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ZACH COUGHLIN
NV BAR 9473 SUSPENDED SEE 60838
1471 E. 9TH ST.
RENO NV 89512

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR COUNTY OF WASHOE STATE OF NEVADA
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
appellant
v.
matt merliss,
respondent

cv11-03628
D8

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MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DECLARATION IN

SUPPORT THEREOF TO SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR REHEARING OF
THIS COURT'S ORDER OF 5/25/13, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE NRCP 59
OR 60 OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SUCH
Petitioner, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, representing himself.,
respectfully submits this
Given NRS 40.400 makes NRAP applicable here, and the fact that some of this

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Court's decision seem to be made in an exercise of its original jurisdiction (ie,

NRS 40.385's dictate to pursue a stay, at least to the commercial tenancy aspect of
Coughlin's lease, with the district court pursuant to NRAP 8...) and therefore,

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would seem to make NRCP applicable (thus the Rule 59, 60, DCR 13(7) WDCR

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12, etc. Motions), whereas other aspects of this Court's Order are arguably made in

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an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, in which case NRAP 40's Petition for

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Rehearing, etc. woudl be indicated:

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However, tenants' involuntary departure from the premises by eviction does not

render such an appeal moot. [FN14] D.C.Joyner v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 479

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A.2d 308 (D.C. 1984).

The 7/25/13 Order in CV11-03628 by 2JDC Judge Stiglich reads: "CV11-03628
D8 On May 30,2013, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Appellant ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN's (Coughlin) appeal from a district court order denying
his emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or injunction and
awarding attorney's fees. (NOTE: here, Judge Stiglich adopts Richard G.Hill,
Esq.'s approach of leaving out the fact that Coughlin's 12/30/11 Motion was a NRS
40.385 Motion for Stay (the sort of stay that is not a matter of a District Court
Judge's discretion as to whether or not to grant where Coughlin plunked down the
statutorily set $250.00 on no less than four occasions in the Reno Justice Court
10/17/11, 10/25/11, 12/13/11, 12/22/11 in Rev2011-063341) ((See Case No. 61383
(May 30, 2013).) The Nevada Supreme Court also dismissed all of Coughlin's
appeals from any other order or determination arising from the district court's
review of this matter, which includes all district court orders entered in this case
after that order was entered. (See id.) (NOTE: Actually, that Order in 61383 of
5/28/13 reads: "For the same reasons, to the extent that appellant seeks to
appeal from any other order or determination arising from the district court's
appellate review of the justice court matter, this court likewise lacks
jurisdiction to consider any such appeals."...the problem with that logic, however,
is that NRS 40.385 (the version put into effect on 10/1/11, which incorporates
NRAP 8) imbues the district court with original jurisdiction to that portion of
Coughlin's tenancy which was utilized as a commercial tenancy, and Klein makes
quite clear that the Nevada Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction where the
district court must embrace such an exercise of appellate jurisdiction (just what is
meant by "arising in" and "arising from the district court's appellate review"
necessarily would connote some decision, premised upon an exercise of its original
jurisdiction, by the justice court, and clearly, the legislature chose not to create any
such jurisdiction in the justice courts in NRS 40.385 as to commercial tenants upon
enacting the new version of NRS 40.385)
Because this matter has been fully adjudicated, (NOTE: actually, there are
still several outstanding motions in CV11-03628, and the 5/28/13 Order in 61383
does not change that or obviate the district court's duty to embrace its jurisdiction
therein, as to, say, Coughlin's 4/7/12 Motion to Alter or Amend the 3/30/12 Order
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denying his appeal (which applied all sorts of appellate principles applying only to
plenary matters to that appeal of a summary eviction, then, which, despite NRS
40.400 making NRAP 38 applicable, in consideration of the admission in Judge
Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order that he had not previously sanctioned Coughlin in that
matter, means the 6/25/12 Order awarding attorney fees was an application of DCR
13(3), given Judge Flanagan's apparent indication that he did not view a preemptive
opposition to a motion for attorney's fees (if Coughlin's 1/14/12 Opposition to
Motion for Attorney's Fee is characterized thusly) as operative)...regardless, NRS
7.085 and NRS 69.050 definitely do not apply in light of NRS 40.400, which makes
NRAP applicable to appeals of summary eviction orders; also outstanding, and very
much not moot is Coughlin's 6/10/12 NRCP 60(b) motion, and his motion of
7/10/13, and that of 9/15/12) all of Coughlin's outstanding motions pending in
this case are DENIED as moot, including his Emergency Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis. This case is closed. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 25th day
of July, 2013. /s/ Lidia S. Stiglich District Judge""
Judge Stiglich's 7/25/12 Order in CV11-03628 (which especially curious in
its timing considering the failure, yet again, by 2JDC filing office staff to file in (in
violation of WDCR 18 and NRCP 5(e), Whitman, Donoho, Barnes, et al)
Coughlin's 7/22/13 submission of a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, etc.:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/157166359/7-29-13-0204-2JDC-Clerk-Wise-Tips-OffJudge-Stiglich-Results-in-7-25-13-Order-in-CV11-03628-2025-03628-7-22-13Mandamus-IFP-Etc-Letter-2JDC-Clerk-Wise) references the 5/28/13 Order
Dismissing Appeal in 61383, which reads:
"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL This is an appeal from district court
orders denying an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or
injunction and awarding attorney fees (NOTE: the Nevada Supreme Court, too,
apparently, does not countenance the fact that Couglin's 12/30/11 filing in CV1103628 implicates a mandatory stay under NRS 40.385) in a landlord-tenant matter.
Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Patrick Flanagan, Judge. Appellant
moved the district court for a temporary restraining order or injunction in an
appeal from a justice court order in a landlord tenant dispute. Following the denial
of that motion, appellant appealed to this court. Subsequently, the district court
entered an order awarding attorney fees to respondent and appellant also appealed
from that order. The district court has final appellate jurisdiction in all cases
arising in justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85
Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d 359, 360 (1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an

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appeal from an order refusing to grant an injunction, and NRAP 3A(b)(8)

authorizes an appeal from a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees, see
Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006)
(recognizing that an order awarding attorney fees and costs is substantively
appealable as a special order after final judgment), because the orders challenged
(NOTE: actually, the RJC refused to rule on Coughlin's NRS 40.385 Motion for
Stay, as such, the 2JDC's 1/11/12 Order, which failed to grant the stay where doing
so is not up to the district court's discretion, was an exercise of the district court's
original jurisdiction, especially as to that portion of the premises Coughlin utilized
as a commercial tenancy) in this case arose from the district court's exercise of
appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a justice court decision, the district
court's orders were ostensibly rendered final and are not appealable to this
court. For the same reasons, to the extent that appellant seeks to appeal from
any other order or determination arising from the district court's appellate
review of the justice court matter, this court likewise lacks jurisdiction to
consider any such appeals. Accordingly, as we lack jurisdiction over this appeal,
we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.fn1 (lRespondent's April 26, 2013, motion
seeking to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction on other grounds and his April
26, 2013, motion to strike are denied as moot. To the extent that respondent seeks
attorney fees based on the motion to dismiss this appeal, that request is denied. We
further deny as moot any other requests for relief pending in this matter.) /s/
Gibbons, J., Douglas, J., Saitta, J."
VERIFICATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
MADE AND SIGNED IN STATE OF NEVADA, COUNTY OF WASHOE
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, being first duly sworn, according to law,
upon oath deposes and says: That he is the Respondent (or whatever designation is fitting)
in the above-captioned matter; that he has read the foregoing document herein filed and
knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to
those matters therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters he believes
to be true. Further, that I have authorized ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., to
make the foregoing application for relief.
DATED this 8/1/13 /s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin,

Zachary Barker Coughlin,

Appellant
3 is not moot at all. Coughlin could still receive tremendous benefit from it, even
beyond the consideration of the collateral consequences in 62337 and 61901 and
the spectre of the $42K attorney fee award at issue in 61383 (where such was never
a "case" arising the the justice court, necessarily, as it was premised upon an
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application of nrs 69.050, which relates to atty fee awards for appeals of
JUDGMENT by justice courts, and it would be consitutionally violative to subject
coughlin to such with no right to review therof of any sort (ie, such was necessarily
not a decision by the justice court, ie, the atty fees for the work done just on appeal,
and therefore could not be said to have "arisen" in the justice court.
hatley 231 se 2d 633, 634-35. in re ak 628 se 2d 753, 755.

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as to Waugh alleged bar, see Zamarripa 747 p.2d 1386 nevada case provides
exception allowing this Court to consider appeal in this matter, and Waugh's reliand
on "must not be tried anew and citioation to njcrpc 72-75 is distinguished from
Anvui's "de novo" review2 standard per Mackie 329 p.2d 448, as such RJC not an
'inferiro tribuanl' as de novo review precludes such an interpretiation and the
3/30/12 and and 8/21/12 8/28/12 orders in cv11-03628 rule on constitutional and
validity of nrs 40.253(5)-(6) and nrs 40.385.

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further,the RJC "proceeding" appealed is not a "case" and was not one "arising in"
as the RJC lack jurisdiciton to even hold the 10/25/11 "Trial" therein given the lack
of a complaint being filed or 20 days accorded to file an answe rper njcrcp rule 109

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pluas waugh is called in to doubt by kjb 2jdc 103 nev 473

This court's three Justice Panel's 5/28/13 Order indicates Article 6 Sec 6 is an
issue, but I have some thoughts on that...or maybe a Mandamus Petition would be
better route to go.
judge flangan's 5/29/13 order in cv11-03628 struck Coughlin's 5/20/13 emergency
amended notice of appeal and Coughlin's arrest in by the rjc bailiff's of 5/23/13
prevented his filign the motion/notice/surreply he intended to that night...
dist ct has no pwoer to strike notice of appeal lils 414 f.2d 612 plus paul v
armstrong may allow for cert 1 nev 82 further waugh relies on a repealed statute in
nrs 40.410, also, where merliss did not himself hold title to the property, but rather,
his living trust, art 6 sec 8 may retlate to the title issues making the RJC
inappropriate forum thus not 'arising in" 29 nev 181 also, Coughlins' 12/30/11
motion in cv11-03628 whas
A MOTION FOR STAY PER NRS 40.385,
WHICH KEEPS GETTING MISCHARACTERIZED AS ONLY A MOTION FOR
TRO. AND RJC'S REFSUAL TO RULE ON SUCH NRS 40.385 MOTION
(KEPT SAYIGN MUST ASK DIST CT FOR STAY AND CHANGES TO NRS
40.385 CIRCA 10/1/11, MAY OR MAY NOT APPLY, IF THEY DO NRAP 8
NECSSARILY IMPLIES SUCH A MOTION NO 'ARISING IN ' RJC AND
SHOUDL THEREFORE NOT FACE AN ART 6 SEC 6 BAR.

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SEE OEENL

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rough sketch as to why Waugh doesn't apply...see 6 10 13 filing in CV11-03628 for

idea of what Petition for Rehearing may be focused on...NRS 40.386 is not
discretionary, I don't think...plus Waugh was an appeal of a plenary UD action, not
an appeal of a de novo review by the Dist Ct of an Justice Court decision..
Also, wherre Dist Ct basis its decision on second prong of NRCP 56(c) (ie, genuine
issue of fact part) wherre NRS 40.253 limits jurisdiction to, essential, the "no legal
defense" second prong of NRCP 56(c) (Anvui says summary eviction appeal are
review based on the standard applied to review of summary judgment, as "they are
analogous", but clearly, under NRS 40.253(6), they aren't identical, as "no legal
defense" is all that is contained therein, nothing about "genuine issue of material
fact", which is what Flanagan hung his hat on in denying appeal.

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I think exception to nev const article 6 sec 6 bar involves where dist court exceeds
jurisdiction or fails to embrace jurisdiction (the failure by flanagan to grant a stay
under NRS 40.385 where such is not discretionary (ie, plunk down $250, you get
your stay, period) is a failure to embrace his jurisdiction, and basing the denial of
my appeal on the "genuine issue" prong of nrcp 56(c) when Nrs 40.253(6) clearly
does not contain such a standard, exceeds jurisdiction, furhter, the 6/25/12 award of
attorney's fees based on nrs 69.050 exceeds jurisdiction in that such statute only
applies to judgments, which necessarily stem from civil actions, ie, plenary trials,
not summary evictions...so, more exceeding jurisdiction exception to article 6 sec 6
bar.

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Coughlin certainly does not feel that his appeal in 61383 (or CV11-03628) is
"moot", as an Order by the either the District Court or Nevada Supreme Court
undoing that ordered in CV11-03628 of (especially where such a refusal to
exercise its jurisdiction to enter the non-discretionary, automatic stay required
under NRS 40.385 pursuant to Coughlin's 12/30/12 Motion for Stay (see pages 1213, and 18 therein, as its so much more than a Motion for TRO, though NRCP 62
does provide for an automatic 10 day stay as to Orders such as that of , which begs
the question as to how it was appropriate for Hill to insist on throwing away the
personalty he had removed from the former home law office (the 12/30/12 Motion
in CV11-03628 was not directed solely to enjoining the 12/21/11 Order in Rev11001708, a closer reading than that done by Hill or Baker will reveal the NRS
40.385 Motion for Stay therein), 3/30/12 (especially where such an order exceeded
the 2JDC's jurisdiction

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Consider, speaking of the idea that 61383 is "moot", the collateral

consequences to Coughlin of the various Orders appeal from in CV11-03628
remaining in place (beyond the fact that Hill and or Merliss now has a "judgment"
for $42,065 in attorney's fees against Coughlin for the appeal of a summary
eviction, with particularly emphasis on the salience of the conviction in 61901 and
associated testimony by Hill vis a vis that criminal trespass conviction and
Coughlin's alleged lack of competency, and or "conduct" or "candor" (whether to
the tribunal, for which there is an RPC, 3.3, that requires such, or, apparently to
some non-existenct RPC that the OBC's King believes require candor to opposing
counsel (actually, its RPC 3.4, requiring "fairness", rather than "candor") in 62337:
The 12/14/12 Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law now on appeal in 62337
(despite the fact that that the title of that 12/14/12 FOFCOL fails to categorize or
identify such as a "decision" sufficient to invoked SCR 105(3)'s docketing of such
or implementation of a briefing schedule or transmission of any ROA (ironic given
Hill and Echeverria's criticism that the title of Coughlins' file bare little relation to
that addressed therein).That 12/14/12 FOFCOL includes the following:
"19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testify at the hearing of this
matter: Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing with the State Bar of Nevada
for 33 years. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr. Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a
landlord tenant dispute with his tenant Coughlin. See Transcript of Proceedings
of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20. (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page
37:14 to 37:20) Q And how did you first come into contact with Mr. Coughlin? A
Well, I was hired by a Dr. Matthew Merliss. My office was to remove a tenant from
a home at 121 River Rock in Reno. Dr. Merliss had going back and forth with Mr.
Coughlin for several months. Mr. Coughlin had not paid any rent for, at that point I
believe it was --)

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(NOTE: actually, it was Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq. who worked the
case, so why it is that Hill was an appropriate witness to testify to all sorts of
matters in a case that he had not appeared in (either 1708 or 03628 up until
approximately August 2012 (where that appeal was docketed in the 2JDC on
12/21/11, and by Hill's appearing in Baker's place upon Baker absconding to
Kentucky at a time, August 2011 when 99% of the work in 1708 and 03628 had
already been done by Baker, briefing was over, the appeal was denied and
oppositions to post-judgment motions had been filed by Baker) is not clear:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 38:20 to 38:23) "Q And did you end up
representing Dr. Merliss inan eviction action?
A My office did. I assigned
the case to my associate at the time, Casey Baker.")
The FOFCOL continues on misrepresenting Hill's actual participation in
1708 and 03628: "Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court and
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Washoe County District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in
the matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed filings
in of a case in which Coughlin is involved with Washoe Legal Services. See
Transcript of Proceedings Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3.
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 39:13 to 40:3) Q "Could you describe to the panel in a
chronological manner some of the events that you have personal knowledge of that
exhibited this behavior that formed your opinion? MR. COUGHLIN: Objection.
Relevancy. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS (Hill): I've read
(NOTE: Hill's Declaration in support of the Motion for Attorney's Fees that Baker
made first in his 2/24/12 Answering Brief (violating DCR 13 where Baker made
such a motion for fees again on 4/19/12) attests only to reading everything Baker
filed, but regardless, there is a difference between Hill as a witness asserting that he
had personal knowledge of whether or not Coughlin displayed candor to the
tribunal or anyone else, or fairness to opposing counsel or overall competency had
Hill actually appeared in or worked the cases during the time frames of the alleged
events or misconduct to which he testifies to (asserting first hand knowledge
thereof as to such events or conduct) and Hill merely perusing the file after the fact)
virtually everything that Mr. Coughlin has filed, not only in the Department 7
eviction case, and before that the Reno Justice Court's eviction case. He's now got
-- had two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in that case, and I've read virtually
everything that he's done. I've also followed the filings that he's had in his dealings
with Washoe Legal Services. And I've followed the filings that he had in the
supreme court discipline matters."
20.
In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin, Mr.
Hill's firm obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the
premises. (NOTE: here the FOFCOL mischaracterizes what that 10/27/11 Order in
1708 actually said, where it reads: ""That the sheriff/constable of Reno Township,
or one of their duly authorized agents be, and hereby is, directed to remove each
and every person found upon and within the rental unit" ...the difference is clear
and order "allowing Couglin one week to vacate" sounds more like a trespass
warning than one that indicates the WCSO is "directed to remove each and every
person found upon and within the rental unit") Ultimately, Coughlin failed to
comply with the eviction order and was convicted of criminal trespass. See
Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an
order in favor of Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's
fees in the amount of $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan
entered the order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The motion
seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the defense of the
eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and vexatious and

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presumably so found by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P 3, L 411.

22.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review of the
pleadings in the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review of the
pleadings in Coughlin's litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is of the
opinion that Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin
was not truthful with either counsel or the court. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill felt that Coughlin's filings
were abusive, at one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has
accused Mr. Hill of bribing the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested.
Mr. Hill's staff is terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
54, L 4 -15."

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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:11 to 41:4) Hill: "In the appeal -- we had recovered a
$42,000 attorney's fee award against Mr. Coughlin for handling just his appeal of
the eviction. He would file these documents that would have a caption on it that
would indicate that it was a motion under Rule 59, for example. (NOTE:
compare to 12/14/12 FOFCOL not including characterizing in title identifying such
as a "decision" sufficient to implicate SCR 105(3)) And you would get into it, and
there would be no mention in the body of Rule 59, there would be no analysis of
Rule 59, but we would have to run down all of the little issues that he would raise
on the off chance that if you don't respond to one, the district court judge is going to
find something that he thinks is important, and the client ends up having an adverse
result. $42,000 on a no-cause 30-day eviction, and that's just for the appeal of it, is
absolutely astronomical. But that should tell you -- I have provided Mr. King
with a copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which he sets forth the reasons for
such an extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the quality of the
work that he was filing."
Hill demonstrates his own RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violations where he falsely
characterizes the "reasons" Judge Flanagan provides for entering the attorney fee
award of 6/25/12 in CV11-03628 (FHE 2): "HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:25 to
41:4) I have provided Mr. King with a copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which
he sets forth the reasons for such an extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's
behavior, and the quality of the work that he was filing."
Actually, as Hill and King (see King's inclusion of such 8/28/12 Order in his
8/30/12 email to Coughlin) well know, Judge Flanagan's 8/21/12 and 8/28/12
Orders in 03628 clearly contradict Hill's assessment that Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12
Order in 03628 "sets for the the reasons for asuch and extraordinary award,
being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the qualiity of the work that he was
filing...". Rather, Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in 03628 makes clear:
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"...Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues this Court

has already decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previously
ignored...Accordingly, Coughlin's Motion to Alter or Amend Order, or Pled in
Alternatid [sic] Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and Motion for Order
Shortening Time and Notice of Appeal of Atly [sic] Fee Award of 6/25/12 and
NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees are DENIED."
Panel Chair John Echeverria, Esq.'s FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW of 12/14/12 in SBN v. Zachary Barker Coughlin, NG12-0204, NG12-0434, and
NG12-0435 reads:
"THIS MATTER came before a designated Formal Hearing Panel of the Northern
Nevada Disciplinary Board (the "Panel") for hearing on Wednesday, November 14, 2012.
The Panel consisted of John P. Echeverria, Esq., Chairman; Lay-Member Karen Pearl,
Stephen Kent, Esq., Clark V. Vellis, Esq., and Michael K. Johnson, Esq .. The State Bar of
Nevada (the "State Bar") appeared and was represented by Deputy Bar Counsel, Patrick O.
King, Esq.. The Respondent, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Nevada State Bar No. 9473 (the
"Respondent" or "Coughlin") appeared in propria persona.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the pleadings filed, the documentary evidence admitted as Hearing
Exhibits 1 through 16, and the testimonial evidence of the Honorable Judge Bruce
Beesley, Richard Hill, Esq., Paul EIcano, Esq., the Honorable Judge Dorothy Nash
Holmes, Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. and Mary Barker presented at the hearing of these
proceedings, the Panel makes findings of facts as
follows:
1.
Coughlin is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada. At
all relevant times prior to and at the time of the filing of the Complaint in this matter, the
Respondent's principle office, as filed with the State Bar of Nevada in accordance with
the Rule of Professional conduct ("RPC") 79(1)(a), was Post Office Box 3961, Reno,
NV 89505. See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0001, lines 7-10 (State Bar of Nevada vs. Zachary B.
Coughlin, Esq., Case No: NG12-0204, NG12-0435, NG12-0434, Complaint at P1 (filed
August 23, 2012). (NOTE: such citation yields only: "ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.,
Bar No. 9473 Respondent. PLEASE TAKE notice that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
("SCR") 105(2) a").
(NOTE: Coughlin denied by Verified Answer and or Response all the allegations
in the Complaint, as such, it is impermissible for the FOFCOL to rely on or cite to the
Complaint (as Coughlin denied each and every charge the FOFCOL's citation to the
Complaint as "evidence" is error. Hutchens, 74 SW 3d 976. (and arguably the same goes
for citing to fugitive documents where no right to confront the "accuser" were utilized and
or offered into evidence, especially where the Complaint failed to attached , see FHEs 2, 3,
10, 11)
2.
Coughlin was admitted as a member of the State Bar of Nevada on March
25, 2005. See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0001, lines 7-8 (State Bar of Nevada vs. Zachary B.
Coughlin, Esq., Case No: NG12-0204, NG12-0435, NG12-0434, Complaint at P1 (filed
August 23, 2012). ("ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ., Bar No. 9473).
3.
On September 9, 2011, Coughlin shoplifted a candy bar and cough drops
from a Wal-Mart store with an approximate value of fourteen dollars ($14.00). On
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November 30, 2011, Municipal Court Judge Kenneth R. Howard found Coughlin guilty of
the offense of Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Coughlin appealed the
judgment of conviction. On March 15, 2012, the Honorable District Court Judge Steven P.
Elliott affirmed the judgment of conviction on appeal. See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0002,
5, lines 11-15; (State Bar of Nevada vs. Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., Case No: NG12-0204,
NG12-0435, NG12-0434, Complaint at P2 (filed August 23, 2012).
4.
Coughlin's conduct during the trial of the petit larceny case on November
30, 2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona, was so disruptive that Judge
Howard found Coughlin in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to jail that same
day to be released on December 3, 2011 at 8:00 PM. Judge Howard specifically found
Coughlin's conduct to be disorderly and was either contemptuous or behavior insolent
toward the judge in that Coughlin refused:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being
advised by the Court to refrain from doing so; demeaning the Court with
statements such as "WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing
during testimony and further questioning the court and its authority."
See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF contempt
COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT,
November 30, 2011.
(NOTE: Such FHE 11 lacks a Certificate of Service page, and this is done on
purpose, as the RMC refused to provide such OPSC to Coughlin upon his being
released from jail (Coughlin called the RMC and spoke with RMC Judicial
Assistant for Judge Howard, Veronica Lopez the Monday following his release
from jail on 12/3/11), and such was not provided to Coughlin at jail or upon his
release, and attempts to obtain such after from the RMC, and specifically Veronica
Lopez were rudely rebuffed. Also, such was made in absentia of both Coughlin
and the prosecutor, and as such, the deadline to appeal it has not even started to
run, given no notice of Entry of Order for such Order has been filed and served.
Further, lines 16-17 of page 1 of such OSPC reveals the extent to which such Order
failed to find any such behavior (lines 26-28 and the colon after the word
conduct between lines 26-27, and the failure of the RMC to check such blank,
combined with the check on the blank on line 19 where behavior, rather than
conduct is referenced, takes such out of the purview of any admissible evidence
of a RPC 3.5 violation.
Additionally, the entirety of such 11/30/11 (apparently the RMC can obtain a
file stmape for Orders submitted after 4:30 pm, but not attorneys or litigants?)
OPSC is violative of McCormack and the Sixth Amendment where Judge Howard's
10/27/11 Order denied Coughlin court appointed counsel and failed to rule that
jail time was not a possibility. Aigersinger.
Attorney's conduct in continuing to cross-examine police officer after judge
had ruled that police log was not admissible was not contempt where attorney
claimed that he was trying to impeach witnesses' memory, not lay foundation for
admission of log, so that his conduct could not be said to be willful. United States
v Giovanelli, (1990, CA2 NY) 897 F2d 1227. Resort to summary disposition of

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criminal contempt proceeding under Rule 42(a), Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, is permissible only when express requirements of rule are met and when
there is compelling reason for immediate remedy or when time is of essence. Thus,
attorney's conviction for criminal contempt in pursuing line of questioning
forbidden by court would be reversed, since record showed that there was no
compelling need for immediate remedy provided by Rule 42(a), Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and that trial court, by its own actions, did not consider time to
be of essence; trial court should have observed "normal" procedure" of notice and
hearing, provided by Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. U.S. v.
Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 124 (7th Cir. 1982). See United
States v Turner, (1987, CA11 Ala) 812 F2d 1552, 14. (page 29 of Coughlin's
6/18/12 Motion for Leave in 60838, the matter within which King's SCR 111
Petition resides, a document which, along with other filings by Coughlin in the
NSCT, were attached as exhibits (usually on a disc, but not always) to a multitude
of the documents Coughlin submitted for filing with the SBN's Clerk of Court in
NG12-0204, etc.
(see, also, the transcription Coughlin provided therein between pages 35-85,
which clearly reveal the patent lack of due process attendant to that trial (denial of
Sixth Amendment (as to both the petty larceny trial and the trial on the summary
contempt finding made ten minutes into the petty larceny trial (the failure to
immediately render a summary contempt order with Houston (see, also, the 2012
Marshall case, especially where Judge Howard is clearly punishing Coughlin for
behavior occurring outside the immediate presence of the court, whether or not
his 11/30/11 OPSC admits to that or not, which includes Coughlin's rancorous
interactions with Marshal Menzel at the 10/10/11 arraignment (the hold of which
violated NRS 178.405 in light of the then pending 9/7/11 Order for Competency
evaluation of which the RMC was made aware, in writing in), similar interactions
with RMC filing office counter clerks and supervisors incident to their refusal to
allow Coughlin to access even the Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable
Cause until after the 10/10/11 arraignment, etc), and Coughlin's 11/28/11 Motion to
specificity brings McCormack into play, and the possibility of jail time for such
contempt required the appointment of counsel as well), failure to apply the
exclusionary rule to evidence (despite Coughlin having a receipt proving he
purchased the very Duract Cough Melts found in his pocket) where both NRS
171.1255 and NRS 171.136 were violated, therefore making such arrests and
searches incident thereto illegal arrests requiring application of the exclusionary
rule), prosecutorial misconduct ( Deputy Reno City Attorney Pamela Roberts,
Esq., put on testimony she knew to be lies given the very video provided to her by
Walmart and or RSIC Police clearly show Coughlin providing his driver's license
to Officer Crawford), witness misconduct (numerous instances of perjury by both
Walmart's Frontino and Officer Kameron Crawford), and a to per se indigent under
2008 Indigent Defense Order, abuse of contempt power, violation of Pengilly and
McCormack, failure to grant a continuance where excuplatory evidence was being
wrongfully withheld by and opposing counsel whom had burglarized Coughlin's
former home law office with both the WCSO and RPD (Russell v. Kalian, NRS
40.253(5), Mayes v. UVI), and denial of a continuance to Coughlin (despite one

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being agreed to in writing by RCA Roberts) is particularly suspect given the

failure, then, to accord Coughlin's right to a speedy trial (which he did not waive)
where Coughlin, whom bailed out on 9/10/11 was not afforded a trial within 45
days as an out of custody defenant, and where the RSIC refused to release to
Coughlin even the Arrest Report and Probable Cause Sheet until after the 10/10/11
arraignment, wherein RMC Judge W. Gardner refused to reveal to Coughlin, then a
licensed practicing attorney, the names of the four possible court appointed defense
counsel sufficient for Coughlin to perform a conflict check prior to agreeing to
such confidential information being released to whichever allegedly randomly
assigned court appointed counsel would get such (and it may be law of the case that
Coughlin's right to such counsel was recognized at such time, making Judge
Howard's subsequent October 27th, 2011 denial of Aigersinger and the Sixth
Amendment even more suspect).
Also from such 6/18/12 Motion in 60838 at pages 29-30: "With respect to
matters which may bring into doubt the validity of the conviction in the trial court
judgment in RMC 11 CR 26800: In the appeal to the District Court in CR11-2064,
Judge Elliot utilized a civil statute in excusing the RMC from its failure to forward
to the District Court a copy of the transcript of the audio recording of the trial and
to forward such to the District Court within ten days of the filing of the notice of
Appeal. Further, Coughlin made numerous attempts to order such a transcript and
was thwarted in his attempts to do so by the RMC's express dictate that only the
RMC's transcriptionist of choice, Pam Dongoni, would be permitted to perfrom the
transcribing duties, and Ms. Dongoni hung up the phone on Coughlin and refused
to provide information related to where and in what method of payment Coughlin
could pay for the transcript and assure its production. Further, the RMC refused to
timely provide Coughlin a copy of the audio recording of the trial until well after
the deadline for filing tolling motions or a notice of Appeal had passed, and
further, the RMC failed to notate in the certified docket (which is not available to
litigants during these matters, and attempts by Coughlin to so obtain such a docket
has resulted in the City of Reno Marshals threatening Coughlin and forcing him to
leave the courthouse and writing disengenous letters to Bar Counsel."
Also served on Bar Counsel and amongst those materials that the SBN
wrongfully failed to transmit with the ROA, andt he Panel wrongfully failed to
consider (especially given the SBN's fraudulent assertions that it was copying all
five Panel members with the entirety of every one of the documents Coughlin
submitted for filing, including the discs attached thereto as exhibits) was the
entirety of the ROA transmitted by the RMC to the 2JDC from 11 CR 22176 and
the entirety of that in the record in the appeal thereof in CR11-2064 (in addition to
all of Coughlin's correspondence with the RCA and RMC regarding such matter,
and the materials that the RMC fraudulently failed to include within the ROA),
amongst such materials:
Coughlin's 11/2/11 Motion for Reconsideration of RMC Judge Howard's
10/27/11 Order Denying Motion for Appointment of Counsel, at page 1 thereof:
Trevino v. State 555 SW 2d 750 Formerly 110k641 2(4), 11Ok641.2 Tex.Crim
App.,1977 Criminal defendants In misdemeanor cases are entitled to counsel if
there exists a possibility that imprisonment may be imposed Judge Gardner refused

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to tell the undersigned the last names of the four attorneys who might be appointed
counsel. Accused has a right to know that, Its important to check qualifications and
experience. Further, Judge Gardner touted their abilities by mentioning some, or
all, of them were former prosecutors. The NFL doesn't hire to many offensive
coordinators, to coach defense. I feel the same about criminal defense. The arrest
did not occur in the presence of the police officer. There was no consent to
search. Officer made statements conditioning whether arrest would be made
upon whether consent to search was given, there are other impermissible acts...
Additionally, while page 1 contains a certification by RMC Filing Officer
Supervisor (whom regularly refuses to file documents even in criminal matters
based on unwritten legibility rules she applies), there is no indication such
certified copy contained the 01682 bates stamp apparently later applied by
King. Such FHE11 should be excluded from the admissible evidence based on
such prejudicial inclusion by King of such bates stamping, especially where King
subsequently argued that Coughlin should be prevented from having the entirety of
such 11/7/12 production by the SBN of a 3,200 page SCR 105(2)(c) consolation
prize:
11/14/12 HEARING (Page 302:6 to 302:12) MR. COUGHLIN: Sorry, your
Honor. There was just one other thing I was hoping to offer into evidence. It will
only take a second to ask to do it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is that? MR.
COUGHLIN: I would like to -- but the file. And then the subpoena that I tried to
get the sheriff here and --- Vol. I, (Page 304:18 to 304:23) MR. COUGHLIN: I
would ask that I would be allowed to be a little bit more specific. Mr. King got me
a big box of stuff. I'm only seeking to put in -- and it was broken up into about
four different things, each one kind of had a cardboard thing and a rubber band
holding it together." HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 304:25 to 305:1) And it's Bates
stamped." HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 305:6 to 306:17) This is not just the
pleadings. There's some stuff in here I never even saw before, like an affidavit by
Laura Peters that speaks to things like the service of the complaint. It's filed. I'm
wondering why didn't I get a copy of it if it has a file stamp on it? That's kind of
strange. So I do think -- I would ask that I be able to admit this into evidence.
MR. KING: I don't know what that is. And I object to it at this stage, proffering a
bunch of papers that haven't been discussed, haven't been admitted, no
foundation laid. Just to say they are going to go up to the supreme court, it doesn't
make sense. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I tend to agree. These are all -- the pleadings
themselves, as we now understand it, are going to go -- would be part of the record
the supreme court reviews. What you're offering appears to be a stack of
documents three inches thick that I have no idea what's in there. MR.
COUGHLIN: May I -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: We don't have time. I would really
like to afford you an opportunity to address the issue that I asked. So I'm going to
sustain the objection. I'm not going to permit those exhibits to be entered into at
this stage. You had all day in which to do that, and identify specific pieces and
proffer specific pieces. Instead you chose to spend a great deal of time attempting
to get in videotapes and transcripts. So I'm going to overrule that objection to the
extent these are factual documents. To the extent there are pleadings in there that

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are part of the official record, they are going to go up. It's now a quarter to 5:00.
You've heard the questions that the panel is interested in having addressed in the
final arguments. Mr. King. MR. KING: Thank you very much.
Whether or not 2JDC Judges L. Gardner, Flanagan, or Elliott took any NCJC
Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action by contacting the SBN (appropriate
authority) about Coughlin is completely relevant to Coughlin's defensive
collateral estoppel claims, in addition to thoroughly undermining King's offensive
collateral estoppel claims, and, arguably, revealing King's fraudulent Bomer
worthy approach here.
Also, the extent to which King flat out admits he manipulates the record is an
embarrassment to this Court and the Bar: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 304:1 to
304:7) MR. KING: In other words, everything Mr. Coughlin sent, oftentimes with
these multiple captions where he's sending them to many people, he might caption
as a pleading, it doesn't make it a pleading. It has to be something that was sent
to us, filed in, and that would be a pleading. And if there was such a thing as file
stamped with the supreme court, it will go up. Sounds very similar to King
allegedly he does not control the Clerk of Court during the 9/25/12 interaction
with Coughlin detailed in Coughlin's Motion for Order to Show Cause (served on
the SBN and submitted for filing with the SBN Clerk of Court on 10/1/12 in
60838, and submitted at that time in NG12-0204 as well, though apparently never
filed stamped by the SBN, yet ruled on in the Panel Chair's 10/31/12 Order, which
indicates such was filed in on 10/16/12, which absolutely entitles Coughlin, even
more than Clerk Peters 9/11/12 assertions respecting the permissibility of Coughlin
filing (and therefore serving on Bar Counsel) by facsimile).
5.
On June 7, 2012 the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada upon petition of
Bar Counse pursuant to SCR 111, ordered Coughlin temporarily suspended from the
practice of law in Nevada. The Order futher directed that the matter be referrred to the
Appropriate disciplinary board, as mandated by SCR 111 (8), with directions for the board
to institute a formal hearing "before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be
determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed." In the Matter of Discipline
of ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, Esq., Bar No. 9473, No. 60838, June 7, 2012.
6.
On November 15, 2011 Coughlin was arrested and charged with three
violations of the Reno Municipal Code. The charges of Failure to Provide Evidence of
Security or Insurance (a violation of RMC 6.06.555(a)) and Failure to Provide Vehicle
Registration (a violation of RMC 6.06.560(a)) were dismissed at arraignment. On
February 27, 2012 a trial was held in Reno Municipal Court before the Honorable Judge
Dorothy Nash Holmes on the remaining charge of a Right of Way Stop Sign violation at
an intersection (a violation of RMC 6.06.170(a)). Coughlin again appeared in propria
persona. The trial commenced at 3 p.m. and was concluded by the Court at 4:30 p.m.,
without a verdict, after the court held Coughlin in criminal contempt of court for his
behavior and activities committed during the course of the trial and in the presence of the
Court. See Hearing Exhibit 4. ORDER FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN contempt OF
COURT AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS.
7.
Judge Nash Holmes ordered Coughlin into custody on February 27, 2012
and to be incarcerated at the Washoe County Regional Detention Facility for the term of

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five (5) days. Alternatively Coughlin could pay a fine of $500. The Court's sentence was
based on its detailed
findings regarding Coughlin's conduct in his own defense.
"The court finds that defendant's contemptuous conduct
consisted of his rude, sarcastic, inappropriate, insubordinate,
disrespectful, antagonistic, deceitful, disruptive, argumentative
and childish behavior during trial, all of which appeared to be
done to vex and annoy the court, the witness, and the opposing
party, and to disrupt the trial process. The court finds that the
following occurred, and constitute contempt: 1) defendant's
mimelike, clownish antics of making faces at the court; sagging
down into his seat and hanging his head; looking behind himself
and inside his coat as if searching for a better way to ask a
question; rolling his eyes; and mimicking others words; 2)
defendant's incessant arguing with the court, talking over the
court, and interrupting the court; 3) defendant's repeatedly
restating matters after being told by the court to "move on" or "ask
the next question;" 4) defendant's repeatedly injecting allegations
of bribery, perjury, and police retaliation into the matter after the
court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himself to
issues pertaining to the facts of the "Boulevard Stop;" 5)
defendant's repeatedly trying to insert" Richard Hill" into his
questions and statements when such person was not relevant to the
proceeding and the defendant had been ordered to stop discussing
that; 6) defendant's disregarding the rules of evidence and court
procedure by continually posing improper questions after being
directed by the court to properly phrase his questions 7)
defendant's continually accusing the court of denying him the right
or ability to ask questions and telling the court to "give me a list of
questions you want me to ask;" 8) defendant's suggesting that the
court "tell me what would make you happy;" 9) defendant's lying
to the court in response to direct questions posed by the court with
regard to his recording the proceedings; and 10) defendant's
failing and refusing to properly examine the witness, despite
numerous admonitions by the court to stop repeating questions,
misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the
witness and mischaracterizing the testimony."
See Hearing Exhibit ORDER FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN contempt OF COURT
AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS.
8.
The trial of the matter was continued to March 12, 2012. Coughlin failed
to appear and failed to contact the court to explain or excuse his absence. However, after
serving the five-day contempt of Court sanction and after being released from custody,
Coughlin fax-filed a 224-page document entitled "notice of Appeal of Summary contempt
Order; Motion to Return Personal Property Confiscated by Reno Municipal Courts and Its

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Marshalls; Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend Summary contempt Order." See
Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P 2, lines 1-6.
(NOTE: Contempt of court in the form of filing a false pleading did not constitute
a contempt committed in the "immediate presence and view of the court" as such term was
used in a statute authorizing summary punishment for such a contempt. Ex parte Collins,
329 Mich. 192, 45 N.W.2d 31 (1950).
As to failing to appear, one there does not appear to be anything in the record
(not that the RMC would let Coughlin view it) to suggest Coughlin was noticed in writing
with respect to the date and time of such 3/12/12 continuation of the traffic citation trial
suspended on 2/27/12 by Judge Nash Holmes summarily incarcerating then practicing
attorney Coughlin. Further, the enormity of the disturbance to Coughlin's life and law
practice occasion by such summary incarceration dictated taking a bit more seriously
the avoidance of prejudice to client's matters than the federal case a municipal court
judge and her crooked, thuggish marshal were trying to make of a simple traffic citation
trial.
During that period of time, such client's fires needing addressing were numerous.
For instance, there was pressing concerns in the Keller case (NVB 10-05104), the Gessin
adversary proceedings (NVB 11-05077 and 11-05078), Eastman (2JDC CV11-00820), the
UIFSA and custody case for Harris (FV05- and FV11-), custody case for Bell (FV1104628), foreclosure defense for the Carpteniers (CV08- ), the matter of an Coughlin's own
Reply Brief coming due while in the summary eviction from his former law office
involving as opposing counsel the very same Richard G. Hill, Esq., whom attempted to
have Coughlin served (despite Caplow and his being an e-filer) the 2/8/12 Order to Show
Cause in the appeal of that summary eviction (such Order to Show Cause hearing was
resolved in Coughlin's favor in Judge Flanagan's 3/27/12 Order, which King was
provided), by the same WCSO Deputy Machen whom burglarized Coughlins' former
home law office on 11/1/11 with Hill's associate Baker (and Machen again burglarized one
of Coughlin's rentals on 6/28/12 while purportedly attempting to conduct a lockout
without the passing of 24 hours from the tenant's receipt of any such summary removal
order in Rev2012-001048...at which point Deputy Machen also arrested Coughlin in
RCR2012-67980, a case which the RJC and WCDA let drag on for nearly a year in a
transparent attempt to leverage such (which they always intended to dismiss given the
enormity of the problems associated with the 6/14/12 5 Day Notice allegedly posted (but
not mailed, much less with a USPS Certificate of Mailing) listing, pursuant to NRS
40.253(3)(b)(3) Sparks Justice Court as the court which Coughlin must file his Tenant's
Answer/Affidavit...where Coughlin timely submitted such Tenant's Answer for filing with
the Sparks Justice Court and a request to proceed in forma pauperis to which the Sparks
Justice Court clerks committed misconduct in failing to file in or otherwise apprise
Coughlin of any deficiencies incident thereto, and then to set such matter for hearing, but
rather, the SJC simply forwarded Coughlin's 6/26/12 Tenant's Answer (which was a
Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction) to the Reno Justice Court in a fax at 11:05 am
on 6/28/12 (which the RJC has subsequently removed from the file in the matter which is
opened, Rev2012-001048 upon Nevada Court Services submitting a landlord's affidavit
(which was deficient anyways, and which indicated it had rented Coughlin a dwelling
unit or apartment only to then indicate Coughlin had somehow breached the rental
agreement that such affidavit referenced as attached thereto, but which was not, and is still

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not attached thereto in the RJC file in that matter (also excised from the RJC file in that
matter is the 6/26/12 email to the RJC and its then Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil, Liz
Stuchell of the WCSO Civil Division (Machen's supervisor), a member of the Reno PD,
and the RJC's general email address...which is odd considering, clearly, such email was, at
one point, part of such file, on the left hand side thereof, under the docket.
For instance, with Gessin, for whom Coughlin filed an Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment on 3/19/12 (just 4 days after being burglarized by the WCSO and
Gayle Kern, Esq., on 3/15/12 incident to the too early summary lockout) there is now a
decision detailing such time period from the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of
the Ninth Circuit: NV-11-05078.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/bap/2013/03/05/Gessin%20%20Memo%20121330.pdf On February 21, 2012, Taitano filed her MSJ based on the state court
judgment, the arbitrators findings of fraud and the doctrine of issue preclusion. On
March 19, 2012, attorney Zach Coughlin, filed a late opposition11 on debtors behalf.
The opposition, of which we have taken judicial notice, covered a number of grounds.
First, it addressed the role of Coughlin, who apparently was listed as the attorney of
record in the adversary, but who was actually ghost writing debtors pleadings. (NOTE:
this is rather interesting, given Richard G. Hill, Esq., purportedly emailed the SBN an
unsigned grievance against Coughlin making such baseless and negligent ghost
writing accusations, which Coughlin so thoroughly eviscerated to the SBN that such was
not even an accusation in the SBN's 8/23/12 Complaint (and, really, the purported email,
unsigned grievance by Hill, whom astoundingly is on the NNDB Panel (which says just
about all one ever need know about such Panel) was apparently so completely
defenestrated by Coughlin that the SBN was too embarrassed by it to even seek to admit it
into evidence, despite the failure to do so kind of undermining the attempt to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that Coughlin somehow violated RPC 8.1, so much so,
that the SBN and Panel were reduced to making some lame arguments that Coughlin's
receiving a letter from King, which King purports to have sent on February 14th, 2012
(and which King's complaint falsely asserts King or the SBN ever emailed to Coughlin),
but which Coughlin, due to issues stemming from Gayle Kern, Esq.'s chicanery, that of her
associat
Coughlin sought to withdraw. Next, the opposition contained points and
authorities under which numerous cases addressing breach of fiduciary duty under
523(a)(4) were cited with little analysis or discussion. Third, debtor requested the
bankruptcy court vacate the state court judgment based on his counsels failure to
zealously advocate debtors position during the arbitration hearing, contending this was
excusable neglect under Civil Rule 60(b) (incorporated by Rule 9024). Fourth, debtor
asserted that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction because he ruled on real property
matters. Fifth and last, debtor requested the judgment be vacated because of newly
discovered evidence.12 (footnotes: 11 The actual title of the document was Motion for
Extension of Time to File Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment for
Dischargeability; or, Plead in the Alternative, Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. We take judicial notice of debtors
opposition to Taitanos summary judgment and his supplement with attached exhibits
which were docketed and imaged by the Bankruptcy Court in this case. Atwood v. Chase

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Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 12
This evidence consisted of numerous affidavits of individuals who worked with Christina
Ho, debtors ex-girlfriend and the mother of his son. Hos co-workers declared that Ho
had entered into a conspiracy with Taitano and Rissone to defraud debtor and ruin him
financially. It does not appear that these affidavits were filed in the arbitration proceeding
nor is there any indication that debtor moved to vacate the judgment in the state court with
this newly discovered evidence.) On May 4, 2012, the bankruptcy court heard the MSJ,
but the transcript reflects that no substantive arguments were made with respect to the
motion. The bankruptcy court stated on the record that it would grant the MSJ based on
the preclusive effect of the state court judgment. The court requested Taitanos counsel to
file certified copies of the state court judgment and record and took the matter under
submission. On June 8, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting Taitanos
MSJ on the grounds that the state court arbitrators award established every element under
523(a)(2) and thus the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented debtor from relitigating
those elements in the bankruptcy court. Debtor timely appealed....III. ISSUE Whether the
bankruptcy court erred in deciding that the state court judgment was nondischargeable
under 523(a)(2) based on the doctrine of issue preclusion.
9.
Judge Nash Holmes observed that the pleading filed by Coughlin failed to
address most of the topics listed in the caption. Rather, she observed, the document
contained rambling references to Coughlin's personal life, his father's football career in
college; dozens of pages of string citations taken from the internet and other unrelated
references. Judge Nash Holmes found the pleading to be disjointed and incoherent and a
"pathetic demonstration of what might once have been legal and academic prowess that
appears to now be greatly damaged." See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P2, lines 9-15; P2,
lines 16-20.
10.
Judge Nash Holmes also found that Coughlin, after being released from
custody following the February 27, 2012 contempt of Court incarceration, filed other
nonsensical pleadings including a 218 page document:
"...purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled "Motion to
Return Cell Phones; Motion to Set Aside Summary contempt Order;
and notice of Appeal of Summary contempt Order." With scant
discussion of, or relevance to, the above captioned matter, said
document mostly argues against Judge Howard in a Department 4 case
and again contains more than 200 pages of string legal citations; lyrics
to rocks (sic) songs; Mr. Coughlin's personal family history; discussion
of an eviction case and another contempt case; disjointed legal
citations and other nonsensical matters that have no apparent relevance
to his traffic citation case.
11. After observing that Coughlin's conduct had been inappropriate, bizarre,
dishonest, irrational and disruptive, Judge Nash Holmes concluded, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Coughlin had committed numerous acts of attorney misconduct,
including, but not limited to, violating Rules of Professional conduct 8.4(c), 8.4(d), 3.3(a),

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3.1, 3.2, 3.4(c), 1.3 and 1.1. See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P,3, lines 25-26; P4, lines 523.
12. Judge Nash Holmes also concluded that Coughlin violated Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 229, section 2(b), as amended by ADKT 449 on August 1, 2011 by
surreptitiously recording the traffic court proceedings without advance permission and
lying to the court when questioned regarding the matter by denying that he had done so.
See Hearing Exhibits, ORDER, P,4, lines 24-28.
13. Judge Nash Holmes ordered, among other orders, that the traffic court matter
be continued and all proceedings relating to the traffic court matter be tolled pending
referral of the matter to the State Bar of Nevada. See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P,4,
lines 7- 18,
14. On March 14, 2012, Judge Nash Holmes referred the matter of Coughlin to
State Bar Counsel David Clark and suggested the matter had some urgency. See Hearing
Exhibit 8, Letter dated March 14, 2012 from Reno Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash
Holmes to Office of State Bar Counsel, Nevada State Bar.
15. Judge Holmes testified at the hearing of this disciplinary matter that one of the
purposes of her March 14, 2012 Order was to provide the panel to hear this matter with
clear and convincing evidence, based on her experience and background as an attorney,
prosecutor and judge that Coughlin had violated numerous provisions of the Nevada Rules
of Professional conduct. See
Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 137, L 22 -P 138, L 9.
16.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Bruce Beesley was called to testify at the hearing
of this matter. During the time frame 2011 to 2012, Coughlin appeared before Judge
Beesley two or three times as an attorney representing clients in a bankruptcy matter. On
one occasion Coughlin appeared wearing a T-shirt and a tie and no jacket. See Transcript
of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 10, L 10-16. Coughlin had filed a
pleading in the bankruptcy matter, on behalf of his client. Judge Beesley testified that the
pleading was "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of rambled through a great deal
of irrelevant stuff." See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
10, L 24 -P 11, L 1. On other occasions, although Coughlin appeared polite and intelligent,
his pleadings and arguments didn't make any sense. See Transcript of Proceedings of
Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 11, L2-7
17.
Judge Beesley became concerned, wrote a letter to the State Bar explaining
his experience with Coughlin and indicated that he did not believe Coughlin, in his current
state, was able to adequately represent his clients. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012,P 13, L 24 -P 14, L 7.
18.
In Judge Beesley's opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See
Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14,2012,PIS, L 11 -15.
19.
State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testify at the hearing of
this matter: Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing with the State Bar of Nevada for
33 years. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P
37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr. Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant
dispute with his tenant Coughlin. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20. Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court
and Washoe County District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in the
matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,

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November 14, 2012, P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed filings in of a case in
which Coughlin is involved with Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript of Proceedings
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3.
20.
In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin, Mr. Hill's
firm obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the premises.
Ultimately, Coughlin failed to comply with the eviction order and was convicted of
criminal trespass. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18
-P 44, L 12.
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 41:17 to 44:12) BY MR. KING: Q Did you
end up getting an eviction order removing Mr. Coughlin from Dr. Merliss's
home? A (Richard G. Hill, Esq.) We did. Q Subsequent to the eviction order,
was Mr. Coughlin removed from the home? A I'm sorry. There was an order
issued in court that gave Mr. Coughlin a week to vacate. I believe it was
November 1 that my wife, my associate -- and my associate, went to the home
with the sheriff and conducted a lockout. The front door locks were changed.
The back door locks were changed. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Objection what? MR. COUGHLIN: Hearsay.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Hearsay? Overruled. THE WITNESS: And the whole
thing was videotaped. The next day I went to the home to videotape the place to
preserve what was there to prevent any arguments later, because by that point
in time we knew what we were dealing with. I get there, and the front door is
locked, but almost all the windows are closed but unlocked, and the back door is
unlocked. And I, of course, go through, lock everything, make sure the place is
secure, videotaped it. And I went back and read my wife and my associate the
riot act, and they both said no, the doors were locked. Okay. I go back the next
day, same thing. Back door's unlocked, windows are unlocked. This continues
for the next two weeks. Mr. Coughlin is sending out e-mails to us but will not,
apparently, read the e-mails we're sending to him saying we have to get your
stuff out of here. No response. Two weeks after the eviction on a Sunday Dr.
Merliss comes to town and says, I want to see the house. I meet him about
10:30, 11:00 o'clock on a Sunday morning at the house. We go in. Back door is
open. There's food wrappers on the counter that've been there that weren't
there the last time I was in. Windows are open again, and it's a very
exacerbating situation. And he says, I want to check the basement. I didn't
know there was a basement in the house. There's things piled in the
stairwell to get down into the basement, tool kits, and heavy stuff. We get it
out of the way. We get down there. And I can see when he pushes on the
door, and he turns to me, and he says, "It's barricaded," from the inside. It
wasn't locked, it was barricaded. We know what's going on. So we call the
police. The police come over. They try to get Zach out of the basement,
whoever was in there at that point. The police bang on the door, "Come on
out, Zach. Police. You have to go." No response. They turned to us and say,
we're going to leave. (NOTE: does that not sort of vitiate any subsequent
finding of probable cause to arrest where the police clearly do not feel
justified in pursuing such alleged illegal activity?) Wait a minute. I'm the
owner. You have the authority to break the door down. "We don't do

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that." So Dr. Merliss goes down to the bottom of the stairs. Dr. Merliss
kicks the door open, and the police officer sticks his head around the corner
and pulls his gun out, and here's Mr. Coughlin down there. Mr. Coughlin
voluntarily came upstairs with his dog and was placed under arrest. After he
left, we went downstairs. Mr. Coughlin had a dwelling set up. He had water.
He had food. He had a hot plate, a microwave, had his computer set up
down there. He had the dog. There was dog food, dog poop. He had a bed
and his computer system set up down there. He was arrested and was
subsequently convicted of criminal trespass)
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order
in favor of Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's fees in the
amount of $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered the order
on June 25, 2012. (NOTE: this use of the term sanction is noticeably absent from this
finding and the following excerpt from the transcript cited to, further, despite such
excerpt being only two lines long, it does manage to reveal that Judge Flanagan's Order
granted Merliss's motion for attorney's fees...which, when one considers that Merliss's
4/19/12 filing was titled ) See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday, November 14,
2012, P 47, L 3-7.
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 47:3 to 47:7) Q In this order did Judge
Flanagan accept that by granting the full amount of fees requested? If you read
the last sentence of Page 3. A (Richard G. Hill, Esq.) Yes. "Accordingly,
Merliss's motion for attorney's fees is granted in the sum of $42,065.50.)
(NOTE: Well, so what? Since when do NRS 69.050 prevailing
party attorney fee awards warrant a summary disbarment proceeding?
Have some respect for yourself, SBN, NNDB. As far as this finding is
concerned, and the excerpt of the transcript it cites to, such award of
attorney's fees may well have been nothing more than an award of the
prevailing party attorney's fees of appeal from a justice court civil
action pursuant to NRS 69.050, where a judgment is involved, that
Hill's associate, Casey D. Baker, Esq., cited to as providing a basis for
such a fee award (never mind that NRS 40.400 makes NRAP controlling,
meaning only NRAP 38 would provide such a basis for any fee award,
and Breliant limits the adjucatory boundaries, right (though he failed to
cite to any such authority for such proposition, that was the gist of Baker's
argument that Coughlin's failing to specifically cite to NRS 40.385 in any
filing (Baker's 1/3/12 Opposition to Coughlin's 12/30/11 NRS 40.385
citing Motion to Stay incorrectly asserts that Coughlin first cited to NRS
40.385 in Coughlin's 12/5/11 filing in the justice court when, actually,
Coughlin's 11/23/11 filings expressly cites to NRS 40.386 and Coughlin's
10/15/11 written correspondence with Baker excerpts the following from
the Landlord Tenant Handbook distributed by the AOC: The
drawbacks to summary eviction are: 1. You cannot get a money judgment
as part of your action; 3. The tenant may be able to file an appeal, and
remain in the unit until the appeal is heard by posting a bond with the
court that may be cheaper than that required in the formal eviction
process.....

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Further, it is worth noting that Hill's own associate, Baker's 4/19/12

Motion for Attorney's Fees lies where it reads: 2. Coughlin filed his

first notice of appeal in the eviction case on November 3, 2011, two

days after he was properly and lawfully locked out ofthe property.
ROA, Vol. III, pp. 229-233 given the fact that Baker, Hill, and the
landlord Merliss actually burglarized Coughlin's former home law
office, so, uh, its rather a stretch to taunt NRAP 38 by asserting that
Coughlin was properly and lawfully locked out of the property. )
See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. (Accordingly, Merliss's Motion for
Attorney's Fees is GRANTED in the sum of $42,065.50.)
(NOTE: Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 03628 (FHE2) reads: ORDER
CV11-03628 7 Currently before this Court is Respondent MATT MERLISS' s
("Merliss") Motion for Attorney's Fees filed on April 19, 2012. In the absence of
any opposition from Appellant ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"),
Merliss submitted this matter for decision on May 9, 2012. However, on June 9,
2012, Coughlin filed a Supplement to Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees. In
response, Merliss filed a Reply to Supplement to Opposition to Motion for
Attorney's Fees on June 14, 2012, and submitted the matter-again-that same day.
Merliss requests this Court to award attorney's fees in the amount of $42,065.50
against Coughlin in the underlying summary eviction matter pursuant to NRS
69.050 and NRS 7.085 Merliss and his counsel aver these fees are reasonable,
particularly given Coughlin' "deliberate[] ... pattern of abusive, vexatious, and most
importantly, expensive behavior in both this appeal and in the case below [in Reno
Justice Court]." (Mot. at p. 2) (Original emphasis. Merliss avers Coughlin's
litigation strategy "was simply to keep the fight going" and "require substantial
additional work by Merliss' counsel, far beyond anything in a 'normal' eviction.'
(Mot. at p. 3.) Merliss asserts this additional work was necessary because he "could
not risk the court accepting some random citation in Coughlin's papers and entering
an adverse ruling because [he] had not opposed it." (Mot. at p. 5.) Further, Merliss's
counsel, Richard G. Hill, alleges these fees "do not include substantial amount of
editing and other activities performed by [Mr. Hill] in this case." (Mot. a p. 6; Mot.
Ex. 4.) Merliss contends "[i]t is hard to imagine a more appropriate case than this in
which to award the maximum amount justified by the substantial evidence before
the court.' (Mot. at p. 6.) Merliss goes even further and states:
As proven above and below, the frivolity and vexatiousness of
Coughlin's maintenance and extension of this matter has been so
beyond reason, and so outrageous, and the nexus of his behavior to
the fees incurred by Merliss so direct and indisputable, that nothing
less than a full award of those fees should even be considered by the
court. To not impose the full measure of the harm Coughlin has
caused would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in this and
other cases. There needs to be a day of reckoning for Coughlin's
antics.
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(Mot. at p. 8.)

Nevada law provides for "a reasonable attorney fee to be fixed and allowed
by the district court for all services rendered in behalf of the prevailing party" on
appeal from justice court. NEV. REV. STAT. 69.050. In addition, NRS 7.085
requires the district court to order an attorney personally to pay reasonable
attorney's fees incurred as a result of the filing, maintaining or defending of civil
action where "such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact or is not
warranted by existing law ...." NEV. REV. STAT. 7.085(1)(a). The same applies
to attorney who has "[u ]nreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action. "
NEV. REV. STAT. 7.085(1)(b).
If grounds exist to award attorney's fees, Nevada courts follow the lodestar
analysis. Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., 121 Nev. 837, 864, 124 P.3d
530, 549 (2005) ("The lodestar approach involves multiplying the number of hours
reasonably spent on the case by reasonable hourly rate.") (Quotations and citations
omitted.) In determining the reasonablenes of the fee award, the district court
should consider the following four factors: (1) the advocates' qualities; (2) the
character of the work; (3) the work performed; and (4) the result obtained. See,
Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969)
(citation omitted); Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning, 124 Nev. 821,
829, 192 P.3d 730, 73 (2008) (per curiam) (applying the Brunzell factors).
After reviewing Merliss's moving papers-including the detailed and
thorough summary of fees and his counsels' accompanying Declarations-and after
considering all of the parties' arguments, this Court concludes Merliss's attorney's
fees request is authorized by Nevada law. This Court also has considered the
factors set forth in Brunzell, supra. After analyzing those factors, and given the
unique features of this case, this Court concludes Merliss's fee request is
reasonable.
Accordingly, Merliss's Motion for Attorney's Fees is GRANTED in the sum of
$42,065.50. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 25th day of June, 2012. /s/ Patrick
Flanagan District Judge)

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The motion seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the
defense of the eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and
vexatious and presumably so found by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13;
P 3, L 4-11.
22.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review of the
pleadings in the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review of the
pleadings in Coughlin's litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is of the opinion
that Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23.
Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was
not truthful with either counsel or the court. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill felt that Coughlin's filings were abusive, at
one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill of bribing

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the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staff is terrorized by
Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15.
24.
State Bar Counsel called attorney Paul Elcano to testify at the hearing of
this matter. Mr. Elcano is the executive director of Washoe Legal Services that provides
legal services to indigents. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
88, L 25 -P 89, L 14. Coughlin was employed by Washoe Legal Services from August 29,
2007 to May 11, 2009. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 93,
L 17 -20. Mr. EJcano became aware of an order entered by Judge Gardner on April 10,
2009 in the matter of Joshi v Joshi and, as a result, reviewed the taped transcript of the
hearing. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 94, L 22 -P 95, L 6.
25.
Judge Gardner's order in the Joshi matter indicated that Coughlin had
conducted no discovery in the case and failed to present any documentary evidence at
the trial of the matter on behalf of his client Mrs. Joshi. See Hearing Exhibit P 12, L 4
-6. After commenting on various negative aspects of Coughlin's representation of his client
Mrs. Joshi, (See Hearing Exhibit P 12, L 9 -P 13, L 40) Judge Gardner specifically held:
"The most troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic
and disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to
understand a balance sheet; his failure to conduct discovery; and his lack
of knowledge with regard to the rules of evidence and trial procedure. All
of this was compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation of
the case that resulted in a shift from a fairly simple divorce case to a
contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount of time. "

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See Hearing Exhibit P 13, L 5 -10

26. Judge Gardner sanctioned Coughlin personally and awarded attorney's fees to
Mr. Joshi in the amount of $934 to be paid personally by Coughlin within 30 days of the
order. See Hearing Exhibit P 13, L 14 -17

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Uh, no. Actually, Judge L. Gardner has never sanctioned Coughlin. There is not
sanctions order of any legally operative effect in existence that so holds. What is
sanctionable is King and Judge Nash Holmes presenting such (and perhaps Judge L.
Gardner and her brother RMC Judge W. Gardner for giving such to Judge Nash Holmes,
though, clearly, Judge W. Gardner expressed surprise to hear that such FHE3 that he
received from his sister and passed around to his fellow RMC Judges had been provided to
the SBN by Judge Nash Holmes (echoing the lack of permission to speak on his behalf
that RMC Judge Dilworth expressed disatisfaction with respect to during the trial incident
to the wrongful RPD arrest of 7/3/12 in RMC 12 CR 12420). Whether Judge W. Gardner
was negligent in providing such inoperative FHE3 to Judge Nash Holmes is a matter for
Mr. Sarnowski, and perhaps the courts, given judicial immunity is not quite such an
impenetrable defense when it comes to courts of limited jurisdiction...See, Glazier.

2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 2/25/09 Order reads: "ORDER RE PRETRIAL

PROCEDURE This matter is set for trial on March 12, 2009 at 1:30 p.m. Good
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, if a party intends to offer more
than ten trial exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexed.
Plaintiff's exhibits will be marked in alphabetical sequence and Defendant's
exhibits will be marked in numerical sequence. Each party shall submit two
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copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing
counsel. Counsel shall contact Martha Casique-Andrews at 775-325-6779 to
schedule a time with the Clerk to organize and mark exhibits. For trials set for one
full day or more, counsel shall meet with the Court Clerk no later than 3:00 p.m. on
the Friday prior to trial to mark the trial exhibits. For trials which are scheduled for
less than one full day, exhibits shall be marked immediately prior to the convening
for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes before the scheduled time of
trial. Prior to meeting with the Court Clerk, counsel shall meet and discuss the
admissibility of proposed exhibits. At the time of marking the exhibits with the
Clerk, the Clerk shall be told which Exhibits may be admitted without objection. At
the opening of trial, counsel shall inform the Court which exhibits are being
admitted without objection. Each party must file with the Court a trial statement,
financial declaration and UCCJA declaration. Courtesy copies of the trial statement
shall be hand-delivered to opposing counsel and Judge Gardner's chambers by no
later than 5:00 p.m. five (5) days prior to trial. Failure to timely deliver these
documents may result in sanctions against the offending party as set forth in NRCP
37. If the financial circumstances of a party have changed substantially since the
filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an updated
financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement. Dated this ..ay of
February, 2009. /s/ Linda M. Gardner"
2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 7/15/09 Order reads: " ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
IN PART On April 13, 2009, the Court entered an Order After Trial specifying its
findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the divorce trial that took place
March 12 and March 17, 2009. On May 12, 2009, a Notice of Appeal was filed by
Zachary Coughlin, Esq., specifying he was appealing the Order After Trial entered
April 13, 2009. On May 13, 2009, a Motion to Strike was filed by John P.
Springgate, Esq., alleging the Notice of Appeal filed on May 12, 2009, was
untimely filed pursuant to NRAP 3A. Specifically, Mr. Springgate argued there
was no final judgment entered in this matter yet as the Order After Trial had not
been memorialized into a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and
Decree of Divorce1. (fn1 A Decree of Divorce was entered in this case on June 19,
2009.) On May 27, 2009, a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Springgate.
On June 8, 2009, Mr. Coughlin opposed the motion and argued it was not clear
whether the Order After Trial was a final order, and "[i]t certainly is not worth
risking the deadline for filing an appeal. . . Opposition 2:13-2:14. On June 8, 2009,
a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Coughlin.
Upon review of the pleadings and papers filed herein, the Court finds and
Orders as follows. Insofar as Mr. Coughlin is appealing the award of attorney's
fees, the Court finds the Order After Trial entered April 13, 2009, was a final order
from which Mr. Coughlin may appeal as the Court did not intend the award of
attorney's fees to be included in the Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, Mr.
Springgate's Motion to Strike is denied with respect to the appealability of the
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Order After Trial as it pertains to the award of attorney's fees. With regard to appeal
of the issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/divorce, the Court finds the Order
After Trial was not a final order from which Mr. Coughlin may appeal as the Court
intended all issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/divorce to be separate and
apart from the award of attorney's fees. (NOTE: then, certainly, it made little
sense to mix the two in one 4/13/09 Order After Trial, but regardless, the 6/19/09
final Decree of Divorce (especially when view with the knowledge that
Springgate's 5/21/09 Proposed Decree contained an attorney's fees award provision,
and where the 7/22/09 Accordingly, Mr. Springgate's Motion to Strike is granted
with respect to the appealability of the issues pertaining solely to the Joshi divorce.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARINGI IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 15, 2009 /s/
Linda M. Gardner District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an
employee of the Second Judicial District Court, and that on the j fry day of July,
2009, I deposited for mailing, first class postage pre-paid, at Reno, Nevada, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document addressed to: Document: Order
Denying Motion to Strike in Part; Order Granting Motion to Strike in Part Zachary
Coughlin, Esq. 945 W. 12th Street Reno, NV 89503 I hereby certify that on the 15
day of July, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court
system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following: John
Springgate, Esq. Marc Ashley, Esq. /s/ Stephenie Broome Administrative Assistant
- Dept. 14" (NOTE: there is an inconsistent approach taken by the 2JDC,
Springgate, and WLS in only serving certain selected filings or orders in DV0801168 on Coughlin upon his being terminated by WLS.
Springgate's letter to Coughlin supports the Consent Decree argument, to
whatever extent any fees were even still part of any operative Order or Decree
given Springgate's Proposed Decree of 5/21/09 contained a section expressly
providing for such fees, where the Final Decree 2JDC Judge L. Gardner entered on
6/19/09 (which nobody served on Coughlin, conveniently) contained all of
Springgate's Proposed Decree save the paragraph 6 therein providing for an award
of attorney's fees. Further, Judge L. Gardner's Order of 7/15/09 further supports
the position that there was no longer any attorney fees award, as a sanction or
otherwise (likely due to a recognition of the legitimacy of Coughlin's argument
with respect to Springgate having failed to comply with NRCP 11's 21 day safe
harbor provision (incorporated into NRS 7.085 by the express language of such
statute) in addition to the fact that the 4/13/09 Order After Trial relied upon a
position that alimony was not indicated, and, therefore, Coughlin had litigated
vexatiously, where the Final Decree ultimately entered did, in fact, award alimony
to Coughlin's former client. Further support for this position resides where WLS
and Springgate arguably entered into a Consent Decree even further vitiating any
finding that attorney's fees were awarded. Springgate's letter to Coguhlin of
12/8/09 reads:

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December 8, 2009 VIA EMAIL Zachary Coughlin, Esq. 731 Foreset Street
Reno, NY 89509
Dear Zach: I have received the Supreme Court's Order
Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Accordingly, you still owe me fees from
the Second Judicial District Court matter, and are in contempt for not paying them.
My offer to make a token donation to Casa de Vida or, alternatively, the Food
Bank of Northern Nevada, remains in effect. They need the help and I would be
happy to put this case behind me. Please advise as to your intentions. Very truly
yours, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ."
The 7/22/09 filing in DV08-01168 reads: STIPULATION TO AMEND
DECREE OF DIVORCE COME NOW the parties hereto, ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., and
BHARTI JOSHI, by and through her counsel of record, MARC ASHLEY, ESQ., of
Washoe Legal Services, and hereby stipulate and agree to an Order Amending the
Decree of Divorce in the following regards: In response to Ms. Joshi's motion, the
Court amended the proposed Findings of Fact to include a finding of ONE
DOLLAR ($1.00) per year alimony for Ms. Joshi. However, the Decree, as
amended by the Court, did not include a term. The parties had originally
agreed or suggested a term of five (5) years and they therefore stipulate and
agree that this Stipulation and Order thereon shall amend the Decree of
Divorce to include ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) alimony for five (5) years in favor of
Ms. Joshi. DATED: 7/20/09 /s/ John Springgate, Esq., /s/ Marc Ashley, Esq."
27. Based on the order and Coughlin's conduct in the Joshi matter, Coughlin was
terminated by Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November
14, 2012, P 110, L7-8 28, In Mr. Elcano's opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 94, L 3 -8.
29. State Bar Counsel called Coughlin to testify at the hearing of the matter.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 from Assistant
Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel forwarded to Coughlin
correspondence received from Richard G. Hill. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing Exhibit 6. Coughlin's
response, dated March 9, 2012, asked for additional time in which to respond. See Hearing
Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that Coughlin substantively responded to Bar
Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012 prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
Coughlin failed to directly respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring if Coughlin ever
subsequently responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
30.
Coughlin also failed to directly respond to questioning regarding
whether or not he had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in
this matter, to a letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel regarding the letter received
by the Nevada State Bar from Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes and dated March 14, 2012.
See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 174, L 13 -P 180, L 4. See
Hearing Exhibit 8. (NOTE: there is nothing in the record to support the finding that
Coughlin received such letter from Bar Counsel, in fact, Coughlin testified to Bar
Counsel's chicanery in that regard, and certainly King should not be allowed to testify to
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sending Coughlin some letter that King refused to even seek have admitted into evidence,
especially where King successfully moved, on an ex parte basis, to quash Coughlin's
subpoenas on King and SBN Clerk of Court Peters, not to mention RPC 3.7, etc..
Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate when Coughlin first saw such
3/14/12 grievance letter that RMC Judge Nash Holmes sent to the SBN, not Coughlin
(King's constant trumpeting of the bates stamps that he had affixed to the box of 3,200
pages delivered to Coughlin four judicial days before the hearing (in flagrant violation of
all of SCR 105(2)(c) references the bates stamps found on the Hearing Exhibit 8...and
where King admits such letter did not have any such bates stamping on it to begin with, its
inappropriate for King to have successfully had admitted such version with King's 11/7/12
production of 3,200 pages worth of bates stamped SCR 105(2)(c) materials (none of which
include any Canon 2, Rule 2.15 letters from the Judges whose orders King offered as
evidence of Coughlin's professional misconduct, such as Hearing Exhibit 2's Judge
Flanagan Order of 6/25/12 in the appeal of the summary eviction from Coughlin's former
home law office that Richard G. Hill, Esq., burglarized while managing to get Coughlin
wrongfully convicted of criminal trespass (see 61901) by Hill's lying to, and with, the
Reno Police Department). Some clear and convincing evidence of when Coughlin
received or viewed such letter would be pretty important to support the Panel's finding
that Coughlin failed to directly respond to questioning regarding whether or not he
had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, to a
letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel directly respond to questioning regarding
whether or not he had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in
this matter, to a letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel where when and prior to
the filing of the Complaint take on similar importance to the fact that there is no evidence
that Bar Counsel even forwarded Coughlin such letter to begin with (boy was the Panel
Chair mad that Coughlin could not honestly testify on behalf of the State Bar as to when,
if ever, he received such letter from the SBN...it would have helped so very, very much
alleviate all the messy issues that would be associated with putting the 3/16/12 letter from
King to Coughlin (notice the SBN did not present any copy of any such letter with some
Certificate of Mailing slip to prove Coughlin ever received it, and Coughlin testified
extensively, and offered a great deal of proof as to the fact that he was not regularly
receiving his mail when such letter was sent, including offering copies of numerous
envelopes (several sent to Coughlin's by the RMC even) that Coughlin only received much
later, after senders notified him of such being returned to them, or after the USPS finally
releasing such to Coughlin, replete with, in many instances, several of the small yellow
stickers indicating a variety of reroutings and recipient temporarily unavailable
messages incident to the domestic violence and mailbox tampering/lease
disputes/wrongful summary eviction by Gayle Kern, Esq. (whom also had Coughlin's
former home law officer burglarized with the help of the WCSO, just an hour before the
very 3/15/12 hearing in NVB 10-05104 that Judge Beesley testified about)
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 174:13 to 180:4) "BY MR. KING: Q Do you
recognize that letter that's been identified as Exhibit 8 that purports to be
written to Mr. David Clark, Office of Bar Counsel, from Judge Dorothy
Nash Holmes? A It is the one that has a received March 14th date on it?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's the one that's marked Exhibit 8. BY MR. KING: Q
The one I just handed you. Did you see that letter? A I don't see it marked

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Exhibit 8. It's not marked. Q It's marked up here, Mr. Coughlin. A That's
why I was asking for clarification. March 14th. Q The question is: Do you
recognize that letter? A Yes, sir. Q And -- A This is the letter where she
alleges a competency issue, and then goes on to say, but I'm still trying to
hold a trial, I'm trying to get this trial set right away, in violation of NRS
178.405 which states you stay proceedings when you feel a defendant has
a competency issue. You don't plunge right ahead. That letter, yeah, I
recognize it. MR. KING: I'm going to ask that Exhibit No. 8 be admitted.
This is the letter that Judge Holmes sent to the Office of Bar Counsel that she
testified about during her testimony. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any objection,
Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: I don't think so. Well, relevancy. And I
don't believe this is pled in the complaint. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
(Exhibit 8 admitted.) BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Coughlin, you received that
because Bar counsel forwarded it to you; is that correct? A I don't remember
how I received this. I imagine it would -- I don't think a stranger sent it to me.
I don't know. Q Did you respond to the allegations to Bar counsel, the
allegations made in the letter by Judge Holmes, and the accompanying
documents; did you respond to that investigation? A Actually, I'm trying to
remember -- did I get this letter attached to like an SCR 117 petition? Can
you help me out? Did I get it soon after -- I think you were kind of coy about
this, actually, Pat. Right? You kind of -- you were kind of coy about having
it. You didn't just get this letter, and then I don't think you mailed it to me on
March 14th. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the question is did you
reply to it? THE WITNESS: I don't know -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry.
The question is: Was it forwarded to you? THE WITNESS: That's what I was
expounding upon. I'm trying to remember when did I first get this letter.
Because this is like a gut punch if you've devoted your life to becoming an
attorney. And, in fact, I didn't get her March 28th letter -- I mean her March
28th order that was entered. I didn't even get that until I saw it attached to an
SCR 117 disability petition in case number 60975. I guess I kind of figured
she just wasn't going to make an order, you know. And she mailed this one,
the one for February 28th, she mailed it to the old River Rock address where I
was evicted from, despite the fact it appeared, at least a couple other
departments in her court had a more recent address for me. And then I have -if I had been noticed on this -- I have a lot of these letters. I meticulously kept
the envelopes. I kept the change of addresses. I think I might have sent Pat
these with the yellow -- I had a lot of the yellow stickers on my letters, you
know, where they were like -- and the court, the court had these too. The muni
court. And I had a big ordeal with the post office incident to they didn't want
to give me a key to the mailbox. This eviction, the evil work that you
sanctioned, Pat, that I mentioned earlier, it has a fallout necessarily. In my
opinion -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, excuse me. Do you remember
the question? THE WITNESS: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What was the
question? THE WITNESS: Did I receive this. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And the
answer? THE WITNESS: I'm working my way through it mentally as to how
I got this. MR. KING: If I'm not mistaken, we're past that. You said you did

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receive it. He doesn't recall how. And my follow-up question was: Did you
respond to the allegations by Judge Holmes that are contained in that letter,
and by the accompanying documents? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, if
you could focus on answering that question, that would be helpful to the
panel. THE WITNESS: One, this letter is not to me. I would like to read it.
Again, that's where the notice part of due process is key, you know. If I was
noticed on the idea that I didn't respond to this -- and I'll enter my objection. I
would like to see where in the complaint it says Mr. Coughlin failed to
respond or cooperate with Bar counsel. It might. I'd just like to be sure. Where
does it say where -- was I noticed the import of today was going to include,
the relevant inquiry today that I have been put on notice for, was going to
include the idea that I didn't appropriately respond to this? So if I go to the
complaint, I'm just wondering where in the complaint might I be put on
notice that I would be expected to know when I got this today, and respond
intelligently in that regard. (Exhibit 9 marked.) MR. KING: Mr. Chairman,
may I move on? MR. ECHEVERRIA: You may. THE WITNESS: May I
answer as best as I can remember then? MR. ECHEVERRIA: If you will
answer the question, it would be helpful. But these rambling discourses are
not helpful. THE WITNESS: They're not winning any points on notice and
due process? MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is a preliminary investigation. Bar
rules require attorneys to cooperate with the preliminary investigation. As I
understand, Mr. King is trying to establish whether or not you did so. That's
an issue that I believe is relevant to the determination of the degree of
punishment, if any, that should flow to you as a result of your conduct. So,
Mr. King, move on, please. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: Your
Honor, can I just quickly attempt to more thoroughly address that issue? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I think you've been afforded adequate opportunity to do so.
How you choose to respond is up to you."
FHE 8, Judge Holmes' 3/14/12 grievance against Coughlin addressed to
the SBN only (to what, and upon whose request was Coughlin supposed
to "provide some information" per RPC 8.1 as to NG12-0434, much
less NG12-0435? Further, the portion of the transcript Echeverria cites
to in no way supports the finding Echeverria made, it fails to even
establish that the SBN ever asked Coughlin to responde, much less
"provide some required information" not subject to RPC 1.6, to the
SBN in response to Judge Holmes FHE 8 letter) and hand delivered to
the SBN along with a box of materials reads:
...This letter constitutes a formal complaint of attorney misconduct
and/or disability against Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying
box of materials demonstrates some of the problems with the practice
of this attorney being experienced by myself and the other three
judges in Reno Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what
should be a simple traffic citation case are self-explanatory and are
included, together with copies of massive documents Mr. Coughlin

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has faxfiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings of two of my

hearings in this matter are also included. He failed to appear for the
second one this past Monday.
I have another traffic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned
to me based on our Department 1 judge being out for surgery. We
have multiple addresses for Mr. Coughlin and can't seem to locate him
between cases very easily. We are setting that case for trial and
attempting to serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E.
9th St. #2 Reno NV 89512), although I heard today he may be
living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an address for his
mother, however, as she recently posted part of a fine for him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late
last year that is now on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court.
Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a matter currently
pending in his court with Mr. Coughlin as the defendant. I have
enclosed some copies of documents from those matters, in
chronological order, simply because they appear to demonstrate that
he is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staff also
made you some audio tapes of Coughlin in the matters in Departments
2 and 4 so you can hear for yourself how this attorney acts in court.
You can see his behavior in my traffic citation case does not appear to
be an isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter
pending on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant was contacted by
the Washoe Public Defender in February when I had Mr.
Coughlin jailed for contempt of Court and they stated that they
represent him in a Gross misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no
other information on that.
You will have the full cooperation of myself, the other judges, and
the staff of Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit of this matter. Mr.
Coughlin has positioned himself as a vexatious litigant in our court,
antagonizing the staff and even our pro temp judges on the most
simple traffic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is a case of
some urgency, and I apologize for taking two days to get this
package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies
of the audios of Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today, and I felt it was
important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered
by the State Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he
was actively practicing law and had appointments with clients. I
do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing serious
harm to the practice of law in Northern Nevada and could be
jeopardizing someone's freedom or property interests."
(NOTE: no matter how hard he may try, Coughlin could likely never
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be jeopardizing someone's freedom or property interests as regularly

and thoroughly as does Judge Nash Holmes, especially where she
damaged such very interests of Coughlin's clients upon denying a
stay of any sort to a then practicing attorney (something that is pretty
much verboten in American jurisprudence) (immune from arrest while
going to, attending, or leaving court, and Coughlin maintained such at
the time, and therefore did not waive any such right, meaning, even
had Judge Nash Holmes and her crew of Marshals managed to
conduct a lawful search incident to arrest of Coughlins' smart phone,
micro sd card, cell phone, and electric shaver, rather than the unlawful
confiscation of such a day later after those items had already been
booked into Coughlin's property (such items were returned to
Coughlin with all the data thereon erased, and WCSO Deputy Hodge
admitted to Coughlin on March 19th, 2012 that the Washoe County
Jail had released to the RMC Marshals such items already booked
into Coughlin's personal property on 2/28/12, and that such were
still in the possession of the RMC on 3/19/12)
In a ridiculous attempt to assert some impropriety on Coughlin's part,
like that done by Judge Nash Holmes in her 3/13/12 Order Striking
Fugitive Document that King was too embarrassed by to admit in its
entirety into the record, but which is mistakenly included the
Certificate of Mailing thereto along with the partial purported filing
by Coughlin admitted as FHE9 (R1784-1786) where R1786 is the
RMC's Certificate of Service that King mistakenly forgot to excise
from FHE9, (which does indicate that such Order was faxed to the
jail, but certainly does not indicate anything about the jail providing
such to Coughlin, and Coughlin has never been provided any Order
from any court by any jail, ever) though King did manage to
fraudulently excise page 1 of 3 of the 3/7/12 filing by Coughlin (the
page that would have come right before the Affidavit found at
R1784), a page which clearly indicates Coughlin is an attorney (to
whatever ridiculous extent the RMC and King are alleging they were
not already aware that Coughlin was an attorney, including where
Coughlin's plea for a stay of the 5 day incarceration order on 2/27/12
included (as King's own stupid pleadings have recounted, duh) the
prejudice to Coughlin's client upon Judge Nash Holmes going against
the overwhelming majority viewpoint in american jurisprudence
essentially requring a Judge refrain from summarily incarcerating an
attorney for contempt (R1782-83, especailly R1783, which makes all
the more fraudulent what King presented on the very next page of the
ROA, where he clearly violated PRC 3.3, 3.4, and 3.8 in removing the
first page of the 3/7/12 filing by Coughlin in 26800, along with the
3/13/12 Order Striking Fugitive Document by Judge Holmes' (the
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Order to which the Certificate of Service found on page 1786 goes to)
that attached said filing of 3/7/12 by Coughlin (which further conceals
the extent to which the RMC attempted to prevent Coughlin from
accessing the recording of that 2/27/12 trial in 26800, as Coughlin
also filed a Records Request on the form the RMC hold out for such
purposes, directed towards obtaining the audio transcript of all
hearings in that matter, including that of 2/27/12, which the RMC
refused to respond to...which is why Coughlin had to stealthily have
his momma go obtain to the audio transcript from the RMC, in
addition to the versions which King and the SBN finally provided
Coughlin in late June 2012, which King, curiously, alleges to be not
certified and apparently lacking in foundation and probably not all
that truthful, apparently (if that's so, then why isn't someone
investigating the RMC for providing altered audio transcripts to
the SBN?).
31.
On March 7, 2012 Coughlin caused to be filed an "Affidavit of Poverty in
Support of Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis." See Hearing Exhibit 9. In his Affidavit,
Coughlin represented that he was self-employed as a "Jack of all Trades." See Hearing
Exhibit 9. The Affidavit does not identify Mr. Coughlin as a lawyer or identity any
income from the practice of law. See Hearing Exhibit 9.
(NOTE: why not see FHE8 too, especially the sentence in Holmes letter addressed
only to the SBN which reads: " On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was
actively practicing law and had appointments with clients").
32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also filed a motion on November
14, 2011 to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number 11 CR 22176 pending in the Reno
Municipal Court before Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19-23.
(Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that his
incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in
his "affidavit of poverty" does not indicate any income from his practice of law. Of
note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the litigation of the instant matter.)
(Also, the "Ruling" of the municipal court was affirmed on appeal in CR11-

2064, with the Order pointing out a failure to cite to pages in the record supporting
the arguments in the Brief. Permission to file by email was granted to Coughlin
therein by RMC Filing Officer Supervisor Ballard (see attached exampled of
Supervisor Ballard file stamping a subpoena that was submitted via email only.
Such permission to file be email was withdraw at the earliest, on 12/19/11
(constructive notice to Coughlin thereof). However, the Record on Appeal in
CR11-2064 fails to contain the clear, one page per page emailed filings, rather, in
some instances, completely illegible 4 page per page versions were submitted
(despite express indications to the RMC filing office that the email version ought be
included in the ROA).
"Fwd: Attached Image? Donna Ballard (BallardD@reno.gov)Add to
contacts11/29/11 To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com From:
Donna Ballard
(BallardD@reno.gov) You moved this message to its current location. Sent: Tue
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11/29/11 4:47 PM To:

zachcoughlin@hotmail.com Outlook Active View 1
attachment (44.0 KB) 0661_001.pdf Download Download as zip Thank you. I am
taking it up to the Department now. Donna -----Original Message----- From:
"MUNI CT 1st Floor Clerks" <canon@reno.gov> To: "DONNA"
<ballardd@reno.gov> Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 17:42:28 -0800 Subject: Attached
Image Donna Ballard Senior Court Specialist Reno Municipal Court 1 South Sierra
Street Reno, Nevada 89501 (775)334-3101
IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:22 AM To: ballardd@reno.gov;
renomunirecords@reno.gov 2 attachments Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry
Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdf (381.9 KB), Coughlin IFP and
Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 22176 2I.pdf (372.0 KB) Zach
Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia St. #2 Reno, NV 89501 tel: 775 229-6737 fax: 949 667
7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473")
(NOTE: Coughlin request judicial notice be taken of the error in the date
assigned to such In Forma Pauperis motion, incorrectly identified as filed on 11/14/11,
when, clearly, from the copy thereof attached as Exhibit 6 to NNDB Chairman Susich's
5/31/12 SCR 117 Petition in 60975, such was actually filed after the trial in such matter of
11/30/11, wherein Coughlin pleaded for a stay, citing concern for his client's affairs, to no
avail. Susich, like King, takes the fraudulent callow approach in his Exhibit 6 to excising
page 1 of 3 from Coughlin's 3 page 12/14/12 Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and
Affidavit of Poverty In Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Paupers (see, page 2
marking at the bottom of the page on the first page of such Exhibit 6. Such
clownsmanship by Susich and King must not stand, its an embarrassment to the Bar
and the Nevada Supreme Court, and the State of Nevada as a whole) Judge Howard's
Order denying Coughlin's motion specifically noted that Coughlin's "affidavit of poverty"
did not identify any income from the practice of law yet Coughlin had implied to the
court when sentenced to incarceration for contempt that his incarceration would adversely
affect his clients.
(NOTE: how terribly difficult it is for a RMC former prosecutor turned judge to
imagine that any attorney not a prosecutor or former prosecutor turned RMC defender
could possibly yield any benefit to any client, or to admit, in any way, the importance of
attorneys to the judicial system) See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23. (NOTE: too bad
King's Complaint did not identify some alleged failure to identify any income from the
practice of law basis for arguing some professional misconduct, but, rather, fraudulently
asserted 17. Respondent filed Affidavits of Poverty in Support of his Motion to Proceed
Informa Pauperis, wherein he fails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney and instead
under Employment and Self-Employment he identifies himself as a "Jack of All Trades".
18. Despite a claim of poverty in the above mentioned affidavits, Respondent told the
Court that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients.
The RMC initially approved, in writing, Coughlin's submitting filings via
email (subsequently, without any prior notice, the RMC fraudulently failed to included
such filings submitted via email in the ROA for the very petty larceny conviction resulting
in Coughlins' current temporary suspension, which is an abominably embarrassing
miscarriage of justice, in CR11-2064), and Coughlin's submission on 12/14/12 clearly
defeats the vague at best accusations made with respect to any Motions to Proceed In
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Forma Pauperis or Affidavits connected thereto (whether pled in King's Complaint or only
added later by the Panel in a desperate attempt to shore up its insipied 12/14/12 FOFCOL):
33. Although Coughlin claims to suffer the impairment of attention deficit
disorder, for which he is prescribed medication and which medication he took on the day
of his hearing, he does not feel he needs any additional help. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 199, L 13 -P 204, L 9.
34. On August 23, 2012, the State Bar of Nevada filed its Complaint in this matter
and served it upon Respondent Coughlin by Certified Mail to his address then registered
with the State Bar of Nevada. See Docket. Complaint.
35. Not having received a response to the Complaint, on October 9, 2012 the State
Bar of Nevada filed and served on Respondent Coughlin, by certified mail, a "notice of
Intent to Proceed on a Default Basis." The notice attached an additional copy of the
Complaint and indicated that unless a responsive pleading to the Complaint was received
by the State Bar by October 24, 2012, the matter would proceed on a default basis. See
Docket, notice of Intent to Proceed on a Default Basis.
36. On October 31, 2012 Panel Chair Echeverria issued the Panel's Order denying
Coughlin's "Motion to Dismiss" filed October 16, 2012; Denying Coughlin's "Motion for
Order to Show Cause Regarding Improper Attempt by Bar Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB
to Delay and Obstruct Hearing Required by Courts (sic) June 7, 2012 Order in Case No.
60838 and Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in Case 61426 filed October 2, 2012;
Granting (NOTE: if you say so) Coughlin's Motion to Review and Inspect Bar Records
filed October 16, 2012 and Denying Coughlin's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing and
Motion to Dismiss for (sic) Complaint (sic) Failure to Sufficiently State the Charges
with Specificity and Support and for Utter Failure of Bar Counsel to Perform
Reasonable Investigation." See Order Dated October 31, 2012. In that Order, Chairman
Echeverria further ordered that the Formal Hearing would proceed on a default basis
unless Coughlin filed a Verified Answer to the Complaint by November 9, 2012. See
Order Dated October 31, 2012, P 2, L 7-10.
(NOTE: SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters "Certificate Of Service"
for King's file stamped 10/24/12 Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to
Bifurcate, Motion to Dismiss reads: "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The
undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing, Motion to
Dismiss was deposited in the United States Mai l at Reno, Nevada,
postage fully pre-paid thereon fo r certified and fi rst class mail addressed
to the fo llowing: Zachary B. Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno NV 89505
DATED this 24th day of October, 2012. /s/ Laura Peters, An Employee
Of The State Bar Of Nevada" However, The USPS Track & Confrim
Indicates That, Even Where Peters Certificate Of Mailing Lacks The
Mikohn "to Go Out That Day" Language, Peters Certificate Of Mailing Is
Untrue Where Such Did Not Even Go Out The Next Day 10/25/11, But
Was Only Picked Up By The Usps On 10/26/12, Prejudicing Coughlin's
Ability To File A Reply Thereto, Especially Where Panel Chair
Echeverria, Curiously (even Though The Panel Had Only Been
Designated The Previous Date, 10/30/12 By Nndb Chair Susich) Entered

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An Order On 10/31/11 Denying Coughlin's Motions To Bifurcate,

Dismiss, And For An Order To Show Cause. The Usps Track & Confrim
For Such 10/24/12 File Stamped Sbn King Opposition To Coughlin's
Motion To Birfurcate, Motion To Dismiss Reveals: "your Label Number
Service Status Of Your Item Date & Time Location Features
70102780000354295526 Notice Lef T October 27, 2012, 4:03 Pm Reno,
Nv 89512 Certified Mail Arrival At Unit October 27, 2012, 6:39 Am
Reno, Nv 89506 Processed Through Usps Sort Facility October 27, 2012,
4:50 Am Reno, Nv 89510 Depart Usps Sort Facility October 27, 2012
Reno, Nv 89510 Processed Through Usps Sort Facility October 26, 2012,
10:15 Pm Reno, Nv 89510" And, really, such is not all that surprising
considering King's own signature on that Opposition indicates such was
"Respectfully submitted on this 25 day of October, 2012 STATE BAR OF
NEVADA DAVID A. CLARK, BAR COUNSEL By: /s/ Patrick O. King,
Assistant Bar Counsel".)
Further, beyond the fact that both King and SBN Clerk of Court
Laura Peters denied Coughlin's verbal and written requests to so inspect
the materials to which Coughlin had a right to do so under SCR 105(2)(c)
on several occasions between the 8/23/12 filing of the Complaint and up
to within three days of the hearing, if King's 10/25/12 signed (but file
stamped 10/24/12, and USPS Track & Confirm proven to have been
deposited for mailing on 10/26/12) Oppoistion to Motion to Bifurcate and
Motion to Dismiss was being truthful where King purported to have no
objection to Coughlin so inspecting the file (...the State Bar of Nevada

responds as follows: Zachary Coughlin may inspect the evidence

that the State Bar has pertaining to his discipline matters up to
three (3) days prior to the hearing, pursuant to SCR 105(2)(c).
Coughlin has been sent, via both certified and first class mail, a
Notice of Hearing which was accompanied by a Designation of
Witnesses and Summary of Evidence prepared by bar counsel
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule. To the extent that Coughlin wants
to review the disciplinary files pertaining to his case, Bar Counsel
has no objection.), then why would the Panel Chair's Order of
10/31/12 order something other than such (indicating, obviously, more
ex parte communications between Echeverria and the SBN, not hard to
believe considering their offices are within as stone's throw of each
other. Echeverria should, perhaps, just stick to defending drunken multimillionaire rapist quarterbacks and get out of the judging game).
Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order remixed SCR 105(2)(c) (and, also,
makes some very telling, and interesting findings regarding what
Coughlin filed and when Coughlin filed such filings when considering
the manner in which Coughlin submitting such submission for filing, and
the extent to which the SBN failed to place a file stamp on Coughlin's
Motion for Order to Show Cause, in addition to failing to file stamp in, or
even recognize, the 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss (with a 9 page letter to
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NNDB Chair Susich and the SBN's King that Echeverria would later
reference in the hearing in his mistaken assertion that Coughlin did not
want to bifurcate the SCR 105 formal hearing from the hearing
required by the Nevada Supreme Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838 and SCR
111(8) that the SBN excised completely from the 2/13/13 ROA in 62337)
as to Coughlin's right to inspect, up to within three days of the hearing
the permitted materials, and, in going against what King himself indicated
(in an obvious bit of trickeration and misdirection given the ex parte
communications between Echeverria and the SBN, resulting in such
10/31/12 Order ruling otherwise), where such 10/31/12 Order reads: The
Formal Hearing in these matters is scheduled to take place on Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, beginning at 9:00 at the Northern Nevada Bar
Center, 9456 Double R. Blvd., Suite B, Reno, Nevada 89521. Several
motions have been filed and are pending. The Formal Hearing Panel
Chair has had an opportunity to review and consider the following
motions and responsive pleadings (NOTE: King only filed one
Opposition, and, regardless, pleadings entail only an Answer and a
Complaint or similar (such as a Demurrer, a Motion to Dismiss, a Motion
for More Definite Statement, etc), not Oppositions, so Echeverria's
subsequent conclusion of law that the allegation in King's Complaint
could be take as admitted as a matter of default in view of his
finding that Coughlin failed to file a responsive pleading is seriously
undone): Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:.. 1. Motion to Dismiss
prepared September 16, 2012, and filed October 16, 2012, is DENIED.
2. Motion for Order to Show Cause Regarding Improper Attempt by
Bar Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB to Delay and Obstruct Hearing
Required by Courts June 7th, 2012 Order in Case No. 60838 and
Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in Case 61426 prepared October 2,
2012, and filed October 16, 2012, is DENIED. 3. Motion to Review and
Inspect Bar Records; Motion to Bifurcate Hearing; Motion to Dismiss
for Complaint [sic] Failure to Sufficiently State the Charges with
Specificity and Support and for Utter Failure of Bar Counsel to Perform
Reasonable Investigation prepared October 15, 2012, and filed October
16, 2012, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Office
of Bar Counsel will arrange for copies of the file to be delivered to Mr.
Coughlin at the address that he has provided to the State Bar at the
earliest opportunity."
(NOTE: the earliest opporunity turned out to take another seven
days, meaning such were only delivered to Coughlin four judicial days
before the formal disciplinary hearing.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 6:20 to 7:6) MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King? MR. KING: As the record reflects, Mr. Coughlin was
served a copy of the complaint to the address that he is mandated to
provide to the State Bar. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't believe that's correct.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt, Mr. Coughlin. Go ahead.

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MR. KING: Subsequently, Mr. Coughlin filed, immediately after we

mailed the complaint via certified and regular mail, Mr. Coughlin filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 302:13 to 304:15) MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I believe that all the pleadings that have been filed
would be part of the panel's record that would go to the supreme court.
MR. KING: Anything that's been marked as an exhibit and identified and
accepted into evidence by the panel will be part of the record. And the
entire transcript of the proceedings. No other documents at this time,
anything that hasn't been proffered as evidence will be not admitted. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Do the pleadings go up or just that which is offered into
evidence and accepted? MR. KING: To the extent that the complaint will
certainly go up, everything that's in this packet will go up. Anything that
you had marked and accepted as evidence will be sent up on the record,
along with the entire transcript. But to have other documents just
compiled, it won't help the record, it will make it more confusing. The
supreme court has better things to do. MR. VELLIS: Pleadings filed, they
don't go automatically, the whole case file doesn't go, just whatever is
entered here? MR. KING: Correct. My pleadings, for instance, as you can
see by the Bates stamp numbers are thousands of pages of nonsensical emails and disparaging e-mails. I didn't think that that would add to this
day or help the supreme court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think the
confusion, at least I have, is whether or not the pleadings themselves,
whatever file, whatever Mr. Coughlin has filed, a motion for whatever
reason, are those part of the record that go up on appeal? In civil
litigation, with which I'm only familiar, that does become part of the
record if so designated. MR. KING: If the orders go up, pleadings that are
not admitted do not go up. MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I can just
interject -- MR. KING: In other words, everything Mr. Coughlin sent,
oftentimes with these multiple captions where he's sending them to many
people, he might caption as a pleading, it doesn't make it a pleading. It has
to be something that was sent to us, filed in, and that would be a pleading.
And if there was such a thing as file stamped with the supreme court, it
will go up. MR. VELLIS: That is my question. It doesn't have to be
necessarily be brought up here, but if it was submitted and file stamped as
being submitted, then it's part of the record that goes up, whether it was
mentioned here or not? MR. KING: Correct. That would be my
understanding. Only if it was properly filed, timely filed, stamped in by
the court.
Its no wonder the went with an Alphabetical List of Documents
in the ROA it filed on 2/13/12 (after the ROA it filed on 12/24/12 was
stricken on account of it being such a trife bit of codswallop) where such
Alphabetical List of Documents (as opposed to, say, a Docket, arranged
in chronological order) does indicate that several of Coughlin's
submissions were just plain not file stamped by the SBN (though
purportedly included, at least in part (of course the discs attached as

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exhibits thereto and the massive bates stamped pdfs found thereon and
transcripts of hearing the SBN felt were of no ulility, and, therefore, not
included amongst that transmitted, though Coughlin filed a Motion in
62337 for such to be so transmitted....BUT, TO BE CLEAR, AND THIS
IS IMPORTANT: there are several of Coughlin's filings that just plain
were not included at all in any way in the ROA, including the very
10/31/12 )
62337 INDEX LIST OF DOCUMENTS BY PAGE NUMBER
1-28 Complaint and First Designation of Hearing Panel Members 8/23/12
29-32 Notice of Intent to Proceed on a Default Bases 10/9/12
33-37 Notice of Formal Hearing; Desig, of Witn., Summ. of Evidence
10/12/12
38-39 Affidavit of Laura Peters, Custodian of Records 10/9/12
40-43 Motion to Dismiss 10/15/12 (missing 9 page fax to OBC/NNDB of
9/12/12 Exh)
43:1-10Missing Exhibit 1, 9 page fax to OBC/NNDB of 9/12/12
44-106 Mtn Order Show Cause, Amend. Mtn Dismiss (NF, subm.
9/17/12, 10/15/12)
107-152 Motion to Review, Inspect, Bifurcate, Supplem. Dismiss
10/16/12
153-156 Opp. to Respt.'s Mtn to Bifurcate Hearing, Motion to Dismiss
10/24/12
157-158 Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel 10/30/12
159-162 Coughlin's Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence
10/31/12
163-165 Order 10/31/12
165:1166-176 Mtn to Quash Subp. Directed to RMC Judges and Court Staff
11/2/12
177-195 Ex Parte Mtn to Quash Subp. Duces Tecums, Subpoenas to
Compel Test. 11/3/12
196-197 Supplemental Designation of Witnesses 11/7/12
198-200 Order 11/7/12
201-204 Notice of Non-Service of Intent to Take Default of Approx.
Oct.9, 2012 11/8/12
205-216 Supplem.Rspdt.Desig.Witn./Summ. Evid., Notice Obj.,
Reply.Opp.Bifur, 11/8/12
217-297 Well Would You Mtn Set Aside, Alter, Amend Order, Opp. Mtn
Quash 11/8/12
298-350 Emerg. Ex Parte Mtn to Dismiss, For More Definite Stmt, Good
Cause 11/13/12
351-352 Order 11/16/12
353-714 Motion for New Trial, Notice of Hill and Baker's Malfeasance
11/30/12

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715-718Amended Supple. to Respondent's Emergency Motion to Set

Aside 11/30/12
719-736Notice of RMC's Failure File Coughlin's Timely Notice of Appeal
(NF, 11/16/12)
737-790Post-Hearing Brief, Mtn Disqualify/Mistrial, Transcript Req,
Recons Order Quashing, Bifurc, , Rule 103(7) Challenge for Cause (NF,
submitted 11/16/12)
791-796 Declaration of Zachary Barker Coughlin (NF, subm. 12/7/12)
797-1347 Motion for Mistrial (Whopper Chocked 10/9/12 Affd. Peters)
(NF, subm. 12/3/12)
1348-1371 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 12/14/12
1372 Certificate of Service by Mail of Record On Appeal 2/13/13
1373-1698 Transcript of Hearing held 11/14/12, No Response on SCR
119 until 12/18/12
1699-1922 Formal Hearing Exhibits 1-16 11/14/12, No Response SCR
119 until 12/18/12

SBN King's 10/24/12 (well, it was file stamped that day, apparently,
at least) Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing,
Motion to Dismiss reads: "Respondent, Zachary Coughlin
("Coughlin") filed a motion asking to review and inspect bar records;
Motion to Bifurcate Hearing and Motion to Dismiss. (NOTE: here,
King reveals the extent to which he later forces SBN Clerk of Court
Peters to remove from the record the file stamped copy of the Motion
for Order to Show Cause that she previously placed in the record on
copied the NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria on, as Echeverria admits to
in his 10/31/12 Order...its understandable why King would want such
filing by Coughlin, essentially stricken (in a real under the table sort
of way, naturally) as such filing by Coughlin completely destroys any
assertion by the SBN or the NNDB Panel that Coughlin was served
the Complaint, and also brings into view all the messy issues
associated with Clerk of Court/Investigator/Paralegal/SBN Custodian
of Records Laura Peters wearing so very many different hats in this
formal disciplinary hearing setting) Patrick King, Assistant Bar
Counsel, on behalf of the State Bar of Nevada responds as follows:
Zachary Coughlin may inspect the evidence that the State Bar has
pertaining to his discipline matters up to three (3) days prior to the
hearing, pursuant to SCR 105(2)(c). Coughlin has been sent, via both
certified and first class mail, a Notice of Hearing which was
accompanied by a Designation of Witnesses and Summary of
Evidence prepared by bar counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule.
To the extent that Coughlin wants to review the disciplinary files
pertaining to his case, Bar Counsel has no objection. Coughlin's
Motions to Bifurcate and to Dismiss must be denied as totally
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lacking in merit. Consistent with other pleading filed by Coughlin, the

instant motion is twenty-seven (27) pages long including over one
hundred (100) pages of attached documents. Together the motions
lacks merit and must be denied. The Complaint in this matter is
sufficiently clear and specific as to inform Coughlin of the charges
against him and the underlying conduct supporting the charges.
The Complaint includes two criminal convictions (NOTE: such sort
of undermines the NNDB Panel's findings and conclusion
premised upon the view that Coughlin sustained two criminal
contempt convictions, no?) and a Court Order finding that by clear
and convincing evidence Coughlin violated numerous rules of
professional conduct. See SCR 105(2). (NOTE: funny, no mention of
FHE2, Judge Flanagan's attorney's fee sanction (well,
presumably, right? No mention of 2JDC Judge L. Gardner's stale,
laches ridden Order being asserted as a basis for charging Coughlin
with violations of numerous rules of professional conduct)
Coughlin had twenty (20) days to file a verified answer to the
Complaint. Instead, Coughlin attempted to avoid service and now
argues that the Complaint be bifurcated and or dismissed. Coughlin
has been temporarily suspended by the Nevada Supreme Court as a
result of a SCR 111 petition filed after appeal of a misdemeanor
conviction. The Court referred the matter to a disciplinary panel of
the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. The pending formal
Complaint filed by the State Bar of Nevada was not based exclusively
on the SCR 111 petition, but primarily from grievances filed with the
Office of Bar Counsel.
Coughlin is misapplying the Court Order resulting from a SCR 111
petition. The Supreme Court said, regarding the criminal conviction,
that the only thing to be decided is the discipline or penalty that
should be imposed. The Court's position on this is consistent with the
fact that Coughlin was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and
therefore the State Bar need not prove that Coughlin committed the
crimes. Coughlin would like that interpretation to mean that that State
Bar may not bring multiple disciplinary charges against Coughlin in
the Complaint.
Clearly, Coughlin's interpretation is wrong. The
Supreme Court in the same Order found that Coughlin is suspended
pending a disciplinary hearing. (NOTE: the phrase formal
disciplinary hearing as found in SCR 105, is absent King's
restatement of the 6/8/12 Order in 60838). Coughlin's Motion to
Dismiss, while largely unintelligible, is based on Coughlin's
assertions that Bar Counsel failed to conduct an adequate
investigation. See Motion page 16 ll 10- 12 where Coughlin argues as
follows:
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So Coughlin has been and continued to tell King about the

ridiculousness of the conviction and dismissal of the appeal in the
criminal trespass matter, and King gets all spooked about his utter
failure to investigate, and tries to jam through an SCR 111 filing
while on the phone with Coughlin. Motion page 16 ll 10-12.
This matter has been investigated. The Supreme Court in response
to the first SCR 111 Petition suspended Coughlin pending disciplinary
hearing. Coughlin has not filed an Answer to the Complaint.
Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Bifurcate should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of October, 2012.
STATE BAR OF NEVADA DAVID A. CLARK, BAR COUNSEL
By: /s/ Patrick O. King Assistant Bar Counsel Nevada Bar No. 5035
9456 Double R. Blvd. , Ste. B Reno, NV 89521
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies
that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Opposition to
Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Hearing, Motion to Dismiss was
deposited in the United States Mail at Reno, Nevada, postage fully
pre-paid thereon for certified and first class mail addressed to the
following: Zachary B. Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno NV 89505
DATED this 24th day of October, 2012. Laura Peters, an employee of
the ,State Bar of Nevada"
(NOTE: Just what does King mean by this matter? Such is especially
inscrutable where King indicates, above, that he need not investigate anything,
apparently, with respect to the two criminal convictions and Court Order which
found by clear and convincing evidence this or that completely beyond the
jurisdiction any municipal court judge of a limited jurisdiciton court has,
particularly where such Order is premised almost entirely on alleged conduct
outside the immediate presence of the court (Chief Marshal Justin Roper
admitted to Coughlin during a conversation with Coughlin that neither Marshal
Harley, nor any other RMC Marshal, entered the restroom during the one restroom
break in such 2/27/12 trial while Coughlin was using such restroom (bringing to
mind the question of just how Judge Nash Holmes could possibly testify as she did,
truthfully (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 141:2 to 141:13) THE WITNESS: When the
marshals came back from the restroom, they told me that Mr. Coughlin had, in fact,
been recording the proceedings because he had disassembled a device and left parts
of it in the bathroom. Or left -- disassembled parts of it, and then they discovered
parts of it. In any case, when he was taken into custody and held in contempt of
court at the jail, he had physically two recording devices on him, a cell phone -either two cell phones or a cell phone and some other recording device. I assumed
that was pieces of which he was messing with in the bathroom.)
(NOTE: Where King writes grievances filed with is sort of stretching it,
King, no, where NG12-0435 (the 2JDC Judge L. Gardner grievance that King
was forced to admit, ultimately was filed by the SBN, (ie, defensive collateral
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estoppel bar to King's attempts to character such as conclusive evidence, or even

clear and convincing evidence of any violations of the rules of professional
conduct, particularly where King's Complaint limited the use of such order to only
that which is quoted therein, where the Panel's FOFCOL cited to protions thereof
not so quoted in King's Complaint, where King failed to even do the whole Mirchstyle incorporate by reference and attach a copy of such Order to the Complaint
(wanna bet there is a reason why King failed to do so beyond his just being
inordinately lazy? Like, such Order fails to find Coughlin in contempt, and is
premised upon the view that Coughlin's allegations (NRCP 11 by way of NRS
7.085 involves allegations, right, William L. Terry, Esq., not the arguments
addressed in RPC 3.3's meritorious claims rule) were not based in fact or law
where, ultimately, as admitted to in her 6/19/09 Final Decree of Divorce, 2JDC
Judge L. Gardner (only after her Order gave WLS's Elcano a pretext to fire
Coughlin) had to admit that some alimony, in fact, was appropriate (ie, hard to
argue Coughlin vexatiously extended a proceeding by failing to buy Springgate
and Judge L. Gardner's hard sell of Srpinggate's settlement proposal wherein
Coughlin's client was to waive any claim for alimony in exchange for some illusory
agreement that Springgate's client would be reponsible for the inflated medical
debt, and third party unsecured credit card debt for which Springgate's client was
the sole signatory (Coughlin provided the SBN all his filings in 53833 and 54844,
which well detail the whole domestic duty has priority over third party debt basis
in fact and law that should have prevented the ridiculous sanction by 2JDC
Judge Gardner (especially where Coughlin referenced his ALR article research
findings on point, where such is the majority viewpoint in American jurisprudence).
(See 60302, 60317) Coughlin actually just grew tired of the double standard
Elcano subjected Coughlin to daily at WLS (Sternlicht can behave in as
outrageously offensive and caustic manner as she please...Coughlin needs to follow
a dress code, whip up a Petition to challenge the Board of Equalization's ruling that
non-profit WLS must pay its for profit landlord's property taxes in the days
preceding the very trial from which 2JDC Judge L. Gardner's FHE3 Order stems,
etc., and the minute Coughlin voices any annoyance with not being given the raise
promised upon his being employed at WLS for one years time (where Coughlin had
been employed 18 months by that point), WLS, rather than address the reasons
behind WLS President Kathleen Breckenridge ordering and obtaining a copy of the
FV09-00886 TPO hearing wherein Coughlin, representing a, gasp, male victim of
domestic violence (see 60302, 60317 for details on Sternlicht declaring to an
assembly of dv victims (that included two men) at a clinic that men cannot be
victims of domestic violence for an idea of why WLS would prefere to jump on
the pretextual Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order After Trial entitles us to fire youtrain, instead of address WLS Breckenridge's obtaining a copy of the recording (as
noted in the docket in such case) of the 3/12/09 TPO hearing prior to the entry of
such FHE3 Order by 2JDC Judge Gardner (the docket notates that Breckenridge,
apparently in response to Complaints by the same CAAW run 2JDC TPO office,
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that Coughlin sued in 60317, obtained a copy of such TPO hearing wherein
Coughlin represented a male victim of domestic violence whom was beaten with an
alarm clock swung repeatedly from its cord, on 4/10/09, compared to the 4/13/09
entry date of Judge L. Gardner's FHE3 Order After Trial).
And, actually, hey, 3/12/09, that's the same day as the first day
of trial in the DV08-01168 divorce trial wherein John Springsnake,
er, John Springgate, Esq., himself violated procedural rules in
failing to have his more than ten exhibits indexed, bound, and
tabbed, and provide a copy of such to Coughlin, prior to the trial
(as required by Judge L. Gardner's 2/25/09 Pre-Trial Order), in
addition to failing to abide by NRCP 11's requirement that a filing
ready 21 day safe harbor motion be served on Couglin prior to
Springgate moving for NRS 7.085 sanctions (which Springgate did,
in his closing arguments, during the second day of the divorce trial
in DV08-01168, which occurred on 3/17/09, (ie, two judicial days
apart were the two trial dates in that divorce case, contrary to WLS
Elcano sworn testimony and his not in the heat of battle
commentary in his termination letter to Coughlin of 5/7/09
(HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 112:1 to 112:8) And one of the things
that was relevant there is that this hearing took place in two sections;
I want to say they were a week or ten days apart. And the conduct
and the criticisms of the conduct by the judge in the first hearing,
Mr. Coughlin came back and behaved exactly the same way in the
second hearing, he had not heeded anything the judge had told
him...),where such three year old Order was provided to him by
RMC Judge Nash Holmes upon her receiving it from RMC
Administrative Judge W. Gardner, whom admitted to Coughlin,
finally, during RMC Judge W. Gardner refused to recuse himself
from the criminal trespass trail stemming from Hill's burglary of
Coughlins' former home law office and Hill's concomitant false
statements to a police officer to effect a wrongful arrest (see 61901),
failed to disclose 2JDC Judge L. Garnder is his sister despite
prompting on during a 2/2/12 hearing in that criminal trespass case,
violated NRS 178.405 on during the 4/10/12 trial and hearing he
held, wherein, finally, after serious prompting, he disclosed his that
2JDC Judge L. Gardner is his sister, though he did indicate that it
was the first time I have hear of that upon being informed that
RMC Judge Nash Holmes had passed the very Order by his sister
that RMC Judge Gardner admitted to taking from his sister and
distributing to his fellow RMC Judges, on to the SBN), King was
forced to admit (and Clerk of Court/Investigator Peters shady and
sneaky commentary during a 10/15/12 conversation with Coughlin
is absolutely hysterical in this regard, as is King's during the 3/26/12
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in person meeting with Coughlin, the 7/10/12 in person meeting

with Coughlin, the 8/13/12 in person meeting with Coughlin and Bar
Counsel David Clark, and the conversation between King and
Coughlin in June 2012, and 10/12/12 and 10/15/12...if only there
was a verbatim transcript of such conversations...would that not be
interesting, right?)
37. Again on November 7, 20 12, Chairman Echeverria, in an Order Granting the
State Bar's Motion to Quash certain Subpoenas reminded Coughlin that unless a Verified
Answer to the Complaint was filed by 5:00 p.m. on November 9,20 12 the panel would
proceed on a default basis. See Pleadings Docket Order Dated November 7, 2012, P 2, L
8 -13.
38. Following a lengthy attempt to determine whether or not Coughlin believed he
had filed a timely verified answer or response to the State Bar's Complaint, Coughlin
attempted, at the hearing of the matter, to transform a pleading previously filed in the
Reno Municipal Court into a "New Verified Response (sic) Pre-Hearing Motion to
Dismiss/Summary Judgment, Memorandum of Law (See Hearing Exhibit 14) and to
transform an "Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss ... " previously dated November 12,
2012 and altered at the hearing to reflect a date of November 14, 2012 into a "Declaration
and Verified Response." See Hearing Exhibits 15 and 16. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 244, L 16 -P 270, L II.
39. During the course of the hearing of this matter Coughlin continued to
demonstrate a pattern of conduct similar to, if not identical to, conduct in other forums
for which he had repeatedly been sanctioned. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14,2012. Pleadings in this matter filed by Coughlin were exceedingly lengthy,
demonstrated a lack of focus and understanding of the issues involved, were rambling and
incoherent and contained discussion of irrelevant issues. See, e.g Hearing Exhibits 14, 15,
16. See also, Pleadings Docket Motion for Order to Show Cause ... " dated October
2,2012; "Motion to Review and Inspect Bar Records ... " Filed October 16, 2012; Pleading
entitled "Well Would You Look at That ... " dated November 7,2012; "Emergency Ex
Parte Motion To Dismiss or Quash ... " Filed November 13,2012.
40. Coughlin's conduct at the hearing included conduct not reflected in the
transcript of
the proceedings by way of facial gestures, body language, voice intonation and volume.
See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 181, L 19-P 182, L 1.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Panel hereby issues the following
Conclusions of Law:
(A) The Panel was designated by the northern Nevada Disciplinary Board Chair to
adjudicate the Complaint filed by the State Bar of Nevada against Zachary B. Coughlin,
Case Nos. NG12-0204, NG12-0435 and NG12-0434 and to determine the extent of the
discipline to be imposed pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court Order of Temporary
Suspension and Referral to Disciplinary Board entered in Case No. 60838, In the Matter of
Discipline of Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., Bar No. 9473, entered June 7, 2012.
(B) The Panel has jurisdiction over the Respondent and the subject matter of
these proceedings. See Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 99.
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(C) Venue in this matter is properly with the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board
and in
the County of Washoe, State of Nevada. Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 105.
(D) Coughlin received notice and a copy of the Complaint, notice of his right to
respond, as well as notice of the evidence and witnesses upon which the State Bar
intended to rely at a formal hearing. notice of the formal hearing was served on Coughlin.
Coughlin appeared in the matter, filed numerous motions, appeared at the hearing of the
matter, cross-examined witnesses and testified on behalf of the State Bar and on his own
behalf. Accordingly, the State Bar complied with the procedural requirements of SCR 105.
(E) Coughlin was afforded ample opportunity to prepare a verified answer or
response to the allegations of the Complaint and failed to timely do so. See Findings of
Fact 34, 35 and 36. Accordingly, the matter could proceed on a default basis and the
allegations of the Complaint deemed admitted. SCR 105(2) Notwithstanding the fact that
the matter could have been decided on a default basis, the Panel permitted the State Bar
and Coughlin to present evidence.
(F) Submitted to the panel for decision are the following issues:
(1) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 1.1 (Competence).
(2) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 1.2 (Diligence). (NOTE:
actually, RPC 1.2 is Scope of Representation and Allocation of
Authority Between Client and Lawyer, and RPC 1.3 is
Diligence.
(3) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and
Contentions)
(4) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.3 (Candor to the Tribunal).
(5) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel)
(6) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum
of the Tribunal)
(7) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.5A (Relations with Opposing
Counsel)
(8) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements
to Others)
(9) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 4.4 (Respect for the Rights of
Third Persons)
(10) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters)
(11) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal
Officials)
(12) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.4 (Misconduct)
(13) The extent of the discipline to be imposed pursuant to SCR
111 as a result of
Coughlin's conviction of the "serious" crime of Petit Larceny.
(G) The State Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Coughlin
violated RPC 1.1,'
1.2,3.1, 3.3, 3.4,3.5,4.1,4.4, 5A (sic),8.1,8.2,and 8.4. See Nev Sup. Ct. R. 105(2)(e); In re
Stuhff, 108 Nev. at 633-634, 837 P.2d at 856; Gentile v State Bar, 106 Nev. 60, 62, 787
P.2d 386,387 (1990).

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Competence
(H) RPC 1.1 states "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
(I) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin lacks the
competency to represent clients, including himself.
(J) First, the record demonstrates severe criticism by the trial court in the handling
of the Joshi matter, including Coughlin's lack of understanding of a balance sheet, his
failure to conduct discovery, his lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence and trial
procedure. Supra' 25
(K) Second, Judge Beesley testified that the pleadings filed by Coughlin on behalf
of his client in a bankruptcy case were "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of
rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff." Judge Beesley also testified that
Coughlin's pleadings and arguments on behalf of his client "didn't make any sense." Supra
' 16 Judge Beesley became concerned enough about Coughlin's competency as a lawyer
that he contacted the State Bar. Supra' 17
(L) Third, Judge Nash Holmes questioned Coughlin's competency as a lawyer and
in her Order finding Coughlin in contempt of Court noted that Coughlin disregarded the
rules of evidence, continually imposed improper questions, failed to properly examine
witnesses, repeatedly asked the question, misstated answers, injected irrelevant material,
argued with witnesses and mischaracterized testimony. Supra 7 (NOTE: Where the
punishment for contempt is limited to a fine or imprisonment, an attorney may not be
disbarred as a punishment for contempt of court. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 513.)
(M) Fourth, Judge Nash Holmes found that Coughlin's pleadings failed to address
topics listed 'in the caption, contained rambling references to Coughlin's personal life and
other irrelevant material, were overly lengthy, disjointed and incoherent. Supra' 9 & 10
(N) Fifth, the State Bar called two judges and two practicing attorneys (Elcano is
not listed as an "active attorney" at www.nvbar.org, nor has he been for over 5 years), each
with significant experience with Coughlin and each of whom rendered an expert opinion
regarding Coughlin's competency as a lawyer. Judge Beesley testified that in his opinion,
Coughlin was not competent to practice law. Supra 18. Judge Nash Holmes testified that
in her opinion, Coughlin violated numerous Rules of Professional conduct including his
lack of competency to practice law. Supra 15. Attorney Richard Hill also testified that in
his opinion Coughlin is not competent to practice law. Supra 22 Attorney Paul Elcano,
who once supervised Coughlin as a lawyer and ultimately terminated him from Washoe
Legal Services, also testified that, in his opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. Supra 28
(O) Sixth, the record establishes that Coughlin offered no expert opinion or evidence as
to his competency.
Diligence
(P) RPC 1.2 states "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." The record is less clear as to whether or not Coughlin violated
RPC 1.2 on more than on occasion.
(R) Judge Howard, in the Joshi case, certainly found that Coughlin failed to
conduct discovery on behalf of his client in that matter. Supra 25

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(S) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin failed to
provide a verified responsive pleading even in the defense of his own disciplinary
action. Supra 38
(T) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin habitually
files numerous, untimely and repetitive motions.
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin continuously
and repetitively files irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the issue at hand and
continuously and repetitively injects irrelevant matters into proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes found, for example, that Coughlin repeatedly injected
allegations of bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traffic case involving the
failure to stop at a stop sign. Supra 7 She also found that Coughlin repeatedly injected
attorney Richard Hill into questions and statements when Mr. Hill was in no way involved
in the traffic citation trial. Supra 7 She also found that pleadings filed subsequent to
Coughlin's incarceration were lengthy (more than 200 pages) contained scant discussion
of, or relevance to, the matter and contained irrelevant discussion of facts unrelated to the
proceedings at hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's conduct
was so vexatious and frivolous as to result in substantial sanction of attorney's fees. Supra
21 See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's filings,
even in his own defense of the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy, irrelevant facts and legal
issues into this proceeding.
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin violated RPC
3.3(a)(l) when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he was surreptitiously
and without permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 Of note, Coughlin did not
deny that he had lied to Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his cross examination of Judge Nash
Holmes focused on how she had learned of the true facts. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testified that based on his experience in litigating with
Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
(CC) The record also establishes that Coughlin was less than candid with the Court
in two separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis, when he failed to disclose his
true occupation as an attorney and instead indicated he was self-employed as a "Jack of all
Trades" failed to identify any income from the practice of law after having represented to
the court that his incarceration would adversely affect his clients. Supra 31 & 32
Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

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(DD) RPC 3.4(c) states "A lawyer shall not: (k)nowingly disobey an obligation
under the
rules of a tribunal except for an op en refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."
(EE) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has a clear and
continuing pattern of knowingly ignoring and disobeying instructions from the Court.
(FF) In his Order of contempt, Judge Howard found that Coughlin refused to obey
directives of the Judge and continued lines of questioning after being instructed to refrain
from doing so. Supra 4
(GG) Judge Nash Holmes, in her Order of contempt, found that Coughlin
incessantly argued with the Court, interrupted the Court, repeatedly restated matters after
having been admonished to refrain from doing so, disregarded directives to ask properly
phrased questions and disobeyed nwnerous admonitions by the court to stop repeating
questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and
mischaracterizing testimony. Supra 7 tribunal."
repeatedly conducts himself in a manner that is disruptive of the tribunal while in the
courtroom.
(HH) The transcript of the hearing in this matter clearly demonstrates that
Coughlin repeatedly and incessantly interrupts witnesses, counsel, Panel members and
Panel Chairman and refuses to heed admonitions to refrain from doing so. See generally of
Wednesday, November 14, 2012.
Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
(II) RPC 3.5(d) states "A lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to disrupt a
tribunal.
(JJ) The disruption must have occurred in the courtroom. One cannot disrupt a
tribunal with conduct outside of the courtroom. In re Michael Stuhff, 108 Nev. 629,
837P.2d 853 (1992)
(KK) The record overwhelmingly, clearly and convincingly establishes that
Coughlin repeatedly conducts himself in a manner that is disruptive of the tribunal while
in the courtroom.
(LL) The various orders of contempt or imposing sanctions issued by Judges
Kenneth Gardner, Linda Gardner, Dorothy Nash Holmes and Patrick Flanagan each
describe a similar pattern of conduct and behavior that is intentionally disruptive of
the tribunal. Supra 4, 7, 10, 21 and 25
(4. Coughlin's conduct during the trial of the petit larceny case on November 30,
2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona, was so disruptive that Judge
Howard found Coughlin in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to jail that
same day to be released on December 3, 2011 at 8:00 PM. Judge Howard specifically
found Coughlin's conduct to be disorderly and was either contemptuous or
behavior insolent toward the judge in that Coughlin refused:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being advised by
the Court to refrain from doing so; demeaning the Court with statements such as
"WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing during testimony and further
questioning the court and its authority."

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See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF contempt

COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT,
November 30, 2011.
(NOTE: do not believe Exhibit 11 was even admitted into evidence, but regardless,
Howard's Order for Summary Punishment (which has never included a Certificate of
Service attached to it, not in NNDB Board Chair Susich's use of it as Exhibit 6 to his
5/31/12 retreated of Hill's associate Baker and King's machinations in the SCR 117
60975 Petition, not in King's attaching one version of it (with a different certification
by RMC Filing Officer Supervisor Donna Ballard) within what King purported to be
a true and accurate copy of his Complaint (but which included a far more legible copy
of Judge Holmes' 3/12/12 Order (like the version thereof that became FHE5) and that
attachments to it, and not in FHE11, the same 11/30/11 OPSC by RMC Judge
Howard..non e of which have a Certificate of Service (notice no harping on how the
appeal turned out by the Panel Chair for either of the criminal conviction for
contempt...indeed, where RCA Roberts was not even present for the additional three
minutes on the record occurring at 8:30 p.m., when Judge Howard had Coughlin
brought back into the court room in handcuffs, such was rendered in absentia and the
deadline to appeal such therefore (and Howard attempted to convince Coughlin he had
not right to appeal such contempt order, whilst specifically informing Coughlin of his
right to appeal the petty larceny conviction) does not even run until the RMC or RCA
finally files a Notice of Entry of Order, etc. (the use of the term ruling by Judge
Elliott in FHE12 now makes more sense) failed to check the box in that form order that
King needed to be checked to have any chance of the offensive collateral estoppel he is
seeking to apply here, which results in the defensive variety of such controlling...not to
mention the fraudulent misrepresentation of whether Coughlin had any right to appeal,
the fact that the RMC failed to ever serve Coughlin a notice of Entry of Order for that
OSPOC, made in absentia of either or both Coughlin and RCA Pamela Roberts, Esq.
(whom everybody can thank for turning our legal community into as big a rock fight in
the street as she could)).
7.
Judge Nash Holmes ordered Coughlin into custody on February 27, 2012
and to be incarcerated at the Washoe County Regional Detention Facility for the term
of five (5) days. Alternatively Coughlin could pay a fine of $500. The Court's sentence
was based on its detailed findings regarding Coughlin's conduct in his own defense.
"The court finds that defendant's contemptuous conduct consisted of his
rude, sarcastic, inappropriate, insubordinate, disrespectful, antagonistic,
deceitful, disruptive, argumentative and childish behavior during trial, all of
which appeared to be done to vex and annoy the court, the witness, and the
opposing party, and to disrupt the trial process. The court finds that the
following occurred, and constitute contempt: 1) defendant's mimelike,
clownish antics of making faces at the court; sagging down into his seat and
hanging his head; looking behind himself and inside his coat as if searching for
a better way to ask a question; rolling his eyes; and mimicking others words; 2)
defendant's incessant arguing with the court, talking over the court, and
interrupting the court; 3) defendant's repeatedly restating matters after being
told by the court to "move on" or "ask the next question;" 4) defendant's

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repeatedly injecting allegations of bribery, perjury, and police retaliation into

the matter after the court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit
himself to issues pertaining to the facts of the "Boulevard Stop;" 5) defendant's
repeatedly trying to insert" Richard Hill" into his questions and statements
when such person was not relevant to the proceeding and the defendant had
been ordered to stop discussing that; 6) defendant's disregarding the rules of
evidence and court procedure by continually posing improper questions after
being directed by the court to properly phrase his questions 7) defendant's
continually accusing the court of denying him the right or ability to ask
questions and telling the court to "give me a list of questions you want me to
ask;" 8) defendant's suggesting that the court "tell me what would make you
happy;" 9) defendant's lying to the court in response to direct questions posed
by the court with regard to his recording the proceedings; and 10) defendant's
failing and refusing to properly examine the witness, despite numerous
admonitions by the court to stop repeating questions, misstating answers,
injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and mischaracterizing the
testimony."
See Hearing Exhibit 4 ORDER FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN contempt OF
COURT AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS. (NOTE: King failed to attach FHE 4 to
his Complaint.)
10.
Judge Nash Holmes also found that Coughlin, after being released from
custody following the February 27, 2012 contempt of Court incarceration, filed
other nonsensical pleadings including a 218 page document:
"...purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled "Motion to
Return Cell Phones; Motion to Set Aside Summary contempt Order; and
notice of Appeal of Summary contempt Order." With scant discussion of,
or relevance to, the above captioned matter, said document mostly argues
against Judge Howard in a Department 4 case and again contains more than
200 pages of string legal citations; lyrics to rocks (sic) songs; Mr. Coughlin's
personal family history; discussion of an eviction case and another
contempt case; disjointed legal citations and other nonsensical matters that
have no apparent relevance to his traffic citation case. (NOTE: King's
Complaint faile to notice plead any of the above, much less incorporate it by
reference or even attach it as an exhibit: "14. In the case of City of Reno vs.
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Case No. 11 TR 26800 21, a trial was held on a
traffic citation issued to Respondent. The matter was called at approximately
3:00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict at about 4:30 p.m. after the court
held Respondent in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and
activities committed in the direct presence of the court during trial."
21.
On behalf of his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order in
favor of Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's fees in
the amount of $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered
the order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript of Proceedings of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The motion
seeking attorney's fees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the defense of the
eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as frivolous and vexatious and

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presumably so found by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P 3, L 411.

25.
Judge Gardner's order in the Joshi matter indicated that Coughlin had
conducted no discovery in the case and failed to present any documentary
evidence at the trial of the matter on behalf of his client Mrs. Joshi. See Hearing
Exhibit P 12, L 4 -6.
After commenting on various negative aspects of Coughlin's representation of his
client Mrs. Joshi, (See Hearing Exhibit P 12, L 9 -P 13, L 40) (
Judge Gardner specifically held:
"The most troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and
disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a balance
sheet; his failure to conduct discovery; and his lack of knowledge with regard to the
rules of evidence and trial procedure. All of this was compounded with a
continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a shift from a
fairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount
of time. "
See Hearing Exhibit 3, P 13, L 5 -10:
("At trial. Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no
discovery in this case. In addition, Mr. Coughlin failed to present one
documentary piece of evidence at triall on behall of Ma. Joshi's claims. Mr.
Coughlin argued incessantly with the Court throughout trial and made
sarcastic, derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgote, and Mr. Joshi
throughout trial. The Court notes that there were well overr 40 objections
during four (4) hours of trial. Mr. Sprlnggate's objections were well-founded
and continuously sustained except in one instance").
(NOTE: King failed to attach Gardner's 4/13/09 Order After Trial (FHE3)
and failed to incorporate it by reference either, in his Complaint, and the
above excerpt was not amongst the portion of such Order King did quote in
his Compliant)
(NOTE: just as Coughlin was not a party for purposes of appealing any
part of the Order After Trial (or anything else in the case) that was not
superseded by the 6/19/09 Final Decree, so to is Coughlin not in privity
with his former client, Ms. Joshi, or a party sufficient to provide an
offensive collateral estoppel bar for the SBN obviating its burden to prove,
by clear and convicing evidence, any alleged professional misconduct is
alleges is proven by doing nothing more than citing to a mere small portion
of such superseded FHE3 (failing to incorporate by reference such order or
to even attach such to the Complaint, not to mention failing to produce a
certified copy, which made especially dubious Chair Echeverria's allowing
WLS's Elcano to provide foundations for or authenticate that produced by
King in FHE3 where Echeverria refused to provide such treatment to
Coughlin and his mother's attempts to authenticate and or provide
foundation for the audio recordings (one purchase directly from the RMC by
Coughlin's mother, one provided to Coughlin by the SBN, whom purported
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the RMC) for both the 2/27/12 and 3/12/12 trail dates resulting in,
respectively, FHE4, and FHE5).

Judge Linda Gardner's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Decree of Divorce (FOFCOLDOD) in DV08-01168 of 6/19/09 held:
2JDC Judge Gardner's 6/19/09 final Decree of Divorce excised only from
Springgate's 5/21/09 Proposed Decree the attorney's fees award detailed in
paragraph six of Springgate's Proposed Decree, (the language Judge L. Gardner
excised therefrom read: 6. ATTORNEY'S FEES: The Court has the discretion to
award attorney's fees in a divorce action, pursuant to NRS 125.150(3), and Love v.
Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998). There is further authority for fees
pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(B), and NRS 7.085. Based on the above and foregoing,
former counsel for the Defendant is ordered to pay attorney's fees in the amount
of $934.00 within thirty (30) days of this Order and Decree.).
Instead, Judge L. Gardner's 6/19/09 final Decree of Divorce operated to
amend and or supersede her 4/13/09 Order After Trial (the 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearings NG12-0435, FHE3) to not contain vacate any such attorney
fee award (and all the language the SBN King's quoted therefrom in his 4/13/09
Complaint) where such final Decree reads: "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree of Divorce ...9. The Court adopts, as Findings of Fact, each and
every Conclusion of Law below, which by this reference are expressly incorporated
herein. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
4. COMMUNITY PROPERTY/DEBT.
B) Mr. Joshi's Vehicle: The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be
considered as Plaintiff's sole and separate property and Plaintiff shall be
responsible for the debt remaining thereon. Since the car is worth about
$10,910.00 and there is $15,009.75 due and owing on the vehicle, Mr. Joshi's
assumption of this asset is to be considered as an undertaking of community debt of
approximately $4,100.00.
C) Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate
property and she shall be responsible for any debt remaining thereon. Since no
evidence was presented to the Court as to the value of the auto, either positive or
negative, there is no value for this community asset.
D) Son's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will
not be divided among the community.
E) Daughter's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and
will not be divided among the community. (NOTE: Coughlin elicted testimony
from Mrs. Joshi with respect to Mrs. Joshi being liable or cosigning for the
daughters vehicle, which arguably is supportive of the alimony claim)...
J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt of
approximately $15,650.00 which has been expended for community purposes. Mr.
Joshi has agreed to be responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as
his sole and separate responsibility. ...

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L) Medical Debt: There is a debt due to St. Mary's Hospital for

$6,735.00 and a debt to REMSA for $500.00. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be
responsible for these debts and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate
responsibility. ...
N) General Community Debt: There was no evidence to establish
community debt. Mr. Joshi agreed to take the remaining community debt in his
name that is outstanding and the debt shall be his sole and separate responsibility. It
should be noted that Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the
community debt of the parties and the Court finds his testimony to be a compelling
reason for making an unequal distribution ofthe community debt.
5. Spousal Support: The Court has found that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi
is 46; the parties earn roughly equivalent amounts; the parties have been
married 21 years but Ms. Joshi has always been employed during that time; Ms.
Joshi has a college degree; both parties are able to work; and after consideration of
the net income, deduction of taxes, and the amount paid in community debt by Mr.
Joshi, an award of alimony in the amount of one dollar ($1.00) shall be awarded
to Ms. Joshi pursuant to NRS 125.150, Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d
196, and Shydler v. Shydler, 194 Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988).... IT IS
SO ORDERED."
The only other difference between Springgate's Proposed Decree and the
final Decree of Divorce Judge L. Gardner entered is found in paragraph 5: 5.
SPOUSAL SUPPORT: The Court has found that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi is
46 and the parties earn roughly equivalent amounts and that, after consideration of
net income, deduction of taxes, including the amount paid on paying off
community debt, as set forth above, and in light of the fact the parties have been
married for twenty-one (21) years and Ms. Joshi has always been employed
during that time, inclusive of the fact that she obtained a college degree prior to
marriage, both parties being healthy and able to work, the Court does not believe
that Ms. Joshi is entitled to an award of alimony, pursuant to NRS 125.15(1)(A),
Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 196 (1996), and Shydler v. Shydler, 194
Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988).
Witness the alterations to Springgate's Proposed Decree above in the final
Decree of Divorce Judge L. Gardner ultimately entered: 5. Spousal Support: The
Court has found that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi is 46; the parties earn roughly
equivalent amounts; the parties have been married 21 years but Ms. Joshi has
always been employed during that time; Ms. Joshi has a college degree; both parties
are able to work; and after consideration of the net income, deduction of taxes, and
the amount paid in community debt by Mr. Joshi, an award of alimony in the
amount of one dollar ($1.00) shall be awarded to Ms. Joshi pursuant to NRS
125.150, Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355,929 P.2d 196, and Shydler v. Shydler, 194
Nev. 192, 196,954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988)

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However, Judge L. Gardner's final Decree of Divorce would up

highlighting the fact that Coughlin did, in fact, put on evidence supportive of
an alimony claim, the fact that the parties had been married 21 years, (where, at
least under the Tonopah formula is over twice the ten years rule of thumb so
commonly predictive in family court of whether there will be an award of at least
some, or rehabilitative alimony, especially where there are children of the marriage.
Judge L. Gardner's final Decree of Divorce altered the language in Springgate's
Proposed Decree in a manner which accentuates such fact (which Coughlin
argument during trial and direct examination of his client, Ms. Joshi, established, in
Coughlin's making argument for an award of alimony that was, in fact, based in fact
and law (in addition to Coughlin's insightful invocation of an ALR article providing
support for the position that Springgate's proposed settlement was largely a chimera
were a domestic duty is accorded greater protection under the law than unsecured
third party credit card debt (J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt of
approximately $15,650.00 which has been expended for community purposes. Mr.
Joshi has agreed to be responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as
his sole and separate responsibility. (and where Mr. Joshi's have a selection of
credit cards in his name only, and for which only he had the Duluth Model
power and control (how do you like that, CAAW? TWS? CIS?) to monitor or
incur charges under, and for which there was no documentary evidence (where
FHE3 originally criticized Coughlin for putting on only testimonial evidence to
support the claim for alimony...which is similar to FHE3 alleging Coughlin
conducted no discovery (which was not litigated, and where WLS and Elcano
completely obstructed Coughlin's ability to disprove such, including refusing to
allow Coughlin to access his former coughlinz@washoelegalservices.org email
account or MS Outlook files) especially where Coughlin is not in privity with Ms.
Joshi) where Springgate's retort to Coughlin's inquiring as to just what discovery
Springgate himself conducted was met with the specious response that I did my
discovery in the 16.1 (see Springgate email to Coughlin to support the blanket
assertion that such J. General Credit Card Debt (which Judge L. Gardner stops
short of finding to be community debt (especially where her final Decree
specifically indicates there was no evidence to establish community debt;
where such decision only underscores the legitimacy of the arguments Coughlin
made during the trial respecting the attenuated chances any such unsecured
third party credit card creditors, especially where such general credit card
debt was divided amongst a number of cards such that no one account was
sufficiently large to expect an extensive litigation proving some doctrine of
the necessaries basis for holding Mrs. Joshi personally liable for the credit
card accounts for which her husband was the sole signatory sufficient to
justify Coughlin joining Judge Gardner and Springgate's immediately-beforethe-trial-Settlement Conference (apparently, according to Springgate, a
CMC counts as a second settlement conference) hard sell to his client, Mrs.
Joshi seeking her approval, essentially, foregoing her right to appeal any
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adverse decision by Judge Gardner, especially as to her alimony claim (Mrs.

Joshi was adamant at the time, that even a Siragusa, jurisdictional reservation was
not satisfactory, and that she needed some actual, liquid, alimony...(see 54844,
53833... shut up and don't listen to your attorney were said).
It is very interesting to compare the dates and individual listed in the various
Certificates of Services in the Joshi matter post Coughlin's suspension from WLS
on 4/20/09 (the day after his written complaint to Elcano of a hostile work
environment and other issues) incident to Judge L. Gardners work in FHE3,
particularly with respect to the final Decree of Divorce and the impact thereof as to
the Order After Trial presented at the formal disciplinary hearing as FHE3.
REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION It is hereby requested that the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce being filed concurrently herewith
be submitted to the Court for decision. Additionally, counsel for Defendant has
reviewed the decree and approved it as conforming with the Court's Order.
DATED this 1L day of May, 2009. /s/ John P. Springgate, Esq. CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby celiifYthat I am an employee of THE
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN SPRING GATE, and that on this date I personally
served at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within FOR fully addressed to: Marc
Ashley, Esq. Washoe Legal Services 299 S. Arlington Avenue Reno, NV 89501 X
for mailing by first class mail, postage prepaid Dated this 21st day of May, 2009.
/s/ Linda A. Knowlden".
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Thursday,
May 28, 2009 10:46 AM To: Marc Ashley; Deborah Pringle; Caryn Sternlicht
Subject: FW: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests Dear
Washoe Legal Services, Please see my concerns in the emails below. The proposed
Decree submitted by Mr. Springgate presents real problems for Ms. Joshi.
Specifically the debt distribution is in no way referred to as being characterized as
in lieu of alimony or given any similar treatment. There is a wealth of authority,
some of which I have provided and some of which is contained in my emails to Mr.
Springgate during the pre-trial phase of the Joshi litigation that spells out why this
is disadvantageous to Ms. Joshi. Bankruptcy law specifically 532a(15) could
potentially see Mr. Joshi, upon the requisite showing, be discharged of the debt
distributed in the decree and not forced to pay alimony. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
Esq. (NOTE: thereafter Coughlin included his email to Springgate: WDCR 9
Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests? From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Sent:
Sun 5/24/09 7:19 PM To:
springgatelaw@sbcglobal.net Hi Jon, Have you submitted a Final Decree or
Findings of Fact yet? Will you be providing me a copy. Apparently, I am not able
to access efile for this case, so I assume that means you could not serve me such a
document via efile. Do you intend to assert that I am not entitled to a copy of the
proposed order, pursuant to WDCR 9? If I am, I have 5 days to object to it, etc...I
know we previously discussed language for bankruptcy concerns in our
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settlement discussion, but I feel it is important for the final order to specify what
is for what so that any 523-a-15 or 523-a-5 issues do not become problematic;
granted she is WLS's client...However, to the extent that the Final Decree spells
out the sanctions, I believe I am entitled to 5 days to review any proposed Final
Decree prior to your submitting it. ...Can you respond to my earlier question, see
below, regarding whether you ever sent any discovery requests to Ms. Joshi?
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin....
RE: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests? From:
Marc Ashley (mashley@washoelegalservices.org) Sent:
Thu 6/04/09
3:19 PM To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com; Deborah Pringle
(dpringle@washoelegalservices.org); Caryn Sternlicht
(csternlicht@washoelegalservices.org) Zach, Sorry for the delay in getting back to
you on this. Ive been out of the office and this is my first day back. When
summarizing the evidence in her order, the judge did mention that Mr. Joshi
suggested that maintenance be kept open for 5 years as protection against his
default on the debts he was ordered to pay. However, when she got to that portion
of her order concerning maintenance, she specifically denied maintenance after
reviewing relevant factors such as the parties relative ages, earning capacities and
state of their health. Springgate recalls discussing the award of $1 per year
maintenance for 5 years so it could be revised to account for any default on his
clients part and also has said that he thought the provision was going to be part of
the order. However, he feels that the clause cannot be included in light of the
judges plain statement that maintenance is denied (I would assume also because it
doesnt benefit his client), so the final decree was submitted as originally
proposed. We have filed a motion to amend it on the basis of mistake or
inadvertence. Marc Ashley Staff Attorney Washoe Legal Services 299 S. Arlington
Ave. (NOTE: WLS's Ashley failed to provide Coughlin any copy of the Motion to
Amend he references in his email, and the Certificate of Service on such Motion to
Amend of 5/27/09 by WLS's Ashley does not list Coughlin amongst those to whom
it was mailed)
WLS's Ashley's 5/27/09 Motion to Correct Proposed Decree somewhat
incorporated the legal analysis Couglhin email to WLS on 5/26/09, where such
reads: MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant/Counterclaimant, by her attorneys, Washoe Legal Services by Marc
Ashley, objects to the form of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree of Divorce and moves that it be corrected because key provisions have been
omitted through mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, as more fully set forth
in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. ...DATED this 26th day of
May, 2009. /S/ Marc Ashley, Esq., Washoe Legal Services.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES NRCP Rule 60
allows a Court to relieve a party from the terms of a final judgment, order or other
proceeding on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.
Defendant in this case contends that the final decree was to have contained
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certain provisions to protect her in case Plaintiff fails to pay the indebtedness
he has been ordered to pay. These debts are in Defendant's name and they will
be asserted against her if he does not pay or files bankruptcy. Specifically, in
its Order After Trial, page 6 lines 18-20, the Court notes that ''to protect Ms.
Joshi in the event Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the
court maintain jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support for five years." It
was Defendant's understanding that this was to be done through an award of
maintenance of One Dollar ($1.00) Per year for five years. If Plaintiff ceased
paying the debts, she would then be able to request maintenance to offset the
added payments.
In discussing the form of the decree with Plaintiff's attorney, he was
likewise of this understanding and maintained that the $1.00 Per year
language would be in the final decree. However, in preparing the final papers
he noticed that the court denied maintenance altogether at page 11, lines 1718, so did not include the expected language. Accordingly, Defendant moves
the court to amend the order to include an award of maintenance in the amount
of One Dollar ($1.00) Per year for five years, so Defendant will have recourse to
protect her credit if Plaintiff defaults on the debts in her name. The debt on the
car which is titled in Plaintiff's name and their daughter is also in Defendant's
personal name. Defendant was of the understanding that Plaintiff was also to retitle the car in the name of Defendant and their daughter, and Defendant moves
for amendment of the order to accomplish this. Dated this 26th day of May,
2009. /S/ Marc Ashley, Esq.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby
certify that I am an employee of Washoe Legal Services, and that on th.. Day of
May, 2009, I served the foregoing: MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED
DECREE by depositing with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, at
Reno, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the within document addressed to: Law
Offices of John P. Springgate, Esq. 203 South Arlington Avenue Reno, NV
89501 /s/ Deborah Pringle, CP An employee of Washoe Legal Services
So, where Springgate, the 2JDC, and WLS did not see fit to include
Coughlin on numerous Certificates of Service (or, indeed serve him such
documents, never mind WLS utterly failing to defend Coughlin, support him in
having the 4/13/09 Order After Trial vacated, or allow him access to his email to
Mrs. Joshi and others (including WLS employees whom Coughlin would need
obtain checks from to send out discovery, etc., or those that prove Coughlin did in
fact extensively research the issues involved in that case prior to taking the
positions he took at trial), and the 2JDC removed Coughlin from the list of
individuals able to access such case on eFlex, unless Coughlin paid an $88 real
party in interest first appearance fee (which WLS refused to pay on Coughlin's
behalf), and Coughlin was not allowed to appeal the Order After Trial in that he
is not considered a party (or in privity, really per Albany v. Arcata) it would
hardly be just to absolve the SBN of its duty to investigate such grievance (the
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SBN was provided all the filings in DV08-01168 by Coughlin, in addition to all of
those on file in 53833 and 54844 (as were all the members of the Panel) beyond
simple taking such FHE3 from Judge Nash Holmes in her box of materials she
collected and submitted along with FHE8, her 3/14/12 grievance letter to the SBN
and monkeying with the date received stamp the SBN affixed thereon to (as if
such really throws one off a whole lot) indicate such was received 3/15/12 with
the 5 in 15 going through many, uh, changes, over the months and through the
various iterations thereof. Further, both SBN Clerk of Court Peters, and King made
statements and writing despite WDCR 9 requiring that Springgate had to have
served on any parties to the action and affected by the judgment (so, Coughlin's
not being a party entitles the Court, Springgate, and WLS to let Coughlin
continue to litigate an appeal and then a Petition for Writ all the while being
unaware that 2JDC Judge Gardner had entered an Order on 6/19/09 which vitiated
completely the 4/13/09 attorney fee sanction.
It is entirely clear why Judge L. Gardner, Springgate, and WLS did not want
Coughlin to be aware of the 6/19/09 Decree, specifically to the extent that the
changes from the Order After Trial to the final Decree completely undermine
WLS's rationale proffered for firing Coughlin, which rested entirely, (sole reason
according to Elcano) upon Judge L. Gardner's since 4/13/09 Order After Trial,
where Elcano, on behalf of WLS (see 60302, 60317) made the decision to terminate
Coughlin employment, announcing such to Coughlin on 5/7/09, making the 6/19/09
date of entry of the final Decree of Divorce incredibly convenient for all involved
except Coughlin...just so long as Coughlin does not become aware of the entry of
such final Decree on 6/19/09, and so long as he is not aware of the extent to which
the changes between the two completely vacate the sanctions, and, in doing so,
eviscerate WLS's rationale for terminating Coughlin.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com To: springgatelaw@sbcglobal.net
Subject: discovery requests Date: Mon, 18 May 2009 09:43:17 -0700 Hi John, Do
you have any record of sending any discovery requests to Bharti Joshi? If so, could
you indicate what they were and when and provide a copy? Sincerely, Zach
Coughlin, Esq.
Re: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE: discovery requests From: John
Springgate (springgatelaw@sbcglobal.net) . Sent: Tue 5/26/09 5:14 PM To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com 1 attachment 20090526171158758.pdf (345.0 KB) 1.
The proposed order was filed May 21. I have attached a copy via pdf. I kept it very
sparse on the sanctions. 2. The bankruptcy concerns are not your issue, she is not
your client. 3. I did my discovery in the 16.1.
Coughlin's conduct therein, is made all the more understandable given the
complaints to Elcano by then named Tahoe Women's Services upon Coughlin
failing to satisfy advocate Cecilia Gonzalez's standard as to just how much he
should have exorted his then client Paula Haubl to proceed at the extension hearing
for the order of protection she obtained against her husband, where Mrs. Haubl was
extremely conflicted in that regard, and where Haubl actually spoke with and wrote
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to Elcano praising Coughlin's representation of her incident to Elcano conducting

an investigation in response to TWS's written complaint against Coughlin, which
Elcano refused to provide to Coughlin).
Such brings to mind the question, then how was Springgate's use of
discovery, presentation of various forms of evidence (testimonial, documentary,
or otherwise) sufficient to avoid a sanction, not to mention his knowledge of
procedural rules and rules of evidence where Springgate, not Coughlin violated
Judge L. Gardner's Pre-Trial order respecting the requirement to provide Coughlin
a copy of the more than ten exhibits that Springgate offered, prior to trial in a
form that is bound, tabbed, and indexed (ironically, Springgate's violation of such
procedural order (Judge Gardner's FHE3 takes Coughlin to task where he objected
to such then failed to cite to a specific rule, despite there being no specific rule,
but rather, such being law of the case incident to the Pre-Trial Order that Coughlin,
not Springgate, complied with).
Indeed, Judge L. Gardner's Order of 7/15/09 further explained: Insofar
as ... the award of attorney's fees,...the Court did not intend the award of
attorney's fees to be included in the Decree of Divorce....On May 13, 2009, a
Motion to Strike was filed by John P. Springgate, Esq., alleging ... there was no
final judgment entered in this matter yet as the Order After Trial had not been
memorialized into a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and
Decree of Divorce.
Given that, the stipulation to an Amended Decree between Springgate and
WLS on 7/22/09, and Judge L. Gardner entering an Order adopting such on
7/23/09, along with Judge L. Gardner excising from Springgate's Proposed Decree
the attorney fee award included therein.
Of course 2JDC Judge L. Gardner is annoyed with WLS's Elcano (like many
people) incident to his taking her Order After Trial and using it for that which it
was never intended. Regardless, Springgate's invocation of NRS 18.010(2)(b) is
more than misguided, and clearly fails to support any view that the FHE3, 4/13/09
Order After Trial by 2JDC Judge L. Gardner is till at all operative (which it is not,
clearly), especially where such was premised upon an original order that did not
provide for alimony where the final Decree of Divroce indeed did so award
alimony:
102k194.44 k. Bad Faith or Meritless Litigation. Most Cited Cases
Defendant did not bring or maintain counterclaims without reasonable ground, as
would support statutory award of attorney fees to plaintiffs in their action for
breach of contract; defendant was successful in his counterclaim for breach of
contract, as reflected in supplemental judgment allowing him an offset against
plaintiffs' judgment for loans that one plaintiff did not repay to defendant, and
while defendant was not successful on his other counterclaims, he presented some
evidence and testimony to factually and legally support them. West's NRSA
18.010(2)(b). Halls v. Phillips Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3838487 (Nev. 2010). In light
of our decision to reverse in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in
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favor of respondents, we conclude that any award of attorney fees and costs under
NRC 18.010(2)(b) is premature, and thus, the award must be reversed. Kahn, 121
Nev. at 479-80, 117 P.3d at 238 (reversing an entire fee award made under NRS 18.
010(2)(b) when a summary judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part on
appeal). Nev.,2010. Edwards v. National Credit Adjusters, LLC Slip Copy, 2010
WL 3838693 (Nev.)
Further, had no alimony award ultimately been entered, Springgate's client
would have arguably obtained a recovery exceeding $20,000, therefore taking such
out of the purview of NRS 18.010(2)(b).
But really, basically what happened was Coughlin filed his docketing
statement in 53833 with the attachment thereto, and 2JDC Judge L. Gardner
decided she did not need any of that, and that this was Springgate's and
Elcano/WLS's problem now, and she undid her 4/13/09 sanctions Order by entering
(MM) The transcript of the proceedings in this matter reveal a continuation of a
similar pattern of conduct by Coughlin despite his having been sanctioned twice with an
adverse award of attorney's fees and twice by incarceration. See generally of Wednesday,
November 14, 2012. (NOTE: no, not good enough Echeverria to go "See generally", see,
getting specific. Further, the FHE 2 Order awarding attorney's fees failed to specify such
as being against Coughlin in his role as his own attorney, versus against Coughlin as the
litigant incident to Flanagan's void application of a "prevailing party" attorney fees statute
that only applies to plenary judgments anyways (NRS 69.050).
Relations with Opposing Counsel
(NN) RPC 3.5A states "When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know the identity of a
lawyer representing an opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer
by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the
opposing lawyer's intention to proceed."
(OO) Although the State Bar pled a violation of RPC 3.5A in its Complaint, no evidence
was presented that Coughlin ever violated the rule. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the
State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue as an evidentiary matter but finds
that as a matter of default the violation may be deemed admitted.
Truthfulness in Statements to Others
(PP) RPC 4.1 (a) states "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (a) (m)ake a false statement of material fact or law to a third person."
(QQ) Although the evidence established that Coughlin knowingly made false statements to
Court and Counsel (See (AA), (BB) and (CC no evidence was presented that
Coughlin knowingly made false statements of material fact or law to a third person.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on this
issue as an evidentiary matter but fmds that as a matter of default the violation may be
deemed admitted. (this is a nonsense argument, especially where the Panel and SBN pat
themselves on the back for, allegedly, providing sufficient due process to
Coughlin/fulfilling SCR 105...its one or the other...but the Panel doesn't get to purport that
Coughlin defaulte where it is also trumpeting the feats of due process it enabled....).
Respect for the Rights of Third Persons

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(RR) RPC 4.4(a) states '"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person... "
(uh...like Hill's allegations of finding a "crack pipe and a bag of weed" or a "vial of
something" and "a large quantity of pills"? Actually, even that would not fit squarely
under the RPC 4.4(a) heading becuase Coughlin was a party therein, not a third
person...and that same rationale applies to the landlord Merliss...and the Panel fails to cite
to anybody else whom would qualify as a third person to whom Coughlin has somehow
subjected to a violation of RPC 4.4(a), and such would certainly not apply to the Reno
Police Department Officer Chris Carter, Jr. and Sargent Marcia Lopez whom assisted Hill
and landlord Merliss in burglarizing Coughlin's former home law office that day based on
a FOFCOLOSE that, on it's face, failed to contain the summary order for removal of the
tenant within 24 hours of receipt of the order language required by NRS 40.253(5)(a).
Regardless, there was never any valid lockout done by the WCSO's Office where its only
attempt to do so was done without complying with the requirement that the WCSO knows
full well attaches to each and every summary eviction in Nevada (that, at the very least,
the sheriff posts the summary eviction lockout order to the tenant's door and allows 24
judicial hours to pass prior to conducting such lockout) =, no matter which county such
occurs in, not matter how codependent and sick a relationship the local judiciary has with
law enforcement, no matter how little regard the Judges of Reno and Washoe County have
for the statutes the legislature passes in reducing the will of the people of Nevada to black
letter law).
(SS) The record establishes clearly and convincingly that in the Merliss eviction
action, Coughlin conducted himself in a manner that was abusive, vexatious and for
purposes of delay. The matter was a simple eviction action (apparently all evictions are
simple in Nevada, huh?) that apparently lasted through several proceedings at the
Municipal Court level, an appeal to the District Court and two appeals to the Nevada
Supreme Court and which also resulted in Coughlin's conviction for criminal trespass.
Supra 19 and 20
Coughlin's conduct in the proceedings was so egregious that Judge Flanagan
ordered Coughlin to pay (NOTE: notice such is not referred to as a sanction and does
not specify whether Coughlin the litigant or Coughlin acting as his own attorney was the
capacity in which such order was issued...but regardless...such is irrelevant beyond
establishing the defensive collateral estoppel bar to all the various RPC's the SBN and
Panel keep trotting out with such order in an attempt to skip straight past even
establishing any such violation by way of meeting a burden of proof via the introduction
of actual evidence (rather than hearsay via an interested party dressed up as expert
testimony) (Hill, Judge Nash Holmes, Elcano)) Dr. Merliss $42,065.50, an amount that is
still unpaid. Supra 21
(TT) The record also establishes that Coughlin habitually prolongs proceedings
unnecessarily; files lengthy, irrelevant, nonsensical pleadings requiring court, staff
and counsel to spend unnecessary effort in evaluating and/or responding to the
pleadings. Supra 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21, 23, 25, 27, 39 and 40 (NOTE: neither
court, staff, nor counsel are third parties to which and analysis of RPC 4.4(a)
flows. Whose competency is being questioned, again?
Disciplinary Matters

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(UU) RPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, " ... a lawyer ... in connection with a
disciplinary shall not: (b) ... knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority...
(VV) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin knowingly
failed to respond to the State Bar's request for information in the disciplinary
proceeding and failed to timely file a required verified responsive answer or pleading
to the Complaint.
(WW) First, Coughlin asked for an extension of time to respond to the letter of
February 14, 2012 regarding the Richard Hill Complaint then failed to respond at
all. Supra 29.
29. State Bar Counsel called Coughlin to testify at the hearing of the matter.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 from
Assistant Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel forwarded to
Coughlin correspondence received from Richard G. Hill. See Transcript of
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing
Exhibit 6. Coughlin's response, dated March 9, 2012, asked for additional time in
which to respond. See Hearing Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that
Coughlin substantively responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012
prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter. Coughlin failed to directly
respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring if Coughlin ever subsequently
responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 163:13 to 164:23) "BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Coughlin,
I'm handing you what's been identified as Exhibit No. 6. Would you please tell me
if you received that letter from me? A Is this the letter in its entirety? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The question is: Did you receive that from Mr. King? THE
WITNESS: This letter, he said? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know what it is. All
I know is it's Exhibit 6, and the question is, did you receive Exhibit 6 from Mr.
King? THE WITNESS: No, that wasn't the question. He said did you receive this
letter. And I need to know -- BY MR. KING: Q The next question may be about
attachments. But the question is: Did you get this letter? A I need to know what is
entailed in the term "a letter." Q This document that I handed you. Did you
receive this document either alone or as part of a package? Did you receive this
document Bates stamped 02983? A Without the Bates stamp? Q I believe it did
not have the Bates stamp when it was sent to you. A Yes. I think so. I'm not sure. I
think I received something longer. Maybe that's the attachments you're referring to.
Q So is that a yes? A Actually, I might have ultimately received this. But I recall
there being an issue. I was a victim of domestic violence during this time, and my
mail was being -- there was some issues with it. So I think ultimately I did receive
this, Mr. King. But maybe this isn't going to your question. You didn't ask me
when. So yeah, I think I received this one."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 169:13 to 172:16) Q My question is: Did you
send a subsequent letter or explanation to the State Bar? In other words,

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you're asking for additional time. Did you ever send -- A What you do is evil,
Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. THE WITNESS: What you do is evil.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I have cautioned you about interrupting on
numerous occasions. But apparently a pattern of behavior has been the subject
of at least three court orders that we have seen so far. And I would ask you to, in
your best interests, to attempt to resist yourself, allow the question to be
completed, and then make whatever objection you wish. The question directly to
you, and if it's not direct enough, let me ask it. Did you ever specifically
respond to the letter of February 14th, 2012, Exhibit 6? THE WITNESS: I
responded to it. Specifically. I'm not sure exactly what that means. I believe I
cooperated with Bar counsel. I don't have a thousand pages of stuff. (NOTE: the
transcript contains an error there in that Couglin actually said: I know I
provided the Bar thousands of pages of stuff and...videos, audios transcripts,
etc.. This is confirmed by King's own admission in the transcript and only
further underscores the extent to which Echeverria conducted the hearing like a
total fraudster working overtime to get over his agenda). Videos. Audio. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The question is: On February 14th you were sent substantial,
apparently, correspondence from Richard Hill alleging professional
misconduct. You were asked to make a specific response within ten days. It
appears that you did not do so, unless you have some evidence to the contrary -THE WITNESS: I didn't get this letter. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I
continue to talk while you're trying to interrupt. My question is: Did you ever
respond specifically, prior to the institution of the complaint, to Mr. Hill's
comments and reporting to the State Bar? Did you ever address those issues
raised by Mr. Hill prior to the filing of the complaint? THE WITNESS: Maybe
it would help if I had the Mr. Hill attachment. I believe I did. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: When did you do that? THE WITNESS: There's a multitude
of instances where I wrote or responded or communicated with Mr. King.
(Exhibit 8 marked.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: When was the first time? THE
WITNESS: Well, probably this time in asking for more time, because I didn't
get this letter very soon after it was sent. I rented a room off Craigslist. And
there was some ill will that built up, the people I rented it from. And I didn't get
this letter -- basically I think I got it this day, and I threw this together. I was
obviously very upset to see that the State Bar had wanted to hear from me, and
given me ten days. I think, obviously, it had already passed by this point. So
right when I got that letter -- and I think if I had been noticed on this, I would
have given you the envelope that shows that there was some -- like the post
office wouldn't let me -- I forget exactly what happened. But I think I gave Pat
this stuff -- MR. KING: With the chair's permission, I'll move on. THE
WITNESS: -- legitimate reasons why I didn't get this that evince a lack of
culpability on my part. But that's consistent with what Pat does. He puts on stuff
he knows is baseless. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King. Mr.
Coughlin, I don't believe you answered the question. It was a direct question.
When did you first respond substantively to Mr. Hill's complaints? I have not
heard an answer. The response -- THE WITNESS: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me. Your response is argumentative. Mr. King, go ahead with your next

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question. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: I can answer it. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, there's not a question pending. THE WITNESS:
But it sounded like you said I didn't answer the last question. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That was my observation.
(XX) Second, Coughlin failed to respond to a subsequent letter from the State Bar
regarding the Complaint filed with the Bar by Judge Nash Holmes. Supra 30
(YY) Third, Coughlin ignored SCR 105(2) when he failed to timely file a verified
response or answer to the Complaint, despite several warnings to do so. Supra 34, 35,
36, 37, 38 Coughlin compounded this violation when he attempted, during the course of
the hearing in this matter, to transform a pleading previously filed in Reno Municipal
Court into a "New Verified Response (sic) Pre-Hearing Motion to Dismiss/Summary
Judgment, Memorandum of Law by crossing out the original caption and handwriting the
"new" caption. Supra 38.
Coughlin also attempted, during the hearing, to transform a pleading he had filed
the day before the hearing entitled "Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss ... " by
handwriting the words "Declaration and Verified Response ... " onto the caption of the
pleading. Supra 38
(ZZ) The conduct described herein not only demonstrates a lack of cooperation
with the State Bar, but a lack of competency as well.
Judicial and Legal Officials
(AAA) RPC 8.2(a) states "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer. ..
(BBB) During the course of the hearing, Coughlin accused Judge Nash Holmes of
lying during her testimony. Coughlin has expressed similar views concerning Judge Nash
Holmes in various pleadings filed in this proceeding as well as others. Coughlin has also
uttered other derogatory remarks about various judges with whom he has interacted.
(CCC) The State Bar presented scant evidence on this issue and no evidence from
which the panel could conclude that the expressions were knowingly false as opposed to
an expression of opinion. While the conduct displayed is, in the view of the Panel
reprehensible, the Panel concludes that the State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on
the issue as an evidentiary matter but finds that as a matter of default the violation may be
deemed admitted.
Misconduct
(DDD) RPC 8.4 provides (in pertinent parts):
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to :
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional conduct...
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(EEE) The Pleadings, Hearing Exhibits and Transcript of these proceedings
overwhelmingly, clearly and convincingly establish a repeated, unrelenting and obstinate
pattern of misconduct by Respondent Coughlin evincing numerous and repeated

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violations of several provisions of RPC 8.4 (NOTE: this conclusion lacks any specificity
whatsoever) in violation of RPC 8.4(a). (So, would that not be something not noticed or
plead in the Complaint, and therefore, only appropriate in some future disciplinary
hearing, if any? Otherwise, is that not transmogrifying what is required to be a plenary
hearing into one of a summary nature?).
(FFF) Coughlin was convicted of petit larceny on November 30, 2011, a violation
of RPC 8.4(b). Such violation is sufficient alone to trigger application of SCR 111. The
Nevada Supreme Court referred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary panel for a
determination of the extent of punishment that should follow from the conviction. Supra
para. 5
(NOTE: the USPTO has indicated that it does not view Coughlin's petty larceny
conviction, given the totality of the circumstances therein, to be a serious crime.
Further, certainly not every conviction for petty larceny is violative of RPC 8.4. For
instance, if one stole a loaf of bread from a isolated small town grocery to see that a small
child avoided dying of starvation where exigent circumstances required doing so, would
that really be an criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, ... etc.?)
(GGG) The record also establishes that Coughlin was convicted of criminal
trespass in the prolonged eviction proceedings involving Dr. Merliss, a violation of RPC
8.4(b). Supra 20.
(NOTE: King's SCR 111(4) Petition in 61901 provides a defensive collateral
estoppel bar or party opponent admission that the dubious criminal trespass conviction
reported therein somehow supports an attempt to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337:
3. As evidenced by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been convicted
of a crime which triggers the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel under SCR
111(4). Further, King's failure to file any such SCR 111 Petition (whether one under (4)
or (6)) for the alleged crimes the 12/14/12 FOFCOL characterizes the criminal
contempt convictions to be provides a further defensive collateral estoppel bar.

As evidenced by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been

convicted of a crime which triggered the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel
under SCR 111(4). In addition, 111(7) and)(8), state that upon receipt of a petition
demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the Court
shall enter an order suspending the attorney, pending the final disposition of a
disciplinary proceeding, in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
of the discipline to be imposed.
Indeed, compare the language King used in his SCR 111(4) Petition in
61901 for the criminal trespass conviction with that he employe in 60838 in the
petty larceny conviction: As evidenced by the documentation submitted herein,
Mr. Coughlin has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime under the Nevada
Revised Statutes. However, that conviction was for "theft." The following
language, as set forth in SCR 111(6), dictates that Respondent's crime
constitutes a serious crime:
Definition of "serious crime." The term "serious crime" means (1) a felony
and (2) any crime less than a felony a necessary element of which is, as determined
by the statutory or common-law definition of the crime, improper conduct as an
attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
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misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file an income tax return, deceit, bribery,
extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of
another to commit a "serious crime." [Emphasis added.]
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, Bar Counsel respectfully brings this
matter to the Court's attention and requests that the Court enter an Order
temporarily suspending Respondent from the practice of law and referring this
matter to the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board for further disciplinary
proceedings, in accordance with SCR 111(7) and (8).
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 327:2 to 327:6) (Coughlin): Well, it could
consider the trespass thing certain, right? But Bar counsel filed an SCR 111.4
petition recently. What does that mean? It means Bar counsel themselves
admit that that was not a serious crime, a serious offense as elucidated under
SCR 111.6 As such, the Panel clearly erred where it concluded that the criminal
trespass conviction in 61901 is a violation of RPC 8.4(b), as the decision not to
bring a SCR 111(6) Petition by bar counsel and the decision not to take any of the
steps set out in SCR 111(7)-(9) by the Nevada Supreme Court establishes that such
criminal conviction is one for which there is not a necessary element...as
determined by the statutory or common-law definition of the crime, that involves
improper conduct as an attorney, interference with the administration of justice,
false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file an income tax
return, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a "serious crime. As such, the
Panel is barred from concluding that such criminal trespass conviction is, in any
way, and instance where Coughlin could be said to (b) Commit a criminal act that

17

other respects.)

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reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in

(HHH) The Complaint in this matter alleges that Coughlin has been arrested and is
awaiting trial on a larceny charge involving a cell phone and on a charge of abusing 911
emergency procedures. However, no evidence was presented on these charges but as a
matter of default the allegations may be deemed admitted and would constitute additional
violations of RPC 8.4(b).
(JJJ) The record, as described at length above, establishes several violations of
RPC 8.4(c).
See (AA), (BB), (CC), (AAA), (BBB) and (CCC).
(KKK) The entire record in this matter is replete with instances demonstrating
that Coughlin's conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice. (NOTE: here
Echeverria is just not content to have gutted every bit of due process required of this
hearing, and instead wants to glom on some summary disciplinary order on top of all his
crimes against jurisprudence) Coughlin has been repeatedly sanctioned monetarily and by
way of incarceration for his conduct, has repeatedly filed lengthy, irrelevant and
nonsensical pleadings requiring staffs, courts and counsel to expend needless and
unnecessary time in responding to such pleadings, has repeatedly disrupted proceedings
and failed to follow instructions and admonitions of the courts. The record establishes that

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the pattern of conduct continues despite the severe sanctions administered and continues
up to and during the disciplinary process and hearing of this matter.
(NOTE: the instances that Panel finds support such conclusions are plainly not
sanctions (FHE2 never was a sanction, FHE3 was superseded by the Final Decree, which
excised and superseded such sanction and ultimately awarded the very alimony FHE3
purported Coughlin to have litigated vexatiously for seeking for his client):
B. Amendment and Correction 3. Procedure and Relief Topic Summary References
Correlation Table s 388. Operation and effect, in general West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Judgment k 330 West's Key Number Digest, Judgment k 331
Generally, an amendment or correction of a judgment gives the judgment the same effect
as though the defects necessitating the amendment had never existed. Since the
amendment of a judgment is merely perfected evidence of what existed from the time the
judgment was pronounced,[1] as between the parties, the amendment or correction relates
back to the original judgment and becomes a part of it, and gives the judgment the same
effect as though the defects or mistakes had never existed.[2] However, it usually does not
make a new judgment or confer any new or additional rights,[3] although any substantive
modification of a judgment constitutes an opening of the judgment,[4] and a change
materially affecting a judgment and the rights of the parties against whom it is rendered
and involving the exercise of judicial discretion does amount to a new judgment.[5]
Generally, an amendment leaves the original judgment effective and unimpaired.[ 6]
Where the court strikes part of a judgment, the remaining portion stands, so that the court
need not enter a new judgment with the stricken part omitted.[7] An order amending a
clerical error in a judgment does not supersede the judgment or incorporate it into the
order, and the clerk's act in correcting the judgment pursuant to that order is ministerial
and does not affect the materiality or finality of the judgment or order.[8] An amendment
or correction of a judgment is binding on those parties who were afforded an opportunity
to be heard,[9] but an amendment or modification changing the rights of the parties fixed
by a former judgment is not binding on a party in interest who was not afforded such an
opportunity.[10] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Any change in a judgment made
during the trial court's plenary power is treated as a modified or reformed judgment that
implicitly vacates and supersedes the prior judgment, unless the record indicates a contrary
intent. SLT Dealer Group, Ltd. v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc., 336 S.W.3d 822
(Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2011). [END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [FN1] Okla.-Gaines v.
Gaines, 1944 OK 142, 194 Okla. 343, 151 P.2d 393 (1944). [FN2] Ark.-T.J. Moss Tie Co.
v. Miller, 169 Ark. 657, 276 S.W. 586 (1925). Conn.-Coxe v. Coxe, 2 Conn. App. 543,
481 A.2d 86 (1984). Ill.-First Bank of Oak Park v. Rezek, 179 Ill. App. 3d 956, 128 Ill.
Dec. 806, 535 N.E.2d 20 (1st Dist. 1989). Okla.-Gaines v. Gaines, 1944 OK 142, 194
Okla. 343, 151 P.2d 393 (1944). As to amendments nunc pro tunc, see s 389. [FN3] Cal.McConville v. Superior Court within and for Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248
P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926). Okla.-Mason v. Slonecker, 1923 OK 695, 92 Okla. 227, 219 P. 357
(1923). [FN4] Conn.-Commissioner of Transp. v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696,
894 A.2d 259 (2006). As to the effect of opening a judgment, see s 470. [FN5] Cal.McConville v. Superior Court within and for Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248
P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926). [FN6] Cal.-McConville v. Superior Court within and for Los
Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248 P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926). [FN7] Ind.-Elliott v.

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Gardner, 113 Ind. App. 47, 46 N.E.2d 702 (1943). [FN8] Cal.-McConville v. Superior
Court within and for Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 203, 248 P. 553 (2d Dist. 1926).
[FN9] Iowa-Samek v. Taylor, 203 Iowa 1064, 213 N.W. 801 (1927). Pa.-Altoona Trust
Co. v. Fockler, 311 Pa. 426, 165 A. 740 (1933). [FN10] N.Y.-Emmet v. Runyon, 139 A.D.
310, 123 N.Y.S. 1026 (2d Dep't 1910). Westlaw. (c) 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. CJS JUDGMENTS s 388
Consent judgment may supersede pleadings Ill.-City of Marseilles v. Radke, 287
Ill. App. 3d 757, 223 Ill. Dec. 181, 679 N.E.2d 125 (3d Dist. 1997).
In fact, John Springgate, Esq., agreed to a Consent Decree in the )
(NOTE: tellingly, the Panel fails to identify either contempt order as a criminal
conviction in this RPC 8.4(b) context, which is counter the characterizations of such the
Panel makes elsewhere. Given this admission by the Panel that such contempts orders are
not convictions of crimes, the SCR 111(5) approach falls apart, and the SBN is stuck
with meeting a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof that it completely failed to
even attempt to meet. At this point, the SBN probably wishes the transcripts and or audio
recordings it has sought so desperately to exclude (where Coughlin fully wanted to pick
them apart, conduct much more extension cross-examinations of everyone involved, and
all those whom he subpoenaed, and fully expose their systemic, fraudulent, reprehensible
misconduct (particularly that of the City of Reno Marshals), Judge Howard, Judge Nash
Holmes, Judge W. Gardner, etc., etc. The RJC and 2JDC decided not to join the party
King threw, and for good reason. The RMC either was not smart enough to do that, or had
to deal with the rash, imprudent, acts of judicial conduct that it had already committed to
record (60838 (abuse of the contempt power, misconduct in willfully violating Canon 1
Rule 1.1 in failing to abide by the Indigent Defense Order), 61901 (failure to recuse where
either per se required, or overwhelmingly indicated, violations of NRS 178.405,
ridiculously biased approach throughout the case (not right to confront the arresting officer
even), the RMC's Lisa Gardner trashing the timely notice of appeal Coughlin filed on
6/28/12, and, like in the case resulting in 60838, the RMC willingly and knowningly
countenance a multitude of instances of misconduct by City of Reno prosecutors and the
contract based court appointed defense counsel the RMC or City of Reno employs), and
Judge Nash Holmes' hysterical offensive, etc.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 130:4 to 130:25) (Exhibit 4 marked.) BY MR. KING: Q
I'm holding in my hand an order that was signed by you dated the 28th of February, 2012,
in the matter of 11 TR, which I assume stands for traffic, 26800 21. And it's an order
finding the defendant in contempt of court and imposing sanctions. Do you recall
executing such an order? A Yes, I did. I wrote it myself, and I signed it, and I found him
in contempt, in direct contempt during the proceeding, and right after that did the order. Q
I'm reading from Page 3 of your order, which is the final page that has your signature on it
before the service, certificate of service. But in that final paragraph it says, "The court
finds that the defendant's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt
for the court, and in the presence of the court, for purposes of disrupting and delaying the
proceedings and dishonoring the rule of law and this court, and constitute the
misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation of NRS 22.010. Good cause appearing
therefore, the following sanctions are imposed." HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 147:12 to
147:21) Q Is it proper for you to call something summary criminal contempt when you
cite to a civil contempt statute? A I don't know what is proper in your book, Mr.

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Coughlin. I know that the behavior that I saw, I know that I held you in contempt, I held a
precise -- you committed direct contempt in front of me in my court -- Q Criminal
contempt or civil contempt? A -- I held you in contempt on the spot, and then I went and
wrote the order.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 148:8 to 151:1) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge, did
your order characterize it as misdemeanor criminal contempt? A I do not have my order
in front of me, so you can consult my order. I believe it was misdemeanor contempt. I
believe it was criminal, direct criminal contempt. MR. COUGHLIN: I'll note on Page 3 at
line 14 it says, Misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation of NRS 22.010. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Which order are you referring to, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN:
February 28th order. Page 3, line 14. MR. KING: I think it's Exhibit No. 4. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Okay. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge, is NRS 22.010 a civil contempt
statute? MR. KING: Objection. THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin, you can consult the
statutes. I don't have my books right in front of me. NRS identifies in Chapter 22
contempt. And the Reno Municipal Code has sections relating that or incorporating those
sections into the Reno Municipal Code. Either way, what you did in front of me was direct
contempt, and I held you in direct contempt, and you went to jail for five days because of
it. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Is it permissible for a judge to call a civil contempt statute a
criminal contempt statute, vis-a-vis -- this is 22.010, a civil contempt statute. And the law
in Nevada does have NRS 199 -- I believe it's 240 -- which is the criminal contempt
statute. Is it permissible for you to cite to a -- easier to meet civil contempt statute, and
then recharacterize it as criminal contempt? MR. KING: Objection. THE WITNESS: Mr.
Coughlin, I'm not going to argue the law with you. You have the statutes there. You can
consult them yourself. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q On Page 3 at line 4, sub .9 -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Which exhibit, sir? MR. COUGHLIN: Exhibit 4, your Honor. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q You wrote, defendant lying to the court in response to direct questions
posed by the court. What were the lies in your vague order that lacks any specificity to
support a summary contempt finding, what were those lies that you failed to elucidate in
your order? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, that question is argumentative. Do you
want to rephrase it? MR. COUGHLIN: Sure. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What were you
referring to when you wrote, "Defendant lying to the court in response to direct
questions"? A Well, it would be explained in the order there. I don't remember everything
at this time because I don't have it in front of me. But I do believe that you lied about or
misrepresented that you were not recording, because I believe you probably were. I don't
know. I believe you probably were. At the same time there were things that you and the
prosecutor were arguing about with regard to discovery. And she disagreed with you and
said you were lying to her about that. And there were other items that you went back and
forth about that appeared to me that you were not totally honest about...."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 151:7 to 153:15) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q When you
say, alternately you were probably lying. And then you put in your order, "I find by clear
and convincing evidence that he lied," is that ambiguous there? How do you reconcile
that? A How do I reconcile what? Q The fact that your order says you find by clear and
convincing evidence? A Because that's what I wrote. I did find by clear and convincing
evidence. I found by absolutely convincing evidence that you were behaving improperly in
court, as you are now, apparently. Q You're saying you found by clear and convincing
evidence that a licensed attorney lied to the court. And then you characterize that as

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probably, well, I kind of think he was. I think he was, because I know some unattributed
hearsay that I'm going to base it on. I'm going to get the order I think is wrong about the
bathroom break. I'm not going to have a marshal sign an affidavit. Then I'm going to remix
a criminal contempt statute with a summary contempt statute and pick and choose and
make it as retaliatory as I possibly can. Isn't that a fair characterization of your approach as
a judge? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Judge, you don't need to answer that question. That was
way out of line, and extremely argumentative. THE WITNESS: Thank you. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Do you want to ask a legitimate question, Mr. Coughlin? BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q What basis do you have to assert in your order that defendant lying to
the court in response to direct questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the
proceedings? A The opinion is self-explanatory. I do not have it in front of me, Mr.
Coughlin. You have access to the tapes and the opinion. And I stand by what I wrote, and I
stand by the proceedings that day. Q But it's kind of hard to pick inconsistencies in your
testimony today and those materials when you refuse to testify now, isn't it? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Argumentative, Mr. Coughlin. You are not assisting yourself here. MR.
COUGHLIN: I'm asking her. It's a question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. MR.
COUGHLIN: Is that not true that she is subverting the legal process by refusing to testify
instead of saying, well, read the order and read -- listen to the recording, and therefore she
is not subjecting herself to putting forth any further inconsistencies. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, the time for argument is later, not now. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. So I'm
objecting. It's nonresponsive. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What was your basis -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That objection is overruled."
NOTE: Judge Nash Holmes' assertion that she right after that (summarily finding
Coughlin in contempt at 4:00 pm on 2/27/12) did the order is not quite accurate, is it,
where FHE 4 is file stamped 2/28/12, with 3:47 p.m. Indicated as the time of filing.
Houston and the body of summary contempt jurisprudence place a high burden on entering
such orders nearly immediately after summarily incarcerating one (ie, Judge Nash Holmes
does not get twenty four hours to have her Marshals go down to the Washoe County Jail
and pull some strings and get Coughlin's personal property (the smart phone and micro sd
card of a practicing attorney, and his cell phone) released to them (which both the RMC
and WCSO have since lied about in attempting to cover such up, but, darn it, Deputy
Hodge told the truth to Coughlin on 3/19/12, and people are just going to have to deal with
that, and someone needs to explain the erasing of all the data on those items prior to their
being returned to Coughlin (causing massive damages to Coughlin's life and practice), and
the extent to which such being done has prejudiced Coughlin's ability to defend himself
(can't exactly offer into evidence the micro sd card or smart phone to prove that Coughlin
did not, in any way, lie to Judge Nash Holmes in response to her enormously inappropriate
sua sponte interrogation of him immediately after the one restroom break on that trial date,
and, contrary to Echeverria's fraudulent attempts to find that Coughlin failed to deny such
accusations, Coughlin most certainly did, in fact, he has denied each and every accusation
made in King's piffle ridden Complaint.
The fact that Echeverria and the SBN have clumsily sought to make disappear the
filings Coughlin submitted on 10/31/12, 11/9/12), 1/3/13, 1/17/13, and others only further
underscores the extent to which all involved, except for Coughlin, in this disciplinary
matter are enormously immoral, corrupt, and, in many ways, rather inept. Laughable is
weasel Clark Vellis talking himself out of his guity conscience stemming from being such

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a willing participant in the gang bang King and Echeverria put on on 11/14/12, where he
obviously relies on some attenuated and vague conception that a busy Nevada Supreme
Court will catch anything important that he might have missed in the filings included in
that which would be transmitted with the ROA (where Kent missed such because he
admitted not to looking at things, and not caring to, then he and King got caught lying
about whether the SBN had provided copies to each Panel member of the discs Coughlin
attached as exhibits to his various filings, and Vellis, laughably, swallows down King's
nonsensical explanation of just what will be included in the ROA, and just how such
determination are come to)
The Extent of the to be imposed pursuant to SCR 111 As a Result of
Conviction of the "Serious" Crime of Petit Larceny.
(LLL) The matter of the referral from the Supreme Court was considered in
conjunction with the allegations in the Complaint filed by the State Bar. While the
conviction at issue in the Supreme Court Order of June 7, 2012 may not alone warrant the
discipline recommended in this Panel's recommendations, taken as a whole and in
conjunction with the numerous and repeated other violations of the Rules of Professional
conduct, warrant, in this Panel's view, the discipline recommended herein.
(NOTE: actually, not one second of the eight hour plus hearing was at all devoted
to that which the 6/7/12 Order in 60838 ordered in referring the matter to a disciplinary
panel. King put on not one shred of evidence, or argument even, respecting the nature
and extent of the punishment appropriate for such conviction. Further, Panel Chair
Echeverria continually obstructed Coughlin's right, under SCR 123 and Laub, etc. to
compare his case to others (like the very same Stephen R. Harris, Esq., that Judge Beesley
testified so glowingly about during Mr. Harris disciplinary hearing (which was given more
time (and Grundy got to file a 54 page brief therein) despite Mr. Harris only being charge
with two RPC violations, ones to which he admitted to, even, plus, Mr. Harris was
provided with the 30 days written notice by the Panel, after the Panel was chose, rather
than, as occurred in this matter, the SBN's King slapping together a notice and a laughably
skint DowSoE, then having Laura Peters lie in her Certificate of Mailing respecting when
it was mailed, then hold a formal disciplinary hearing six judicial days after the Order
appointing the Panel was even constructively noticed to Coughlin (especially hard to
address those matters SBN President Flaherty spoke to in his 2/25/13/ Petition in ADKT
0482 or get a SCR 103(6), etc. conference or addres SCR 110(4) issues where NNDB
Susich refuses to communicate with Coughlin in any manner, as was also the case with
Echeverria, on top of the SBN providing all the misdirection and lies it could muster.
Further, by kitchen sink-ing it, here, the Panel fails to do that which the Court
ordered it to do, where it does not specify the nature and extent of the punishment for
the conviction in 60838, but rather lumps everything together in a ridiculously
overwrought, and, frankly, enormously fraudulent recommendation).
DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION
In assessing the fonn of discipline to recommend, the Panel has accounted for a
number of aggravating and mitigating factors that must be considered. The Panel finds that
the State Bar has shown by clear and convincing evidence the presence of at least eight of
the eleven aggravating circumstances to be considered in accordance with the provisions
of SCR 102.5(1).

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First, while there have been no fonnal prior disciplinary proceedings by the State
Bar, the record establishes that Coughlin has been disciplined by way of sanctions on at
least four prior occasions.
Second, the record reflects, at least with respect to the Merliss matter and the two
criminal trials, that the pattern of conduct was for selfish reasons: to preserve an unlawful
tenancy and to delay and prolong criminal convictions.
Third, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that the pattern of
misconduct is consistent (NOTE: too bad King failed to notice plead pattern on
continuing misconduct in his Complaint) and includes, without limitation: the disruption
of the proceedings; the refusal to heed the directions and admonitions of the court; the
injection of irrelevant material and matters; the filing of lengthy, irrelevant and
nonsensical pleadings; the willingness to lie to court and counsel and the inability to
understand and follow the rules of evidence and procedure.
Fourth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has
committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional conduct, as more fully
discussed above.
Fifth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin engaged in a
bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by failing to file the pleading required by
SCR 105(2) and instead filing several lengthy, irrelevant and nonsensical pleadings,
mostly pleadings filed in other matters, and refiled in the disciplinary action under a
similar but different caption. In some instances, Coughlin simply crossed out the case
name and hand wrote the names of the parties in the disciplinary proceeding.
Sixth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has refused to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct despite having been sanctioned on at
least four prior occasions.
Seventh, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has shown a
complete indifference to making restitution and has so far ignored orders to do so.
Eighth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that some of Coughlin's
misconduct involves illegal conduct that evinces fraud and dishonesty. For example, he
was convicted of one instance of petit larceny and is awaiting trial on a second.
The Panel finds few potentially mitigating factors to be present. While the Panel
finds that there is a lack of prior public discipline by the State Bar, the Panel notes that
Coughlin has been publicly criticized in the Joshi matter, has been heavily sanctioned with
an adverse award of substantial attorney's fees in the Merliss matter, and has been
incarcerated at least twice for criminal contempt of court. Although there has been an
absence of prior public discipline by the State Bar, there have been multiple instances of
judicial censure and sanction.
Although Coughlin suggested at the hearing that he may have personal or
emotional problems or a mental disability, he denied that he needed further help.
Furthermore, no medical evidence was presented regarding the potential impact of a
mental disability, no evidence that the disability was the cause of the misconduct, no
evidence of recovery by rehabilitation and no evidence that a recovery has arrested the
misconduct and that a recurrence is unlikely to occur.
These potentially mitigating factors are weak at best and do not excuse the well
established numerous and repeated violations of the Rules of Professional conduct and do
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The Panel recommends that the Respondent be ordered:
(1) Irrevocably disbarred by the Supreme Court. While irrevocable disbarment is
clearly the harshest form of discipline, the unusual circumstances here, compounded by
the repetitive nature of the misconduct prior . to and even during the disciplinary process
and hearing, clearly warrant the level of punishment recommended.
(2) That his temporary suspension be continued pending final resolution of this
matter.
(3) Within three (3) days of the effective date of disbarment, to demonstrate to Bar
that he has placed all his Nevada clients with other counsel, otherwise concluded the
representation, or with the assistance of Bar Counsel thereafter attempted to expeditiously
aid any
remaining client in finding new counsel.
(4) To pay the costs associated with these proceedings pursuant to SCR 120. "

10

INDEX OF HEARING EXHIBITS (SBN 'S 1 TO 13) Coughin's 14-15 Chair's 16

11

1 -Index of Documents Selected for Hearing Packet by SBN's Pat King in attempt
to skirt his lie that he lacked a certified copy of every Order attached to filings
contained therein and containing numerous fraudulent Proofs of Service by the SBN
page 333
- p. 336 5 pages of what King purports RPC excerpts (1.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.5A, 4.1,
4.4, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4)
- p. 341 8/23/12 Complaint SBN v. Coughlin:
-Exhibit 1: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Judgment of Conviction and Court Order in
22176 candy bar 3/15/12 Judge Elliott Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in appeal
CR11-2064
-Exhibit 2: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Order for Summary Punishment of contempt
Committed in View and Presence of the Court in 11 CR 22176
-Exhibit 3: 3/12/12 RMC Judge Nash Holmes Order of 3/14/12 with "clear and
convincing" language.
2 -Attorney Fees Order of $42,050 by Judge Flanagan in CV11-03628 6/28/12 pursuant
to 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees by Richard G. HIll, Esq., within appeal of summary
eviction in RJC rev2011-001708 by Judge Sferrazza page 387
3 -Order After Trial by Judge Linda Gardner of 4/10/09 in DV08-01168 that WLS
cited as the sole reason for firing Coughlin from domestic violence attorney position page
392
4 -contempt Order 2 28 12 Judge Holmes 26800 Order Finding Defendant in contempt
and Imposing Sanctions, page 407
5 -Order attached to Complaint 3 12 12 Judge Holmes attached to Complaint Order
26800 fed clear and convincing burden for RPC standard by SBN page 412
6 -Letter dated February 14, 2012 to Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King 2 14 12 partial
letter from SBN King excised Hill's 1 14 12 ng12-0204 grievance, so no notice of it, not
pled page 419
7 -Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011 from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar Coughlin's 3
9 12 fax to SBN regarding delayed receipt of 2 14 12 letter from King re Hill's grievance
page 421

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8 -Two page letter dated March 14, 2012 from Judge Holmes to SBN Northern Office
3 14 12 complaint against Coughlin to SBN North page 424
9 -Affidavit of Poverty 3 7 12 Affidavit of Poverty lacking caption or certification by
RMC D3 page 427
10-Order in Case 11 CR 22176 RMC Judge Howard 12 15 11 Order denying IFP for
Transcript Preparation and New Trial and Recusal page 431
11- Order for Summary Punishment RMC Judge Howard 11 30 11 Order for Summary
contempt incident to defense of 60838 conviction page 543
12-Order Affirming Ruling of RMC Judge Elliott 3 15 12 Order Affirming RMC Judge
Howard's conviction in candy bar petty larceny CR11-2064 page 439
13-Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal Judge Elliott 8 27 12
CR12-1262 Order Dismissing Appeal of trespass Conviction by Judge William Gardner
in RMC 11 CR 26405 page 444
14-New Verified Response Coughlin 11 14 12 New Verified Response after Chair
Echeverria's threatening misstatements of the law re default page 448
15-Declaration Verified Response with two DVD discs Coughlin's 11 15 12 Declaration
and Verified Response page 509
16-Emergency Ex Parte Motion Chair Echeverria's 11 14 12 incomplete and secretive
exhibit entered sua sponte, in his attempt to one up Judge Nash Holmes as to
transmogrifying a plenary formal disciplinary hearing into a summary
contempt/disciplinary hearing, where no copy of Exhibit 16 was presented to Coughlin at
the time Exhibit 16's admission, and copy incomplete lacking discs page 543 and where
that which is represented in Exhibit 16 is an incomplete copy of the filing itself (an "edit",
Bar Counsel King might say, if Coughlin was seeking it's admission, where the Exhibits
that were attached to what Exhibit 16 purports to be, are not present (because neither the
SBN nor the Panel Chair (and Panel Member Kent indicated he wouldn't care to review
any materials on an attachments in cd/dvd form ever submitted by Coughlin anyways)
seem to be able to burn a cd/dvd very easily, much less review the materials collected
therein and presented by Coughlin in various filings),

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8/23/12 SBN V. Z. COUGHLIN SCR 105 COMPLAINT, NG12-0204, 0434, 0435:

"PLEASE TAKE notice that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule ("SCR)105(2) a
VERIFIED RESPONSE OR ANSWER to this Complaint must be filed with the Office of
Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada, 9456 Double R Boulevard, Ste. B, Reno, Nevada,
89521, within twenty (20) days of service of this Complaint. Procedure regarding service
is addressed in SCR 109. Complainant, State Bar of Nevada ("State Bar"), by and through
its Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick O. King, is informed and believes as follows:
Zachery Coughlin ("Respondent"), Bar number 9473, is a member of the State Bar
of Nevada admitted on March 25, 2005. Respondent's date of birth is September 27, 1976.
The address that Respondent has on file with the State Bar of Nevada, in accordance with
Rule of Professional conduct ("RPC") 79(1 )(a) is Post Office Box 3961, Reno NV 89505.
Respondent engaged in acts of misconduct warranting the imposition of professional
discipline. The State Bar alleges as follows:
1. Multiple grievances were received by the Office of Bar Counsel between the
period of January 14 and March 15, 2012, concerning Respondent. Due to the serious
allegations of misconduct, grievance files were opened and an investigation was initiated
by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King.
2. Respondent was advised of the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brief
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar Office in Reno. Respondent did not cooperate with
the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as requested, Respondent sent
non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
3. Respondent has not made a request to be placed on disability status, nor has he
acknowledged that he may have mental infirmity, illness, or addiction.
4. The investigation of the grievances against Respondent shows a serious pattern
of misconduct.
5. On September 9, 2011, Respondent shoplifted a candy bar and cough drops a
Wal-Mart store with an approximate value of fourteen dollars ($14.00). On November 30,
2011, Municipal Court Judge Kenneth R. Howard found Respondent guilty of the offense
Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Respondent appealed the judgment of The
judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal. See Exhibit 1.
6. During the trial Respondent's conduct was so disruptive that Judge Howard
Respondent in direct contempt of Court and sentenced him to serve three (3) days in See
Exhibit 2.
7. On August 20, 2011, Respondent was arrested on a second larceny charge for
stealing a cell phone. Those charges are currently pending in Reno Justice Court.
8. Respondent was again arrested on January 13, 2012, for allegedly abusing 911
services, a gross misdemeanor.
9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a document entitled, notice of
Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty , Waiver of Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc.
in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630, City of Reno v.
Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Respondent's unprofessional, disruptive
conduct, and lack of respect for the court and opposing counsel.
10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police Department
and charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor, for which he was later convicted.

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11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as follows: at an

hearing Justice of the Peace Peter Sferrazza ordered that Respondent vacate the home he
was renting effective November 1, 2011. After the locks were changed and the notice was
posted on the front door the owner, Dr. Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into
the home and was barricaded in the basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was
in the basement to open the door. Dr. Merliss was forced to kick open the door where the
Reno Police found Respondent. Respondent had broken into the home and living in the
basement. Respondent was arrested for criminal trespass and was subsequently convicted
of that charge.
12. Respondent, representing himself as co-counsel, filed a 36-page motion to
dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge William Gardner and was
determined to be without merit. The motion, on its face, demonstrates that Respondent
lacks competence to practice law.
13. Once Respondent was evicted, an order was obtained to remove his belongings
from the home. Respondent interfered with the contractor who was hired to remove
Respondent's personal belongings. The police were called and after talking with
Respondent they recommended that he find something else to do. Respondent refused to
their advice and was subsequently arrested by the Reno police.
14. In the case of City of Reno vs. Zachary Barker Coughlin, Case No. 11 TR
26800 21, a trial was held on a traffic citation issued to Respondent. The matter was called
at approximately 3:00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict at about 4:30 p.m. after the
court held Respondent in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and activities
committed in the direct presence of the court during trial.
15. In a March 12, 2012 Order, Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash Homes
found by "clear and convincing evidence" that Mr. Coughlin committed numerous acts of
attorney misconduct. See Exhibit 3. Judge Holmes explained in her Order that after
Respondent served his five-day contempt of court sanction imposed by the court on
February 27, 2012, Respondent fax-filed to the court a 224-page document. Judge Holmes
found that the document contained rambling references to his personal life and was
incoherent.
16. In her Order, Judge Homes found by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated Rule of Professional conduct ("RPC") 1.1 (Competence), RPC 1.3
(Diligence), RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), RPC 3.2 (Expediting
Litigation), RPC 3.3(a) (Candor toward the Tribunal), RPC 3A(e) (Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel). RPC 8.4 (c) (Engaging in Dishonesty. Fraud. Deceit or
Misrepresentation) and RPC 8.4(d) Engage in conduct that is Prejudicial to the
Administration of Justice).
17. Respondent filed Affidavits of Poverty in Support of his Motion to Proceed
Informa Pauperis, wherein he fails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney and instead
under Employment and Self-Employment he identifies himself as a "Jack of All Trades".
18. Despite a claim of poverty in the above mentioned affidavits, Respondent told
the Court that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients.
19. On March 22, 2012, Respondent appeared at the Reno Municipal Court
wearing (smiley face) flannel pajamas. Respondent became argumentative and Marshals
were called to were called to ask him to leave.

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25. On April 10, 2009, District Judge Linda Gardner of the Second Judicial District
Court executed an "Order After Trial," in case No. DV08-01168. In that case, Respondent
represented the Defendant/Counter Claimant. In her Order Judge Gardner explained
Respondent's inappropriate behavior in part as follows: The most troubling aspect of this
case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr.
Coughlin's inability to understand a balance sheet; his failure to conduct discovery and his
lack of knowledge with regard to the rules of evidence and trial procedure. All of this was
compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a
shift from a fairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive
amount of time.
27. In light of the forgoing Respondent violated RPC 1.1 (Competence); RPC 1.2
(Diligence); RPC 3. 1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions): RPC 3.3 (Candor to the
Tribunal): RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); RPC 3.S (Impartiality and
Decorum of the Tribunal); RPC 4. 1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others): RPC 4.4
(Respect for the Rights of Third Persons); RPC SA (Relations with Opposing Counsel);
RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters); RPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal Officials); and RPC 8.4
(Misconduct).
WHEREFORE, Complainant prays as follows:
1. That a hearing be held pursuant to Nevada Supreme Court Rule 105:
2. That Respondent be assessed the costs of the disciplinary proceeding pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 120(1); and
3.That pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 102, such disciplinary action be taken by
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board against Respondent as may be deemed appropriate
the circumstances."

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INDEX TO EXHIBITS 8/23/12 Complaint SBN v. Coughlin, NG12-0204, NG12-0434, NG120435:

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1. Exhibit 1: -11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Judgment of Conviction and Court Order in
22176 candy bar; -3/15/12 Judge Elliott Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC in appeal
CR11-2064

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2. Exhibit 2: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Order for Summary Punishment of contempt
Committed in View and Presence of the Court in 11 CR 22176
3. Exhibit 3: 3/12/12 RMC Judge Nash Holmes Order of 3/12/12 with "clear and
convincing" language.

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Time to add some more Richard G. Hill, Esq. chestnuts to the lie pile, especially
considering Hill's testimony under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary
Hearing and the follow sworn testimony by Hill from the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in
conjunction with the statements Hill made to the RPD Officer Chris Carter and
Sargent Marcia Lopez just prior to and at the time of the 11/13/11 custodial arrest
of Coughlin at his former home law office for trespassing:

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THE COURT: When Mr. Hill is here to ask some questions that I think you've
explored the possibilities, and I don't know what else you can offer the Court in
terms of this case via cross-examination. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
I'll wrap this up quickly. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day,
November 13th, did the owner of the premises warn the arrestee to leave the
property? A I think the message was communicated. Q Via what medium? A The
fact that you were handcuffed and arrested. Didn't you get the picture? Q Okay,
prior to the handcuffing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You need to leave the
premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I did not hear that, sir. Q
Did you say it? A No. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Not that I heard. Q Did the police? A
No, not that I heard. Q So, nobody that you heard of warned the person arrested
for trespassing? Page -110 (see transcript of 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC
11 CR 26405.
Now, compare Hill's sworn testimony of 6/18/12 in RMC 11 CR 26405 with his
sworn testimony at Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing, and it becomes clear
that Hill finally figure out that an essential element of a criminal trespass conviction
under RMC 8.10.010 is a failure to leave by one after being warned to do so...so,
magically, at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing in NG12-0204 (see 61901
and 62337) Hill managed to "remember" such a warning...well, sort of...not
initially, then he couldn't keep straight whether the Police identified themselves or
not, whether three minutes intervened before some such "order" to "come out,
Zach", or whether there was just some vague "coaxing".
However, the Nevada Supreme Court's Order of 7/24/13 in 60838 may say
otherwise, where it reads:
Hill's associate Baker's 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees in 03628, reads:
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Respondent, MATT MERLISS, by
and through his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and CASEY D. BAKER,
ESQ. moves the court, pursuant to NRS 69.050 and NRS 7.085, for an award of
attorney's fees. This motion is based on the above-referenced statutes, the record
on appeal ("ROA"), the points and authorities below, and all papers and pleadings
on file herein. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
1. This is an appeal from a summary eviction entered in the Reno Justice
Court ("RJC"). Reference is made to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order for Summary Eviction entered by the RJC on October 27, 2012 for the facts
of the underlying eviction. ROA, Vol. II, pp. 75-80.
2. Coughlin filed his first notice of appeal in the eviction case on November
3, 2011, two days after he was properly and lawfully locked out oft he property.
ROA, Vol. III, pp. 229-233. Coughlin inexplicably filed an additional notice of
appeal on November 23, 2011. ROA, Vol. III, P.5.

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3. Since filing his first notice of appeal, Coughlin has deliberately engaged
in a pattern of abusive, vexatious, and most importantly, expensive behavior in both
this appeal and in the case below. Coughlin continued to file motions and other
documents, and engage in other inappropriate and time-consuming behavior in the
RJC, both before and after the first ROA was finally sent up to this court, some
seven weeks after the first notice of appeal was filed. The court is asked to take
judicial notice, pursuant to NRS 47.130, that the RJC sent up a supplement to the
ROA on January 4, 2012, which consisted of 21 additional items.
(NOTE: Actually, as evinced by the RJC's Supplement filed in the 2JDC on
4/1/13, which did actually contain those 21 additional items (though, still,
curiously, failed to contain three of Coughlin's filing on 12/22/11 speaking to his
right to a stay pursuant to NRS 40.385, including the fact that Coughlin deposited
the required $250, not once, but twice (on 12/13/11 and, again, on 12/22/11). Also
troubling is the fact that, even in such 4/1/13 Supplemental, which contained filings
between 12/19/11 and 1/4/12, the RJC failed to file stamp Coughlin's timely Notice
of Appeal of 12/26/11 appeal Judge Sferrazza horrific 12/21/11 Order Resolving
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, which may be the most abominable
eviction order ever entered in the Western States...such failure to originally transmit
Coughlin's 12/26/11 Notice of Appeal, in addition to failing to file stampe it, for
whatever reason, is of concern too where footnote 5 on page 5 of Judge Flanagan's
3/30/12 Order Denying Coughlin's appeal purports to justify Judge Flanagan's
failure to adjudicate the portion thereof appeal such 12/21/11 Order Resolving
Coughlins' 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, where Judge
Flanagan, strangely, indicates that Coughlin's alleged failure to identify any
procedural error in the RJC's setting of the hearing somehow absolves Judge
Flanagan of his duty to adjudicate Coughlin's appeal of such 12/21/11 Order, which
was appealed for a multitude of reasons, not all of which even related to the RJC's
failure to abide by NRS 40.253(7)-(8), which, regardless, was indeed one of the
procedural errors in the RJC's setting of the hearing that Coughlin identified.
What Flangan's Order reads like at footnote 5, on page 5 of such 3/30/12 Order is,
some might say, watch this, I am a judge and if I make a finding, poof, there goes
any liability my friends at the RJC may face as a result of violating Nevada law
requiring such hearing be held within ten days of your filing such Motion to
Contest Personal Propert Lien...have fun with that collateral bar, buddy... which is
not the most judicial of looks for Judge Flanagan to be donning.)
NRS 40.253(7)-(8) required the RJC to hold such hearing within 10 days of
Coughlin's 11/16/11 filing...instead, Richard G. Hill, Esq., in his 11/21/11 written
correspondence to Coughlin committed professional misconduct in implying an
improper ability to influence a tribunal (and implication which, apparently, turned
out to be prescient, as Hill indeed was able to legislate away such hold the hearing
on Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien within 10 days of its
11/16/11 filing, on account that Hill, allegedly was to be traveling on vacation for
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the six weeks following the original 11/22/11 hearing date which Hill and Baker
simply failed to show up to, (where Hill indicated Coughlin would not get a
hearing until after Hill returned from his vacation six weeks later.
Hill was not even the attorney of record in that matter, which brings the
utility of his testifying to matters involved in the justice court proceeding in 1708
into question (especially where the SBN's allegedly filed its 10/12/12 DowSoE and
therein limited those matters to which Hill would be allowed to testify to pursuant
to SCR 105(2)(c), where such designation of witnesses and summary of evidence
required included with such Notice of Hearing (which must be provided by the
Hearing Panel (ie, not by Asst. Bar Counsel King weeks before such Hearing
Panel is even chosen by the Board Chair...with such misconduct by King being
more clearly put in relief upon a review of SBN President Flaherty's 2/25/13
Petition in ADKT No. 0484 in the Matt of the Amendment to SCR 103, SCR 105,
SCR 105.5....
Regarding Appointment of Disciplinary Hearing Panel Members filing with
the Nevada Supreme Court. SBN Presdent Flaherty's assertions therein strongly
indict the misconduct committed by Asst. Bar Counsel King and Clerk of Court
Laura Peters, where such reads: Board Chairs also hear all preliminary motions on
a case until the appointment of a Hearing Panel, at which time the Hearing Panel
Chair (panel Chair) hears such motions. (NOTE: such may be the practice, but it
goes against express text of SCR 110(4), which provides that it is the Chair of the
Disciplinary Board not the Chair of the Hearing Panel, whom rules on motions to
quash subpoenas (they tend to be extremely important, such as in Coughlin's case,
where a multitude of essential issue involved therein required to use of subpoenas
to adequately litigate (such as addressing the insufficiency of service of process of
the Complaint issue wherein Clerk of Court Peters made express indications to
Coughlin with respect to the practices and policies and SCR 105(4) rules of
procedure adopted by the NNDB (after receiving approval from the SBN Board of
Governors...though both NDB Chair Susich and Panel Chair Echeverria, and the
SBN as a whole, refuse to provide Coughlin with any actual written, published such
rule of procedure so adopted...) vis a vis whether Peters mailing via Certified
Mailing on 8/23/12 the Complaint at issue in 62337 would be asserted, per SCR
109 as effecting service of the Complaint should such Certified Mailing not yield
the return of a signed by the Respondent Return Receipt Request card (SBN
Clerk of Court Peters own 10/9/11 Affidavit of Laura Peters (which the SBN never
served on Coughlin until including such within 3,200 pages of materials the SBN
only had delivered to Coughlin some four judicial days before the 11/14/12 formal
hearing (an SCR 105(2)(c) violation compounded by the SBN refusal to allow
Coughlin to inspect up to three days before the hearing where such violation
is particularly unethical given the SBN's fraudulent failure to disclose (never mind
promptly disclose) the summary...of the evidence against the attorney...together
with a brief stament of the facts to which each will testify... with respect to any of
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the witnesses, really, but particularly with respect to the two witnesses whom were
only designated as such one judicial day prior to the 11/14/12 formal hearing,
where, as was the case with all the witnesses, the SBN completely failed to provide
anything in the way of satisfying its obligation under SCR 105(2)(c) to give
Coughlin a summary...of the evidence against the attorney much less a brief
statement of the facts to which each witness will testify where witnesses or
evidence, other than for impeachment, which became known to bar counsel
thereafter, and which bar counsel intends to use at the hearing, shall be promptly
disclosed to the attorney...
(NOTE: The which became known to bar counsel thereafter bit was
allegedly the case with respect to witnesses NVB Judge Beesley and WLS's Elcano,
despite Beesley himself testifying that he contacted the SBN via letter about
six weeks after the 3/15/12 hearing in the NVB wherein Coughlin appeared less
than an hour after being burglarized by Gayle Kern, Esq., and the WCSO, in direct
violation of RJC Judge Schroeder's wrongfully issued anyway summary eviction
Lockout Order of that morning) (11/14/12 HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 24:10 to
24:13).
Such failure to promptly disclose witnesses Beesley and Elcano is
particularly prejudicial where the Panel Chair refused to for good cause
shown,...allow additional time, not to exceed 90 days, to conduct the hearing.
So, where SCR 105(2)(c) requires the Hearing Panel provide Coughlin at
least 30 day's written notice of the hearing, 62337 saw such Hearing Panel not
even being chosen and constructively noticed to the NRCP 6(e) made applicable
via SCR 119(3) until six judicial days prior to the 11/14/12 formal disciplinar
hearing where NNDB Board Chair Susich's 10/30/12 Order designating the
Hearing Panel and Panel Chair was allegedly (though not sufficiently indicated
pursuant to Mikohn where Clerk of Court Peters Certificate of Mailing of such
Order fails to indicate such was placed in the mail to be picked up for mailing to
go out that day) placed in the SBN's outgoing mail box (before or after the mail
was picked up for that day is not clear) on that day, 10/30/12.
Now, consider that, in the context of SBN President Flaherty's 2/25/12
Petition in ADKT 0484, where such reads:

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Also, HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 180:13 to 180:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.

King, you cited in one of your pleadings a request that all issues pending before you be
heard at one hearing. There was a letter you sent to the state Bar that you quote in one of
your pleadings. THE WITNESS (COUGHLIN): I requested that? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes, sir. THE WITNESS: You haven't read my pleadings. My whole point was
bifurcating, how ridiculous it is to glom all these together. I'm so glad you just said that on
the record.

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King's SCR 111(4) Petition in 61901 provides a defensive collateral estoppel bar or
party opponent admission that the dubious criminal trespass conviction reported therein
somehow supports an attempt to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337: 3. As evidenced
by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been convicted of a crime which
triggers the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel under SCR 111(4). Further,
King's failure to file any such SCR 111 Petition (whether one under (4) or (6)) for the
alleged crimes the 12/14/12 FOFCOL characterizes the criminal contempt convictions
to be provides a further defensive collateral estoppel bar.

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As there was not motion to dismiss pending in the precursor non-payment

summary eviction proceeding brough in Rev2011-001492, the landlord (and justice court
Judge Sferrazza ) should have been collaterally estopped from ordering any NRS
118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit, and also from finding that, rather than evicting Coughlin
in retaliation for engaging in various protected activities under NRS 118A.510, that the
lanldord utlized a no-cause summary eviction proceeding to evict Coughlin for nonpayment of rent).
Plaintiff retains right to dismiss complaint voluntarily while motion to dismiss is
pending. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 12(b), 41(a). Gallen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and
For County of Clark, 1996, 911 P.2d 858, 112 Nev. 209.
It was completely inappropriate for 2JDC Judge Elliott to dismiss Coughlin's suit
in CV11-01896 against WLS and the same CAAW whose Executive Board Judge Elliott
sat on on a NRCP 12(b)(4) insufficiency of service of process basis, where such does not
even get to the merits of the case (and was not dismissed on the pleadings but on the
sufficiency of either the service or the process), only to then award attorney's fees.
Conclusiveness of adjudication: Dismissal of case for plaintiff's failure to state
claim upon which relief can be granted constituted adjudication on merits so as to
render matters raised res judicata where plaintiff on appeal from judgment of dismissal did
not assign as error abuse of discretion of court in not granting leave to amend, did not
thereafter seek any leave to amend its complaint and order of dismissal had been made
with prejudice as to each defendant. NRCP 12(b) and (1-7), 41(b), 56. Zalk-Josephs Co. v.
Wells Cargo, Inc., 1965, 400 P.2d 621, 81 Nev. 163. Judgment 654
In assessing motion to dismiss on pleadings, trial court assumes that underlying
facts support allegations of claim, but in assessing motion for attorney fees, trial court
must determine whether plaintiff had reasonable grounds for its claims, which analysis
depends on actual circumstances of case rather than hypothetical set of facts favoring
plaintiff. N.R.S. 18.010, subd. 2(b); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 12(b)(5). Bergmann v. Boyce,
1993, 856 P.2d 560, 109 Nev. 670.
Where the 12/14/12 FOFCOL purports to find that Coughlin still has not filed a
verified answer or response, Coughlin cannot be said to have waived all the detailed an
intricate basis for dismissing the SBN's Complaint that are not more readily apparent to
him, which is good, considering that the SBN still has not served Coughlin the Complaint
in the matter now on appeal in 62337:

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Waiver of defenses: Before a defendant files a responsive pleading such as an

answer, that defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency
of process, and/or insufficiency of service of process, and such a defense is not waived by
being joined with one or more other defenses. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.
Now, just like how 2JDC Judge Elliott dismissed Coughlin's case in CV11-01896
against the very Elcano and the WLS for which he is the Exec. Director, so to must this
Court (via a Writ, or otherwise) or the Panel dismiss the SBN's Complaint for failing to
effect service of process within the 120 days allowable under NRCP 4, by way of SCR
119(3). Fair's fair. See 60317.
A defendant may raise its defenses, including those relating to jurisdiction and
service, in a responsive pleading; objections to personal jurisdiction, process, or service of
process are waived, however, if not made in a timely motion or not included in a
responsive pleading such as an answer. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.
To avoid waiver of a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency
of process, or insufficiency of service of process, the defendant should raise its defenses
either in an answer or pre-answer motion. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.
Alleged tortfeasor's appearance, after its motion to quash service of process for
lack of personal jurisdiction was denied, would not amount to a waiver of its challenge to
the district court's jurisdiction. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of
Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.

Defense of insufficiency of service of process was waived by defendant's

responsive pleading filed in aid of its motion to set aside default judgment. NRCP
12(b). Phillips v. Incline Manor Ass'n, 1975, 530 P.2d 1207, 91 Nev. 69.

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which shall...give the attorney at least 30 days' written notice of its time and
place where the notice shall be accompanied by a summary prepared by bar
counsel of the evidence against the attorney, and the names of the witnesses
bar counsel intends to call for other than impeachment, together with a brief
statement of the facts to which each will testify, all of which may be inspected
up to 3 days prior to the hearing (which the USPS Track & Confirm proves was
not even picked up for mailing by the USPS until 10/16/12, and not even delivered
to Coughlin's mail box until 10/22/12 (seemingly owing to the delay's incident to
Coughlin's SCR 79 address being changed upon the Reno Police Departments
Sargent Olive Miller and Alan AJ Weaver continuing with their 42 USC 1983,
Soldal v. Cook County rampage that RJC Judge Scott Pearson so thoroughly
endorsed in Rev2012-078432 at the 10/2/12 hearing on Coughlin's Verified
Complaint for illegal lockout; where Coughlin submitted his Official USPS Change
of Address on 10/5/12 to the downtown Reno Postal Station personally)

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As
though Coughlin did (though he was not granted a default like the one
Gayle Kern, Esq., obtained on 3/15/12 (at 8:33 a.m., for a summary eviction
proceeding based on Kern's pursuit of a no cause summary eviction that was set for
8:30 a.m., where Kern smirked at Coughlin as she was walking out of the
courtroom while he was walking in (NV Energy and Kern's conspiring to refuse to
allow Coughlin electricity for an entire week in his former home law officer at
1422 E. 9th St. #2 put some limitations on Coughlin's alarm clock navigation, as did
RMC Judge Nash Holme's five day summary incarceration of Coughlin's between
2/27/12 and 3/2/12 (and the concomitant $300 bill from the towing/impound yard
where Coughlin and his mother, Mary Barker had to retrieve Coughlin's 1996
Honda Accord with 115k miles on it (a gift in 2002 from his beloved grandmother
Ruth Hugh Mom Barker, whose tradition of activism he carries on...also,
Coughlin, with a ton of help from his mother, managed to get his CLE done and bar
dues paid by the 3/1/12 deadline as well...) and her, not incident to arrest, and
without any written order or warrant, confiscating from where such had already
been booked into Coughlin's personal property at the Washoe County Jail, then
practicing attorney Coughlin's smart phone, a separate micro sd data card
(apparently the in Rev2012-000374 against Coughlin incident to her very own RPC
3.5A violation (RPC 3.5A Relations With Opposing Counsel: When a lawyer
knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer representing an
opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any
default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing
lawyer's intention to proceed.) where Kern, via Coughlin serving on her his
3/7/12 Tenant's Answer therein, identifying himself as his own attorney in the
matter, was well aware that she was taking a default (though NRS 40.253(6)
does not allow for such taking a default where Coughlin had filed a detailed
Motion/Tenant's Answer of 3/8/12), as Kern was still plenty able to test the
truthfulness and sufficiency of the affidavit to a more full extent than Coughlin
would have been able to so test Kern's or her client's landlord's affidavit, given
such had not even been filed by the time Kern was walking out of RJC Judge
Schroeder's courtroom at 8:35 a.m. (the audio record reveals Kern did not file such
affidavit in open court...which would have violated NRS 40.253(6) anyways, but
Judge Sferrazza let Hill's client do that, so...), smirking at Coughlin while he
walked in, where the landlord's unlawful detainer affidavit on file in that matter
bares a time/date stamping of 8:39 a.m., 8/15/12 and a signature that is more of an
initialing lacking anything in the way of an indication as to whom such signature
belongs...and regardless, such 3/15/12 unlawful detainer affidavit (funny, a
voice mail to Coughlin has been all the RJC ever needed previously to set a hearing
in a landlord tenant matter involving Coughlin (an email worked in a criminal
matter for the 11/13/12 hearing in RCR2011-063341, even)).

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I can't because I don't have a credit card and my pacer account is past due. I need
the audio of my hearings before the NVB Judge Beesley. these are available for $2.60
each online. it only takes 2 minutes to sign up.

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SCR 105(2)(c) requires the State Bar to notify respondent Coughlin of potential
witness, in writing, 30 days before the hearing. The SBN only notified me that Judge
Beesley would testify 1 judicial day before the hearing (same with Beesley's 1977
classmate at McGeorge School of Law, Washoe Legal Services Paul Elcano, whom joined
both of their 1977 McGeorge School of Law classmate Reno Municipal Court Judge
Dorothy Nash Holmes as three of the four witnesses at Coughlin's formal disciplinary
hearing on 11/14/12. Somehow the SBN was able to quash Coughlin's subpoenas on
Judges (like the 2JDC's Flanagan, Elliott, RMC's W. Gardner, K. Howard, etc, apparently
based on some argument that one may not query judges about their thought processes,
only for the SBN to then call Judge Nash Holmes and query her about her though
processes in an attempt to apply some offensive collateral estoppel or claim preclusion to
her 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Orders in a "simple traffic citation" case in RMC 11 TR 26800
where she found Coughlin in contempt for, amongst other things,
The only cases Coughlin had in the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Nevada (NVB) (and the first three bankruptcy cases Coughlin ever worked on) necessarily
would be those Judge Beesley testified to, however, vaguely and devoid of any specifics
whatsoever (but its not like his testimony was pointed to as a basis for taking away,
permanently, the property right under the Fourteenth Amendment that Coughlin and his
parents worked so hard for over decades and decades...oh wait...strike that, as the 12/14/12
Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law by NNDB Panel Chair John Echeverria ("you
haven't lived in Nevada long enough" said Judge Beesley upon the SBN King's butchering
the pronunciation of Echeverria's last name, on the record of the 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearing) :
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 9:8 to 9:15) MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Beesley, the panel consists of John Echeverria -- I'm not pronouncing the name
-- but there's five panel members. JUDGE BEESLEY: John Echeverria. You have not
spent enough time in Nevada. MR. KING: That is correct. Thank you for that.
Those NVB cases are: NVB 10-05104, Cadle Company v. Keller; NVB 11-05078
Allison Taitano Moore v. John Gessin; and NVB 11-05077 Stacey Rissone v. John Gessin
(all Adversary Proceedings); NVB11-05078 was appealed and decided on 3/4/13:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/bap/2013/03/05/Gessin%20%20Memo%20121330.pdf
While Asst Bar Counsel King was too embarrassed by the purported emailed
grievance against Coughlin Richard G. Hill, Esq., sent to the SBN to offer such into
evidence (which really ought be detrimental to the SBN's attempt to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the allegation in its 8/23/12 Complaint that Coughlin violated
RPC 8.1, but this was a specially chosen Panel, with a very special Panel Chair, so, no,
King's failing to put into evidence whatever it was Coughlin was supposed to respond to
(ie, some written complaint with specific allegations made by somebody, like, say,
Richard G. Hill, Esq.) really did not get in the way of the Panel finding a violation by
Coughlin of RPC 8.1 (failing to cooperate with disciplinary authorities pursuant to a
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lawful demand for information (though the SBN did not subpoena Coughlin, and though
Coughlin, where Rules of Professional Conduct were repeatedly applied against him as to
his own self representation (even Judge Nash Holmes findings that Coughlin violated
duties to himself were given the ol' offensive collateral estoppel treatment by the Panel),
Coughlin certainly should be able to assert attorney-client privilege as to any demand for
information...but regardless, Coughlin responded to all of the allegations in King's
Complaint, denying each and every last one made in that insipid four and a half page, typo
ridden slapdash, unethical, tacky bit of jibberish, which, as to RPC 8.1, alleged:
1. Multiple grievances were received by the Office of Bar Counsel between the
period of January 14 and March 15, 2012, concerning Respondent. Due to the serious
allegations of misconduct, grievance files were opened and an investigation was initiated
by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King.
2. Respondent was advised of the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brief
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar Office in Reno. Respondent did not cooperate with
the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as requested, Respondent sent
non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
King's Complaint reveals serious misconduct where it indicates Multiple
grievances were received by the SBN between 1/14/12 and 3/15/12, especially where
Coughlin's cross-examination of Judge Beesley (which Chair Echeverria seemed to have a
real hard time finding the relevance in) managed to nail down the date any purported letter
from Judge Beesley to the Bar regarding Coughlin was sent by Beesley to the SBN (no
testimony that such letter was a grievance or evidence of such, and, typically, the SBN
failed to even produce such purported letter by Judge Beesley regarding Coughlin to
Coughlin, even where Beesley was a witness at the formal hearing).
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 10:6 to 11:15) BRUCE BEESLEY Having been first
duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge
Beesley, can you explain to the panel your knowledge in this relevant time frame 20112012 regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared
in my court a couple of times, at least two or three times. The first time I recall him
coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a T-shirt and a tie, and no jacket.
And he indicated that he had been evicted from his residence or his office, indicating it
was not because of not paying the rent, and that that was why he wasn't what I would
consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I don't have my letter in front of me. But my
recollection is that he had filed a pleading on behalf of his client in regard to some aspect
of a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just
sort of rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff.
I had him a couple other times in my court and had the same experience, that -he was dressed appropriately the other times I had him there, and he was very polite and
appeared to be a very intelligent man. But his pleadings didn't make any sense. His
arguments didn't make any sense. And I became concerned that he was suffering from
alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of mental issues which were preventing him from
being able to represent his client. I talked to -- I made some inquiries of the court and State
Bar if there was anything -- the federal court first, if there was anything that I had
authority to do to try and get Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that I could not.

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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 13:4 to 14:7) THE WITNESS (BEESLEY): I'm not
quite sure where I was in my testimony, but based on the discussions I had, and the
information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't a program
that was going to -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
King? MR. KING: The testimony is clear. He's explaining the actions he took relative to
Mr. Coughlin's conduct, which is the purpose. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: He was specifying -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- no foundation for what he was asserting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, I've overruled your objection. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Judge. BY MR. KING: Q I apologize, your Honor, for
the interruption. But you were just about to testify as to what action you took with respect
to the information you learned. A What I did was I wrote a letter to the State Bar
explaining what had occurred with Mr. Coughlin, indicating, I believe, that I thought that
in his current state he was not able to represent his clients adequately, and that the State
Bar should look into it. I think that was the extent of what I did in summary.
(ie, Judge Beesley did what 2JDC Judges Elliott, Flanagan, and L. Gardner, and
RMC Judges Howard and W. Gardner did not do (RMC Judge Dilworth indicated to
Coughlin on the record in a 12/5/12 trail in RMC 12 CR 12420 that Judge Nash
Holmes had indicated the SBN would have the full cooperation of...the other RMC
Judges where she had no such authority or permission to make any such statement,
and that, combined with Nash Holmes' allusions to problems Coughlin gave even our pro
tempore judges when Coughlin never appeared before any, is beyond troubling,
especially when considering all the lying attendant to her disassembled a recording
device and hid a piece of it in the bathroom narrative, whether the lying is hers or the
RMC Marshals, or a group effort, is really not that important where, at the very least, her
egregious negligence (at best) as to the truth (not to mention her using probably and
by clear and convincing evidence so interchangeably when (not just during the 11/14/12
formal hearing, but on the audio record of the 3/12/12 hearing wherein she rendered one
Order, only to whip it into more offensive collateral estoppel hoping worthy shape the
following day upon reducing such to writing, in her transparent attempt to transmogrify a
simple traffic citation trial into some Bloody Mary worthy summary disbarment
proceeding), clearly, there is a rather salient difference that one would hope one holding
judicial office might readily grasp) and unimaginable arrogance is beyond worrisome) ,
that being, take some Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action where he felt such prudent.
Obviously, defensive collateral estoppel (oh no, Pat King might have to do some actual
work beyond attaching orders from judges, which, by the way, King was too lazy to even
manage to do, or even incorporate by reference Mirch-style with respect to FHE 2, 3,
4,applies to defeat the various allegation by King and findings or conclusions by the Panel
that any orders by 2JDC Judges
One important hearing to obtain for $2.40 electronically off of Pacer.gov would
probably be the one on 3/15/12 that Judge Beesley testified to at Coughlin's formal
disciplinary hearing, where Coughlin had been burglarized by the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office (along with Gayle Kern, Esq.'s associates) just an hour before the hearing
(they refuse to post an eviction order and wait 24 hours like the law requires under NRS
40.253(5)(a), and where every other county in Nevada manages to so comply.

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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 20:13 to 21:4) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge

Beesley, what in particular did you notice about my work product -- when did you first
contact Mr. King about me? A When did I first contact who? Q Mr. King. Bar counsel
for the State Bar. A I don't know that I ever contacted Mr. King. I sent a letter to the
State Bar. I think it was probably addressed to Mr. Clark, but I'm not positive. Q So I'm
sorry for that, your Honor. I do recall you saying you sent a letter now. Did you ever speak
with Bar counsel Patrick King with regard to me? A The only time I recall speaking to
him was a few weeks ago or a few days -- probably a few weeks ago when he asked me
if I would be able to testify at this hearing.
Where King only constructively noticed Coughlin of Judge Beesley's anticipated
testimony one judicial day before the formal hearing, its hard to decide which is more
troublesome: that King may have failed to so notice Coughlin via supplement to his SCR
105(2)(c) Designation of Witnesses, Summary of Evidence for a few weeks or that
King's witness Beesley can not seem to remember whom he addressed his letter to at the
SBN, not even one specific with respect to any of the cases or filings by Coughlin or court
appearances to which he testified to having such strong feelings about (sufficient to take
Rule 2.15 action, even, perhaps), or whether it was a few weeks ago or a few days that
Judge Beesley spoke to King and King asked Beesley if he would be able to testify at this
hearing. And Judge Beesley became concerned that Coughlin was suffering from
alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of mental issues? HEARING - Vol. I, (Page
11:7 to 11:10).
The SBN violated SCR 123(3) by contacting Coughlin's then client, a former
WCSO Deputy named Peter Eastman (CV11-00820, whom has some Canon 2, Rule 2.15,
RPC 8.3 things to say about RJC Judge Sferrazza that LCL's Coe Swobe ought be made
aware of, and whom alleged to Coughlin that his friends in the courthouse informed him
that Judge Sferrazza is out to get you, which makes troubling Judge Sferrazzas quashing
Coughlin's subpoenas on 11/19/12 based upon some non-existent requirement in Nevada
law to pay witness fees in criminal misdemeanor trials (never mind the fact that Sferrazza
clearly waived any such imaginary requirement anyway during the 10/22/12 hearing:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajOqx4xFCK4 at the 49:40 mark Judge Sferrazza rules:
I am allowing you to subpoena them without advancing the fees, I may at a later point
order that you pay those fees, but in the meantime, I will allow you to subpoena witnesses
without advancing those fees...at a later point in time I will determine your financial
ability to pay witness fees Further, at the 52:10 mark Judge Sferrazza denies Coughlin's
motion to be provided the sealed portions of the record in that matter which bare on the
Marsden and Stankewitz issues that Coughlin was required to argue and preserve prior to
any appeal...also, at the 11:25 a.m., WCPD Jim Leslie contradicts his own statements on
the record on 8/29/12 (where he indicated that in misdemeanors, Coughlin must make his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and preserve them in the trial court.)
Particularly troubling in RCR2011-063341 and revealing the extent to which Judge
Sferrazza's bias has impermissibly tainted the entirety of this disciplinary matter (given his
presiding over the initial summary eviction in Rev2011-001708 involving Hill and the
intial arrest of 8/20/11 in RCR2011-063341, and his rejection of the plea deal Coughlin
and the WCDA's Office voluntarily agreed to at the 8/27/12 hearing therein) is illustrated
by the following vis a vis his failing to hold subpoened witness Nicole Watson in
contempt and failing to grant a continuance upon her failure to appear at the 11/19/12 trial,

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in addition to the flagrantly inconsistent rulings by Sferrazza where teh WCDA is

permitted to put forward all the hearsay it pleases when it comes to explaining why the
officer took the steps he did next, while, in the following excerpt, Judge Sferrazza can
hardly imagine how the fact that Nicole Watson was captured on tape admitting that a still
unidentified man picked up a phone off the concrete ground next to the Truckee River in a
skate plaza and announced to those dispersed throughout the plaza that he would throw the
phone in the river if someone did not claim it immediately:
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I'll call Mr. Nathaniel Zarate.
THE COURT: Okay. Come up and be sworn and then if you'll spell your first
and last name for the record. I believe you testified before. So, Mr. Young
will have the right to object if it's something which has already been testified
to before. Raise your right hand. (The witness was sworn.) THE COURT:
Would you state and we spell your first and last names. THE WITNESS:
Nathaniel Zarate, N-A-T-H-A-N-I-E-L. Last name Zarate, Z-A-R-A-T-E.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir, Your Honor. NATHANIEL ZARATE, called as a witness, having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: DIRECT
EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Good afternoon, Mr. Zarate.
Thank you for being here today, sir. I am going to ask you, do you recall on
the night in question, August 20th, 2011, someone you 197 might have
referred to earlier as the man with the six pack holding the iPhone while
offering it up to people in the park? MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, objection.
Hearsay. It's the truest definition of hearsay as I objected to already.
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I could quickly offer a counter to that.
THE COURT: Well, you can just ask him the question if recalls some -- you
said that you testified to earlier. You asked him to recite testimony from a
prior proceeding. You can ask him the question, if he saw someone hold up
the phone. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you see -- did someone hold up a
phone that night? A Yes. Q He offered up to the people in the park? MR.
YOUNG: Your Honor, again, I object to that, hearsay. THE COURT: I'm
going to overrule that because it was asked before and answered by this
witness I believe. If not, it was answered by the officer, one or the other 198
BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q You may answer that, sir. THE COURT: because I
heard that testimony and I have no way of knowing it except for that. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Mr. Zarate, will you answer that, please. Yes. There was a
man holding up a phone. Q A Q Did the man say something to the affect that
somebody claim the phone or I'll throw it in the river? MR. YOUNG: Your
Honor, I object to that. I know for a fact that it's not been introduced into
evidence . THE COURT: MR. YOUNG: All right. And again there's no -- I
have not heard an exception to the hearsay rule provided by Mr. Coughlin, I
think it is clearly hearsay.
MR. COUGHLIN: And Your Honor, may I just offer a hearsay objection?
Exception. THE COURT: What's the hearsay exception? MR. COUGHLIN: I
would say I believe that then existing mental or emotional or physical
condition would apply as would present sense impression. THE COURT: I'm
going to overrule the objection. Go ahead. 199 BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q A Q

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You may answer, sir. To which question? Did somebody hold the phone up
and (indiscernible) in the river if somebody doesn't claim (Indiscernible)? A I
don't remember that man specifically saying I'm going to throw the phone in
the river. that? Q A Q Anything like that? I don't remember him saying
anything like that. Do you recall Nicole Watson admitting to hearing MR.
YOUNG: THE COURT: Your Honor, again That is sustained. This witness
can answer what hearsay is. MR. YOUNG: THE COURT: MR. YOUNG:
Mr. Coughlin knows what hearsay is. What? Mr. Coughlin knows what
hearsay is. Throughout the entire day, he's attempted to elicit almost nothing
but hearsay. THE COURT: That's fine. But that prior question, the one that he
answered I think is an exception but this one is not and it is double hearsay on
top of that, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, Your Honor. It's not 200 offered to
proof the truth of the matter asserted. THE COURT: Well, I don't care. I've
sustained it. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Do you
recall seeing me with some cameras and recording equipment about a week
after the arrest MR. YOUNG: THE COURT: Objection, relevance. What's the
relevance? MR. COUGHLIN: One, I believe it goes to the exculpatory
material and it's been said that someone -- if Mr. Zarate heard me ask that
question and heard someone admit to hearing a man say he's going to throw it
in the river THE COURT: I sustain the objection.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Can I ask Mr. Zarate to authenticate a recording
that was made with him present in which his voice is on? THE COURT: You
may. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I would -- if this is a video taken a week
after the incident -- THE COURT: Oh, a week after? MR. YOUNG: Which
he was just referring to, I would object to that. THE COURT: Then I sustain
the objection. If it 201 was contemporaneous with the incident, then I'll allow
it. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, it was a week after the incident and -- THE
COURT: So the objection is sustained. It's not relevant to this charge today,
sir. MR. COUGHLIN: So if the individual had percipient knowledge of the
events of the night of the arrest a week later our videotape describing the
arrest, that's not relevant for the event involved? THE COURT: The arrest is
not the issue. It's whether or not you stole the cell phone. MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, the action incident to the arrest or resulting in the arrest if they are
testifying -- not go testifying but commenting a week later on videotape
knowing they are being recorded as to what actions were involved in the
arrest, what precipitated what, that's not relevant? THE COURT: Sir, tell me
specifically you can make an offer of proof, a brief one, as to what is
allegedly on this video that deals with the arrest on the night of the incident.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. And I'll just note quickly, I reviewed the tape of
the October 22nd hearing date and at the 48 minute mark of the second file on
that you note that I'll be afforded the right to waive the 202 witness fees for
subpoenas and therein I would suggest that my properly serving Nicole
Watson incident NRS 174.345
THE COURT: Well, I see that is a proper service but it's not one she has
to obey because it's by mail. So if she doesn't get it, and if she doesn't sign for
it, then it's not evidence that she was served. It may comply with the

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technicality of the statute but it doesn't give me the power to order,

(Indiscernible) or to issue an warrant for her nonappearance. MR.
COUGHLIN: I do believe it provides a basis for a continuance. THE
COURT: No, sir, not unless you made a proper motion based on that.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm making that now, sir. THE COURT: It's denied.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Well, as to your prompting me to issue an offer of
proof, this recording, and I have a video of it and an audio of it swell -- might
remember Mr. Templeton (indiscernible) it will show Mr. Zarate standing
next to Ms. Watson when Ms. Watson admits to hearing the man with the 6pack holding the iPhone and threatening to throw it in the river if somebody
didn't claim it immediately. MR. YOUNG: How Mr. Coughlin does not see
that 203 as hearsay, Your Honor -- THE COURT: All right. MR.
COUGHLIN: And I think it's THE COURT: You are saying that Ms. Watson
said that on the video? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, with Mr. Zarate there.
Further I think it's relevant to the extent that Mr. Zarate then clearly appears
to dissuade her from further contradicting what he allegedly told the police
that night and I believe there is indicating a motive on his part to cover up the
extent to which his misstatements to the police resulted in my arrest.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the objection. Go ahead. MR.
COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I would note for the record I do believe I
complied with the statute with respect THE COURT: I believe you complied
except that you did not provide for the witness fee. But you indicated that I
waived it which I still haven't seen or heard. But even if I had, the evidence is
that she's no longer here. So I don't know what MR. COUGHLIN: Well, she
wasn't here today, is that-- THE COURT: No, she's no longer in this
204 .----...... community. MR. COUGHLIN: She is. I confirmed that she's a
student at McQueen High School. THE COURT: According to the testimony
earlier today, there is testimony that she's no longer. MR. COUGHLIN: Mr.
Lichty, I recall him saying he wasn't aware of -- he hadn't talked to her in a
year. THE COURT: And he also indicated that he believed that she had
moved. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't recall that. I believe he indicated to me that
no THE COURT: Okay. Let me look at the -- actually I don't have one for her
but I assume you have a certificate for her. Do you have it with you? MR.
COUGHLIN: I provided it to the Court, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well,
the one that I have did not show it. MR. COUGHLIN: Would it be all right,
Your Honor, if I reviewed THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter right now. I
am ruling that what she would have testified to would have been hearsay and
also probably not relevant to whether or not it was a theft. I know your
argument somehow this was found property but what some third party 205
did or didn't do is not going to be at issue in this case when we finish it.
MR. COUGHLIN: So if the phone was going to be in the river but for
someone's intervention, that's not bearing on the fact whether or not,
comparing someone's walking up
THE COURT: If somebody said that, I don't know, No . 1, that they did
because it hearsay as objected to by Mr . Young. So I'm sustaining his
objection as to hearsay. But even if it wasn't hearsay, the bottom line is I

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don't know, No . 1, if the person would have done that or not. I don't know
how they came into possession of the cell phone and, thirdly, you did claim
the phone from that person, according to what I heard. MR. COUGHLIN:
But if you had heard all the things from me, then you would then perhaps
reconsider allowing this excited utterance or (indiscernible). THE COURT:
No, I ruled. Okay. I'll allow you to argue it. All right. You can argue anything
you want but the bottom line is the evidence will be what I decide on and that
is not evidence that the hearsay testimony of someone who's not here and
even if they were here, it would be still be hearsay . MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir, Your Honor. And if it's not going to offer to prove the matter asserted
but 206 rather to demonstrate a bias or motive on this witness' part to
shush anybody who is suggesting something that is counter to what he
told the police in which affected a wrongful arrest. THE COURT: Still
sustained. I think it's at best marginally relevant by some tangential issue
to this case which is whether or not -- and I told you this three times -whether or not you did willfully and unlawfully steal, take and carry away
the personal property of another. That's one count. The other count is
whether on or about the 20th day of August, you did willfully and unlawful
possess or withheld stolen goods. All right. You can make any argument you
want. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. If I could just quickly -- this isn't the right
time -- but if he could quickly indicate, Your Honor, respectfully, I believe it
goes to the willfulness aspect of -- and the aspect of another. If something
is going to be in the river, I think, one, it arguably no -- THE COURT: You
can, you're done. I've already ruled on it twice now. MR. COUGHLIN:
Perhaps it's just my inexperience, Your Honor All right. THE COURT:
Perhaps it is. But the bottom line 207 is I have ruled and you can proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN: Granted, but isn't there a negative THE COURT: I'm not
getting through to you. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, but THE
COURT: I've denied -- I've sustained the objection and denied your request
for a continuance to bring in this witness. MR. COUGHLIN: the record why
-- All right. Go ahead . And I'm not able to preserve for THE COURT: You
already have preserved for the record. I think it's quite apparent. I understand
what your argument is... 208
However, Judge Sferrazza himself made a completely inconsistent ruling
while WCPD Jim Leslie was still representing Coughlin:
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Page
123:6 to 123:24) BY MR. LESLIE: Q So the other guy picked up the
iPhone and said, "Does it belong to anybody," or words to that effect? A
Yes, sir. Q Did that guy also say something to the effect of he was going
to throw it in the river or anything like that? MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I
object on the grounds that it's hearsay. THE COURT: On the grounds of
what? MR. YOUNG: Hearsay. MR. LESLIE: Well, your Honor -- THE
COURT: I don't think it's offered for the truth of the matter. So I'm going
to overrule the objection. BY MR. LESLIE: Q So did he say anything
along those lines? A I did not hear him say that.

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Compare, also, such to Judge Sferrazza's approach during the 8/27/11

hearing on the Motion to Suppress (the entirety of which WCDA Young was
allowed to copy and paste into the trial that followed, despite his many
arguments that certain testimony and questions was permissible in that is was
only occurring within the hearing on the Motion to Supress):
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages
24:23 to 26:17) A So then Mr. Coughlin was left with the other officers
who were on scene. I made contact with the victim. Q (WCDA Z. Young)
Do you recall the victim's name? A (Witness RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde)
I recall his last name. Q What was that? A Zarate. Q Okay. A I
asked him what occurred. In summary, he told me that his phone had been
taken. MR. LESLIE: Objection, hearsay. MR. YOUNG: It's not hearsay
because it goes to the effect with respect to this motion to suppress. THE
COURT: I'll overrule this objection, it's not admitted for the purposes of
the truth of the matter. MR. LESLIE: Well, your Honor, I would also object
based on relevance. We're attacking the pat-down. This is not germane to the
pat-down. This is investigation so it's not relevant. THE COURT: So you're
objecting that there was a pat-down? MR. LESLIE: We're attacking, in our
Motion to Suppress, the validity of the pat-down search. This testimony now
about his discussions with witnesses is part of his broader investigation which
is not relevant to whether or not he was justified in patting down Mr.
Coughlin at an earlier stage. THE COURT: Well, I agree with that. So a patdown -- inaudible, if I understand this correctly. MR. LESLIE: I've stated my
objection. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor the motion to suppress also attacks the
plain field doctrine talking about this reaching into the phone. This goes
directly to that part of the motion to suppress. THE COURT: Reaching in for
the phone, I mean it wasn't part of the pat-down, wasn't it? MR. YOUNG:
Well, that's what I'm attempting to show to the court through testimony. THE
COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection because I'm not clear I
understand the facts of this case. MR. YOUNG: Sure.
Further, the State offered double hearsay successfully: PARTIAL
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages 28:3 to 29:10) Q
Okay. When speaking with Mr. Goble, what was it that Mr. Goble advised
you? A He advised me that his phone had been taken. A friend had seen it
be taken and pointed the person out who had the phone to him. Q All
right. A He had confronted the subject that he identified as Mr. Coughlin
and asked for his phone back. He was told by Mr. Coughlin that he didn't
have a phone. So he called the phone and when he dialed his phone number,
he saw the phone screen -- MR. LESLIE: I again object on hearsay. THE
COURT: It's overruled again. MR. LESLIE: I won't keep doing it every
time, but I just want to be clear. THE COURT: I think it goes to the
officer's P C possibly for the arrest or whatever happened. MR. YOUNG:
Yes, sir. MR. LESLIE: Why don't I state it this way, may I have a
continuing objection in the Motion to Suppress to the officer testifying to
what witnesses told him? MR. YOUNG: That's fine. THE COURT:
Absolutely. MR. LESLIE: Thank you, your Honor, then I don't have to

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interrupt every time. THE COURT: Maybe at some point, the objection
would be sustained so that's my only concern but at this point, I'm going to
overrule the objection because I don't believe it's offered for the truth of the
testimony.
However, when WCDA Young wants witness Zarate to testify as to what
the still unidentified man whom picked up the phone off the concrete ground
said in a loud voice heard throughout the skate plaze, its not hearsay?:
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages
101:13 to 102:2) Q (WCDA Young) So what happened? A (Witness
Zarate) From then, I see one man. I don't know who this man was. He was
carrying a sixpack of beer. He walked up to my friend's hat, Cory Goble's hat.
He saw that and he waved it around and said, "Oh, is this anybody's," because
I assume that he was going to claim it for himself. Then we saw Cory -- my
friends and I saw Cory, wearing that hat. So we said, "Oh yes, that's Cory's
hat." Then he saw the phone with what -- we got the hat back and then we
saw the phone on the ground or he saw the phone on the ground, and he was
doing the same thing waving it around to see if anyone was going to claim
it.
Further, WCDA Z. Young suborned witness Nathaniel K. Zarate's
perjury where he proffered the following testimony despite Coughlin
providing a video taped admission by Zarate that such was not true, and that
he did not personally eye witness Coughlin receive such phone from the
unidentified man:
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages
102:12 to 103:15) Q Okay. Go ahead. A From then, I saw -- that's when
Mr. Coughlin approached the man with the phone. The man with the sixpack, he said, "Oh, is this anybody's phone," and that's when the person who
was trying to take the hat and claim the hat -- Q And just to be clear, do
you see the first man in the courtroom today? A No. He's not here. Q
Okay. Do you know who that guy is? A No. Q Okay. You were saying?
A From then, I witnessed Mr. Coughlin look at the phone and then since
the first man gave the hat back to us, I assumed he was asking if it was his
phone and then Mr. Coughlin claimed it was his phone. I saw him take it
from him and then Mr. Coughlin was on his bike. Then we weren't sure
whose phone it was, at the time. So we called my other friend to see if it was
his phone, but he answered his phone so we weren't sure whose phone it was
at first. Then we -- since the phone was right next to Cory's hat, we went up
and asked Cory if that might have been his phone and that's when we started
to put two and two together.
In the investigatory video and audio recordings taken by Coughlin, which
he declares under penalty of perjury he has not altered in any way, Robert
Dawson and Nate Zarate admit that they believe the "man with the six-pack"
gave Coughlin the phone based upon the circumstantial evidence that they
personally eye-witnessed Coughlin go up to the man with the six-pack shortly
after he held it aloft, offered it up, and after the man threatened to throw it in
the river if someone did not claim it immediately (Nicole Watson admits

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hearing the "man with the six- (page 3 of 293 of Coughlin's 10/18/12 and
11/15/12 Motion for Mistrial in 63341) pack" say this, whereupon, in
VIDEO0099, Zarate is seen and heard attempting to dissuade her from saying
anything further with regard to the material facts as she witnessed them,
particularly where they depart from the version Zarate has provided to the
RPD and or in his witness statement). Dawson and Zarate both admit in the
videos taken by Coughlin that they did not personally eyewitness the man
with the six-pack give Coughlin the phone, but rather made that inference
upon questioning that man and determining that he no longer had the phone
after Coughlin finished interacting with him. Zarate states something in
VIDEO0099 to the effect that he knew Coughlin had the phone because the
man with the six-pack no longer had the phone upon their questioning him.
However, in his trial testimony Zarate indicates, in response to a direct
question from Judge Sferrazza, that he did, in fact, "personally eye-witness"
Coughlin be given the phone by the man
In one of the subsequent investigatory videos that Coughlin filmed Nicole
Watson blurts out in response to one of Coughlin's questions that yes, she did
in fact here the man who picked up the phone threatened to throw the phone
in the River if someone did not claim it immediately. At that point in the
video filled by Coughlin Zarate can be seen attempting to quiet Nicole
Watson down and then later pulling her aside and seemingly dissuading her
from testifying or submitting further to an interview with Coughlin. It is clear
that Zarate sought to obstruct justice (in the videos Coughlin filmed and
provided to both the WCPD and WCDA's Offices, including "VIDEO0099"
(length: 5:15) (and Zarates's sworn testimony at trial is contradicted by 184/293 - MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
statements of the form and 26 second mark video 0099 wherein rather than
asserting that he personally eye witnessed Coughlin received the phone from
"the man with the six-pack", but instead Zarate indicated that he saw the man
hold the phone aloft and heard him offer it up and then Zarate stated on that
investigatory video Coughlin filmed upon his release from jail: at 4:05 mark
of "VIDEO0099 watson we saw you take a phone from a man" (length:
5:15)
Also, WCDA Z. Young suborned the perjury of RPD Officer Nicholas
Duralde with respect to his fraudulent assertion that his receipt of a report
from dispatch of a possible fight was factored into this reasonable suspicion
and probable cause analysis:
(from the Motion for Mistrial Coughlin served on the WCDA's Office and
submitted for filing on 10/18/12 (well in advance of the 11/19/12 trial date, at
which Coughlin was not permitted to cross-examine arresting Officer
Duralde) and where, by 10/18/12, Coughlin had still not been provided the
ECOMM recordings of verbal communications between the RPD and
ECOMM's dispatchers (one of whom is the arresting officer's wife, Jessica
Duralde, where the RPD Detective wrongfully arresting an overcharging
Coughlin on 3/8/13 (SBN's fraudulent TPO/EPO violation allegations) ,
Detective Yturbide, also has an ECOMM dispatcher wife, Jodi Ytrubide), and

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where the disc finally provided by RCA Skau following the ridiculously
scheduled, fraudulently noticed 11/13/12 Emergency Hearing still failed to
included all the 911 calls/ and communications between RPD and ECOMM
required by both Coughlin's subpoena and his public records request (ie, such
hearing was scheduled the day before Coughlin's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary
hearing...we get it Sferrazza, you really hate Coughlin, are really pulling out
every last stop you can to torpedo not only the summary eviction from his
former home law office, but also convict on both counts in the iphone petty
larceny/receiving stolen property case, on top of severely prejudicing his
defense in the formal disciplinary matter which you purposefully schedule a
trail in 63341 as close to as possible and permitted two emergency hearings
immediately before (11/8/12 and 11/13/12) wherein you quashed all of
Coughlin's subpoenas, some might say) on various Motions to Quash
Coughlin's subpoenas (which Skau fraudulently asserted to Coughlin he had
been given authority to serve Coughlin notice thereof via email)
(What follows is DDA Young's barrage of attempts to mislead the court,
and, basically lie...as Young continually tries to get across that the first
dispatch report was about "a possible fight", rather than a "CK FOR LARC
OF ACELL PHONE JUST", on multiple occassions. 1:55:45 pm state of a
few questions Your Honor Mr. Leslie asked you or do you recall Mr. Leslie
asking you that once dispatch advised of am update that it was a potential
larceny he asked something along the lines of...would that alleviate any
concern for threats or violence ...weapons... And I know I am misstating his
exact words but it was something along those lines you recall the question?
(There Young misleads the Court and shows a lack of candor, again, to the
tribunal in suggesting, based upon some imaginary "possible fight" dispatch
report, that there was, therefore, some fear of threats or violence that such an
update, downgrading the situation to a a mere larceny, would necessarily
"alleviate". Duralde yes state and are called by written your response was
could be Duralde I don't recall the exact response but many times we put
information from dispatch that inaccurate or mixed as police officers we have
to keep our guard up for whatever might be there when we arrived for safety
1:56:47 pm state and in this case the larceny was additional information that
you receiving from the first report Duralde yes - 185/293 - MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW (Actually....there he goes
again...Young and Duralde continue attempting to purport that the report of a
larceny was not the first part of the first report, period...but rather some
"additional information" in some, necessarily, subsequent update. (Curiously,
Duralde's narrative and his November 28, 2011 narrative does not mention
this alleged initial report by dispatch the State so perseverates on in fact that
narrative begins thusly: "On August 20, 2011 at approximately 2327 hours I
was dispatched along with Reno PD Officer R. ROSA to the plaza at on a
report of a larceny of a cell phone at that location. Dispatch relayed
information that the victim had set his phone down and that he was now
calling the phone and it was lighting up in the suspect's pocket. The suspect
was described as a white male adult, 35 years of age, 6'02", 210 Ibs, wearing

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a red Chicago hat and a white or yellow shirt and plaid shorts. Dispatch also
relayed that the suspect was still on scene" And, in fact, the dispatch logs do
not reveal any notation of "a possible fight". Actually, this "possible fight"
garbage seems more and more to be professional misconduct on DDA Young
and Duralde's part, as there is no indication in any of the contemporaneous
records or statements by Duralde that he was under the impression there was
any "possible fight", though both Duralde and Young have misled the Court
in that regard, and, not surprisingly, who else, Leslie has joined in on the act,
mentioning a "possible fight" several times, despite the record, as far as what
Officer Duradle was made aware of upon arriving on scene then immediately
handcuffing Coughlin shortly after Coughlin broached the topic of
constitutional rights. Further, DDA Young continually refers to the dispatch
report of "a larceny" being "additional information" or an "update from the
first report", when, in fact, the first report's first message is "CK FOR LARC
OF CELL PHONE"...so again DDY Young and Duralde are playin' fast and
loose with the facts. Rather, the first entry at 11:23:36 pm indicates:
"TEXT:ICE RINK AREA - CK FOR LARC OF CELL PHONE JUST SUSP OS - LOUD VERBAL DISTR". Sure, a "loud verbal distrubance"...but,
all this about "possible fight" appears to be nothing more than DDA Young's
creation in an attempt to shore up an exigency/safety analysis for his pat
down rationale. That is sanctionable conduct. Further, the next update in the
dispatch log, from 11:25:20 pm still fails to mention any "possible fight", but
rather reads: "STILL LOUD DISTR - RP LEFT HIS CELL PHONE ON
POST AND CALLED THE CELL PHONE AND ITS LIGHTING UP IN
SUSPS POCKET.". YOung and Duralde really need to explain their attempts
to mislead the Court and lack of candor to the tribunal to the extent that they
purported the phrase possible five to be up bit of information included in the
dispatch communications rather than their interpretation of of something that
may be incident to a loud disturbance where dispatch only reports a loud
disturbance particularly one of a "VERBAL" variety. 11:25:47 pm marks the
time of another dispatch text (apparently sent to the officer's in their vehicles,
not that Leslie would ask anything like that): "SUPP TEXT:RP WAS
SCREAMING AT SUSP AND LINE DISCONNECTED." The fact that the
dispatcher described the call as"RP (reporting party, ie, Goble) SCREAMING
AT SUSP" is telling and would strongly suggest that Duralde would have had
more reason to pat down Goble or his compatriates than Coughlin, and it is
possible Goble was in his vehicle or otherwise aware of this dispatch report
(Leslie failed to ask any questions about how and when these officers were
apprised of information by dispatch, including whether they were so even
after arriving on the scene, but the video Coughlin took of the arrest clearly
contains the sounds of dispatch radios, though, curiously, the smart phone in
Coughlin's right front shorts pocket displays no "sound of the iPhone
vibrating" such as what Duralde and DDA Young pin most of the "probable
cause" in their case on. Lastly, there is strong evidence to suggest Duralde
never received the information from dispatch (prior to arriving on the scene
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that was contained in the dispatch text from 11:27:11 pm: TEXT:RP (Goble)
CALLING BACK ON 911 ADV'ING SOMEONE JUST HIT A "MINOR" RP (reporting party) JUST SAID "THERE IS A COP THERE WAIVE HIM
DOWN". Duralde appears on the sidewalk near the Center Street Bridge in
the video Couglin took of the arrest at approximately 11:27:55 pm, and, that,
in combination with an utter paucity of mentions by the State or Duralde
respecting the "socked a minor" ruse, indicates Duralde was not even privy to
any dispatch information in that regard, and, of course, if it was, in fact
Duralde (who testified he was "first to arrive on the scene" (and, as is
customary, took the lead on the investigation), the bit in the dispatch log that
"RP JUST SAID "THERE IS A COPY THERE WAIVE HIM DOWN" is
likely referring to Duralde. Further, Duralde's laconic, relaxed tone and
approach upon arriving on scene further belies the lack of sincerity in the
State's "possible fight" message, which, it seems clear, dispatch never made
(not that the DA, the RPD, or Emergency Dispatch Services has supplied any
tapes thereof, contrary to Goodnights duly made request therefor.
NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria is the only Panel member to sign his 12/14/12
FOFCOL, which made the following Findings of Fact:
29. State Bar Counsel called Coughlin to testify at the hearing of the matter.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 from Assistant
Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel forwarded to Coughlin
correspondence received from Richard G. Hill. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing Exhibit 6. Coughlin's
response, dated March 9, 2012, asked for additional time in which to respond. See Hearing
Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that Coughlin substantively responded to Bar
Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012 prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
Coughlin failed to directly respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring if Coughlin ever
subsequently responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
30.
Coughlin also failed to directly respond to questioning regarding whether
or not he had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, to
a letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel regarding the letter received by the Nevada
State Bar from Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes and dated March 14, 2012. See Transcript of
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 174, L 13 -P 180, L 4. See Hearing Exhibit 8.
31.
On March 7, 2012 Coughlin caused to be filed an "Affidavit of Poverty in
Support of Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis." See Hearing Exhibit 9. In his Affidavit,
Coughlin represented that he was self-employed as a "Jack of all Trades." See Hearing
Exhibit 9. The Affidavit does not identify Mr. Coughlin as a lawyer or identity any income
from the practice of law. See Hearing Exhibit 9.
32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also filed a motion on November
14, 2011 to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number 11CR 22176 pending in the Reno
Municipal Court before Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See Hearing Exhibit 10. Judge
Howard's Order denying Coughlin's motion specifically noted that Coughlin's "affidavit of
poverty" did not identify any income from the practice of law yet Coughlin had implied to

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the court when sentenced to incarceration for contempt that his incarceration would
adversely affect his clients. See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23.
Chair Echeverria's FOFCOL then made the following Conclusions of Law:
Competence
(H) RPC 1.1 states "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
(I) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin lacks the
competency to represent clients, including himself.
(J) First, the record demonstrates severe criticism by the trial court in the handling
of the Joshi matter, including Coughlin's lack of understanding of a balance sheet, his
failure to conduct discovery, his lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence and trial
procedure. Supra' 25
(K) Second, Judge Beesley testified that the pleadings filed by Coughlin on behalf
of his client in a bankruptcy case were "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of
rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff." Judge Beesley also testified that
Coughlin's pleadings and arguments on behalf of his client "didn't make any sense." Supra
' 16 Judge Beesley became concerned enough about Coughlin's competency as a lawyer
that he contacted the State Bar. Supra' 17
(L) Third, Judge Nash Holmes questioned Coughlin's competency as a lawyer and
in her Order finding Coughlin in Contempt of Court noted that Coughlin disregarded the
rules of evidence, continually imposed improper questions, failed to properly examine
witnesses, repeatedly asked the question, misstated answers, injected irrelevant material,
argued with witnesses and mischaracterized testimony. Supra' 7
(M) Fourth, Judge Nash Holmes found that Coughlin's pleadings failed to address
topics listed 'in the caption, contained rambling references to Coughlin's personal life and
other irrelevant material, were overly lengthy, disjointed and incoherent. Supra' 9 & 10
(N) Fifth, the State Bar called two judges and two practicing attorneys (Elcano is
not listed as an "active attorney" at www.nvbar.org, nor has he been for over 5 years), each
with significant experience with Coughlin and each of whom rendered an expert opinion
regarding Coughlin's competency as a lawyer. Judge Beesley testified that in his opinion,
Coughlin was not competent to practice law. Supra 18. Judge Nash Holmes testified that
in her opinion, Coughlin violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct including his
lack of competency to practice law. Supra 15. Attorney Richard Hill also testified that in
his opinion Coughlin is not competent to practice law. Supra 22 Attorney Paul Elcano,
who once supervised Coughlin as a lawyer and ultimately terminated him from Washoe
Legal Services, also testified that, in his opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. Supra 28
(O) Sixth, the record establishes that Coughlin offered no expert opinion or evidence as
to his competency.
Diligence
(P) RPC 1.2 states "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." The record is less clear as to whether or not Coughlin violated
RPC 1.2 on more than on occasion.
(R) Judge Howard, in the Joshi case, certainly found that Coughlin failed to
conduct discovery on behalf of his client in that matter. Supra 25

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(S) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin failed to
provide a verified responsive pleading even in the defense of his own disciplinary
action. Supra 38
(T) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin habitually
files numerous, untimely and repetitive motions...
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin continuously
and repetitively files irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the issue at hand and
continuously and repetitively injects irrelevant matters into proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes found, for example, that Coughlin repeatedly injected
allegations of bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traffic case involving the
failure to stop at a stop sign. Supra 7 She also found that Coughlin repeatedly injected
attorney Richard Hill into questions and statements when Mr. Hill was in no way involved
in the traffic citation trial. Supra 7 She also found that pleadings filed subsequent to
Coughlin's incarceration were lengthy (more than 200 pages) contained scant discussion
of, or relevance to, the matter and contained irrelevant discussion of facts unrelated to the
proceedings at hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's conduct
was so vexatious and frivolous as to result in substantial sanction of attorney's fees. Supra
21 See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's filings,
even in his own defense of the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy, irrelevant facts and legal
issues into this proceeding...
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin violated RPC
3.3(a)(l) when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he was surreptitiously
and without permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 Of note, Coughlin did not
deny that he had lied to Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his cross examination of Judge Nash
Holmes focused on how she had learned of the true facts. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testified that based on his experience in litigating with
Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
(CC) The record also establishes that Coughlin was less than candid with the Court
in two separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis, when he failed to disclose his
true occupation as an attorney and instead indicated he was self-employed as a "Jack of all
Trades" failed to identify any income from the practice of law after having represented to
the court that his incarceration would adversely affect his clients. Supra 31 & 32...

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Chair Echeverria insisted upon finishing the hearing in one day's time, no matter
what, not even if the Reno Justice Court failed to comply with Coughlin's subpoena, which
former RJC Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil on 8/2/13, finally indicated to Coughlin at
her new position as a filing counter clerk at the Sparks Justice Court, that RJC Judge
Clifton had instructed her not to respond to Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoena (some might
say those who are not big enough team players get shipped to the Sparks Justice Court, to
be replaced by those whom are. Christine Erickson is the new Chief Civil Clerk at Reno
Justice Court). On that note Coughlin was unable to move to quash the subpoena on
Judge Beesley that Pat King never filed or notified Coughlin of in any way (Coughlin
managed to spy a copy of the waiver of service that Judge Beesley faxed to the SBN only
over the lunch during Coughln's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing, where such was
discarded in a far corner of the room for no apparent reason). Pat King, of course, was
able to get his 11/2/12 Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Quash Coughlin's Subpoenas
granted, however, in the Chair's 11/7/12 Order.)
Coughlin was not permitted to call Judge Beesley as a witness in his case in chief
because Judge Beesley's schedule did not permit for such a level of due process be
afforded to Coughlin where he was only available, by telephone (which made it fairly
difficult to refresh his memory with anything like, say, handing him or otherwise
providing him with any of the filings by Coughlin that Judge Beesley had the vaguest of
recollections of, including Coughlin's filing of 3/30/12 filing in Cadle Co. v. Keller (NVB
10-05104) wherein Coughlin detailed the extensive prejudice to both his client's John
Gessin (NVB 11-05077, 11-05078, and that 3/19/12 Opposition by Coughlin does not
seem too bad viewed through the prism of circumstance yielded through knowing about
the 2/27/12 summary contempt incarceration (no stay of any sort for a practicing attorney,
said Judge Nash Holmes...strange that Coughlin's subsequent 3/7/12 Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis and Affidavit In Support Thereof would be offered (well, pages 2 and 3 of
that three page filing...after all, page 1 thereof did clearly identify Coughlin as an attorney,
with Esq. after his name, and his Nevada Bar number above the caption)to support an
allegation that Coughlin committed professional misconduct by filing an Affidavit in
Support of his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis that failed to disclose that he was an
attorney (Coughlin's pleading for a stay on 2/27/12 to Judge Nash Holmes and arguing that
the failure to grant a stay of any sort would necessarily prejudice his client's cases, like
those before NVB Judge Beesley, of Gessin and Keller would sort of disclose the fact that
Coughlin was a practicing attorney and kind of undermine such allegation in King's
8/23/12 Complaint, no? King's Complaint alleged) and allegation and Robert Keller
stemming from RMC Judge Nash Holme's having Coughlin's smartphone, cell phone,
micro sd card, and electric shaver, taken out of Coughlin's personal property, into which it
was booked on 2/27/12 at 5:15 p.m., and given to the Reno Municipal Court Marshals
(whom should have been held in contempt for failing to respond to the subpoena that
Coughlin's mother served on them on 11/6/12, but NNDB Chairman Susich could not be
bothered with complying with SCR 111(3)-(4), so.... just like Judge Nash Holmes failed to
abide by NRS 22.030(2)-(3) in failing to follow the requirement that any alleged
contemptuous conduct not occurring within the "immediate view and presence" of the
court be supported by an sworn affidavit under NRS 22.030(2) (Judge Nash Holmes also

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struck Coughlin's request for audio of the 2/27/12 hearing from the record, as well as his
notice of appeal.
Further, the SBN attempted to (and succeeded) in have Coughlin convicted of
professional misconduct incident to an allegation that he failed to disclose that he was an
attorney in his 3/7/12 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit (Declaration
works under Buckwalter, but since so many judges choose to violated NCJC Canon 1,
Rule 1.1, and strike such filings by indigents when they cannot afford a notary's signature,
Coughlin as forced to utilize an older in forma pauperis affidavit). Preposterously
fraudulent was the SBN's King's admitting as an exhibit only a portion of Judge Nash
Holmes' reprehensible 3/13/12 Order wherein she struck from the record such Motion to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit in Support Thereof (which sought to waive the
$35 fee Coughlin's mother ultimately had to pay in sneakily seeking a copy of such
proceeding (which is a part of the public record) from the RMC after the RMC repeatedly
refused to provide such to Coughlin, even where he attempted to pay for it, and the SBN
refused to provide such to Coughlin until 6/27/12, some three and a half months after the
SBN initially indicated it would provide such to Coughlin (which makes the SBN's
allegation that Coughlin failed to respond to some alleged letter to Coughlin from the
SBN seeking a response to "grievances" from Judges Nash Holmes, and, apparently,
some unnamed other (the SBN, due to its own fraudulent approach, was unable to admit
into evidence the purported 3/16/12 letter it wrote to Coughlin wherein King allegedly
requested a response (though such lacks any within ten days language like that in
FHE 7;, and where King put on no argument that Coughlin violated RPC 8.1 with respect
to any grievance other then Hill's (which King failed to put into evidence, completely
undermining his attempt to establish such by clear and convincing evidence) with the
dicey terrain King found himself on upon Coughlin exposing King's fraudulent attempt to
avoid the strong defensive collateral estoppel arguments provided to Coughlin by Judge L.
Gardner deciding not to take any Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action by contacting an
appropriate authority like the SBN (see the former Canon 3(D)(2)) by initially indicating
that the SBN had received a grievance from Judge L. Gardner, when, in fact, the SBN was
forced to admit (along with Judge Nash Holme) that Nash Holmes herself included FHE3,
Judge L. Gardner's ancient three year old FHE3 (which King knew or should have known
from the materials Coughlin provided him had been vacated by virtue of the superseding
final Decree of Divorce, especially given the attendant Proposed Decree and alteration by
Judge L. Gardner to the very sections therein involving subject matter originally purported
to support some such sanction)...
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 154:3 to 154:25) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you
or anyone with the Reno Municipal Court transmit or otherwise deliver Judge Linda
Gardner's order for sanctions to the State Bar of Nevada? A (JUDGE NASH
HOLMES) I'm sorry. I didn't hear all that. Did I what? You'll have to repeat the question.
Q Did you or anybody with your court, the Reno Municipal Court, transmit or
otherwise deliver Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 order sanctioning me to the State
Bar of Nevada? A I'm sorry. Deliver to whom? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar,
Judge. THE WITNESS: Oh. After -- let me explain quickly. My trial was my first
experience in exposure to Mr. Coughlin. After everything happened, and I held him in
contempt, then Judge Gardner told me that his sister, Judge Gardner, has a life

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experience with Mr. Coughlin, and he provided me a copy of her opinion from a couple
years earlier. And that may have been in the package I forwarded to the court.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 155:4 to 157:2) MR. COUGHLIN: Can I ask one
more question about the pending -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin -- MR.
COUGHLIN: -- competency evaluation or -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- with the trial? It's a good question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's an
interruptive question, and it's improper conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: You're not going to
let her (NOTE: her being RMC Judge Nash Holmes) answer that, huh? You are not
going to make her answer that? ... MR. COUGHLIN: She held a trial with a pending
competency evaluation in violation of law. ... I just got it on the record. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Judge. We appreciate you taking your time into the lunch
hour. THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'll hang up now. MR. KING: Thank you, Judge. ...
MR. COUGHLIN: I'd like to call Judge Nash Holmes in my case in chief and ask her
why she persists in holding trial if she was aware of a pending competency order. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You had the opportunity to ask her those questions. MR. COUGHLIN:
No, I didn't. You just refused it to me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, I gave you -- MR.
COUGHLIN: You did another basis for an impartiality finding. ... You're not letting
me ask any question that would tend to implicate impropriety on the part of a judge.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You can characterize the rulings as you wish. I have made the
rulings.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 83:19 to 84:16) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you intend to
call him on direct in your case in chief? MR. COUGHLIN: I might. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Hill, would you mind being on telephone standby? And, Mr. Coughlin, if you intend
to call him, I want a half-hour notice. THE WITNESS: That will be today? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. Are you available this afternoon? THE WITNESS: I will cancel
whatever I have to make myself available for the panel. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Do you want me to come back out here or do you want me to be
available telephonically? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I just want you to be available by a phone
call, because I'm not sure Mr. Coughlin has committed that he, in fact, will call you this
afternoon. But he's asked us not to release you from the subpoena. I'm asking Mr.
Coughlin to give us at least a half-hour notice if you intend to call Mr. Hill in your
case.
However, despite Chair Echeverria's indication that if Coughlin provided a halfhour notice of his intent to call back witnesses (with, for some reason, Judge Beesley's
busy schedule making him off limits), Coughlin was not permitted to call witnesses such
as Elcano, Nash Holmes, and Hill back for a direct examination during his case in chief
(allegedly lengthy objections therein did not result in Coughlin being given more time,
in contrast to the approach Chair Echeverria took during King's presentation of his case in
chief: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 54:18 to 54:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm
going to afford you extra time also for cross-examination. Part of it, the length of the
direct, was due to lengthy objections, and I have to take that into consideration. So please
proceed, and I will give you additional time.
Such giving additional time to King for his direct examination of Hill proved
unduly prejudicial to Coughlin's case where so much of what the Panel cites to as
supportive of the various findings and or conclusions respecting the alleged misconduct
issued from such direct examination of Hill after the passing of the fifteen minutes per

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witness dictated contained in Chair Echeverria's 11/7/12 Order (never mind that such
Order also required both sides to make offers of proof for all they sought to introduce
into evidence where King was never once grilled for an offer of proof and nearly
everything Coughlin sought to introduce was put through the offer of proof parallel
universe in which Chair Echeverria likely believes he is somehow a just and honorable
human, which, clearly, he is not)
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 83:7 to 83:17) MR. ECHEVERRIA: As soon as we
release Mr. Hill, we'll take a break. MR. COUGHLIN: And I can't call him on direct?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR. COUGHLIN: I can't call him -- do I have
direct? Do I have a case in chief? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sure. MR. COUGHLIN: So
he's not released from the subpoena. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you not want him
released? MR. COUGHLIN: No
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 236:1 to 236:5) MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to
give you the 30-minute notice that I would like to cross-examine Judge Nash Holmes and
Richard Hill or call them in my case in chief, rather. I'll do that now. I note that I have a
time of 2:55.
And with respect to the audio transcripts for the petty larceny trial incident to
60838 (from which the FHE11 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt also stems),
and both the 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 audio trancripts of the hearings from which FHE4,5 are
drawn: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 224:21 to 224:25) MR. COUGHLIN: Can I call Pat
King and say, Pat, were you provided these copies of the audio? Everything is a copy,
okay, it's not -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the offer of proof? What are you intending
to prove?
However, given the 2/28/12 Order involves an allegation of direct or summary
contempt implicating NRS 22.030, and where such (and the most inflammatory
accusation therein, clearly, was the charge that Coughlin lied to Judge Nash Holmes
with respect to some alleged activities by Coughlin in the restroom (ie, clearly outside the
immediate view and presence of the court, and therefore NRS 22.030(2)-(3) (see
McCormack) now require Judge Nash Holmes, where Coughlin is and has objected to her
presiding over any trial of the contempt, in addition to Coughlin filing NRS 1.230 and
Canon 3(E) Motions to Disqualify Judge Nash Holmes (who will need to comply with
NRS 1.235 and answer, by affidavit, within 5 days, Coughlin's allegations as to just where
she went for an hour between starting the cases on her stacked docket at 1:30 p.m.,
clearing the courtroom of every last person and case to leave Coughlin's for last (but she
only heard about Judge W. Gardner's sister's life experience after she found Coughlin in
contempt? Right), and just what the Washoe County Public Defender's office
communicated to her or any of her functionaries in any way related to its then client
Coughlin, as to whom WCPD Biray Dogan (the one whom violated NRS 178.397 in
failing to appear at Coughlin's 2/14/12 arraignment on the gross misdemeanor misuse of
911 emergency communications referenced in King's Complaint, from which King also
drew upon Coughlin's 2/21/12 filing responsive to Dogan's misconduct (8. Respondent
was again arrested on January 13, 2012, for allegedly abusing 911 services, a gross
misdemeanor. ...9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a document entitled, Notice of
Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty, Waiver of Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc. in
one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630 (NOTE: the only gross
misdemeanor case or charge Coughlin has faced, ever, and, therefore, the exact case

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Judge Nash Holmes referenced in her 3/14/12 letter to the SBN, (FHE8 reads: It is my

understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney.
My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February
when I had Mr. Coughlin jailed for Contempt of Court and they stated that they
represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other information
on that.), City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Respondent's
unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court and opposing
counsel.)
Judge Nash Holmes and Judge Clifton of the RJC, along with RMC Judge W.
Gardner and Judge Howard, and RJC Judges Schroeder and Sferrazza (especially
troublesome is the menacing behavior by RJC Bailiff Reyes and Sexton during the
12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/17/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and
Judge Sferrazza's unhinged performance therein, and the unbelievably coercive setting
such courtroom took on (clearly Judge Nash Holmes has been receiving reports of the
tiresome and tireless glowering mixed with gossiping mixed with busy bodying and rights
trampling continually demonstrated by RJC Bailiff Reyes (apparently looking to score
some points and just enjoy being domineering and inappropriate) (note, SCR 229 applies
to reporters not litigants, and not to attorneys, and why are these courts and their bailiffs
and marshals so spooked that litigants and or their attorney might be recording the
proceedings? It likely is not just motivated by wanting to get that $35 for a copy of the
disc...but more out of a desire to avoid the kind of oversight and accountability that is
inevitable in an age where vast numbers of even ordinary people walk into courtrooms
with smart phones equipped with enough technology to bring levels of Sunshine Senator
Grassley could have never imagined...and the old school brown nose bullying bailiff
approach by those like RJC Bailiff's Reyes and Sexton needs to be put out to pasture
immediately, as does the abuse of the contempt power demonstrated by Judges Sferrazza,
Nash Holmes, Howard, Elliott, etc.)
(Coughlin's 11/14/12 FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING IN 62337 - Vol. I,
(Page 140:9 to 140:19) THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin asked for a bathroom break. I
originally said I would not give the break. And then I said that I would, but he had to leave
all his materials in the courtroom. And I said that because I suspected that he was taperecording the court proceedings without my permission, and without asking permission
first. Because he's apparently been known to do that. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection,
hearsay. Lack of foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
The 12/20/11 hearing in RJC Rev2011-001708 before Judge Sferrazza, finally
held, on Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, beyond being an
enormously disturbing recording, touches on many of the key issues in 62337, including
the extent to which the 10/27/11 FOFCOL lacks the within 24 hours language
presenting a jurisdictional prerequisite to such order even being valid, and displaying the
extent to which Judge Sferrazza and most of the RJC have been carrying out summary
evictions in Washoe County in a ridiculous manner that is violative of Nevada law. Even
RJC civil clerks have indicated to Coughlin in the past that these evictions are carried out
ridiculously fast. Also, Coughlin goes into the jurisdictional bar presented by NRS
40.254(2) where the summary procedures of NRS 40.253 are not available against one
using property for commercial purposes unless the non-payment of rent is alleged, which
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001049 not only provides a defense to the no-cause eviction in Rev2011-001708 pursuant
to NRS 118A.510(e), but also a collateral bar to any assertion that Coughlin owed any rent
(which should have also operated to prevent any requirement under NRS 118A.355(5) that
Coughlin must deposit $2,275 in rent escrow in order to assert his retaliatory eviction
defense to the no-cause summary eviction). It is hard to understand what could be
motivating these judges to approach this area of the law in the manner in which they do,
where they permit, and sometimes even seem to encourage, the WCSO to race over to a
tenant's home and or business almost immediately after the hearing and not post the
summary removal order and wait 24 hours, but just dive right in to conducting the lockout.
Its horrific, as is the display by RJC Bailiff Reyes, Chief Bailiff Sexton, Judge Sferrazza,
and Richard G. Hill, Esq., here:
Part one of 12/20/11 hearing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkAvvUvv7kA
Rather amusing to hear the judge litigating, er, establishing for the record some alleged
spurious and false statement with the court respecting why Coughlin did not get the
hearing required by NRS 40.253(8) within 10 days as required by Nevada law.
Part two of 12/20/11 hearing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QkTf_a_cLOY
(see RJC Bailiff Reyes accosting Coughlin at 2:37 pm and Reyes and Sexton misconduct
at 2:41:20 p.m., and then at 2:53:30 witness Richard G. Hill, Esq., with the same Bailiff
Reyes whom on 11/28/11 growled at a seated Coughlin that he would take him to jail and
or put my foot up your ass, and the same Chieff Bailiff Sexton whom on 11/22/11
interfered with Coughlin's attempts to post a supersedeas bond in making menacing
commentary in the filing office to Coughlin about Coughlin's ass as where Hill remarks
to Sexton and Reyes, all three of whom are within 10 feet of Coughlin, I'd like to put
something up Coughlin's ass to, to which Coughlin reported to Judge Sferrazza, along
with the put my foot up your ass threats of Reyes and those of Sexton, at which point
Judge Sferrazza indicated he himself would threaten Coughlin.
Oddly, upon Coughlin pointing out the masturbatory gesture Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
was making in respone to Coughlin elucidating the extent to which the abusive litigation
tactics Hill and his associate, Casey D. Baker, Esq., engaged incident to their preposterous
personal property lien over the client's files of the opposing counsel in the summary
eviction from such counsel's former home law office. At the 3:32:00 p.m., Coughlin spells
out the tremendously big liability Hill and Baker may face for prejudicing Coughlin's
respresentation of middle class people in foreclosure defense cases wherein Coughlin
was trying to save them from losing there homes...at which point Judge Sferrazza engages
in an tremendously inappropriate screaming fit at 3:33:25 p.m. (the type of judicial
misconduct that only encourages the rampant misconduct the RJC Bailiff's Reyes, Medina,
Chief Bailiff Sexton, Ramsey, and Heibert have been engaging in (flat out refusing to
accept documents for filing, refusing to allow Coughlin access to review even files in
cases where his liberty is at stake, or exigent landlord tenant matters...) , for no apparent
reason of any legitimacy, but rather to indicate the extent to which Coughlin has just
pointed out the tremendously suspect approach taken not just by Hill and Baker, but by the
RJC its self in not granting Coughlin a default upon his showing up to the 11/22/11
hearing that Judge Sferrazza called a witness for the purpose of proving the RJC provided
such hearing within 10 days of Coughlin's 11/16/11f filing of a Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien (of course, when such inquiry began to reveal the extent to which a

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default was indicated where Hill and Baker failed to show up, Judge Sferrazza
immediately lost intrest in making a record of anything related thereto).
Further, between approximately
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 139:9 to 146:14) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Nash Holmes, what did your marshals tell you about a bathroom break? A I'm sorry.
What marshals when? Q Well, the ones you reference on the audio from the March 12th
hearing? A Well, again, which -- my marshals. Could you be more specific, please, in
your question? Q How much have they told you about the hearing -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the judge. She asked you a question. Do
you want to be specific as to a particular conversation? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Yeah.
There was one bathroom break in the hearing. What were you told during the bathroom
break by either a marshal or the city attorney? MR. ECHEVERRIA: With respect to any
particular issue, Mr. Coughlin? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q No. Just anything. Anything
connected to me? MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's what I'm asking. Is it involving you, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: All right. THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin
asked for a bathroom break. I originally said I would not give the break. And then I said
that I would, but he had to leave all his materials in the courtroom. And I said that because
I suspected that he was tape-recording the court proceedings without my permission, and
without asking permission first. Because he's apparently been known to do that. MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection, hearsay. Lack of foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: So I required one of my marshals to accompany him to the restroom.
MR. COUGHLIN: She just gets to say a bunch of hearsay? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, she is responding to your question. Go ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: When
the marshals came back from the restroom, they told me that Mr. Coughlin had, in fact,
been recording the proceedings because he had disassembled a device and left parts of it in
the bathroom. Or left -- disassembled parts of it, and then they discovered parts of it. In
any case, when he was taken into custody and held in contempt of court at the jail, he had
physically two recording devices on him, a cell phone -- either two cell phones or a cell
phone and some other recording device. I assumed that was pieces of which he was
messing with in the bathroom. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Which marshal told you that? A
I'm sorry? I can't hear that. Q Which marshal -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin,
you don't need to yell. THE WITNESS: It was Marshal Harley that told me that, Joel
Harley, H-a-r-l-e-y. He said when they went in and checked the bathroom after Mr.
Coughlin left, and he had found evidence that he had disassembled some object or
something in there. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What evidence, and what object? A I just
described it as some sort of a recording device. Whether it was a cell phone and he took
the SIM card out or whatever it was, I wasn't sure. But I had asked you, Mr. Coughlin,
point blank in court if you were recording, and you told me no. And then you asked
immediately to go to the bathroom, and I said no. And then you begged and squirmed and
said you had to relieve yourself, and I had to let you go to the bathroom. And then when
you did that, you went into the bathroom -- BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Really? A Took
apart and disassembled a recording device. Q Really? Would audio show that, Judge?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. I've asked you repeatedly to please not interrupt
people. MR. COUGHLIN: I thought she was done. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It was clear she
wasn't when you were interrupting her. MR. COUGHLIN: All right. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You will cease that conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. MR.

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ECHEVERRIA: You've asked a question of the judge. She answered it. Do you have a
question? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge, was there one bathroom break during the
trial? A I'm sorry. The crowd has recessed here, and let me move across the hallway,
because I can't hear anything right now, there's a big crowd. Q Don't worry. Just my law
license, Judge. No biggie. Was there one bathroom break? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, I for one do not appreciate your side comments. I think you should focus
seriously on the issues to be addressed here. The judge simply asked for accommodation
so she could hear. MR. COUGHLIN: I only have so much time, your Honor. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I know. Quit wasting it. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Was there one
bathroom break during the trial? A There was one bathroom break. Q Have you
reviewed the audio of that trial? A I'm sorry, I can't hear you again. Say it again. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Did you review the audio of the trial? THE WITNESS: I have not
reviewed them recently, no. I did at the time. I did when I entered my contempt order and
sent my package to the discipline board. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Why does the audio of
the trial indicate that you did not ask any questions about recording until after the one
bathroom break? A I'm not sure that's the case. I don't know. Q That is the case. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin -- BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Yet you testified today that
Mr. Coughlin asked to use the bathroom right after I asked him about recording. How do
you explain that? A I don't know the sequence of events. I don't recall -- Q You just said
you -- A I listened to the audio at the time when things happened. And when you came
back from the bathroom, either way I determined from -- I concluded that you were most
likely recording without my permission. Q Earlier your testimony was that you asked Mr.
Coughlin if he was recording, and he got real squirmy and asked to use the bathroom. Is
that correct? A Yes. Q Now are you remixing that testimony? A No. Q You just said,
I don't know the sequence of events. A Well, I don't recall the sequence of events. I know
that I asked you if you were recording. You denied you were. I asked you a couple times if
you were recording, if you had gotten permission to record, what you were doing. And at
some point it was determined that you most likely were. Q You know there is an audio of
these things you're testifying to, right, that we can like compare to what you're saying;
right, Judge? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, please exhibit a civilized tone. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q You're aware there's an audio? A Yes, there's an audio. I have not -- Q
That we can compare -- A -- I'm giving you my best recollection at this time. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you're trying my patience with your continuing
interruptions. That's not evincing the conduct of a competent lawyer. You should wait
until the witness finishes before interrupting her. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead. Ask your next question. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q So the
marshals said Mr. Coughlin left some disassembled part of a recording device in the
bathroom, and they retrieved it from there; is that correct? A I don't recall the exact
words. The impression I got from what the marshal said is that you had gone into the
bathroom, disassembled some sort of recording device, and they went in the bathroom
after you and checked that and determined that. That's my recollection of the events.

However, that's the downside to the SBN's King and Peters in lying about whom
filed which grievance (the SBN initially attempted to play it off like Judge L. Gardner (the
RMC Judge W. Gardner's sister), out of the blue, three years after the fact, took some
Canon 2 Rule 2.15 "appropriate action" and submitted a grievance with the April 13, 2009

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Order After Trial she entered that Judges Beesley and Nash Holmes' 1977 McGeorge
School of Law classmate Washoe Legal Services Exec. Director Paul Elcano claimed was
the "sole reason" for Coughlin's firing (which resulted in NSCT cases 60317) from
Washoe Legal Services, where he worked as a domestic violence attorney in a legal aid
setting. Its hard to tell what embodies what ails Nevada legal circles more, an attorney
being now temporarily suspended over a year for a candy bar he did not steal, where the
petty larceny trial included so many patent due process deprivations (no counsel appointed
to an indigent applying for such whom had been wrongfully evicted, burglarized by
opposing counsel and the Sheriff under the guise of conducting a summary eviction
lockout (11/1/11, even where the RJC continued to retain over ten times the amount of
Coughlin's money required for the mandatory, non-discretionary stay Coughlin filed for
under NRS 40.385 (the RJC failed to return the $2,275 in rent escrow Judge Sferrazza
fraudulently insisted, under an inapplicable NRS 118A.355(5) approach in a no-cause
summary eviction where NRS 118A.360 more than handled any of the rent Sferrazza felt
was owed, where, again, it was a no-cause summary eviction being litigated?), then
burglarized again by the Reno police (beyond the void/staleness/prematurity/not ripeness
of the eviction order vis a vis the 24 hour lockout per Russell v. Kalian, Mayes v. UVI,
Coughlin's 11/3/11 Motion for Stay under the disability provision in NRS 40.251(4)
provided Coughlin an additional five days from the notice of entry of a still yet to be made
order denying it (Judge Sferrazza was too busy awarding attorney's fees where none are
permitted whilst alleging he had been divested of jurisdiction as to anything Coughlin
sought (like the NRS 40.385 stay request further enunciated at the 11/7/11 hearing) to
enter any actual order addressing such 11/3/11 NRS 40.251(4) Motion for Stay by
Coughlin...) ...its never a civil matter when Richard G. Hill, Esq., comes a calling, huh,
RPD?) , whom wrongfully arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass (a jail stay with
concomitant outlay of cash for bail between 11/13/11 and 11/15/11)
As to 60317, the appeal of case where 2JDC Judge Elliott (whom failed to disclose
that he was on WLS's co-defendant CAAW's Exec. Board, then failed to recuse himself,
which any judge who reads this is now required to report pursuant to Canon 2, Rule 2.15,
to the NCJD (not to mention 2JDC Judge Elliott's misconduct revealed in the attached
transcript of the hearing on the curiously timed 2/27/12 Order for Competency Evaluation
by RJC Judge Clifton (apparently, the 2/21/12 filing in RCR2012-065630 by Coughlin
that King referenced in his Complaint (9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a
document entitled, Notice of Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty , Waiver of
Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc. in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No.
RCR-2012 065630, City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows
Respondent's unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court and
opposing counsel.) was not sufficiently punished by the RJC upon its judicial secretary
Lori Townsend voluntarily providing the SBN in her 4/11/12 email to King, with dockets
and that filing (with offers to provide more), where such Coughlin filing pointed out the
fact that Coughlin's WCPD, Biray Dogan, Esq., (King swiftly sent Coughlin a letter in
response to his grievance against Dogan indicating King would not investigate such
matter), whom had agreed to enter a not guilty plea for Coughlin at the 2/14/12
arraignment that Dogan failed to appear at (a violation of NRS 178.397 by Dogan where
the charge was a gross misdemeanor) when Coughlin and his then attorney of record
Dogan discussed the case on 2/8/12 (Upon Coughlin writing and calling Dogan to see if a

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mandatory status conference date had been provided at the arraignment, and Dogan
revealing he failed to appear at such, Dogan rebuffed Coughlin's imploring him to take
some immediate action to ameliorate such failure to appear by Dogan, sufficient to avoid a
warrant being issued for Coughlin's arrest, to which Dogan refused to take any such
action, and incorrectly (again, NRS 178.397 and all) insisted that, despite his then being
listed as attorney of record, he had no obligation to attend such arraignment (the RJC
subsequently listed such 2/14/12 arraignment date as vacated, covering up for Dogan's
own RPC inquiries worthy failure to appear and concomitant refusal to ameliorate such (a
true Jim Leslie, Esq., protege is Dogan), and, instead, apparently filed a grievance with the
SBN, in addition to its judicial secretary sending King her 4/10/12 letter and Coughlin's
2/21/12 filing pointing out such NRS 178.397 violation by Dogan) (that is apparently, as
at the 1/4/13 TPO extension hearing in RCP2012-000607 King alleged, while violating
RPC 3.7, that he had received a grievance from a justice court judge...though none was
ever provided to Coughlin...) ...wherein Judge Elliott (whom also dismissed all of
Coughlin's criminal conviction appeals based on the most suspect of rationale in CR112064 and CR12-1262) managed to dismiss Coughlin's lawsuit against WLS, before even
getting to the merits of Coughlin's Complaint (only to to then award attorney's fees to
Coughlin's opponent purportedly based upon some assessment of the merits of
Coughlin's Complaint), based on the most inventive (see the whole "judges failing to
recognize Buckwalter's holding that Declarations in Lieu of Affidavits (especially those on
the 2JDC's own Proof of Service of Process forms held out to the public which prompt for
a "Declaration") theme above for any idea of why Coughlin's lawsuit was dismissed for
alleged "insufficient service of process") approach to finding service of process
insufficient, which included a finding that the copy of the Complaint and Summons that
Coughlin had served were too blurry or illegible... the irony in the SBN King's Complaint
attaching a very blurry copy of Judge Nash Holmes 3/12/12 Order (formal hearing exhibit
5 at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing resulting in a NNDB Panel recommendation
that Coughlin be permanently disbarred in Nevada) purporting to copy and paste the
entirety of the Rules of Professional Conduct in her intemperate carpet bombing of
"findings" by, coincidentally, the "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof
standard that the SBN had fed her just that day) is not lost where Judge Elliott's various
orders dismissing Coughlin's lawsuit against Elcano and the WLS he is Exec. Director for
was premises upon a finding that such copies of the Complaint and Summons therein
Coughlin had served were not legible. The SBN's King apparently fearing similar such
legibility issues incident to the laughably slapdash/illegible/askew photocopy of Judge
Nash Holmes' 3/12/12 Order (FHE 5) that he attached to his 8/23/12 Complaint, went to
fraudulent lengths to ameliorate such legibility issues by simply replacing the illegible
pages from his 8/23/12 Complaint (reproduced in the packet in FHE1) with cleaner,
more legible copies thereof (thereby holding out such reproduction of his 8/23/12
Complaint in FHE1 as a true and correct copy thereof, when, actually, it was a doctored up
more legible copy thereof with respect to the illegible Judge Nash Holmes Order King
attached thereto. Again, Bomer worthy.
Speaking of 60317 and 60302, WLS's Elcano's daughter, Tyler Elcano was
recently hired by the same Washoe County District Attorney's Office that managed to
score a hat trick of vindictive wrongful prosecutions of Coughlin in one calendar year,
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the courthouse and throwing him over a bench in retaliation for Coughlin seeking copies
of documents in the public record that the RJC wishes he would just forget about (like the
2/5/13 audio recordings in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630 wherein RJC Judges
Pearson and Clifton, along with WCDA Zach Young violated NRS 178.405 (a regular
occurrence in the RMC and RJC) and the mandatory stay of "all proceedings in all
departments" required incident to Judge Pearson's Order for Competency Evaluation that
morning at 8:45 a.m....which begat an impermissible extra-judicial communication
between former WCDA criminal prosecutors turned RJC Judges Pearson and Clifton
(detailed in CR13-0552 in Coughlin's short-lived 4/2/13 Petition for Writ wherein
Coughlin detailed such NRS 178.405 violation in an attempt to get the 2JDC to order the
RJC not to hold the 4/2/13 trial before Judge Clifton in RCR2012065630: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxrqMs6XU-o )
and
Gessin
11-05077 and 11-05078 (one is Taitano Moore v Gessin, the other is Rissone v. Gessin)

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11/14/12 SBN V. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN (62337) FORMAL

DISCIPLINARY HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 3:12 to 3:23)
STATE BAR EXHIBITS
MARKED ADMITTED
1 - Index of Documents
32 35
2 - Attorney Fees Order
45 48
3 - Order After Trial
87 114 (2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order)
4 - Contempt Order
129 132 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes 2/28/12 Order)
5 - Order attached to complaint
132 137 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes 3/12/12
Order)
6 - Letter dated February 14, 2012 to
Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King
159 165
7 - Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011
from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar 165 169
8 - Two page letter dated March 14, 2012
(RMC Judge Nash Holmes letter to SBN
(where's the SBN's purported letter to Coughlin attaching such and requesting a response?
Not in evidence, that's for sure, as it reveals to much about the fraudulent Bomer worthy
conduct of Asst. Bar Counsel King and Clerk of Court Laura Peters)
from Judge Holmes to Mr. Clark
171 175
9 - Affidavit of Poverty
179 187 (pages 2 and 3 of Coughlin's 3 page 3/7/12
Motion to Proceed IFP and Affidavit in Support Thereof, and the Certificate of Service to
the RMC Judge Nash Holmes
10- Order in Case 11CR 22176
187 188
11- Order for Summary Punishment
191 193
12- Order Affirming Rules
197
13- Order Granting Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss Appeal
197
14- New Verified Response
262
15- Redacted and Verified Response with

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two DVD discs

264
16- Emergency Ex Parte Motion

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267

268

Now, while the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes claimed to have so much
trouble tracking down Coughlin, Coughlin's various filings in the RMC, which
the RMC Judges admit to discussing in their several meetings wherein an approach
to Coughlin was developed (like, say, Coughlin's 2/21/12 Motion for New Trial in
RMC 11 CR 22176 (see 60838), or the 1/9/12 submission to the RMC by Coughlin
in the other case before Judge Nash Holmes, RMC 11 CR 00696 (the 1/12/12
custodial arrest of Coughlin for jaywalking outside the same former home law
office that the same Richard G. Hill, Esq., that Judge Nash Holmes found Coughlin
in contempt for seeking to interject the name of where such person had no
relevance to the proceedings of 2/27/12 (the simple traffic citation trial for the
three tickets Coughlin was given by RPD Sargent Tarter minutes after Tarter
directed Coughlin to leave Hill's Officer at 652 Forest St., where Coughlin had
ventured to retrieve from Hill Coughlin's wallet, keys, client's files, smartphone,
hard drives, etc., that Hill had arguably stolen from Coughlin incident to Hill's
office's burlaries of Coughlin's law office (and all the Sierra Glass professional
misconduct incident to Hill going through Coughlin's confidential client's files (Hill
had to walk a pretty fine line while testifying at Coughlin's criminal trespass trial on
6/18/12 before 2JDC Judge L. Gardner (see the 11/14/12 formal hearing exhibit 3,
which the SBN King originally attempted to play off as having been received from
2JDC Judge L. Gardner herself (because, otherwise, any failure by 2JDC Judge L.
Gardner to report any such alleged misconduct by Coughlin to the SBN would yield
to Coughlin an offensive collateral estoppel argument that such decision by Judge
L. Gardner not to take any such Canon 2, Rule 2.15 (the old Canon 3(D)(e)
addressed in Mirch).

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Dear Reno Direct, and Reno Police Department, and RPD Internal Affairs,
IAConcerns@reno.gov
askrpd@reno.gov.
I am being attacked by the County and City, please help.
Theres a smorgasbord of things detailed at the following:
http://www.youtube.com/user/25teddyjames
http://www.youtube.com/user/NevadaGadfly

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and in the Nevada Supreme Court cases 61901, 62337, 61383, 60838, 62104,
63342, etc. much of which is available on the Courts site and or scribd.com

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The WCSO refuses to follow Nevada law, and instead systematically burglarizes
tenants, which the RMC, RJC, and 2JDC, and SBN, some might say, all
countenance
Here's how the Clark County Assistant Manager approached a similar situation:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/victim-family-court-gropingincident-files-federal-lawsuit
The Reno City Attorney's Office is bringing two cases to trial on 8/28/13 against
Coughlin alleging violations of a fraudulent Workplace Harassment Protection
Order obtained against Coughlin by the State Bar of Nevada, prosecuted by Chief
Criminal Deputy City Attorney Wong in 13 CR 3913, 3914, where the RMC filing
office continues its criminal misconduct in refusing to accept documents Coughlin
submits for filing (Judge Dilworth indicates he is not aware of any outstanding
motions...indicating that even when Coughlin obtains a filing stamp on a motion he
has submitted, the RMC filing office is continuing on with its past criminal
misconduct.
The Reno Police Department burglarized Coughlin's former home law office on
11/13/11, then retaliated against Coughlin for submitting written complaints by
harassing him continually and arresting him six times, and the wife of RPD Officer
Nicholas Duralde and RPD Detective Yturbide are both ECOMM 911 dispatchers,
with Coughlin's written complaint of the wrongful arrest of 8/20/11, misconduct,
and perjury at trial in RCR2011-063341 by Duralde resulting in the wrongful
11/13/11 (custodial arrest for criminal trespass in RMC 11 CR
26405: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eh2xyc-9cg0 where the RPD and
opposing counsel in the summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office
case in Rev2011-001708 were actually burglarizing Coughlin's rental (see Russell
v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 (R.I., Apr 28, 1980), and Mayes v. UVI Holding, LLC
(301 A.D.2d 409 [1st Dept 2003])):
Mayes v. UVI: It is law of the case that no application for a new warrant
was ever made in connection with the second judgment of possession. The record
contains no documentation with respect to the warrant of eviction actually executed
by the Marshal. A secretary for the law firm testified that she thought she had
mailed a copy of the stipulation vacating the first judgment and warrant of eviction
to the Marshal. However, no copy of an accompanying cover letter has been
produced, which the witness testified would have been included as a matter of the
firm's general procedure. Nor could the witness state when the stipulation
might have been sent to the Marshal. Significantly, the record does contain a
cover letter dated August 23, 1996, directed to the Marshal from the law firm,
which enclosed the judgment of possession. The cover letter bears the anonymous
handwritten notation, good warrant 8/26/96. It is not clear what the law firm
was attempting to accomplish by means of this correspondence.
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Whether plaintiffs' eviction on an invalid warrant was deliberate or inadvertent,

there is no question that neither the landlord nor its attorneys can evade
responsibility for the wrongful eviction. Generally, a landlord is not responsible
for the manner in which an officer executes a valid process duly issued *** the
officer only becomes his agent where the process is irregular, unauthorized or void
(Ide v. Finn, 196 App.Div. 304, 314-315, 187 N.Y.S. 202; see also, Campbell v.
Maslin, 91 A.D.2d 559, 560, 457 N.Y.S.2d 40, affd. 59 N.Y.2d 722, 463 N.Y.S.2d
440, 450 N.E.2d 246 for reasons stated below). Civil Court has ruled that plaintiff
tenant was wrongfully evicted from her apartment based upon a void warrant. On
a previous appeal in the instant action, this Court held that the landlord was
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of its wrongdoing in Civil
Court and is collaterally estopped to dispute its liability (268 A.D.2d 209, 700
N.Y.S.2d 682). Moreover, as lessor, the landlord is liable to its tenant for any
contract damages plaintiff sustained as a result of the breach of her lease.
It is a principle of long standing that conduct of litigation is the prerogative of
counsel. As stated in Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510,
474 N.E.2d 1178, From the nature of the attorney-client relationship itself, an
attorney derives authority to manage the conduct of litigation on behalf of a client,
including the authority to make certain procedural or tactical decisions (see Code of
Professional Responsibility, EC-7-7; Gorham v. Gale, 7 Cow 739, 744; Gaillard v.
Smart, 6 Cow 385, 388). It is counsel's responsibility to maintain control over
the proceedings; to this end, counsel is chargeable with the misuse of process by
agents employed to further the course of litigation, even if liability is only vicarious
(see, Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 276, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149, 614 N.E.2d
712)....
As between the law firm and the Marshal, the firm, as the entity in control of
the litigation, had superior knowledge of its course (see, Bevona v. Judson Realty,
213 A.D.2d 349, 350, 624 N.Y.S.2d 416). Thus, the firm bore the responsibility to
keep the Marshal informed concerning the status of a warrant that appeared
valid on its face (see, Chelsea Marina v. Scoralick, 94 A.D.2d 189, 193, 463
N.Y.S.2d 489 [failure to advise Sheriff of temporary restraining order]), and any
misapprehension necessarily implicates a lapse by counsel (supra, at 195, 463
N.Y.S.2d 489). ...
(NOTE: while such authority is more applicable to the summary eviction by
Hill's firm, given it prepared the proposed FOFCOLOSE utlized as a lockout order,
where such curiously contained nearly every other term lifted verbatim from the
various statutes involved (save, of course, an elegant misstatement of NRS
118A.510(e) inserted by Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq., done to get around
to thorny collateral estoppel problems vis a vis any allegedly owing rent presented
by Hill's firm initially bringing a summary eviction proceeding based on nonpayment of rent in a prior proceeding filed 9/6/11 in Rev2011-001492, only to
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abandon such course (with all the attendant collateral estoppel consequences
associated therewith, arguably) and, instead, pursue what it felt was the path of
least resistance in maintaining a subsequent summary eviction proceeding in
Rev2011-001708 based on a no-cause landlord's affidavit pursuant to NRS
40.254(2), fraudulently alleging that the lease had expired where the term of the
lease was misstated by Baker and lanldord Merliss as being for 12 months when
the lease, plainly, on its face, reads that such term is for not less than 12 months
and where both Baker and Merliss's unlawful detainer affidavits (should one
allow Merliss' testimony midway through the trial to satisfy that required under
NRS 40.253(6) to be filed before the justice court shall hold a hearing) swore that
the landlord's claim for relief was authorized by law where, plainly, the landlord
had no such no-cause termination right upon a reading of paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 of
the lease, and where, given the fraudulent misstatement as to the lease having
expired upon the passing of 12 months on 3/1/11, the subsequent purported
8/22/11 30 Day Notice to Vacate was of no legal consequence given it wrongly
concluded that the lease had already expired, and, therefore, failed to operate to
terminate such lease, even had the landlord possessed any such right to do so
under a no cause, holdover tenant basis (which, again, the landlord did not have any
such right under the lease).
Witness where Baker's proposed FOFCOLOSE (which Judge Sferrazza
signed with on one minor alteration) elegantly glosses away from Nevada law
pursuant to NRS 118A.510(e), where such reads:
The transcript of the 10/25/11 proceeding reveals such further: Landlord
(Baker): Your Honor moving down the statute to subsection e the tenant has
instituted or defended against judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration
in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this
chapter respecting habitability of dwelling units. That cannot be. He notices the
first no cause termination notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22,
2011 Mr. Coughlin did not institute or defendant any proceeding on any
habitability issues until after those notices were provided. Dr. Merliss can't
retaliate for something that is going to happen in the future that has not happened
yet Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed under that statute to the extent Mr. Coughlin is
complaining about this mold business first of all the may e-mail in Exhibit 8 does
not qualify in or satisfied the statutes regarding notice to a landlord about a
habitability issues and Dr. Merliss drove this point home when he testified that he
didn't understand what Mr. Coughlin was asking for I mean if you look through
these e-mails what Mr. Coughlin does is he identifies something he claims is some
sort of problem and then he tries to bargain some money off of the rent for he has
not produced to mean he does not say in then they e-mail this is my notice to you
under NRS 118A.355 I am going to withhold this rent unless you fix this he just
says we've got this issue he is later come for the court and he has (NOTE: why
would Coughlin reference NRS 118A.355 when he proceeded, to any extent the
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landlord's written acquiesence of 6/2/11 makes such approach even necessary,

under NRS 118A.360?)... ...
Judge: well I tend to agree that under subsection e, sorry of 118A.510 one he he
has to have instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding
based on habitability...
(NOTE: Judge Sferrazza presided over the prior non-payment summary
eviction proceeding filed on 9/6/11 in Rev2011-001492, where NJCRCP RULE
102.FILING OF SUMMARY EVICTION CASES becomes relevant to an
analysis of bring or threaten to bring an action for possession and instituted or
defended against a judicial...proceeding language in NRS 118A.510(e), where
Rule 102 reads: A summary eviction case shall be deemed filed with a justice
court upon the timely filing of an affidavit by a tenant and the payment of the
required filing fee by the tenant or upon the filing of an affidavit by the landlord
with an application for an order of summary eviction, together with the payment
of the required filing fee by the landlord.... Baker's argument that NRS
118A.510(e) is not satisfied where notes that the first no cause termination
notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22, 2011. Mr. Coughlin did not
institute or defendand any proceeding on any habitability issues until after
those notices were provided is premised upon Baker's hope that his allegedly
having a notice to vacate served on August 22, 2011 where the Tenant's Answer
of 9/6/11, pursuant to NV JCRCP Rule 102 manes such summary eviction case
shall be deemed filed with a justice court upon the timely filing of an affidavit by
a tenant.... The phrase instituted or defended against like relates to the point at
which a summary eviction case shall be deemed filed with a justice court,
which, in Rev2011-001708, would be 9/7/11 upon the timely filing of an
affidavit by a tenant, Coughlin. So, regardless of if the landlord's allegedly
serving a 30 Day No Cause Termination Notice to Vacate on 8/22/11 suffices as
threaten(ing) to bring and action for possession, such hardly operates to foreclose
a determination that Merliss then, subsequently, in retaliation did, in fact bring
an action for possession in retaliation (via Coughlin's filing of a second Tenant's
Answer or Affidavit on 10/6/11 in the no-cause summary eviction proceeding, as,
certainly, without more, the landlord's allegedly serving a 30 Day Termination
Notice to Vacate on 8/22/11 would not operate to bring an action for possession,
as, indeed, a requisite to doing so would be the service of the 5 Day No Cause
Notice of Unlawful Detainer, in addition to the landlord then, should the tenant fail
to file a Tenant's Answer, pursuant to NV JCRCP 102 filing...an affidavit by the
landlord with an application for an order of summary eviction, together with the
payment of the required filing fee by the landlord.) for Coughlin's, by filing a
Tenant's Answer on 9/7/11 in the non-payment summary eviction proceeding,
institut(ing) or defend(ing) against the prior non-payment summary eviction
proceeding in )
...which that is different than complaining about habitability which he can
interests through a separate lawsuit
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Plaintiff: yes
Judge: so I simply Simply complaining about habitability issues does not
satisfy the retaliatory conduct provision (NOTE: actually, it does under NRS
118A.510(b) if the landlord evicted the tenant in retaliation for simply
complaining about habitability (ie, its only in NRS 118A.510(e) that the tenant
need show they instituted or defended against a judicial proceeding...arguing
habitability, to which the landlord then in retaliation evicted them).
Plaintiff: that is exactly right Your Honor and in any event Mr. Coughlin has not
shown as is his burden to do that any of his complaints were in good faith under
that statute or that Dr. Merliss acted in a retaliatory fashion Dr. Merliss said I
didn't evict you because of these things you didn't pay your rent we tried to help
you you would let us that's not retaliation. Your Honor he's, Mr. Coughlin, is
attempting to make logical leaps between him threatening to sue for retaliation
and Dr. Merliss is hiring our office that that is you know per se retaliatory well
what are you supposed to do when you're tenant threatens to sue you? You gotta get
a lawyer..."
Also, with respect to the failure of the 9/27/11 Notice to contain the
jurisdictional predicate enacted by the legislature in 2009 ("NRS 40.253(3)(b)
(2):"That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; and), the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE fails to to contain such language, and where the legislature
requires landlord's to place it in the 5 Day UD Notice, the failure to include in the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE any language whatsoever "directing the sheriff to remove
the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order..." makes such order void as
well.
Despite Baker's proposed FOFCOL being remarkably faithful to most
every other verbatim passage of NRS chapters 118A.510 and 40.251, 40.280,
40.253, and 40.254, the little bit about "24 hours" needing to elapse from the
time of the Sheriff's posting, at the very least (tenant's receipt could involved
a Brahams or Zammarippa analysis similar to receipt of suspension of one's
drivers license scenarios, or the 90 days to file suit from the receipt of the EEOC's
right to sue letter line of cases) such order to Coughlin's door (at least
according to the Order in Anvui) Baker carefully excised, (as he also did with
respect to several of the finer aspects of NRS 118A.510(b)-(g)) which is too bad
for him, his firm, the Sheriff (thought the Sheriff, per the Mayes v. UVI decision,
can sue the law firm now), and the landlord, given Russell v. Kalian and its ilkage
(see Coughlin's correspondence with the NNDB and SBN's OBC specifically citing
to such line of cases vis a vis the fact that it was actually Hill and Merliss, the
WCSO, and RPD doing the trespassing, not Coughlin. Proper notice to quit has
also been described as a jurisdictional necessity. HUD/Willow Street
Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 792 A.2d 165 (2002); Cincinnati
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Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 155 Ohio App. 3d 189, 2003-Ohio-5671, 800
N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2003), appeal allowed, 101 Ohio St. 3d
1487, 2004-Ohio-1293, 805 N.E.2d 538 (2004) and judgment rev'd on other
grounds, 104 Ohio St. 3d 445, 2004-Ohio-6554, 820 N.E.2d 315 (2004). ).
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Baker managed to get the justice court's
Sferrazza to sign read: "That the sheriff... be, and hereby is, directed to remove
each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121 River Rock, Reno,
Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm." Now,
Judge Sferrazza did intineate "no later than" in place of "no earlier than", but, the
real problem is that NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) is what it is. The legislature works hard
on this stuff, and makes these laws for good reason, and they are not to be
selectively applied and gerrymandered to Judge Sferrazza's heart's content, for
whatever reason it is he so chose to here. As he did with respect to the "USPS
Certificate of Mailing" requirement in NRS 40.280(3)(b) (at the very least such
subsection required the 9/27/11 to "be served" by mailing it (whether NRS
40.280(3)(c)'s requirement that "before an order to remove a tenant is issued"..."the
landlord shall file...a proof of service" of the 9/27/11 notice, which "must consist
of" one of the three options set forth in subs. (a)-(c) therein may be read to require
that the "other process server" must provide an "endorsement" "stating the time and
manner of service", with such "service" (as defined in NRS 40.280(1)(a)-(c))
carrying a requirement that the "mailing" (which is absolutely required per the
record on its face in the instant matter) be represented by a simple indication in the
"proof of service" required by NRS 40.280(3) that such was mailed, or whether a
USPS Certificate of Mailing is also required, even where such posting was
purportedly done, as here, by a "licensed process server" is unclear.
What is very, very clear is that, at the very least, the landlord was required to
mail a copy of that 9/27/11 notice to Coughlin, and that Coughlin preserved his
objection to the landlord's failure to do so, and that such is not waivable by
Coughlin or the justice court. While a deficiency in a proof of service, per NRCP 4
may not normally render service that actual did comply with the requirements
therein invalid, where a statutory dictate is involved, such as in NRS 40.280(1)(a),
which provides that an order "shall not issue" until compliant proof of service is
filed by the landlord, and subsequent assertion that Merliss would now make that
(in contrast to MROA 655, where NCS's prepaid postage/stamped Pitney Bowes
envelope addressed to Coughlin was attached to that 8/22/11 Notice (found
attached as Exhibit 1 in "Exhibit D", Merliss's deficient "Unlawful Detainer
Affidavit"), no such envelope (and certainly not and USPS Certificate of Mailing)
is evidence by the record as to the 9/27/11 5 Day Notice found at MROA 662 (Exh.
2 to Exh D.), which consists of Baker's "Certificate of Service" indicating he
"personally handed at the hearing in the above reference matter" such 9/27/11
notice, but then completely fails to indicate any mailing thereof was done. Even if
Baker's violation of courthouse sanctuary rule/atty defendant immunity from
service while attending court was overlooked, NRS 40.280(3)(a) is still quite clear
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in requiring the signature of a witness thereto (in addition to the attestation of the
server) and the tenant acknowleding such service) as such Baker's Certificate of
Service at MROS 662 needs more to comply. Which requires an analysis of the
"Certificate of Service" at MROA 640 by the "licensed process server for NCS, and
a determination as to whether such satisifies NRS 40.280(3)(c)'s:"The
endorsement of a sheriff, constable or other process server stating the time and
manner of service." There would seemingly be an argument that such is compliant,
where it not for the fact that the court indicated an "envelope" (like that associated
with the 8/22/11 Notice at MROA 655).
As such, the collective landlord's affidavit presented by Baker's 10/19/11
Declaration Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), Merliss's unlawful detainer affidavit
only admitted as an exhibit midway through the 10/25/11 trial/proceeding, and
Merliss's testimony to supplement such all are fraudulent where they assert the
notices were served in accord with NRS 40.280 when they plainly failed on the
USPS Certificate of Mailing requirement as to both the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11
notices, particularly where the 9/27/11 notice's proof of attempted service failed to
even include the photocopy of the envelope with postage that Judge Sferrazza
indicated he had allowed, in the case of a licensed process server to suffice for
the requirement to file a USPS Certificate of Mailing under NRS 40.280(3)(c), in
addition to the fact that there is really no indication, under Mikohn, that even NCS's
Durden placed to go out for mailing that day any copy of such notice in the
mailbox, and certainly, Baker's 9/27/11 Certficate of Service completely fails to
indicate any mailing at all took place.
Generally,Litigants, their attorneys, and witnesses are immune from service
of process while attending court. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76
L. Ed. 720 (1932); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192
(1916); Moreo v. Regan, 140 A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988);
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. District Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and
For Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1980). AMJUR PROCESS
21.
The 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOSE Baker was able to get Judge Sferrazza
to briefly sign on to (until his 11/7/11 rendition of an order amending such at the
hearing on that date) read: 10.3 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that
prior to being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices,
Coughlin had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units"
as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: here Baker attempts to
mischaracterize the language of the statute to get around the fact that Couglin, by
defending against the non-payment summary eviction proceeding following the 5
Day Non-Payment Notice of Unlawful Detainer purportedly served on Couglhin on
8/22/11, in RJC Rev11-1708, and therein arguing habitability issues, did, thereby,
invoke the protections of NRS 118A.510(1)(e), as, only thereafter did Merliss
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bring...an action for possession in 1708. While Baker attempts to argue that
Couglin need have instituted or defended against a judicial...proceeding prior
to being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices the
statute simply does not say that. Now, Baker can argue that his client did not
thereafter bring and action for possession (and, given the unique nature of
Nevada's approach, it is not entirely clear at which point one can be said to bring
an action...is it upon serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer? Did the
landlord bring an action upon his purportedly terminating Coughlin's month to
month tenancy on 8/22/11? Hard to imagine that qualifies (particularly where
such Notice of 8/22/11 is deficient in that is incorrectly asserts that Coughlin's lease
had expired, where, clearly, such is not the case upon a close review of
Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 of the 2/24/10 Standard Rental Agreement).
A close review of the FOFCOLOSE, particularly Findings of Fact 1-8 reveal
something curious....Baker's provided to Judge Sferrazza a proposed FOFCOLOSE
that does not actually make any indication as to the key inquiry with respect to the
NRS 118A.510(e) analysis vis a vis just when one can be said to bring an action
for possession or have instituted or defended against a judicial ... proceeding. It
is likely that Nevada law will view the landlord to be said to bring an action for
possession either upon the service of the 9/27/11 5 Day No Cause Notice of
Unlawful Detainer, or, upon Couglin's filing his Tenant's Answer in response
thereto on 10/6/11, and the landlord thereafter communicating some intention to the
Court to follow through with a hearing, and (or, perhaps, upon nothing more than
the Tenant filing a Tenant's Affidavit...that is, the landlord need not do anything
further thereafter to be said to have brought (bring) and action for possession).
However, Baker's attempt to characterize the mere service of some 30 Day Notice
to Vacate as the bring(ing) of an action for possession is simply unsupportable,
in light of the fact that there is no legally operative effect to Baker's doing so absent
his then serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer, at which point, should tenant
Coughlin have failed to file a Tenan'ts Answer within 5 days thereof, Merliss would
be able to obtain a lockout Order from the court.
The thing is, Couglin argued that his Litigation Demand Letters to Merliss
between May-September of 2011 suffice to meet the instituted or defended
against requirement (and there are instances of such letters from Coughlin to the
landlord that predate even a finding that the service of the 30 Day Notice to Vacate
of 8/22/11). Indeed, how is Baker's service upon Couglin of a 30 Day Notice to
Vacate bring(ing) an action for possession if Coughlin's litigation demand
letters are not instituting or defending against a judicial proceeding where
habitability an issue (and Coughlin's Litigation Demand Letters specifically invoke
habitability issues and warn Merliss against any anticipated retaliatory conduct by
the landlord.
Further, the NRS 118A.510 inquiry is not limited to a comparison of the
mere temporal relation between the landlord's bring(ing) or threatening to bring
an action for possession and the tenant's instituting or defending against (NOTE:
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and such is especially not limited to a strict race to see whether the landlord
allegedly served on 8/22/11 a 30 Day Termination Notice to Vacate prior to the
tenant instituting or defending against the no-cause proceeding by filing a
Tenant's Answer on 10/6/11 where the Tenant had filed a Tenant's Answer on
9/7/11 in the precursor non-payment summary eviction proceeding in Rev2011001492).
Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421, 724 P.2d 749 (1986). (NOTE:
Paullin was a civil action where the former tenant brought a claim for wrongful
eviction, as such, it was a plenary civil action, not a summary eviction
proceeding...so the standard of review applicable thereto is a sterner one to meet in
order to overturn such judgment (S & D first contends that the evidence does
not support a finding of retaliatory eviction. In considering such a claim, this court
must assume that the jury believed all the evidence favorable to the prevailing party
and drew all reasonable inferences in her favor. The verdict of the jury will be
overturned only if there is no substantial evidence to support it. E.g., General
Motors v. Reagle, 102 Nev. 8, 714 P.2d 176 (1986).). Incidentally, that same
supported by substantial evidence standard is the one 2JDC Judge Flanagan
applied to uphold the justice court's ruling...which is clear error, and arguably
Mandamus worthy in that such ruling was made in excess of the district court's
jurisdiction.
52B CJS LANDLORD 1576: C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings;
Summary Proceedings 7. Appellate Review 1576. Standard of review , Landlord
and Tenant 291(18), 315(1), 315(3) A decision of the trial court in a summary
dispossession proceeding may be reviewed for abuse of discretion, but under some
statutes, a de novo review is conducted. The reviewing court will give weight to the
opinion of the trial court[1] and will not disturb an exercise of discretion by the trial
court in the absence of an abuse of the court's discretion.[2] The appellate court will
indulge in reasonable presumptions in support of the findings of the trial court on
conflicting evidence[3] and in support of the judgment appealed from.[4] Under
some statutes, however, dispossession proceedings are triable de novo on appeal.[5]
Where there is a trial de novo, the appellate court should consider the facts of the
case[6] and render a proper judgment.[7] Whether the unlawful detainer notice
requirement is calculated in accordance with the timing provisions of the civil rules
is a matter of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.[8] An order granting
a summary eviction under a lease providing for periodic rent reserved by the
month, or any shorter period, should be reviewed on appeal based upon the
standard of review for an order granting summary judgment, which is de novo
review, because such proceedings are analogous.[9] [FN1] N.Y.Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App. Term 1964).
[FN2] Cal.Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9 (5th Dist.
1963). Reviewing decision regarding issuance of a protective order D.C.Graham
v. Lanier Associates, 19 A.3d 361 (D.C. 2011). Plenary review of sufficiency of
notice to quit Conn.Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 973 A.2d 1229
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(2009). [FN3] Ala.Hyde v. Isbell, 254 Ala. 373, 48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Ill.
Woodson v. Benson, 330 Ill. App. 248, 70 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1947). [FN4] Ill.
Mitchell v. Tyler, 332 Ill. App. 577, 76 N.E.2d 237 (1st Dist. 1947). Mass.
Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729 (1947). [FN5] Ala.Hyde v.
Isbell, 254 Ala. 373, 48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Mo.Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385
(Mo. Ct. App. 1952). [FN6] Ariz.Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz.
199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). [FN7] Ariz.Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64
Ariz. 199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). Mo.Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1952). [FN8] Wash.Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash. 2d 365, 173 P.3d
228 (2007). [FN9] Nev.Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163
P.3d 405 (2007). CJS LANDLORD 1576
However, the landlord's attorney, Baker, adopted the same fraudulent
approach to restating the law in a way that conveniently, and uncolorably,
mistakenly indicates a different standard (RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 violations, much?)
than that which is really controlling (similar to Baker's conveniently leaving out of
the 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOSE the within 24 hours of receipt by the
tenant (note: the actual language in the statute merely implies it is the tenant's
receipt of such summary order for removal of the tenant, rather than, as the
RJC and apparently the WCSO (in contravention of the view and approach taken by
every other county in Nevada) purport to believe, such receipt being that of the
order by the Sheriff (though, tellingly, former RJC Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil
recently admitted to Coughlin that RJC Judge (not even Chief Judge at the time on
October 30th, 2012...) Clifton instructed her not to answer Coughlin's subpoena on
her, RJC Court Administrator Steve Tuttle, and the RJC Custodian of Records,
which sought, amongst other items, the fax log to indicate just when the RJC faxed
either or both the 10/25/11 Eviction Order and Decision and the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE to the WCSO (with the importance being that, should Nevada law be
what Stancil and the RJC and WCSO have been purporting it to be, ie, that NRS
40.253(5)(a) requires of the Sheriff to perform such summary eviction lockouts
within 24 hours of the Sheriff's receipt of such summary order for removal of
the tenant that any failure to so conduct such lockouts (and this is detailed in the
very 3/5/12 Motion to Dismiss in the criminal trespass prosecution against
Coughlin in RMC 11 CR 26405 (see the SCR 111 Petition in 61901 that operates as
a defensive collateral bar to King and the Panel now purporting that such is a
serious offense sufficient to buttress numerous violations of the rules of
professional conduct: (from the 12/14/12 FOFCOL now on appeal in 62337:
In the 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOE Baker submitted, which Judge
Sferrazza signed, Baker artfully omitted the required within 24 hours of receipt
language required by NRS 40.253(5)(a), and replacing it with, initially no later
than 5:00 p.m., October 31st, 2011 (which Judge Sferrazza caught before signing
the FOFCOLOSE, changing such to no earlier than 5:00 p.m. in a telling example
of the manner in which Baker fraudulentl approaches litigation, in addition to
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Baker's remixing what Judge Sferrazza actually indicated in his order as rendered
with respect to the $2,275.00 in some half baked NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow
deposit required of Coughlin in a no cause summary eviction proceeding).
Judge: alright I am prepared to rule and I do first of all I do want to say I
acknowledge the defendant's argument with respect to rule 44 And Justice Court in
Las Vegas and I have been unable to find a similar rule with respect to Reno justice
court so my decision with respect to the escrow money will be separate from this
but I do find number one that the landlord met its burden of proof with respect to
unlawful detainer that the exhibits and the testimony submitted to the court
specifically exhibit B the tenant was notified of the no cause termination in a timely
manner and with proper service exhibit C the tenant was notified five day notice of
unlawful detainer and compliance with the statute and with proper service and
therefore the defendant was an unlawful detainer effective as of the date of the
beginning of these proceedings which was on artists I'm sorry well certainly by
October 10 when the landlord's affidavit was filed but certainly today without
question further I have sitters the tenant's arguments with respect to it retaliation
specifically under 118A.510 with respect to subsection a although the tenant has
complained about violations of building housing or hope code I do not find there is
any evidence that he made said complaint to a government agency charged with
responsibility for enforcement of that code second with respect to this subsection be
although defendant did present evidence today of destruction of carpet and alleged
that it was a crime under NRS 206.330 205.270 206.040 there is no evidence that
said complaint cited a specific statute to the landlord but rather a general complaint
about the structure of this carpet and therefore I find it that subsection of the statute
was not satisfied as will him and I further find that even if it was even if the
landlord knew what you're trying to say the landlord did not retaliate against you
for that the landlord eviction was based on nonpayment of rent not your
complaining of your destruction of carpet and I also at the prior court proceeding I
made findings with respect to the damages and those damages in total were $2725
and that was the outside number and so I found that you owed at least $2275 even
giving you the benefit of all the doubts and today there was evidence presented that
the stairs were only $75 I gave you $1250 for the stairs credit there was an e-mail
presented today that indicated that it's all you are asking for was $75...and then with
respect to the noxious weeds first of all I find that that is not a habitability issue
second of all I find that under the lease you were required to maintain the lawn and
third this is under subsection a you didn't make a complaint the governmental
agency and there is no evidence that you did with respect to the noxious weeds the
mold insulation I do find that that could be a habitability issue clearly could be
whoever again under 118A.510 subsection to make it retaliatory it has to be have
been presented either in action suit. By you or defendant against you against by you
and the judicial administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised
the issue of compliance with the requirements of habitability and sense you didn't
raise this issue until after the landlord had in fact file the complaint I find that that
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did not violate the habitability statute did not violate the retaliatory eviction statute
for all those reasons I find that the defense of retaliation does not meet the
requirements of chapter 40 specifically one second here, specifically, 40.253
subsections 6
The Court determines that there is not a legal defense to the
alleged unlawful detainer and therefore the court grants the eviction. With respect
to the money in escrow, the court finds that that money is owing to the landlord;
however, I am not going to order that today since the defendant has made argument
that the court does not have enough, in fact, a proper rule with respect to escrow as
similar to Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44, and, therefore, since the tenant still has
the ability to appeal in this matter I will give him 10 days to file a proper appeal
which is the statutory time frame, and if he does so, that money will be used to
satisfy his appeal bond in this matter. If he does not do so, then at that time a
proper motion can be made by plaintiff's counsel, on this matter. The eviction will
be effective October 31 at 5 PM.

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The proposed FOFCOLOSE Baker was able to get Judge Sferrazza to sign
on 10/27/11 read: 10.3. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to
being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin
had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the requirements
of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units" as required
by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: that last little bit, as required by NRS
118A.510(1)(e) is a possible RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violation by Baker where he
presented his proposed FOFCOLOSE containing such a misstatement of the
text of NSR 118A.510(1)(e)).
Compare that to what the statute actually states, verbatim: NRS 118A.510
Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies;
exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in
retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy,... or bring or
threaten to bring an action for possession if:..(e) The tenant has instituted or
defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised an issue of habitability...
Baker's 2/24/12 Answering Brief in that appeal of the summary eviction in
1708 read: III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A]n order granting summary
eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based upon the
standard for review of an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56
because these proceedings are analogous.,,8 Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC,
123 Nev. 212, 215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successfully defend against a
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the
pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific
facts that show a genuine issue of material fact. 9 Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124
Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
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'"A case appealed must not be tried a new."10 NJCRCP 76A. Further, "a
[lower court's] findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence."11 Gibellini v. Klindt, 110
Nev. 1201, 1204, 885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added). "The notice of appeal
shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment,
order or part thereof appealed from ...,,12 NJCRCP 72(c). "Only those parts of the
judgment which are included in the notice of appeal will be considered by the
appellate Court.,,13 Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d
458 (1960).
The eviction apparently resulted from a series of disputes between Sutton
and the manager
of the Las Vegas Manor Apartments, Robert Paullin. In March of 1983, Paullin
received a
memo from his supervisor directing him to inspect all storage areas and make sure
they were
cleaned out. Paullin testified that he went to the storage shed near Sutton's
apartment, discovered
that none of his keys fit the lock, and instructed a handyman to break the lock. At
that
time, Sutton came out and informed Paullin that the items in the storage shed
belonged to her.
Sutton claimed that use of the shed had been part of her lease when she first moved
into the
building in 1964 (NOTE: such is similar to Coughlin asserting his rights under
paragraph 22, 23, and 28 of the lease, especially with regard to the proportionate
reduction of rent resulting from the landscapers (from any cause) damaging the
property and Coughlin's personalty)...On April 22, 1983, Paullin delivered a letter
to Sutton instructing her **750 to (1) bring her apartment into a clean and sanitary
condition
within ten days FN1; (2) vacate and clean the storage unit within thirty days; (3)
immediately
remove from her window a sign which read, Please inquire at the office about
names
and addresses. Thank you. FN2 ; *423 and (4) put current license plates on her
car, inflate
the tires, and bring it into operable condition within ten days, or it would be towed
away at her
expense.FN3 Paullin testified that, upon receiving this letter, Sutton stated that she
was not
going to do a damn thing. Paullin spoke to his supervisor later that day concerning
the problems
with Mrs. Sutton, following up the call with a letter detailing the problems he was
having
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with her. His supervisor instructed Paullin to serve a notice to quit upon Sutton.
This decision
was made within four days of the April 22 demand served upon Sutton. The notice
was
served May 2. At that time, Sutton had not removed the sign or the items in the
storage shed,
and had not repaired or removed the automobile. She vacated the premises on June
2, 1983,
and brought this action against S & D Management Inc. (S & D), the owners of the
apartments,
and against Robert Paullin. S & D appeals from a jury verdict awarding Sutton
$12,000
in compensatory and $88,000 in punitive damages.

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Tenant's Rights and Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45

AMJUR POF 3d 375 (2011); 99 Am. Jur. Trials 289, Retaliatory Eviction Claims
(2011).
B Retaliatory Eviction with Respect to Particular Kinds of Leases
7 Fixed-term leases
C Retaliation for Particular Conduct by Tenant
9 Complaint of housing code violation or unfit condition of premises
10 Exercise of other legal rights
D Proof and Effect of Retaliatory Eviction
12 Tenant's burden of proof; rebuttable presumption of retaliation
12.5 Proof of intent; mixed motives; pretext
E Landlord's Defense of Retaliatory Eviction Claim
14 Rebutting evidence or presumption of retaliatory eviction, generally
15 Tenant's complaints made after notice to quit
16 Tenant's complaints not related to habitability of leased
premises
19 Effect of tenant's failure to pay rent or renew lease
III Model Discovery
23 Defendant tenant's interrogatories to plaintiff landlord
24 Tenant's request for production of documents
24.5 Other discovery considerations
IV Elements of Proof
25 Proof of landlord's retaliatory eviction of tenant; checklist
V Proof of Landlord's Retaliatory Eviction of Tenant For Reporting
Housing Code Violations
A Testimony of Tenant
26 Rental of premises
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27 Landlord's violation of housing code

28 Tenant's complaint to landlord of unsatisfactory condition of premises
31 Service of notice to quit
32 Landlord's refusal to state reason for eviction
33 Absence of good cause for eviction
Judge Sferrazza, in his order as rendered at the conclusion of the 10/25/11
summary eviction proceeding and or during the 11/7/11 Hearing ruled that he was
finding that the landlord evicted Coughlin for non-payment of rent. Such is
reversible error where the court was foreclosed from making such a finding given
the defensive collateral estoppel bar presented by such (especially where it was
actually litigated) in the prescursor non-payment summary eviction case, in
addition to the landlord's failure to plead that any rent was owing in Rev2011001708, the subsequent no-cause summary eviction.
Presumptions and burden of proof 3,8-11,13[b],14[a],16:
Particular Circumstances Affecting Application of Retaliatory Eviction
Remedy or Defense
8 Notice of eviction following report within short period of time
10[a] Tenant fails to pay rent or renew leaseRetaliatory eviction
established or supportable
11[a] Tenant's report follows evictionRetaliatory eviction established
or supportable
16 Other or unspecified considerations
Many statutes prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant out of retaliation
for the tenant's reporting of the landlord's violation of law include a rebuttable
presumption against the landlord once certain facts are established. The burden of
proof is then shifted to the landlord to rebut that presumption. In one case, a tenant
created a rebuttable presumption by establishing that an eviction proceeding was
initiated against her after she made a report to code enforcement authorities that her
furnace was not in good working condition. The burden of proof was shifted to the
landlord, who failed to rebut the presumption that the eviction proceeding was
brought in retaliation. Cornell V Dimmick (1973) 73 Misc 2d 384, 342 Nys2d 275.

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The 10/27/11 FOFCOL was changed by Judge Sferrazza's 11/7/11 Amended

Order, especially where the 10/27/11 FOFCOL reads:
10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he
"complained in good faith to the landlord or a law enforcement agency
of a violation of [NRS Chapter 118A] or of a specific statute that
imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
10.3. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to being
served with the referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin
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had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding

or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of
dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: that last little
bit, as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e) is a possible RPC 3.1, 3.3, and
3.4 violation by Baker where he presented his proposed FOFCOLOSE
containing such a misstatement of the text of NSR 118A.510(1)(e)).
Landlord Merliss violated NRS 118A.510 in retaliating against Coughlin.
NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant
prohibited; remedies; exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in
retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy,... or bring or
threaten to bring an action for possession if:..(e) The tenant has instituted or
defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised an issue of habitability...
Actually, Dr. Merliss evicted Coughlin in retaliation for Coughlin
asserting his rights pursuant to Merliss's own 6/2/11 written agreement to the setoffs for fixing issues as detailed therein, in addition to, to whatever extent such is
even necessary, the rent deductions provided for in the lease where for any
reason the premises are rendered untenatable (such as Merliss's landscapers
wreaking havoc thereupon on May 23rd, 2011, of which Coughlin complain to
Merliss in writing, including about the criminal law violations referenced in NRS
118A.510(b)), and the NRS 118A.510(b) violation of this Chapter attendant to
Merliss bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession upon Coughlin
asserting his rights to a NRS 118A.360 fix and deduct approach upon Merliss
failing to address Coughlin numerous such notices within the allotted 14 days, in
addition to Merliss immediately hiring an attorney and referring Coughlin to such
upon Coughlin asserting his rights to 48 hours notice, pursuant to the lease, prior to
any entry by the landlord or his agents, as detailed in the written exchange between
Merliss and Coughlin on 8/16/11. Not such great logical leaps, really.

So, as to the holding in Mayes, while the WCSO Civil Division ought have a
hard time keeping a straight face in alleging it need rely on the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE to know whether or not Nevada law requiring, at the very lease, the
posting of such summary eviction 24 hour lockout order and the passing of 24
hours prior to such lockout being carried out, Hill's associate Baker provides the
WCSO with a good argument that Hill's office bares a higher degree of culpability
where such 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE fails to include the required within 24 hours
language mandated by NRS 40.253(5).
Furthermore, the Marshal, as an officer of the court, is entitled to rely on
the presumption of regularity (see, CPLR 4520), which has long been accorded to
the conduct of the affairs of her office (see, Burkhard v. Smith, 19 Misc. 31, 42
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N.Y.S. 638 [1896]), and defendant law firm has failed to make a prima facie
showing to overcome the presumption by demonstrating that she knowingly or
negligently executed an invalid warrant (cf., De Zego v. Bruhn, 67 N.Y.2d 875,
877, 501 N.Y.S.2d 801, 492 N.E.2d 1217). Nor do plaintiffs suggest that the
outcome should be otherwise. They state that counsel, in the person of Jacob
Goodman, admitted his office instructed the Marshal to execute a warrant that he
himself had agreed to vacate, and that led to a major screw-up. The law firm
defendants are therefore responsible as a matter of law for the illegal eviction.
As to the Washoe County Sheriff's Office's (and the RPD) burglaries on
Coughlin (at least 4).(2) Initially, Kalian and Pari contend that the clerk of the Sixth
Division District Court acted contrary to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969
Reenactment) s 9-25-21 in entering the return date of June 13, 1977, upon the
execution for possession of Elsie's apartment. Since the execution was issued on
May 23, 1977, it was valid for twenty days. According to Kalian and Pari, this
alleged error would render the execution irregular but not void because the statute
affords a successful plaintiff a three-month period during which the execution can
be served. This argument is not persuasive, for the execution's twenty-day return
date is clearly sanctioned by s 9-25-21, which requires that (e)very execution
issued by any district court shall, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, be
returnable three (3) months after the date thereof, and be returned to the district
court which issued it. (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that, in the
absence of a date specified on the execution, the date of return is to be three months
after issuance. June 13, 1977, was the date inserted on the execution in question;
thus, Kalian and Pari could not lawfully act on the execution after this date. It may
be that the execution in question was issued as the result of the summary procedure
set forth in s 34-18-9(a), where the ground for the ejectment is nonpayment of rent.
In the event judgment is issued for the landlord, this statute specifically requires
that the execution shall be issued only to the sheriff. If the sheriff or his deputy does
not execute the mandates of the execution within twenty days of its issuance, the
sheriff must appear before the justice of the court issuing the execution on the
day following this twenty-day period to show cause why the court's mandate was
not carried out. .... If Kalian and Pari were dissatisfied with the execution, they
could have returned to the District Court and sought the issuance of an alias
execution. Instead, they chose to evict Elsie under an invalid execution, thereby
subjecting themselves to liability for trespass. Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462
(R.I., Apr 28, 1980). 17 Causes of Action 809, Cause of Action Against Landlord
for Conversion of Personal Property in Possession of Tenant (2012) HN: 2,3
(A.2d).
RMC Judge Howard abused the contempt power in summarily sentencing an
attorney actively engaged in representing clients to three days in jail while also
violating the Sixth Amendment (refusing to appoint counsel in violation of
Aigersinger where Coughlin's 10/26/11 application for such met the per se
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indigency standards established by the 2008 Indigent Defense Order) in

countenancing a violation of both NRS 171.136, and NRS 171.1255 (Reno Sparks
Indian Colony Police routinely make misdemeanor arrests at the Indian Colony
Walmart despite Nevada law forbidding such misdemeanor arrests by "tribal police,
so just as the WCSO has potentially vast liability for the systemic burglaries its
deputies conduct in failing to accord the passing of 24 hours from, at the very least,
posting a 24 hour summary eviction lockout order on a tenant's door, so to does the
RMC, RCA, and City of Reno where the RCA continually offers "evidence"
obtained via searches incident to unlawful misdemeanor arrests by tribal police)
that RCA prosecutor Pamela Robert was fully aware of when she suborned the
perjury of RSIC Officer Kameron Crawford and Walmart's Thomas Frontino in
RMC 11 CR 22716 (see NSCT 60838): http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=JEn3phdRVgI
Further, Judge Howard violated the following as well, especially where
asserted basis for the three day summary incarceration were plainly pretextual and
he was punishing Coughlin for his 11/29/11 Motion For Sanctions against RCA
Pamela Roberts, Esq., and an interaction with RMC Marshal Menzel, and filing
office staff occurring outside the court's presence, where Coughlin (also, in
violation of NRS 1.230, 1.235) moved for Judge Howard to recuse himself form the
contempt trial: Statute providing that in all cases of contempt arising without
immediate view and presence of court, judge of court in whose contempt defendant
is alleged to be, shall not preside at such trial over objection of defendant, is
constitutional. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in
and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
1/12/12 (RMC 12 CR 00696) a shameful custodial arrest for jaywalking
outside Coughlin's former home law office Sifre ordered RPD Officer's Leedy and
Look to make, where all officers violated the law in failing to inform Coughlin he
was being arrested, then again in failing to indicate why he was being arrested):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vlEI1fJJWc ,

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1/14/12 (RPD Sargent Sifre ordered his second custodial arrest of Coughlin
in 48 hours, working with ECOMM dispatchers (where RPD Officer Duralde's
wife, Jessica is an ECOMM dispatcher) in the joint vindictive misconduct
displayed therein, where Sifre was also caught on tape indicating a level of
complicity with the Reno Justice Court in that regard), and in retaliation for
Coughlin obtaining a confession from RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez just the day
before, on 1/13/12 regarding the misconduct by she and RPD Officer Chris Carter,
Jr. in burglarizing Coughlin's former home law office incident to the wrongful
11/13/11 wrongful arrest of Coughlin for criminal
trespass: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcVDVjFK64g

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The City of Reno Marshals Harley, Coppa, etc. got in on the act on 2/27/12
in lying to Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR 26800 (integral to the fraudulent attempt
to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337) incident to the 5 day summary
incarceration Coughlin ws subjected to where NRS 22.030(2) was violated.
The City of Reno Marshals have lied in a fraudulent attempt to have an
attorney disbarred incident to RMC 11 TR 26800 (a "simple traffic citation" trial
stemming from the three traffic tickets RPD Sargent John Tarter issued Coughlin
outside the law office of opposing counsel in the summary eviction from Coughlin's
former home law office in Rev2011-001708, Richard G. Hill, Esq., shortly after
Sargnet Tarter directed Coughlin to leave (which Coughlin did) where Coughlin
appeared as Hill's law office seeking the return of his wallet, smartphone, hard
drives, client's files, state issued identification, and client's files incident to Hill and
RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Chris Carter, Jr. burglarizing Coughlin's
former home law office on 11/13/11.
The State Bar of Nevada seeks to mischaracterize such summary contempt
Order of 2/28/12 as "criminal contempt" in hopes of taking advantage of SCR
111(5), though Asst Bar Counsel has failed to file any SCR 111 petition reporting
any such "criminal conviction" presenting a defensive collateral estoppel bar of
Coughlin's own in that regard, beyond the fact that Judge Nash Holmes cited to a
plenary civil contempt statute anyways in her 2/28/12 Order. The best way to
distinguish civil from criminal contempt is to examine the penalty sought or
imposed. If the defendant holds the keys to the jail and can purge himself from
the contempt finding by committing an affirmative act (such as Coughlin's paying
the $500 Judge Nash Holmes ordered as an alterantive to incarceration on 2/27/12),
the contempt is civil in nature. An example of such civil contempt punishment is a
judges ruling that a defendant shall be incarcerated until he brings current his
support arrearage. If the defendant brings his arrearage current, he may be released.
In this situation, the defendant has an opportunity to purge himself of the civil
contempt. Conversely, if the defendants punishment is unmodifiable by action
from the defendant, then the contempt is criminal. An examples of such criminal
contempt would be a fixed unconditional jail sentences. Richmond Black Police
Officers Assn v. City of Richmond, 548 F. 2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977); Steelworkers v.
Newport News, 220 Va. 547 (1979); and Mine Workers v.Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994). Coughlin's summary five day incarceration, however, was conditional,
with Judge Nash Holmes admitting that she ruled that Coughlin could, in the
alterantive, pay a $500 fine and avoid such incarceration.
Sanction for civil contempt is characterized by court's desire to compensate
contemnor's adversary for injuries which result from noncompliance; however,
award to opposing party is limited to that party's actual loss. State, Dept. of Indus.
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Relations, Div. of Indus. Ins. Regulation v. Albanese, 1996, 919 P.2d 1067, 112
Nev. 851.Contempt 74 Contempt 75
In the case of Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 14, 441 S.E.2d 223
(1994), the court of appeals set forth the test for distinguishing civil from criminal
contempt. In that case, the trial court found the defendant in civil contempt for his
willful failure to pay child support as ordered. The trial court then sentenced the
defendant to eleven months in jail without any provision allowing the defendant to
purge himself of such contempt by payment of all or a portion of his support
arrearages. On appeal, the court ruled that the contempt was criminal not civil since
there was no opportunity for the defendant to purge himself of the contempt. 9
Order requiring Indian tribe to post $10,000 bond if it violated injunctions in
contempt order was a civil contempt order rather than a criminal contempt order; ?
condition was designed to coerce tribe's compliance. In re Determination of
Relative Rights of Claimants and Appropriators of Waters of Humboldt River
Stream System and Tributaries, 2002, 59 P.3d 1226, 118 Nev. 901. Since a civil
contempt sanction is designed to coerce the contemnor into complying with a court
order, it must be conditional or intermediate, i.e., it must end if the contemnor
complies; ?in contrast, a criminal contempt sanction is intended to punish the
contemnor for disobeying a court order and, thus, must be determinate or
unconditional. Warner v. Second Judicial Dist. Court In and For County of
Washoe, 1995, 906 P.2d 707, 111 Nev. 1379. Part of judgment for contempt,
directing imprisonment in county jail until fine imposed is paid, held invalid.
Comp.Laws 1929, 8950, 8951. State v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for
Humboldt County, 1931, 1 P.2d 105, 53 Nev. 343. A witness was asked a number
of questions, all being addressed to the same point, which he refused to answer. The
court found him guilty of a separate contempt for every question that he refused to
answer. Held, that he was guilty of but one contempt, and the court had jurisdiction
to impose but one sentence. Maxwell v. Rives, 1876, 11 Nev. 213. A witness was
asked a number of questions, all being addressed to the same point, which he
refused to answer. The court found him guilty of a separate contempt for every
question that he refused to answer. Held, that he was guilty of but one contempt,
and the court had jurisdiction to impose but one sentence. Maxwell v. Rives, 1876,
11 Nev. 213. (Judge Nash Holmes took two turns at the plate in adjuciatory
Coughlin's alleged contemptuous conduct in both her 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Order in
11 TR 26800).
Presence of court: Though a grand jury is an adjunct of the court, it is not
such part thereof as, under Comp. Laws, 3556, authorizing summary punishment
for a contempt in the immediate presence of the court, permits the judge to
summarily punish offenders for any act before the grand jury, without proceeding
on affidavit and citing the offender to show cause why he should not be punished.
Ex parte Hedden, 1907, 90 P. 737, 29 Nev. 352, 13 Am.Ann.Cas. 1173. Contempt 6

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Affidavits: Order to show cause complaining of alleged contemptuous

conduct of wife and her attorney in recording property settlement agreement with
county recorder's office after district court had ordered all records in the matter to
be sealed should have been accompanied by affidavit, as complained of conduct
was not committed in immediate view and presence of court or judge in chambers.
N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 2. Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407.
Where suit was begun in 1907 to establish water rights of various
appropriators on river system, and decree was entered in 1919, changes in
ownership were understandable, and contempt petition for violation of decree
containing information and belief verification of allegations setting forth history
of suit and rights granted to each of parties thereto, was sufficient. N.C.L.1929,
8943. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County,
1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
An affidavit that defendants had continued to enlarge a ditch across
plaintiff's ranch in violation of an injunction held sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the court to proceed against them for contempt, under Rev. Laws 1912, 5396, as
amended by St. 1913, c. 94, requiring that the affidavit present the facts
constituting the contempt, though tested by an original proceeding in prohibition
rather than on certiorari, in which there is no chance to amend the affidavit;
lack of jurisdiction being the only ground on which either writ will issue. State
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 1922, 211 P. 105, 46 Nev. 410.
To give jurisdiction of a proceeding for contempt, a substantial and general
statement in the affidavit is sufficient. Strait v. Williams, 1884, 4 P. 1083, 18 Nev.
43.
Judge: In case of contempt arising outside view of court, judge should have
recused herself in response to peremptory challenge. N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 3.
Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407. Judges 51(4)
Counsel's failure to appear for scheduled hearing before the Supreme Court,
conduct occurring within immediate view and presence of the court, was a direct
rather than a indirect, contempt; hence, the Supreme Court was not disqualified
from presiding over the contempt proceedings. N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 3. Gipson v.
State, 1986, 714 P.2d 1007, 102 Nev. 61. (
NOTE: the holding in Stuhff, that
for conduct to disrupt a tribunal such must occur in a courtroom arguably brings
the utility of Gipson into doubt).
Order of court - In general: For purposes of statute governing summary
contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence, which
requires court to enter an order, while a trial court's oral contempt order is
immediately enforceable, a written order including the statute's required elements
must be promptly entered. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County
of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Order of court Sufficiency: Appropriate remedy for attorney who had been
found in direct contempt of court in divorce proceeding in which he represented wife,
where contempt order had been found to be insufficient by Supreme Court, in that it did
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not contain a sufficient statement concerning what conduct was held to be contemptuous,
was to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that Supreme Court's opinion
addressed issue of first impression and announced standard for contents of written
contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark,

2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 66(8)

A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence,
must set forth specific facts concerning the conduct found to be contemptuous.
Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544.
Written summary contempt order finding attorney for wife in divorce proceeding
in direct contempt of court failed to indicate what particular comments by attorney were
held to be contemptuous, and, thus, order was insufficient, under statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence.

Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544.
Sufficiency, order of court: Appropriate remedy for attorney who had been
found in direct contempt of court in divorce proceeding in which he represented wife,
where contempt order had been found to be insufficient by Supreme Court, in that it did
not contain a sufficient statement concerning what conduct was held to be
contemptuous, was to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that Supreme
Court's opinion addressed issue of first impression and announced standard for
contents of written contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.

County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 66(8)
A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence,
must set forth specific facts concerning the conduct found to be contemptuous.
Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Written summary contempt order finding attorney for wife in divorce
proceeding in direct contempt of court failed to indicate what particular comments
by attorney were held to be contemptuous, and, thus, order was insufficient,
under statute governing summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt
committed in judge's presence. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Both the 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt by RMC Judge
Howard and the 2/28/12 Order summarily punishing direct contempt by Coughlin
via citing to a plenary civil contempt statute are violative of all the precedent
presented in Houston.

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The RPD continued its misconduct incident to the summary eviction in

Rev2012-001048, with Officer Alan Weaver, Sargent Brian Dye, Sargent Oliver
Miller, and Lt. Kevin Brown all actively involved in violating Soldal v. Cook
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County and committing other 42 USC 1983 violations, including those in

connection with the 7/3/12 arrest in RMC 12 CR 12420.
On 1/16/13 RMC Judge W. Garnder (whom failed to reveal during the 2/2/12
hearing in the criminal trespass prosecution in RMC 11 CR 26405 that his sisters is
2JDC Judge L. Gardner (see NSCT cases 54844, 53833, 60302, 60317, 62337)
Also, see Nevada Supreme Court cases 61901, 62337, 61383, 60838, 62104,
63342, etc. much of which is available on the Courts site and or scribd.com
The WCSO refuses to follow Nevada law, and instead systematically burglarizes
tenants, which the RMC, RJC, and 2JDC, and SBN, some might say, all
countenance
Here's how the Clark County Assistant Manager approached a similar situation:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/victim-family-court-gropingincident-files-federal-lawsuit
Sincerely,

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NVB Judge Beesley's testimony at Coughlin's 11/14/12 FORMAL

DISCIPLINARY HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 4:2 to 32:20) RENO, NEVADA;
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14TH, 2012; 9:00 A.M. -oOo- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: This is the date set for the disciplinary hearing en re Zachary B.
Coughlin. The time is now 8:56. The hearing was originally noticed for 9:00
o'clock. Last week on November 7th the panel met by telephone conference, and
given some issues to be dealt with we issued an order requiring the hearing to start
at 8:45. It is now 8:56. Mr. Coughlin is not present. We have information that he
did phone the State Bar office and said that he would be late. The reason we're
proceeding in the absence of Mr. Coughlin is that one of the witnesses, Judge
Beesley, is in Las Vegas and can only testify between 9:00 and 9:30, and so we're
commencing the hearing in the absence of Mr. Coughlin, despite his absence,
because the hearing was noticed to commence at 8:45. With that, does any panel
member have any other comments before we proceed with the testimony of Judge
Beesley? Mr. King? MR. KING: Could I ask the chairman for the record to
introduce the panel members in attendance, and then I will -- MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Panel members for this hearing are Mr. Steve Kent, Mr. Clark Vellis, Mr. Michael
Johnson, and Karen Pearl. And I'm the chairman, John Echeverria. MR. KING: My
name is Patrick King on behalf of the State Bar of Nevada. With the chairman's
permission, I would like to take a witness. The honorable federal Judge Bruce
Beesley, has information that I think the panel will find relevant to Mr. Coughlin's
hearing, and I would ask permission to call him at this time. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Has Mr. Coughlin been notified that Judge Beesley is an expected witness? MR.
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KING: Yes, he has. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you. MR. KING: In candor, Mr.
Coughlin has sent via e-mail many, many pages, and I'm not exaggerating when I
say hundreds of pages of e-mails. And in many of those e-mails he's protested my
calling any witnesses, proceeding with the hearing, and specifically protested
against having any judges not physically present testify by phone. I had noticed that
these people would be testifying via phone, which is why he's aware of that. And I
would ask that the chair allow any judge to testify by phone. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Unless any panel member has an objection, that's so ordered. MR. KING: Thank
you. I will now try to reach Judge Beesley. (Placing call to Judge Beesley.) MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Let the record reflect that it's now 9:02, and Mr. Coughlin has
joined the hearing. Mr. Coughlin, we're waiting to connect with Judge Beesley who
is the first scheduled witness to appear between 9:00 and 9:30. MR. COUGHLIN:
I object to him appearing. He wasn't noticed until far too close in time -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I didn't hear. Can you speak louder? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
I don't believe he was appropriately noticed of the hearing, this hearing. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: As the record reflects, Mr. Coughlin was
served a copy of the complaint to the address that he is mandated to provide to the
State Bar. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't believe that's correct. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please don't interrupt, Mr. Coughlin. Go ahead. MR. KING: Subsequently, Mr.
Coughlin filed, immediately after we mailed the complaint via certified and regular
mail, Mr. Coughlin filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I
think his argument here is that he wasn't notified that Judge Beesley would be a
potential witness. MR. KING: We sent a supplemental notice to Mr. Coughlin that
we intended to call Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. If I can just
interject quickly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -before the proceeding -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: May I
record the proceedings? MR. KING: I'm handing, with the chairman's permission,
a copy of the supplemental notice. In addition, as I indicated, the purpose of calling
Mr. Beesley is to assist the panel to understand Mr. Coughlin's conduct in his court,
and also as a potential rebuttal witness. Unfortunately, Judge Beesley is in Las
Vegas and is only available between 9:00 and 9:30. So what I would ask the panel
to do is to allow, as an offer of proof, allow Judge Beesley to testify. And then if
the panel subsequently determines for some reason that it's not appropriate, rebuttal
testimony -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. I need to enter, this is a special -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- I need to submit that for the
record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: I need to
submit that for the record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You'll get your opportunity. MR.
KING: Judge Beesley, my name is Patrick King. I represent the State Bar of
Nevada in a disciplinary hearing involving Zach Coughlin. Did you understand that
that was the matter in which you were going to testify to this morning? JUDGE
BEESLEY: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Just a second, Mr. King. Let me state on
the record that because of the time constraints, I'm going to rule that we can take
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the testimony of Judge Beesley, subject to Mr. Coughlin's later objection. He does
have an objection. Given the time constraints, he has not had an opportunity to put
on the record his objection. I'd like to take the testimony of Judge Beesley, and then
listen to Mr. Coughlin's objection. MR. COUGHLIN: I did file a -- MR. KING:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Beesley, the panel consists of John Echeverria -I'm not pronouncing the name -- but there's five panel members. JUDGE
BEESLEY: John Echeverria. You have not spent enough time in Nevada. MR.
KING: That is correct. Thank you for that. Across from me is sitting Mr. Coughlin,
Zachary Coughlin. And in the room also is a court reporter. There's no one else in
the room other than some court security. So what I'm going to ask you, Judge
Beesley, if you could explain to the panel your knowledge of Mr. Coughlin relative
to the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct related to -- MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection. Relevancy. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King. We probably
should administer the oath to Judge Beesley. MR. KING: Judge Beesley, the court
reporter will administer you the oath. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm going to object on
relevancy grounds. BRUCE BEESLEY Having been first duly sworn, testified as
follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge Beesley, can you
explain to the panel your knowledge in this relevant time frame 2011-2012
regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared
in my court a couple of times, at least two or three times. The first time I recall him
coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a T-shirt and a tie, and no
jacket. And he indicated that he had been evicted from his residence or his office,
indicating it was not because of not paying the rent, and that that was why he wasn't
what I would consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I don't have my letter in
front of me. But my recollection is that he had filed a pleading on behalf of his
client in regard to some aspect of a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was
lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of rambled through a great deal of
irrelevant stuff. I had him a couple other times in my court and had the same
experience, that -- he was dressed appropriately the other times I had him there, and
he was very polite and appeared to be a very intelligent man. But his pleadings
didn't make any sense. His arguments didn't make any sense. And I became
concerned that he was suffering from alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of
mental issues which were preventing him from being able to represent his client. I
talked to -- I made some inquiries of the court and State Bar if there was anything -the federal court first, if there was anything that I had authority to do to try and get
Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that I could not. I then talked to, I think I
talked to Coe Swobe, who is Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers -- MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection. Relevancy. This wasn't noticed either or -- no -- or mentioned in the
DOSEAL, which you didn't serve appropriately, and you're violating SCR 102 -1052(c). MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I talked to Mr. Swobe
who indicated that the State Bar did have some services available, and that he had
been in contact with Mr. Coughlin. That's really all he told me. And it became
apparent to me that over a period of a couple months at least and I also learned of
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some other odd behavior in some of the courts with judges that I knew. MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Hearsay. THE WITNESS: But based on -- MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Can I get a ruling on my objection before you continue
testifying? MR. KING: I'm going to ask the chairman to direct Mr. Coughlin not to
shout or make speaking objections. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to do that. You
can do it -- I appreciate being able to be heard, but we can do it at a lower level, Mr.
Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: You didn't seem to hear me. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Madam Reporter, would you please read back the answer to which Mr. Coughlin
was objecting. (Record read by the reporter.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: The objection
is hearsay. Mr. King? MR. KING: The judge was just about to testify as to the
action he took based on the information he received, and that is the purpose of the
information is to show why he took the action he did. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled. MR. KING: Thank you, Judge. THE WITNESS: I'm not quite sure
where I was in my testimony, but based on the discussions I had, and the
information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't a
program that was going to -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Foundation. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: The testimony is clear. He's explaining
the actions he took relative to Mr. Coughlin's conduct, which is the purpose.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. MR. COUGHLIN: He was specifying -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- no foundation for what he
was asserting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I've overruled your objection.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Judge. BY MR.
KING: Q I apologize, your Honor, for the interruption. But you were just about to
testify as to what action you took with respect to the information you learned. A
What I did was I wrote a letter to the State Bar explaining what had occurred with
Mr. Coughlin, indicating, I believe, that I thought that in his current state he was
not able to represent his clients adequately, and that the State Bar should look into
it. I think that was the extent of what I did in summary. BY MR. KING: Q Based
on your actual personal knowledge of Mr. Coughlin, would you believe that he has
violated Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct? MR. COUGHLIN: Objection.
Calls for an expert opinion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Overruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. Settle
down. You do not need to yell in this proceeding. BY MR. KING: Q Would you
be of the opinion -- MR. COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Can we get a ruling from the judge? Can we
have some due process here, Pat? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, do not raise
your voice again in this proceeding. MR. COUGHLIN: If this is a proceeding, it
needs to be handled like a proceeding according to the rules of evidence. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's true. And that's what we're doing. MR. COUGHLIN: No,
it's not. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And I'm going to overrule your objection. Please
proceed. BY MR. KING: Q Have you formed an opinion, your Honor, as to
whether or not Mr. Coughlin is competent to practice law? A Yes. Q And what is

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that opinion? A I don't believe he is, unfortunately. MR. KING: Thank you very
much. I have no further questions. I really appreciate your time. The panel in these
settings may ask you questions or they may have questions for you, as well as, I
suspect, Mr. Coughlin. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, do you have any
cross-examination? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Good morning, Judge Beesley, your Honor. A Morning. Q
I'm sorry to hear you feel that way about me, sir, but I would like to ask you a few
questions. A Certainly. Q I would bet that your statements are made out of
concern. A They are. Q So I appreciate that, sir. And I don't mean for my
reactions this morning to indicate anything other than a complete and utter lack -- a
complete and utter respect for you, sir. A I don't take it any other way. Q Thank
you, sir. But it's out of a profound respect for the law and due process that I'm
acting the way I am. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a question, Mr. Coughlin?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, I do. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you have Karen Sabo
as a member of your firm at one point? A Yes, I did. Q Can you describe any
connection between myself and Karen Sabo that you might be aware of? A I'm not
aware of any. MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The
relevance, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: I couldn't hear the judge, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm asking you the relevance of that question. MR. COUGHLIN:
But to the extent that the judge's speaker is right next to Mr. King, I believe it's
affording him an impermissible advantage. I couldn't hear what the judge just said.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Doesn't matter. You asked a question about was Judge
Beesley aware of any relationship between you and this lady. MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. Just for -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a minute. Mr. King objected on
relevance. Your proffer of relevancy? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, sir, if I can just
preserve for the record. You said that if Mr. King is obtaining an impermissible
advantage it doesn't matter to you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I didn't say that. MR.
COUGHLIN: That's what I heard. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please address the issue
at hand. What is the relevancy of your relationship with this former lawyer and Mr.
Beesley's law firm? You're pausing on that -- MR. COUGHLIN: Because this is a
respected federal judge, sir. But I am suing Ms. Sabo's organization right now. MR.
KING: I would object on the ground that it goes beyond the scope of direct. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The relevancy of that? MR. COUGHLIN: His objection is
relevant. My response, with all due respect to the Honorable Judge Beesley, it goes
somewhat to witness bias. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the issue is very
narrow. The question is what is the relevancy of your relationship with this Ms.
Sabo? How is that relevant to the issues in this proceeding? MR. COUGHLIN: I
believe it bears on Judge Beesley's testimony. I don't know quite the extent to
which -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Objection sustained. MR. KING: For the record,
the judge did answer. And for Mr. Coughlin's benefit, he said he was not aware of
any such relationship. Did I mischaracterize your testimony, your Honor? THE
WITNESS: That's what I said. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Next question, please. MR.
COUGHLIN: Can I clarify? He wasn't aware of any such relationship meaning?
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, please address another issue. MR.

COUGHLIN: A basis for conflict. Yes, sir. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Beesley, did you testify on behalf of Stephen R. Harris recently? MR. KING:
Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The relevance, Mr. Coughlin? MR.
COUGHLIN: I didn't hear Judge Beesley again. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That
doesn't matter. MR. COUGHLIN: It doesn't matter that Pat can hear him, but I
can't hear him? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. I can't hear the judge either, because you
interrupted him. MR. COUGHLIN: Just now? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes. There's
an objection as to relevancy as to whether or not what relevancy -- MR.
COUGHLIN: I objected. I didn't interrupt him. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I asked you
to explain the relevancy. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I'm trying to remember the
question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The question was did he testify on behalf of Mr.
Harris. The relevance of that issue in this proceeding? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I
think it provides a basis for me comparing Judge Beesley's response to me being
evicted to his response to Mr. Harris's issues. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled -I'm sorry, sustained. Next question, please. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Beesley, what in particular did you notice about my work product -- when did you
first contact Mr. King about me? A When did I first contact who? Q Mr. King.
Bar counsel for the State Bar. A I don't know that I ever contacted Mr. King. I sent
a letter to the State Bar. I think it was probably addressed to Mr. Clark, but I'm not
positive. Q So I'm sorry for that, your Honor. I do recall you saying you sent a
letter now. Did you ever speak with Bar counsel Patrick King with regard to me? A
The only time I recall speaking to him was a few weeks ago or a few days -probably a few weeks ago when he asked me if I would be able to testify at this
hearing. Q Are you aware of any extent to which Mr. King has violated SCR 121's
confidentiality dictates by contacting my clients prior to any SCR 11 petition? A
Hold on one second. Go ahead. I'm sorry. Am I aware that Mr. King violated a
particular statute? In what manner? Q Whether or not he violated one? A No,
I'm not, one way or the other. Q Do you have knowledge of there being a motive
for Mr. King to all of a sudden seek to bring you into this forum in that he has been
subject to an accusation setting forth a basis for this proceeding that relies primarily
upon some contention that you or -- I believe you yourself, your Honor, because
you're the only bankruptcy judge I appeared before -- but Mr. King telling his boss
and, apparently, at least one of my clients prior to my being suspended or even the
petition being filed, that your court had issued an order preventing me from
practicing there? A I have no idea what Mr. King may or may not have said to
anybody. But I do not recall issuing an order that said you couldn't practice there. Q
So can I take that to mean you haven't issued any such order? A I don't think so. I
sign probably 150 orders every day. So I don't remember all of them. I think
certainly I would have remembered a case not allowing you to practice there. But if
I did, it would have been because I was concerned that you weren't able to represent
your clients adequately, and they were being hurt. But I don't know that I did that.
Q What review did you undertake of my work product and filings in your court to
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come to your opinions? A I looked through two or three pleadings that you had
filed in, I think you had one or perhaps two cases, and read them. And I observed
you arguing in court. Q When specifically? A I don't recall. Q Was your
testimony earlier today that the first time you recall being aware of me was when I
appeared at the March 15th hearing in Cado Company v. Keller at 2:30 P.M.
shortly after being evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County Sheriffs -- A I
actually think you had appeared in front of me one time before that. But that was
my first strong recollection of you appearing in front of me. Q And it was that
brief interaction whereupon you formed your opinion that I wasn't fit to practice? A
No. I thought it was odd, but I do understand that people have adversity in their
lives sometimes, which happens -- Q You took it to be adversity rather than
misconduct by the sheriff? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the
witness. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge. THE
WITNESS: And I believe that you had filed some pleading in that case. And I went
to the pleadings, and they frankly didn't make any sense. And I think you
subsequently filed pleadings in other cases which also didn't make any sense,
and I became concerned. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q At what point did you -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin. Quit interrupting the witness. MR.
COUGHLIN: I thought he was done, sir. I'm sorry. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go
ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: I became concerned, and I undertook further
inquiry with Mr. Swobe following that. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, I
would like to narrow it down. When did you first contact the State Bar about me? A
I don't recall. I actually contacted Coe Swobe who works for the State Bar, but is
independent of them in most ways. Q When did you first contact Mr. Swobe? A I
think it was perhaps a month or six weeks after my first recollection of you
appearing, my first recollection of you appearing in front of me after you had been
evicted. Q You would be referring to the T-shirt and tie incident? A Yes. Q
With a suit jacket on though? A Yeah. And your apology was satisfactory,
although I thought your appearance was odd. Q Do you recall a hearing prior to
that in that same Cado Company v. Keller wherein Cado sought to amend their
adversary proceeding charges, and there was maybe a five- to ten-minute hearing
on that incident to which I submitted about a 15-page motion addressing the salient
points of law in that setting? A I cannot place it in the context of that case. But I
do remember you submitting a motion describing some points of law on something,
and I didn't think that that was competent work, frankly. Q You're referring to
which motion? A I don't know. I don't have any motion in front of me. Q So you
have a fairly strong opinion on it, yet you don't recall any specifics. Would that be
an accurate assessment of your testimony? A What I recall is that your appearance
in court was odd, and your pleadings were not truly comprehensible, and that and
further inquires made me concerned that you were having some difficulties that
prevented you from serving your client appropriately. Q Did you find any of my
work competent? A I don't believe I did. Q Not a single filing? MR. KING:

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Objection. Argumentative. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR.

COUGHLIN: Q Sir, are you aware I was ranked 10th in my law school class, and
a National Merit finalist? MR. KING: Objection. Beyond the scope of direct. MR.
COUGHLIN: He testified as to my competency and my credibility as a lawyer and
a professional. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your question had to do with what time
frame? MR. COUGHLIN: It has to do with my capabilities. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
In law school? MR. COUGHLIN: In life. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you asked
about a specific event. Did that occur in law school? MR. COUGHLIN: What
event? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The merit scholar thing. MR. COUGHLIN: No.
That's a standardized test. The top half of one percent of all high school juniors are
selected as national merit finalists. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You're inquiring about a
high school test? MR. COUGHLIN: I'm inquiring about the judge's representation
that he hasn't found one filing of mine competent. And the reason I'm going into
that is I believe it goes to this judge's credibility, frankly. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Sustained. Next question, please. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, I'd like to
narrow down some of these assessments you've made vis-a-vis when they occurred.
A Unless you can show me the document, I don't think I can help you with that. Q
But you've testified pretty definitively here today. So wouldn't that indicate some
negligence on your behalf in that regard? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, do you
have any specific points of law or issues with which you can elucidate why you
question my competency to practice in your court? MR. KING: Objection. Asked
and answered. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Do you
recall any of my work product in Cado and Company? A Not specifically, no. I
remember a fairly lengthy brief that you filed which, I think, was that case, that I
thought was rambling, addressing points of law which weren't relevant. I think had
some discussions of historical matters and some discussions of perhaps
constitutional law, but it wasn't really relevant to the matter that was in front of me.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, if you could be mindful of the fact that the judge has a
hearing he needs to attend, and advise Mr. Coughlin that he needs to be judicious in
his questions. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We have issued an order, Mr. Coughlin, that
limits the examination of witnesses on each side to 15 minutes. You have slightly
exceeded 15 minutes. If you have a few more questions to rapidly wrap this up. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, on Cado Company, wouldn't it indicate a fairly
high level of skill, particularly for one who hadn't been practicing in a bankruptcy
setting for very long at all for, one, to deduce that in that case Cado had issues with
respect to the fact that they had not renewed a dormant foreign judgment in that
under the Texas statute at issue, given the fact that the judgment was over ten years
old, and within the two years under the statute within which they had to take some
act to revive a dormant judgment, they failed to do so. Wouldn't the fact that I
pointed that out in a brief, and specifically cited to relevant legal research with
respect to what particular acts would qualify as reviving a dormant judgment in that
respect, wouldn't that indicate some level of competency? A I did not ever say that
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I did not think you are highly intelligent. I think you are. But intelligence and legal
competence are not the same thing. I think you have a significant lack of ability to
focus on the issues at hand, but you're very smart. Q If I pointed out, which I
believe I did in that case, that Cado, by having a vice president file an affidavit
seeking to register a foreign judgment, that their doing so violated NRCP 11, in that
a corporation such as Cado is not entitled to appear pro se, to wit through a vice
president who is not an attorney, wouldn't that evince some level of capability as an
attorney sufficient to avoid having a federal judge respond to Mr. King's imploring
him to badmouth me at a hearing? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. MR. KING: Thank you. MR. COUGHLIN: I
appreciable your time, your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further, Mr.
King? MR. KING: No. Any questions of the panel? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any
questions of the panel? Thank you, Judge Beesley. MR. KING: Appreciate your
time this morning. Thank you very much. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We took that
testimony under consideration of your objection. Let's hear your objection, Mr.
Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Well, I believe Judge Beesley was
identified in a supplement to Mr. King's, I'll call it a DowSoE, and I hope the panel
will know what I mean, designation of witness's summary of evidence. I've
shortened it in my filings. Which, incidently, SCR 1052(c) is one of the few
procedural rules in the supreme court rules designed to afford attorneys or
suspended attorneys, such as myself, some due process. That rule requires that the
DowSoE be served in the same manner in which the complaint is served upon the
respondent by the panel with at least 30 days notice, or at least 30 days prior to the
hearing. This panel wasn't even empaneled until, I believe the order was October
30th. Mr. King purports to have sent the DowSoE himself rather than in some
separation in accord with the rule, but he sent it himself. On October 12th he filed
material suggesting that he sent a certified mail October 12th, and in that way it's
completely violative of the rules. Completely. And Steve Harris, who the judge
testified to, who was -- he admitted to misappropriating 800K. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Harris is not the subject matter of this hearing. You are. MR.
COUGHLIN: He got David Grundy. And he got his DowSoE sent by the panel.
And he got his full 30 days. And I sent that forward -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm
not concerned with Mr. Harris. Did you get notice that Judge Beesley would be
testifying? MR. COUGHLIN: Maybe -- I would like to check my records, but like
a couple days before this hearing. A couple days. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Was that a
supplemental designation? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is that
permitted? MR. COUGHLIN: I think it is permitted, perhaps if something comes
up out of the blue that's really bearing, but Mr. King's known about this for quite
some time. And, in fact, I've filed a complaint with, I believe I included this in my
complaint with State Bar president Lardon -- I hope I'm saying that correctly -under SCR, I want to say 104(3) in that I believe upon information and belief that
Mr. King contacted one of my clients or maybe one of my clients contacted him in
early May -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focusing on your objection to the testimony
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of Judge Beesley. Do you claim any prejudice because of that? MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is that prejudice? MR. COUGHLIN: Lack of
notice. MR. ECHEVERRIA: How does the lack of notice lead to prejudice? You
seem to be very familiar with cases that appeared -- in which you appeared in front
of Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I wasn't. I wasn't as sharp on that Cado stuff,
because I didn't think I needed to be this morning, and I could have been a lot
sharper on that. I really could have. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to overrule the
objection. I think the notice was sent. Mr. Coughlin was aware that Judge Beesley
would be testifying, and unless the panel has any objection to Judge Beesley, would
accept that testimony. Next witness, Mr. King.

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"ORDER DENYING MOTIONS On June 7, 2012, we issued an order

temporarily suspending attorney Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law and
referring him for disciplinary proceedings, based on his conviction of petit
larceny/theft.1 (fn1 lWe note that our order was based solely on Coughlin's
conviction. It was not based on any alleged failure to report the conviction or on the
SCR 117 petition subsequently filed by bar counsel.) Coughlin has since filed
motions entitled: (1) Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Suspension and
Opposition to Petition of Bar Counsel for Temporary Suspension from the Practice
of Law Pursuant to SCR 111 and Request for Extension of Time to Supplement
Opposition (hereafter, Motion for Leave to File Opposition); (2) Motion for Leave
to Supplement or Amend Emergency Motion to Alter or Amend, or Set Aside
Temporary Suspension and Notice of Supreme Court Clerk's Failure to Timely File
Opposition to Bar Counsel's Petition for Temporary Suspension (hereafter Motion
for Leave to Supplement); (3) Motion for Leave to File Opposition to SCR 117
Petition (hereafter, SCR 117 Motion); and (4) Motion for Order to Show Cause
Regarding Improper Attempt by Bar Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB to Delay and
Obstruct Hearing Required by Court's June 7th, 2012, Order in Case 60838 and
Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in Case 61426 (hereafter, Motion for Order to
Show Cause).
With regard to all the motions, we note that none of them
comply with the rules of appellate procedure pertaining to motions. NRAP 27.
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Further, we have disregarded factual assertions in the motions which are not
supported by references to the record or which are outside the record. Carson
Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981).
To the extent the motions attempt to relitigate the conviction underlying the
instant matter or other legal problems Coughlin faces, this SCR 111
proceeding is not the proper forum for doing so. We therefore do not address
such claims. With regard to the Motion for Leave to File Opposition filed June 11,
2012, we elect to treat it as a motion to set aside the suspension pursuant to SCR
111(7). We are unconvinced by Coughlin's arguments that good cause exists to
set aside our order, however, and therefore deny the motion.2 (fn2 2To the extent
these arguments can be construed as claims that mitigating circumstances exist,
such contentions are more properly addressed in the context of the disciplinary
proceedings. SCR 102.5(2).)
With regard to the Motion for Leave to Supplement filed June 18, 2012, we
note that Coughlin was properly advised to seek leave of court in writing;
moreover, he was not prejudiced by any alleged failure to timely file his
opposition, because he succeeded in filing an opposition and we have
considered it on the merits. Despite Coughlin's attempts to elaborate on claims
made in his previous motion that good cause exists to set aside our order, we
remain unconvinced. We therefore deny the motion.
With regard to the SCR 117 motion filed June 18, 2012, it is identical to the
Motion for Leave to Supplement filed that same day. It is therefore likewise
denied.3 (fn3 To the extent it challenges the SCR 117 petition filed in Docket No.
60975, such claims are more properly addressed in the context of that proceeding.)"
Finally, with regard to the Motion for Order to Show Cause filed
October 5, 2012, such claims are more properly addressed in the context of the
petition for a writ of mandamus filed in Docket No. 62104. We note, however,
that the language in our June 7, 2012, order stating that "the sole issue to be
determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed" does not limit the
hearing panel from considering other disciplinary matters. Rather, it limits the
hearing panel from making a contrary factual finding that no crime was
committed. SCR 111(5). We therefore deny the motion. It is so ORDERED. /s/
Pickering, C.J., Hardesty, J., Saitta, J."
While SCR 111(5) holds: "5. Certified document conclusive. A certified
copy of proof of a conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the
crime stated in it in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney based
on the conviction", the NNDB Panel completely overextended such rule to an
absurd degree, refusing to allow Coughlin to put on any mitigation evidence, even,
as to the conviction in 60838 or even any evidence offerred for any number of other
legitimate purposes (including, pursuant to Claiborne and, by analogy, SCR 114, to
demonstrate that the conviction from which 60838 springs, and the the denial of

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Coughlin's appeal were so patently devoid of due process as to render such

convictions devoid of the quality necessary to apply SCR 111(5) therto).
Additionally, Couglin would really prefer that the Court did not "with regard to the
Motion for Leave to File Opposition filed June 11, 2012, we elect to treat it as a
motion to set aside the suspension pursuant to SCR 111(7)."
This is particularly true where such 6/11/12 Motion is over a year old now
(as is the temporary suspension, which really comes across as ridiculous when
considering the Las Vegas attorney convicted of someting along the lines of
attempted statutory seduction of a fifteen year old only received a six month
temporary suspension and the attorney whom admitted to misappropriateing
$750,000 from clients received no temporary suspension and only a three month
suspension, ultimately, especially where Coughlin's ability to put forward a more
compelling SCR 111(7) good cause showing for why his temporary suspension
should be set aside has been unduly compromised by a raft of misconduct by judges
(on no less than three occassions was Coughlin summarily incarcerated while
representing clients, where all three judges (RMC's Howard and Nash Holmes and
2JDC's Elliott) refused to grant any stay of such summary incarceration whatsoever
to avoid prejudice to Coughlin's client's affairs and Coughlin's practice) and local
law enforcement (Coughlin has been burglarized on no less than four occassions by
local law enforcement in connection with the practice of the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office incident to effecting lockouts in summary eviction in violation of
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1),(5)(a), where the WCSO simply refuses to comply with the
statutory requirement, that every other county in Nevada appears to comply with,
that the sheriff (or contsable) must wait at least "24 hours" from the tenant's
"receipt" of a summary eviction or "lockout order" before effectuating such a
lockout (the WCSO simply posts the summary eviction lockout order to a tenant's
door and burglarizes the tenant's rental in one fell swoop, somehow convincing
itself it is just and in compliance with Nevada law to draw their guns, on some
occasions, fail to identify themselves prior to entering, then do a protective sweep
(often while having the tenant handcuffed or "detained", whereupon the tenant is
given five minutes or so to grab those items deemed really necessary, before they
are ordered to leave the premises under threat of arrest for criminal trespass by the
WCSO. In Coughlin's case in Rev2012-000374, this occurred a matter of four
hours after the 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing resulted in a Lockout Order by
RJC Judge Schroeder (whom endorsed such misconduct by the Sheriff in his
subsequent jurisprudence in that case, incredibly, not to mention repeating himself
again in Rev2012-001048 (in both cases the jurisdictional prerequisites required
under Davidsohn were absent (in Rev2012-000374, the landlord failed to file an
affidavit prior to the summary eviction hearing, and the "unlawful detainer
affidavit" eventually filed failed to include nearly all of that required by either NRS
40.254(2) or NRS 40.253(5) (the confusion as to which applies relating to Gayle
Kern, Esq. apparently switching up her basis for moving for such a summary

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eviction upon reading Coughlin's 3/8/12 filign therein where Coughlin pointed out
that his pleading a tenancy that uses the premises, at least in part, for commercial
purposes precluded a no cause summary eviction...the only problem for Kern and
her client being that the 30 Day No Cause Termination Notice and 5 Day Unlawful
Detainer Notice failed to alleged non-payment of rent (as did, really, her 3/15/12
"unlawful detainer affidavit"; in Rev2012-001048, the 5 Day UD Notice failed to
contain an of that required by NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1)-(3) (such actually listed the
wrong court to file the Tenant's Affidavit in, and Coughlin's submitting for filing
just such a Tenant's Affidavit in the court listed as the forum in which to file it in
the 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice failed to register with the RJC), then the
"landlord's affidavit" alleged a "dwelling unit or apartment" was rented to
Coughlin, despite the "landlord's agent" alleging that a summary eviction for
"breach of lease" should issue based upon an allegation that Coughlin utilized such
unit as a "dwelling unit or apartment")
Scribd AmJur 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law B. Disciplinary
Proceedings
2. Discipline as a Judicial Function
33. What courts have disciplinary power
However, a court's authority in the discipline of attorneys practicing before it
is limited to the jurisdictional boundaries of that court and cannot extend to other
courts beyond that boundary.[FN4] Unless restricted by the constitution or a statute,
a court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to suspend or disbar an attorney
who is found guilty of conduct unbecoming the standard of propriety that should be
maintained by members of the legal profession.[FN5] Courts of special or limited
jurisdiction have no power to disbar an attorney unless that power has been
expressly conferred on them.[FN8] [FN4] In re Moseley, 643 S.E.2d 190 (Va.
2007). - [FN5] Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552 (1883).
[FN8] Appeal of A Juvenile, 61 Ohio App. 2d 235, 15 Ohio Op. 3d 400, 401
N.E.2d 937 (11th Dist. Lake County 1978). 34. Preliminary general investigation by bar
4. Grounds for Discipline
b. Misconduct as an Attorney
(1). In General
44. Generally
(2). In Relation to Court or Judge
50. Disrespectful, abusive conduct
51. Criticism of judicial acts
52. Contempt

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d. Nonprofessional Misconduct
(1). In General
82. Generally
83. Alcohol or drug abuse
(2). Conviction or Commission of Crime
86. Generally
91. Other crimes and offenses
Use, in attorney or physician disciplinary proceeding, of evidence obtained by
wrongful police action, 20 A.L.R.4th 546 (60838 violation of NRS 171.136)
92. Effect of appeal or probation
93. Effect of pardon
94. Conviction in another jurisdiction
96. Effect of acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi
5. Defenses to Disciplinary Action
98. Mental or emotional illness
99. Entrapment
100. Other defenses
6. Procedure
101. Nature of proceeding
102. Who may institute proceeding
103. Limitations and laches
104. Right to jury
105. Due process requirements; notice and opportunity to be heard
106. --Presumption of innocence
107. Failure to answer
108. Discovery
109. Right to subpoena witnesses
110. Evidence; admissibility
A foreign jurisdiction's adjudication of guilt will be accepted as conclusive
proof of guilt of the misconduct charged unless the attorney demonstrates why the
foreign judgment is not valid. The Florida Bar v. Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
1994).
"This March 22, 1960, at Chambers in Cookeville, Tennessee.
[1] [2] [3] The record sustains the Special Chancellors decree and it is affirmed.
However, there are two legal propositions in connection with this appeal which we
should like to discuss briefly. The first is, that it is not the rule that an opinion of a
chancellor, or of this Court, or a decree thereon, any more than a judgment of the
Circuit Court in a civil matter as distinguished from one criminal in nature, in a suit
not brought to disbar an attorney, has *147 the effect of estopping a lawyer in a
subsequent disbarment proceeding so as to prevent the introduction of any proof
therein contrary to the opinion and decree. The rule is that records,that is
pleadings and proof in cases in which an attorney appeared either as an attorney or
as a partycan be offered in evidence to the extent they are relevant to the issue of
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fitness to practice, but that such records and judgments are not res judicata and do
not necessarily work an estoppel in a subsequent disbarment suit.
The law on this subject is best discussed in the case of In re Santosuosso, 318 Mass.
489, 62 N.E.2d 105, 107, 161 A.L.R. 892. In that case which was an inquiry into
certain alleged misconduct of Santosuosso, an attorney, upon a petition of the Bar
Association of the City of Boston, the petitioner offered in evidence the entire
printed record in the files of the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in a civil case in equity in which Santosuosso had
been a defendant, and the findings and order in the case. Santosuosso objected that
the evidence was not admissible under the doctrine of res adjudicata and also that
apart from the doctrine of res adjudicata, the statements made by a judge in his
findings and decree were not admissible as evidence. In holding that the paramount
considerations supporting proceedings to investigate the worthiness of members of
the bar to practice law could not be defeated by the application of strict rules of
evidence governing the trial of adversary proceedings between parties, and that the
necessity for the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the safety of the
public rises above strictly technical rules of evidence that govern such adversary
proceedings between parties, the court said:
*148 We are of opinion that the evidence contained in the record offered by
counsel designated by the court to conduct the proceeding, that is, the evidence
adduced at the hearing in the Superior Court of the equity suit in question, at which
the respondent, a party thereto, was present and represented by counsel, testified
and had full opportunity to present and examine witnesses and to cross-examine
those called by the plaintiff, is admissible in the present inquiry. See State ex rel.
Nebraska State Bar Assn v. Gudmundsen, [145] Neb. [324], 16 N.W.2d 474. We
reach this conclusion without dependence upon such cases as Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585, Ann.Cas.1917D, 569, and Matter of
Ulmer, 268 Mass. 373, 167 N.E. 749, in each of which a judgment of disbarment in
another judisdiction was held to settle the issue that the attorney in question was
unfit to practice. We are unwilling to attach such conclusive effect to a judgment at
law or a final decree in equity, based upon alleged corrupt conduct on the part of a
defendant attorney, where the judgment or final decree entered rests upon findings
that the attorney has been guilty of corrupt conduct. * * * we are of opinion that the
evidence in the proceeding in equity in question is admissible in an inquiry such as
the present, and like any other evidence is to be given such weight as the single
justice shall deem proper, when considered together with all other evidence that the
respondent may produce **571 at the hearing, in the course of which he must be
heard with full opportunity to present all relevant evidence that he may wish to
adduce.
*149 The foregoing view finds support in such cases as In re Lacy, 234 Mo.App.
71, 112 S.W.2d 594; In re Pate, 232 Mo.App. 478, 119 S.W.2d 11; State ex rel.
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Nebraska State Bar Assn v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324, 16 N.W.2d 474; Werner
v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 611, 150 P.2d 892, and Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60
Conn. 11, 22 A. 441, 13 L.R.A. 767. See also Matter of Becker, 229 App.Div. 62,
6566, 241 N.Y.S. 369; Id., 255 N.Y. [223] 233, 174 N.E. 461; Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d ed. 4(7). In the Gudmundsen Case the court, after stating that there
had been some doubt as to the admission of evidence such as that offered in the
present proceeding, said: It is thought, however, that this question should no longer
remain in doubt. It is therefore the holding of this court that the finding in a civil
action that an attorney at law has been guilty of conduct justifying disbarment is not
conclusive on the same question when presented for determination in an action for
disbarment; that notwithstanding the finding in the civil action the culpability of the
attorney must be established in the disbarment action by a clear preponderance of
the evidence. For this purpose the evidence taken at the trial of the civil action and
all other competent evidence is admissible (page 476 of 16 N.W.2d).

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Other cases holding, in general, to this same effect are: In re Berkeley, 174
App.Div. 205, 160 N.Y.S. 1093; In re Bailey, 31 Ariz. 407, 254 P. 481; Fairfield
County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 22 A. 441; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 A.
497; State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324,
16 N.W.2d 474; Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Oppenheim, 58 App.Div. 510, 69
N.Y.S. 524.
*150 State v. Bomer, 179 Tenn. 67, 162 S.W.2d 515, supports this view. This was a
proceeding against Bomer for his disbarment on the ground he had instituted prior
disbarment proceedings in Chancery Court against two attorneys for no just reason
and without any probable cause, being actuated by motives of personal hatred and
ill will, and had thus abused the courts process as a means of carrying out his
desire for personal vengeance. Upon Bomers objection to the introduction of the
decrees of the Chancery Court in the suits which he had filed against the two
attorneys (which decrees recited the suits were without merit), our Supreme Court
said that such decrees could be received in evidence, not as conclusive proof of the
charges against Bomer, but only as evidence in the case, to show the result of the
prior trials, and in that case the recitation in the decrees that the suits were without
merit, was not taken as foreclosing that issue to Bomer and other proof in regard
thereto was offered by him and heard.
[4] [5] The second proposition upon which we should like to comment is with
respect to the application of the doctrine of laches to this case. The doctrine of
laches may be applicable in a disbarment proceeding and the Special Chancellor
could very well have predicated his opinion and decree in good part thereon. The
incident out of which this disbarment proceeding arose occurred in 1950. It was
fully investigated by the Chattanooga Bar Association in that year with the result
that that Association recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against
Berke. The petitioner had immediate notice of the incident and caused investigation
to be made of it. However, no court action was taken against Berke until the
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commencement of these proceedings in 1959, nine years after *151 the incident.
We think such long delay, unexplained as it is in this record, coupled with proof
that witnesses have died or otherwise have become unavailable, constitutes laches
(Gibsons Suits in Chancery, 5th Ed. 81) and was a ground for **572 dismissal
of the petition. In 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client, 25b, it is stated Staleness in a
charge against an attorney may prevent its being considered, because an
unreasonable delay in the presentation of a charge of misconduct may make it
impossible for an attorney to procure the witnesses or the testimony which would
have been available at an earlier time to meet such charge. That is the condition
here. The gravity of the charges demanded that they be examined fully at the first
opportunity. That this was not done does not appear to have been the fault of Berke,
who offered to appear before the petitioner and submit to an investigation. Nor,
does it appear the delay has been to his benefit but rather, strongly, to his detriment.
Moreover, it appears that in the nine year period Berke has not transgressed against
the ethics or the morals of the legal profession, but to the contrary sustains a good
reputation as a lawyer. In such case, the doctrine of laches was applicable."
Tennessee Bar Assn v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140 (1960) 344 S.W.2d 567
Also, see, In re McCarty, --- A.3d ---- , Vt. S.W.2d ; Attorneys at law: delay
in prosecution of disciplinary proceeding as defense or mitigating circumstance, 93
A.L.R.3d 1057 (especially as to NG12-0435's three and a half year old Order After
Trial that was vitiated by a subsequently entered Final Decree anyways...permitted
the equitable defense of laches to bar an attorney disciplinary action, Tenn. Bar
Assn v. Berke, 344 S.W. 2d 567, 571-72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960), where the vast
majority of courts leave the ultimate question of whether laches is available in legal
malpractice unaddressed. See In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1113-14 (Del.
2007); In re Johnson, 2004 MT 6, 20-21, 84 P.3d 637 (2004); In re Siegel, 708
N.E.2d 869, 871-872 (Ind. 1999); Ching v. State Bar of Nevada, 895 P.2d 646, 64849 (Nev. 1995); In re Wade, 814 P.2d 753, 764 (Ariz. 1991); Harris v. State Bar of
Cal, 800 P.2d 906, 910, (Cal. 1990). Courts have found similarly in other
professional disciplinary proceedings, such as physician disciplinary actions.
"In State v. Bomer, 179 Tenn. 67, 162 S.W.2d 515 (1942), the grounds of
disbarment were unjustified and malicious prosecution of disbarment suits against
two other lawyers. (Pat King would be playing the Bomer role in this movie) The
fact of the filing, manner of prosecution and disposition of the prior disbarment
actions were proven by the records in said cases. The following is found in the
Bomer opinion: In determining the question of malice, it is proper for the Court to
consider the entire record, including *648 the bill and answer, as well as attending
circumstances. * * * * * * This proceeding is in no sense a review of the decrees
rendered in the **302 Boyd and Gerber cases. The question for consideration in
the instant case is, whether or not the charges made in these cases were false and
malicious, made without investigation and without probable cause. 179 Tenn. at 79,
162 S.W.2d at 521. In Tennessee Bar Association v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140,
344 S.W.2d 567 (1960) we find: Complainant predicates its cause wholly upon
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two decrees rendered against the defendant, (1) the opinion of the Chancery Court
of Knox County, Tennessee, wherein the defendant was found guilty of gross
negligence in exchanging Nine Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 ($9,900.00)
Dollars of new money for old, the new money having been stolen from DobynsTaylor Hardwere Company, located at Kingsport, Tennessee, and (2) the opinion of
the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Division, rendered on November 28,
1958, wherein that Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancellor in the Knox
County Chancery cause, but further held that the defendant, Harry Berke, had been
paid a substantial fee as a remuneration for his part in a conspiracy to conceal the
identity of the money, which opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals became
incontestable on or about the 8th day of April, 1959, when the Supreme Court of
Tennessee denied the writ of certiorari. 48 Tenn.App. at 142, 344 S.W.2d at 568. *
* * *649 The rule is that records,that is pleadings and proof in cases in which an
attorney appeared either as an attorney or as a partycan be offered in evidence to
the extent they are relevant to the issue of fitness to practice, but that such records
and judgments are not res judicata and do not necessarily work an estoppel in a
subsequent disbarment suit. 48 Tenn.App. at 147, 344 S.W.2d at 570. Referring to
State v. Bomer, the Court further said: * * * Upon Bomers objection to the
introduction of the decrees of the Chancery Court in the suits which he had filed
against the two attorneys (which decrees recited the suits were without merit), our
Supreme Court said that such decrees could be received in evidence, Not as
conclusive proof of the charges against Bomer, but only as evidence in the case, to
show the result of the prior trials, and in that case the recitation in the decrees that
the suits were without merit, was not taken as foreclosing that issue to Bomer and
other proof in regard thereto was offered by him and heard. 48 Tenn.App. at 150,
344 S.W.2d at 571. In Tennessee Bar Association v. Freemon, 50 Tenn.App. 567,
362 S.W.2d 828 (1961) this Court held inadmissible the testimony in a former case
to which the accused attorney was not a party, and said: To sustain the action of the
Chancellor in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Spinks as evidence in this case the
Bar Association relies most strongly upon the leading case of Re Santosuosso, 318
Mass. 489, 62 N.E.2d 105, 161 A.L.R. 892. That case involved an inquiry into the
professional conduct of Attorney *650 Santosuosso. As the opinion points out, it
was not a truly adversary proceeding but an information asking not for disbarment
or other disciplinary action but rather for such action as the court might deem
proper. But, we think, A more acute distinction lies in the fact that the evidence
admitted was contained in the transcript of evidence in a Case to which
Santosuosso was a party, in which he appeared in person and by counsel and cross
examined the witnesses against him and in which there was an adjudication of
misconduct personal to him from which he could, if he chose, appeal. **303
(emphasis supplied) 50 Tenn.App. at 572, 362 S.W.2d at 831. It thus appears that
there was a finding in the former case that the attorney had been guilty of conduct
justifying the disbarment. There was no such finding in the present case. 50
Tenn.App. at 573, 362 S.W.2d at 831. In Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar
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Association, 209 Tenn. 304, 309, 353 S.W.2d 401 (1962) the Supreme Court
affirmed a disbarment decree and said: In the trial court the complainants relied
upon the record of the impeachment proceedings in the State Senate * * *. (p.
306," Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Assn, 58 Tenn.App. 636 (1968) 436 S.W.2d
296.
Evidence that would otherwise be hearsay may be admitted if not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. fn5 Although a referee may not go behind a
conviction to determine the attorney's guilt of an ethical violation, a referee may
consider evidence concerning the circumstances behind a conviction in determining
the recommended discipline.[FN7] Where a disciplinary proceeding is based on
acts disclosed in the record of a civil action in which the attorney was a party, the
record of the other cause is admissible in the disciplinary proceeding.[FN8]
Nontestimonial evidence from other civil proceedings to which an attorney was a
party are admissible in a disciplinary proceeding against the attorney where the
factual issues in the underlying proceeding and the disciplinary proceeding are
essentially identical.[FN9] A foreign jurisdiction's adjudication of guilt will be
accepted as conclusive proof of guilt of the misconduct charged unless the attorney
demonstrates why the foreign judgment is not valid.[FN10] A statement made
during a disciplinary proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege against a civil action
based thereon as long as the statement is relevant and material to the proceeding.
[FN11]
[FN7] The Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2005). - [FN8] In re
Disciplinary Action Against Perry, 494 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1992). - [FN9]
Rosenthal v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d 612, 238 Cal. Rptr. 377, 738 P.2d 723 (1987). [FN10] The Florida Bar v. Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1994). - [FN11] Hecht v.
Levin, 66 Ohio St. 3d 458, 1993-Ohio-110, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993).
Certain documents produced in the course of investigation of respondent
attorney, including a trust account ledger for client's account and a statement for
client's checking account, did not constitute hearsay in attorney disciplinary matter;
attorney provided the documents in response to a subpoena, such that the
documents were presumably what the attorney represented as his own work and
records, and because attorney prepared and submitted the documents, he arguably
manifested a belief in the validity of the documents. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2).
In re Crews, 698 S.E.2d 785 (S.C. 2010). (NOTE: reversible error for Echeverria to
rule that Coughlin could not authenticate or provide foundation for the various
audio and video recordings he sought to introduce into evidence.
In attorney disciplinary proceeding; relevant, testimony presented may
involve where attorney's counsel was able to attack the opposing counsel in a
former matter testifying as a witness as the disciplinary hearing's credibility and
establish any potential bias or prejudice other attorney may have had against
attorney. In re White, 378 S.C. 333, 663 S.E.2d 21 (2008), reinstatement granted,
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380 S.C. 200, 669 S.E.2d 588 (2008). Hearing officer in attorney disciplinary
proceeding could omit portions of expert testimony on standard of care and was not
required to give any weight to the testimony that was admitted; one expert was
judge who had been retired for twenty-four years, another expert improperly
referred to rules of lawyer discipline as only general guidelines, no expert had
specialty in ethics, and attorney failed to show that any expert was more
knowledgeable that hearing officer. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against,
162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008).
Attorney's decision to call his own character and reputation witness at the
beginning of disciplinary hearing opened the door on the subject of his character;
thus, allowing later witnesses to testify concerning attorney's reputation as a lawyer
and his reputation for honesty was rebuttal testimony after attorney's own character
witness testified. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873,
175 P.3d 1070 (2008). -

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"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 213:25 to 229:13) MR. COUGHLIN: I'm going to put
on some evidence right now. This is the audio from the trial, Judge Nash Holmes'
deal. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a copy for us? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, I
do. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcript? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio
transcript? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know what you are offering, so I would
like to see a transcript. MR. COUGHLIN: The official audio from the muni court.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is it exactly that you're proffering here? MR.
COUGHLIN: It's a court of record. They record the proceedings. And it's the audio
from that proceeding. Pat King has it. I got it from Pat King. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Which proceeding is this? MR. COUGHLIN: The traffic case that she testified to
today where she said, I asked you if you were recording, and then you got all
sneaky, and then you wanted to go to the bathroom. And I want to show this and
show whether or not the going to the bathroom occurred before the sua sponte
interrogation about the recording, and we'll see how truthful Judge Nash Holmes
will be. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcript of that proceeding? MR.
COUGHLIN: The problem is I appealed it. And under the law she is supposed to
order the transcript whether I pay a down payment or not, but they keep breaking
the law in the muni court. They just flat out break the law. Some people might say
it helps their bottom line not to prepare the transcript, even though the law says
they have to. MR. ECHEVERRIA: My question is, do you have a transcript? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: May I see it, please? MR. COUGHLIN:
No. It's an audio transcript. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcribed
transcript? MR. COUGHLIN: You mean like a typed out? Some of this stuff I
typed out. If you had read the stuff I submitted to you, you would see I typed some
of it out myself. MR. ECHEVERRIA: So it's not a certified transcript? MR.
COUGHLIN: The only certified one I have, I believe, is that Richard Hill trespass
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case. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, what is it exactly that you're offering now? MR.
COUGHLIN: The audio from the trial. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just
played into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: You let him just read stuff into evidence
from an order. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, it was after it was admitted into evidence.
MR. COUGHLIN: All right. I would like to admit into evidence the DVDs that I
gave you, that I attached. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I have three or four DVDs. Can
you be specific? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. The one attached as exhibit, I believe
it's Exhibit 4 to the ex parte motion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't have an Exhibit
4. MR. COUGHLIN: But I also was told that you consented -- is it not the case
that you consented to electronic service to some extent? MR. COUGHLIN: I did
not consent to that. MR. COUGHLIN: Then how did you rule on a motion if -MR. ECHEVERRIA: The motion was written, presented to me, and I ruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: How did you get the motion? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar
provided it to me. MR. COUGHLIN: Oh. So did the State Bar provide all the
DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's their function, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN: Did they provide the DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No. MR. COUGHLIN: They didn't? I thought that was their function. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No. If you have evidence to present, identify it. Let's be specific.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. The DVDs. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's not specific, sir.
MR. COUGHLIN: It's the file on the DVDs that is 11 TR 26800R -- I only have a
limited time. Can I play this? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know anything about it.
MR. COUGHLIN: It has my name on the file, and it's on the DVDs attached. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That does not lay a foundation. MR. COUGHLIN: It's the
official court audio from the muni court case that Judge Nash Holmes testified to.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Lay the foundation. You object to documents that have a
certification by the county clerk or the city clerk. MR. COUGHLIN: Mr. King
gave me this. He gave it to me as part of the leftovers from his screening panel,
which he still won't tell me who was on the screening panel. It's the court of record
audio recording by the muni court of that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have that
on a separate DVD or disk or whatever? MR. COUGHLIN: I gave it to Mr. King.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: As a separate document? MR. KING: Actually, it's not. It's
not, Mr. Chairman. I encouraged Mr. Coughlin to go to the municipal court and
purchase or acquire, however it's done appropriately, official records -- MR.
COUGHLIN: And I did. Actually, my mom did. MR. KING: Mr. Coughlin said, I
can't get them. They won't give them to me. MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah, they
wouldn't. MR. KING: I said that's not my responsibility. You get them. And I
contacted the court myself just to find out, and they said all he needed to do is come
in, fill out a short form, and he can acquire them. MR. COUGHLIN: Which was a
total lie. MR. KING: So that's what they told us. So I explained to Mr. Coughlin
that I don't have the official version. I have copies which are, in essence, copies of
copies. The reason I object to any use of audio records -- MR. COUGHLIN: I was
wrong, Mr. King. I'm sorry. My mom actually bought an official version, just to cut
to the chase. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. Can you tell me how many times
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I need to remind you not to interrupt? At what point do you get it? MR.
COUGHLIN: Sir, I just thought it would be helpful to the court, given the limited
time we have here today to make sure the court is aware I might have misspoke
earlier when I said -- I did get a copy from Mr. King -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Can
you answer my question, sir, and quit interrupting? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King. MR. KING: Thank you. The reason I object so
strongly to these recordings is a transcript you can look at, you can fill in the
blanks, if you want to read on either side of something to put it in proper context,
you can. And that's why a court requires a written transcript. I was punished to sit
through the recordings of all these proceedings as part of my job as Bar counsel
doing an investigation. They go on for hours. And in the case of this particular
matter more than one day. So to suggest that anything is going to be proved by
having Mr. Coughlin pull out excerpts and have you listen to it where there is no
ability to put it in proper context, no ability to see the entire record, I think is highly
prejudicial, and no doubt would confuse the matter as opposed to assisting the
matter. Dorothy Nash Holmes' order as she said it speaks for itself. Those were her
findings. That's when she testified that this is what I believe took place with regard
to the audio transcript. But that wasn't the sole reason for her contempt order, and
he was convicted. So him wanting to burden us by having you listen to an excerpt
of a video recording I think is highly inappropriate. Plus, Mr. Coughlin has
demonstrated an ability to post matters to YouTube, to do editing, and we have no
way to know whether or not, in fact, these have been edited. I have listened to a
couple of excerpts from him regarding an arrest, and it is my opinion that they were
extremely altered. So for those reasons, either an official transcript be produced of
which he's had plenty of time to acquire one, or they not be admitted for that
purpose. Thank you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to require you to lay a
foundation for whatever it is you proffer. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I provided to
this court and the Bar true and accurate copies of the official audio transcripts. And
in some instances the pleadings have gone in typed out things. In one instance for at
least probably 80 percent of the summary eviction I took advantage of a free trial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focusing on what you're proffering now. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is a transcript of the trial for
your traffic citation? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The one
that Judge Holmes issued an order finding you in contempt? MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you appeal it? MR. COUGHLIN: I tried to. She
wouldn't let me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And it's a final order? MR. COUGHLIN: I
did the research on that, but she is saying -- I don't know what she is saying. But
she is not letting me appeal it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We know what she said in her
order. So I'm not going to entertain an inquiry into the conduct of the trial on your
traffic citation itself. That issue has been litigated. And if you are offering portions
of that transcript without a foundation, without a witness here to tell us that what
you are about to play is an official part of the transcript, without an official written
transcript that is easily obtained, I'm going to sustain the objection. MR.
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COUGHLIN: Did he have a witness to say the order was such and such? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. It's called a certification. MR. COUGHLIN: He got orders
that weren't certified into the record today. Mr. Elcano -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: He
laid a separate foundation for them. I'm giving you an opportunity to lay a
foundation for what you are about to play. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm not going to take it on your word. MR. COUGHLIN: Why
not? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Because the law requires a foundation to be laid.
Independent. MR. COUGHLIN: Independent of what I can lay for it? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Right. I want something from the court that says this is an official
transcript. MR. COUGHLIN: My objection, I believe I am able to lay a
foundation. I'll testify under oath this is an official copy of the audio transcript in
that case. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you don't know that. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
I do know that. My mom had to go pay for it because they would not give it to me
for months. They wouldn't let me buy one. Pat King played his little game and
wouldn't give it to
me. He wouldn't give me any of the screening panel things, because he's so
dishonest. It's disgusting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, from my view one
of the rules of professional conduct is to treat opponents with respect. MR.
COUGHLIN: I agree. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm not sure that comment you just
made is respectful. So let's proceed. If you're about to play some audio, I'm not
going to permit it without an adequate foundation being laid. So move on. MR.
COUGHLIN: Can I -- without an adequate foundation being laid. And I can't say
it's the audio my mom had to pay for, 35 bucks, to get from the court? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No. Your mother is not here. If you want to call her, we'll listen to
what she has to say. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't have a phone. I can call her? MR.
VELLIS: Can he use this one? MR. COUGHLIN: Should I get up and dial? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR. COUGHLIN: Should I approach the phone and
dial? MR. ECHEVERRIA: However you think you need to lay a foundation. MR.
COUGHLIN: Mr. King, he can't lay the foundation? He was provided these by the
muni court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is your case, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: Can I
call Pat King and say, Pat, were you provided these copies of the audio? Everything
is a copy, okay, it's not -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the offer of proof? What
are you intending to prove? MR. COUGHLIN: To show she is so reckless. To
show a lot of things. But one, this idea that a conviction is completely dispositive,
he cited no authority for that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the supreme
court issued an order in your case that says with respect to, in essence, a conviction,
that the sole issue to be determined here is the nature and extent of the punishment.
MR. COUGHLIN: But that's the candy bar thing. You guys made a hearing about
30 other things. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I kept talking while -- MR.
COUGHLIN: You were done talking, and I responded. You keep trying to bait me,
and you keep trying to make a record of that, and it's dishonest the extent to which
you do that. You stop talking, and I respond. I didn't talk over you that time. And I
resent the fact that you keep appearing to want to do that. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
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The supreme court, as I read its order, tells this panel that the only issue to be
determined with respect to a conviction is the nature and extent of the punishment,
if any. So if you have testimony on that issue with respect to any conviction, or
order holding you in contempt, please present it. MR. COUGHLIN: Not under
Claiborne. Claiborne says a conviction is not the end of the inquiry. That in fact,
the panel and the Bar have a duty to look beyond the conviction. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: We have a specific order in your case with respect to what the
issues to be determined in this proceeding are with respect to a conviction. So do
you wish to offer evidence as to the nature and extent of punishment, if any, that
should be rendered by this panel? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. And I -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. So I'll play that audio
with your permission. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sustaining the objection because it
lacks foundation. MR. COUGHLIN: Then I'll call my mom. May I approach to
call my mom? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sure. (Telephone call being placed.) MR.
COUGHLIN: Mom, it's Zach. MRS. BARKER: Yeah. MR. COUGHLIN: Listen,
you're on the record right now, okay? The panel can hear you. Are you there?
MRS. BARKER: I'm having trouble hearing you. But anyway -- I'm in a store. Go
ahead. MR. COUGHLIN: You're being listened to right now and recorded. Okay?
MRS. BARKER: I understand that. MR. COUGHLIN: I need to ask you -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Let's put her under oath. Would you swear the witness in, please.
(The oath was administered telephonically to the witness.) MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Would you tell us your full name and address, please. MRS. BARKER: Mary
Eleanor Barker. 94 -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Spell your last name. MRS. BARKER:
B-a-r-k-e-r. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And your address, please. THE WITNESS: 945
West 12th Street. MR. ECHEVERRIA: West what street? MRS. BARKER: 12th.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: South? MRS. BARKER: 12th. Reno, Nevada 89503. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Ms. Barker. Mr. Coughlin, you may proceed. MRS.
BARKER: No, it's Barker. MARY BARKER having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mom,
did you have to buy an audio of the trial with that Judge Nash Holmes? A Did I
have to buy an audio? Q Yeah. Did you buy a copy of the proceeding? A Yes. Q
Did you give it to me? A Oh, God. I think so. I did several things. I paid $100 for
something -- no, that was something else. Q Right. You paid a hundred dollars for
bail, and she wouldn't let me out, but she kept the money anyway? A Yes. And the
man that I gave the money to told me that you would be released within several
hours, and you weren't. Q They did the old switcheroo, right? A I'm sorry? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I would appreciate it if you would refrain from
interrupting even your own mother. THE WITNESS: Especially his own mother.
MR. COUGHLIN: Is that good enough? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Mom, was it an official copy? A I don't know. Q Did you go to
the court and say I want a copy of the proceeding, and you paid the money they
asked you to pay? A I don't know that it was official or not. But I requested a
copy, yes. I would assume it would be official. I was requesting it in the
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courthouse. Q And you filled out whatever form it was they made you fill out, and
paid whatever money it was they wanted right? A Yes."
"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 215:24 to 217:19) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, what is
it exactly that you're offering now? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio from the trial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just played into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN:
You let him just read stuff into evidence from an order. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No,
it was after it was admitted into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: All right. I would
like to admit into evidence the DVDs that I gave you, that I attached. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I have three or four DVDs. Can you be specific? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yeah. The one attached as exhibit, I believe it's Exhibit 4 to the ex
parte motion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't have an Exhibit 4. MR. COUGHLIN:
But I also was told that you consented -- is it not the case that you consented to
electronic service to some extent? MR. COUGHLIN: I did not consent to that. MR.
COUGHLIN: Then how did you rule on a motion if -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: The
motion was written, presented to me, and I ruled. MR. COUGHLIN: How did you
get the motion? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar provided it to me. MR.
COUGHLIN: Oh. So did the State Bar provide all the DVDs I gave them? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's their function, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Did they
provide the DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. MR. COUGHLIN:
They didn't? I thought that was their function. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. If you
have evidence to present, identify it. Let's be specific. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. The
DVDs. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's not specific, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: It's the
file on the DVDs that is 11 TR 26800R -- I only have a limited time. Can I play
this? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know anything about it."
Hardly anything that came out of the Panel Chair's mouth was true on
11/14/12: HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 215:24 to 216:7) "MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Well, what is it exactly that you're offering now? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio
from the trial. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just played into evidence. MR.
COUGHLIN: You let him just read stuff into evidence from an order. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No, it was after it was admitted into evidence..."
"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 45:5 to 47:15) BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Hill, do
you recognize that document? A This is the attorney's fees order from Judge
Flanagan. MR. COUGHLIN: I object, your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a
minute, Mr. Coughlin. Wait. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
There's a question, Mr. King? MR. KING: Yes. I asked Mr. Hill if this was the
order that he was testifying about regarding the judge ordering of sanctions of
$40,000 in attorney's fees. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have an objection to that
question, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, sir, I thought he was putting it
into evidence. So I probably was too early to object. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's
why you interrupted too early? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. I'm sorry. MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Hill. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. This is the award regarding
attorney's fees in accordance with NRS 69, I believe it's 050. There is also an order
granting us approximately $2500 in costs. BY MR. KING: Q In this particular
order at Page 2, is this the order signed by Judge Flanagan? A Yes, sir. Q What
date did Judge Flanagan sign this order? A This is dated June 25th, 2012, and it
bears a file stamp of the same date. Q Could you read the paragraph regarding
"Merliss goes even further and states." Could you read that paragraph on Page 2. A
Beginning at line 4? Q Line 9 on Page 2. A Okay. "Merliss goes even further and
states: As proven above and below, the frivolity and vexatiousness of Coughlin's
maintenance and extension of this matter has been so beyond reason, and so
outrageous, and the nexus of his behavior to the fees incurred by Merliss so direct
and indisputable, that nothing less than a full award of those fees should even be
considered by the court. To not impose the full measure of the harm Coughlin has
caused would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in this and other cases.
There needs to be a day of reckoning for Coughlin's antics." Q In this order did
Judge Flanagan accept that by granting the full amount of fees requested? If you
read the last sentence of Page 3. A Yes. "Accordingly, Merliss's motion for
attorney's fees is granted in the sum of $42,065.50. Q Do you have personal
knowledge of whether or not, as the attorney for Dr. Merliss, whether or not that
award has been paid by Mr. Coughlin? A It has not. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman,
we have provided you with certified copies of each of these orders. I would move
that Exhibit No. 1 be admitted pursuant to the NRS statute 52 --"
111. --Sufficiency; standard of proof
Attorney and Client 53(2)
An attorney has no less rights than any other party, and as such, his or her
discipline must be based upon more than speculation.[FN1] Perhaps it is owing to
the relatively skint due process afforded to attorney respondent and the dint of
availability of discovery (particularly where King cheats the system and Coughlin
only gets one tenth of the time to "inspect" the evidence and witness lists and other
items provided in SCR 105(2),(2)(c) that the Panel and King, under SCR 119,
should be held in contempt for failing to accord Coughlin) that the standard of
proof required in Nevada disciplinary matters is comparatively high to that in other
states. The courts have used different expressions to indicate the degree or
quantum of proof necessary to justify disbarment or suspension of an attorney.
Courts have held: that a convincing preponderance,[FN2] a clear preponderance,
[FN3] or fair preponderance of the evidence is sufficient;[FN4] that competent,
substantial evidence is required;[FN5] that the evidence is full, clear, and
convincing;[FN6] that substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence is
needed;[FN7] or that clear and convincing evidence is essential.[FN8]
Because evidence that was not presented to the bar is virtually impossible
to evaluate in the absence of cross-examination, the supreme court will
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generally not consider it.[FN10] It would be inordinately unfair to allow King

to purposefully fail to timely supplement his DOWSOE (especially as to the
testimony of Beesley and Elcano and the entry of FHE2, an Order by Judge
Flanagan where nothing in the 8/23/12 Compliant in any way notice-pleads
Coughlin that such would be included in any allegation or was otherwise at
issue. Further, the Panel Chair was obviously either clueless to the concepts
of notice and notice-pleading, or, more likely, just fraudulently ran roughshod
over them in a more than willful manner.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 72:23 to 75:5) "MR. KING: Mr.
Chairman, if I could respond by pointing out the fact that the order from
Judge Flanagan, which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that those
fees were generated because of Mr. Coughlin's vexatious conduct. And that
the fees were reasonable and were awarded against Mr. Coughlin, not one
cent of which has been paid. So I think any suggestion to the contrary is
irrelevant, because Judge Flanagan's order is to be accepted by the panel.
MR. COUGHLIN: ...I don't know that's actually pled in your complaint,
Mr. King, or included amongst one of the three grievances. ... Am I here
today on Judge Flanagan's sanction? Is he a grievant and accorded a case
number too? ... MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today to
measure all of your conduct as a practicing lawyer. ... MR. COUGHLIN:
So we're not here today based on what's been noticed? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: We're not here today to relitigate orders that have been filed
that you have appealed, and that you have lost. MR. COUGHLIN: ... I'm
asking what is it limited to? Because it sounds like from what you just said
it's not limited. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any limits on
you in terms of what you attempt to proffer as evidence. I will rule on what
you proffer as evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited to,
your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I understand the
supreme court's order with respect to your conviction of theft, and the issues
here with respect to the other grievances that have been filed against you are
to the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment that you should
sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered into
evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN: This order
has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has. MR.
COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any complaint. Judge Flanagan's not a
grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing to some
extent today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the issue of your
conviction of trespass was an issue, that your handling of that case was an
issue, and it's relevant as to that." (NOTE: Panel Chair Echeverria time and
time again reverts to non-sequitur as his trusty workhorse when confronted by
Coughlin with the appalling lack of due process his Panel presents, something
he mixes up with only the occasional outright lie (confronted with the
quandry presented by the rules that require these hearings be limited to what
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is notice-pled, Echeverria reaches for the ol' "not here today to relitigate
orders" regardless of the fact that such order was neither notice-pled (not even
identified in the DOWSOE or any supplemental, as Hill's testimony is limited
therein to that occurring in 1708, not the appeal in 03628, to say nothing of
the fact that King purposefully eliminated all reference to Hill or that
summary eviction appeal in his 8/23/12 Complaint, choosing also to avoid
seeking admission of any written grievance by Hill (its like that Seinfeld
where Jerry takes his less than attractive girlfriend to the Chinese restaurant
way across town to avoid the embarrassment of being seen with her);
confonted again as to the notion that such hearing is limited to that which is
notice-pled, Echeverria lamely responds that he does not "intend to impose
any limits on you" rather than address Coughlin's contentions as to the limits
imposed on bar counsel's presentation of his case, then, where Coughlin
persists, Echeverria shows he is a real five tool player, and attempts to make
some nice broken field running by riffing on his ridiculously fraudulent
assertion that the "supreme court's order with respect to your convict of theft"
somehow provides a basis for finding Coughlin guilty of all that alleged in
any of the grievances (including imaginary ones that were not notice-pled)
and insisting Coughlin just bend over and skip straight to the "big mea culpa"
mitigation, mitigation dancey dance, finally Echeverria, who just will not let
it go, asserts that the Complaints referencing the trespass conviction (any
allegation that such is a SCR 111(6) "serious" offense is undone by King's
SCR 111(4) Petition reporting such "crime" in 61901, so...), stating: "You
were noticed that the issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that
your handling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant as to that". The
only problem is that where Echeverria wants to assert Coughlin's "handling of
that case" involved the appeal (appeals have their own case numbers, and just
because Baker and Hill billed some hours in the justice court does not make
there moving for an award of fees based upon NRS 69.050 acceptable) of the
summary eviction proceeding that Hill's associate handled (making Hill's
testimony, rather than Baker's rather dubious as to relevancy and or best
evidence notions) rather then the criminal trespass case (that case? Which
case? Whichever one the witch trial needs the most, apparently, rather
than whichever one lazy, entitled, assist. bar counsel with no training in his
first week on the job Pat King manage to notice-plead).
However, quite clearly, that statutory remedy provided by NRS
40.253, and Anvui, not to mention CG Wallace, make quite clear that the "de
novo review" in the appeal "case" (03628) that Flangan's Order is found
within, involves not, in an analysis of Coughlin's "handling" of it (beyond the
fact that such "case" was in no way notice-pled), anything to do with any
criminal trespass prosecution or conviction. Hill's client is free to file a
lawsuit for damages incident to the criminal trespass (though, he should
probably not given he was actually himself participating in a burglary, in
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addition to lying to and with the police and Hill to accomplish a fraudulent
arrest), and King was free to notice-pled any such "handling" of that "case" in
his Complaint, much less his DOWSOE, but, darn it, he just did not manage
to, so, no, Chair Echeverria, its not appropriate to make Flanagan's Order
(FHE2) King's lead-off hitter in a Rickey Henderson star of the show kind of
way...
This, in addition to the fact that the SBN and far too many of the
judges in Reno and Washoe County are insipidly allowing this situation to
turn into an embarrassing rock fight in the street/dumpster grease fire of epic
proportions (apparently not to help Hill purchase his twenty-fourth Porsche,
but rather, to indulge base vindictiveness), that, like some Russian egg, peels
away layer after layer of misconduct and the incestuous relationship between
bailiffs (Medina, Reyes, Chief Bailiff Sexton, Ramsey, and Heibert, they of
the ripping up Coughlin's filings/throwing them away/making up new
wrinkles to the dubious at best "Administrative Order" requiring Coughlin to
conduct all business with the RJC through its abusive, unprofessional bailiffs,
such as "only one filing per day", or "only fifteen minutes a day to review any
and all files" (that is when the bailiffs aren't bizarrely indicating that "all your
eviction files are in Carson" or providing some other misdirection non-sense,
such as citing to JCRRT 10 in relation to "landlord tenant matters' or criminal
cases)), marshals (Coppa, Thompson, Harley, Menzel), sheriffs (Durbin,
Canizzaro, Stuchell, Machen), police officers (Sifre, Look, Leedy, K. Brown,
Duralde, Rosa, Crawford, Braunworth, Weaver, Dye, O. Miller, Schaur),
DAS Officers (Ramos, Wickman, C. Brown), bar counsel, Clerk of Court of
the SBN, juni courthouse security detail (A. Perez, M. Greene), and judge
after judge (Sferrazza, Flanagan, Elliott, Sattler, Schroeder, Clifton, Pearson,
Nash Holmes, L. Gardner, W. Gardner, Howard) process server companies
(Nevada Court Services, Jeff Chandler, Wray, Durden) and property
managers (Sue King, Jared Scalise, Western Nevada Managment) cum
unauthorized practitioners of landlord law, and the Hill, Baker, Kern,
(Loomis, Puentes, Sotelo, Dogan, Leslie, Lindsay collective of Washington
Generals court appointed defenders), (Skau, Christensen, Hazlett-Stevens,
Wong, Roberts, Ormaas, Drake, Sooudi, Young, Stege purveyors of
prosecutorial misconduct), Elcano, Springgate, and other Goya-esqe
archetypes of the Northern Nevada legal landscape, with the only silver lining
being that Coughlin more than paid Elcano back for hiring him on at Washoe
Legal Services by single handedly doing more for tenant's rights than the
WLS's Marc Ashleys of the world would even come close to were they to
continue collecting a paycheck for two hundred years (exposing the state
sponsored burglaries by the Washoe County Sheriff's Office, and the
complete indifference to jurisdictional prerequisites (at least as far as they
benefit tenants) demonstrated by the RJC as a whole), not to mention bring
light to an epidemic of unprofessional, abusive, bullying, and fraudulent
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behavior by RMC Marshals and RJC Bailiffs, and some court staff (C.
Erickson, R. Baker, C. Wood, L. Matheus):
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 73:23 to 75:5) "MR. COUGHLIN: So
we're not here today based on what's been noticed? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're not here today to relitigate orders that have been filed that you have
appealed, and that you have lost. MR. COUGHLIN: ...I'm asking what is it
limited to? Because it sounds like from what you just said it's not limited.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any limits on you in terms of
what you attempt to proffer as evidence. I will rule on what you proffer as
evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited to, your Honor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I understand the supreme
court's order with respect to your conviction of theft, and the issues here
with respect to the other grievances that have been filed against you are to
the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment that you should
sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered
into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN: This
order has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has.
MR. COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any complaint. Judge Flanagan's
not a grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing
to some extent today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the
issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that your handling of that
case was an issue, and it's relevant as to that."
Special judge did not abuse his discretion, in disbarment proceedings, in
excluding exhibits evidencing attorney's pattern of writing checks on trust account
to pay for personal obligations, to extent such exhibits were generated outside time
span covered by disbarment complaint, especially given that attorney was not
afforded prior notice of such exhibits and pleadings were not amended to reflect
such exhibits. Ligon v. Dunklin, 368 Ark. 443, 247 S.W.3d 498 (2007).

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Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing,

and satisfactory evidence; the touchstone of the clear and convincing standard is
that the evidence must establish that the truth of the facts asserted is highly
probable. In re Swanson, 288 Kan. 185, 200 P.3d 1205 (2009).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. In re Nelson, 288 Kan. 179, 200 P.3d 1262 (2009).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. In re Crow, 285 Kan. 1110, 179 P.3d 1093 (2008).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In re Bishop, 285
Kan. 1097, 179 P.3d 1096 (2008).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. In re Trester, 285 Kan. 404, 172 P.3d 31 (2007).

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In an attorney disciplinary proceeding in which the lawyer does not answer

the formal charges, (Coughlin absolutely did answer all of the charges, denying
guilt as to each an every one, and its especially pathetic where King and Peters
had to attempt to excise Coughlin's filings of 10/30/11 and 11/9/11 from the
ROA, amongst others) if the legal conclusion the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (ODC) seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily
apparent from deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be
submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted
factual allegations. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 19, Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
Rule, 11(E)(3), 8 LSAR.S. In re Hackett, 42 So. 3d 972 (La. 2010).
Clear and convincing evidence did not support referee's finding that
attorney violated disciplinary rule prohibiting a lawyer from failing to
communicate with client or failing to diligently work on her case; record was
almost entirely silent on issues. State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of
Nebraska Supreme Court v. Wintroub, 277 Neb. 787, 765 N.W.2d 482 (2009).
In disciplinary proceedings against attorney, documents disbarring attorney in
Colorado for conversion of client's trust fund were prima facie evidence that he
committed the acts described therein, and thus attorney had the burden of proving
that the findings forming the basis of the Colorado disbarment were not supported
by the evidence or that the findings were not sufficient grounds for discipline in
Oklahoma. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Rymer, 2008 OK 50, 187 P.3d 725
(Okla. 2008).
[FN1] Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245 (Ky. 2006). -[FN2] Iowa
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa 2007). [FN3] In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160 Wash. 2d 317, 157 P.3d
859 (2007). - [FN4] Matter of Capoccia, 59 N.Y.2d 549, 466 N.Y.S.2d 268, 453
N.E.2d 497 (1983). - [FN5] The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
2006). - [FN6] In re Disciplinary Action Against Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458 (Minn.
2007). - [FN7] In re Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011 (Kan. 2007). - [FN8] In re Pharr, 950
So. 2d 636 (La. 2007); State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of Nebraska Supreme
Court v. Petersen, 272 Neb. 975, 725 N.W.2d 845 (2007). - [FN9] Maddy v. First
Dist. Committee of Virginia State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56 (1964). [FN10] Baca v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 3d 294, 276 Cal. Rptr. 169, 801 P.2d 412 (1990).
- [FN11] The Florida Bar v. Roberts, 626 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1993). - [FN12] Connor
v. State Bar, 50 Cal. 3d 1047, 269 Cal. Rptr. 742, 791 P.2d 312 (1990). - [FN13]
Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, 910 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.
1990).

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112. Protection against self-incrimination

113. Judgment and award of costs; enforcement
Where, however, the bar takes an excessively broad approach to a
disciplinary proceeding and fails to abandon counts against the attorney which
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could not be proved, each party should bear its own costs even though the
proceeding results in the disbarment of the attorney.[FN5] If the state bar fails to
prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence, costs should not be assessed
against the attorney in a disciplinary proceeding.[FN6] [FN5] The Florida Bar v.
McCain, 361 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1978). - [FN6] State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Albert, 2007 OK 31, 2007 WL 1417160 (Okla. 2007).
Pat King failed to seek costs until after Coughlin concluded his closing
argument, and for that reason alone, and in addition to the favorable comparision to
footnotes 5 and 6 above, costs should not be awarded to the SBN, but Coughlin
should be awarded costs of $50,000, plus both a NRS 7.085 and NRAP 38 attorney
fee award (and Coughlin, unlike Springgate, Hill, or Baker, did comply with the 21
day safe harbor procedural requirement):
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 330:16 to 331:20) "I thank you for your time
today. MR. KING: I have no further argument as the panel chair directed, but I do
have something I need to put on the record. If the panel chooses not to disbar Mr.
Coughlin, but instead afford him some opportunity through reinstatement,
regardless, he should be held responsible for paying the costs of the investigation of
these proceedings. They shouldn't fall on the other members of the Bar to pay. And
I believe it would be appropriate since you heard evidence on the issue of the court
order that he pay Dr. Merliss's fees. That any reinstatement, if you don't disbar him
permanently, would be he would be required to follow that court order to pay those
fees. Thank you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further? I'm going to propose,
because it's getting late, I would like to circulate an e-mail to the panel members
tomorrow to arrange a date when we can either get together in person and/or on the
phone and discuss the situation. We have 30 days, I believe, in which to issue a
written opinion. I would like to set up a meeting sometime within the next week
where we can all discuss this issue and come up with a ruling, and then I'll offer a
tentative ruling, then I'll offer to write the opinion and circulate it for approval or
disapproval. At this time is the hearing will stand adjourned, and I will circulate an
e-mail tomorrow. (Proceedings concluded at 5:30 P.M.)"
Also, it just ridiculous for King to be cheerleading for Hill's client to get
paid above all else.
114. Review
7. Reinstatement of Disbarred Attorney
115. Generally; procedure
116. Considerations affecting right to reinstatement
117. Burden of showing present good character
118. Review
Attorney and Client 56 As a general rule, because a referee in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses,
[FN1] the court will not second-guess a referee's recommended discipline as long
as that discipline is authorized under the state standards for imposing lawyer
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sanctions and has a reasonable basis in existing case law.[FN2] When reviewing a
referee's recommended attorney discipline, the court's scope of review is broader
than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact because the court has the ultimate
responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction.[FN3] However, since the court
has exclusive authority and wide latitude in determining disciplinary sanctions over
lawyers,[FN4] a referee's recommendation for discipline receives less deference by
the court than a referee's guilt finding.[FN5] Thus, although a referee's
recommendation in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is persuasive, the court does
not grant it the same deference as it does to guilt recommendations, because the
ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriate sanction rests with the court.
[FN6] It has been stated elsewhere that the court may impose whatever sanction it
deems appropriate, regardless of the referee's recommendation, since the court does
not accord the referee's recommendation as to appropriate attorney discipline great
weight or consider it conclusive, and that the court is entitled to impose discipline
more or less severe than the discipline recommended by the referee.[FN7]
Similarly, another court has stated that recommendations of a bar association board
of governors are advisory in nature, and the court makes an independent review of
the record and findings of fact.[FN8] It has also been stated that, although the court
generally accords great weight to a review department's recommendation, its
findings and recommendations are merely advisory.[FN9] Although the attorney
sanctions for professional misconduct standards are not binding on the court, they
promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures, and the
court will not reject a recommendation arising from application of the standards
unless it has grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline.[FN10]
The ultimate decision regarding attorney discipline rests with the court, which has
not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than that recommended by the review
department, and when the facts have warranted doing so, the court has even
rejected a recommendation of suspension and disbarred the attorney.[FN11] While
the court's scope of review over disciplinary recommendations of a referee is
broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact, the referee's
recommendation of discipline is nevertheless afforded a presumption of correctness
unless the recommendation is clearly erroneous or not supported by the evidence.
[FN12] Unlike a referee's factual findings in an attorney disciplinary proceeding,
which are entitled to deference from the court, a referee's order granting summary
relief in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is reviewed de novo by the court.
[FN13 Where neither party filed a petition for review of the hearing officer's
findings in the attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court would accept
and adopt those findings but would reserve final judgment as to misconduct and
disciplinary sanction. In re Powell, 893 N.E.2d 729 (Ind. 2008). Generally, the
Supreme Court will not second-guess a referee's recommended attorney discipline
as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The Florida Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052 (Fla.
2008). Factual findings by the hearing judge in attorney disciplinary proceeding
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will not be interfered with by Court of Appeals if they are founded on clear and
convincing evidence. Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Pawlak, 408 Md.
288, 969 A.2d 311 (2009). A unanimous decision of state bar association
disciplinary board will be upheld in the absence of a clear reason for departure.
Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070
(2008). Evidentiary rulings made by the hearing officer in an attorney disciplinary
proceeding will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Burtch, In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008). The hearing
officer's denials of motions for mistrial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion in
attorney disciplinary proceeding. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against,
162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008). A de novo standard applies to a review
of the adjudicatory record made before the Lawyer Disciplinary Board as to
questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of
appropriate sanctions. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Cavendish, 700 S.E.2d 779 (W.
Va. 2010). The Florida Bar v. Senton, 882 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2004). - [FN2] The
Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2006). - Absent a showing that a
referee's findings in an attorney disciplinary proceeding are clearly erroneous or
lacking in evidentiary support, the court is precluded from reweighing the evidence
and substituting its judgment for that of the referee. The Florida Bar v. Senton, 882
So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2004). - [FN3] The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
2006). - [FN4] In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007). - [FN5] The Florida
Bar v. Feige, 937 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2006). - [FN6] The Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908
So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2005). - [FN7] In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery,
2007 WI 1, 298 Wis. 2d 289, 725 N.W.2d 613 (2007). - [FN8] Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245 (Ky. 2006). - [FN9] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN10] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN11] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN12] The Florida Bar v. Barcus, 697
So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1997). - [FN13] The Florida Bar v. Gold, 937 So. 2d 652 (Fla.
2006). I AM INDIGENT, I SWEAR.
, I declare this is true under penalty of perjury pursuant to nrs 53.045:
Dated this 8/12/13

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/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

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Appellant

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Proof of Service:

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On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to all registered efilers, and to those whom are not I placed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the usps mail on this date:

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State Bar of Nevada's Patrick O. King and David Clark.

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Richard G. Hill, Esq.

Casey Baker, Esq.
Richard G. Hill, CHTD.
Attorneys for Respondent Merliss
652 Forrest St.
Reno, NV 89509

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DATED THIS: Dated thi 7/15/13

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/s/ Zach Coughlin

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Zach Coughlin

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Appellant

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INDEX TO EXHIBITS:

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1. Exhibit 1: various relevant materials.

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