Electric Shock Final Report

Electric Shock Prevention Project Final Report
Electric shock prevention project
1 Table Of Contents
1 2 3 3.1
3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5
TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY List of recommendations

Fit For Purpose equipment Competency of people doing electrical work and welding Procedures Management systems Legislation
I 1 2 2
2 3 3 4 4
4 4.1 4.2 5 5.1

5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3
ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS Abbreviations Definitions INTRODUCTION Electric shock

Effects of electric shock Types of electric shock Causes of shock
5 5 5 7 7
7 7 8
5.2
5.2.1 5.2.2
Assessment project
Terms of reference The project team
8
9 9
6 6.1 6.2 6.3 7 7.1 7.2 7.3

7.3.1 7.3.2
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT Electrical inspectors Philosophy of operation Electrical engineering safety METHODOLOGY Referenced documents Electric shock victim management procedure Management of electrical engineering safety
Risk management Ownership of electrical work
10 10 10 11 12 12 13 13
13 13
7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13
AS 3000 and AS 3007 audits Competence Commissioning and testing Electrical maintenance Portable apparatus Isolation Welding Site compliance inspections Process Actions i
13 13 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 15
NSW Department of Mineral Resources
Electric shock prevention project
8 8.1 8.2 8.3

8.3.1 8.3.2
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Role of electricity in mining Procedure for the management of victims of electric shock Management of electrical engineering safety
Risk management Ownership of electrical engineering safety
16 16 16 17
17 17
8.4 8.5
8.5.1
AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 audits Competency standards

Knowledge and Training
17 18
19
8.6
8.6.1
Commissioning and testing

Test equipment
19
20
8.7 8.8 8.9

8.9.1
Maintenance Portable Electrical Apparatus Isolation

Internal isolation
21 24 28
29
8.10 8.11
8.11.1 8.11.2 8.11.3
Welding Site compliance inspections

Risk of direct contact Risk of indirect contact Fit for purpose electrical equipment
30 34
34 39 41
9 9.1 9.2
9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.2.4 9.2.5
LEGISLATION Differences between mining and non mining electrical installations Legislative models for electrical engineering safety
NSW non mining workplace NSW coal mines NSW metalliferous and extractive mines and quarries Comparison of models Standards of Engineering Practice
56 56 57
57 57 58 58 58
10 10.1 10.2 10.3

10.3.1 10.3.2 10.3.3 10.3.4
LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A: List of Figures Appendix B: Electric Shock Statistics Appendix C: Assessment Statistics
Procedures Equipment Inspections Knowledge of Electricity Workers Enforcement Actions
60 61 64 68
70 73 75 75
10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9
Appendix D: Case Study 1 Appendix E: Case Study 2 Appendix F: Case Study 3 Appendix G: Extracts from AS3859 Appendix H: Extract from Coal Mines (General) Regulation Appendix I: Extract from the General Rule 2000
76 79 83 89 91 92 94
10.10 Appendix J: DMR assessment document
ii
Electric Shock Prevention Project
2 Acknowledgments
The authors wish to acknowledge the following bodies whose support contributed to the success of the project: The management and field officers of the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) who assisted in conducting the assessments. The mine managers and mine engineers whose high level of cooperation with the mine safety officers (MSOs) conducting the assessments contributed largely to the success of the project. The Hunter Industrial Electrical Safety Network (HIESN), a working group constituted for the sharing of safety information and learning. The authors wish to acknowledge HIESN, and in particular member institutions BHP Billiton and Incitec, for their willingness to share knowledge and experience and guidance documents such as the Electric Shock Victim Management Protocols.
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3 Executive summary
The DMR identified an emerging problem of electric shocks at NSW mines and developed a systematic program to identify the issues. This program has shown that: Industry performance is well below DMR expectations because a significant amount of equipment is not fit for the purpose for which it is being used. This fitness for purpose begins at the design and carries on through installation and commissioning, operation, maintenance, modification, decommissioning and finally disposal. Some important procedures do not exist, some are not known to all people on site and, in some cases, are not complied with. The training and skill levels of electricity workers have not kept up to date with contemporary requirements. Prevention of electric shock is based on multiple barriers being present. The project has shown that these barriers to preventing electric shock are often absent. When all the barriers are absent, the result is an electric shock. This absence of multiple barriers shows a failure of mine management systems. This failure of management systems is shown by the fact that: A number of mining operations have not identified electricity as a serious hazard Good electrical engineering practice is not always a prime consideration The number of non-conformances shows that a number of mines have not paid high regard to complying with legislation The following section 3.1 summarises the recommendations made in respect to the electrical safety of all workers at mining operations.
3.1 List of recommendations

3.1.1 Fit For Purpose equipment Refer Section 8.4 (p18)
All mines carry out a comprehensive AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 audit on all surface electrical installations. Rank any nonconformances according to the risk and prepare a schedule for the rectification work to be carried out over a reasonable time frame. Particular attention should be paid to: Ensuring earthing requirements of AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 are met Targeting the risk of electric shock due to direct and indirect contact Ensuring the tests detailed in AS/NZS 3000 Section 6 are carried out on all electrical installations where required by AS/NZS 3000 and records of such tests are retained at the mine for future reference
Refer Section 8.11.2 (p40) Refer Section 8.4 (p18) Section 8.11.1 (p38) Refer Section 8.6 (p20)
Signs and notices at all electrical installations should be checked to ensure that the requirements of the Coal Mines (General) Regulations, AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 are complied with.
Refer Section 8.11.3.2.4 (p50)
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Welding equipment must be in a fit for purpose state, and voltage reduction device (VRD) units should be fitted to the output of welding machines where the voltage is above extra low voltage.
Refer Section 8.10 (p34)
Consider the fitting of residual current devices (RCDs) to all lighting Refer Section 8.11.2.4 circuits, socket outlets and control circuits to field devices that (p40) operate at low voltage. Workers doing electrical work have access to suitable test equipment Refer Section 8.6.1 that has an adequate safety rating. (p20) Review the means for isolation that are present on site with due regard to the risk to the operator while carrying out isolation. 3.1.2 Competency of people doing electrical work and welding Refer Section 8.5 (p19) Refer Section 8.9.1 (p29)
All mines should detail requirements for the competency of electricity workers on site. The requirements should contain those competency elements that relate to all aspects of electrical engineering safety and standards compliance. In particular: Implement a structured training program aimed to refresh the skills of electricity workers in the area of AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 compliance People who do electrical work are sufficiently trained so that they are capable of determining the suitability of the instrument for the circuit under test 3.1.3 Procedures
Refer Section 8.5.1 (p19) Refer Section 8.6.1 (p20)
Mines should develop and implement a procedure detailing the steps necessary to ensure that all victims of electric shock are provided with transport for professional medical assessment that includes a 12 lead ECG. Mines should review procedures for the safe use and maintenance of portable tools and leads. The procedures should consider the adoption of the manufacturers safety directions, AS/NZS 3760 and AS/NZS 3012, and make particular reference to requirements for wet areas.
Refer Section 8.2 (16)
Refer Section 8.8 (p27)
Isolation procedures should contain detailed steps for testing for zero Refer Section 8.9 energy. (p29) Mines should review their welding practices to ensure that they comply with the requirements of AS 1674.2. Refer Section 8.10 (p34)
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3.1.4
Management systems Refer Section 8.3 (p17) Refer Section 8.3 (p17) Refer Section 8.7 (p24)
Mines should recognise electricity as a serious hazard. Mines should implement engineering risk controls using a management system approach consistent with AS 4081. Mines should reassess their maintenance strategy to ensure that it covers standards compliance and pays particular attention to: The identification of direct contact risk The regular testing of earth continuity Regular insulation resistance testing, and A testing program aimed to ensure that electrical protection systems are set correctly and functional 3.1.5 Legislation
Future revisions to mining regulations for both the coal and the metalliferous and extractive sectors should: Require the development, implementation and monitoring of standards of engineering practice and that a clear definition of standards of engineering practice be developed to cover the life cycle of the equipment Require records of tests required by AS 3000 to be retained at the mine
Refer Section 9.2.5 (p59)
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4 Abbreviations and definitions

The following abbreviations are used throughout this report.
4.1 Abbreviations
AS CMRA DMR ESA ESEIR GR2000 HBA HBR HIESN IEC IEE IP MIA MSO OHSA OHSR PPE RCD SEP SMP SWP VRD Australian Standard Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982 NSW Department of Mineral Resources Electricity Safety Act 1945 Electricity Safety (Electrical Installations) Regulation 1998 General Rule 2000 Home Building Act 1989 Home Building Regulations 1997 Hunter Industrial Electrical Safety Network International Electrotechnical Commission Inspector of Electrical Engineering - DMR Ingress Protection rating Mines Inspection Act 1901 Mine Safety Officer - DMR Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 Personal Protective Equipment Residual Current Device (Safety Switch) Standards of Engineering Practice Safety Management Plan Safe Work Procedure Voltage Reduction Device
4.2 Definitions
Standards of engineering practice Standards of Engineering Practice (SEP) are prescribed for the coal mining industry in the Coal Mines (General) Regulation 1999 (CMRA) and inferred in the General Rule 2000 (GR2000). There is no definition for SEP in legislation. For the purposes of this report the following working description has been adopted. A document or set of documents that set the minimum acceptable engineering standards for all electrical equipment, activities and competencies at a mining operation. It details the minimum acceptable criteria for the design, manufacture, installation, commissioning, use, maintenance, modification, decommissioning and disposal of electrical equipment.
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The term SEP is used throughout the document in both the legislative and generic sense. Because the authors believe that SEPs are fundamental to achieving a structured approach to electrical engineering safety there has been no distinction made in the way it has been applied to either the coal or metalliferous and extractive mining sectors. Pole filler A device used for blanking off unused circuit breaker positions in distribution boards. Such devices provide protection against direct contact by providing an ingress protection of IP2X. Ingress protection The level of physical protection afforded by a piece of electrical equipment. This is concerned with protection against the inadvertent entry of personnel and the entry of water and dust that may adversely affect the safe operation of the equipment. The levels of ingress protection are detailed in AS 1939-1990 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures for electrical equipment (IP Code).
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5 Introduction
The mining industry has previously had a good record with regards to the number of electrocutions, with the last death in the NSW mining industry occurring on 13 October 1992. There have been 119 incidents of electric shock reported in the period 1 September 1999 to 30 June 2002, the period covered by the electric shock statistics in this report (eg Appendix B). This number had risen to 153 by 30 March 2003. The number of reported electric shocks is at an unacceptable level and shows no indication of declining. The DMR developed a program to assess and improve electrical engineering safety performance in the NSW mining industry.
5.1 Electric shock

5.1.1 Effects of electric shock
The effects of electric shock are described in the Australian Standard: AS 3859-1991 Effects of current passing through the human body (See Appendix G for extracts from AS 3859). (Note: In late 2002, AS/NZS60479.1 Effects of current on human beings and livestock replaced this standard.) It is generally known that the human body depends for its survival on oxygen being transported to the brain. The lungs take oxygen into the blood that is pumped to the brain and other parts of the body by the heart. Life will be under threat should the normal function of either the heart or lungs be disrupted. The magnitude and the effect of an electric shock depend on the current passing through the body. Relatively low levels of voltage and current can be lethal. Voltages above 50V a.c. are considered lethal and currents as low as 20mA can affect breathing and 50mA can affect the operation of the heart. (Note: a standard 100 Watt light globe has a current of approximately 400 milliamps (mA) flowing through it.) 5.1.2 Types of electric shock
AS/NZS 3000 describes types of electric shock and the methods that may be used to prevent them occurring.
5.1.2.1 Direct contact
AS/NZS 3000 defines direct contact as contact with a conductor or conductive part that is live in normal service. It further requires that persons and livestock be protected against electric shock by direct contact. The methods that may be employed in the prevention of direct contact are: Insulation: by completely covering the live parts with an insulating material Barriers and enclosures: by placing live parts inside enclosures designed to protect against inadvertent contact with live parts. The level of protection that is required is an ingress protection rating of IP2X as defined in AS 1939 Obstacles: these shall prevent unintentional approach to the live parts and unintentional contact with live parts in normal service Placing out of reach: by placing accessible parts at different voltages out of arms reach
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Electric Shock Prevention Project 5.1.2.2 Indirect contact
AS/NZS 3000 defines indirect contact as contact with a conductive part which is not normally live but has become live under fault conditions (due to insulation failure or some other cause). AS/NZS 3000 requires that persons and livestock be protected against the dangers arising from indirect contact. The methods of prevention against indirect contact are: Automatic disconnection of supply: by automatically disconnecting the supply on the occurrence of a fault between live parts and exposed conductive parts or a protective earthing conductor Use of Class II equipment: by the use of appliances and other equipment that do not rely only on basic insulation for safety Electrical separation: by the use of supply that is derived from an isolating transformer complying with AS 3108 5.1.3 Causes of shock
The statistics relating to the incidence of electric shock are contained in Appendix B. The data shows that the majority of shocks have occurred on the surface areas of mines on fixed equipment operating at low voltage. It further shows that 62% of shocks were categorised as being indirect and that in 73% of cases the victim was not an electrical worker. This information leads to the conclusion that the equipment was not fit for the purpose for which it was being used. This is further identified in that for 75% of cases not fit for purpose was identified as the primary cause of the incident. The fitness for purpose of electrical equipment begins at the design stage and covers the installation and commissioning, use, maintenance, overhaul and repair, modification, decommissioning and finally disposal. In any of these stages, the safety of people must not be compromised by exposure to the risk of electric shock. In order to achieve fitness for purpose at all stages of the life cycle of electrical equipment, the people who undertake the tasks associated with each stage must be suitably competent to carry out those tasks. In the area of compliance with legislation and standards it is vital that the people who are responsible for achieving compliance are suitably trained in the requirements of the standards.
5.2 Assessment project

John Waudby, Senior Inspector of Electrical Engineering, NSW Department of Mineral Resources, initiated this project to investigate the state of electrical installations, current practices and procedures that mining operations have in place to manage the risk of electric shock. The project focussed on, but was not limited to, compliance with the applicable mining legislation. Compliance with AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 is required by the relevant legislation for both the coal, and metalliferous and extractive sectors of the industry. Compliance with other Australian Standards was assessed due to their particular relevance in the mining industry. This report makes recommendations that are necessary to improve the electrical engineering safety and reduce the incidence of electric shock throughout the mining industry.
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5.2.1 Terms of reference Analyse available data on electric shock incidence in the NSW mining industry. Prepare an assessment document for use during site inspections aimed at identifying issues that have an impact on the risk of electric shock. Carry out an assessment on the surface of NSW mining operations to give the DMR an overview of the management of electrical technology and the state of installations in relation to issues that have an impact on the incidence of electric shock. Carry out inspections at all coal operations and a selection of metal mines and quarrying operations. Supply operations inspected with a report detailing findings of the inspection. Construct a database to hold the results of the inspections. Review legislation for appropriateness. Make recommendations to reduce the risk of electric shock in the NSW mining industry. Communicate the findings of the project to the mining industry and other interested bodies. 5.2.2 The project team Steve Millington, IEE, DMR Paul Lackey, MSO (Electrical), DMR John Weaver, MSO (Electrical), DMR
Project manager: Team members:
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6 Background and context

6.1 Electrical inspectors
The DMR employs Inspectors of Electrical Engineering (IEE) as inspectors under the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982 and the Mines Inspection Act 1901. The function of an IEE is to assess the safety of electrical installations and practices at mines, and to implement enforcement responses where required. IEE carry out assessments and incident investigations at mines and processing plants. IEE are also involved in apparatus approval, workshop approval and workshop auditing functions. IEE are involved in the setting of standards and are active participants in the preparation of Australian Standards, International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards and MDG guidelines. Due to this involvement, IEE are ideally positioned to observe the effectiveness of contemporary electrical engineering safety legislation and standards, and make comparisons of safety performance against other mining and non mining legislative regimes. IEE are able to observe and draw comparisons about electrical engineering safety performance in the non work place, residential installation arena. In addition the IEE have detailed knowledge of the difficulties confronted in applying existing electrical legislative requirements.
6.2 Philosophy of operation

The Nertney Wheel. The basis of this as a model is that in order to have a safe system, key elements must be present. These elements are that the system must contain appropriate Safe Working Procedures, using fit for purpose equipment that is installed and maintained by competent people within a Safe Working Environment.
Figure 1. Nertney Wheel
The IEE have adopted the Nertney Wheel as a fundamental element of their philosophy of operation", showing how the IEE consider electrical engineering safety. The philosophy of operation is: Based on risk management Requiring fit for purpose equipment Using competent people and processes/procedures All supported by management systems Applies throughout the life cycle of the mine Ownership of safety rests with the mine owners/operators and equipment manufacturers/suppliers The way IEE do things must contribute to changing the safety culture of the industry so that industry accepts ownership of safety Anything IEE do must provide for a level of risk less than or equal to the current risk Information is provided in advisory terms, not as a must do it this way, but be prepared to take appropriate actions against stakeholders not complying with safety legislation
NSW Department of Mineral Resources Page 10
6.3 Electrical engineering safety

Electrical engineering safety encompasses: Prevention of electric shock and burns, (electrocution, death or injury as a result of a shock, radiation burns, flash burns, burning particles and plasma) Prevention of electrical arcing and surface temperatures that have sufficient energy to ignite gas and/or dust Prevention of fires caused by the malfunction of electrical equipment, and Prevention of injury and death from unintended operation due to a failure to stop, or a failure to operate, of electrically powered and electrically controlled equipment
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7 Methodology
In response to the frequency of reported electric shocks in the NSW mining industry, the DMR researched all available statistics on electric shock in the industry. This information showed a recurring pattern of electric shock incidence. A decision was made to conduct an assessment of the systems that mining operations have in place to manage the risk of electric shock. The statistics revealed that the majority of incidents had occurred at surface mines and quarries and the surface areas of underground mines. Only 21% of the incidents occurred in the underground workings of mines. The objective was to conduct the assessment of the surface areas of all coal operations, including mines and preparation plants, and a number of larger metal mines and quarries. The project was to assess the sites for compliance with the legislation and standards, and to ascertain the level of residual risk present on site. An assessment document was produced to assist in the process and to gather information about the industry as a whole (Refer to Appendix J). Its function was to investigate how the industry manages the issues that relate to electrical engineering safety. This document covered the areas that were deemed to be a high risk, either due to the historical record of electric shock, or due to the nature and function of the equipment itself. A selected number of sites were selected for follow up visits in order to determine whether there had been an improvement since the initial visit. The assessment process was designed to examine the procedural aspects of the management of electrical safety and to conduct an inspection of a selection of electrical equipment that is common to most mine sites. The equipment inspected was considered to be high risk, either due to the number of reported electric shocks or the nature of the equipment itself.
7.1 Referenced documents

This project considered the requirements of the following standards, regulations and codes when conducting the assessments: NSW Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982 Coal Mines (General) Regulations 1999 Coal Mines (Open Cut) Regulations 1999 Coal Mines (Underground) Regulations 1999 NSW Mines Inspection Act 1901 General Rule 2000 Mines Inspection Regulation 1999 AS/NZS 3000-2000: Electrical Installations (Also known as Wiring Rules) AS 3007.1-1987 : Electrical Installations - Surface Mines and Associated Processing Plant- Scope and Definitions AS 3007.2-1987 : Electrical Installations Surface Mines and Associated Processing Plants General Protection Requirements AS 3007.3-1987 : Electrical Installations Surface Mines and Associated Processing Plants General Requirements for electrical equipment and ancillaries AS 3007.4-1987 : Electrical Installations Surface Mines and Associated Processing Plants Additional Requirements for Specific Applications
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AS 3007.5-1987 : Electrical Installations Surface Mines and Associated Processing Plants Operating Requirements AS 1674.2-1990: Safety in Welding and Allied Processes - Electrical AS 1966.1-1985: Electric Arc Welding Power Sources - Transformer Type AS 1966.2-1985: Electric Arc Welding Power Sources - Rotary Type AS/NZS 3760-2001: In Service Safety Inspection and Testing of Electrical Equipment AS/NZS 3012-1995: Electrical Installations Construction and Demolition Sites AS 3859-1991: Effects of Current Passing Through the Human Body AS/NZS 4836:2001 Safe Working on Low Voltage Electrical Installations
The following items (7.2 to 7.11) were covered in the assessment process.
7.2 Electric shock victim management procedure

The existence of a procedure and whether it contained all necessary aspects of victim management The level at which the procedure was known and understood by all workers on site
7.3 Management of electrical engineering safety

7.3.1 Risk management The recognition of electricity as a serious hazard The existence of a SEP to manage the hazards associated with the safe use of electricity The greatest risk of electric shock on site as determined by the mine personnel 7.3.2 Ownership of electrical work The organisational structure of the mine with respect to how the electrical workers are controlled
7.4 AS 3000 and AS 3007 audits

Whether an audit of the surface areas of the mine for standards compliance has been conducted The person or organisation that conducted the audit if one had been carried out How comprehensive the audit had been and whether it covered every circuit on the surface of the mine
7.5 Competence
Whether the operation has competency standards for electrical workers Whether the workers on site meet these standards The training that electrical workers have received in AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 Whether the workers on site have been trained to use the mines SEPs
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7.6 Commissioning and testing

Whether the electrical personnel carry out the tests detailed in AS/NZS 3000 Section 6 How the tests are recorded The commissioning procedure used by the operation The testing that is carried out on site The test equipment used by electrical workers Whether every electrician has access to suitable test equipment and whether the employer provides it How electrical workers test for zero energy when carrying out isolation of electrical equipment
7.7 Electrical maintenance

The manner in which maintenance is carried out Who carries out the maintenance Whether the maintenance strategy has provisions to ensure the ongoing compliance with AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 The existence and content of Standards of Electrical Engineering Practice (SEPs) relating to the maintenance of electrical equipment Whether the site SEPs meet the requirements of CMRA Regulations and GR2000 Whether there is evidence of the application of relevant standards Whether the electrical workers have knowledge of, and use of, these standards
7.8 Portable apparatus

The existence of a SEP for the safe use and maintenance of portable electrical apparatus The application of AS/NZS 3760 on site Whether a testing, inspection and tagging program for portable electrical apparatus and leads is in place Whether there are special provisions for use the use of portable tools and leads in wet locations
7.9 Isolation
Whether the mine has documented isolation procedures Whether the operation has a documented Test Before You Touch procedure Whether the operation uses a lockout system of isolation Whether procedures exist for the Removal and Restoration of power
7.10 Welding
Whether the operation has a documented procedure for the safe use and maintenance of welding equipment Whether the mine has taken the requirements of AS 1674.2, AS 1966.1 and AS 1966.2 into consideration in determining safe welding procedures Whether basic welding safety practices are followed Whether the use of VRDs is practised on site
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7.11 Site compliance inspections

The equipment inspection section of the assessment was conducted with focus on the following areas: Main switch yard / substation area Conveyor installation Three electrical enclosures / switch rooms General preparation plant areas Workshops General electrical installations Mains fed mobile equipment
7.12 Process
Two additional MSOs were appointed to enable the project to be completed in a reasonable time frame. The MSOs were stationed where they could best access a majority of the mines. An Electrical Inspector was nominated to manage and coordinate the project. On completion of each inspection and assessment of a mining operation or declared plant a report was prepared and a copy sent to the operation for information. A purpose-designed database was used to analyse the information gathered by the assessments to highlight common problems that require attention.
7.13 Actions
Every mine has been forwarded an individual report. In some cases improvement notices were issued. Where installations were considered unsafe they were rectified immediately, turned off or temporary barriers installed. Presentations have been conducted for several industry committees about the project including: Internal DMR field officers Check Inspectors Conference Hunter Industrial Electrical Safety Network (HIESN) Mine Safety Advisory Council (MSAC) Electricity Industry Safety Advisory Council (EISAC) Mine Electrical Engineers Meetings Mine Electrical Engineering Safety Conference Mine Safety Conference (Terrigal) Articles published in the Mine Safety Update (a DMR publication) The assessment documents are part of the assessment files for each mine and will be used as reference material for future assessments by DMR field officers.
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8 Findings and recommendations

8.1 Role of electricity in mining
We must acknowledge the importance of the supply of electricity and the contribution it makes to our daily lives. It plays an important role in the mining industry by the provision of energy for the mining and processing of various minerals and ores. However, it is also a ubiquitous hazard and a major cause of accidental deaths and injury within the Australian community. To minimise this hazard the mining industry must comply with legislation, regulations, standards, codes of practice, electrical industry safety guides, installation procedures, safe working procedures, safety tag and lock-out procedures, testing procedures and testing procedures for installations, etc. Where the legislation, regulations, standards, codes, guides and procedures are not followed incidences of electric shock are likely to occur.
8.2 Procedure for the management of victims of electric shock

If a person suffers an electric shock it is vital that prompt action is taken in order to increase the chance of recovery. The effects of electric shock cannot be easily determined by normal first aid and only medical practitioners have the knowledge and equipment available to properly treat victims of electric shock. The effects of electricity on the human body are detailed in AS3859-1991: Effects of current passing through the human body (refer Appendix G). The manner in which a mine manages a victim of electric shock is best detailed in a procedure that is conveyed to all people on site. It was expected that all operations would have a procedure that covered the care of a victim from the time the shock was received through to their return to work. A significant number of electrical workers and mine managers were not aware of the need to seek medical assessment for all victims of electric shock. The assessment process revealed that 76% of sites indicated that they would send all victims of electric shock for professional medical assessment and 61% of mining operations had this detailed in a formal procedure. In many of those cases the existence and content of the formal procedure was not well known.
61% of Mines have documented victim management procedures.
76% of Mines would refer all victims of electric shock to hospital. 50% of Mines have procedures that require an ECG.
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
Figure 2. Victim management statistics
Recommendation 1. All mining operations should have a procedure detailing the steps necessary to ensure that all victims of electric shock are provided with transport for professional medical assessment that includes a 12 lead ECG. The procedure should be known to all workers, including contractors.
8.3 Management of electrical engineering safety

8.3.1 Risk management
The assessment project revealed that only 58% of sites had formally recognised electricity as a serious hazard. The sites that had considered the hazard had not sufficiently addressed the risk in either the SEP or the SMP in place at the mine. The assessment process included an identification of the greatest risk of electric shock on site in the opinion of either the manager of the operation or the electrical engineer, depending on the site. The most common risks identified by the mine personnel were: Use of portable electric tools Welding Welding in wet locations Contractors working generally The identification of the above items as the greatest risk on site did not always lead to those risks being properly managed. Very few operations considered the poor state of equipment or installations as their greatest risk of electrical shock, although some sites had major equipment and installation upgrades planned. The statistics clearly show that a lack of fitness for purpose was a factor in 75% of the reported electric shocks. 8.3.2 Ownership of electrical engineering safety
It is difficult to quantify the effect that a particular management structure has on electrical engineering safety. However, all operations require a level of engineering presence to ensure that compliance with legislation and standards is maintained. An important element is that the ownership of electrical engineering safety is vested in a person at the mine. The attributes of ownership are that it must be identified, agreed and resourced. At the mines that were assessed as very secure these attributes were strongly evident. Conversely at the mines assessed as very exposed there was little evidence of ownership. Ownership can take many forms depending on the nature of the operation, eg coal mine electrical engineer, or contract electrician at a quarry. It can range from a permanent member of the management team to a person under a contract or consultant arrangement. Recommendation 2. Mines should recognise electricity as a serious hazard and identify and implement risk controls in accordance with AS 4081.
8.4 AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 audits

Legislation requires that all surface mines and the surface areas of underground mines comply with AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007. These two standards detail the general requirements for electrical safety and contain measures for the prevention of electric shock to both persons and livestock. It has not been uncommon for inspectors to find that electrical installations are below an expected standard when carrying out inspections. Previously, inspectors have made suggestions that all operations should have their electrical installations audited for
compliance with AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007, and have systems in place to ensure ongoing compliance. A number of operations have responded and carried out such audits. In some cases, a structured audit revealed that there were in excess of 2000 non-compliances on a single site.
58% of Mines have conducted audits for compliance with standards. 26% of Mines have conducted audits that cover all circuits on surface.
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
Figure 3. Audit statistics
This project revealed that only 58% of mining operations had carried out AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 audits, with only half of these being comprehensive audits. A sample inspection of selected electrical equipment is not sufficient when determining safety compliance. An audit of this type needs to cover every electrical circuit on site. Of the operations that have carried out audits, many have non-conformances that require attention. In the worst cases the audits had been carried out over two years previously and non-conformances were still outstanding. Recommendation 3. All operations carry out a comprehensive AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 audit on all surface electrical installations. This should specifically target risk of electric shock due to direct and indirect contact. Rank any non-conformances according to the risk and prepare a schedule for the rectification work to be carried out over a reasonable time frame.
8.5 Competency standards

The Coal Mines (General) Regulation 1999 Clause 9 requires that all coal mines and declared plants establish standards of engineering practice. Clause 9 (3) (a) requires that the SEP contain provisions for competency for working on relevant equipment. The General Rule 2000 Clause 12 (6) requires all persons at the mine have the necessary skills and competence for the tasks that they are to undertake. In order to achieve fitness for purpose at all stages of the life cycle of electrical equipment, the persons who undertake the tasks associated with each stage must be suitably competent to carry out those tasks. At 74% of the operations assessed, there were some forms of competency provisions. The detail of these competency provisions differed markedly from site to site. Of the sites that do have provisions for competency in the SEP very few have criteria for what requirements are necessary to achieve that competency. There are very few of the SEP competency provisions that require an electrical worker of the mine to be licensed.
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Many of the smaller metal mines and quarries rely solely on the services of an electrical contractor for the provision of electrical services on site. The mine relies on the fact that the contractor is licensed as a measure of competency. Recommendation 4. All mines should detail requirements for the competency of electricity workers on site. It should contain those competency elements that relate to all aspects of electrical engineering safety and standards compliance.
8.5.1
Knowledge and training
An important component in the prevention of electric shock is that electrical installations are installed and maintained to ensure compliance with AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007. An essential element in ensuring compliance is that electrical tradesmen have a good working knowledge of these standards. This knowledge is of a nature that tradesmen need continual refresher training in order to keep skills up to date. Structured AS/NZS 3000 training has only been provided to electrical workers at 42% of those operations inspected. Very few electrical workers have received any form of training or instruction in the requirements of AS 3007. Knowledge of standards and legislation is paramount if the site is to remain in compliance. Interviews with electricity workers to determine how well the standards are known and understood revealed the following statistics: 57% had read AS 3000 38% had read AS 3007 88% knew the meaning of direct contact 42% knew the meaning of indirect contact 48% used an RCD tester to test earth leakage devices 83% used non contact testers when testing for dead 29% know how to determine whether a multimeter is suitable for the circuit under test 51% knew when an enclosure should be locked Recommendation 5. All mines should implement a structured training program aimed to refresh the skills of electricity workers in the area of AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 compliance.
8.6 Commissioning and testing

Section 6 of AS/NZS 3000 details the testing and verification requirements of any new installation, alteration, addition or repair prior to the power being applied. It outlines visual inspections, mandatory tests comprising of continuity of earthing system, insulation testing, polarity and correct circuit connection and optional tests. AS/NZS 3000 Section 6 also details the acceptance criteria for this testing. It was found that 64% of operations carry out these tests but the keeping of records associated with these tests is not common.
The Coal Mines (General) Regulations 1999 Clause 28(2) requires all coal mines and declared plants to comply with AS/NZS 3000. The General Rule 2000 Clause 68 (1)(c)(ii) requires all metal mines and quarries to comply with AS/NZS 3000. Recommendation 6. All mining operations adopt a policy where the tests detailed in AS/NZS 3000 Section 6 are carried out on all electrical installations where required by AS/NZS 3000 and records of such tests are retained at the mine for future reference.
8.6.1
Test equipment
In order to prevent electric shock and arc blast injuries when using test equipment for the purposes of testing for dead or other reasons, it is vital that electricity workers have access to suitable test equipment. For test equipment to be suitable for use it must have an appropriate safety rating and be suitable for the circuit under test. Non contact detectors are used to detect the presence of electricity without actually contacting the live parts. They can be particularly useful when determining if there are unwanted voltages present in an enclosure after isolation as part of a test before touch process. Electricity workers need to know how to determine the suitability of test equipment for the circuit under test. Only 29% of electricity workers understood the fault level limitations of the multimeters they were supplied with. Recommendation 7. All operations ensure that electricity workers have access to suitable test equipment having a suitable safety rating and that electricity workers be sufficiently trained so that they are capable of determining the suitability of the instrument for the circuit under test.
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8.7 Maintenance
Essential to the ongoing compliance to standards and legislation is the maintenance that is carried out on electrical equipment. The General Rule 2000 Clause 68 (1)(b) requires that suitable inspection and testing of electrical installations at the mine is carried out at the time of installation and then periodically in order to identify any deficiencies and have them corrected. The Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982 section 103 for mines and section 145 (i) for declared plants requires all sites to have a system for the inspection and testing of electrical equipment. In most cases compliance with AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 issues were not well covered in the maintenance strategy. Those mines that did attempt to cover compliance were very general in the inspections that were required and rarely did maintenance inspection sheets cover basic requirements such as risk of direct contact. Many mines do not have specific equipment checks as part of a maintenance scheme but rather do maintenance on an as needed basis. The number of non compliances identified during the course of this project attests to the fact that standards compliance has significant room for improvement.
Ineffective temporary repairs have been made to the socket outlet. The outlet has been held to the mounting block with tape. The tape has since let go allowing the 240 V socket outlet to fall away from the base thus exposing the conductors. This exposes workers to a risk of direct contact with the exposed live conductors.
Figure 4. Socket outlet held in place with tape
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Essential to the prevention of electric shock by indirect contact is that the protection system is designed and set according to the application. The elements of the protection system should be regularly checked to ensure correct operation under a fault condition. The assessment found that deficiencies existed with the protection of the final subcircuits. The Coal Mines (General) Regulation 1999 Clause 28 (2) requires that all mines and declared plants comply with AS 3007. The General Rule 2000 Clause 68 (1)(c) requires all metal mines and quarries to comply with AS 3007. AS 3007.2 details the requirements for protection systems at mining sites. One essential element of a protection system is the integrity of the earthing. If the earthing is not present or it is inadequate then the protection system is unlikely to operate in case of fault. Periodic testing for the safety of the electrical installations is not common with only 44% of sites carrying out regular earth continuity testing.
Earth conductors which have been left disconnected means that there may be some equipment in the field that is no longer earthed. Maintenance strategies should include earth continuity testing protocols that will detect unearthed equipment. Unearthed equipment may cause protection systems to be ineffective and increase the risk of shock due to indirect contact.
Figure 5. Disconnected earth conductors in electrical panel
44% of Mines conduct regular earth continuity testing of electrical equipment

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
Figure 6. Percentage of mine that conduct EC testing
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Essential to protection against electric shock by direct and indirect contact is the quality of the insulation. Insulation testing should be carried out to establish the integrity of the insulation. Regular insulation resistance testing is carried out at 50% of sites.
The light fitting has water trapped inside. Insulation resistance testing programs should identify and remedy instances of insulation failure. Water ingress such as this increases the risk of shock due to indirect contact.
Figure 7. Fluorescent light fitting full of water
50% of Mines conduct regular insulation resistance testing of electrical equipment

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
Figure 8. Percentage of mines that conduct regular insulation resistance testing
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In circuits protected by RCD units the testing of these units to ensure correct function is essential. The testing requirements and frequency of such tests is detailed in AS/NZS 3760. Very few of the maintenance schemes in place make reference to this standard and only 44% of mines carry out the injection tests of RCD units as required by AS/NZS 3760.
44% of Mines test RCD unit functionality using injection test methods.
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
Figure 9. Percentage of mines that injection test RCD units
Recommendation 8. All mines should reassess their maintenance strategy to ensure that it covers standards compliance. The maintenance scheme should have specific requirements for: The identification of direct contact risk Regular testing of earth continuity Regular insulation resistance testing, and a Testing program aimed to ensure that electrical protection systems are set correctly and functional.
Maintenance has been considered in the design of the distribution board. The socket outlets on the right side of the distribution board have been installed for the sole purpose of injection testing RCD units.
Figure 10. Well designed distribution board
8.8 Portable Electrical Apparatus

Portable electrical apparatus includes portable hand tools, hand lamps, extension cords, portable welders, mains powered measuring equipment, portable heaters, etc. These are all items of electrical equipment that are held while being used in their normal function and they account for 19% of the total electric shocks reported.
The assessment project examined all aspects relating to the safe use and maintenance of portable tools and leads and revealed that the management of portable tools and leads has significant deficiencies. Most sites have considered the maintenance of portable tools and leads in the mine maintenance strategy. AS/NZS 3760 describes the type and frequency of tests required to be performed on all portable tools to ensure safety. The type of environment that is present on mine sites and preparation plants is particularly harsh. AS/NZS 3012 details the precautions necessary for the safe use in environments such as this. There have been a number of safety alerts advising mine sites to consider the recommendations of AS/NZS 3012 when using portable tools and leads on site. The use of portable tools, in particular Class II equipment, can be particularly hazardous if they are operated in a damp environment and pose a risk of serious electric shock due to the fact that no protective conductor is present in the tool. Manufacturers of portable tools usually draw attention to these hazards in their recommendations for safe use. There was a general lack of acknowledgment of the manufacturers safety directions with most operators not knowing what these recommendations were, or even having access to the documentation that is supplied with the tools by the manufacturer.
23% of Mines consider wet areas in the procedures
79% of Mines cover contractor's equipment in their procedures
25% of Mines consider manufacturers safety directions in their procedures 10% of Mines consider AS 3012 in their procedures
25% of Mines include steam cleaners, sump pumps etc. in their portable apparatus scheme
74% of Mines include leads in scheme
78% of Mines include tools in scheme
73% of Mines maintain portable apparatus according to AS 3760 32% of Mines consider suitability of equipment in their portable apparatus scheme
57% of Mines have a documented procedure

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
Figure 11. Portable tool statistics
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Inspections of the portable tools and leads on site revealed that much of the equipment was not in a fit state to remain in service. The typical non-conformances observed were: No evidence of inspections having been carried out Inspections out of date Equipment that had visible damage that was still in service Equipment being used in unsuitable locations Equipment not fit for the purpose for which it was being used There is an onus of responsibility on all workers to visually check the equipment prior to use to make sure that the equipment has a valid inspection tag and that the equipment is not damaged.
A lead with the conductors showing at the back of the plug. It was still in service at the time of inspection.
Figure 12. Portable lead with conductors showing
A damaged lead with a recent inspection tag attached. The lead was not in a serviceable condition, as the lead was not properly restrained in the plug top.
Figure 13. Lead with current tag that is not serviceable
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A lead with the conductors clearly visible at the back of the plug.
Figure 14. Lead with conductors showing
A welder with a badly damaged case. The practice of repairing the damage using duct tape is not a suitable means of repair. The equipment was still in service and was clearly not fit for purpose.
Figure 15. Portable welder with damaged case
Recommendation 9. All mines and preparation plants should revise their procedures for the safe use and maintenance of portable tools and leads. The scheme should consider the adoption of the manufacturers safety directions, AS/NZS 3760 and AS/NZS 3012. It should make particular reference to requirements for wet areas.
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8.9 Isolation
Isolation procedures form an important part in the prevention of electric shock to persons working on electrical equipment. When electricity workers are required to work on electrical equipment the Coal Mines (General) Regulation Clauses 27 and 33 require an operation have an isolation procedure to ensure that conductors are not energised, and that steps are taken to ensure that this will remain so while work is carried out. The General Rule 2000 Clause 73(a)(iii) requires that the power supply to equipment be isolated prior to work being carried out and steps taken to ensure that it cannot be reconnected accidentally. Most sites had some form of isolation procedure with 85% having this documented in some format. It was most common for this to be contained in either the SEP in the case of coal operations, or in the SMP in metal mines and quarries. In some of the smaller operations isolation and tagging were contained in the induction documentation only. There is a trend toward a lockout philosophy for isolation equipment in lieu of tagging alone. This trend is such that 44% of operations use locks in all or part of the site isolation procedures whereas 41% still use tags alone in their isolation. An essential part of isolation procedures is a test before you touch protocol. This is a critical test where electrical workers are required to work on electrical conductors in order to prove that correct isolation has been effected. Many isolation procedures require electrical workers to carry this out but do not specify the test method. The method for conducting a test before you touch action should be documented. Documented test before touch procedures were not readily available at most sites.
Recommendation 10. Isolation procedures should contain detailed steps for testing for zero energy.
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8.9.1
Internal isolation
Isolation devices should be readily accessible without exposing the operator to live parts.
The circuit breakers are located inside an electrical enclosure that has to be opened to effect isolation of electrical equipment. The location of the equipment means the operator is exposed to an increased risk of injury due to arc blast. It is also foreseeable that due to the nature of operation of the circuit breaker toggles, a slip by the operator would result in a serious direct contact shock.
Figure 16. Circuit breakers for isolation
Recommendation 11. Mining operations should review the means for isolation that are present on site with due regard to the risk to the operator while carrying out isolation.
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8.10 Welding
The use of welding equipment is responsible for 9% of the total electric shocks reported. In some cases the contributing factor was the fitness for purpose of the equipment and in other cases it was the manner in which is was being used. Welding operations need to be conducted with due regard to the safety of the welder and other persons who may be in the vicinity and the potential adverse impact on other electrical installations. This is best detailed in a procedure for safe welding. This procedure should detail the precautions necessary for the prevention of electric shock to the operator and others and also consider the design and installation of the equipment.
An electrode holder is left unattended. This is poor practice as it increases the risk of electric shock to either the welder or other workers in the area, due to an inadvertent contact with the electrode and the work bench.
Figure 17. Unattended electrode holder
The assessment of procedures and equipment as part of this project revealed that the procedures were not sufficiently detailed and that the quality of the welding equipment was generally poor and that a number of deficiencies exist. Only 51% of operations have any form of documented safe welding procedure at all and only 14% consider the design of the welding equipment in that procedure. Only 43% of sites adopted safe welding practices and only 39% of sites had adopted AS 1674.2 as a basis for safe welding practices. To ensure that the welding equipment remains in a serviceable condition it is necessary to periodically test that the equipment is safe. AS 1674.2 details the tests necessary and the recommended frequency of those tests. In 66% of cases the mine carries out these tests at the required intervals. The continued use of damaged equipment increases the risk of electric shock to the user. At 47% of sites the welding equipment that was in use was damaged in some way. This damage ranged from cracked electrode holders up to the case of the welder being damaged such that it had been held together with tape.
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This handpiece is damaged and should be replaced.
Figure 18. Damaged electrode holder
The connections to the welder have been replaced but the original defective connections have been left connected to the terminal.
Figure 19. Damaged connections
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The power lead of the welding machine has suffered insulation damage and has been repaired with PVC tape.
Figure 20. Damaged supply cable
A common practice within the industry is to locate the welding machine in a convenient position and reticulate the welding leads throughout the building as necessary. In 13% of these cases the return lead of the welder is permanently connected to the building frame. This practice is not consistent with the requirements of AS 1674.2 and can seriously affect the safe earthing of other electrical equipment in the building.
The return lead of the welding machine is permanently connected to the building frame. This practice is not consistent with the requirements of AS1647.2 and has the risk of adversely affecting the safe earthing of electrical equipment.
Figure 21. Return lead connected to building
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The output circuit of welding equipment is sufficient to inflict a serious shock. The DMR has released safety alerts in the past recommending the use of VRDs as a means of limiting the open circuit voltage of a welding machine to a safe level. The adoption of VRDs to welding equipment has been adopted at 60% of mine sites but at most sites the function of the VRD is not tested.
A well fitted out welding machine. The environment in which the welder will be operating has been considered. The welder is located inside a stainless steel enclosure and the unit is well elevated to prevent water ingress from washing down activities. The VRD is visible at the top of the unit.
Figure 22. Well fitted out welding machine
The presence of water when welding operations are being carried out greatly increases the risk of electric shock.
These workers are standing in water while carrying out welding operations. This practice greatly increases the risk of electric shock to both the welder and the assistant. AS1674.2 details precautions to be taken when welding in damp locations.
Figure 23. Welding in damp areas
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49% of Mines have safe welding procedures
39% of Mines comply with AS 1674.2
14% of Mines consider AS1966.1 14% of Mines consider AS1966.2
66% of Mines test welding equipment every 3 months
8% of Mines overhaul welding equipment every 2 years
65% of Mines require the use of VRDs
25% of Mines test VRD units
43% of Mines apply basic welding practices

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
Figure 24. Welding statistics
Recommendation 12. All mines should review their welding practices to ensure that they comply with the requirements of AS 1674.2. They should also require the use of equipment that is in a fit for purpose state, and VRD units should be fitted to the output of welding machines where the voltage is above extra low voltage.
8.11 Site compliance inspections

8.11.1 Risk of direct contact The risk of electric shock by direct contact is very serious. It was found during the assessment project that 62% of mining operations had an identifiable risk of direct contact somewhere on the site. AS/NZS 3000 defines direct contact as contact with a conductor or conductive part that is live in normal service. Preventive measures against direct contact are defined in AS/NZS 3000 as: Insulation Barriers or enclosures Obstacles Placing out of reach
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Electric Shock Prevention Project 8.11.1.1 Enclosure locking
AS 3000 requires that live parts be inside enclosures or behind barriers that provide a degree of protection of at least IP2X as defined in AS1939. 17% of all the enclosures inspected had a risk of direct contact due to the enclosure not being locked when live parts are exposed.
This enclosure is not normally locked. The terminals inside are live in normal service and represent a significant risk of electric shock due to direct contact. There were no signs warning of the presence of live parts.
Figure 25. Enclosure that is not normally locked
This enclosure is not normally locked. Live parts are readily accessible when the enclosure is opened. This presents an increased risk of electric shock due to direct contact with live conductors. It also increases the risk of injury to persons who open the enclosure whilst it is in operation due to arc blast when the switchgear is operating.
Figure 26. Enclosure with exposed live terminals
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Electric Shock Prevention Project 8.11.1.2 Internal control functions
Enclosures that have internal reset or control functions that are located in the vicinity of live parts present an increased risk of direct contact due to the frequency of exposure to the hazard by the person operating the equipment. It was found that 26% of enclosures have some form of internal control function.
It is necessary to open this enclosure to start the drive. Note that the start pushbutton is located inside near unshrouded terminals located within the enclosure and on the door.
Figure 27. Enclosure with internal start function
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8.11.1.3
Missing pole fillers
Pole fillers are used to blank off unused circuit breaker positions in distribution boards. When these are not in place there is a risk of electric shock due to direct contact. The risk of electric shock when these pole fillers are not fitted is high due to the action of operating the circuit breakers, and the close proximity of an operators finger to the live parts when operating adjacent circuit breakers. The inspection of enclosures on site revealed that pole fillers were missing from 20% of enclosures that required them.
The distribution board has missing pole fillers.
Figure 28. Distribution board with missing pole fillers
This distribution board has been manufactured in situ. The positions where there are no circuit breakers fitted are not blanked off and live parts are easily accessible.
Figure 29. Distribution board constructed on site
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Missing pole fillers allow inadvertent contact with electrical terminals through the opening. It presents a high risk due to the action of operating the circuit breakers.
Figure 30. Distribution board with missing pole fillers
An area of the distribution board has several pole fillers missing. The live parts are visible and an electric shock in this instance is foreseeable.
Figure 31. Distribution board with several pole fillers missing
Recommendation 13. Mine sites should undertake an audit process to identify risks of direct contact, have them rectified and include provisions for identification of these issues in the mine maintenance scheme.
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8.11.2 Risk of indirect contact AS/NZS 3000 defines electric shock due to indirect contact as contact with a conductive part that is not normally live but becomes live under fault conditions (due to insulation failure or some other cause). Preventive measures against indirect contact are: Automatic disconnection of supply Use of Class II equipment Electrical Separation
8.11.2.1 Earth bonds
When an electrical enclosure has equipment mounted on the door, there must be an earth bond from the enclosure to the door. This is to prevent a difference of potential between the door and the enclosure in the case of a fault occurring. Inspections revealed that earth bonds were missing from 8% of enclosures that had electrical equipment mounted on the door.
The earth bond has been left off this door. There is a risk of electric shock due to indirect contact due to a possible difference of potential between the enclosure and the door should a fault occur.
Figure 32. Enclosure door with earth bond not connected
8.11.2.2
Disconnected earths
One form of protection against indirect contact is the automatic disconnection of the supply in case of a fault occurring between live parts and earth. In order for this protection to be effective all conductive parts of the installation must be effectively earthed.
The earth conductors have been left disconnected. This means that there may be some equipment in the field that is no longer earthed. When equipment is not earthed there is a possibility that electrical protection systems will be ineffective.
Figure 33. Disconnected earth conductors
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Electric Shock Prevention Project 8.11.2.3 Earthing of conductive parts
AS/NZS 3000 requires that all conductive parts of an installation be earthed to protect against differences of potential due to a fault.
The switch is not the correct type for terminating armoured cables. For all parts of the installation to be earthed the glands and the armouring must be effectively earthed. The risk of electric shock due to indirect contact is increased if the extraneous conductive parts are not effectively earthed.
Figure 34. Metal glands in plastic enclosure
Recommendation 14. Mines sites should review all electrical installations to ensure that the earthing requirements of AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 are met.
8.11.2.4 Earth leakage protection
AS/NZS 3000 requires that RCD units be fitted for the protection of socket outlets and lighting circuits where there is an elevated risk. In 8% of circuits containing socket outlets and 55% of lighting circuits RCD protection was not present.
The enclosure has had a socket outlet fitted to the outside. The socket outlet had been fitted as an addition sometime after the original installation. It had no RCD protection, which increases the risk of electric shock due to indirect contact.
Figure 35. Control station with socket outlet fitted
Recommendation 15. All mines should consider the fitting of RCDs to all lighting circuits, socket outlets and control circuits to field devices that operate at low voltage.
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8.11.3 Fit for purpose electrical equipment To ensure an item of electrical equipment is suitable for its intended purpose it must comply with all aspects of Good Electrical Engineering Practice. According to defined engineering standards equipment must be: designed manufactured installed commissioned used maintained repaired modified decommissioned, and finally disposed of The use of equipment that was not fit for the purpose for which it was being used was determined to be a factor in 75% of the reported electric shocks.
8.11.3.1
Design
The first criterion of equipment fit for purpose is the design must be suitable for the application and the environment in which it operates. It is important that the design be suitable for the present conditions and the conditions that may be expected into the future.
These socket outlets are covered with a lot of dust. This type of environment puts a significant strain on design IP ratings. It also raises the question of whether the design IP ratings can be maintained in the field.
Figure 36. Socket outlets covered in dust
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8.11.3.2
Installation
Electrical equipment needs to be installed in accordance with Australian Standards and good engineering practice. The equipment should be installed in a manner that does not compromise the design of the equipment.
The installation of this distribution board has not been completed. The top cover has not been fitted, so there is a sizeable gap at the top of the board. There is a risk of electric shock due to inadvertent contact with live parts through the opening at the top of the enclosure.
Figure 37. Distribution board with top cover left off
The duct at the top of the switchboard has no cover fitted. This presents an increased risk of electric shock due to insulation damage. AS/NZS 3000 requires that all conductors have single insulation installed in a conduit or duct.
Figure 38. Cable duct with no cover fitted
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The flexible conduit has been pushed through the opening in the panel without regard to proper glanding. Some of the cables have suffered damage and at the lower end of the panel the damage is such that the conductors are visible.
Figure 39. Cables in flexible conduit entering enclosure
These cables have not been glanded correctly. The IP rating of the enclosure has been compromised by the use of the rubber flap around the cables.
Figure 40. Unglanded cables entering enclosure
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8.11.3.2.1
Installation (IP rating)
Electrical enclosures should be appropriately IP rated according to the location in which they will be installed.
The control panel has had some openings in the front panel covered with paper and tape. This is not an effective form of IP protection.
Figure 41. Paper used to blank holes in panel
An installation where the environmental conditions have been considered in the selection and installation of the equipment.
Figure 42. Well designed local control station
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8.11.3.2.2
Installation (location of equipment)
Electrical equipment should be installed in a location that will not present an increased risk. AS/NZS 3000 details locations where certain types of equipment are prohibited from installation.
This switchboard is near a wash tub. The location is not suitable for electrical equipment due to the high risk of people being wet when operating electrical equipment.
Figure 43. Switchboard adjacent to wash tub
A building column within a workshop. The column has been used to mount the necessary services for the workshop. The socket outlets are close to the water and air services. The socket outlets are not weatherproof unless the plug that is connected is a weatherproof type.
Figure 44. Building with services
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The installation of the pump on the bath house floor is not fit for purpose. It is located in an area which is regularly hosed down and is not suitably IP rated for this location.
Figure 45. Bath house pump
This pump was installed when the water level was much lower than shown. A workman must stand in the water in order to operate the local isolator.
Figure 46. Dam pump
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8.11.3.2.3
Installation (main switchrooms and switchyards)
Switchrooms and switchyards are important items of electrical equipment due to the switching of high energy sources within the enclosures. As such they have some special requirements and should be maintained to a high standard.
Access to switchrooms is important in order to exit in case of emergency. AS/NZS 3000 requires that there be two exits that can be opened from the inside without the use of a key or tool. This switchroom has sustained damage to the exit doors. The doors are nailed shut preventing anyone from exiting in an emergency.
Figure 47. Switchroom with doors bolted shut
The doorway to this switchroom opens to the inside making it difficult to exit from the inside in an emergency.
Figure 48. Switchroom with door that opens inward
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Many mine sites are supplied with electric power by means of pole top transformer installations. This installation is laid out in a way that the safe isolation of the HV fuses would be difficult.
Figure 49. Elevated substation installation
This switchroom is in need of maintenance to allow ready access. The door is hard to open due to the build up of debris around the switchroom.
Figure 50. Switchroom
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8.11.3.2.4
Installation (Signs)
Requirements for signs to be fitted to all electrical installations are detailed in AS/NZS 3000, AS 3007 and the legislation. Adequate signs are necessary in order to warn of the presence and the dangers of electricity. The assessment project revealed that 73% of electrical installations at coal mining sites do not comply with the Coal Mines (General) Regulations Clause 29 and that 70% of sites in the metalliferous and extractive sectors do not have the required signs.
There are no signs attached to the electrical enclosures. These enclosures should have signs stating the presence and danger of electricity and the highest voltage within the panel.
Figure 51. Enclosure with no signs
The use of homemade paper signs does not adequately cover the requirements of signage in AS/NZS 3000 or the legislation.
Figure 52. Enclosure with paper signs
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The sign on the switchyard fence is no longer legible.
Figure 53. Sign on switchyard fence
A switchboard that has been well fitted out with signs.
Figure 54. MCC with a high standard of signage.
The type of signs that should be located at all electrical installations are: Sign to indicate the presence and dangers of electricity and the highest voltage within the enclosure Sign to indicate the steps to take in case of a fire occurring on the electrical equipment Sign to indicate the procedure for resuscitating a victim of electric shock Sign to indicate the circuits controlled by the equipment
Recommendation 16. All mines should review the signs and notices at all electrical installations on site to ensure that the requirements of the Coal Mines (General) Regulations, AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 are complied with.
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Electric Shock Prevention Project 8.11.3.3 Commissioning
Electrical equipment must be installed and commissioned in accordance with AS/NZS 3000. Section 6 Testing and Verification details the inspection and tests required for new and modified installations.
The installation of a replacement main switch is unsuitable. The existing conductors are too large for the terminals of the new switch so smaller lengths of conductor have been used to connect the switch. Inappropriate installation and commissioning procedures means this issue has not been identified.
Figure 55. Main switch with smaller conductors
8.11.3.4
Use
Electrical equipment should always be used in accordance with the equipment design and good engineering practice. Equipment safety should never be compromised by bypassing functions or protection systems.
An electrical enclosure that is badly corroded. It is possible to place your finger through the hole. Note: The power was isolated when this photograph was taken. Equipment should not be allowed to deteriorate.
Figure 56. Badly rusted enclosure
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Wooden wedges have been used to hold contactors in the closed position.
Figure 57. Contactors wedged in
8.11.3.4.1
Use (access to switchboards)
AS/NZS 3000 requires there be clear access to all switchboards.

This distribution board cannot be opened due to the practice of storing equipment in front of the switchboard.
Figure 58. Access to distribution board is restricted
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8.11.3.5
Maintenance
In order for electrical equipment to remain in a fit for purpose condition, maintenance must be effective and appropriate to the task. The maintenance must consider the ongoing compliance with AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007.
A section of this switchboard has had some repairs carried out. The cover of the panel no longer fits, as the new equipment is larger in size. The cover is held on with insulation tape.
Figure 59. Switchboard cell held with tape
The wiring in the enclosure is not contained within ducting or in a wiring harness. There are no identification numbers on wiring making fault finding difficult. When maintenance practices are such that enclosures are kept in this condition it indicates that plant standards are unsuitable for ensuring equipment is kept in a fit for purpose condition.
Figure 60. Unloomed conductors in an enclosure
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The condition of the enclosure is an indicator of a lack of maintenance. The wiring is not restrained or marked and redundant equipment has not been removed.
Figure 61. Stray wires in an enclosure
The enclosure is not suitable for the environment that it is installed in. The environment is very dusty and, although the enclosure may have been dustproof when installed, a lack of maintenance has seen the seals deteriorate. The result is that a significant amount of dust now enters the enclosure and the installation is no longer in a fit for purpose condition.
Figure 62. Enclosure that dust has entered
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8.11.3.6
Disposal
When electrical equipment is no longer required (become redundant) it needs to be managed so that it does not present a risk of electric shock.
These cables are redundant. They have been disconnected and left to hang under the cable tray. This practice increases the risk of electric shock due to the redundant cables being inadvertently re-energised.
Figure 63. Redundant cables
The redundant cable has not been handled well. It has been cut off and placed behind the adjacent cable.
Figure 64. Redundant cable poked behind adjacent cable
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9 Legislation
9.1 Differences between mining and non mining electrical installations
Electrical installations in mining are not similar to mainstream industry and have traditionally been regulated under a different legislative model than the "ordinary" workplace. There are many situations in mining where electrical installations differ markedly from those normally encountered in the non mining workplace. Some are listed here: Installations tend to be temporary, and mining operations are continuously moving. Transportable / relocatable high voltage substations. Earthing installations at the bottom of open cuts where effective connection to the mass of earth is exceedingly difficult. Frequent use of explosives with electrically initiated detonators. Very large diesel powered mobile machines with on board generating equipment and high voltage electric drive traction, with attendant fire and malfunction risks. Processing and beneficiation plants where electrical apparatus is continuously wet and exposed to conductive and corrosive mineral slurries and concentrates. High voltages (now up to 22 kV) reticulated in flexible cables to very large mobile machines. Particular earthing requirements for trailing cable fed mobile machines. Overhead lines on sites with material stock piles, large earth moving equipment and large dump trucks (generally larger than standard road vehicles) where the height of the ground below the line may be subject to change. High voltage cables installed where persons and machinery can contact them. High voltage cables installed in confined roadways underground where probability of exposure is very high, and possibility of retreat from danger is limited. High voltage installations where persons are routinely required to stand knee deep in mud and water to maintain and operate them. Large high powered machines supplied with trailing cables, where free steered vehicles run in close proximity. High powered machinery controlled with radio remote controls in restricted space, with persons closely concentrated around the machine. Very deep shaft vertical and slope winders conveying large numbers of persons. Some other issues unique to mining that impact on electrical engineering safety are: Office buildings and workshop / store complexes are on site and staffed by the same people who operate the mine. Machinery and plant migrates from store to mine to workshop etc. It would be impractical to have different legislation for electrical installations for different parts of the mine. Some mines (including office and workshop) are powered only by on site privately owned generating plant. Such installations are best regulated by specific mining legislation. Some mines that begin life as open cut operations later become underground mines. Many mines are remote from population centres, making it difficult to access the licensed tradesmen and consulting engineers with particular expertise.
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9.2 Legislative models for electrical engineering safety

9.2.1 NSW non mining workplace
The NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (OHSA) and Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 (OHSR) govern workplace safety. While the OHSA largely applies to mines, the bulk of the OHSR does not. WorkCover administers this legislation. The main legislation governing the safety of electrical installations is the Electricity Safety Act 1945 (ESA) and the Electricity Safety (Electrical Installations) Regulation 1998 (ESEIR). None of this legislation is applicable to mines. This legislation is administered by the Department of Fair Trading. The ESA defines the electrical installation and electrical work. The licensing of electricity workers is described in the Home Building Act 1989 (HBA) and the Home Building Regulations 1997 (HBR). This legislation is also administered by the Department of Fair Trading. The HBA defines specialist work, and includes electrical, gas fitting and plumbing in this category. It requires that only licensed persons are allowed to carry out specialist work, and then broadens the application of this requirement to all electrical installations, not just residential building work. The HBA prohibits any electrical work from being performed other than by the holder of a licence to perform that work, and sets out the classes of licence and supervision requirements. The OHSR contains provisions for plant safety, electrical installations, and maintenance of electrical installations. WorkCover also gazettes industry codes of practice for a range of endeavours. One example applicable to electrical work is "Low Voltage Electrical Work". The combined effect of all this legislation is a model than can be summarised as follows: All electricity workers must be licensed by the Department of Fair Trading All electrical installations must conform to AS 3000 All new work, additions and modifications must be subject to prescribed commissioning tests Commissioning results must be recorded on a commissioning report The qualified person's licence details must be added to the report The commissioning report must be submitted to the local electricity distributor In the case of new work, the electricity distributor may then connect supply on the basis of the commissioning results Records must be kept for a prescribed period 9.2.2 NSW coal mines
The ESA, ESEIR, HBA, HBR, electrical content of OHSR, the National Standard for Plant, and WorkCover codes of practice do not apply to NSW coal mines. Health and Safety in NSW Coal Mines is governed by the Coal Mines Regulation Act (CMRA) 1982, Coal Mine (General) Regulation 1999, Coal Mine (Open Cut) Regulation 1999, Coal Mine (Underground) Regulation 1999 and NSW OHSA. The provisions relating to an electrical installation and electrical work can be summarised as follows: A mine must have a mine electrical engineer, "licensed" by the DMR The mine manager and mine electrical engineer must establish Standards of Engineering Practice These standards must include competencies of persons working with relevant equipment
Electrical installations must comply with AS 3000 and AS 3007 Electrical equipment must be installed in such a manner as to control risk of fire, explosion, electric shock or unintended movement during the whole life cycle of the equipment. NSW metalliferous and extractive mines and quarries
9.2.3
The ESA, ESEIR, HBA, HBR, electrical content of OHSR, the National Standard for Plant, and WorkCover codes of practice do not apply to NSW metalliferous and extractive mines and quarries. Health and Safety in NSW metalliferous mines is governed by the Mines Inspection Act (MIA) 1901, and the General Rule (GR2000) 2000. The provisions relating to an electrical installation and electrical work can be summarised as follows: A general manager must prepare a Mine Safety Management Plan The general manager must ensure that people performing work at the mine have the necessary skills and competence Electrical installations must comply with AS 3000 and AS 3007 Electrical equipment must be installed in such a manner as to control risk of fire, explosion, electric shock or unintended movement during the whole life cycle of the equipment. 9.2.4 Comparison of models
It can be seen that the legislation relating to electrical work in mines is much less prescriptive than it is for the ordinary industrial workplace. Responsibility for setting minimum levels of competence and supervision is with the manager or general manager of the mine. The mine manager is not required to submit commissioning reports to the electricity distributor for additions or modifications. There is no requirement for traceability or accountability of the electricity worker. There is no requirement for consent or approval prior to connecting supply to new work, additions or alterations. There are no Industry Codes of Practice for the way in which electrical work is carried out. There is, however, a strong emphasis on hazard identification, risk management, and implementation of risk controls by the mine. 9.2.5 Standards of engineering practice
The legislative models for mining enable the mine manager, or general manager, to determine the most suitable way to achieve health and safety outcomes, through risk management and Mine Safety Management Plans. Key sub clauses for electrical engineering safety in the respective legislation are listed here.
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CM(Gen)R 1999 28 Electrical equipment and installations (1) All electrical equipment at a mine or declared plant must be designed, installed, commissioned, operated, maintained (including servicing, repairing and overhauling) and decommissioned in such manner as to control any risks from fire, explosion, electric shock or unintended movement of equipment.
GR 2000 68 Requirements as to electricity The general manager of a mine must ensure that: (a) electrical installations at the mine are designed, installed and maintained to minimise the potential for any electric shock or for burns, injury, explosion, fire, overheating or mechanical damage,
These outcomes can only be achieved by establishing minimum standards for equipment, competence, work and work environment, in respect of the safe use of electricity. For coal mines, Clause 9, Coal Mines (General) Regulation 1999 requires that standards of engineering practice are developed and implemented the clause also specifies certain attributes of these standards. In the GR 2000 it is not specifically stated, but inferred within the requirements that there be a Mine Safety Management Plan. In both cases the standards set by the mine must be sufficiently rigorous to provide an equivalent and better level of electrical engineering safety than would have otherwise been applied by the mainstream NSW legislation. The standards should be referenced within the Mine Safety Management Plan, and subject to review and audit process to ensure continuous improvement and continued relevance to the operation. The measure of effectiveness of this less prescriptive legislative environment will ultimately be the health and safety outcomes, for example, the number of electric shocks in the workplace. Recommendation 17. Future revisions to mining regulations for both the coal and the metalliferous and extractive sectors to require the development, implementation and monitoring of standards of engineering practice. Also a clear definition of Standards of Engineering Practice be developed to cover the life cycle of the equipment and that records be retained, specifically the results of electrical tests.
Recommendation 18. at the mine.
Records of tests required by AS3000 are retained
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Electric Shock Prevention Project - Appendices
10 List of appendices
Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I Appendix J List of Figures Electric Shock Statistics Assessment Statistics Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 Extract of AS3859-1991: Effects of current passing through the human body Extract of the Coal Mines (General) Regulations 1999 Extract of the General Rule 2000 DMR assessment document
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10.1 Appendix A: List of figures

FIGURE 1. NERTNEY WHEEL...................................................................................................................................................... 10 FIGURE 2. VICTIM MANAGEMENT STATISTICS ........................................................................................................................... 16 FIGURE 3. AUDIT STATISTICS .................................................................................................................................................... 18 FIGURE 4. SOCKET OUTLET HELD IN PLACE WITH TAPE ............................................................................................................. 21 FIGURE 5. DISCONNECTED EARTH CONDUCTORS IN ELECTRICAL PANEL .................................................................................... 22 FIGURE 6. PERCENTAGE OF MINE THAT CONDUCT EC TESTING ................................................................................................. 22 FIGURE 7. FLUORESCENT LIGHT FITTING FULL OF WATER ......................................................................................................... 23 FIGURE 8. PERCENTAGE OF MINES THAT CONDUCT REGULAR INSULATION RESISTANCE TESTING .............................................. 23 FIGURE 9. PERCENTAGE OF MINES THAT INJECTION TEST RCD UNITS ....................................................................................... 24 FIGURE 10. WELL DESIGNED DISTRIBUTION BOARD .................................................................................................................. 24 FIGURE 11. PORTABLE TOOL STATISTICS ................................................................................................................................... 25 FIGURE 12. PORTABLE LEAD WITH CONDUCTORS SHOWING ...................................................................................................... 26 FIGURE 13. LEAD WITH CURRENT TAG THAT IS NOT SERVICEABLE ........................................................................................... 26 FIGURE 14. LEAD WITH CONDUCTORS SHOWING ....................................................................................................................... 27 FIGURE 15. PORTABLE WELDER WITH DAMAGED CASE ............................................................................................................. 27 FIGURE 16. CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR ISOLATION. ....................................................................................................................... 29 FIGURE 17. UNATTENDED ELECTRODE HOLDER ........................................................................................................................ 30 FIGURE 18. DAMAGED ELECTRODE HOLDER ............................................................................................................................. 31 FIGURE 19. DAMAGED CONNECTIONS........................................................................................................................................ 31 FIGURE 20. DAMAGED SUPPLY CABLE ...................................................................................................................................... 32 FIGURE 21. RETURN LEAD CONNECTED TO BUILDING................................................................................................................ 32 FIGURE 22. WELL FITTED OUT WELDING MACHINE .................................................................................................................. 33 FIGURE 23. WELDING IN DAMP AREAS ...................................................................................................................................... 33 FIGURE 24. WELDING STATISTICS ............................................................................................................................................. 34 FIGURE 25. ENCLOSURE THAT IS NOT NORMALLY LOCKED ....................................................................................................... 35 FIGURE 26. ENCLOSURE WITH EXPOSED LIVE TERMINALS ........................................................................................................ 35 FIGURE 27. ENCLOSURE WITH INTERNAL START FUNCTION ...................................................................................................... 36 FIGURE 28. DISTRIBUTION BOARD WITH MISSING POLE FILLERS............................................................................................... 37 FIGURE 29. DISTRIBUTION BOARD CONSTRUCTED ON SITE ....................................................................................................... 37 FIGURE 30. DISTRIBUTION BOARD WITH MISSING POLE FILLERS............................................................................................... 38 FIGURE 31. DISTRIBUTION BOARD WITH SEVERAL POLE FILLERS MISSING................................................................................ 38 FIGURE 32. ENCLOSURE DOOR WITH EARTH BOND NOT CONNECTED ......................................................................................... 39 FIGURE 33. DISCONNECTED EARTH CONDUCTORS ..................................................................................................................... 39 FIGURE 34. METAL GLANDS IN PLASTIC ENCLOSURE................................................................................................................. 40 FIGURE 35. CONTROL STATION WITH SOCKET OUTLET FITTED. ................................................................................................. 40 FIGURE 36. SOCKET OUTLETS COVERED IN DUST. ..................................................................................................................... 41 FIGURE 37. DISTRIBUTION BOARD WITH TOP COVER LEFT OFF ................................................................................................. 42 FIGURE 38. CABLE DUCT WITH NO COVER FITTED .................................................................................................................... 42 FIGURE 39. CABLES IN FLEXIBLE CONDUIT ENTERING ENCLOSURE............................................................................................ 43 FIGURE 40. UNGLANDED CABLES ENTERING ENCLOSURE.......................................................................................................... 43 FIGURE 41. PAPER USED TO BLANK HOLES IN PANEL. ............................................................................................................... 44 FIGURE 42. WELL DESIGNED LOCAL CONTROL STATION. .......................................................................................................... 44
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FIGURE 43. SWITCHBOARD ADJACENT WASH TUB..................................................................................................................... 45 FIGURE 44. BUILDING WITH SERVICES ....................................................................................................................................... 45 FIGURE 45. BATH HOUSE PUMP................................................................................................................................................. 46 FIGURE 46. DAM PUMP. ............................................................................................................................................................ 46 FIGURE 47. SWITCHROOM WITH DOORS BOLTED SHUT. ............................................................................................................. 47 FIGURE 48. SWITCHROOM WITH DOOR THAT OPENS INWARD. ................................................................................................... 47 FIGURE 49. ELEVATED SUBSTATION INSTALLATION................................................................................................................... 48 FIGURE 50. SWITCHROOM ......................................................................................................................................................... 48 FIGURE 51. ENCLOSURE WITH NO SIGNS ................................................................................................................................... 49 FIGURE 52. ENCLOSURE WITH PAPER SIGNS............................................................................................................................... 49 FIGURE 53. SIGN ON SWITCHYARD FENCE ................................................................................................................................. 50 FIGURE 54. MCC WITH A HIGH STANDARD OF SIGNAGE. ......................................................................................................... 50 FIGURE 55. MAIN SWITCH WITH SMALLER CONDUCTORS.......................................................................................................... 51 FIGURE 56. ENCLOSURE THAT IS BADLY RUSTED....................................................................................................................... 51 FIGURE 57. CONTACTORS WEDGED IN ....................................................................................................................................... 52 FIGURE 58. ACCESS TO DISTRIBUTION BOARD IS RESTRICTED. .................................................................................................. 52 FIGURE 59. SWITCHBOARD CELL HELD ON WITH TAPE .............................................................................................................. 53 FIGURE 60. UNLOOMED CONDUCTORS IN AN ENCLOSURE. ......................................................................................................... 53 FIGURE 61. STRAY WIRES IN AN ENCLOSURE............................................................................................................................. 54 FIGURE 62. ENCLOSURE THAT DUST HAS ENTERED ................................................................................................................... 54 FIGURE 63. REDUNDANT CABLES .............................................................................................................................................. 55 FIGURE 64. REDUNDANT CABLE POKED BEHIND ADJACENT CABLE........................................................................................... 55 FIGURE 65. ELECTRIC SHOCK BY THE LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE ............................................................................................ 64 FIGURE 66. CATEGORY OF MINE WHERE THE ELECTRIC SHOCK OCCURRED. ............................................................................. 64 FIGURE 67. ELECTRIC SHOCK BY EQUIPMENT TYPE .................................................................................................................. 65 FIGURE 68. ELECTRIC SHOCK BY THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTOR ........................................................................................ 65 FIGURE 69. ELECTRIC SHOCKS BY CATEGORY OF SHOCK. ......................................................................................................... 66 FIGURE 70. ELECTRIC SHOCKS BY SOURCE VOLTAGE ............................................................................................................... 66 FIGURE 71. ELECTRIC SHOCK BY TYPE OF WORKER .................................................................................................................. 67 FIGURE 72. OVERALL INDUSTRY RATING .................................................................................................................................. 69 FIGURE 73. COAL MINING SECTOR ............................................................................................................................................ 69 FIGURE 74. METALLIFEROUS AND EXTRACTIVES SECTOR .......................................................................................................... 69 FIGURE 75. VICTIM MANAGEMENT STATISTICS ......................................................................................................................... 70 FIGURE 76. HAZARD STATISTICS ............................................................................................................................................... 70 FIGURE 77. AUDIT STATISTICS .................................................................................................................................................. 70 FIGURE 78. COMMISSIONING STATISTICS .................................................................................................................................. 71 FIGURE 79. MAINTENANCE STATISTICS ..................................................................................................................................... 71 FIGURE 80. PORTABLE TOOL STATISTICS ................................................................................................................................... 72 FIGURE 81. ISOLATION PROCEDURE STATISTICS ........................................................................................................................ 72 FIGURE 82. WELDING STATISTICS ............................................................................................................................................. 73 FIGURE 83. DIRECT CONTACT RISK ........................................................................................................................................... 73 FIGURE 84. INDIRECT CONTACT RISK ........................................................................................................................................ 74 FIGURE 85. SIGNS AND NOTICES ................................................................................................................................................ 74 FIGURE 86. WELDING EQUIPMENT STATISTICS .......................................................................................................................... 74 FIGURE 87. WORKER KNOWLEDGE STATISTICS ......................................................................................................................... 75
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FIGURE 88. FLOATING PUMP PONTOON...................................................................................................................................... 76 FIGURE 89. PUMP STARTER ENCLOSURE .................................................................................................................................... 76 FIGURE 90. INSIDE OF PUMP ENCLOSURE ................................................................................................................................... 77 FIGURE 91. EXPOSED LIVE PARTS .............................................................................................................................................. 77 FIGURE 92. EARTH LEAKAGE UNIT............................................................................................................................................ 78 FIGURE 93. BOTTOM OF ENCLOSURE ......................................................................................................................................... 78 FIGURE 94. RAG BLOCKING HOLE IN ENCLOSURE ...................................................................................................................... 79 FIGURE 95. AUTO TRANSFORMER .............................................................................................................................................. 79 FIGURE 96. INTERNAL CIRCUIT BREAKER .................................................................................................................................. 80 FIGURE 97. EXPOSED LIVE PARTS ............................................................................................................................................. 80 FIGURE 98. ENCLOSURE INTERIOR ............................................................................................................................................. 81 FIGURE 99. CIRCUIT BREAKER ENCLOSURE ............................................................................................................................... 81 FIGURE 100. CONTACTOR ARC CHUTE MISSING ........................................................................................................................ 82 FIGURE 101. WORKSHOP BUS RAIL SYSTEM .............................................................................................................................. 83 FIGURE 102. LIGHT PLUGGED INTO BUS SYSTEM....................................................................................................................... 83 FIGURE 103. WORKSHOP BENCHES............................................................................................................................................ 84 FIGURE 104. WORKBENCH AND TOOL LOCKER .......................................................................................................................... 84 FIGURE 105. REDUNDANT CABLE .............................................................................................................................................. 85 FIGURE 106. WELDER SUPPLY CABLE ....................................................................................................................................... 85 FIGURE 107. WELDING ELECTRODE HOLDER ............................................................................................................................. 86 FIGURE 108. WORKSHOP CABLING ............................................................................................................................................ 86 FIGURE 109. MODIFIED SOCKET OUTLET................................................................................................................................... 86 FIGURE 110. CRIB ROOM........................................................................................................................................................... 87 FIGURE 111. LAMP ROOM ......................................................................................................................................................... 87 FIGURE 112. DOUBLE ADAPTORS .............................................................................................................................................. 87 FIGURE 113. METHANE BOTTLES .............................................................................................................................................. 88
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10.2 Appendix B: Electric shock statistics

Electric Shock Incidents The following statistics relate to electric shocks reported throughout the NSW mining industry from 1 September 1999 to 30 June 2002. They were used during the electric shock assessment project in order to determine the areas that needed the most attention.
Location The following graph depicts the incidence of electric shock according to the location at the mine in which they have occurred. It shows that in the majority of cases the electric shock occurred at surface mines and the surface areas of underground mines.
UG Elsew here 17% UG Hazardous 4% Preparation Plant 34%
Surface 45%
Figure 65. Electric shock by the location of occurrence
Mine type The following graph depicts the incidence of electric shock according to the type of operation at which the shock occurred.
Surface Metal 6% UG Metal 34% Surface Coal 42% UG Coal 18%
Figure 66. Category of mine where the electric shock occurred
[Note: Reporting rates may vary from one area to another.]
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Equipment type The following graph shows the type of equipment that the electric shock was received from. The source of the majority of reported electric shocks has been fixed equipment. This type of equipment is responsible for 53% of the total shocks with portable tools and welding equipment also having a significant number of reported shocks.
Welding 9% Portable 19% Fixed 53%
Transportable 3% Mobile 16%

Figure 67. Electric shock by equipment type
Contributing factor The data from the reported shocks has been analysed with regards to the factor that contributed most to the electric shock. In the majority of cases the factor that contributed most was that the equipment was not fit for the purpose that for which it was being used.
Procedures 22%
Competency 3%
Not Fit For Purpose 75%
Figure 68. Electric shock by the main contributing factor
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Category of shock There are 2 categories of electric shock as defined in AS/NZS 3000. These are direct contact and indirect contact. Even though strictly not an electric shock, burns from electrical equipment has been included in this graph. It can be seen that the majority of electric shocks fall into the indirect category.
Burns 3% Direct 36% Indirect 61%
Figure 69. Electric shocks by category of shock
[Note: Any indirect shock is an indication that the equipment is not fit for purpose.]
Source of shock The following graph shows the source of the shock according to the voltage level. The voltage levels defined in AS/NZS 3000 are: ELV <50Va.c. LV =50-1000Va.c. HV >1000Va.c.
Extra Low Voltage 9% High Voltage 8%
Low Voltage 83%
Figure 70. Electric shocks by source voltage
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Type of victim The following graph shows the nature of the victims employment. The data shows that the majority of victims of electric shock are not electricity workers but are employed in other fields.
Electrical 27%
Non Electrical 73%

Figure 71. Electric shock by type of worker
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10.3 Appendix C: Assessment statistics

The statistics that follow are based on the following data: Number of operations assessed Number of electrical enclosures inspected Number of electrical workers interviewed Number of welders interviewed 111 286 85 67
The mining operations assessed were made up as follows: Type of Mine Antimony Basalt Coal Preparation Plants Open Cut Coal Mines Underground Coal Mines Surface Copper Mines Underground Copper Mines Surface Gold Mines Underground Gold Mine Granite Underground Lead / Zinc Limestone Magnetite Quartzite Refuse Sand Slate Alluvial Tin Number of Operations 1 10 17 23 39 1 2 4 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1
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Ratings for risk of electric shock All mines that were assessed were rated in accordance with the risk of electric shock. The factors taken into consideration in order to determine this ranking were: The presence and relevance of procedures that are necessary in order to manage the risks associated with the safe use of electricity. Evidence that these procedures are well known to those persons who need to follow them and how well they are being followed. The condition of the electrical equipment on site. The training and competence of the electricity workers who carry out the installation and maintenance of the electrical equipment on site.
Very Secure 3% Secure 31%
Very Exposed 6%
Exposed 29%
Average 31%
Figure 72. Overall industry rating
Very Secure 4%
Very Exposed 4% Exposed 27%
Secure 33%
Average 32%
Figure 73. Coal mining sector
Very Secure 4% Secure 25%
Very Exposed 13%
Exposed 29%
Average 29%
Figure 74. Metalliferous and extractives sector
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10.3.1 Procedures
10.3.1.1 Electric shock victim management
Mines that have documented victim management procedures
61%
Mines that would refer all victims of electric shock to hospital
76%
Mines where procedures call for an ECG
50%
20
40
60
80
10 0
Figure 75. Victim management statistics
10.3.1.2
Management of electrical hazards
Mines that have identified electricity as a hazard
53%
Mines that have a SEP for managing electrical hazards

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
48%
Figure 76. Hazard statistics
10.3.1.3
Audit of electrical equipment for standards compliance
Mines that have conducted audits for compliance to standards Mines that have conducted an audit covering all circuits on surface
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
58%
26%
Figure 77. Audit statistics
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Electric Shock Prevention Project - Appendices 10.3.1.4 Installation and commissioning tests
Mines that conduct the tests from AS/NZS 3000, Section 6 Mines in which electricians have access to a multimeter Employers who provide multimeters 64%
89%
84%
Electrical workers who use a Cat III meter
67%
Electrical workers who are issued with non contact testers

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
65%
Figure 78. Commissioning statistics
10.3.1.5
Maintenance
Mines that address AS/NZS 3000 compliance in a maintenance scheme Mines that address AS/NZS 3000 compliance in SEP Mines that have competency provisions for electricity workers Electricity workers who have been trained in AS/NZS 3000 Mines that address all equipment on site in their maintenance scheme Mines that have insulation testing protocols 58%
44%
64%
39%
60%
50%
Mines that have earth continuity testing protocols
44%
20
40
60
80
10 0
Figure 79. Maintenance statistics
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10.3.1.6
Portable tools and leads
Mines that consider wet areas
23%
Mines that cover contractors equipment
79%
Mines that consider manufacturers directions
25%
Mines that consider AS 3012
10%
Mines that consider steam cleaners, sump pumps etc. Mines that include leads in the maintenance scheme Mines that include tools in the maintenance scheme Mines that adhere to AS 3760
25%
74%
78%
73%
Mines that consider the suitability of equipment
32%
Mines that have a procedure for the safe use of portable tools
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
57%
Figure 80. Portable tool statistics
10.3.1.7
Isolation procedures
Mines that have documented isolation procedures Mines that employ locks in their isolation practices
85%
44%
Mines that rely on tags alone for their isolation procedures
41%
Mines with documented removal and restoration procedures

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
53%
Figure 81. Isolation procedure statistics
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Electric Shock Prevention Project - Appendices 10.3.1.8 Welding procedures
Mines with safe welding procedures
49%
Mines that comply with AS 1674.2
39%
Mines that consider AS1966.1
14%
Mines that consider AS1966.2
14%
Mines that test welding equipment 3 monthly
66%
Mines that overhaul welding equipment every 2 years Mines that require the use of VRDs
8%
65%
Mines that test VRD units
25%
Mines that cover apply basic welding practices

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
43%
Figure 82. Welding statistics
10.3.2 Equipment inspections

10.3.2.1 Risk of direct contact as defined in AS/NZS 3000
Enclosures that have full pole fillers fitted
80%
Enclosures locked in accordance with standards
83%
Enclosures with no internal reset or control functions
26%
Mines having no identifiable risk of direct contact
38%
20
40
60
80
10 0
Figure 83. Direct contact risk
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Electric Shock Prevention Project - Appendices 10.3.2.2 Risk of indirect contact
Mines with RCDs on all socket outlets
92%
Mines with RCDs on lighting circuits
46%
Enclosures having correct earth bonds to doors
92%
Switchyards with earth bonds on gates
92%
20
40
60
80
10 0
Figure 84. Indirect contact risk
10.3.2.3
Signs
Coal mining installations having the signs required by legislation Metalliferous installations having suitable signs
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
27%
30%
Figure 85. Signs and notices
10.3.2.4
Welding equipment
Welders with VRD fitted when required
40%
Welders that have earth lead connected correctly
87%
Mines where equipment was undamaged

0 20 40 60 80 10 0
53%
Figure 86. Welding equipment statistics
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10.3.3 Knowledge of electricity workers The following questions were asked of the electricity workers interviewed in order to ascertain training levels of workers. The responses to the questions are as follows:
Read AS/NZS 3000
57%
Read AS 3007
38%
Knew meaning of direct contact
88%
Knew meaning of indirect contact
42%
Have received training in AS/NZS 3000
57%
Use RCD tester to test RCD units
44%
Have been issued with non contact testers
83%
Know how to determine if meter is safe for circuit under test Know when an enclosure should be locked
0 20 40 60 80 10 0
29%
51%
Figure 87. Worker knowledge statistics
10.3.4 Enforcement actions During the assessment project a number of enforcement actions were taken. These actions were for those issues that were deemed to be either unsafe or warranted for other reasons. Number of notices issued in accordance with section 61 of the CMRA 1982 Number of notices issued in accordance with section 36(b) of the MIA 1902 19 8
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10.4 Appendix D: Case Study 1

Case Study 1 The installation is located some distance from the mine site and is used to supply fresh water to the mine. The pump is installed on a floating pontoon.
The lake is part of the local water supply and is administered by the water board. The mine personnel maintain both the pump and the associated electrical equipment. The power and control supply cables are installed on a cable tray fixed to the side of the access walkway.
Figure 88. Floating pump pontoon
The pump is supplied by an enclosure that is mounted on the switchyard fence. The supply transformer is configured as an IT system (for detail of an IT system refer to AS 3007) with a neutral earthing impedance being located within the switchyard. The enclosure is a weatherproof type with an overhanging hood to protect it from the elements. The enclosure is badly corroded and requires some attention if it is to remain serviceable into the future. The installation does not comply with the Coal Mines General Regulations Clause 29, which requires certain signs to be located at all electrical installations. There is no sign to indicate the function of the enclosure and what equipment it controls. There is no sign to indicate how to resuscitate a victim of electric shock. There is no sign to indicate procedure in case of fire.
Figure 89. Pump starter enclosure
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AS/NZS 3000 requires all electrical enclosures to be locked to prevent the occurrence of electric shock by direct contact. Even though this enclosure is normally locked there is a risk of inadvertent contact due to the design of the equipment. The enclosure must be opened to: isolate, start the drive and reset the overload.
There are several areas inside the enclosure where there are exposed live parts that are inappropriately protected against inadvertent contact.
Figure 90. Inside of pump enclosure
The terminals on the overload units are not protected against direct contact and are live when the enclosure door is opened. Also note that the screws in the fuseholders are exposed.
Figure 91. Exposed live parts
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There is a socket outlet located within the enclosure that does not have RCD protection having 30mA sensitivity. The main earth leakage protection is not failsafe. This is particularly important on an IT system since an earth fault that is not cleared by the earth leakage unit will go undetected by other forms of protection. The control circuit is connected phase to neutral. This practice is strongly discouraged in AS 3007 for an IT configuration. The 240 volt a.c. control circuit has no sensitive earth leakage protection. It would be recommended that this circuit have sensitive earth leakage protection since the local control station is located on the pump pontoon.
Figure 92. Earth leakage unit
The bottom of the enclosure is used to store spare parts. The unused cable entries have not been properly blanked off, therefore compromising the IP rating. The sharp edges are not bushed to prevent insulation damage to the cables. The cables, rather than being glanded properly, have had knots tied in them to prevent them from falling through the enclosure.
Figure 93. Bottom of enclosure
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10.5 Appendix E: Case Study 2

Case Study 2 This case study is of an ore processing plant. The plant is supplied from a pole top transformer located adjacent to the main switchroom. The switchroom has a collection of separate enclosures that control the primary crushing and conveyor systems.
This is a harsh environment with ingress of dust being a major concern. In an attempt to prevent dust entering the enclosure through the top, a piece of rag has been used to block up the hole.
Figure 94. Rag blocking hole in enclosure
An attempt to keep the dust out of this enclosure has met with limited success. The cables entering the enclosure have not been properly glanded and the enclosure is not protected from vermin.
Figure 95. Auto transformer
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An isolator is located inside this enclosure. It is necessary to open the enclosure in order to operate the circuit breaker. The terminals of the circuit breaker are not shrouded to protect against inadvertent contact with live parts. This increases the risk to the safety of the operator due to arc blast.
Figure 96. Internal circuit Breaker
Even though the enclosures are kept locked the key is available to all personnel on site. AS 3007 requires that entry to electrical enclosures is restricted to skilled people only. In this case the only personnel who should have access to the enclosures should be electricians.
Figure 97. Exposed live parts
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All of the enclosures within the switchroom have been wired without the use of wire numbers. There are no schematic or single line diagrams available for the circuits. This makes fault finding very difficult and encourages live testing.
Figure 98. Enclosure interior
The bottom of this photograph shows the earth leakage relay for the crusher. Above the earth leakage relay is a circuit breaker. The label indicates that in order to start the crusher the circuit breaker must be turned off. This bypasses the earth leakage protection as it interrupts the shunt tripping supply.
Figure 99. Circuit breaker enclosure
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This enclosure contains a star delta starter for controlling a large drive. The contactor to the right has had the arc chute removed. Without the arc chute in place the contactor cannot effectively break the current and increases the risk of fire.
Figure 100. Contactor arc chute missing
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10.6 Appendix F: Case Study 3

Case Study 3 This study is not of a single installation but more a collection of bad practices that were present on a site. It is the result of bad work practices over a long period that sees several non compliance and safety issues present.
The workshop is supplied from a main distribution board via an overhead busbar system. The busbar system is protected against short circuit and earth leakage at the distribution board end. The earth leakage protection is set at 500 mA. The individual circuits are supplied via plug in boxes as shown. The plug in boxes contain fuses for short circuit protection.
Figure 101. Workshop bus rail system
A circuit that supplies the lighting circuit via a 3 pin plug. The lighting circuit is not appropriately protected against short circuit or earth fault.
Figure 102. Light plugged into bus system
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Another section of the same workshop. The plug in busbar units are used to supply the socket outlets that are mounted on the bench tool lockers. The cabling to the socket outlet is unsupported. The socket outlet does not have RCD protection to the value of 30mA. The tool lockers are not earthed.
Figure 103. Workshop benches
A similar installation. In this case the supply cable is a 3 phase. The mixed circuit supplies: The 3 phase socket outlet The GPO socket outlet The fluorescent light over the bench
There is no 30 mA RCD protection. The locker is not earthed. The supply cable is not adequately supported.
Figure 104. Workbench and tool locker
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A piece of equipment that is no longer needed. It was supplied from a similar busbar plug. Note the cable from the switch has been cut off and pushed behind the adjacent cable. The cable should have been completely removed so that it cannot be re-energised.
Figure 105. Redundant cable
A welding machine in the same workshop. The supply cable has suffered insulation damage and has been repaired by taping the damaged section with insulation tape.
Figure 106. Welder supply cable
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Another welder in the same workshop has the electrode left in the holder unattended on the workshop bench.
Figure 107. Welding electrode holder
Renovations to the workshop have seen the installation of a roller door for workshop access. The cabling needed to be relocated to allow the installation. The cabling has not been reinstalled on cable tray, but rather tied to a support pipe using rope.
Figure 108. Workshop cabling
A modification to the circuitry has been made to allow RCD protection to be present on the socket outlet. The socket outlet on the left is inoperative and serves only as a junction box. The portable RCD unit is permanently wired to the circuit, affording RCD protection to the appliances plugged into the outlet. An out of service tag is attached to the unit. It is almost two years old and states that the RCD unit is defective and cannot be turned off.
Figure 109. Modified socket outlet
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The single extension cord from the portable RCD unit was used to supply the crib room area. Contained within the crib room was a: refrigerator, microwave oven, conventional pie oven, sandwich toaster, and vertical grill. The portable RCD unit is rated at 10 Amperes.
Figure 110. Crib room
The lamp cabin area of the same mine. Due to a lack of permanently wired socket outlets there is a high usage of double adaptors within the lamp room area. The socket outlets are not protected by RCD units with 30mA sensitivity.
Figure 111. Lamp room
This is the area of the lamp room where the methane monitors are checked and calibrated. This area also has a heavy reliance on the use of double adaptors.
Figure 112. Double adaptors
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Another of the portable RCD units used in order to afford RCD protection to the appliances plugged into it. The photograph also shows the practice of storing the methane calibration tubes on top of the portable RCD device.
Figure 113. Methane bottles
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10.7 Appendix G: Extracts from AS3859

Excerpts from AS 3859-1991: Effects of current passing through the human body
PHYSIOLOGY OF ELECTROCUTION (Informative)
B1 ELECTROCUTIONDESCRIPTION The term electrocution implies death due to the action of electric current. The current may produce functional derangement incompatible with life in certain vital organs. The most common disorders of this sort relate to heart function and respiratory action. If the heart ceases its function of pumping blood, the oxygen carried by the blood does not reach vital centres and death ensues. If breathing ceases, then insufficient oxygen enters the blood stream (hypoxia) and this causes cell and tissue death. Some tissues are more sensitive than others to hypoxic damage, the most sensitive being the brain, which can only be without oxygen for about 4 minutes before onset of irreversible damage. In electrocution, cessation of circulation (circulatory arrest) occurs because the natural rhythm of the heart is disrupted, making coordinated pumping impossible. The disordered rhythm may take one of several forms, the most common being ventricular fibrillation, where heart muscle cells contract in a random disordered fashion. B2 ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY OF EXCITABLE CELLS All cell membranes are electrically polarised, the inside of the membrane surface negative with respect to the outside. The membrane has a polarisation voltage of 70 mV to 90 mV, maintained by active cellular processes that create ionic concentration differences across the membrane. When a cell membrane is stimulated, it becomes locally depolarised with the inner surface losing its charge. When this process reaches a certain electrical threshold, a regenerative process occurs which leads to depolarisation of the whole membrane. This depolarisation is propagated by local currents along the cell producing a measurable voltage known as an action potential. The membrane must repolarise before another action potential can be conducted and during this period is said to be refractory. B3 EFFECT OF FREQUENCY Because of membrane capacitance, the response of excitable cells is frequency dependent. The membrane is effectively a low-pass filter. If the frequency of the applied current is high, the time constant of the cell membrane may be sufficiently long to prevent the depolarisation threshold being reached. Thus such a current would be an ineffective stimulus. B4 EFFECT OF ELECTRICITY ON HEART MUSCLE CELLS Heart muscle cells are particularly susceptible to low-frequency alternating current in the range 40 Hz to 100 Hz. An appreciation of how such currents can disrupt cardiac rhythm requires an understanding of the electrical and mechanical events in the cardiac cycle. The heart is a sophisticated four-chambered pump controlled by an intricate electrical system. The upper chambers of the heart are known as the right and left atria. The lower chambers are
known as the right and left ventricles. Blood entering the right ventricle must be pressurised sufficiently to be forced through the pulmonary circulation to the left atrium and left ventricle. The left ventricle is then responsible for generating enough pressure to force the now oxygenated blood through the body. The heart rate is governed by both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Electrical impulses originate in the sino atrial (SA) node in the right atrium, which initiates the contraction process. The wave of depolarisation initiated in the SA node is carried to the remaining cardiac muscle through a specially adapted network of fastconducting muscle fibres as shown in Figure B1. The SA node (the hearts natural pacemaker) discharges at an intrinsic rate of about 1 Hz. However this may be modulated up or down by sympathetic and parasympathetic nerves impinging on the SA node or by circulating hormones or both. Physiologically the atria are electrically insulated from the ventricles except at the AV node. The wave of depolarisation originating in the SA node moves over the atria (causing contraction) and eventually reaches the atrio-ventricular (AV) node. Functionally the AV node is similar to the SA node. It acts to coordinate the atrial impulse so that it is transferred to the ventricles as a single impulse and from where it is distributed throughout the ventricles via a further network of specialised conductive tissue. Thus the ventricles contract a short time after the atria. An electric current that impinges on the orderly contraction process may disrupt it, the requirements being sufficient magnitude and appropriate frequency. Heart muscle is particularly vulnerable during its electrical repolarisation phase and ventricular fibrillation may result, (see Figures 6 and 7 of page 16). Ventricular fibrillation will often continue even though the source of current may be switched off or removed.
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10.8 Appendix H: Extract from Coal Mines (General) Regulation

9 Standards of mechanical engineering practice and electrical engineering practice (1) For the purposes of this Regulation and the Underground Regulation or Open Cut Regulation, a mine manager must, within 6 months after the commencement of this Regulation: (a) in consultation with the mine mechanical engineer, establish standards of mechanical engineering practice for the mine, and (b) in consultation with the mine electrical engineer, establish standards of electrical engineering practice for the mine. (2) For the purposes of this Regulation, a manager of a declared plant must, within 6 months after the commencement of this Regulation, establish standards of mechanical engineering practice and electrical engineering practice for the declared plant. (3) Standards of engineering practice established under this clause must be sufficient to meet any relevant requirements of the Act, this Regulation, the Underground Regulation and the Open Cut Regulation and include: (a) standards of competency for persons working with relevant equipment at the mine or declared plant, and (b) standards for the design, installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance (including servicing, repairing and overhauling) and decommissioning of relevant equipment at the mine or declared plant, and (c) in the case of a mine, standards for the systematic examination and testing of relevant equipment at the mine for the purposes of a scheme in force under section 103 of the Act. (4) The standards must be documented and the relevant document or documents must be kept at the mine or declared plant. (5) A manager of a mine or declared plant must: (a) monitor the standards of engineering practice established at the mine or declared plant, and (b) employ, or cause to be employed, as many competent persons as are necessary to ensure that those standards are met. (6) If it comes to the attention of a mine mechanical engineer that a mechanical engineering standard established at the mine is not being met and, as a result, a significant hazard may arise, the mine mechanical engineer must inform the mine manager in writing of the nature of the hazard as soon as practicable. (7) If it comes to the attention of a mine electrical engineer that an electrical engineering standard established at the mine is not being met and, as a result, a significant hazard may arise, the mine electrical engineer must inform the mine manager in writing of the nature of the hazard as soon as practicable. (8) In this clause, relevant equipment: (a) in relation to standards of mechanical engineering practice, means mechanical equipment, and (b) in relation to standards of electrical engineering practice, means electrical equipment.
10.9 Appendix I: Extract from the General Rule 2000

68 Requirements as to electricity 1. The general manager of a mine must ensure that: (a) electrical installations at the mine are designed, installed and maintained to minimise the potential for any electric shock or for burns, injury, explosion, fire, overheating or mechanical damage, and (b) suitable inspection and testing of electrical installations at the mine is carried out at the time of installation and then periodically in order to identify any deficiencies and have them corrected, and (c) electrical installations at the mine comply with the requirements of the following standards applicable to the installations: (i) Australian Standard AS 3007.11987 Electrical installationsSurface mines and associated processing plantScope and definitions, and (ii) Australian Standard AS 3007.21987 Electrical installationsSurface mines and associated processing plantGeneral protection requirements, and (iii) Australian Standard AS 3007.31987 Electrical installationsSurface mines and associated processing plantGeneral requirements for equipment and ancillaries, and (iv) Australian Standard AS 3007.41987 Electrical installationsSurface mines and associated processing plantAdditional requirements for specific applications, and (v) Australian Standard AS 3007.51987 Electrical installationsSurface mines and associated processing plantOperating requirements, and (vi) Australian Standard AS 3000:2000 Electrical installations (known as the Australian/New Zealand Wiring Rules). 2. The general manager of a mine must notify an inspector or a mine safety officer of any intention: (a) to introduce an electricity supply to the mine, or (b) to introduce an electricity supply to underground workings at the mine, or (c) to cease using electricity at the mine, or (d) to make major additions or alterations to the electricity supply at the mine, or (e) to make major additions or alterations to fixed generating equipment or reticulation at the mine, or (f) to install or extend fixed electrical generating capacity at the mine. 3. The general manager must make available to the inspector or mine safety officer any further information, plans or details required by the inspector or mine safety officer. 4. The general manager of a mine that has an electricity supply must ensure that a means of communication between major supply points and between surface and underground supply points is provided for use in case of danger or faults in the supply.
5.
The general manager of a mine must report any of the following incidents to an inspector or a mine safety officer at the earliest practicable time but, in any event, no later than 24 hours after the event: (a) any electric shock sustained by any person from an electricity source above extra low voltage, (b) any burns requiring first aid treatment, where the heat source that caused the burn was electrical equipment, (c) any fire caused by the malfunction of electrical equipment, any unintended movement of electrically powered or controlled equipment (including any failure of that equipment to stop) that endangered persons or caused serious property damage.
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10.10 Appendix J: DMR assessment document

This is a copy the document used by DMR Mine Safety Officers during the Electric Shock Prevention Project when visiting sites to assess the management of issues that relate to electric engineering safety.
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NSW DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL RESOURSES Level 1, 1 Civic Avenue (PO Box 51), Singleton, NSW 2300, Australia INSPECTORATE: Phone (02) 6572 1899 . Fax (02) 6572 1201
PREVENTION OF ELECTRIC SHOCK

Inspection in Accordance with Section 59 (1) CMRA and Section 36 MIA
Electrical Safety Assessment by Inspectors of Electrical Engineering
Date
Operation
Inspectors of Electrical Engineering Operation Personnel
Areas Inspected
Summary of comments
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Contents of Report
Section Summary of comments Contents of report Purpose Scope Definitions Process Feedback Electric shock procedures AS 3000 Audit Known NCRs Test Equipment Electrical Maintenance Portable Apparatus Welding List of Attachments
Page
Purpose
1. To reduce the risk of electric shocks in NSW mines.
Scope
2. All mines in NSW. 3. Initial focus on coal operations and large metalliferous mines. 4. Mainly fixed low voltage installations on the surface. 5. Portable low voltage apparatus. 6. Welding equipment and practices.
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Definitions
7. Low voltage (LV) greater than 50 V ac (ELV) but less than 1000 V ac (HV). Ref AS 3000 8. VRD voltage reduction device, used to control the output of a welder to a safe level. 9. RCD Residual current device, also known as earth leakage relay. 10.SEP Standard of Engineering Practice, as required by Clause 9 General Regulation or Clause 68 (1) GR2000. 11.SOP Standard Operating Procedure or equivalent.
Process
12.Inspectors of Electrical Engineering and Electrical MSOs will assess all coal operations and selected metalliferous mines in NSW. 13.The assessment will flow as follows:
Forward assessment criteria to the operation for self evaluation, and arrange an assessment date. Site inspection with engineer and Electrical Check Inspector if available. Interview electricity workers and others on site. Information session with Electrical Engineer. Close out meeting with the manager of the operation.

14.DMR officers will record assessment data in Comet, and prepare summary information for industry.
Feedback
15.The duty for ensuring AS3000 is complied with rests on the manager of the operation. 16.The manager should be briefed on the outcomes of the assessment. 17.An assessment report should be forwarded to the manager. 18.Opportunities for improvement should be identified in accordance with the DMR enforcement policy. 19.Summary data will be provided to the corporate level and at industry forums.
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Electric shock procedures
Does the operation have documented electric shock victim management procedures.
Do they require provision of transport to hospital? Do they require an ECG at hospital?
Management
20.Who controls the electrical maintenance staff at the mine, 21.Has electricity been identified as a serious hazard at the mine? 22.Is there a safety management plan for electrical hazards in place, either in full or as part of another SMP? 23.What do you think is the biggest electric shock risk on site?
AS 3000 and AS 3007 audit
24.Has the operation completed an audit against AS 3000 and AS 3007? 25.Who conducted the audit? 26.Did it cover every circuit on the surface? 27.Did it examine compliance for direct contact? incl
Access to live parts IP ratings Fences / barriers Notices Isolation devices etc
28.Did it examine compliance for indirect contact? Incl

Earthing Protection
29.Did it consider equipment rating? 30.Did it consider physical suitability of equipment for it environment? 31.What is the status of any known NCRs from the Audit?
Known NCRs
Have alternative risk controls been implemented? Are they risk based? Do they conform to the hierarchy of risk control? (ie eliminate, control, minimise, PPE)
Commissioning and Testing
32.Do the installation and modification procedures at the mine include conducting the Section 6 tests out of AS 3000? 33.How are test results reported? 34.What are the reporting procedures(eg to DMR if under GR2000, or to Mine Electrical Engineer if CMRA) 35.How do electricians prove that conductors are de energised?
Test Equipment
Does every electrician have a multimeter? Are they issued by the employer? Are they Cat III? What model? What kA rating? Are electricians issued with non contact devices?
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Electrical Maintenance
36.How does the operation carry out maintenance to ensure ongoing compliance with AS 3000 and AS 3007?
Is it addressed in inspection scheme? Is it addressed in SEPs? Are there competency provisions? Have electrical staff been trained in AS 3000 and AS 3007? Are there specific equipment checks? Are there SOPs for Insulation testing? Are there SOPs for EC testing? What EC test apparatus is used? How do you ensure protection can operate?
Portable LV Apparatus
37.Does the mine have a SEP for portable apparatus?

Does it include suitability of design? Does it include maintenance? (AS 3760) Does it cover hand held tools? Does it cover extension leads? Does it cover steam cleaners? Sump pumps? Pendant controls? Does the operation apply AS 3012? Does it take into account manufacturers safety directions? Does it address contractor equipment?
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How do you check contractor equipment? Are there special provisions for wet areas?
Isolation / Removal and Restoration
38. Does the mine have isolation procedures? 39.Do they use tag out or lock out? 40.Does the mine have removal and restoration procedures? 41.What is required after a circuit breaker trip? 42.Does the operation have SEPs that cover design, installation, operation and maintenance of welding equipment?.
Welding
Does it call up AS 1674.2? Does it call up AS 1966.1? Does it call up AS 1966.2? Does it include 3 month inspections? Does it include 2 year overhauls? Does it require VRDs? Do you test VRDs? Does it cover basic welding safety practices? Who is allowed to do welding at the site? What competencies must they possess?
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Electric Shock Prevention Project Final Report

Electric shock prevention project

TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY List of recommendations

4 4.1 4.2 5 5.1

ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS Abbreviations Definitions INTRODUCTION Electric shock

6 6.1 6.2 6.3 7 7.1 7.2 7.3

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric shock prevention project

8 8.1 8.2 8.3

AS/NZS 3000 and AS 3007 audits Competency standards

Commissioning and testing

8.7 8.8 8.9

Maintenance Portable Electrical Apparatus Isolation

Welding Site compliance inspections

10 10.1 10.2 10.3

10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9

10.10 Appendix J: DMR assessment document

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

3.1 List of recommendations

Refer Section 8.11.3.2.4 (p50)

Electric Shock Prevention Project

Refer Section 8.10 (p34)

Refer Section 8.5.1 (p19) Refer Section 8.6.1 (p20)

Refer Section 8.2 (16)

Refer Section 8.8 (p27)

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

Refer Section 9.2.5 (p59)

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

4 Abbreviations and definitions

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

5.1 Electric shock

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project 5.1.2.2 Indirect contact

5.2 Assessment project

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

Project manager: Team members:

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

6 Background and context

6.2 Philosophy of operation

Figure 1. Nertney Wheel

Electric Shock Prevention Project

6.3 Electrical engineering safety

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

7.1 Referenced documents

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

7.2 Electric shock victim management procedure

7.3 Management of electrical engineering safety

7.4 AS 3000 and AS 3007 audits

NSW Department of Mineral Resources

Electric Shock Prevention Project

7.6 Commissioning and testing