Journal of Psycli(ilii((y and Cliri.siianily 2004 Cliriitiun .

A,';soriarinn for Psychological Studies

2OO'l, Vol. 2.^, No, 2. 110-12(1 I.SSN 0753-1273

Resonance: A Model for Relating

Science, Psych^^logy, and Faith
VCarren S. Brou-n
Graduate Sch<X)l of Psychology
Fuller 7heolo,^ical Seminary

It Ls otten difficuli to be clear alunil i.-ithi.T ihf prcxesses lo engage in, or the final oiikomes to be txpecl-
ed. when altemptlng to rehile science and religion, or psychology and faith. Ttiis anicle presents tlie Reso
nance Modei as a metaphnric way to think about the processes and ouicumes o( these dialogues. The
Resonance MtxJel has the advantage of: (a) specifying a larger number uf domains of relevant information
that intist tx; lakcn into account; (b) suggesting what son of interrelationships can be expected; and (c) pro-
viding a formulation that is dynamic and suggestive of how to prcKeed. One example of a search tor reso-
nance is described—an attempt to relate a Christian anthropology to a neuroscientific view of human nature.

The problem of relating psychology and
Christian faith is a broader and deeper problem
(han much of the discourse in this area supp<xs-
es. This is because there is much more to con-
sider than the iwo domains of modern
psychological research and practice and the
tenet.s of historic Christian faith. There are also
various cultural traditions (societal and religiotis)
that must be considered, as well as the subjec-
tive experiences of persons. In addition, the
domain of infortnation that is currently most
detnantling of attention in our culture is science,
and particularly cognitive neuroscience. Based
on neuroscience research, mucb is being pro-
posed about the nature of persons that also
needs to he brought into dialog with Christian
theology. This article presents a model (or more
accurately, a metaphor) for understanding what
is nece,s.sary in relatirig science, psycln>logy, and
Christian faith.
What are we trying to accomplish?
Some o!" the confusion and lack of apparent
progress in relating psychology (particularly
neuroscience) and Christian faith is, I believe,
related to a lack of clarity regarding both tbe
process and llie ultimate goal of this dialogue.
With respect to process, when we are faced
with relevant information from a number of
cotnpeting sources, how can the authority of
these sources and the implications of their par-
ticular conclusions be appropriately recognized
Correspondence regarding this article should be
addressed to Warren S. Brown, Ph.D., Professor of
Psychology, Graduate School of Psychology, Fuller
Theological Seminary, 135 N. Oakland Avc, Pasade-
na,, CA 911H2,
and reconciled? What is the best process for
weighing the claims made by various fields, dis-
ciplines, and sources of authority?
And what should the final outcome of these
dialogues look likei" Shoiik! there be a set of
propositioas on which all .sources of authority
agree? Should Christian theology adopt without
modification all the implications of current psy-
chological or scientific theories, or should sci-
ence and psychology accommodate without
fLirther comment some version of Christian theol-
ogy? In these conceptual card games, who gets
to trump whom? If there is to be some blending,
what sort of a blend, integration, or correlation
should we expect to achieve?
This article comes out of my own need to
develop a perspective from which to work and a
model lo gtiide me in making various conceptual
and theoretical moves. I occupy an unusual aca-
demic position, and an appreciation of this posi-
tion can help the reader understand the
motivation behind the model I develop in this
article. First, I atn a research neuropsychologist
with an active laboratory. My students and I
.study the cognitive and psychosodal outcomes
of a cotigenital brain abnormality called agenesis
of the corpus callosum. Second, I am a professor
in a doctoral program in Clinical Psychology. All
of my students are training to be clinicians and
therapists. Third, I am a professor in a theologi-
cal seminaiy. Both my re,search and my teaching
occur within the life and academic programs of
Fuller Theological Seminary. Finally, my theolog-
ical and ecclesiastical roots are within the Wes-
ieyan tradition. All of these ideas and influences
impinge on my thinking.
As neiiro,science comes tnore and more to the
forefront in both psychology and popular cul-

110

tiire, it i.s not po.s.sible fur me to hide away in my
lab and work at doing good and important
research with my graduate students. I find myself
called to consider more deeply the relationship
between my field of human cognitive neuro-
science, wider domains of p.sycholog>', and ihe
Wesleyan nature of my Christian faith.
What follows is my understanding of what is
possible and necessar>' in relating psychology,
neuro.science, and Christian faith. I present the
Resonance Model as iny way of understanding
what must be accomplished and how to go
about relating these various domains of knowl-
edge and information. As a case study. I will
briefly outline the work I have done in finding
re.sonance between neuroscience and a Christian
view of human nature.
Methods of Relating Psychology and Faith
There are a number of diflereni nKjdels or
approaches to relaiing psychology and faith.
One approach (or non-approach) is what Don-
ald Mackay (1979, p. 29) has called "conceptual
apartheid"—keeping views from different
domains in watertight compartments so that
they can never interact. When functioning in
this way. we do uur best to ignore the contra-
dictor\' naiLire of informaticjn and implications
that exist within varicjus domains of knowledge
and theory, (^ne version of conceptual apartheid
would he a complete disintegration where one
believes something in one context with the
implication "A." and believes something else in
another context with the implication "not-A,"
without noting or being ccjncerned about this
problem. Some postmodernist thinking appears
lo endorse this sort of conceptual apartheid by
prestiming that we simply have two differing
narratives, neither of which has any obligation
to take account of the other. The idea that reli-
gion and .science are "non-overlapping magiste-
ria" (Gould, 1999) is a n o t h e r version of
conceptual apartheid. Some versions of concep-
tual apartheid might be better repre.sented by
the metaphor of an "intellectual gated communi-
ty," with walls, gates, and locks defending one
domain from the cognitive dissonance of having
to bother with information from a n o t h e r
tiomain. It is clear that other information exists,
bill one has constructed a defended position
that shields one from confronting potentially
discordant information from another domain.
The intellectual gated community overlaps
with another method for dealing with potentially
WARKEN S. BRCJWN 111
conflicting s o u r c e s ^ t h e choice of a farorite
indispiilahle anthonty. Whatever source is cho-
sen is presumed tt) iruinp any differing concepts
or ideas from other domains of information.
Influences between domains can only go in one
direction. The favored authority is not open to
pressure for reinterpretation from any other
source. Of course, this makes discus.sion quite
difficult between inclividtials who have adopted
different authority rankings. The heated and
seemingly Linresolvable debate between cre-
ationism and evolutionary science can be viewed
as occurring between groups who have adopted
different indisputable and unassailable authori-
ties, Certainly, examples of individuals who have
adopted indisputable authorities can be found
within both science (e.g., Richard Dawkins) and
psychology (e.g., h'reud). In the dialogue
between psychology and Christian faith, Biblical
Counseling (Powlison. 2000) and Christian Psy-
chology (Roberts, 2000) would also fall within
the orbit of this position, as does the position of
Collins (despite his use of the term "integration")
(Collins, 2(K)0). While on the surface the.se posi-
tions on psychology and Christianity may seem
to have merit as "defenders of ihe faith," they
implicitly assume that the Bible can be directly
and indisputably interpreted with respect to its
implications for psychology, the relevance of sci-
ence, the nature of persons, the events of cre-
ation, etc. However, if some form of
interpretation ot the Bible is, in fact, necessary to
answer such questions, who.se interpretations are
to be accepted as the trump card in this game?
And might not harmony with other domains of
Information help one choose between potential
interpretations of relevant Biblical material?
Particulady within di.scussions about psychology
and tlieology, lots of people talk al:K)ut integra-
tion. This term does not have a precise definition
and means lots of different things to different
writers. Nevertheless, most of these meanings
refer (at least implicitly) to an attempt to make
concepts from the two fields explicitly compara-
ble and, where possible, to combine (and. thus,
to integrate) theories. Carter and Narramore
(1979) describe integration as follows: "Genuine
integration involves the discovery- of and articula-
tion of the fomnion tinderlying principles of both
psychology and the Scriptures. It is this di,scovery
of the one overarching configuration or set of
principles that constitutes the deepest level of
integration, not sitnply lining up of parallel con-
cepts from two di.stinct disciplines" (p. 92).
112 Kl-SONANCK: A MODEL FOR
However, there are a number of problems
with this form of integrative a[iproach. As the
quotation from Carter and Narramore (above)
indicates, the term "integration" connotes an
attempt to force (sometime.s through interpretive
legerdemain) the discrepant sources to say
exactly the same thing so that they can be
shown not to be incotnpatible. However, there
are major differences between ttomains in their
presuppositions, epistemologies, and sources (JI
relevant data. Thus, attempts at integration ain
the danger of doing some degree of violence to
the epistemological integrity of various fields of
enquiry and scholarship.
Yet another way of understanding the relation-
ship between fields like psychology and theolo-
gy is the idea of "levels of explanation" (Mackay.
1979. 1991; Myers, 2000; Myers ^Jeeves, 1987)
-^a view sometimes labeled perspectivalism.
Here it is believed that physiological science,
psychology, sociology, philosophy, theology,
scripture, personal faith, etc., all provide descrip-
tions of human nature from differing points of
view. One way perspectives can differ is wiih
respect to the closeness or distance <;)f view,
varying from the more microscopic (e.g.. cellular
physiology) to the more macroscopic (e.g.. ,soci-
ology or theology). Another way information
about human nature can vary is with respect to
external observations versus internal subject
experience. Mackay (1979, 1991) calls these two
perspectives the O story" (observer perspective)
and the "I story" (subjective experiences of per-
sons). Mackay believes these points of view-
should correlate, but one should never attempt
to integrate them or to substitute one for the
other. Thus, within perspectivalism, different
fields are presumed to provide diflcrent views ol
exactly the same phenomena. While ihere
should be some correspondence or correlation
between the views, the views should never be
confused or substituted one for another.
I find perspectivalism more satisfactory than
others as a method for understanding the rela-
tionships between psychology, neuroscience,
and Christian theology. For one thing, there are
obviously more than two domains or perspec-
tives that need attt.'ntion and consideration. In
addition, within perspectivalism one can respect
differences between domains in methodology
and sources of data. However. I also feel per-
spectivalism has some significant limitations.
First, the idea of levels-of-explanation. with its
implications of hierarchy, has the potential for
trumping out-of-hand theories and ideas from a
"lower" level because they are not consistent
with a higher level explanation, or (in the case
of reductionism) presuming to give a better
account of theories and ideas from higher levels
by showing the micro-level "determinants." Sec-
ond, it is difficult to know what one can accom-
plish u'ithin perspectivalism that goes beyond
(he form of conceptual apartheid found in "non-
overlapping magisteria" or the differing narra-
lives of postmodernism. We need a richer view
regarding how to establish correspondence
between what is learned iilxjul human naiure at
different levels or Iroin ditfcrcnl j:)erspectives.
We alst) need a model tliat signals the dynamics
ot process in addition to ihc hoped-(<.)r outcome.
Tfje Wesle}'€in Quadrilateral
In the 18''' Century. John Wesley was faced
with is,sues of competing authorities in trying to
revitalize personal Chri.stian faith within the
Anglican church of his day. He wrestled with
reconciling the competing authorities of scrip-
lurc, Anglican theological tradition, his own per-
sonal spiritual experiences, and the dictates of
rational thought. He was also well aware of
developments within the rapidly atKancing sci-
ence of ihe Enlightenment. The solution for Wes-
ley was an implicit method thai allowed for
some arbitration and interaction between author-
ities. Wesley s apparent methodology has been
formalized and made explicit by Outler (Outler,
1985) in the form of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral.
From his various writings and sermons, it is clear
that Wesley presumed that four sources of
authority (Scripture. Experience, Rationality, and
Tradition) must be taken into account in order
best to understand truth about God, human
nature, the physical workl, redemptitm. holiness,
elc. For a further expianaiion see Maddox. 1994.
A geometric arrangement in \hv form of a
quadrilateral (sec Figure 1 for my representation
of the Quadrilateral) is mt^ant to emphasize Wes-
ley's recognition that there are different domains
of authority; that each domain has a valid voice
that must be heard and considered: and that
truth (such as it can be known) is revealed
somewhere at the intersection of these domains.
These concepts derived from Wesley seem to
provitie a feiiile starting point for thinking aboiil
the relationship between psychology, neuro-
science, and Christian faith, particularly in our
attempt to understand the nature of persons.

The Wesieyan Quadrilateral
Four Sources of Authority
Scripture
TRUTH
Experience
Figure 1. The Wesieyan Quadrilateral, the four sources of authority: Scripaire, Rationality,
Experience, Tradition.
Given that Jolm Wesley was an Anglican priest
and situated professionally within the religious
world of his day. what is to be particularly
appreciated in his implicit model is that there is
no attempt to disregard the importance of cjthev
domains of knowledge, nor to ignore the poten-
tial for apparent discrepancy between the impli-
cations of information from the different
dutnains. This way of thinking avoids proposing
a single, absolute authority that trumps all others
on every question (as in sola Sciiptura). but it
allows each domain to stand ba,sed on its own
integrity. This quadrilateral tiiodel, derived from
Wesley's writings, would be less likely to violate
the epistetnological integrity of the different
domains by forcing them to come io exactly the
same conclusions. Rather, the Quadrilateral sug-
gests respect for what each dotnain can know
tnost a.ssuredly given its methods and focus.
However, the Wesieyan Quadrilateral as a
model for relating neuroscience, psychology,
and Christian theology is incomplete with
respect to two i.ssues. The first issue is the
domains thai need to be recognized—-within the
current dialogue between science and religion, it
is better to recognize five primary dotiiains,
rather than four. Although Wesley would have
considered science a.s v\ithin the domain of
rational discourse. T believe it is more informa-
WARREN S. BROWN 113
tive in the current age to differentiate between
science and rationality. Second, the model does
not specify how the domains interrelate. (Of
course, the Quadrilateral is derivative from Wes-
ley's writings and, thus, one would not expect to
find tuuch specificity attached to it.) As a tnodel,
the Quadrilateral does not give us any guidance
as to how conflicts are arbitrated or how consen-
sus might be reached, particularly since the
methodologies and sources of information within
each domain are so vastly different. Nor does the
Quadrilateral hint at what a coherent resolution
(.)f information from various domains might be
like. Here I propose the metaphor of resonance,
and the following model.
The Resonance Model
I believe that a helpful way of thinking about
what we need to be doing in the dialogue
berween theology, neuroscience, and psycholo-
gy is best represented by an auditory/acoustic
metaphor involving the property of resonance.
In this tnodel, resonance refers to the amplifica-
tion or enrichment of sound when two or more
auditory signals vibrate together synchronously
or hannonically. The opposite would be disso-
nance, which is the datiipening or discordance
caused from the combination of two or more
inharmonious sources.
114 RKSONANCF,: A MODEL FOR RKLAHNG
Brown's Resonance Model
••^^, '••>;-. Experience////
/•-TRirthc
Rationality
Figure 2. Brown's Resonance Model: Experience, Tradition, Scripture, Rationality, Science.
Resonance is meant primarily to be under-
stood as a rich metaphor. However, to give
greater meaning to the term "resonance." I offer
the ftillowing more explicit definition: A state-
ment from psychology and a statement of Chris-
tian theology (for e x a m p l e ) would be
considered resonant if o n e is directly pre-
dictable from the other, or if one is reasonably
probable given the other. Similarly, two such
statements would not be considered dissonant if
they are not directly contradictory, or if their
inescapable deductions or implications are not
contradictory; or if the implications of one does
not make the other significantly improbable.
In this model, arbitration of differences between
domains is conceived of as a prixre.ss of finding
maximal resonance between [he information ema-
nating from various sources. To seek resonance is
not to look for different domains to say the .same
thing, nor is it allowing one field to taimp anoth-
er. Rather, it is presumed that if a conclusion is
true within one domain, it should have some
form of resonance with other domains.
Figure 2 is a visual representation of the Re.so-
nance Model. Five domains of information are
conceived of as old fashioned radios. In the Res-
onance ModeL each radio is understood to be
,
tfadition
Scripture
giving off an auditory signal (i.e., information
from that domain). All of these auditory signals
(indicated by the radiating dashed lines repre-
senting .sound waves) have some implication for
understanding what is likely to be true. Howev-
er, in this model, information from a single
source is not always synonymous with truth.
Truth, such as it can be known and understood,
is found in the inter-domain resonant field.
Thus, somewhere in the middle of the 5 radios
(or information .sources), where the sound waves
meet and overlap, truth is best understood. The
word "Truth" in Figure 2 should be depicted in
sotne fuzzy and indistinct graphical form, repre-
senting the idea that we oniy know "as through
a darkened glass." Our comprehension is always
partial and incomplete. Nevertheless, each
source is hopefully telling us something about
what is tRie. Thus, the most reliable knowledge
and understanding is to lie found .s<.)mewhere in
the re.sonant field where information from differ-
ent domains intersect.
Kach radio is labeled to indicate one domain
of information. As indicated above, I have split
the Wesleyan idea of "Rationality" into "Science"
and "Rationality" in order to recognize differ-
ences in epistemology. "Science" is meant to

denote information based on sy.stematic and
repeatable tili.servations of the natural world
(physical, biological, and social). While .science
uses rational tools, the final arbiter of truth in
.science is whether findings are empirically repli-
cabte. ralher than logically consistent. Logical
inconsistency is tolerated in science at least
while waiting for clarification from further obser-
vations and experiments. In this model, psychol-
ogy as a summary of obser\ations of human
behavior would be primarily within "Science."
"Rationality" is then allowed to uniquely repre-
sent the outcome of the application of the rules,
melhods, and arguments within areas like mathe-
matics, philosophy, logic, elc. "Rationality"" refers
not only to the outcome of the lawful processes
of information manipulation specified within
ihese intellectual disciplines, but also the natural
kinds of logical arguments that are advanced in
discussions and debates. In their theoretical mani-
festations, btrth neuroscience and psychology are
most clearly nitional, as is systematic theology.
"Kxperience" is meant to include our personal
religious experiences, our subjective experience
of l:)eing a person, the experiences of being in
relationship to other persons, and the shared
experiences of local communities. Personal
episodic memories are a core aspect of this
domain of information. "Experience" as a source
of knowledge would also encompass procedural
knowledge and emotional learning, which are
major contributors to "tacit knowledge" as
described by Michael Polanyi (19S8). Explication
of the nature of subjective experience is a critical
component in psychology, particularly within
many theories of psychopathology and psy-
chotherapy. The fact that neuroscience is begin-
ning t<i sketch out brain systems involved in
various forms of subjective experience should
not confuse us into thinking that science can in
any way completely override (or "taimp") the
truth contained in our subjective experiences.
However, the rapidly accumulating neuroscience
of subjective experiences provides one of many
challenges in finding resonance.
"Tradition" means not only religious tradition,
but also the wisdom of the cultural traditions of
families, local communities, elhnic/national
groups, professions, etc. Community narratives
and stories form a critical ma.ss of .such traditions.
Since all knowledge .starts with "pre-knowledge"
in the form of presuppositions that are stamped
on us by our families and cultures, the impact of
Tradition" in this model cannot be minimized.
WARREN S. BROWN 115
The postmodern critique of .science and rationali-
ty suggests that the traditions of local cultures
(including scientific cultures) have an influence
on theories, formulations, choice of questions,
what is accepted as valid information, etc.
Finally, "Scripture" refers to the Bible (or
other writings viewed as sacred and authorita-
tive by adherents of various other religions).
"Scripture," in this model, is placed as one of
several pointers to truth, rather than truth itself,
in that there is always a hermeneutical and
interpretive task when attempting to figure out
what scripture means, both in its original con-
text and with respect to a particular psychologi-
cal, scientific, or even theological question.
Thus, one implication of this model is that
other domains are seen as aids to scriptural
interpretation by creating re.sonance or disso-
nance with our attempts to understand the
meaning of the Bible.
The knob.s on each radio suggest the dynamic
process implied by this model (i.e., the possibili-
ty of Inning the information coming from each
of the sources). Tuning refers to a process of
finding, within the range of interpretations that
are permissible within a particular domain, the
one that is most resonant with information and
theories from other domains. Thus, to extend
our resonance metaphor, as the radios are tuned
(i.e., the information changes in pitch or loud-
ness) the outputs sometimes resonate at the
pt)int of intersection in a way that makes truth
clearer. But sometimes the settings result in dis-
sonance, causing the signals to cancel or distort,
such that truth becomes less clear. When disso-
nance occurs, the task of knowing and under-
standing is to go to each of the sources and try
adjusting the knobs (within the range of reason-
al)le interpretations for that particular domain) in
order to find settings that result in greater reso-
nance. While truth is to be found in resonance,
dissonance indicates that some form of misinfor-
mation or misinterpretation is being broadcast
from one or several sources. The static nature of
a diagram such as seen in Figure 2 cannot cap-
ture the dynamic that is intended in this model-
The reader needs to imagine the knobs turning,
and sound waves pulsing at various frequencies
and intensities, and the word "Truth" variously
coming more or less into focus with the chang-
ing signals emanating from the S radios.
Finally, it must l>e emphasized that the search
for re.sonance is a community endeavor. No sin-
gle person can know enough about all of the
11(1 RESONA^^CE: A M O D E L KOR R E I A T I N G
various domains. We must have conversati<ins
between persons, each of whom has knowledge
from at least one of these domains. Of course.
the hazard is that experts easily adopt an altitude
of academic imperialism, where the dynamic and
range of possibiliiies within their own field is
never subjected to the test of resonance with
other domains.
Further Implications of the Resonance Model
One of the issues in the development of the
Resonance Model was what word to put in ihc
middle—the point of intersection of information
between domains. The reader may be imcom-
fortable with the word "truth." The commitment
in this model to the position that a reality exists
that is knowable in some manner, is an idea that
rings of a modernism which is currently in disre-
pute among most philosophers. However, this
model attempts to capture some ot the spirit and
concerns of postmodernism in that it proposes
that our understanding of what is true is dynam-
ic. Important truths seldom appear absolutely
clearly, or are independently validated, within
any one domain. What is more, this model rec-
ognizes that any understanding of what might be
true is always influenced by lx)th tradition and
personal experience. Neither science nor ratio-
nality, nor a combination of these, .stand alone as
arbiters of truth.
The challenge for this model is to indicate in
some way that an understanding of tnith at any
one time or by any one person or group is
always somewhat partial and indistinct. One po.s-
sibility would be tt) replace "Truth" with "Theory-"
or "Hypothesis." However, this move would have
the problem that the outcome of the model
would be something upon which one cannol act
with confidence. We do not wish to make critical
decisions for ourselves or our communities based
on theories or hypotheses. In fact, we would be
better to use the words "theory" and "hypothesis"
for the information coming from each domain.
What can be known from the resonance ot infor-
mation is something more reliable.
Reasonable alternatives might be "Knowledge"
or "Understanding" as codes for "bcsl under-
standing of truth under the circumstances." How-
ever, I have chosen to keep "truth" as the central
idea to reinforce my presumption that properties
of the world and of human nature are largely
constant and at least partially knowahle, and thai
these properties can be reflected in some veridi-
cal manner is the resonance of information com-
ing from different domains. Thus, this model is
not entirely modern (it gives an equal place to
personal experience and cultural traditions), is
not entirely postmodern (it escapes objection-
able forms of cultural relativism by granting that
important information about truth comes from
science and rationality), and is not secular (it
gives a critical voice to the authority of scripture,
as well as to the wisdom of religious traditions).
One can easily imagine thai not ever\" source
will have relevant information bearing on all lop-
ics. With respect to topics about which only one
domain has any relevant information, we would
grant that a single source might have sole
authority. For example, information from the sci-
ence of neurophysiology would have sole
authority with respect to knowledge of the
nujlecular structure and function of the mem-
brane of a neuron. Other domains have nothing
particular to say about ihis topic. However, as
soon as generalizations about human nature (for
example) are made from the implications of such
neurophysiologica! data, c>ther sources will also
have information to contribute, and the reso-
nance or dissonance between other sources and
this generalization from neuroscience must be
taken intt) account.
The exact number and designation of critical
domains is, to .some degree, a matter of choice.
Those I have designated I would consider to be
the primary voices in our understanding of
human nature. With respect to other conversa-
tions, one might want to break 'Tradition" into
"Culture" and "Religious Tradition." Or, for other
purposes, one might want to differentiate "Phys-
ical Science" and "Social Science." I would con-
sider such aliernatives to be entirely within the
spirit of this model. What is important is to com-
prehend the metaphors of resonance between
multiple .sources and the possibility of tuning
signals from every source in the attempt to find
resonance.
An Example of the Resonance Model
in Operation
Finding le.sonance between Christian theology
and modern neuroscience is challengiTig, particu-
larly with respect to views of human naaire. It is
increasingly difficult to hold a traditional Chris-
tian view of persons in a w'orld of modern neuro-
biology, cognitive science, and neuropsychology.
As an example of the usefulness of the Reso-
nance Model, I will review what I have written
elsewhere regarding areas of dissonance antl the

p()lfnii;il for resonance between a Christian
(specifically Westeyan) view of human nature
und the view emanating from cognitive neuro-
science (Brown. 199Ha, 1998b. 2002, 200.^. 2004;
Brown & Jeeves, 1999).
The critical issue creating dissonance between
theological and scientific views of the nature of
persons lies in a fundamental difference in a
basic assumption lield by neuroscience and
witliin most Christian theology. To put the prob-
lem formally, we are faced with two opposing
views of human nature represented by the fol-
lowing ccsntradictory propositions (Brown &
Jeeves, 1999).
Proposition 1: Humans are physical
beings who also have non-maierial
.souls. It is through our souls that we
experience and relate to God. A
related proposition would be that
our souls are the source of oi[r free
will and moral agency.
Proposition 2: Humans are neurobi-
ological beings whose minds (also
souls. religioLLS experience, etc.) are
determined by, and can (at least in
theory) be exhaustively explained
by neurobiology. neurochemistry,
and ultimately by physics.
Proposition 2 expresses a view called reduc-
tive (or eliminative) materialism that is character-
istic of the pliilosophic view of many (certainly
not all) scientisis, but that is denied by a Chris-
tian understanding of human nature. While vari-
ations on Proposition 2 exist, it is difficult tt)
hold this position without mental and spiritual
life being presumed to be epiphenomenal—that
IS, all ihe causes of hiuiian experience and
human behavior emanate from the lower levels
of neurophyslology and neurochemistry. Thus,
one easily arrives at conckisitjns that spiritual
experiences are merely halhicinations. free will
does not exist, sin and personal responsibilily
are a myth, and human behavior is entirely
determined by biological and physical laws.
Proposition 1 is a statement of body/soul (or
body/mind) dualism that has been the predomi-
nant Christian view for much of the last millen-
nium. Dualism has its primary rotns in llie
teachings of Plato, St. Augustine, and Descartes.
Here soul (or mind) is presumed to be a non-
material entity with a realm of activity and agen-
cy separate from, but interacting with, the
physical body. However, such body-soul dual-
WARREN S. BROWN 117
ism is also faced with critical problems. First, the
nature of the interaction between a non-material
soul and a physical body and brain has never
been specilied in a convincing way (although
some have tried). Second (and more important-
ly), there is a decreasing residue of leftover
higher human mental functions and even reli-
gious experiences that have not yet been shown
to have neurocognitive correlates. Tliere is not
tiiuch left unexamined by neuroscience that
might constitute evidence for a non-material
scjul that has some notable form of agency with-
in htiman behavior To have a separate entity
such as a soul in a manner that is more than
trivial, the soul must have some realm (or
realms) of independent causal power within
human mental and physical activity. The soul
must do something that the brain does not do,
or that cannot be affected by damage to the
brain. Othei'wise. the concept of a soul is with-
out compelling meaning.
Although the research in most cases is incom-
plete (and thus leaves the question open), the
strttng influence of neurobiological processes on
our personal, social, and even spiritual lives, at
the very least, creates dissonance with dualism
and forces us to consider the physical eml>odi-
ment of soulish human functioning. For exam-
pie: What is Ihe meaning of experiences of
nearness to God and intensely personal spiritual
moments when these can be elicited by tempo-
ral lobe seizures (Ramachandran, 1997;
Ramachandran ik Blakesjee, 1998) or magnetic
stimulation of this brain area (Cook & Persinger,
1997)? And what is to he made of the failure of
moral restraint in some patients with frontal lobe
brain damage (Damasio, 199'*). or Ehe dramatic
infringement of Alzheitner's dementia on the
spiritual and religious lives of some patients
(Weaver, 20(N)? Thus, a neuroscience perspec-
tive strongly questions the existence of a sepa-
rate, non-material realm of the soul by which
certain domains of human behavior and experi-
ence can retnain unaffected by changes in brain
function. At the veiy least, we should be uncom-
fortable with simple answers regarding the
nature of the hutnan .souL Here is a form of dis-
sonance calling for tuning of some kind,
Nonreductive PhysicaUstn
I h e alternative to dualism is whoHsm (or
monism), a view that considers humans to be a
single entity. One version of monism is called
"nonreductive physicalism," "Physicalism" refers
118 RESONANCE: A MODEL FOR REI_ATING
to the assumption that it is not necessary to pos-
tulate the existence of a second nonphysical
entity, the soul or mind, to account for human
capacities and distinctiveness. Soul (or mind) is
physiologically embodied. A "nonreductive" ver-
sion of physicalism presumes that, despite the
physical nature of humankind, human behavior
cannot be exhaustively explained by analysis at
lower levels (neurobiology). Our lower-level
neurobiological functioning is influenced (in a
top-down manner) by the more global human
proces.ses of thinking, rea.soning, and deciding.
Thus, there are causal properties of mintl that
emerge from the complexities of brain function-
ing that cannot be reduced to the activity of
brain modules or groups of neurons. Thinking
and willing have a real determinative influence
on behavior.
Thus, statements about the physical nature of
human beings made from the perspective of
biology or neuroscience are about exactly the
same entity as statements made about the soulish
or spiritual nature of persons from the point of
view of theology or religious traditions. When
we talk of "".souls" we are talking about whole
persons. One might say, ""We are .souls; we don't
have souls."
But is there any r e s o n a n c e to be found
between a nonreductive physicalist account of
human nature and a Biblical understanding of
persons? Biblical scholars have dealt in-depth
with the issues and problems of a Biblical view
of human nature. There are tho.se who believe
dualism is the predominant view, and those who
favor moni5m. Among the latter is New Testa-
ment .scholar Joel Green (Green, 1998, 2000,
2002), who suggests that the Bible devotes little,
if any, attention to theoretical or speculative
analysis of such issues as monism vs. dualism.
However, according to Green, the dominant
view in Scripture is a monistic account of the
human person that places a premium on human
relatedness to God, to other humans, and to all
of creation (Green, 2000).
This reference by Green to the critical role of
relatedness in a Biblical definition of human
nature is consistent with a position 1 have devel-
oped in previous papers (Brown, 1998a, 2002,
2003, 2004). I have argued that the qualities of
human nature that have been traditionally
attached to the concept of a soul can be
accounted for (within a monist Christian anthro-
pology) by recognition of the exponential
increase in the capacities for relatedness in
human beings compared to animals, including
other primates. The enhanced capacities ftjr
relatedness are manifest in our relationships with
other persons, our relationship with ourselves
(our inner life), and our relationship to God. I
have proposed that "soul" is an aspect of human
nature (more clearly designated as ".soulishness")
not a distinct part of a person, and that this
aspect is commensurate with our unusual capaci-
ties lor relatedness.
Finding Resonance between Nonreductive
Physicalism ami Wesleyan Theology
Finally, since this issue is about Wesleyan the-
ology, I will .speculate on the following ques-
tions: Does a non-dualist portrait of human
nature (specifically nonreductive physicalism)
find any resonance with Wesleyan theology? Is
the theology of Wesley more or less hospitable
to an account of human nature in which soulish-
ness is understood as an embodied quality of
personal relatedness?
Remember that the primary goal of the Reso-
nance Mt>del is not to have the various domains
say exactly the same thing. In this sense, they do
not have to integrate. What is necessary is that
there is perceived resonance and coherence
between the perspectives. However, achieving
resonance may require some amount of adjust-
ment of the interpretive "dials" and tuning of the
"signal" (within the acceptable ranges of inter-
pretatitjn of the authoritative data within the par-
ticular domain) such that greater resonance can
be perceived.
It is fairly clear from his writings that Wesley
was not a physicalist, but rather a dualist. He
most often expressed his theology in dualist cat-
egories. For example, in one of his sermons
Wesley states:
For no bcxly, or matter of any kind,
can be sinful: Spirits alone are capa-
ble of sin. Pray in what part of the
body should sin lodge? It cannot
kxlge in the skin, nor in the muscles,
or nerves, or veins, or arteries; it can-
not be in the bones, any more than
in the hair or nails. Only the soul can
be the .seat of .sin. (We.sley, lH72a)
However, de.spite a fairly clear commitment to
dualism, Wesley believed in a ver}' close interde-
pendent relationship between body and soul. In
fact, passages like the following suggest that
Wesley was .somewhat uncertain, and at times
inconsi,stent, regarding the body/soul issue. In

his sermon "Wbal is Man?" he specuhilfs aboiil
the location of the "thinking principle":
... it seems to be situated in some
part of the head; but whether in the
pineal gland, or in any part of the
brain, I am not able to determine.
But further; This inward principle,
wherever it i.s lodged, is capable, not
only of thinking, but likewise of
love, haired, joy, sorrow, desire,
fear, hope, and a whole train of
other inward emotions, which are
commonly called passions or affec-
tions. They are styled, by a general
appellation, the will; and are mixed
and diversified in a thou>sand ways.
And they seem to be the only spring
of action in that inward principle I
call the soul. (Wesley, 1872b)
Here ihe bead (we presume the brain) is seen
to be the location for all the functions of the soul
that Wesley can imagine. In fact, the last sen-
tence of this quote suggests that "the soul" and
this embodied "inward principle" are equivalent.
Wesley continues later In [he sermon:
... I cannol but believe, this self-
moving, thinking principle, witb all
its passions and affections, will con-
tinue to exist, although the body be
mouldered into dust. Indeed at pre-
seni this body is so intimately con-
nected with the soul that I seem lo
consist of both. In my pre.sent state
of existence. I undoubtedly consist
of both soul and body: And so 1
.shall again, after the resurrection, to
all eternity. (Wesley, 1872b)
Here Wesley seems to vacillate between .sou! as
an embodied inward principal, and a substantial-
ly separate and distinct soul. Thus, while we
hear in Wesley clear dualist categories, he holds
body and soul as an intimate and almost indistin-
guishable unity. In this sermon, Wesley reads
like a nonreductive physicalist unable to sbed
bis habitual dualist language.
Wesley's anthropology puts great emphasis on
the idea tbat the capacity for relationships consti-
tutes the image of God in bumankind. The
capacity for relatedness rested for Wesley on
three critical faculties: understanding, will, and
liberty (Maddox, 1994, pp. 68-69). I have previ-
t)usly argued ibat the unusual capacity of human
WARREN S. BROWN 119
beings for relatedness rests on the enhancement
and complex interactions of critical cognitive
capacities: language, a theory of mind, episodic
memory, conscious top-down executive func-
tions, and a future orientation. Similarly, Wesiey's
concepts of tempers can be understood as reso-
nant with modern concepts from cognitive neu-
roscience of procedure knowledge, automaticity,
affect memories, and somatic markers (Strawn &
Brown, 2004). For maximal resonance, a nonre-
ductive neuroscience would need to demon-
strate that tbese buman functions and properties
are tbe products of our physical selves, but are,
nevertheless, emergent properties that are
causally efficacious in a manner not reducible to
"nothing but" ibeir underlying biology. Tbis mes-
sage seems to be increasingly what is being
broadcast from the most recent research regard-
ing the cognitive neuroscience of higher human
capacities.
In summary, this foray into dualism, nonreduc-
tive physicalism, and Wesleyan anthropology
.suggests the value of the Resonance Model. Wes-
ley's dualism makes it difficult to integrate his
theology witb the pbysicalist understanding of
persons that emanates from cognitive neuro-
science. Nevertheless, we can find a great deal
of resonance between a nonreductive form of
pbysicalism that places emphasis on the relation-
al capacities of human beings and tbe wbole of
Wesleyan tbougbt, Tbe Resonance Model, a
derivative of tbe Wesleyan Quadrilateral, makes
it possible botb to recognize the autbority of
sucb different domains as neuroscience and
Wesleyan theology, and to tune tbe signals from
each domain in our effort to find greater reso-
nance without violating their integrity.
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Author
Warren S. Broivn is Pr(fessor of Psychology at the
Graduate School of Psychology- at Fuller Theological
Seminary, where he is Director of the Lee Travis
Research Institute. He is also a member of the VCLA
Brain Research Institute. Specializations include e.xper-
imental neuropsychological research, particularly the
corfius callosum. He is co-erfiVor o/"Whatever Happened
to tlie Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of
Human Nature, and Understanding Wisdom; Sources,
Science, and ScK'iety.