Hagin On Deleuze and Phenomenology

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Inverted identification: Bergson and phenomenology in Deleuze's cinema books

Boaz Hagin
a a
Department of Film and Television , Tel Aviv University , Tel Aviv , Israel Published online: 09 Apr 2013.
To cite this article: Boaz Hagin (2013) Inverted identification: Bergson and phenomenology in Deleuze's cinema books, New Review of Film and Television Studies, 11:3, 262-287, DOI: 10.1080/17400309.2013.779794 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17400309.2013.779794
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New Review of Film and Television Studies, 2013 Vol. 11, No. 3, 262287, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17400309.2013.779794
RESEARCH ARTICLE Inverted identication: Bergson and phenomenology in Deleuzes cinema books
Boaz Hagin*
Department of Film and Television, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Deleuzes cinema books are often understood as adopting a Bergsonian framework while rejecting phenomenological accounts of lm experience for equating cinematographic perception with natural perception; or, alternatively, simply as being a phenomenological inquiry. Reading Deleuzes comments on, and references to, phenomenology in the cinema books (especially Merleau-Ponty, Laffay, and Dufrenne), this paper argues that while not following a phenomenological logic in general, at certain moments the cinema books Bergsonian account intersects with phenomenology. Moreover, in the books, the existence of movement-images in the cinema depends on the spectators experience of watching lms. The logic explaining this encounter is indebted to the account of the experience of art and cinema in phenomenology which Deleuze combines with the discussion of real movements in Bergsons Creative Evolution. This reliance on a specic passive viewers experience can explain the books limited interest in early cinema and in television, video, and the digital image. Keywords: Gilles Deleuze; Henri Bergson; phenomenology; perception; movement-image
Introduction Within lm studies, there are conicting accounts of Deleuzes relation to phenomenology in his two cinema books. One camp brands Deleuzes cinema books as phenomenological, but often offers little explanation to support this assertion.1 Conversely, a second camp views the cinema books as rejecting phenomenology and adopting a Bergsonian framework instead.2 While writers in this camp often cite passages in which Deleuze distinguishes between a Bergsonian approach and phenomenology and seems to prefer the former, they ignore places in the cinema books in which Deleuze does take up phenomenological concepts or avers that Bergson mischaracterised cinema and that phenomenology is right (Deleuze 1986, 2). Contributing to the confusion are works that have attempted to combine Deleuzes work with phenomenology or have noted a similarity between them,
*Email: bhagin@post.tau.ac.il
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
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but have done so ambivalently or without expounding on their position. For example, in her work on cinematic experience, Jennifer M. Barker suggests, very briey, various intersections, possible convergences, or a possible overlap between Deleuze and phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger (Barker 2009, 14, 165n21, 166n40, and 178n27). However, she also adds that any easy alignment between the approach of existential phenomenology and a Deleuzian one is impossible (165n21). An additional example can be found in the rst chapter of Vivian Sobchacks seminal Address of the Eye. She claims that Deleuze asserts the signicance of cinematic movement and images phenomenologically (Sobchack 1992, 31) and that his work bears some relation and stands as parallel to her own phenomenological study in many respects (30). Yet she devotes only one paragraph to this discussion, concedes that Deleuze criticises phenomenology, and nds differences between the two projects that seem to greatly upstage any similarity. According to Sobchack, Deleuzes rejection of phenomenology is based on a claim that rigorous phenomenological description need never argue; Deleuze cites only a few early works in phenomenology and misses the dialectical and dialogic character of Merleau-Pontys later semiotic phenomenology which is the basis for Sobchacks project; and his philosophical mentor Henri Bergson asserts that questions relating to subject and object should be put in terms of time, whereas in her book it is space that grounds the response (Sobchack 1992, 31). Sobchacks aim seems to be to dismiss Deleuzes critique of phenomenology and show that it bears no relation to her own project. She never elaborates what value Deleuzes work might have for a phenomenology of cinema and Deleuze is never mentioned again in Address of the Eye and is extremely marginal in her later phenomenological work. Laura Marks (2002) does manage to shift elegantly between Deleuzes work, phenomenological insights, and other theoretical ideas, but she is clearly committed to not drawing out the theoretical implications that this methodological diversity implies. She argues that her haptic or erotic criticism tries to be open to new ideas and does not incorporate them into a totality (Marks 2002, xvii). While she acknowledges that her work is deeply theoretical (xiv), she says that it is far from the rigor of sound scholarship (xvii). Haptic criticism does not place itself within predetermined critical frameworks and does not lead there she dislikes the idea that her engagements with objects and ideas need to eventually give way to a coherent and removed critical structure (xiii). Averse to theoretical frameworks that she fears would lead to totalising, she does not account for the fact that she can work with Deleuzes concepts in one paragraph and then work with phenomenological texts in the next.3 This paper will suggest one possible theoretical framework for understanding such links between the cinema books and phenomenology and will argue for the importance of a phenomenological perspective to supplement Deleuzes Bergsonian theses. There clearly are passages in the cinema books where Deleuze distinguishes his own approach, partly stemming from his reading of
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Bergsons work, from a phenomenological study of the cinema, so that labelling them as phenomenology seems unwarranted. However, the books also include additional commentaries on, and explicit and implicit references to, phenomenological works, which are far from a complete rejection. I will try to clarify some of the rather obscure statements Deleuze devotes to phenomenology in the cinema books, particularly in the rst and fourth chapters of Cinema 1, and argue that although the overall organising principle of the cinema books does not follow a phenomenological logic, at certain moments it does intersect with phenomenology, and moreover, that in a specic sense the cinema books are indeed phenomenological. The second section of this paper shows that phenomenology does not need to be, and indeed is not, absent from Deleuzes Bergsonian taxonomy of images. The following sections argue that phenomenology also serves an important role at the beginning of the cinema books, where Deleuze discusses the viewers and where he claims combining a phenomenological argument about the passivity of the spectators with a Bergsonian understanding of movement that cinematic viewers are not prey to the cinematographic illusion. Here, as elsewhere in the books, Deleuzes remarks about phenomenology are succinct and allusive. In order to unpack them, the subsequent sections will look at Deleuzes commentary on phenomenology and the distinction between natural perception and cinematographic perception in Chapter 4; his understanding of the viewers in the transition between the two cinema books; and, in light of these readings, his use of phenomenology together with a Bergsonian approach when he discusses movement in Chapter 1. The opposite of what phenomenology put forward In Chapter 4 of Cinema 1, Deleuze claims that Bergson begins with a regime or system in which there are no objects or subjects, no viewers, and in which perception is objective and undifferentiated. As has often been noted, this nonhuman system or perception is where the cinema books differ radically from phenomenology (e.g. Hughes 2008, 23; Marrati 2008, 29 32; Pursley 2005, 1194 1196; Rodowick 1997, 32 33; Rushton 2012, 27 28). In so far as phenomenology describes the consciousness, perception, or experiences of subjects, a system in which there are no subjects indeed seems to be radically different. In this section, I will nevertheless argue that Deleuzes elaboration of the Bergsonian system does not sever all ties with phenomenology. This nonhuman perception is only the beginning of Deleuzes reading. He follows it by arguing that Bergsons wish was to reconstitute the order of consciousness with pure material movements (Deleuze 1986, 56). In the system in which there were no subjectivities, it was necessary to show how conscious perception was produced (Bergson 1991, quoted in Deleuze 1986, 226n5) or underwent deducing in the rst place (Deleuze 1986, 58). While the Bergsonian regime initially has no subjects, Deleuze shows how subjectivity can be produced within it.
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Deleuze proceeds by positing an identity of matter, movement, and what he and Bergson call images. He writes that he would like to make an inventory of the varieties of images, and he claims that it is easy to recognise certain kinds of images which pass across the screen (Deleuze 1986, 69). Deleuze presents a double system or regime of reference of images. In the rst system, there is a gaseous world of universal undulation or rippling, without centres or axes, without objects or subjects, in which the images are indistinguishable from their movements, actions, and reactions (Deleuze 1986, 56 59). The set of all of these movement-images is the plane of immanence, the machine-assemblage of movement-images (59). Movement-images act on others and react to others on all their facets and in all their parts at once (58 and 61). This material universe is entirely made up of light, which is not reected or stopped, but is diffused without resistance, and things are luminous by themselves without anything illuminating them (60). In the second system, the material aspects of subjectivity are brought into account when a special type of images, living images, is identied. A living image is dened by a gap or interval between the received and executed movement. Living images form centres of indetermination which allow analysis and selection. The world takes on a curvature and becomes organised to surround the living images which form centres within it, with perception on one side, delayed action on the other side, and affection occupying the interval but not lling it up (Deleuze 1986, 64 65). All perception is primarily sensory motor and is inseparable from action (64). Thus, the movement-images undergo a process of specication (Deleuze 1989, 26 and 29) and divide into three sorts (or avatars) in relation to the centre of indetermination: perception-images, action-images, and affection-images. These are the three material aspects of subjectivity.4 The chapters in Cinema 1 are organised around such types of images and signs (a sign for Deleuze [1986, 69; 1989, 32] is a particular image that represents or refers to a type of image from the point of view of its composition or genesis). In Cinema 2, due to various factors, the material subjectivity described in the book suffers a crisis that results in new types of images and signs, which, when combined with other forces, allow the movement-image to grow in dimensions or powers which go beyond space into a time-image, a readable image, and a thinkable image (Deleuze 1989, 22). The images and material aspects of subjectivity are therefore an important organising principle of the two books.5 Indeed, as Joe Hughes (2008, 25) shows, it seems that Deleuzes study of cinema is just as much a study of subjectivity. Within this logic, the cinema books can be read not as a collection of dominant images from the history of lm, but rather as a theory of the images and signs determined by these moments of material subjectivity (15).6 Deleuze (1986) explains that each one of us, as a special living image or centre of indetermination, is nothing but an assemblage [agencement ] of three ] of perception-images, action-images and images, a consolidate [consolide
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affection-images (66; all italics in quotations are from the original). But then why would a discussion of this material subjectivity in the cinema books be so radically different from phenomenology? Contrary to human subjectivity, Deleuze maintains that the mobility of cinemas centres and the variability of its framings always lead the cinema to restore vast acentred and deframed zones and return to the rst regime of the movement-image: universal variation, total, objective and diffuse perception (64). Instead of going from the acentred state of things to centred perception, cinema could go back up towards the acentred state of things, and get closer to it (58). This according to Deleuze is the opposite of what phenomenology put forward (58). The cinema can go back and forth between subjective perception and the acentred regime of objective perception; it travels the route in both directions (64). Thus, while subjectivity is neither an origin nor an end in the cinema books, travelling the route of the production of subjectivity in both directions would suggest that at some moments the books can come closer to dealing with subjective perception while at other moments they are far from that and closer to the objective perception of the rst regime of movement-images. In the former, a philosophy that deals with subjectivity, such as the descriptions of experience and consciousness offered by phenomenology, can offer productive concepts for the cinema books.7 Indeed, Deleuze does make use of phenomenological concepts and writings in various places in the cinema books. Heideggers Mitsein (beingwith), for example, is employed to discuss the status of the perception-image in relation to the perception of the characters (Deleuze 1986, 72 and 74). When dealing with the cinema of behaviour which involves action-images with strong sensory motor links (which according to Deleuze can be found in realist violence, in the systemisation in the Actors Studio, and in Kazan), Deleuze refers to Maurice Merleau-Pontys The Film and the New Psychology (Deleuze 1986, 155), which makes a connection between cinema and phenomenology.8 While there is a fundamental difference between the Bergsonian approach of the cinema books and phenomenology, at specic moments the two can intersect and in fact they do so explicitly. Ambiguous allies Phenomenology serves as more than a tool kit for the taxonomy of images offered in the cinema books. It is additionally used at the beginning of Cinema 1 to consider the experience of lm spectators. In order to understand this use, we will rst look at Deleuzes understanding of phenomenology expressed in his commentary at the beginning of Chapter 4 of Cinema 1 and then at his understanding of cinematic spectatorship found in the transition between the two books. In an oft-cited discussion in Chapter 4 of Cinema 1, Deleuze describes an almost mythological twin birth of Bergsons theory and Husserls phenomenology, as both attempted to overcome the conict between materialism and
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idealism which, according to Deleuze, had reached a crisis. It is in this context that Deleuze offers his brief commentary on phenomenology and cinema. After misleadingly suggesting that Husserl never mentions the cinema at all,9 and incorrectly claiming that Sartre does not cite the cinematographic image in The Imaginary (Deleuze 1983b, 84; 1986, 56 57),10 Deleuze considers movement in Merleau-Pontys Phenomenology of Perception and in Albert Laffays Logic of the Cinema, which Deleuze (1983b, 85n3; 1986, 226n3) characterises as a complex theory, which is phenomenologically inspired.11 The movement that interests Merleau-Ponty in the section cited by Deleuze is that of the gaze focusing on an object (or a part of it) which he compares with the movement of the camera as it comes nearer to an object to give a close-up view. In normal vision, according to Merleau-Ponty, when my gaze plunges into an object, its inner horizons become an object while the surrounding objects, over which my gaze earlier hovered, recede into the periphery and become a horizon. The objects which are now a horizon, however, do not cease to be there and with these objects I have at my disposal their horizons, in which there is implied, as a marginal view, the object on which my eyes at present fall. The horizon thus ensures the identity of the object and I do not need to explicitly remember, compare, or conjecture what the object was in order to identify it when concentrating on one of its details since its identity is implicit in its horizon. In the cinema, however, when the camera moves nearer to an object, the surrounding objects are no longer visible in the periphery of our gaze. The screen, according to Merleau-Ponty, has no horizons. We therefore do not actually identify the object being shown in close-up but can at most explicitly remember what the object is or what it is a part of (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 78). As Deleuze (1983b, 84; 1986, 57) explains, while the cinema can bring us closer to things, take us farther away from them, and revolve around them, it still suppresses the horizon of the world. Cinemas movement is never like that of our gaze in natural perception which has horizons. Perception in the cinema and natural perception are different and therefore Merleau-Ponty sees the cinema as an ambiguous ally (Deleuze 1986, 57). Perhaps Deleuze means that in some aspects (the ability to move nearer, farther, or around objects) the two perceptions are similar while in other aspects (such as horizons) they are not. Alternatively, perhaps he means that within phenomenological studies, cinema can help in clarifying certain characteristics of natural perception, but only by being contrasted with it in certain aspects. As for Laffay, Deleuze discusses his work, and particularly his notion of cit), and accuses phenomenology of having an attitude embarrasse e, narrative (re a confused or embarrassed attitude, which stems from the privilege it accords to natural perception in its understanding of movement (Deleuze 1983b, 84 85; 1986, 57).12 According to Laffay, the world always remains open and everything in it is ambiguous and capable of changing meaning; things always escape us and we always have both too much and not enough at the same time. Narrative is contrary to the world. It is a type of revenge that people take on the world,
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a fending off of the lack of style of events in it (Laffay 1964, 66). In contrast, photography brings us the world and does not narrate anything (60). In photography the world is beyond my will and intention, it does not ask my permission, it exceeds my spirit (54). Cinema, unlike photography, responds to two contradictory demands, because the lms movement transforms everything (Laffay 1964, 65). While photography is the material of cinema, in cinema there is also a virtual narrative which encompasses and penetrates the ow of images. It decides what we will see and at what rate we will see it and functions as a sort of master of ceremonies, great image-maker (grand imagier) (81), or exhibitor of images (montreur dimages), who takes us from one position to the next (77).13 This, perhaps, is what Deleuze (1986, 57) is referring to when he writes that instead of natural perception, cinema involves an implicit knowledge and a second intentionality. This narration of moving photography differs from movement in natural perception. In reality, I have no such narration. I am either an agent, carried away with my active participation in the world and unable to stand back and view it, or a witness of events that are not narrated, and therefore only able to see incoherent fragments. In the cinema, in contradistinction, I am guided and given privileged points of view and I become a witness who is detached and who saves the view on things from incoherence (Laffay 1964, 169). Film thus offers a union of narrative as its form and photography as its material. Cinemas exceptionality, difculty, and glory, lie in constructing a narrative which is photographic (Laffay 1964, 83). Its spectators are disposed to view a narrative which introduces progress, coherence, and composition into what has the appearance of natural disorder (134 135). It is both the world that escapes human will (photography) and human intervention (narrative, the revenge of people on the world). It is in this sense, perhaps, that Deleuze can accuse phenomenology of having a confused or embarrassed attitude. He argues that phenomenology exalts the new narrative capable of drawing close both to the world (presumably, Laffays understanding of photography) and to perception (presumably, the virtual narrative of the grand imagier), that is, both to the perceived and to the perceiver. However, phenomenology also condemns cinematographic movement for being unfaithful to the conditions of natural perception (Deleuze 1986, 57), since, as we have seen, the ordered cinematic narrative is not the same as our perception of movement when being in the world in reality, when we are either carried away by our action or are witnesses to what is not narrated by a subjectivity. Deleuzes sophisticated formulation shows how taking natural perception as a model can lead to some tension, or a confused or embarrassed attitude, and indeed Laffay (1964, 111) himself describes cinema within his account as a paradox verging on the surreal. However, accusing Laffay of an embarrassed attitude is hardly a damning critique or an all-out rejection of phenomenology. I would like to underline two aspects of Deleuzes discussion of phenomenology here that will be helpful when we deal with the beginning of
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Cinema 1 later on. The rst is that for Deleuze both Merleau-Ponty and Laffay very clearly distinguish between natural perception and cinematographic perception and in this aspect at least cinema is not a problem for their phenomenological accounts. Several works written in the wake of Deleuzes cinema books have criticised a phenomenological study of cinema and have particularly pointed out that human experience is incommensurable with perception by or through lm, assuming that a phenomenology of lm argues otherwise. Steven Shaviro (1993, 30), citing Chapter 4 of Cinema 1, chastises Bazin for taking for granted the anthropocentric prominent lm critic Andre structures of phenomenological reection and contrasts him with radical theorists who insist that lm dislodges sensation from its supposed natural conditions.14 Garrett Stewart (1999, 266), in a book that frequently refers to Deleuzes work on cinema, claims that the roughening of the representational surface in modernism is, rst of all, an affront to the phenomenological model. Our eyes dont see the world that way. Jean Ungaro explains that the way we perceive things according to Husserl, which is presumably the natural phenomenological model, is at odds with the way we perceive things in the cinema. According to Husserl, my perception of a thing is through a ux of different adumbrations (esquisses, Abschattungen) which I experience or apprehend during perception. In the cinema, however, the adumbrations no longer belong to me, but are rather created by the lms director (Ungaro 2000, 52 53). According to Husserl, I can go around a table which will give me different successive adumbrations. In the cinema, however, I am alone in the dark, and the external world only exists through the images on the screen; I cannot go around the thing and take different points of view (55 56). This, he claims citing the same reference to Chapter 4, is a difculty which Deleuze highlights when he compares phenomenology with Bergsonism using the cinema (56). Quoting Ungaro and citing the same page in Deleuze, Dominique Chateau (2010, 103) similarly argues that a conict between Husserls phenomenology and certain theories of the cinema is a consequence of, among other things, the fact that lm does not offer things in the conditions of their natural apprehension, but rather in a way that conforms to the medium, and particularly stems from the fact that the director presents things to us from a given point of view. This common claim seems valid. I fully agree that there are differences between humans and lm cameras and seeing a table on the screen is not the same as being in the world with a table. Jean Mitry, whom Deleuze frequently cites in the cinema books, had already made this cogent claim two decades before Deleuzes cinema books were published, albeit referring to a chair not a table (Mitry 1997, 30 31).15 However, as a reading of Deleuzes cinema books it is not very convincing and the crux of Deleuzes argument lies elsewhere. As we have seen, according to Deleuze, phenomenologists maintain that natural and cinematographic perceptions differ and they do not attempt to collapse this distinction. Cinema is not an affront to their models and there is no difculty or conict between the cinema and their analyses, which do take into account the
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differences between the two types of perception. Signicantly, already in the rst pages of Cinema 1, Deleuze makes it clear that phenomenologists do not try to impose natural perception upon lm or its viewers and it is Henri Bergson who misguidedly believes that cinema reproduces the same illusion as natural perception. According to Deleuze (1986, 2), phenomenology is right in this respect and it was Bergson who misunderstood the true nature of cinematic viewing (3). The second aspect I would like to emphasise is that in this commentary Deleuze continually focuses on movement, even if in quite different ways that of the gaze or camera moving toward an object for Merleau-Ponty and that of the moving cinematic image in contradistinction with immobile photography and with movement in reality for Laffay. In fact, the entire discussion of phenomenology leads to Deleuzes elaboration of the deduction of subjectivity in Bergsons Matter and Memory, where movement and matter are equated. It is preceded by the comparison between Bergsons and Husserls reactions to the crisis due to the conict between materialism and idealism, which Deleuze relates to movement. Thus, he describes the duality between idealism and materialism as a duality of image and movement and repeatedly includes movement within materialism (as opposed to images in consciousness), and writes about movements in space, movements that are extended and quantitative, voluntary action as an example of movement, and pure material movements (Deleuze 1986, 56). This concern with movement is needed for completing a claim Deleuze briey makes against Bergsons Creative Evolution in the very rst pages of Cinema 1. To understand it we will rst look at what Deleuze tells us about cinematic spectatorship. Broken schemata and aesthetic perception One key moment when the cinema books come close to phenomenological thinking occurs in the transition between the two books, which will give us some idea about Deleuzes understanding of the spectators. According to Deleuzes reading of Bergson, the living images in the second system, that of subjective perception, isolate certain images from all those that act in the universe in an operation that he describes as framing (Deleuze 1986, 62). Living images provide a black screen so that the image of light now runs up against an opacity that will reect it so that it can no longer diffuse and propagate in all directions. This reection by a living image is called perception (62). Perception is inseparable from action and is primarily sensory motor. In Bergsons (1991, 233) words, our perception indicates the possible action of our body on others. According to him, it is only due to an adaptation to the interests of practice and to the exigencies of social life that we break up the undivided continuity of pure intuition into elements, including objects (183). Objects are recognised, indeed, torn out of the continuity of reality, only when they are useful and practical. This is so true, Bergson insists, that early observers gave the name apraxia to that
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failure of recognition which we call psychic blindness (93). Not only does our perception chop up reality into things, it also obscures some aspects of reality and thereby diminishes it. As Deleuze (1986, 61) explains, living images only receive actions on one facet or in certain parts and only execute reaction by and in other parts, whereas other images act and react at once, on all their facets and in all their parts. Thus, living beings suppress those parts of objects in which their functions nd no interest and isolate as perceptions only the external inuences to which they are not indifferent (Bergson 1991, 36). We do not then normally perceive the thing in its entirety; we always perceive less of it, only what is in our interest to perceive. Perceptions of things are incomplete and prejudiced, partial, subjective prehensions (Deleuze 1986, 64). Perception is subtractive: We perceive the thing, Deleuze maintains, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs (63). This sensory motor schema allows Deleuze (1986, 70) in the rst cinema book to deal with major groups of lms as assemblages of movement-images and signs structured around perception, affection, and action. Yet at the end of the rst cinema book, with Hitchcock, and at the beginning of the second cinema book, with Ozu, and especially after the Second World War, with Italian neorealism and the French new wave, he identies a crisis in these types of images which leads to a new cinema. The sensory motor link, upon which classical cinemas action-image is based, no longer functions after the war with the rise of situations in which the characters no longer know how to react. Already with Hitchcock, he notes, the usual identication of viewers with active characters is inverted: it is the characters who are assimilated to spectators due to their similar passivity (Deleuze 1986, 205). This inability to act in the new cinema results in pure optical and sound situations where the characters gain in an ability to see what they lost in action or reaction (Deleuze 1989, 272). The new cinema, in which seeing replaces action and whose characters were accused of being too passive (19), is a cinema of pure optical-images and sound-images and a new breed of signs, opsigns and sonsigns (6). According to Deleuze (1989, 3) there is a necessary passage from the crisis of image-action to the pure optical sound image. Recalling his reading of perception in Bergson, Deleuze explains that when we make use of sensory motor schemata we do not perceive the thing (or image) in its entirety, but rather perceive less of it because we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands (20). He argues that if our sensory motor schemata jam or break, then a different type of image can appear: a pure optical sound image that brings out the thing in itself, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its radical or unjustiable character (20). However, if we follow Deleuzes Bergsonian formula and agree that perception is primarily sensory motor and subtractive, then a crisis in which characters are passive means that the subjectivity the cinema books are studying should perceive less, not more. It is far from obvious that passivity should result
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in pure optical sound images that bring out the thing in itself, in its excess of horror or beauty. In the new cinema, without interests and without practice, we should perhaps return to perceiving an undivided continuum, without objects, or perhaps not perceive anything at all.16 While the pure optical sound image might be a necessary step on the way to deducing a time-image, a readable image, and a thinkable image, which are central to Deleuzes taxonomy of images in modern cinema in the second cinema book,17 in itself, this initial step is quite puzzling and does not seem to have been suggested by Deleuzes earlier discussion of perception in the rst book. Perhaps he is merely suggesting that Bergsons mechanism has broken down and should no longer be taken into account; but then what exactly is the new logic according to which lack of action leads to a gain in an ability to see?18 While not clearly in agreement with Deleuzes previous reading of Bergson, the idea that increased perception will result from an inability to act is not arbitrary. It can be found in two books that are cited by Deleuze and labelled by him as phenomenological in Cinema 1. Both can be utilised for formulating the idea that when characters become passive like spectators the result is enhanced perception.19 Laffays Logic of the Cinema, mentioned above as part of Deleuzes discussion of phenomenology and cinema, argues that cinema offers us a type of perception that differs from our everyday practical engagement when being in the world. Indeed, Laffay claims that the simplest and initial joy of early cinema, before it told stories, was in extracting a quality that direct vision could neither seize nor suspect from quotidian elements owing water, stirring leaves, the interchanging of sunlight and shade on a face. Early cinema, he claims, restored virginity to everyday things (Laffay 1964, 51).20 As in reality, in the cinema we also have a world. However, cinema, according to Laffay (1964, 36), conjures up a world that is shifted in relation to our own.21 The world of the cinema, Laffay writes, is in no way imaginary without being, for all that, entirely real (28). As Deleuze claims, when commenting on Laffay, the world in the cinema is made something unreal (Deleuze 1986, 57).22 The world appears at a distance from the spectators who are seated and motionless and who do not believe themselves to be in the midst of the things that appear on the screen (Laffay 1964, 93). The spectators agree to enter a sort of game with the images on the screen and treat them as a quasireality. In reality, according to Laffay, the signicance of what I perceive arises from the way in which I am engaged in the world (93). In contrast, the motionless lm spectators do not participate in the quasi-reality of the cinema; they remain outside of the game (111). The world in the cinema, according to Laffay, appears, but is rendered inoffensive (25). It does not threaten its viewers (24). While the worlds hardness and depth are evoked, they are also immediately denied by an agreed upon disinterest and passivity. It is no more solid than mummies which crumble into dust at the slightest touch (28).
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This shifted world opens up other forms of perception which are not possible when being active in the world that can threaten us. According to Laffay (1964, 134 135), the disposition to accept the quasi-real world of the cinema makes the things that appear on screen a spectacle. The kaleidoscope of cinema, as the poetry of extension, allows us to contemplate from a remote view what the project of living does not give us the leisure to enjoy (170). The enterprise of living does not permit me to draw back; my action absorbs me so much that I am lost in it like water in the sand (Laffay 1964, 168); and in acting I am absorbed in things as ink is consumed by blotting paper (169). For example, Laffay asks what the people who lived through the liberation of Paris saw or felt and suggests that it was the brief roaring of the tanks gun as people dodged behind the sandbags or the weapon as they were nervously pulling the trigger. The former group could be summed up in this gesture of diving behind the parapet and the latters being is concentrated at the point where their index nger pulls the trigger. They were absorbed in their action without being able to pull away and without the leisure to savour the project of living (168). The cinema in contrast allows me to be a detached witness and to contemplate as spectacle what I ordinarily live as engagement (Laffay 1964, 170).23 Instead of the universe in which we are lost and which is animated by our projects, on the screen we look at a panorama which detachment has rendered aesthetic in the etymological sense of the word (135). Laffay is presumably referring to the Greek aisthetikos (of or relating to sense perception) and claiming that the detached viewing of the quasi-real world, which does not threaten us and in which we are passive, renders it a spectacle we can perceive, that is, view and listen to, without being absorbed in it as part of our project of living and without it being possible to reduce our being to action, such as dodging bullets or pulling the trigger. The distance from the world is tied with an aesthetic, that is, perceptual, experience which allows me to see and understand what I do not have the leisure to contemplate in the world in which I am engaged. This phenomenological account can better explain Deleuzes claim that the inverted passive characters (like the lms spectators) gain in an ability to see what they lost in being passive than the Bergsonian framework he avowedly espouses. Mikel Dufrennes 1953 The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience is similarly cited in Cinema 1, where it is identied as an example of phenomenology (Deleuze 1986, 231n16).24 Its interest is in the experience of the aesthetic object which, according to Dufrenne (1973, 541), is different from ordinary experience, which reveals a world in which the subject utilises and explores objects. Ordinary perception, Dufrenne claims, leads to action or to gaining useful knowledge and surpasses the sensuous or perceptible element (le sensible) toward a pragmatic signication of the object (225).25 Ordinary objects present themselves through impoverished sensations, dull and transient, and promptly hide themselves behind a concept (226). Their perception disappears behind the knowledge it leads to and is attentive to the sensuous only in the sense that it is instructive in character (226).
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The experience of the aesthetic object, however, is different. The aesthetic object does not solicit the gesture which uses it but the perception which contemplates it (Dufrenne 1973, 92). The subject is alienated in the object or even bewitched and haunted by it (56). Dufrenne argues that in the aesthetic experience, I forbid myself any active participation in the aesthetic world. [I]nstead of anticipating action and trying to make the object submit to it, he claims, our body submits to the object (57). In aesthetic perception, I must surrender to the enchantment, deny my tendency to seek mastery of the object (231). I am within the aesthetic world, but only to contemplate it (58). The aesthetic object expects of me only the tribute of a perception (92). In the new cinema according to Deleuze, characters gained in an ability to see what they lost in action; similarly, for Dufrenne, passivity in the face of the aesthetic object is correlated with an enhanced perception of the sensuous, the objects perceptible element. The sensuous is not grasped as if it had to be immediately interpreted or surpassed toward a pragmatic signication (Dufrenne 1973, 225). Aesthetic perception is never rushed and never hurries outside of its object (542). The being of the aesthetic object consists in appearing; it is grasped as valid for itself (225). The aesthetic object does not pretend to refer us to an external world or propose action in that world (515). What Dufrenne realised in 1953 and Deleuze would leave unacknowledged three decades later is that this inactive perception is at odds with Bergsons pragmatic theory of perception. Dufrenne specically names the famous formula of Bergsons Matter and Memory according to which recognising an object consists above all in knowing how to use it. According to Dufrenne (1973, 343) disinterested perception, like that of the aesthetic object, cannot be explained by Bergsons reduction of gnosis to praxis. Dufrennes phenomenology thus not only offers a possible account for the passive seers of the second cinema book, but also shows that in so far as perception for Bergson depends on action, Deleuzes explanation in the transition between the books is puzzling. The inversion, in which the passive character has become a kind of viewer (Deleuze 1989, 3), is also one in which the cinema books intersect with phenomenology. The cinematographic illusion The spectators also have an important role at the beginning of Cinema 1, where Deleuze argues that cinema, despite Bergsons claims to the contrary, gives us movement-images. Melinda Szaloky (2010, 50) calls it Deleuzes foundational claim and writes that it appears to be vague. D.N. Rodowick (1997, 23) writes that in it Deleuze makes use of a curious statement and that his reasoning is certainly weak. Richard Rushton (2012, 13) ominously claims that To call the opening pages of the book daunting is something of an understatement. I would like to offer an interpretation of Deleuzes difcult argument in the beginning of Cinema 1 with the help of our reading of Chapter 4 and the inverted
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identication in the transition between the two books. I will argue that Deleuze combines a phenomenological insight about cinematographic perception with the Bergsonian notion of real movements in order to claim that the cinema gives its viewers movement-images and undoes the cinematographic illusion, which only applies to natural (not cinematographic) perception. Deleuze begins Chapter 1 by introducing Bergsons well-known distinction between space (which is homogenous and divisible) and real movements (which are heterogeneous and indivisible). Each real movement has its own qualitative duration and cannot be reconstituted with homogeneous abstract time copied from space which is added to immobile sections (Deleuze 1986, 1). According to Bergson, the becoming or movement of going from yellow to green is not the becoming or movement of going from green to blue; and the becoming or movement of the action of eating is not like the becoming or movement of the action of ghting. These varied movements or becomings are profoundly different and there is no single abstract becoming in general (Bergson 1911, 304). Our natural perception, thinking, and expression in language make the mistake of replacing these different becomings or movements with abstract becoming or time in general and distinguishing them by means of denite states. As Bergson, quoted by Deleuze, claries: We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and string these immobile characteristics of reality to an abstract becoming situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge (Bergson 1911, quoted in Deleuze 1986, 2). Thus, according to Bergson (1911, 273), [o]f becoming we perceive only states, of duration only instants. This error can be found in ancient philosophy which conceives of movement as a regulated transition between poses or privileged instants, and, in a different way, in modern science, which aspires to take time as an independent variable, as in the laws of Kepler and Galileo (Deleuze 1986, 4). According to Bergson, the same incorrect formula of attempting to reconstitute becoming or real movement by adding abstract movement or abstract time to immobile snapshots also characterises cinema. Bergson even dubs the formula the cinematographic illusion in his 1907 Creative Evolution. Cinema gives false movement by means of instantaneous sections called images and an impersonal, uniform, abstract, invisible, or imperceptible time or movement which is in the apparatus (Deleuze 1986, 1). It thus repeats the illusion of natural perception (as well as that of thinking, expression in language, ancient philosophy, and, in a different way, modern science). Deleuze rejects Bergsons analysis of cinema and claims that cinema gives us movement-images and not immobile sections together with abstract movement. Cinema therefore does not repeat the illusion of natural perception and in this respect phenomenology is correct cinematographic perception breaks with the conditions of natural perception. One type of reason that he gives for his disagreement with Bergson is historical: at the time Bergson wrote Creative Evolution, he was only familiar with early cinema and things and people are always forced to conceal themselves [ . . . ] when they begin (Deleuze 1986, 2 3).
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However, with cinemas evolution, with its conquest of its own essence or novelty, the section became mobile, the shot temporal, and cinema discovered the movement-image of Matter and Memory (3). Immediately before this historical account, Deleuze also gives another type of reason for disagreeing with Bergson. He contends that the technical means by which cinema works 24 or 18 immobile sections per second are not what is given to us or for a spectator. We never see the individual immobile photograms, but rather an intermediate image to which movement belongs as immediate given. What appears to us, or for the spectator, is a section which is mobile; cinema immediately gives us a movement-image (Deleuze 1986, 2). This recourse to what is given to the spectator is surprising and not only because the cinema books do not seem to have much interest in spectators.26 No doubt, usually humans who watch a typical movie projected at regular speed do not perceive the individual frames that this lm consists of and indeed perceive movement. However, Bergsons argument is that even when exposed to movement in reality, it is our perception that brings about the cinematographic illusion; it is humans, regardless of the cinema, who take as it were snapshots of reality. Even if we agree that cinema produces real movement, why would it be given to us as viewers? Why would our perception of this movement be any different from our perception of real movement in reality, which is cinematographic? Deleuze argues that in natural perception the illusion of false movement is corrected above perception by the conditions which make perception possible in the subject. In the cinema, however, it is corrected at the same time as the image appears for a spectator without conditions. It is here that he adds that phenomenology is right in assuming a qualitative difference between natural perception and cinematographic perception (Deleuze 1986, 2). How does this combination of Bergsons discussion of false movement and phenomenologys two perceptions lead to the correction of the cinematographic illusion in the cinema? When dealing with phenomenology in Chapter 4 of Cinema 1, Deleuze denes the conditions of natural perception as the anchoring of the perceiving subject in the world with horizons. Movement for phenomenology is related to this anchoring and therefore to existential still poses, that is, a sensible form (Gestalt) which organises the perceptive eld as a function of a situated intentional consciousness (Deleuze 1986, 57). However, even if we agree that in cinematographic perception, which differs from natural perception, the viewers are not anchored in the world shown on screen and are in this sense without conditions, why would this ensure the appearance of movement-images? We saw that for Merleau-Ponty and Laffay, movement in the cinema is indeed different from movement when being in the world and in natural perception (because the screen lacks horizons when the camera moves in to a close-up and because in the cinema the movement of the photographic material adds narration
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to the world unlike our incoherent perception of it when anchored in reality). However, why would this undo the cinematographic illusion? The commentary on phenomenology in Chapter 4 is placed within a comparison with Bergson. According to Deleuze, the Bergsonian deduced subjectivity not only leads to a perception that tears things out of the continuity of reality and is subtractive, as we have already seen, but also creates the false movement of natural perception. The centres that are formed impose xed instantaneous views (Deleuze 1986, 57 58) and Deleuze repeats here the quotation from Bergsons Creative Evolution stating that in natural perception, intellection, and language, we take snapshots as it were of passing reality (Deleuze 1986, 57). He claims that it is the material aspects of sensory motor subjectivity the action-images, affection-images, and perception-images, which are part of his reading of Matter and Memory that replace movement with the assumed end or result of an act, states of bodies, and subjects, objects, and vehicles (59 60 and 65). Like natural perception in phenomenology which is related to existential poses, Bergsonisms action-oriented subtractive perception has no interest in real movement. Rather, it takes characteristic snapshots of reality, immobile sections, and adds abstract time to them. This addition of abstract time is presumably the correction above natural perception that Deleuze refers to at the beginning of Cinema 1. As we know from the transition between the two cinema books, for Deleuze, being a spectator also means being passive. Similarly, for Laffay and Dufrenne, phenomenologists he cites, perception of an aesthetic object (such as in cinematic viewing) is contrasted with being actively engaged in the world.27 Cinematographic perception of the world on screen, which is perception without conditions, is also passive, and it can therefore break with the cinematographic illusion. As Bergson (1911, 306) states, there is no doubt about the altogether practical character of the cinematographic illusion of natural perception. For him, while action only is in question, we are right to pluck out of duration those moments that interest us (273). The snapshots are a result of our orientation toward practice and action. This orientation, however, is suppressed in cinematographic perception in which we are not active in the world that we are perceiving on the screen. Without action, Bergson argues, if our intellect and senses could obtain a direct and disinterested idea of matter, then instead of taking instantaneous views, they would show us that reality is a perpetual becoming, that duration is the very stuff of reality (272). Obtaining such an idea is not an easy endeavour according to Bergson. It requires a painful effort which we can make suddenly, doing violence to our nature, but cannot sustain more than a few moments (237). It goes against the most inveterate habits of the mind and cannot be achieved in one stroke. It is, he maintains, necessarily collective and progressive (192). When Deleuze argues with phenomenology and against Bergson that cinematographic perception differs from natural perception, he is suggesting that cinema is a machine that can take part in this philosophical enterprise. Cinema can
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give the spectator without conditions movement-images at the same time as the image appears because it gives her or him a disinterested perception of a world. Our passivity during cinematic viewing, our break with action-oriented natural perception, allows us to perceive movement-images instead of reducing it to instants with abstract time. It is in this sense that Deleuze (1986, 2) can claim that the movement-image, which is discovered in Matter and Memory beyond the conditions of natural perception, is also available to the spectators of the cinema. Bergson apparently was unable to imagine this option for the cinema, and Deleuze therefore had to turn elsewhere, to the ideas of phenomenology, in order to show how a break with the action-oriented subjectivity described in Matter and Memory can resolve the cinematographic illusion described in Creative Evolution. Nor could phenomenology itself have reached this insight, because according to Deleuze it takes natural perception as its model and hence thinks of movement only in relation to existential poses, leading to its confused attitude when dealing with cinematographic movement. Phenomenologists can describe our enhanced sense perception in the aesthetic experience of things. When dealing with movement, however, because they take natural perception and not the Bergsonian universe of duration and becomings as their model, they cannot conceive real movements even when noting that cinematographic perception goes beyond the habits of our mind or our nature in so far as these are oriented around action. A mere phenomenological account lacks real movements and cannot explain how the cinema gives them to viewers. By combining Bergsons notion of real movements with phenomenologys insight on passive cinematographic perception, Deleuze can argue that cinema itself overcomes the cinematographic illusion and immediately gives movement-images to its spectators who are without conditions. Overeager to enlist Deleuze in a feud about phenomenology, many accounts in lm studies have insisted on either labelling his work as phenomenological or characterising it as using Bergson to oppose phenomenology. The few attempts to combine Deleuze and phenomenology have remained ambiguous and hesitant about the very possibility of theoretically justifying such a union. In contrast, this paper has suggested that we should read Deleuzes commentary not as a critique which sets out to reject phenomenology, but as an elucidation meant to adopt some of phenomenologys insights while distinguishing it from Bergsons approach and pointing out the latters shortcomings. Far from mentioning phenomenology merely to criticise it or creating a straw man that misses much of its potential, Deleuze refers to phenomenology in order to use it to explain how cinema, pace Bergson, gives us real movements. While the overall organising principle of the cinema books does not seem to follow a phenomenological logic, at certain moments it does intersect with phenomenology. In addition, the movement-images are given through the unnatural perception of spectators. In this sense the cinema books are a phenomenology the access to movement-images depends on the spectators experience, not on the mere existence of strips of celluloid or a meditation on
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Bergsons philosophy of images in Matter and Memory,28 although the logic explaining this encounter is as much indebted to the account of movements in Bergsons Creative Evolution as to that of the experience of art and cinema in phenomenology. The cinema books Bergsonism is neither phenomenological nor is it entirely averse to phenomenology as has often been argued. The two approaches can and do meet and forging additional connections between them can be a theoretically sound project. Conclusion I would like to conclude by dealing with an additional ramication of this reading of the cinema books that has to do with whether the books can be extended to contemporary cinema and lmmaking. Can we (and do we need to) extend the books and add an interactive-image, digital image, silicon image, or a third volume, Cinema 3.0?29 As we have seen, for Deleuze the inactive spectators are essential for the appearance of movement-images, since it is their passivity that ensures that their perception of cinematic movements will not be reduced to immobile instants with abstract time. However, while Deleuze, following phenomenology, believes that spectators are both without conditions (not in the world depicted on screen) and passive (not active in the world shown on screen), there is no necessary connection between the two. One could certainly be passive in reality, in the world in which one is in, and, more importantly to us, actively intervene in an on-screen world without being in that world. Deleuze however does not deal with such screen practices. The cinema books are an extremely limited study of moving images and screen practices. They only deal with viewing in which the spectator cannot intervene in the on-screen world. Deleuze shows little interest in other moving-image media that allow greater viewer intervention. He takes great care to clarify that certain modes of viewing lms are not cinema as he understands it. He claims that Bergsons invention of the movement-image in 1896 happened before the ofcial birth of the cinema (Deleuze 1986, 2), so that pre-1897 devices are not ofcially cinema. These include early manually operated peepshow moving-pictures devices like the Kinetoscope and the hand-cranked Mutoscope (see Burch 1990, 233n25 and Williams 1995, 18). Presumably, the spectators who actively operated these machines were too active for their experiences to be included within the category of cinema as Deleuze understands it.30 Similarly, Deleuze (1989, 265) maintains that an analysis of the electronic image, that is, the tele and video image, the numerical image coming into being is beyond our aims and that these new images either had to transform cinema or to replace it. The electronic images, he argues, will have to be based on still another will to art, or on as yet unknown aspects of the time-image (266). Although these media are mentioned in the cinema books, their role is carefully circumscribed and mainly focuses on lmmakers; it does not include interactive viewer experiences.31 Deleuze seems to have no interest here in the way these new media might alter the viewers
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experiences and allow them to actively change the images and movements perceived. He never mentions switching channels on television, or slowing down, accelerating, skipping, repeating, and pausing the ow of images on video, which, as Laura Mulvey (2006, 101) writes, introduce the spectator to a new kind of control over the image and its ow, a process which has its own visual pleasures and rewards (149). To be sure, the viewers who used a Mutoscope in the 1890s or the viewers who switched channels or fast-forwarded a video cassette in the 1980s are not viewers who experience themselves as being in the world that appears on screen. However, they are also not the passive viewers whose actions are in vain since they can act and affect the images on screen. Manipulating what we hear and see on screen is in these cases part of our engagement with the world in a way that is similar to our use of other tools such as giving orders on the phone and pressing a button to unlock a door in another area of a building. Unlike in Laffays account of cinematographic perception, these interactions with the image do not give us the leisure to draw back from our action in the world. When viewers can turn the volume up or down, fast forward the movie, or switch channels, they do seek mastery, unlike their relation with Dufrennes aesthetic object which bewitches and haunts its viewers who do not try to make the object submit to them. While the viewers are not in the world on screen, the screen is not beyond the viewers action and engagement either. It is no surprise that Deleuze does not consider early moving image technologies as cinema and that he writes that the new tele and video (and digital) images are beyond the aims of the books and would either replace or transform cinema. These screen practices do not offer the same break with natural perception and its conditions that cinema offers and which allows Deleuze to argue that the passive viewers, who are not oriented toward action, are given movement-images. This certainly does not foreclose a philosophy that would create the concepts that these and future interactive screen practices give rise to (perhaps making use of Deleuzes concepts in the cinema books or elsewhere). However, the cinema books themselves are based on a passive spectator and their extant framework cannot be extended into these media. By not enabling their extension into interactive media, the books make sure that for those following Deleuze future exploration of these screen practices will require the invention of new concepts. Acknowledgements
For their helpful suggestions and insightful comments, I would like to thank Nir Kedem, the participants of the 2011 Deleuzian Futures conference in Tel Aviv, Warren Buckland, and an anonymous reviewer for the New Review of Film and Television Studies.
Notes
1. In a work from 1988, Gaylyn Studlar simply mentions that in Deleuzes recent (at the time) work on lm he rejects psychoanalysis and turns to a phenomenological approach (Studlar [1988] 1992, 196n2). Vivian Sobchack (1992, 30) reports that
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2.
3. 4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Deleuzes cinema books have been generally identied as a phenomenology of cinema and Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener (2010, 157) state that Deleuze has often been labelled a phenomenologist. Neither Sobchack nor Elsaesser and Hagener give any references to those who have made this assertion about Deleuzes work and both realise it is not an easy connection to make. It has been claimed that in the books Deleuze does not refer himself to phenomenologys founding gures and instead turns to the vitalist life philosophy of Henri Bergson (Elsaesser and Hagener 2010, 158); and that at rst glance Deleuzes relation to phenomenology appears as a strict refusal of the traditional phenomenological model (Guillemet 2010, 96). Indeed, Deleuzes marked aversion to phenomenology, which he dubs our modern scholasticism (Deleuze 1983a, 195), is found throughout his writings. For example, he wonders whether phenomenology is not a prisoner of common sense and the doxa of the traditional Western image of thought continuing its model of recognition (Deleuze 1994, 137 and 320n6); and, lix Guattari, he attacks Husserl and many of his successors for reintroducing with Fe transcendence to the plane of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 46 47). Outside of lm studies, some writers have characterised Deleuzes relation to phenomenology in a more nuanced fashion. His work has been described, for example, as a radicalisation of phenomenology (Colebrook 2002, 60), as an extraction and transformation of certain isolated moments in it (Toscano 2005), and as one in which phenomenology functions as a friend/enemy in a perpetual, incessant sadistic game (Beaulieu 2009). For a further, critical, discussion of her departure from Deleuze into phenomenology, see Perkins (2004) and Elsaesser and Hagener (2010, 125). There is also a relation-image which functions as closure of the deduction and reconstitutes the whole of the movement with all the aspects of the interval (Deleuze 1989, 32). They are not the only one. The cinema books obviously also deal with lms and not just with Bergsonian images. Even if we take Bergson to be the great regulator of the system, references to him are practically non-existent after Chapter 5 of Cinema 2 (Ropars-Wuilleumier 2010, 16). Moreover, despite Deleuzes (1986, ix and xiv) protestations to the contrary, the books seem to offer some kind of historical account of images, their relations with other historical factors, and images of history. There is however little agreement about the logic and cogency of the historical aspects of the cinema books and their relation to the taxonomy of images and signs (see, for example, Bordwell 1997, 116117; Deamer 2009; Elsaesser and Hagener 2010, 160; cs 2000; Marrati 2008, 64 65; Rancie ` re 2006; and Rodowick 2001, 170 202). Kova This could leave us wondering whether Deleuze needs lms. For Hughes (2008, 26), it remains unclear whether the cinema books are a theory of cinema at all. As I will argue later on, our very access to movement-images does depend, in the cinema books, on our experience of the cinema. Deleuzes Bergsonian account of movement-images is not merely a rehearsal of ideas already given in philosophy, but indeed the concepts that cinema gives rise to (Deleuze 1989, 280). However, even in the cases in which the images are closer to the rst regime, an account of subjective perception is not necessarily useless. It can serve as a standard against which the break with everyday human perception (or natural perception) can be evaluated or appreciated. For example, when dealing with the semisubjective perception-image, Deleuze (1986, 72) adds that it is difcult to nd a status for this semi-subjectivity, since it has no equivalent in natural perception. The connection with phenomenology is not mentioned by Deleuze here but it does appear in Merleau-Pontys (1964, 58 59) text.
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9. Deleuze (1986, 56) writes that as far as we know Husserl never mentions the cinema. In a collection of Husserls posthumous texts published in German in 1980, moving images are mentioned several times (Husserl 2005, 66, 584n3, 645, and 646). 10. Sartres LImaginaire (published in English as The Imaginary) does refer to cinema. It mentions the letters of a cinema advert forming themselves on the screen, which Sartre (2004, 76) likens to tracing a gure of eight with the tip of my index nger, thus interestingly drawing an analogy between natural perception/imagination and the cinema. Later on, Sartre again invokes the image of the cinema, when discussing the temporalities of the ux of consciousness and the dream image, and claiming that we are here not in the cinema, where the projection of a lm shot more rapidly gives the impression of slow motion (130), thereby underlining the differences between the cinematic image and the dream consciousness/image. 11. The English translation misspells Laffays name. cit inconsistently as both story and 12. The English translation renders Deleuzes re tale. 13. Laffays notion of the grand imagier is perhaps best known through Christian Metzs (1974, 21) elaboration; see also Gaudreault (2009, esp. 5 6 and 204 n7). 14. Furthermore, Shaviro (1993, 30) contrasts the monstrously prosthetic cinematic perception both with Husserlian bracketing and with sublation and denial by Hegels dialectic, thus forging a connection between phenomenology and Deleuzes worst philosophical enemy. 15. Although it might seem trite, this argument is worth making, since there have been theorists who did maintain that a close connection between natural and cinematic Bazin has been understood as perception exists or should be strived for. Andre making the claim that neo-realism is similar to regular perception, for example by de e Ayfre, who according to Deleuze (1989, 281n1) takes up and develops Ame Bazins thesis to give it a pronounced phenomenological expression. Ayfre (1964, 67 68) suggests that there is a similarity between the way viewers interpret what they see on screen in a lm that conforms to phenomenological realism and the way they bring out the signication of facts in life. Similarly, Hugo Munsterberg can be read as proffering an analogy between lm and mind (Carroll 1988). 16. Or perhaps this passivity should result in affection, insofar as it is dened as an effort that replaces action that has become impossible (Deleuze 1986, 66). 17. Deleuze (1989, 20) calls the sensory motor image of the thing, that is, perceiving . The jamming of the sensory only what is in our interest to perceive, a cliche motor links and the rise of pure optical sound images are not enough to break away s. The image constantly sinks to the state of cliche and the optical-and from cliche . In order to challenge the cliche the optical sound-image can itself become a cliche sound images need to be combined with other forces which will allow the movementimage to grow in dimensions or powers which go beyond space into a time-image, readable image, and thinkable image (21 23). My focus here is not on the shift to thought and time, but on the very appearance of the pure optical sound images. 18. This new logic is not yet the one leading to his discussion of recollection, dream, and time, which Deleuze only reaches later on in Cinema 2. There, he acknowledges a discontinuity with the previous discussion, when he notes that whereas in Cinema 1 he dealt with the rst chapter of Matter and Memory, at this stage, he will deal with the second chapter, which, he writes, introduces a very different point of view (Deleuze 1989, 288n1). This suggests that the earlier discussion, in the transition between the two books, is still meant to be understood as related to Chapter 1 of Matter and Memory with its account of subtractive sensory motor perception that is inseparable from action.
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19. They are not however the only possible source. The idea can for example be reached following existential phenomenological thinking, such as the early work of Martin Heidegger. In Heideggers 1927 Being and Time, he claims that the kind of dealing with things which is closest to us is not bare perceptual cognition, but rather the kind that manipulates things and puts them to use, for example, using a latch when opening a door, or things as equipment when writing, working, sewing, and transportation (Heidegger 2004, 15, 96). Their being, according to Heidegger, is that of readiness-to-hand and the less we just stare, the more we seize, hold, and use, the more unveiledly are they encountered as that which they are (15, 98). Determining the nature of something not as ready-to-hand, but as present-at-hand by observing it, is possible but requires that there be a deciency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully, a holding back from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like (13, 88). In such a mode of holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated (13, 89). Moreover, the presence-at-hand of things can also announce itself and their worldhood can become lit up in certain modes of everyday concern as well: when a thing is unusable, missing, or stands in the way (16, 104). Whereas for Bergson perception depends on use and whatever has no function for our needs is suppressed, for Heidegger a thing is more explicitly and fully perceived when it is not used when we withdraw from our concernful dealings with things, or when our concern is in some way decient and things fall from use. Heidegger is closer than Bergson to Deleuzes idea that an inability to act leads to a gain in an ability to perceive. Signicantly, given Deleuzes analogy with lm viewers, the idea can also be found in writings about the experience of encountering art, such as Emmanuel Levinass 1948 article Reality and its Shadow (1987). Deleuzes argument about a broken action-image bringing about purer perception combines two familiar tropes: a detached or disinterested aesthetic attitude that serves no extrinsic practical end (Danto 1986; Kneller 2012); and a different, perhaps fuller or enhanced, form of perception in the making or experiencing of art or amusement, such as the innocent eye of painters (Ruskin, n.d., 235 236n), a deautomatised or defamiliarised perception in literature (Shklovsky 1988), or intense stimuli and thrills in amusements that break through the everyday blunted perception of an audience exhausted by, or shielding itself against, the overstimulation and shocks of modernity (Singer 2001, 118 124). Any of these, or early Heidegger, seem to me to offer a more convincing framework for Deleuzes argument than his reading of Bergson. Bazins (2005) famous The Ontology of the 20. These ideas can also be found in Andre Photographic Image. It is perhaps no coincidence that his work has also been occasionally labelled as phenomenological. 21. A world for Laffay (1964, 36) is a full set in which things hold each other, in which there is no vacuum, and in which it is impossible to change anything in an instant. el throughout his book and it is most likely 22. Laffay uses the same term irre borrowed from Jean-Paul Sartres (2004) The Imaginary. On the meaning of this term in Sartres work and its relation to Husserls irreal, see the translators notes (Sartre 2004, xxviii). Laffay (1964, 148) explicitly cites Sartres book when discussing actors and his book especially resonates with Sartres (2004, 188 194) consideration of the work of art. 23. As noted above, for Laffay one can also be a witness in the world, but then one merely sees partial and evasive events, never continuity and the whole picture. Cinema, through narration, can rescue the appearance of things from incoherence.
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24. Dufrennes The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience is also mentioned within a discussion of phenomenology in What is Philosophy? (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 231n17). 25. On the sensuous see the translators comment (Dufrenne 1973, xlviii n3). 26. I agree that Deleuze has no explicit conception of the cinema spectator and that nevertheless an implicit theory of spectatorship can be found in the Cinema books (Rushton 2009, 47). The previous section sought to tease out aspects of spectatorship from the transition between the two books. 27. To be precise, Deleuze is not claiming that the spectator is inactive in general. When describing the inverted identication in which the character becomes a kind of spectator, Deleuze does not describe the character as immobile; rather he writes that the character shifts, runs and becomes animated but that this is in vain and that what the character sees and hears is no longer subject to the rules of a response or an action (Deleuze 1989, 3). Similarly, throughout the cinema books, spectators are described as engaging in cognitive and bodily activities: we are told that they know and discover (Deleuze 1986, 201), judge (Deleuze 1989, 139), tremble (Deleuze 1986, 136), and laugh (149). The spectators are active in the world in which the lm is screened, and we can even imagine them talking, eating popcorn, making out, or leaving the movie theatre. However, the spectators are not in the world perceived through the cinema in a way that would enable them to be active within it, to make movements, to act. In this sense, the spectators are passive. Deleuze therefore is not following the notion of the immobile passive spectator from 1970s theories which described spectators trapped in their seats like helpless children or the prisoners in Platos cave, such as Baudry (1985). 28. Moreover, as already noted, Deleuze immediately proceeds with a historical explanation for what he takes to be Bergsons incorrect critique of the cinema. This emphasises that the experience of the viewers is not abstract and universal and that the very existence of the cinematograph certainly does not yet determine what will become of cinema. One concrete viewer a man named Henri Bergson watching specic lms within the specic screening practices of the early 1900s did not understand that cinema gives movement despite being aware of movement-images which he had invented a decade earlier and seemed to have forgotten (Deleuze 1986, 2). The lms and the viewers, then, change historically. The cinematographs movement-image was a potential contained in the xed primitive image, a tendency which still needed to be realised, that is, acted out, by the mobile camera and montage (25). This again emphasises that lms do play a major role in the creation of concepts in the cinema books and that they are not just abstract theorising based on concepts already found in Bergson and other philosophers. Similarly, it might be possible to argue that Deleuze needed Hitchcocks actualisation of the potential of the movement-image in order to come up with his theory of passive lm viewing. 29. For attempts to deal with these images, see, for example, Rodowick (2007), Daly (2010), Rushton (2009, 51 53; 2012, 120ff). 30. Moreover, Deleuze even seems concerned that the action of projecting a lm was too similar to the action of shooting it at the early stages of the cinema when some ` res 1895 Cine matographe, were used apparatuses, such as Auguste and Louis Lumie for both. He writes that at the outset, when cinema still concealed itself and was forced to imitate natural perception, the cinematic apparatus for shooting was combined with the apparatus for projection endowed with a uniform abstract time and that part of cinemas conquering of its essence involved the emancipation of the shooting apparatus which became separate from projection (Deleuze 1986, 3). Perhaps his fear was that with these devices, which doubled as cameras, projectionists would be prone to inuence the lm, for example, by stopping, slowing down,
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accelerating, or reversing its movement in response to the audiences reaction, thus giving viewers too much control (see Tsivian 1998, 52 65; Sklar 1994, 17). 31. Video and electronic imagery can be used by lmmakers, as is the case with Godards use of electronic processing introducing mutation, recurrence and retroaction on written words (Deleuze 1989, 186; on Godards electronic transformations of the scriptural see also 246). Additionally, television made a new stage of the talking lm possible (252) and thus had an effect on cinema, as many other external factors had according to the cinema books (such as the Second World War). However, even in these cases, Deleuze often insists on the primacy of cinema and its great auteurs over television and new technologies. He claims, for example, that television abandoned most of its own creative possibilities, and did not even understand them and therefore needed cinema and its great authors to give it a pedagogical lesson (Deleuze 1989, 252; on the contribution of cinema and its great directors to television, see also Deleuze 1986, x and Deleuze 1989, xii-xiii). Moreover, he claims that there is a dependence on an aesthetic before a dependence on technology and shows how Godard moved in a direction of a screen which functions as an instrument panel even before starting to use video methods and that the autonomy of sound which characterises the new image was already achieved by others through the use of cinematographic methods, or simple video methods, instead of calling on new technologies (267). Similarly, Deleuze mentions a method used by Godard in a lm, which is afterwards transferred to television (179). In addition to the role of these images in lmmaking, Deleuze notes cases in which television (as well as other media) appears within lms, as part of their content (see, for example, Deleuze 1986, 209 and 210).
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Inverted identification: Bergson and phenomenology in Deleuze's cinema books

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