not have a stronger army than they have today and yet where independent. There are two reasons
found that explain the independence of microstates despite an army. First, during the cold war we lived in a
bipolar world with on the one hand the United States seeking to expand and contnue their sphere of infu-
ence and on the other hand the Soviet Union wantng the same thing. Microstates profted in an important
way of this rivalry. In his book Weak States in the Internatonal System Michael Handel describes how weak
states had direct infuence on the UN Security Counsel through their alliance with either the USA or USSR.
This provided them with several advantages that helped them sustaining their independence. First of all the
backing state supplied their allies with military material, mostly in the form of statoned troops and material.
Secondly, especially in case of the USA, the backing state provided the allied state of fnancial aid and much
needed development programs. Thanks to the military and fnancial aid microstates where able to ensure
their own sovereignty. In exchange microstates could not aford not to choose a side. Another downside
was also that only the microstates that where situated in the right place qualifed for help from either the
USA or USSR. Untl the Cuba crisis the USA was not concerned or willing to help Latn American countries as
they had no strategic value to them. Of course one could argue that as result of their alliance with either the
USA or USSR microstates lost much of their sovereignty as they lost control over their own security facilites
and were in some cases fnancially entrely depended on their backing naton. With the end of the cold war
in 1989 microstates needed new ways of guaranteeing independence as there was no longer a threatening
rivalry between two super powers. Thus the UN and its framework of internatonal law and treates became
more important. Already during the cold war the natons of the world came to a closer cooperaton on is-
sues as economy, security and law, be it divided in two camps (NATO versus Warsaw Pact). This convergence
of interests was speeded up afer the fall of communism. Suddenly there where no sides but the American
side. The result is the world as we know it today. The UN being the largest internatonal organizaton ever,
guaranteeing internatonal law and order, varying from a personal level to the level of statehood. Except for
Vatcan City, all microstates are UN member, and thus guaranteed a sovereign status. How this works in prac-
tce we already described in chapter 2.6 (Economy) in the case of Vatcan City and the shady practces of the
OIR. Without the UN and the vast system of internatonal law, conventons and treates microstates would be
outlawed, not being able to defend themselves, not having an internatonal platorm in which they have an
equal status to their larger neighboring states. Without the internatonal law and order as we know it today,
the microstates of the world would be a toy of the mighty like the Penelopesians where to the Athens.
83
Say-
ing so it must be clear that also the acts of UN are infuenced by the powerful states, without them the UN is
doing usual nothing. But thats part of another study.
Internatonal organizatons like the UN are of a vital importance to the sovereignty of microstates as they
are the strongest means a microstate has to demonstrate and advocate its independence. Next to these
internatonal organizatons microstates also group themselves in specialist groups to reach consensus on
certain global issues.
83 Nye 1993, p8 and further
36
Good examples are the AOSIS
84
, SPC
85
and PIF
86
. In doing so microstates bundle their power in forming a
stronger and broader represented bloc on issues in internatonal relatons thus practsing the saying to-
gether we are strong. That those organizatosn should be taken seriously, we will see in chapter 4.4 where
we will describe the strategic value of microstates.
A good example of the Internatonal Community determining whether a state is independent and remains
independent is Kosovo. Afer a sturdy decade (roughly from 1989 to 1999) it was decided by the majority of
the Internatonal Community that Kosovo would be recognized as independent state. However, not all states
(even European Union members; Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) have recognized Kosovo as
independent. Why this is remarkable, is because Kosovo declared independence way earlier then the other
states of the world recognized it. Stll Kosovo has a status apart on the UN listng. A recent confict underlin-
ing the decisive role of the Internatonal Community in recognizing and sustaining independence is the Os-
setan war of 2008 where the provinces South Osseta and Abkhazia, with the help of the Russian Federaton,
declared independence from Georgia. So far only Russia has recognized both states as being independent.
This example also shows the arbitrariness and bias of the internatonal community (and with this the cold
war past). The Kosovo war was in its nature not very diferent from the South Osseta/ Abkhazia war. In both
cases a minority of an existng state sought independence. The only (in my opinion) real diference was that
Kosovo extends the Western sphere of infuence whereas an independent South Osseta and Abkhazia
would have extended the Russian sphere of infuence. The Kosovo case and the Osseta/ Abkhazia case dem-
onstrates that the world somehow has become smaller. Neighbours decide whether they see you as equal. If
they disagree, then you are not a sovereign, not even if you comply with the Montevideo Conventon.
As microstates are small (whats in the name) its most normal to think that they are weak and therefore
have no signifcance strategic value. However, this is far from the truth. Throughout tme history has shown
us the important strategic value of small states and microstates. An easy example to show this is the well
known board game Risk, where there are always some small territories that are either used to get cards, or
to functon in a defensive or ofensive strategy. Microstates have exactly the same role. It is not possible to
summarize the strategic value of all microstates in one simple characteristc. Most of the strategic value is
determined by geography, but also the region. Obviously, European microstates have no signifcant strategic
value at the moment as Europe is at peace.
87
The strategic value of microstates can be looked upon from two
perspectves: that of the microstates self, or how the microstates make themselves from strategic impor-
tance, and from the perspectve of larger (neighboring) states. I will call the frst the actve strategic value of
microstates and the later the passive strategic value of microstates.
84 htp://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/ on 23.8.2010
85 Secretariat of the Pacifc Community
86 Pacifc Islands Forum
87 The critcal reader might debate this. As we analysed earlier, many microstates functon as tax haven, hostng bank accounts
for organizatons with a terroristc eye mark or criminal groupings. In this way microstates in peaceful regions are of strategic value
too. See for example the case of Swiss regarding the bank accounts of Osama Bin Laden.
37
4.3.1. The case of Kosovo retrospect the South Osseta/ Abkhazia case
4.4 The strategic value of microstates
The actve strategic value of microstates is mostly displayed trough special interest groups for microstates
and a united stand point on issues in internatonal relatons, votng along similar lines in for example the
UN.
88
United we are strong is the credo here. A good example here is the votng power of Oceania within the
ADB (Asian Development Bank). Together, Oceania ranks 9th out of 67 natons!
89
During the cold war we saw
a strong example of actve strategic value. Microstates where quite powerful within the UN. They infuenced
the allied power, and in this way indirectly had infuence within the UN Security Counsel, as the allied power
would vote benefcial for the microstate.
The passive strategic value of microstates is determined by the geographic positon and the situaton in the
region. Characteristc for the passive strategic value is that microstates have litle to no infuence at all on it.
The larger states, or super powers of this world decide how the microstate(s) will ft in their policy. Micro-
states are in this way ofen used as bufer states, forming a sphere of infuence that fences of the own country
in case of hostle actons. Other functons might be of logistc nature, take as example the batle for Midway
and Wake Island during the Second World War. Both islands where of great importance as defense of the
Japanese Empire and as supply statons for the United States. A key element in the passive strategic value of
microstates is that they somehow preserve a balance of power. Weber calls them Vacuums in a high pres-
sure area.
90
As soon as the balance of power is lost, the microstate will cease to exist as sovereign as well,
as the jealousy of the rivaling countries form the protecton of the microstates. The microstate itself has litle
to no infuence on this as they have no means to protect themselves. In a situaton like this it is always about
hard power. The protectng naton gives aid (economical, developmental) in exchange for controlled security.
Most microstates having a great passive strategic value are relatvely poor and underdeveloped. They are
mostly found in Oceania and on the African contnent. The passive strategic value of a poor microstate is
always dominant over its actve strategic value. Diplomatc support, or a diferent stand point on issues then
its fellow microstates can be pursued by larger states by rewarding the microstate with aid. An example of
this is shown below in the Oceania and the PRC/ Taiwan dispute.
Next to an actve and passive military strategic value microstates can also have an important economic stra-
tegic value. Tax havens are of greater importance since the global war on terror, thus providing microstates
with a new tool of strategic value. Afer all, thanks to their sovereign status they cannot be forced by military
power to give up their tax havens (see the OIR). Thus making the tax haven issues a power tool for micro-
states in diplomacy.
At frst sight the passive strategic value seems to create an equal balance between the microstate and the
great power; money in exchange for loyalty. However this is far from the truth. It is true that a microstate
could refuse the ofer of a neighbouring country, but this would seriously cripple the microstates situaton,
posing it to a serious threat. It is true that a microstate is not an interestng or desirable country to occupy
(small, no signifcant natural resources and not seldom remote), it stll is an opton if the great power feels
threatened by a negatve attude towards it. Therefore, as Handel notes correctly, microstates cannot af-
88 Captain Sea Sovereign Thomes, US Marine Intelligence in Engaging Oceania p99
89 Ibid., p100
90 Handel 1990, p176
38
ford not to choose sides in rivalry between two great powers. The image of a super power giving money to
a microstate in exchange for its loyalty is the image of a hungry cat petng a skinny mouse. There is nothing
equal in it. Another factor that emphasizes the negatve side efects of great passive strategic value is that
microstates (or basically any state) are kept in reserve. As mentoned earlier, it was only afer Fidel Castro
came to power in Cuba that the USA seriously began to invest in the Caribbean and Latn America.
91

An interestng case study displaying the actve and passive strategic value of microstates is a situaton hap-
pening right now; the dispute over Taiwan. I would like to stress that we will take a look at the positon of
Oceania without giving any kind of opinion or judgement on the PRC/ Taiwan dispute.
Afer the Second World War the USA has been the dominant power represented in Oceania. Either through
direct infuence, or via Australia and New Zealand. This hegemon positon seems to be in decline taken the
newest developments into account. The PRC is executng a full scale charm ofensive in Oceania to win the
hearts and minds of the Pacifc governments. Obviously the PRC simply is extending its sphere of infuence,
gaining in internatonal power. But also Oceania might be of high value in the PRC/ Taiwan dispute. So far it
hasnt come further then war rhetoric and the giving of or denying of aid to the other countries in the world.
However, if it might come to an armed confrontaton, the PRC will have to face the USA, in which case Oce-
ania will be of crucial importance to the USA military logistcs. If the PRC successfully turns Oceania in its ally,
the USA will have a serious disadvantage in interfering in the PRC/ Taiwan dispute.
Another, non militaristc side, is that most states that recognize Taiwan as an independent state are Pacifc
microstates. If the PRC succeeds to convert them, Taiwan will be confronted with a declining support for
its cause of independence. This case study shows us the diferences between the actve and passive strategic
value of microstates.
In this chapter weve analysed microstate security. What are their weaknesses and at what point can they be
strong? We can conclude that a microstate not automatcally equals a weak state. Despite their small size and
ofen lack of military power, a microstate can be of signifcant importance through extensive lobbying and
unifcaton of stand points on issues in internatonal relatons. Stll, weve also seen that when it comes to the
rumble of war, a microstate has to choose sides in order to survive. Afer it has made a choice, its survival
depends largely, if not entrely, on the will of its powerful protector. The strategic value of microstates can be
divided in actve and passive. Actve being the power to negotate and exploit the loopholes of internatonal
law by tax havens, passive being the bufer state needed to go to war or to catch the frst wave of atack.
91 Noteworthy is that despite the disapproval of the USA, most Caribbean microstates have diplomatc relatons with Cuba.
This shows that microstates are not entrely in the grip of the great powers.
39
4.4.1. Oceania and the PRC/ Taiwan dispute
4.5 Conclusion
In this literature research I aimed to describe and explain the existence of microstates in the world of today,
how they came to be and how they contnue to be. The queston being central troughout the research was
what defnes a state as a microstate? Weve seen that there are many opinions on as well the term micro
as the term state. I have tried, and succeeded, in forming a new defniton of the phenomena microstate
in which I looked further then one aspect of statehood. Ive analysed populaton and territory statstcs and
taken a critcal look at microstate governance and security and the place of microstates in internatonal rela-
tons, both in theory as in praxis. All what is lef now is to answer the research queston; what defnes a state
as a microstate?
The answer to this queston is dual. The frst possible answer is that a microstate is an internatonally as
independent recognized state with 100,000 or less inhabitants and/ or 10,000 square kilometre habitable
territory. Besides these criteria, a microstate have globally spoken the following characteristcs. Most micro-
states are islands in either the Atlantc or the Pacifc Ocean. Most of them have a government according to
majority democracy. Economy wise they are roughly divided in three groups: fnancial service (tax havens),
light industry and tourism. The frst two groups are usually combined with the last one, however the frst
two are seldom combined together. Most European, Caribbean and Asian microstate economies are based
on fnancial service and tourism. Most African and Pacifc microstates are based on light industry and some
form of tourism.
The second possible answer is the same answer as above with the diference that a microstate doesnt have
to be recognized by the internatonal community as being sovereign. In this case a state can be a microstate
as soon as it possesses self governance. The other criteria and characteristcs stay the same. This defniton
is the broad defniton, allowing us to do more quanttatve research.
Microstates are the living proof of the post old war society we live in. It is by the grace of the internatonal
framework of law, treates and organizatons that microstates exist. By their nature they are military weak
and ofen politcally disadvantaged. However, by bundling their votes and cooperatng in internatonal or-
ganizatons they are potentally strong voices that have to be considered by the stronger states in the world
regarding their foreign policy. Further have microstates proven that we have to move on from the realist and
neorealist perspectve. The world is not any longer as anarchistc as once Hobbes, Waltz and Morgenthau
portrayed us. In this world, not only the strong and powerful mater, the weak and small have claimed their
place and are to be taken into account. However, it is truth that when it comes to a confict situaton the role
of microstates is very limited and the few cards they have must be played carefully. Either they will form as a
bufer state or they are lucky and stay neutral, fulflling a role as mediator.
I am aware of the fact that this research is limited and at some points even arbitrary. I see both maters as
a given and instead of avoiding them I recognize them. There will always be a debate about the parameters
set in recognizing microstates, and I think this is a good thing. It makes us stay focused and let us think for
ourselves instead of blindly relying on what has been writen down. The queston that has been asked fre-
40
5. Conclusion and Recommendatons
quently, not the least by me, is whether it is useful to group states by their populaton and territory size. I
think that this research shows us that it is useful indeed. Obviously there are massive diferences among
the microstates themselves, to such an extend, that they seem to have nothing more in common then their
populaton and territory only. However, from this research it also became clear that for example governance
and foreign policy within microstates are executed along the same lines. Specially within the feld of Interna-
tonal Relatons one can see similarites that count for all microstates.
I would like to recommend the researchers and students afer me to take a closer look into microstate foreign
policy specifc. I briefy touched it in my research but as tme and space is limited, I could not take a further
look into that. Another subject of research that has captured my atenton, but which I couldnt look into
for the same reasons as just mentoned is the historical aspect of todays microstates. How did colonialism
infuence microstates and what are the main diferences between ex colonial microstates like the Pacifc
microstates and the microstates that where never colonized like the European microstates. Further another
subject that has caught my atenton might be more of a subject for students and researcher in the feld of
economics; namely microstate economy. In my research I came across the very rich microstates (Liechten-
stein) and very poor microstates (Comoros). What are the main reasons for economic success, and how does
a tax haven come to existence?
The last subject I would like to recommend for further research is not limited to microstates solely as it touch-
es the very essence of statehood. What is a sovereign state, and what is needed to be a sovereign state? Is
the Montevideo Conventon of 1933 stll sufcient or do we need to re-evaluate the whole concept of state-
hood? Take for example the earlier mentoned case of Tuvalu.
To conclude this research I would like to thank the people around me that supported me and helped me in
the progress of writng and researching. I would like to thank my professor, prof. Paul Furlong for his remarks
and useful indicatons. My friend and fellow student, Murad for the inspiratonal conversatons we had on
statehood and internatonal relatons, and not in the least my father, Master of (Internatonal) Law, Jurg van
der Vlies for his critcism and support at exactly the tmes I needed it most. Without these people I would
have not been able to complete this research. Thank you all. To the reader: I hope I provided a defniton of
the term microstate that will proof to be useful in real life, and not on paper only. I hoped I gave you a portrait
of what a microstate is and how a microstate exists in this world. I wish you well in your studies and research
and hope that this essay has been of use.
41
I Bibliography
II Used Statstcs
Atachments
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2010 Borrowing Power to Infuence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate
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2006 Islandness or Smallness? A Comparative Look at Political Institutions in Small Island
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2010 Engaging Oceania, Naval War College Review, no1 Winter, 97-106
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2001 IV Staatsvorming, nationalisme en natievorming in Duitsland, 18e-20e eeuw, Amster-
dam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Studies, University of Amsterdam
Country Population GDP - per
capita (PPP) in
USD
Land Area
- sq km
Military expendi-
tures - percent of
GDP
Akrotiri 15,700 NA NA NA
American Samoa 65,628 8,000 199.00 NA
Andorra 83,888 42,500 468.00 NA
Anguilla 14,436 8,800 91.00 NA
Antigua and Barbuda 85,632 18,100 442.60 NA
Aruba 103,065 21,800 180.00 NA
Ashmore and Cartier Islands NA NA 5.00 NA
Bahamas, The 307,552 29,800 10,010.00 0.50
Barbados 284,589 18,500 430.00 0.50
Bermuda 67,837 69,900 54.00 0.11
Bouvet Island NA NA 49.00 NA
British Indian Ocean Territory NA NA 60.00 NA
British Virgin Islands 24,491 38,500 151.00 NA
Brunei 388,190 50,100 5,265.00 4.50
Cape Verde 429,474 3,900 4,033.00 0.70
Cayman Islands 49,035 43,800 264.00 NA
Christmas Island 1,402 NA 135.00 NA
Clipperton Island NA NA 6.00 NA
Cocos (Keeling) Islands 596 NA 14.00 NA
Comoros 752,438 1,000 2,235.00 2.80
Cook Islands 11,870 9,100 236.00 NA
Coral Sea Islands NA NA 3.00 NA
Cyprus 1,084,748 21,200 9,241.00 3.80
Dhekelia 15,700 NA NA NA
Dominica 72,660 10,200 751.00 NA
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) 3,140 35,400 12,173.00 NA
Faroe Islands 48,856 31,000 1,393.00 NA
French Polynesia 287,032 18,000 3,827.00 NA
Gambia, The 1,778,081 1,300 10,000.00 0.50
Gaza Strip 1,551,859 3,100 360.00 NA
Gibraltar 28,796 38,200 6.50 NA
Greenland 57,600 34,700 2,166,086 NA
Grenada 90,739 12,700 344.00 NA
Guernsey 65,484 44,600 78.00 NA
Heard Island and McDonald
Islands
NA NA 412.00 NA
Holy See (Vatican City) 826 NA 0.44 NA
Hong Kong 7,055,071 42,700 1,054.00 NA
Isle of Man 76,512 35,000 572.00 NA
Jan Mayen NA NA 377.00 NA
II Used Statstcs
Country Populaton GDP - per capita
(PPP) in USD
Land Area -
sq km
Military expenditures
- percent of GDP
Jersey 91,626 57,000 116.00 NA
Kiribat 112,850 5,300 811.00 NA
Liechtenstein 34,761 122,100 160.00 NA
Luxembourg 491,775 77,600 2,586.00 0.90
Macau 559,846 30,000 28.20 NA
Maldives 396,334 4,200 298.00 5.50
Malta 405,165 23,800 316.00 0.70
Marshall Islands 64,522 2,500 181.00 NA
Mauritania 3,129,486 2,100 1,030,700 5.50
Mauritus 1,284,264 12,400 2,030.00 0.30
Mayote 223,765 4,900 374.00 NA
Micronesia, Federated States of 107,434 2,200 702.00 NA
Monaco 32,965 30,000 2.00 NA
Montserrat 5,097 3,400 102.00 NA
Nauru 14,019 5,000 21.00 NA
Navassa Island NA NA 5.40 NA
Netherlands Antlles 227,049 16,000 800.00 NA
New Caledonia 227,436 15,000 18,275.00 NA
Niue 1,398 5,800 260.00 NA
Norfolk Island 2,141 NA 36.00 NA
Northern Mariana Islands 51,484 12,500 464.00 NA
Palau 20,796 $8,100 459.00 NA
Paracel Islands NA NA NA NA
Pitcairn Islands 48 NA 47.00 NA
Saint Barthelemy 7,448 NA NA NA
Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tris-
tan da Cunha
7,637 2,500 413.00 NA
Saint Kits and Nevis 40,131 18,800 261.00 NA
Saint Lucia 160,267 10,900 606.00 NA
Saint Martn 29,820 NA 54.40 NA
Saint Pierre and Miquelon 7,063 7,000 242.00 NA
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 104,574 18,100 389.00 NA
Samoa 219,998 4,700 2,821.00 NA
San Marino 30,167 41,900 61.00 NA
Sao Tome and Principe 212,679 1,400 964.00 0.80
Seychelles 87,476 19,400 455.00 2.00
Singapore 4,657,542 50,300 687.00 4.90
Solomon Islands 595,613 2,600 27,986.00 3.00
South Georgia and South Sand-
wich Islands
NA NA 3,903.00 NA
Spratly Islands NA NA 5.00 NA
Svalbard NA NA 62,045.00 NA
Tokelau 1,416 1,000 12.00 NA
Country Populaton GDP - per capita
(PPP) in USD
Land Area -
sq km
Military expenditures
- percent of GDP
Tonga 120,898 4,600 717.00 0.90
Trinidad and Tobago 1,229,953 23,300 5,128.00 0.30
Turks and Caicos Islands 22,942 11,500 948.00 NA
Tuvalu 12,373 1,600 26.00 NA
Vanuatu 218,519 4,800 12,189.00 NA
Virgin Islands 109,825 14,500 346.00 NA
Wake Island NA NA 6.50 NA
Wallis and Futuna 15,289 3,800 142.00 NA
West Bank 2,461,267 2,900 5,640.00 NA
Source: htp://www.theodora.com/wf/ visited on 23.8.2010 & CIA World Factbook 2010