YU

V.

JUDGE TATAD

GR No. 170979, February 9, 2011Brion, J. Facts In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner of estafa.On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuantto our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of 15 days from November 3, 2005,the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file anotice of appeal.On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 dayslate, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for theissuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC fromacting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision Issues: 1.Whether the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases. Held: 1. YES. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of afresh period to appeal sho uld equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons: First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted fromthe notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure andSection 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded,mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar aslegal results are concerned. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminalcases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved apurely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for reviewfrom the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Proceduregoverning appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminalcases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3,2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial. WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED . Miranda vs. TuliaoG.R. # 158763, March 31, 2006 Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodiesof Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the witnessprotection program.2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentencedthem 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being atlarge. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein petitionerMiranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaintfor murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitionersand SPO2 Maderal.Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall orquash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumalian noted the absence of petitionersand issued a Joint order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed theresolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ.The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing theJoint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed apetition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad fromfurther proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolutiongranting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing theinformation against the petition.Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion tothe CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminalcases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdictionof the court Held: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners.It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such aswarrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It isonly when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicialrelief.