Draft of a paper which will be published in: Second Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology, ed. E. Moriconi.

Pisa: ETS.

Does logic slowly pass away, or has it a future?

Carlo Cellucci

Abstract: The limitations of mathematical logic either as a tool for the foundations of mathematics, or
as a branch of mathematics, or as a tool for artificial intelligence, raise the need for a rethinking of logic. In particular, they raise the need for a reconsideration of the many doors the Founding Fathers of mathematical logic have closed historically. This paper examines three such doors, the view that logic should be a logic of discovery, the view that logic arises from method, and the view that logic is not the whole of reason, and on this basis proposes an alternative approach to logic.

1. Introduction There was a time when mathematical logic was the undisputed paradigm of logic. Thus, in 1931, Carnap stated that, while traditional logic was totally incapable of satisfying the requirement of richness of content, formal rigor and technical utility, mathematical logic is an efficient instrument in the place of the old and useless one (Carnap 1971: 134). Again in 1931, Scholz stated that mathematical logic gives us the complete inferential rules which the development of the tremendously exacting modern mathematics requires (Scholz 1961: 67). That very same year, however, Gdel published his first incompleteness theorem, which suggested that, contrary to Carnaps and Scholzs claims, mathematical logic neither satisfies the requirement of richness of content nor gives us the complete inferential rules which modern mathematics requires. Moreover, mathematical logic limits logic essentially to the study of deduction. This leads to a restricted concept of reason and rationality, because it means that reasoning other than deduction escapes logic. All these facts raise doubts about the role of mathematical logic. Reflecting on this role, van Benthem observes that mathematical logicians show a curiously defensive attitude, ill-fitting their status and achievements. Friendly proposals to extend the classical agenda (we cannot keep singing hymns to Gdel and Tarski forever unless we are already in Heaven) are perceived as threats, to be received with suspicion and sometimes even personal attacks. And innovative agents

provocateurs like Lakatos are subjected to torrents of abuse (van Benthem 2008: 40). I have never been able to understand this defense of the status quo. In particular, I have always found many outspoken critics of mathematical logic (Blanshard, Perelman, Toulmin, Lakatos) extremely interesting and well-worth reading, and a useful reminder of the many doors our Founding Fathers have closed historically doors that could be opened again now (ibid.). Indeed, while opening new doors, mathematical logic has closed many other doors that not only could, but should be opened again now if logic is to remain alive and vital. The paper examines three such doors, the view that logic should be a logic of discovery, the view that logic arises from method, and the view that logic is not the whole of reason. On this basis, it outlines an alternative approach to logic.

2. Logic and Discovery The first door mathematical logic has closed is the view that logic should be a logic of discovery, and hence should provide means to acquire knowledge. Mathematical logic rejects this view. This is clear from Frege, the first Founding Father of the subject, who states that we can inquire, on the one hand, how we have gradually arrived at a given proposition and, on the other, how we can finally provide it with the most secure foundation (Frege 1967: 5). The first question, discovery, is merely subjective, because it may have to be answered differently for different persons, only the second question, justification, is more definite (ibid.). Therefore, logic must concern itself not with the way in which mathematical propositions are discovered but with the kind of ground on which their justification rests (Frege 1959: 23). Thus logic cannot be a logic of discovery and must be a logic of justification. Indeed, the task of logic is to provide a proposition with the most secure foundation, so as to place the truth of a proposition beyond all doubt (ibid.: 2). To this aim, logic must set up laws according to which a judgment is justified by others (Frege 1979: 175). These are the laws of deduction, therefore logic must concern itself with deduction. On the other hand, logic can forgo expressing anything that is without significance for the inferential sequence (Frege 1967: 6).

That is, it can abstain from expressing anything that it is not necessary for setting up the laws of deduction (Frege 1979: 5). Therefore, logic can concern itself only with deduction. Thus everything necessary for a correct inference is expressed in full, but what is not necessary is generally not indicated (Frege 1967: 12). As a result, logic will fail to express all aspects of mathematics. But this is irrelevant, because the task of logic is to provide a proposition with the most secure foundation. Logic is suited to this task, and one must not condemn it because it is not suited to others (ibid.: 6). Hilbert even tries to show that logic can concern itself only with deduction by trivializing the question of discovery. Indeed, on the one hand, he states that there is no question of discovering the axioms because the axioms can be taken quite arbitrarily (Hilbert 2004, 563). They are only subject to the condition that the application of the given axioms can never lead to contradictions (Hilbert 1996a, 1093). On the other hand, he states that the question of discovering demonstrations of mathematical propositions from given axioms is a purely mechanical business, because of the decidability of a mathematical question in a finite number of operations (Hilbert 1996b, 1113).

3. Aristotles View of Logic The view of mathematical logic, that logic can be only a logic of justification, contrasts with Aristotles view, that logic should primarily be a logic of discovery. Syllogism can be seen in a twofold manner: as a means of obtaining conclusions from given premises, so a means of justification, or as a means of obtaining premises for given conclusions, so a means of discovery. Syllogism seen as a means of obtaining conclusions from given premises is the conception the deductivist view of syllogism attributes to Aristotle (see, for example, Boger 2004). This view is based on the first 26 Chapters of the first book of Prior Analytics, where Aristotle describes the morphology of syllogism. But then, in Chapter 27, Aristotle states: Now it is time to tell how we will always find syllogisms on any given subject, and by what method we will find the premises about each thing. For surely one ought not only to investigate how

syllogisms are constituted, but also to have the ability to produce them (Aristotle, Analytica Priora, A 27, 43 a 2024). In order to produce them, one must indicate how to reach for premises concerning any problem proposed, in the case of any discipline whatever (ibid., B 1, 53 a 12.). That is, one must indicate, for any given conclusion, how to reach for premises from which that conclusion can be deduced. From this it is apparent that, for Aristotle, syllogism is primarily a means of discovery. While, according to the deductivist view, syllogism is a means of obtaining conclusions from given premises, for Aristotle it is a means of obtaining premises for given conclusions, thus a means for solving problems. Therefore Aristotles view of syllogism is a heuristic view. For this reason Aristotle says that, while arguments are made from premises, the things with which syllogisms are concerned are problems (Aristotle, Topica, A 4, 101 b 1516). By this he means that the thing with which syllogisms are concerned is solving problems. Consistently with this view, in Chapters 2731 of the first book of Prior Analytics Aristotle describes a heuristic procedure for finding premises to solve problems. The medievals called this procedure inventio medii [discovery of the middle term] because it is essentially a procedure for finding the middle term of a syllogism, given the conclusion. (For a description of such procedure, see Cellucci 2013: Chapter 7).

4. Aristotles Analytic-Synthetic Method That, for Aristotle, syllogism is primarily a means of discovery depends on the fact that he develops his theory of syllogism as a tool for the method of science, which he identifies with the analytic-synthetic method. (Note that Aristotles analyticsynthetic method is not to be confused with Pappus analytic-synthetic method, see Cellucci 2013: Chapter 5). Inventio medii is one of the two procedure by means of which premises are obtained in Aristotles analytic-synthetic method. The other one is induction. In order to state Aristotles analytic-synthetic method we need first recall some of his views about science. For Aristotle, each thing belongs to some kind. Each

science is concerned with one and only one kind, because a science is one if it is

concerned with one kind (Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, A 28, 87 a 38). For example, arithmetic is concerned with units, geometry with points and lines. Each science is based on principles that must be in the same kind as the things demonstrated (ibid., A 28, 87 b 23). Principles are given once for all and must be not only true but also known to be true, otherwise we could not have scientific knowledge of what follows from them, absolutely and properly ( ibid., A 3, 72 b 14). Then, Aristotles analytic-synthetic method is the method according to which, to solve a given problem of a certain kind, one must find premises of that kind from which a solution to the problem can be deduced. The premises are obtained from the conclusion either by syllogism or by induction (Aristotle, Topica, 1, 155 b 35 36). That is, they are obtained from the conclusion either by inventio medii or by induction. The premises must be plausible, that is, the arguments for them must be stronger than those against them. Therefore, in order to see whether a premise is plausible, one must examine the arguments for it and the arguments against it (Aristotle, Topica, 14, 163 a 37b 1). If the premises thus obtained are not principles of the kind in question, one must look for new premises of that kind from which the previous premises can be deduced. The new premises are obtained from the previous premises either by inventio medii or by induction and must be plausible. And so on, until one arrives at premises which are principles of the kind in question. Then the process terminates. This is analysis. At this point one tries to see whether, inverting the order of the steps followed in analysis, one may obtain a deduction of the conclusion from the principles of the kind in question. This is synthesis. When synthesis is successful, this yields a solution to the problem. Then Aristotles analytic-synthetic method can be schematically represented as follows.

Principle

A2 Analysis A1 Problem to solve Synthesis

Note that, as Kant points out, plausibility is not to be confused with probability. Indeed, plausibility is concerned with whether, in the cognition, there are more grounds for the thing than against it (Kant 1992, 331). Conversely, probability is a fraction, whose denominator is the number of all the possible cases, and whose numerator contains the number of winning cases ( ibid., 328). Plausibility rests merely on the subject, while probability rests on the object ( ibid., 153). Plausibility is not a mathematical concept, while there is a mathematics of probability (ibid., 331). (On Kants distinction between plausibility and probability, see Capozzi 2002: Chapter 7, Section 5, and Chapter 15).

5. A Paradigm Change in Logic Since, as it has been said in Section 3, for Aristotle syllogism is primarily a means of discovery, for him logic should be primarily a logic of discovery. This shows how inadequate is the widespread view that mathematical logic is an extension of Aristotles logic merely because it is capable of dealing with relations, while Aristotles logic can only deal with properties. This view is put forward, for example, by Carnap who states that the new logic is distinguished from the old because the new logic is able to deal with the theory of relational sentences, while the only form of statements (sentences) in the old logic was the predicative form: Socrates is a man, All (or some) Greeks are men (Carnap 1971: 137). This view is inadequate, because the change from Aristotles logic to mathematical logic is not merely a change from properties to relations but rather a paradigm change. While, for Aristotle, logic is to be a logic of discovery, Frege rejects the view that that logic should concern itself with discovery. He considers the

question of discovery as a merely subjective one, and restricts logic to justification and the study of deduction. Thus Frege brings a paradigm change in logic with respect to Aristotle. (A different interpretation of Frege is put forward by Macbeth 2005, 2014). That mathematical logic brings a paradigm change in logic with respect to Aristotle is something of which the Founding Fathers of mathematical logic not only were fully aware, but even boasted about. Thus Russell states that any person in the present day who wishes to learn logic will be wasting his time if he reads Aristotle (Russell 1967: 202). With respect to Aristotle, mathematical logic introduced the same kind of advance into philosophy as Galileo introduced into physics (Russell 2009: 48). This shows that the expectations of the Founding Fathers on mathematical logic were very high indeed.

6. Logic and Method Another door that mathematical logic has closed is the view that logic arises from method. Mathematical logic rejects this view, as it is clear from Frege, who states that logic is not concerned with the question of how men think, which is subjective and psychological, but rather with the question of how they must think (Frege 1979: 149). The laws of logic prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think at all (Frege 1964: 12). Since the laws of logic prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think, logic is a precondition of method and hence cannot arise from method. But the claim that the laws of logic prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think is unrealistic. As Dewey points out, thus logic is elevated into the supreme and legislative science only to fall into the trivial estate of keeper of such statements as A is A (Dewey 2004: 76). Moreover, the conclusion that logic is a precondition of method, and hence cannot arise from method, contrasts with the fact that, as again Dewey states, as the methods of the sciences improve, corresponding changes take place in logic (Dewey 1938: 14).

A first example of the fact that, as the methods of the sciences improve, corresponding changes take place in logic, is provided by Aristotles logic that, as we have seen in Section 4, originated as a tool for Aristotles method of science, Aristotles analytic-synthetic method. Another example is provided by Bacons and Descartes attempts to develop a new logic as a tool for the method of the new science originating from the Scientific Revolution. Bacon wants to develop a new logic aimed at the discovery of arts, and not of inferences from principles (Bacon 19611986: I, 135). The new logic will be based on the true method, which consists of two parts: the first one is about how to educe and form axioms from experience (ibid.: I, 235). This is the concern of induction. The second part is about how to deduce or derive new experiments from axioms (ibid.). This is the concern of deduction. Descartes wants to develop a new logic which will teach one to direct his reason to discover the truths of which one is ignorant (Descartes 1996: IX2, 13 14). The new logic will be based on the true method. We shall comply with it exactly if we will gradually reduce convoluted and obscure propositions to simpler one (ibid.: X, 379). Thus we will eventually arrive at the simplest of all propositions, which can be intuited first and per se, independently of any other one (ibid.: X, 383). This is analysis. Then, from the intuition of the simplest of all propositions, we will try to ascend through the same steps to a knowledge of all the others (ibid.: X, 379). For all the others can be perceived only by deducing them from those (ibid.: X, 383). This is synthesis. Thus the method is twofold, one by analysis, the other by synthesis (ibid.: VII, 155). Admittedly, the new logics that Bacon and Descartes developed have not been very successful but this is irrelevant here. What is relevant is that they originated as a tool for the method of the new science.

7. Logic and Reason A further door mathematical logic has closed is the view that logic is not the whole of reason.

Mathematical logic rejects this view, as it is clear from Frege who states that, if beings were even found whose laws of thought flatly contradicted the laws of logic, I should say: we have here a hitherto unknown type of madness (Frege 1964: 14). Thus, according to Frege, beings are rational only insofar as they obey the laws of logic, therefore logic is the whole of reason, or at least a necessary condition for reason. Now, that logic is a necessary condition of reason is unjustified, because it excludes feelings and emotions from the sphere of reason and rationality, so that any human act influenced by feelings and emotions will be termed as irrational. This contrasts with the fact that, as Damasio points out, certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality (Damasio 1995: xiii). For example, patients suffering a damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex generally preserve intellectual abilities but have an abnormality in their processes of emotion so severe that they are unable to decide advantageously on matters pertaining to their own lives. In fact, emotions help us to make appropriate decisions on matters pertaining to our lives, and hence they are not opposite to rationality but indispensable to it. They help us to make appropriate decisions also on matters concerning knowledge acquisition, because they may affect us both in the choice of problems and in the choice of hypotheses for solving problems (see Cellucci 2013: Chapter 15).

8. The Failure of the Task of Mathematical Logic As it has been stated in Section 5, by restricting logic to the question of justification, Frege brought a paradigm change in logic with respect to Aristotle. For him, the task of logic was to provide a proposition with the most secure foundation. In the Thirties, however, Gdels incompleteness theorems showed that this task could not be realized. By Gdels first incompleteness theorem, mathematics cannot consist of deductions from given axioms, and, by Gdels second incompleteness theorem, axioms cannot be shown to be consistent by absolutely reliable means. Also Hilberts attempt to trivialize the question of discovery failed. On the one hand, as it has been just stated, by Gdels second incompleteness theorem,

arbitrarily taken axioms cannot be shown to be consistent by absolutely reliable means. On the other hand, by the undecidability theorem, for any consistent, sufficiently strong, deductive theory, there is no mechanical procedure for deciding whether or not a mathematical proposition can be demonstrated from the axioms of the theory. These failures, however, did not lead to a complete rethinking of logic. The only effect they had on mathematical logic was that the latter was developed into a more and more mathematical discipline, so much so that Curry states: Mathematical logic, then, is a branch of mathematics (Curry 1977, 2). Of course, this involved giving up the ambition to contribute to the philosophical understanding of the foundations of mathematics. But the usefulness of logic as a mathematical discipline was expected to compensate for this renunciation. However, the attempt to develop mathematical logic into a more and more mathematical discipline has not been very successful. As Wang points out, although today, as practiced, mathematical logic is but a special branch of mathematics, it is not often regarded as a very central branch (Wang 1974: 21).

9. Fefermans Vindication of Mathematical Logic Despite the failure of mathematical logic to realize the task of providing a proposition with the most secure foundation, and despite the marginal value of mathematical logic when developed into a branch of mathematics, some mathematical logicians have attempted a vindication of the subject. Thus Feferman states that mathematical logic comes much closer to explaining our everyday mathematical experience than physics does to explaining our everyday physical experience (Feferman 1998: 92). It gives us a good underlying analysis of the structure of completed proofs (no gaps, no unsure assumptions or steps) (ibid.). It explains what constitutes the underlying content of mathematics and what is its organizational and verificational structure ( ibid.). And though formal systems are not normally conceived to represent slices of mathematics in a frozen state, one can use these systems to model mathematical growth and change (ibid.).

Fefermans vindication, however, is unconvincing. Mathematical logic does not come close to explaining our everyday mathematical experience, because real proofs do not usually consist in deductions from axioms. As Hersh says, the view that mathematics is in essence derivations from axioms is backward. In fact, its wrong (Hersh 1997: 6). Therefore, mathematical logic does not give a good underlying analysis of the structure of proofs. Moreover, by Gdels first incompleteness theorem, mathematical logic is unable to explain the organizational structure of mathematics, and by Gdels second incompleteness theorem is unable to explain the verificational structure of mathematics. It is also inappropriate to claim that one can use formal systems to model mathematical growth and change. This claim is meant to suggests that although, by Gdels first incompleteness theorem, mathematics cannot be exhausted by any single formal system, it can be represented by a sequence of formal systems, and such sequence can model mathematical growth and change. But then, as Curry points out, mathematical proof would be that sort of growing thing which the intuitionists have postulated for certain infinite sets (Curry 1977: 15). This is incompatible with the axiomatic method, according to which proof is a fixed thing. Now, Feferman states that, once the axioms and basic concepts are granted, all else in mathematics is obtained by logical argument (Feferman 2003: 3). Thus, according to Feferman, the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method. Since the view that mathematical proof is a growing thing is incompatible with the axiomatic method, it follows that mathematical growth and change cannot be modeled by a sequence of formal systems.

10. Kowalskis Proposal for Revitalizing Logic The failure of mathematical logic to realize the task of providing a proposition with the most secure foundation, and the marginal value of mathematical logic when developed into a branch of mathematics, have also led to seek a new role for mathematical logic, for example in Artificial Intelligence. Thus Kowalski states that, for most of the latter half of the twentieth century, mathematical logic was the mainstream of Articial Intelligence. But then it all

went wrong. Articial Intelligence researchers, frustrated by the lack of progress, blamed many of their problems on the logic-based approach, and began to develop other approaches, that were designed to simulate directly the neurological mechanisms of animal and human intelligence (Kowalski 2001: 2). Thus logic seemed to be dying (ibid.). The question is: Is logic really dead or only just sleeping? (ibid.). To save logic from death, Kowalski proposes to embed it in an observationthought-decision-action cycle: Repeatedly, observe the world, think, decide what actions to perform, act (Kowalski 2011: 95). In this cycle, below the logical level, perceptual processes transform raw sensations into observations, and motor processes transform conceptual representations of actions into raw physical activity (ibid.: 124). At the logical level, logic takes care of thinking and deciding what actions to perform. According to Kowalski, embedding logic in an observationthought-decision-action cycle provides a more realistic framework, not only for logic as a descriptive theory of how humans actually think, but also for logic as a prescriptive theory of how humans and computers can reason more eectively. With such a more realistic framework, even if logic might be only half awake today, it can at worst be only sleeping, to come back with renewed and more lasting vigour in the near future (Kowalski 2001: 3). Kowalskis proposal, however, is unconvincing. First, Kowalski assigns only deduction to the logical level, neglecting induction and generally non-deductive inference. Now, Gillies states that the current development of computers and artificial intelligence is destined to change science, and in such a way that Baconian induction becomes a standard part of scientific procedure (Gillies 1996: 69). Commenting on this statement, Kowalski says that he himself has neglected this aspect of Computational Logic (Kowalski 2011: 228). But thus Kowalski overlooks that most inferences we make are not deductive (McDermott 2001: 67). In particular, inferences involved in discovery are not deductive because deductive inferences are non-ampliative, while discovery essentially involves going beyond the data.

Secondly, Kowalski assigns perceptual processes to a non-logical level. This does not explain why the images in our mind are so rich while the stimuli from which they are obtained are poor. The mind integrates these stimuli producing a sensory experience full of color, sound, and texture, so perception is inference, specifically non-deductive inference. In particular, according to von Helmholtz, the formation of our sense-perceptions is the result of inductive conclusions unconsciously formed (von Helmholtz 1962: III, 2627).

11. Towards an Alternative Perspective on Logic In view of the limitations of mathematical logic, it seems legitimate to say that, if logic is to have a future, an alternative perspective on logic is necessary. In what follows I will briefly outline such alternative perspective. My brief outline only indicates a way to move ahead, it does not exclude that there could be different ways that might also be fruitful, although at the moment I do not quite see them. The alternative perspective I want to propose is partly implicit in Aristotles view that logic should primarily be a logic of discovery. Aristotles approach, however, requires a basic change, because Aristotles analytic-synthetic method is incompatible with Gdels incompleteness theorems. Indeed, as we have seen in Section 4, according to Aristotle principles must be in the same kind as the things demonstrated. But, by Gdels first incompleteness theorem, for any consistent sufficiently strong principles of a given kind, there are truths of that kind which cannot be demonstrated from those principles, their demonstration may require principles of other kinds. Therefore, Aristotles analyticsynthetic method is incompatible with Gdels first incompleteness theorem. Moreover, again as we have seen in Section 4, according to Aristotle the principles by means of which a problem is to be solved must be known to be true. But, by Gdels second incompleteness theorem, for any consistent, sufficiently strong principles, the principles cannot be known to be true, because they cannot be shown to be such by absolutely reliable means. Therefore, Aristotles analyticsynthetic method is incompatible with Gdels second incompleteness theorem.

In view of this, the method of solving problems cannot be identified with Aristotles analytic-synthetic method.

12. The Analytic Method Fortunately, since antiquity, another method is known which is compatible with Gdels incompleteness theorems, the analytic method. The latter is the method according to which, to solve a problem, one looks for some hypothesis that is a sufficient condition for solving it. The hypothesis is obtained from the problem, and possibly other data already available, by some nondeductive rule. The hypothesis need not be of the same kind as the problem, and must be plausible in the sense explained in Section 4. But the hypothesis is in its turn a problem that must be solved, and is solved in the same way. That is, one looks for another hypothesis that is a sufficient condition for solving the problem posed by the previous hypothesis, it is obtained from the latter, and possibly other data already available, by some non-deductive rule, it need not be of the same kind as the problem, and must be plausible. And so on, ad infinitum. Thus solving a problem is a potentially infinite process. Then the analytic method can be schematically represented as follows.

Plausible Hypotheses

A2 Analysis A1

Problem to solve

In the analytic method there are no principles, everything is a hypothesis. The problem and the other data already available are the only basis for solving the problem. The analytic method is compatible with Gdels first incompleteness theorem. For in such method the solution to a problem is obtained from the problem, and possibly other data already available, by means of hypotheses which are not necessarily of the same kind as the problem. Since Gdels first incompleteness

theorem implies that solving a problem of a certain kind may require hypotheses of other kinds, Gdels result even provides evidence for the analytic method. The analytic method is also compatible with Gdels second incompleteness theorem. For in such method the hypotheses for the solution to a problem, being only plausible, are not absolutely certain. Since Gdels second incompleteness theorem implies that no solution to a problem can be absolutely certain, Gdels result even provides evidence for the analytic method. In view of this, it seems reasonable to claim that the method of solving problems can be identified with the analytic method.

13. Rules for Finding Hypotheses The non-deductive rules by means of which hypotheses are obtained in the analytic method are not a closed set, given once for all. Rather, they are an open set which can always be extended as research develops. In any case, such rules will at least include induction, analogy, generalization, specialization, metaphor, metonymy, definition, and diagrams (see Cellucci 2013: Chapters 20 and 21). Which kind of non-deductive rule is to be used to find a hypothesis for solving a given problem depends on the problem, and possibly other data already available. The problem and the other data, however, do not uniquely determine which nondeductive rule is to be used. Different non-deductive rules may be used to solve one and the very same problem. This is a basic feature of the analytic method. Moreover, which non-deductive rules is to be used may be positively influenced by feelings and emotions.

14. Science as an Open System From what it has been said above it is clear that there is a basic difference between the analytic method and Aristotles analytic-synthetic method. In terms of Aristotles analytic-synthetic method, a science is a closed system. For it is based on principles that are given once for all, and its development consists in deducing conclusions from them. Since deduction is non-ampliative, a science is implicitly contained in its principles.

On the contrary, in terms of the analytic method, a science is an open system. For it initially consists only of the problem to be solved, and possibly other data already available, and its development consists in obtaining more and more hypotheses for solving the problem from the problem itself, and possibly other data already available, by non-deductive rules. Since non-deductive rules are ampliative, a science is not implicitly contained in the problem or in the other data already available.

15. Analytic Method and Knowledge In Section 12 it has been stated that it seems reasonable to claim that the method of solving problems can be identified with the analytic method. Now, knowledge is the result of solving problems. Then it seems reasonable to claim that knowledge is the result of solving problems by the analytic method. By knowledge I mean not only scientific knowledge but also everyday knowledge, that is, the kind of knowledge which is necessary for the everyday management of life, starting with survival. Indeed, there is continuity between scientific and everyday knowledge. Scientific knowledge can be seen as an extension of everyday knowledge. In particular, scientific knowledge can be seen as an extension of the activities by which our remotest ancestors solved their survival problem. Such activities, and those underlying scientific knowledge, are both essentially based on the same method, the analytic method. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors solved their survival problem by means of the analytic method, making hypotheses about the location of predators or prey on the basis of crushed or bent grass and vegetation, bent or broken branches or twigs, mud displaced from streams, and so on. That scientific knowledge is an extension of everyday knowledge is related to the fact that they are both ways of dealing with the world. The world is an aleatory, unstable and unsafe place, its dangers are irregular, and human beings can survive in it only using everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge.

16. An Alternative Logic Paradigm

What has been said above suggests an alternative logic paradigm, based on the view that logic is to provide means for acquiring knowledge. Logic can actually provide such means because it can provide non-deductive rules by means of which one may find hypotheses for solving problems in the analytic method. The alternative logic paradigm also includes deductive rules, but their role is not a primary one because, as it has been mentioned in section 10, most inferences we make are not deductive. The alternative logic paradigm yields a new view of the relation of logic to discovery. While, according to mathematical logic, logic cannot provide means of discovery, according to the alternative logic paradigm, logic can provide means of discovery. They consist of the analytic method and the non-deductive rules by means of which hypotheses are obtained in such method. Also, the alternative logic paradigm yields a new view of the relation of logic to method. While, according to mathematical logic, logic does not originate from method, according to the alternative logic paradigm, logic arises from method, because it is developed to implement the analytic method. Finally, the alternative logic paradigm yields a new view of the relation of logic to reason. While, according to mathematical logic, logic is the whole of reason, according to the alternative logic paradigm, logic is not the whole of reason, because the choice of hypotheses for solving a problem is not uniquely determined by the problem and the other data already available. It can be positively influenced by feelings and emotions, so feelings and emotions are part of reason.

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